This article was downloaded by: [Princeton University]
On: 03 January 2012, At: 08:34
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Journal of Political Marketing
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wplm20
Filled Coffers: Campaign Contributions
and Contributors in the 2008 Elections
a
Keena Lipsitz & Costas Panagopoulos
b
a
Queens College, CUNY, Flushing, New York, USA
b
Fordham University, Bronx, New York, USA
Available online: 23 Feb 2011
To cite this article: Keena Lipsitz & Costas Panagopoulos (2011): Filled Coffers: Campaign
Contributions and Contributors in the 2008 Elections, Journal of Political Marketing, 10:1-2, 43-57
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2011.540193
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation
that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any
instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary
sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings,
demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or
indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Journal of Political Marketing, 10:43–57, 2011
Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1537-7857 print=1537-7865 online
DOI: 10.1080/15377857.2011.540193
Filled Coffers: Campaign Contributions and
Contributors in the 2008 Elections
KEENA LIPSITZ
Queens College, CUNY, Flushing, New York, USA
Downloaded by [Princeton University] at 08:34 03 January 2012
COSTAS PANAGOPOULOS
Fordham University, Bronx, New York, USA
The presidential candidates alone in 2008 raised a stunning $1.75
billion, which was double the $881 million raised by candidates
during the 2004 election cycle and more than triple the $529
million raised by candidates in 2000. Virtually all of this money
was raised from individual contributions. In this article, the
authors use survey data to examine the individual characteristics
and political attitudes of contributors in 2008.
KEYWORDS campaign finance, campaign fundraising, campaign
spending, political contributions, 2008 presidential election
Although the 2008 presidential election will be remembered chiefly because
it was the first in which an African American was elected to that office, it is
historic for another important reason: it was the first in which a major party
candidate refused public financing for the general election campaign since
the program was created in 1974. When Barack Obama announced his
decision to forego public funding on YouTube on June 19, 2008, he declared
that doing so was necessary because ‘‘Washington lobbyists’’ and ‘‘special
interests’’ were ‘‘gaming’’ the system by giving money to 527 committees that
were airing advertisements in support of his opponent, John McCain. Obama
claimed that by foregoing public funding his campaign would be ‘‘truly
funded by the American people’’ through small individual donations. Americans responded in large numbers, contributing heavily to both presidential
campaigns as well as to the parties, other candidates for political office,
Address correspondence to Keena Lipsitz, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Queens
College, CUNY, 65-30 Kissena Boulevard, PH 200, Flushing, NY 11367, USA. E-mail:
klipsitz@qc.cuny.edu
43
44
K. Lipsitz and C. Panagopoulos
and groups. As we describe below, overall levels of campaign contributions
soared over previous cycles in 2008. This article assesses the demographic
characteristics and political attitudes and behavior of contributors in 2008.
It also assesses whether the people who contributed to candidates and parties during the 2008 election season were any more representative of the general population than they were in 2004.
Downloaded by [Princeton University] at 08:34 03 January 2012
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CANDIDATES IN 2008
The presidential candidates in 2008 raised a stunning $1.75 billion, which was
double the $881 million raised by candidates during the 2004 election cycle,
and more than triple the $529 million raised by candidates in 2000.1 Since political action committees rarely contribute to presidential candidates, virtually all of
this money was raised through individual contributions. In 2008, candidates
received the vast bulk of their individual contributions directly. Obama and
McCain, however, also raised a portion of their funding from individuals through
joint fundraising committees they formed with national party committees.
The growth in financial contributions can be attributed to a number of
factors. The first has to do with the decision of many candidates to forego
the use of public funding, which allowed them to raise and spend significantly more money than if they had accepted public funds. The campaign
finance system created in 1974 has two components. During the primary
campaign, each individual contribution that a candidate receives is matched
up to $250 by the federal government in exchange for the candidate
abiding by statewide spending limits as well as to an overall aggregate
spending cap. In 2008, that cap was approximately $50 million. In 2000,
George W. Bush was the first presidential candidate to decline the primary
matching funds. John Kerry and Howard Dean did the same in 2004. In
2008, virtually every serious contender for a party’s nomination opted out
of the matching fund program. This allowed many of them, including Mitt
Romney, Rudy Giuliani, John McCain, Barack Obama, and Hillary Clinton,
to raise and spend significantly more than the $50 million matching fund
limit during the primary.
The other component of the presidential campaign finance system is the
flat grant that party nominees receive for the general election, which
amounted to $84.1 million in 2008. In exchange for the grant, a candidate
must agree to spend only that money (plus legal and accounting costs). Obama’s decision to forego the general election grant allowed him to continue
raising money during the general election campaign. The $337 million that
Obama raised for the general election accounted for a fifth of all the funds
raised by presidential candidates in 2008 (see Table 1). Yet, even if one
subtracts this amount from the 2008 total, it was still a banner year for
presidential contenders.
