The Political Economy of
Gender in Service Sector
Economies
Torben Iversen
Frances Rosenbluth
“Men respond to their fear of other men by
increasing their own ability to control and
dominate, gradually making this a central
focus of social life.” Allan Johnson, The
Gender Knot: Unraveling our Patriarchal
Legacy
“Men are more inclined to take risks, more
oriented towards attainment of status and
resources, and more single-minded in
achieving these goals. Women, on the other
hand, are more nurturing and empathic, and
more centered on maintaining a 'web' of
relationships than on being at the top of a
hierarchy.” Kingsley Brown.
Efficiency, Bargaining,
and Patriarchy



The efficiency of household sexual division
of labor varies by economic system of
production.
High levels of household division of labor
weaken women’s bargaining power in the
family by reducing her outside options.
Patriarchy, or general the subordination of
women in the private and public spheres, is
the result of weak female bargaining power.
OF = (GF-SF)
Male
1
1-OF
Rubistein bargaining outcome
Pm
Contract line
Om
0
OM = (GM-SM)
1
Female
Modes of Production and
Intra-Family Bargaining

Women in hunter gatherer societies could
survive on their own, giving women outside
options to “marriage.”
– Scholarly opinion differs as to the importance of
male-supplied protein to female and child
survival, but females supplied ¾ of the
community’s caloric intake.
– Female economic viability removes the logic of
hard wired desire for males with resources.
Agrarian Economies and
Patriarchy



The premium on male brawn in agricultural
production and protection increased the
efficient level of household division of labor.
Females’ lost role in food production made
her less viable outside the marriage.
Patriarchal values are strongest when
families raise their daughters to play the
marriage market.
Industrialization



Labor saving devices in food and material
production created a demand for female
labor outside the home.
Outside options to marriage gave females
bargaining power in the home.
Female bargaining power undermines
patriarchal values by altering families’
strategies for socializing their daughters.
Service Sector Economies


Demand for female labor further expands in
service sector economies because of the
proliferation of general skills jobs that do
not penalize career interruption.
We expect value change to accelerate in
service economies, with the increase in
female labor force participation.
80
Den Swe
75
Nor
US
Fin
70
Female LF participation
Can UK
65
Aus
Ger
AutFra
60
Bel
55
Swi
Jap
NL
50
Ita
45
40
30
35
40
45
50
Service employment as pct of WAP
55
75
70
65
55
Services as pct of WAP (left axis)
50
Female LF participation (right axis)
60
45
55
40
50
45
35
40
35
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
30
2000
Demand for non-manual labor
Low
Demand
for hard
physical
labor
(“brawn”)
and
household
-specific
skills
Hunter-gatherer:
Low
High
High equality
between the sexes
(P≈1/2)
Agricultural
society: Male
dominance (high P).
Sharp division of
labor, and patriarchal
norms.
High
Postindustrial
society: High equality in
bargaining power (P≈1/2).
Modest division of labor,
and equitable gender norms
Industrial society:
Sharp division of labor,
but emerging
opportunities for women
outside the family
(intermediate P)
Bargaining Power and
Mate Selection

We expect mate preferences to
change with female labor force
participation
– As females gain stronger bargaining
power, males have weaker expectations
of a strict sexual division of labor.
– The importance of a virgin bride
diminishes as families place less pressure
on their daughters to play to the
marriage market.
Mate preferences as a function of economic sector
Dependent variable
Good cook and
housekeeper
Industrial
employment
Service employment
Desire for home
and children
Chastity
Fertility rate
Constant
-0.003
(0.005)
-0.014**
(0.004)
2.293**
(0.160)
0.002
(0.008)
-0.014
(0.004)
0.084
(0.170)
0.085
(0.054)
1.858
(0.332)
-0.004
(0.009)
-0.016*
(0.006)
3.006**
(0.259)
0.013
(0.013)
-0.011*
(0.007)
-0.348
(0.278)
0.100
(0.089)
2.325**
*
(0.544)
-0.018
(0.010)
0.027***
(0.007)
2.823**
(0.289)
-0.001
(0.013)
-0.017**
(0.007)
0.923***
(0.280)
-0.069
(0.089)
2.584***
(0.547)
Adj R-Squared
N
.451
31
.481
31
.262
31
.297
31
.576
31
.651
31
Western culture
3
Importance of attribute
2.5
2
(1)
(1) Desire for home and children
(3)
(2)
(2) Good cook and housekeeper
1.5
(3) Chastity
1
0.5
Industrialization
Deindustrialization
0
1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
Female Labor Force
Participation and Political
Preferences

All else equal, females prefer
government policies, such as child
care and other services, that enable
them to supply their labor.
In specific skills economies, the public
sector is a crucial source of female
employment that enables women to
maintain outside options.
The Gender Gap in Support for Public Employment
and Left Parties
0.5
Support for Public Employment
Support for the Left
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1
-0.2
Married woman
with no labor
market
participation in a
general skills or low
divorce country
Married woman
with full-time
job in a general
skills or low
divorce country
Unmarried
woman with
full-time job in
a general skills
or low divorce
country
Unmarried
woman with
full-time job in a
specific skills
country with
high divorce
rates
Where is Female Labor?
Asset Specificity
Low
Skills
High
Low
Many
B females in
transactional
a
banking,
law;
n
nursing.
k
i
n
g
Many females in
transactional
retail
High
Few females in
client-based
banking, law,
politics
Few females in
client-based
retail
Where is Female Labor?
Skills
Low
High
Low
Some retail and
banking
Retail and
clerical work
High
Some professional
occupations
Nursing,
teaching
Skills and occupational gender segregation
70
Clerks
Service and
sales workers
60
r = -.74
Technicians
and associate
professionals
Percent women
50
Professionals
40
Legislators,
senior officials
and managers
30
Elementary
occupations
Plant and
machine
operators
Craft and
related
workers
20
Skilled
agricultural
workers
10
0
0.5
1
1.5
Skill specificity
2
2.5
Consequences for Political Preferences
Low
LMEs: Substantial
gender voting gap
over public
daycare, etc.
High
Low
Female Labor Force Participation
Asset Specificity
L
o
w
High
Scandinavia:
Gender voting gap
follows public
sector vs. private
sector employment
Christian
Democratic CMEs:
Relatively small
gender voting gap;
household as unit
Public-Private Sector in
Scandinavia


Pierson (2000) argues that because
Scandinavian men in the private sector
tend to be married to women in the
public sector, the disputes over wage
differentials will be muted.
Relaxing the assumption that the
family is a single utility maximizing
unit shows why this conclusion does
not follow.
Gender Gap on Trade


Burgoon and Hiscox (2004) suggest that the
gender gap on trade will attenuate as
females gain more economic literacy.
We think it is more likely that the gender
gap on trade reflects the fact that more
females are employed in the public sector,
and therefore have a greater fear of
government downsizing.
Consequences for
Political Coalitions



The gender voting gap in Scandinavia is
mediated by the willingness and ability of
governments on the left to protect male
jobs and wages.
Center-left parties are less able to woo
women for fear of making male workers less
secure.
In LMEs, the growth in FLFP pulls the center
of gravity towards more public spending.
Gender, Inequality, and
Political Preferences


Women in low labor-productivity
industries are more likely to vote on
the left because of limited
opportunities.
If there is a tendency for LMEs to use
low-wage labor as a way to economize
on capital, the gender wage gap in
LMEs may exceed that in CMEs.
Conclusions


The demand for female labor in
service sector economies should
undermine patriarchal norms.
The gender gap in political preferences
reflects an attempt to make
opportunities more equal still.