History HL
Internal Assessment
Research question: To what extent was the Great Depression responsible for the Nazi
party’s rise to power?
Word count: 2195
Table of contents
1. Identification and evaluation of sources
2. Investigation
2.1 The impact of the Great Depression on the Nazi party’s rise to power
2.2 Other factors contributing to the Nazi’s rise to power
2.3 Conclusions
3. Reflection
4. Bibliography
1. Identification and evaluation of sources
The first work referenced in the investigation of the research question: To what extent
was the Great Depression responsible for the Nazi Party’s rise to power, is "The Weimar
Republic"1 by Kolb, a German historian and university professor, specializing in the
20th-century history of Germany, which is a value of origin of the source. As the work was
written in 2005, the author had access to more sources, giving him a better basis for critical
analysis. The work’s purpose is to analyze the origins, development, and fall of the Weimar
Republic, making it valuable in inspecting NSDAP’s rise to power. The book has a value of
content as it delves into the socio-economic and political issues in the Republic, exploring its
challenges in this period.
However, the author's lack of expertise in economics, and the fact that the work is a
secondary source, meaning the author had to rely on other people’s varying recollections of
events, are limitations of origin. The content of the source has limitations: the book
describes the Republic in all aspects, the investigation is less detailed, and lacks an economic
analysis of the market. The economic crisis is portrayed as more of a background to political
issues.
The second work analyzed is "1931: Debt, Crisis, And The Rise of Hitler"2 by
Straumann, a renowned Swiss historian and researcher,3 whose research focus is European
financial history, making it a value of origin of the source. The work is a secondary source,
published in 2019, making it valuable due to a diverse and more objective basis for historical
analysis. The book's purpose is a value as it analyzes the financial crisis of 1931 and its
impact on Hitler's rise to power. Moreover, the work has value in its content as the author
provides a critical and details economic evaluation of the financial crisis in the Weimar
Republic.
The author’s profession as an economic historian, is also a limitation of origin, as he
may overlook political and social factors in his analysis of Hitler's rise to power. The fact that
the book is a secondary source is a limitation, so the author had to rely on other people's
recollections, and faced the challenge of determining their reliability. The content holds
limitations as well: the focus on the economic crisis and its role in the fall of the Republic
1
E. Kolb, The Weimar Republik, Routledge, New York, 2005.
T. Straumann, 1931: Debt, Crisis, And The Rise of Hitler, Oxford University Press, New York, 2019.
3
“professor tobias straumann”, https://doron-prize.ch/laureat/professor-tobias-straumann/, accessed: October
13th, 2022.
2
separates the economic factors from the social and political situation, portraying the financial
crisis as the decisive cause of Hitler's rise to power.
2. Investigation
During and after World War I, Europe had major capital inflows from the USA, up
until 1928, with Germany being the biggest receiver of US foreign investments. Germany
also received major capital inflows from other western countries. The fiscal year of 1928 saw
a record in gross capital imports.4 As a direct consequence of the Wall Street Crash on 29th
October 1929, the global economy went into recession known as the Great Depression.
Because her economic growth was based strongly on foreign capital, Germany was hit by the
recession especially hard, causing political instability in the Republic.5
2.1 The impact of the Great Depression on the Nazi party’s rise to power
Germany's most significant ramification of the Great Depression was the drastic rise
in unemployment. Between the summer of 1929 and early 1932 unemployment rose from 1.2
million to 6 million, in other words, the unemployment rate rose from 4.5% to 24%.6 It is
estimated that in 1932 40% of industrial workers were unemployed.7
Due to the rising unemployment industrial production suffered, lowering Germany’s
real GDP. Between the summer of 1929 and early 1932, the real GDP of the Weimar
Republic declined at an annual rate of 8.3%. Real weekly wages continued to decline at an
annual rate of 2.5% from 1931 to mid-1935.8 As a result, living standards decreased
significantly. It is estimated that the Great Depression affected every second family in
Germany.9
The economic recession in the Weimar Republic increased conflicts over wealth
distribution, due to the increasing financial inequality and relative poverty,10 leading to
T. Straumann, op. cit., p. 12.
Ibidem, p. 194.