45
Campaign Contributions and Contributors in the 2008 Elections
TABLE 1 Individual Contributions to Presidential Candidates in 2004 and 2008
Downloaded by [Princeton University] at 08:34 03 January 2012
Individual Itemized
Contributions
$200 or less
$201–$999
$1000
or more
#
Total $
$
%
$
%
$
%
2008 PRIMARY
Obama
Clinton
Edwards
Richardson
Dodd
Biden
Kucinich
Gravel
Dem subtotal
McCain
Romney
Giuliani
Paul
Thompson, F.
Huckabee
Tancredo
Brownback
Hunter
Thompson, T.
Gilmore
Rep subtotal
Total primary
404,843
170,747
33,017
18,211
7,911
7,148
3,542
593
646,012
168,194
44,700
39,250
32,426
17,017
13,744
3,419
2,980
1,660
752
239
324,381
970,393
409.2
194.0
38.6
21.8
11.8
9.6
4.4
0.5
735.5
203.5
59.8
55.0
34.3
23.2
16.0
4.0
3.5
2.3
1.0
0.4
403.0
1138.5
121.2
43.0
11.8
3.5
1.0
1.6
2.5
0.3
184.4
42.2
4.7
3.5
13.4
8.9
4.6
2.2
1.2
1.1
0.1
.03
81.9
266.3
30
22
31
16
9
17
56
52
25
21
8
6
39
39
29
55
34
45
8
9
20
23
113.1
43.8
8.5
4.0
0.9
1.3
1.1
0.01
178.1
40.1
7.9
5.6
9.6
4.2
3.8
1.1
0.1
0.04
0.01
0.03
73.8
251.8
28
23
22
18
8
13
26
24
24
20
13
10
28
18
23
28
22
19
15
9
18
22
174.4
107.7
18.3
14.3
9.8
6.7
0.1
0.01
373.0
121.2
47.2
45.9
11.3
10.1
7.7
0.1
1.5
0.1
0.1
0.03
247.4
620.3
43
56
47
65
83
70
19
24
51
60
79
83
33
43
48
18
43
36
77
83
61
54
2008 GENERAL
Obama
287,143
336.9
114.1
34
79.2
23
143.1
42
2008 COMBINED PRIMARY AND GENERAL
Obama
691,986
746.1
181.3
24
207.9
28
356.8
48
2004 PRIMARY
Kerry
Dean
Edwards
Clark
Lieberman
Gephart
Kucinich
Graham
Sharpton
Moseley-Braun
Dem subtotal
Bush
Total primary
20
39
7
19
5
10
44
7
4
16
21
26
23
51.5
16.4
3.2
4.3
2.6
2.1
3.0
0.8
0.2
0.1
84.2
37.7
121.9
24
32
15
25
18
15
38
18
38
28
24
15
20
120.8
14.6
16.9
9.7
10.8
10.7
1.5
3.3
0.3
0.3
188.9
153.3
342.2
56
29
78
56
77
75
19
75
58
56
54
60
57
206,030
54,448
18,113
17,770
13,345
12,243
9,483
4,098
2,617
588
338,735
190, 352
529,087
215.9
51.0
21.6
17.3
14.0
14.3
7.9
4.4
0.6
0.5
347.5
257.4
604.9
43.6
20.0
1.5
3.3
0.7
1.5
3.5
0.3
<0.1
0.1
74.4
66.4
140.8
Note. Sources: Federal Election Commission; Campaign Finance Institute.
Several factors help to account for the significant jump in the amount of
money raised during 2008. This was the first election since 1952 that did not
feature an incumbent president or vice president as candidates. Spirited
Downloaded by [Princeton University] at 08:34 03 January 2012
46
K. Lipsitz and C. Panagopoulos
contests for the nomination in both parties boosted the level of interest in the
election. Perhaps the best indicator of this was the fact that voter turnout
returned to the levels of the 1950s and 1960s, when it was typical for it to
be well above 60 percent. The 62 percent turnout rate for 2008 was two percentage points higher than in 2004 and 8 percentage points higher than in
2000 (McDonald 2009). A report by the Pew Research Center for the People
and the Press found that interest in the campaign was significantly higher
than in any presidential election since 1992.2 This enthusiasm, however,
appeared to be concentrated chiefly among Democrats. In fact, the report
described a significant ‘‘enthusiasm gap’’ between supporters of McCain
and Obama.
