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HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
References
a. CJCS Memorandum of Policy 30, “Command and Control Warfare,” 8 March 1993.
b. CJCS Instruction 3213.01, “Joint Operations Security,” 28 May 1993.
c. Joint Pub 3-54, (Change 1, 14 April 1994), “Joint Doctrine for Operations Security,” 22 August
1991.
1. Situation
a. Foreign Intelligence and Security Service (FISS)
(1) Threat. Potential opposing forces operating within South Korea are capable of extensive
HUMINT intelligence collection. Intelligence operatives may use "protesters" in an attempt to impede,
disrupt and/or degrade friendly operations.
(2) The theater of counterintelligence structure consists of USPACOM, CFC-CJG2, JTF KOREA,
Service Components, and subcomponents.
b. Counterintelligence
(1) The JTF KOREA J2X will coordinate strategic, national, theater and tactical level
CI/HUMINT operational activities. National agencies will provide support, both inside and outside of the
theater of operations and the Joint Operations Area (JOA).
(2) The national agencies in the JOA include:
(a) CIA. Provides in-country support in the form of introduction to host nation
security officials, database support, and general advice and assistance.
(b) US State Department. Provides in-country support by providing information
regarding known terrorist threats and information on numbers and location of US citizens living/visiting the
country.
(c) Drug Enforcement Administration. Provide liaison and contacts within Korea.
(3) Command structure
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(a) CJG2 coordinates and monitors CI activities of JSOCOM and supporting
forces to ensure CI coverage within the theater of operations; provides staff guidance.
(b) CJG2 Counterintelligence Staff Officer (CISO) assists and advises the
command by functioning as the task force CI coordinating authority (TFCICA). The TFCICA in
coordination with component/supporting commanders, conduct liaison with all in-theater US DOD,
USAPACOM J2, and non-DOD agencies which have CI capabilities and/or functions to ensure receipt of
appropriate information required to support this OPLAN when executed.
(4) Procedures
(a) Ensure adequate procedures are established in their respective commands
for safeguarding information concerning employment, planning, staging areas, troop movement and
routes of movement.
(b) Except in cases where it is believed they will be mistreated, ensure North
Korea deserters, defectors, refugees, and similar persons are remanded to government of South Korea
authorities once initial interview is completed by US interviewers. Combatants will be segregated from
non-combatant detainees at earliest time possible based upon situation and circumstances of coming
under US control.
(c) After interrogation by appropriate US forces, remand internees/detainees and
refugees to host custody, unless host nation forces have been detained. In that event, transfer will be
negotiated through diplomatic channels.
(d) Expedite to parent unit for debriefing of captured, missing, or detained
personnel returned to friendly control. Essential life-saving or pain reduction medical treatment for those
requiring it will take precedence over debriefing.
(e) Return US deserters to their parent unit for intelligence debriefing.
(f)
Submit CI plans, programs, and projects to CGJ2 for review before
implementation.
(g) CI matters concerning citizens of the Republic of Korea will be handled IAW
existing agreements between the United States and the Republic of Korea.
c. Assumptions – None.
2. Mission. Provide for the receipt and dissemination of CI information in a coordinated and timely
manner.
3. Execution
a. Concept of Operations. When OPLAN is executed, JTF KOREA J2 is required to summarize
the scope and objectives of obtaining and disseminating CI information in the JOA.
b. Tasks
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(1) Counterintelligence Collection and Reporting
a. Targets. Targets will be determined by PIR through review of available CI
reports. They will include personalities (Black, Gray, and White lists), as well as installations,
organizations, groups, documents, and materials.
b. Priorities. Priorities will be assigned to targets and collection missions on an
individual basis with consideration given to priorities established by the COMJTF Korea.
c. Forward Initial Spot Reports through JTF Korea J2 channels.
(2) Counterintelligence Analysis and Production
(a) Investigative Memorandum for Record (IMFR), and Reports of Investigation
(ROI) will be written in conjunction with routine non-critical investigative actions. Initial, interim, and
terminal spot reports will be submitted, as required, for critical non-routine actions.
(b) Coordination. Subordinate units will maintain liaison with intelligence
agencies in their areas of responsibility to ensure timely receipt and dissemination of CI information
bearing on military operations specified in this plan.
(c) Responsibility of JTF Korea J2 to ensure commanders are advised of
available CI capabilities and resources.
(d) CI operations will be coordinated early in the planning stage with OPSEC staff
officer.
(e) Miscellaneous. Publications, reports, and communications that contains
classified information will be marked, controlled, transmitted, and safeguarded IAW Service security
regulations.
(3) Counterintelligence Investigations.
All incidents conducted by organizations or
personalities directed against US forces, which could disrupt operations, and/or activities will be reported
immediately to JTF KOREA J2.
(4) Counterintelligence Operations
(a) Tactical Exploitation and CI Source Operations. Prepare detailed and
coordinated plans for seizure and exploitation of CI targets. Target list should include; responsibilities for
interrogation of enemy PWs and defectors, screening indigenous refugees, displaced persons, and
detained suspects; debriefing of US or other friendly personnel who evade, escape, or are released from
enemy control; and exploiting captured enemy documents and materiel.
(b) Coordinating Instructions. None.
4. Administration and Logistics. See Annexes D, E.
5. Command and Signal. See Annexes J, K.
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Tabs
A - Counterintelligence Target List
B - Multidiscipline Counterintelligence Threat Report
C - Designation of Theater CI Executive Agency (TBP)
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