6
N. H. Dimsdale, N. Horsewood & A. van Riel, “Unemployment in Interwar Germany: An Analysis of the
Labor Market, 1927-1936”, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 66, No. 3, 2006, p. 778.
7
T. Straumann, op. cit., p. 195.
8
N. H. Dimsdale, N. Horsewood & A. van Riel, op. cit., p. 778.
9
E. Kolb, op. cit., p. 111-112.
10
Ibidem, p.101.
4
5
society’s frustration and discontent with the contemporaneous government, contributing to
growing tensions.11
The Great Depression forced the Chancellor, Heinrich Brüning, to use contractionary
fiscal policies - raised taxes, decreased spending, and lowered wages, to finance reparation
payments and pay foreign debts.12 This decreased economic growth and worsened the
recession, stirring many discontented citizens away from the democratic system, towards
radical right-wing parties.
Fear of the crisis and financial anxiety caused political polarization within the
society.13 The Germans continued to question the democratic system's legitimacy and were,
therefore, more susceptible to the anti-democratic message of the National Socialists.14 The
right-wing parties - NSDAP and DNVP took this opportunity to undermine the Weimar
democracy by blaming the economic crisis on the rulers and linking the Depression to the
Weimar's ineffectiveness as a system of governance.15 The introduction of the Young Plan in
1929, extending Germany’s war reparations payment deadline, gave the Nazis the perfect
opportunity to accuse the government of conforming to oppressive foreign enemies rather
than fighting for Germany's interests.16 Opposing the Young Plan brought the Nazi Party out
of political isolation, as they joined the DNVP's ‘Reich Committee for the German People’s
Petition Against the Young Plan and the War-Guilt Lie’. Now the now unified right-wing
reprobated the Cabinet further undermined the Weimar government, presenting it as traitors
who let the western powers humiliate Germany.17
From the end of 1929 until mid-1930, the provincial and municipal elections revealed
a trend in favor of the Nazi party. The Nazis had a major advantage in the Saxonian Landtag
in June 1930, winning 14.4% votes, while before the start of the campaign against the Young
Plan, they had only won 5%.18
The Reichstag election on September 14, 1930 - the first parliamentary election after
the recession hit Germany, resulted in a landslide for the Nazis. They went from 12 seats to
107 seats in the Reichstag, making them the second-largest party. There were approximately
4 million more valid votes cast in September 1930 than in the previous Reichstag election,
11
T. Straumann, op. cit., p. 192.
Ibidem, p. vi.
13
E. Kolb, op. cit., p. 112.
14
T. Eschenburg, Die Republik von Weimar. Beitrdge zur Geschichte einer Improvisierten Demokratie, Piper
Verlag, Munich and Zurich, 1984 quoted in: N. H. Dimsdale, N. Horsewood & A. van Riel, op. cit., p. 779.