The higher level of engagement in the campaign, as well as the enthusiasm
gap, was reflected—perhaps to an even more remarkable degree—in the number of individuals making donations of more than $200 to candidates.3 During
the 2004 primary, 338,735 donors contributed to Democratic candidates, while
190,532 contributed to George W. Bush (see Table 1, Column 1). In 2008, the
number of donors contributing to Democratic candidates swelled to 646,012,
while just 324,381 donors contributed to Republicans. The surge in donations
to Democrats was due not only to the fact that Obama had nearly double the
amount of donors that John Kerry did in 2004 (404,843 vs. 206,030, respectively)
but that Hillary Clinton moved an additional 170,747 individuals to make contributions of more than $200 to her campaign. In contrast, only 54,448 made such
donations to Howard Dean in 2004. John McCain had fewer donors than George
W. Bush in 2004, but other candidates, such as Romney and Giuliani, convinced
a significant number of individuals to contribute. During the general election,
287,143 individuals gave more than $200 to Obama, but it is very likely that a
significant portion of these people also gave during the primary, since Obama
was especially adept at convincing donors to contribute more than once
(Malbin 2009).
The growth in small donors during the 2008 election was also dramatic.
Although the Federal Election Commission (FEC) does not require the disclosure of individuals who give less than $200, the Campaign Finance Institute has calculated the aggregate amounts contributed by small (less than
$200) donors to each candidate. During the 2004 primary, Bush raised
$66.4 million from small donors, while Kerry raised $43.6 million and Dean
raised $20 million in such contributions. Although McCain raised less from
small donors than Bush during the 2008 primary ($42 million), Clinton raised
as much in small donations as Kerry did in 2004, while Obama raised an
impressive $121 million from small donors. During the general election campaign, Obama raised more funds from small donors than McCain’s entire
general election allowance. Thus, there is no question that Obama did a
better job of attracting small donors than any other presidential candidate
in recent history. That said, the staggering amounts raised by Obama from
small donors obscures the fact that, as a percentage of overall intake, these
Downloaded by [Princeton University] at 08:34 03 January 2012
Campaign Contributions and Contributors in the 2008 Elections
47
sums were not significantly higher than those of other Democratic candidates
in recent history or even George W. Bush in 2004 for that matter. During the
primary, Obama raised 30 percent of his funds from small donors. Dean
raised 39 percent of his primary funds from such contributions in 2004, while
Edwards raised 31 percent of his funds in similarly small sums during the
2008 primary. In 2004, Bush also raised 26 percent of his funds from small
contributors. Because Obama had to rely on large donors to help him get
his primary campaign off the ground, he was actually able to increase the
proportion of this funding that came from small donors in the general
election to 34 percent.
The real story of 2008 is that more individuals contributed to Obama at
every level of giving. Obama received a historic number of small, medium,
and large donations. As Michael Malbin (2009, 17) observes, ‘‘[Obama’s] ship
was riding higher at all levels.’’ Prior to the 2008 primary, Bush held the
records for funds raised from small and large (over $1000) donors ($66.4 million and $153.3 million, respectively), while John Kerry held the record for
funds raised from contributions ranging from $201-$999 ($51.5 million).
Obama shattered the small and large donations records not only in the primary but also in the general election. In terms of large donations, Obama
bested Bush’s record by more than $20 million during the primary and then
fell just short in the general.
Obama’s fundraising prowess in the 2008 cycle is noteworthy. His campaign’s ability to woo small and medium-sized donations rested largely on its
savvy use of the Internet. In 2000, John McCain was the first candidate to
illustrate how quickly a candidate could raise money over the Internet by
raising $1 million overnight after the New Hampshire primary. In 2004,
Howard Dean built upon the McCain model, adding a social networking
dimension to it by using the Web site Meetup to organize volunteers. Obama,
however, took both the fundraising and social networking aspects of Internet
fundraising to a whole new level with My.BarackObama.com. In essence, he
fused the two. Whereas Dean and McCain had used a simple interface to
allow a person to click on an amount and donate, the Obama Web site combined this with social networking. My.BarackObama.com allowed people to
create their own page on the site and set a personal fundraising target. A person could then use another application to e-mail friends and encourage them
to donate (Green 2008). When they did, a ‘‘thermometer’’ on the person’s
page indicated how close she was to achieving her target. In this way, the
Web site allowed anyone with the inclination and enthusiasm to become a
‘‘mini’’ bundler of sorts. These technology innovations helped the Obama
campaign to shatter small donor fundraising records in presidential
campaigns.
In addition to the ability to donate using a subscription model, people
who signed up for e-mail updates from My.BarackObama.com were encouraged to give more than once. Frequently, people who gave multiple times
Downloaded by [Princeton University] at 08:34 03 January 2012
48
K. Lipsitz and C. Panagopoulos
surpassed a total of $200 but stayed below the $1000 mark, allowing Obama
to set records for medium-sized contributions as well. In fact, Obama’s ability
to attract repeat donors has been described as one of the ‘‘sweet spots’’ of his
fundraising campaign (Malbin 2009, 17).
Obama’s attentiveness to small and medium-sized donors was matched
by an equal attentiveness to those who were willing to give in spades. Nearly
half of the $357 million that Obama raised in large donations during the primary and general elections were raised by bundlers. These individuals solicit
money from others. Bush was the first presidential candidate to create a system for identifying and rewarding bundlers. In the 2000 campaign, individuals who solicited more than $100,000 for the campaign were called
‘‘pioneers.’’ Bush added the ‘‘ranger’’ category in 2004 for those who collected more than $200,000, as well as ‘‘maverick’’ for individuals younger
than 45 who promised to raise $50,000 for the campaign. Kerry adopted
Bush’s strategy in 2004 with his ‘‘vice-chairs’’ and ‘‘co-chairs.’’