15
E. Kolb, op. cit., p. 112.
16
E. Kolb, op. cit., p. 108.
17
T. Straumann, op. cit., p. 196-198.
18
E. Kolb, op. cit., p. 113.
12
which also supports the statement that the support for the Nazis was rising greatly. The
NSDAP gained approximately 6.4 million votes and increased its share of the vote from 2.6%
to 18.2%. (Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, vol.539, page 52 (Berlin, 1933)
The September 1930 election was therefore a turning point for the National Socialists.19
2.2 Other factors contributing to the Nazi’s rise to power
The unstable situation in domestic and social affairs was what enabled the Nazis to
gain electoral support.20 In the diary of Count Kessler, it is highlighted that Germany was in
both political and economic crisis at the same time, and unless supporters of the Republic
present a united front, the republic would collapse, because the parliamentary democracy was
too vulnerable.21
The strong authoritarian sentiment in Germany was another reason for the crisis of
parliamentary democracy. The vision of turning the parliamentary democracy in Germany
into a right-wing authoritarian state was an active objective of president von Hindenburg with
his retinue and Reichwehr leaders under Kurt von Schleicher. After Muller's Cabinet resigned
on 27 March 1930, Hindenburg transformed the political system into one governed by
presidential Cabinets from March 1930, which rule was based on emergency decrees.22 By
creating presidential Cabinets, the President enabled himself to utilize his extensive
constitutional powers granted by Article 48.23 Furtherly, the new Chancellor, Bruning, was
ordered by Hindenburg to form a right-oriented Cabinet without the members of the left-wing
SPD, even though this party had then the largest number of seats in the Reichstag.24 Bruning’s
lack of support in the parliament prompted him to unconstitutionally use Art 48.25 The
frequency of emergency decrees issued increased from 5 in 1930 to 44 in 1931 and 66 in
1932.26 The weakening power of the parliament and therefore the disintegration of democracy
in Germany is additionally exemplified by the fact that in 1930, the Reichstag sat on 94 days,
42 in 1931, and only 13 in 1932.27 As a result of the right-wing authoritarian sentiments, the
19
Ibidem.
Ibidem, 101
21
H. Kessler, Berlin in lights: the diaries of Harry Kessler, 1918-1937, Grove Press, New York, 1999, p.
396-397.
22
E. Kolb, op. cit., p. 116.
23
Ibidem, p. 117.
24
Ibidem, p. 118.
25
Ibidem.
26
Ibidem, p. 121.
27
Ibidem.
20
power was shifted from the Parliament to the President and his Cabinet, the Reichswehr, and
the bureaucracy.28
The
Chancellor
preceding
Hitler,
Kurt
von
Schleicher
also
pursued
anti-parliamentarian policies, bringing the democratic system to its ultimate fall.29 The
government initially had the support of the industrial and landowning classes, the military
aristocracy, and the upper middle class. That support, however, was lost in January 1933,
with Schleicher’s installment of left-wing-like economic policies against the interests of
employers, industrialists, and landowners, ultimately turning them towards the far-right
NSDAP.30 Schleicher’s governance made them believe the Weimar parliamentary democracy
was an unsuccessful system of governance, and a further-right authoritarian government
provided by the NSDAP would favor their interests more.31
The support of the masses was necessary for Hitler's and the Nazis' rise to power.32
The Nazis used nationalism, racism, anti-Semitism, discontent with liberalism and
democracy, and fear of communism, already present in German society. The omnipresent
anxieties and social unrest were exploited by the NSDAP propaganda team.33 Promoting the
idea of the very desired Volksgemeinschaft - "People's Community", furtherly discredited the
divided government. The Nazi propaganda spoke to many young Germans, from all social
classes.34 The NSDAP's vision of creating Lebensraum - "living space" in Eastern Europe
was another pull factor towards the Nazis for the electorate.35 Moreover, revisionism was a
popular feeling in the Weimar Republic.36 Hitler's promise to revise the territorial changes
'dictated' by the Treaty of Versailles appealed greatly to the German population.37
The Nazis were able to use the crisis in the Republic because of their efficient and
elastic manner of organization. The party's structure and ideology made it easy to dominate
the political scene by attracting all people discontented with the democratic government and
thus create a powerful movement.38 Hitler was a strong leader, a visionary, and a committed
authority. He had a small entourage of loyal associates that remained unchanged for over 10
28
Ibidem., p.117.
Ibidem, p.126.
30
Ibidem, p. 130-132.
31
Ibidem, p. 134.
32
H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Harcourt Brace & Company, USA, 1976, p. 306.
33
E. Kolb, op. cit., p. 104.
34
E. Kolb, op. cit., p. 110.
35
Ibidem, p. 104.
36
E. J. Feuchtwanger, From the Weimar to Hitler. Germany, 1918-1933, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1993, p.
234.