Both Obama and McCain continued this tradition in 2008. It is difficult to
pin down the exact amount raised by bundlers for each campaign because
bundler fundraising levels are typically categorized by range, but the Center
for Responsive Politics estimates that 560 individuals were responsible for
soliciting at least $75 million for Obama, while 536 people solicited at least
the same amount for McCain. In reality, the total amount of money raised
by bundlers for each campaign was probably much higher because these
estimates are determined using the low end of the ranges reported by the
campaigns. Still, these numbers suggest that a sizeable portion of the large
donations raised by each nominee were channeled to the campaigns by a
small number of elite individuals.
Another development in the 2008 election, which was also part of the
large donor story, was the role of joint fundraising committees. Candidates
could solicit money for these committees and individuals could write checks
for as much as $70,000 to them. These contributions were then distributed to
the candidates, the national party committee, and various state party committees. These committees were not new; together Gore and Bush raised $5.2
million for their joint fundraising committees in 2000, while Kerry and Bush
raised a combined total of $51.4 for theirs in 2004. What was new about 2008
was that joint fundraising committees became a central component of both
the candidates’ and parties’ fundraising strategies. According to the Center
for Responsive Politics, Obama raised $288 million through his joint committees while McCain raised $221 million. Of the $288 million raised by Obama
through these committees, $87 million was distributed to his campaign, $103
million went to the Democratic National Committee (DNC), and the remainder was distributed to Democratic state parties. McCain received $22 million
from his joint committees, while the Republican National Committee (RNC)
pocketed $120 million and the remainder was spread out among Republican
state parties.4
49
Campaign Contributions and Contributors in the 2008 Elections
Downloaded by [Princeton University] at 08:34 03 January 2012
Because of the prominent role these committees played in the 2008 election and the fact that candidates can solicit funds for them, campaign finance
reformers claim the joint committees are a new ‘‘loophole’’ that has effectively raised individual contribution limits and allowed a small group of
‘‘mega-donors’’ to donate well in excess of the $4,600 ($2,300 in the primary
and $2,300 in the general elections) individual contribution limit. An analysis
of FEC records by Public Citizen revealed that more than 2,205 individuals
contributed in excess of $25,000 through Obama’s joint fundraising committees. McCain had 1,846 mega-donors.5
Below we examine more closely the extent to which the donor pool
may have been expanded in 2008, as well as how representative donors were
compared to the larger electorate.
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PARTIES IN 2008
For the most part, the national party committees encountered greater
difficulty raising money in 2008 than did the candidate committees. The
exceptions were the Democratic Hill committees, which benefited from the
enthusiasm generated by the possibility of tipping Congress further in their
favor. As Table 2 reveals, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee
(DSCC) raised nearly double what it did in 2004, while the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) increased its take by more than 50
percent. The DNC raised considerably less than it did in 2004, however, and
found itself trailing far behind the RNC throughout the primary and general
election seasons. Their troubles started early, with the DNC finishing up 2007
with $50.5 million in its coffers compared to the RNC’s $83 million. The DNC
fell further behind during the primary season as Clinton and Obama
TABLE 2 Contributions to National Party Committees in 2000, 2004, and 2008
2000
Party committee
Hard
Soft
Total
2004
Hard=Total
2008
Hard=Total
DNC
DSCC
DCCC
Total democratic
RNC
NRSC
NRCC
Total republican
Overall
124.0
40.5
48.4
212.9
212.8
51.5
97.3
361.6
136.6
63.7
56.7
257.0
166.2
44.7
47.3
258.2
260.6
104.2
105.1
469.9
379.0
96.1
144.6
619.7
1,089.6
311.5
88.7
93.0
493.2
392.4
79.0
185.7
657.1
1,150.3
260.1
162.8
176.2
599.1
427.6
94.4
118.3
640.3
1,239.4
Note. Source: Federal Election Commission; Center for Responsive Politics. DNC ¼ Democratic National
Committee; DSCC ¼ Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee; DCCC ¼ Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee; RNC ¼ Republican National Committee; NRSC ¼ National Republican Senatorial
Committee; NRCC ¼ National Republican Congressional Committee.
Downloaded by [Princeton University] at 08:34 03 January 2012
50
K. Lipsitz and C. Panagopoulos
siphoned off more potential donors during the protracted Democratic primary. The DNC was also competing for donors with the DSCC and the
DCCC. By the end of April 2008, the RNC had raised an additional $58 million, while the DNC had raised less than half that amount. The DNC began
to have more success during the summer months as Obama began to appear
at joint committee fundraisers.
By the end of the general election campaign, the DNC had raised $260.1
million, with approximately $100 million of that coming from joint fundraising committees.6 In contrast, the RNC had a solid fundraising year, bringing
in $427.6 million by the end of the general election season with $120 million
coming from joint committees. The Republican Hill Committees had a harder
time attracting funds, with the National Republican Senatorial Committee
attracting considerably less than its Democratic counterpart ($94 million)
and the National Republican Congressional Committee raising less than it
did in both 2000 and 2004 ($118 million vs. $145 million and $186 million,
respectively).
CONTRIBUTORS IN THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CYCLE
We proceed to use survey data to analyze contributing behavior and donor
traits in 2008. Studies of contributors in U.S. elections typically conclude that
donors are wealthier, better educated, older, and more often white than noncontributors (Francia et al., 2003). A key question is whether the population
of donors during the 2008 election was any more representative of the wider
electorate than donors in previous years. To answer this question, we turn to
the 2008 National Election Study (NES) administered by Stanford University
and the University of Michigan. It asks respondents to indicate whether they
contributed to a candidate,7 party, or group during the campaign. The following analyses use post-election weights supplied by the NES. This was
especially important in 2008 because the survey oversampled Latino and African American respondents.
Table 3 shows the percentage of respondents who reported contributing
to candidates, parties, and other political groups in 2004 and 2008. As
expected, there was a significant increase in the percentage of Americans
who reported donating to a Democratic candidate in 2008. Whereas only 4
percent claimed to have made a contribution in 2004, 7 percent did so in
2008. There was a small increase in the percentage of respondents who indicated they donated to a Democratic Party committee (from 4 to 5 percent).
Just 4 percent of respondents reported giving to a Republican candidate in
2008 compared to 5 percent 2004. These figures were identical for Republican Party committees. It appears that contributions to other organizations,
such as 527 committees, decreased in 2008. Four percent of the respondents
reported contributing to such organizations while 6 percent did in 2004.
51
Campaign Contributions and Contributors in the 2008 Elections
TABLE 3 Percentage Contributing to Candidates, Parties, and Other
Groups in 2004 and 2008
Democratic candidate
Democratic party
Republican candidate
Republican party
Other group
Any contribution
2004
2008
4
4
5
5
6
16
7
5
4
4
4
15
Downloaded by [Princeton University] at 08:34 03 January 2012
Note. Source: National Election Study. Calculated using post-election survey weights.
Overall, our results suggest the segment of the electorate that contributed to political causes in 2008 was comparable to 2004. In 2008, 15 percent of
respondents reported contributing to political causes, compared to 16 percent in 2004. Taking population growth in the intervening years into account,
these estimates imply that about 35 million Americans made campaign contributions in both cycles.8 Even if the claims we advance above about an
expanded presidential donor pool are true, there is scant evidence of a sizable bump in the number (or share) of Americans who report contributing
in 2008. We infer from these results that the presidential campaigns may have
attracted more donors in 2008, but this growth may have come at the
expense of contributing to candidates or groups at other levels.
To determine whether those who gave in 2008 were any more representative of the general population than in 2004, we use logistic regression to
regress reported donating on a range of demographic and political variables
that have been shown to predict donating behavior. The demographic
variables include income, education, age, race, and gender, while the
political variables include party identification, strength of partisanship, and
interest in the campaign.9 The models also control for the competitiveness
of the respondent’s state, as well as whether the respondent indicated that
she had been contacted by a candidate or party during the course of the campaign season. A study of contributors in the 2004 also found that people who
identify as being ideologically moderate were significantly underrepresented
among contributors (Panagopoulos and Bergan 2006). To assess whether this
was the case in 2008, we used the NES 7-point ideology question. To create a
measure of extremism, we recoded this scale so that a 0 indicates that an individual is moderate while a 3 indicates that the individual is very ideologically
committed. We estimate models for both 2004 and 2008.