37
Ibidem, p. 318.
38
E. Kolb, op. cit., p. 101.
29
years, within which every man had his role.39 The NSDAP had its paramilitary wing, the SA,
that was obedient to the party's leader, which provided the party members with the feeling of
unity and a universal mission.40 The Nazis managed to appeal to different groups within
German society. Hitler’s authority was increased significantly by winning over the German
farmers, who later successfully lobbied Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as Chancellor.41
Their rise to power culminated in the "backstairs intrigue". In early January Papen
contacted Hitler to oust Schleicher and form a new government. An unofficial agreement was
reached to bring the Nazi party into the Reichstag, with Hitler as Chancellor and Papen as
vice-Chancellor. In mid-January Hindenburg suggested forming a new Cabinet to Papen. At
the end of the month, when Schleicher wanted to dissolve the Reichstag and call for a new
election, which was his constitutional right, Hindenburg refused and appointed Hitler as
Chancellor instead.42
2.3 Conclusions
The Nazi party's most successful period was from 1929-1933, as the economic
recession caused a significant shift in election polls in favor of the NSDAP. The Great
Depression and the government's failure to manage the crisis were arguably responsible for
the party's rise to power, but there were other factors, such as the collapse of democracy due
to authoritarian sentiments, Hindenburg's restructuring of the political system to favor the
President and Cabinet, the Nazis' effective organization and ideology, lobbying by big
business owners and farmers, and general social unrest and dissatisfaction with the
democratic government. As it cannot be estimated which factors were more significant than
others, it cannot be said that the Great Depression was the only factor that evoked the Nazi’s
rise to power.
3. Reflection
While writing this paper, I found out that the challenges facing a historian are
numerous and varied. One of the challenges is accessing and evaluating sources, particularly
with archive-based history, where records may be incomplete or unreliable.
39
Ibidem, p. 102-103.
Ibidem, p. 103.
41
Ibidem, p. 106-108.
42
Ibidem, p. 132-133.
40
Another
challenge facing the historian is the interpretation of sources. Unlike scientists or
mathematicians, who can often rely on objective measurements, historians must interpret the
often ambiguous evidence, understanding its context and potential biases. Reliability is
evaluated based on the source's provenance, relevance, and potential bias, and may require
consulting multiple sources, to triangulate the truth of a particular event. Bias refers to the
tendency of a source to present information in a way that is favorable to a particular
perspective or point of view, which is another challenge facing a historian. Selection and bias
are distinct challenges, as sources may favor a particular perspective or be chosen selectively,
affecting the reliability of historical accounts.
This Internal Assessment convinced me that historians can't describe historical events
completely without bias. Even though historians should try to be objective and impartial,
their own identity and background influence the way they notice and evaluate historical facts.
Historians have the role of interpreting the past and providing a precise and nuanced account
of historical events. This requires a deep understanding of the sources and a critical approach
to their interpretation. Historians must be willing to challenge assumptions and question
received wisdom to arrive at a more accurate understanding of the past.
4. Bibliography
Arendt, H., The Origins of Totalitarianism, USA, Harcourt Brace & Company, 1976.
Dimsdale, N.H., Horsewood, N., van Riel, A., “Unemployment in Interwar Germany: An
Analysis of the Labor Market, 1927-1936”, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 66, No. 3,
September 2006.
Eschenburg, T., Die Republik von Weimar. Beitrdge zur Geschichte einer Improvisierten
Demokratie, Munich and Zurich, Piper Verlag, 1984.
Feuchtwanger, E.J., From Weimar to Hitler. Germany, 1918-1933, London, Macmillan Press
Ltd., 1993.
Kessler, H., Berlin in lights: the diaries of Harry Kessler, 1918-1937, New York, Grove
Press, 1999.
Kolb, E., The Weimar Republik, New York, Routledge, 2005.
Straumann, T., 1931: Debt, Crisis, And The Rise Of Hitler, New York, Oxford University
Press, 2019.