The model estimates explaining donating in both election cycles are
shown in Table 4. Models 1 and 2 examine the factors explaining donating
irrespective of the candidate or cause to which the respondent donated. Models 3 and 4 examine the predictors of donating to Republican or Democratic
causes in 2008. Together, the models show that the pool of donors has become
generally less representative of the larger population, compared to 2004, but
52
K. Lipsitz and C. Panagopoulos
Downloaded by [Princeton University] at 08:34 03 January 2012
TABLE 4 Logistic Regression Models Explaining Donating in 2004 and 2008
Income
Education
Age
Male
White
State competitiveness
Strong democrat
Weak democrat
Weak republican
Strong republican
Contacted
Campaign interest
Extremism
Intercept
N
Log likelihood
Pseudo R2
2008
2004
Any
Contribution
Any
Contribution
To Democrats
To Republicans
0.21# (0.12)
0.33 (0.10)
0.04 (0.01)
–0.14 (0.26)
0.44 (0.33)
–0.22 (0.11)
1.16 (0.32)
–0.38 (0.32)
–0.12 (0.31)
0.30 (0.29)
0.65 (0.29)
0.66 (0.24)
0.43 (0.14)
–8.19 (0.84)
775
–234.13
0.25
0.274 (0.10)
0.394 (0.07)
0.014 (0.001)
0.34# (0.18)
0.23 (0.22)
0.05 (0.11)
0.75 (0.27)
–0.146 (0.30)
–0.83 (0.34)
0.068 (0.27)
0.89 (0.21)
0.63 (0.24)
0.702 (0.14)
–7.53 (0.67)
1,929
–647.01
0.21
0.19 (0.13)
0.33 (0.08)
0.01 (0.01)
–0.01 (0.24)
0.22 (0.26)
–0.03 (0.13)
1.12 (0.30)
0.09 (0.35)
–2.87 (0.84)
–3.12 (0.79)
0.94 (0.25)
0.57# (0.35)
0.54 (0.17)
–6.61 (0.75)
1,927
–402.24
0.25
0.50 (0.22)
0.45 (0.12)
0.03 (0.01)
0.23 (0.32)
–0.35 (0.49)
–0.12 (0.20)
–2.88 (1.09)
–1.22# 0.75
0.88 (0.46)
1.54 0.45
1.12 (0.38)
0.75 (0.55)
0.67 (0.23)
–11.15 (1.80)
1,927
–237.88
0.34
Note. Source: 2004 and 2008 National Election Studies. Dependent variable for models 1 and 2 is coded ‘‘1’’
for having contributed to a candidate, party, or group and ‘‘0’’ for not having contributed. In model 3, the
dependent variable is coded ‘‘1’’ if the respondent contributed to a Democratic candidate or party committee and ‘‘0’’ otherwise. In model 4, the dependent variable is coded ‘‘1’’ for having contributed to a
Republican candidate or party committee and a ‘‘0’’ otherwise. All models use logistic regression. Independents (including leaners) are the omitted category for partisanship. Post-election survey weights used
( p < .001; p < .01; p < .05; #p < .10, two-tailed).
this appears to be driven by the fact that those who contributed to Republican
candidates and parties have become more distinctive. Those giving to Democratic interests have actually become more representative for the most part.
Models 1 and 2 show that age was a much weaker predictor of donating
in 2008 than it was in 2004. For example, the predicted probability that a
30-year-old would donate in 2004 was 5 percent, while the likelihood of a
60-year-old giving was 13 percent. In 2008, those numbers were 6 and 9 percent, respectively, indicating that age mattered much less for donating. This is
consistent with the anecdotal evidence that campaigns in 2008, and the
Obama campaign in particular, successfully appealed to younger donors
for financial support. When we turn to models 3 and 4, we see that age matters less mainly for those contributing to Democrats, while age remains a
highly significant predictor of those giving to Republican causes.
Income, education, and gender all seemed to matter more for donating
in 2008 relative to 2004. Even though Obama drew more small donors into
the contributor pool, model 2 indicates that these donors did not make the
donor pool overall any more representative in terms of income. There are
two possible explanations for this. The first is that the new donors in 2008
Downloaded by [Princeton University] at 08:34 03 January 2012
Campaign Contributions and Contributors in the 2008 Elections
53
were simply wealthy people who had never been compelled to give in the
past. Something about the 2008 election suddenly made them decide to open
their wallets. It is also possible that the small donors brought in by one party
were balanced out by more wealthy donors brought in by the other. If this is
case, income should matter more for giving to Republican causes than
Democratic causes in 2008. Models 3 and 4 show that income is a significant
predictor of contributing only to a Republican cause. The size and significance of the coefficient suggest that donors to Republican interests were
even wealthier than they were in 2004. Although the income variable is
positive for those who gave to Democrats, it is not statistically significant.
Model 2 shows that education became a stronger predictor for donating
than it was in 2004, but the larger size of the coefficient appears to be driven
mainly by those giving to Republicans. The predicted probability of giving to
any candidate or party in 2008 tripled between those who had a high school
degree and those who had a bachelor’s degree (5 vs. 16 percent). Among those
giving to Republican candidates and party committees, the predicted probability was 3.3 times higher for those with a bachelor’s degree compared to
those having only a high school diploma (1 vs. 0.3 percent), while it was only
2.6 times higher for those giving to Democrats (2.5 vs. 6 percent). In terms of
the gender and race, model 2 suggests that men were marginally more likely to
give in 2008, while gender made no difference in 2004. Race appears to have
made no statistically significant difference in either year, despite the fact that
2008 featured an African American Democratic candidate.
Turning to the political variables, strong Democrats were significantly
more likely to give in 2004 than independents, weak Democrats, weak
Republicans, and strong Republicans.10 This was also the case in 2008,
although the smaller size of the strong Democrat coefficient (0.75 vs. 1.16)
suggests that it was a somewhat weaker predictor of giving in 2008. It also
appears that weak Republicans were significantly less likely to give in
2008, compared to independents, weak Democrats, and strong Republicans.
In terms of the other political variables, we see that the importance of
being interested in the campaign for donating did not change between 2004
and 2008. The coefficients for both years are virtually identical. Being contacted
by someone from a campaign, party, or group seemed to matter a bit more for
donating in 2008 than 2004, however. Whereas the predicted probability of
donating was 1.8 times higher for those who were contacted in 2004, it was
2.3 times higher in 2008.11 Interestingly, models 3 and 4 show that both interest
and being contacted mattered slightly more for those donating to Republican
causes than those giving to Democratic ones in 2008.
Perhaps the most interesting difference emerging from the analysis is
that the pool of donators in 2008 was even more ideologically extreme than
it was in 2004. In fact, after education, ideological extremism was the most
important predictor of giving in 2008. In 2004, the predicted probability of
donating increased by 12 percentage points as respondent extremism
Downloaded by [Princeton University] at 08:34 03 January 2012
54
K. Lipsitz and C. Panagopoulos
increased from its minimum to its maximum. In 2008, the predicted
probability increased by 19 percentage points over the same range. As was
the case with campaign interest and being contacted, models 3 and 4 show
that extremism mattered slightly more for those donating to Republican
causes in 2008.
Overall, the analysis shows that the pool of donators in 2008 was
probably less representative of the general population than it was in 2004.
Demographically speaking, it does appear that donors giving to Democratic
causes in 2008 were more representative of the general population than
those giving to Republican causes. Whereas the former are simply more educated than the general population, the latter are more educated, wealthier,
and older, which is more in line with what previous studies have found of
donors generally. In terms of political variables, donors in 2008 were more
ideologically extreme than they were in 2004. In the next section, we take
closer look at the role that ideology played in donor behavior in 2008.
CONTRIBUTING AND IDEOLOGY IN THE 2008
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
How did contributors differ from noncontributors ideologically? First,
contributors were significantly more liberal than noncontributors in 2008.
Contributors averaged 3.98 and noncontributors averaged 4.33 on the 7-point
ideology scale.12 A study of contributors in 2004 found that moderates were
grossly underrepresented among donors while those with more extreme
views were overrepresented (Panagopoulos and Bergan 2006). Figure 1
shows that the story was similar in 2008. Moderates continued to be underrepresented: 12 percent of survey respondents and just 6 percent of those
who reported contributing were moderates. Those claiming to be ‘‘extremely
liberal’’ were five times more likely to be found among contributors than
noncontributors while those who were ‘‘extremely conservative’’ were twice
as likely. Both liberals and conservatives were overrepresented among
donors as well. The main difference between 2004 and 2008 was that people
who reported being ‘‘slightly conservative’’ were just as likely to be underrepresented among the self-reported donors as moderates. This finding is
especially perplexing given that such individuals should have found
McCain’s moderate conservatism appealing. This finding may reflect these
individuals’ disappointment with McCain’s need to cater to his base during
the primary.
Table 5 takes a closer look at how the political attitudes of donors to
Republican and Democratic interests differed from those who did not donate
in 2008. The issues listed first in the table are those on which contributors on
both sides of the partisan divide held attitudes that were significantly different from noncontributors. The issues listed later are cases in which only
55
Downloaded by [Princeton University] at 08:34 03 January 2012
Campaign Contributions and Contributors in the 2008 Elections
FIGURE 1 Ideology of noncontributors and contributors in 2008.
those contributing to Democratic or Republican interests held significantly
different views. The difference between contributors and noncontributors
was not statistically significant in only one case: increasing spending on
the environment. In all other cases, there were sizable differences.
TABLE 5 Political Attitudes of Noncontributors and Contributors in 2008
Favor gay marriage
Favor affirmative action
Favor path to citizenship
Favor reducing deficit by raising taxes
Favor universal health coverage
Favor no limitations on abortion
Better if women stay home
Increase spending: war on terror
Increase spending: aid to poor
Increase spending: environment
Did not
contribute
Contributed to
democratic
candidate
or party
Contributed to
republican
candidate
or party
17
21
48
19
53
48
30
50
52
53
67
35
74
53
69
48
10
56
56
57
7
3
25
8
4
12#
38
35
31
42
Note. Source: 2008 National Election Study. Entries are percentages of respondents in category agreeing
with position. All percentages are calculated using pre-election survey weights ( p < .001; p < .01;
p < .05; #p < .10, two-tailed).
Downloaded by [Princeton University] at 08:34 03 January 2012
56
K. Lipsitz and C. Panagopoulos
Contributors to both Democratic and Republican interests held views
that were highly different from the general population on ideologically
charged issues, such as gay marriage and affirmative action. Although just
17 percent of noncontributing survey respondents supported gay marriage,
a whopping 67 percent of those contributing to Democratic interests did.
Republican donors were more representative, with 7 percent supporting
such unions. Twenty-one percent of noncontributors support preferential
hiring of minorities, while 35 percent of donors to Democratic causes
and just 3 percent of Republican causes did. Contributors to both sides
of the partisan divide were equally unrepresentative of noncontributors
on the issue of providing illegal immigrants with a process for obtaining
citizenship. While 48 percent of the general population favored such a process, 74 percent of Democratic donors and 25 percent of Republican
donors did.
Donors to Democratic interests were more ideologically distinct from
noncontributors than donors to Republican interests on the issues of raising
taxes, abortion, and women’s place in the home. The attitudes of contributors to Republican interests were more distinct on the issues of universal
health coverage, devoting more government resources to the war on terror,
and increasing spending on aid to the poor.
Overall, it is difficult to say which group of donors is more ideologically distinct. What is quite clear from the data in Table 5 is that donors
as a group continued to be extreme in their ideological commitments in
2008 even if they were more representative in terms of other factors. If it
is true that donors influence the policy preferences of elected officials—
either through quid pro quo transactions or by simply bending their
ear—then the future promises even more ideological polarization among
political elites.
CONCLUSION
We find little evidence to suggest that the 2008 donor pool was any more
representative of the general public than it was in 2004. Contributors to
Democratic interests were slightly more representative in terms of age and
income, but these were not the most significant predictors of donating in
2008; education and ideological extremism were. With respect to these attributes, donors to Democratic interests were just as unrepresentatative—or
even more so—of the general public in 2008 as they were in 2004. Our analyses do suggest that donors to Republican candidates and party committees
were slightly less representative than those giving to Democratic interests.
That said, these findings should not obscure the overall message emerging
from our analysis: that donors in general continue to be a highly distinct
group of individuals.
Campaign Contributions and Contributors in the 2008 Elections
57
Downloaded by [Princeton University] at 08:34 03 January 2012
NOTES
1. FEC; Center for Responsive Politics.
2. Available at http://people-press.org/report/436/obama-mccain-july.
3. These numbers reflect the number of contributions that were more than $200 since only these
trigger FEC reporting requirements.
4. Campaign Finance Institute press release (January 2, 2010).
5. Available at http://whitehouseforsale.org (accessed January 15, 2010).
6. Campaign Finance Institute press release (January 8, 2010).
7. We note that this item does not ask candidates to distinguish between levels of office, so it is an
aggregate measure of giving to any candidate, party, or group organization, including, potentially, federal
and subnational committees. The NES also does not ask about the amount of contributions, so it is not
possible to compare small and large donors.
8. According to the U.S. Census, the adult population grew by about 13 million Americans between
2004 and 2008.
9. In 2008, the NES used a split sample to test new question wording. Among others, it tested new
versions of their political and campaign interest questions. Instead of excluding the half of the sample that
was asked the new version of the campaign interest question, we replaced all instances in which the new
version of the campaign interest question was asked with a constant value (in this case, the mean response
to the old version of the question) and simultaneously created a dummy variable which was coded ‘‘1’’ for
all cases in which this replacement was made. Including the dummy variable in the analysis allows us to
interpret the coefficient for the campaign interest variable as the substantive effect of the variable for the
cases where a respondent was asked the old version of the campaign interest variable. For clarity of presentation, we have omitted the dummy variable from the table. This method is an elegant way of addressing missing data problems, but it also offers an excellent way of dealing with our situation.
10. The base category is ‘‘Independent.’’ If the ‘‘Strong Democrat’’ dummy variable is omitted instead, the
model reveals that the odds of a strong Democrat giving were significantly higher than for any other group.
11. This figure could not be created with the post-election weights. It is still useful for determining
which groups of respondents were underrepresented among donors in 2008, but the figure should not
be used to draw conclusions about how the ideological composition of the electorate differed from
previous years.
12. The NES ideology scale ranges from 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative). A
one-way ANOVA test reveals the difference in means is highly statistically significant (at the p < .001 level).
REFERENCES
Francia, Peter, John Green, Paul Herrnson, Lynda W. Powell, and Clyde Wilcox.
(2003). The financiers of Congressional elections: Investors, ideologues, and intimates. New York: Columbia University Press.
Green, Joshua. (2008). The amazing money machine. The Atlantic, 301(5). Retrieved
January 3, 2011, from http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200806/obama-finance
Malbin, Michael J. (2009). Small donors, large donors and the Internet: The case for
public financing after Obama. Campaign Finance Institute Working Paper.
Retrieved from January 3, 2011, from http://www.cfinst.org/president/pdf/
PresidentialWorkingPaper_April09.pdf
McDonald, Michael P. (2009). The return of the voter: Voter turnout in the 2008
presidential election. The Forum, 6(4). Retrieved January 3, 2011, from http://
www.bepress.com/forum/vol6/iss4/art4/
Panagopoulos, Costas and Daniel Bergan. (2006). Contributions and contributors in
the 2004 presidential election cycle. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 36(2).