An International Investigation of the
Influence of Social Distance on Trust
Let’s Get Personal: An International
Examination of the Influence of
Communication, Culture and Social
Distance on Trust and
Trustworthiness
Nancy R. Buchan – Univ. of Wisconsin
Rachel T.A. Croson – Univ. of Pennsylvania
Eric J. Johnson – Columbia University
Goal of Research

How does trust manifest itself in different
countries and different contexts?
 Four

countries
China, Japan, Korea, United States
 Two
cultural orientations
 Social Distance
 Personal vs. Impersonal Communication
Perspective: Experimental
Economics

The Trust Game (Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe 1995)

Standard trust game
 Both parties receive $10 participation fee
 Amount sent is tripled, responder is a dictator with total
 One-shot, real money
 Deviations
from equilibrium – trust, trustworthiness
The Influence of Social Distance

Need to incorporate social distance to
explain individual decisions bearing social
consequences (Akerlof 1997)
 Definition:
Location in a social space (Akerlof 1997)
 Degree of isolation from each other and
experimenter (Hoffman, McCabe and Smith 1996)
 Demographic similarity (Glaeser et al. 2000)

Social Distance and Culture

Minimal Group Paradigm (Tajfel et al. 1971)
 Arbitrary
categorization into mutually exclusive groups
 Significant ingroup bias in the United States (Orbell, van
de Kragt & Dawes 1988; Frey & Bohnet 1997)

The Influence of Culture on Group Definition and
Formation
 Permanent
/ Natural groups vs. Temporary / Artificial
(Triandis 1995)
 Likely
resistance from collectively oriented
participants (Mann, Radford, & Kanagawa 1985)
Social Distance and Culture

Hypothesis (tested at the aggregate and
individual levels):
 Countries
(US) / Individuals with relatively
more individualist orientation will display an
ingroup bias.
 Countries (China, Japan, Korea) / Individuals
with relatively more collectivist orientation will
not display an ingroup bias.
The Influence of Communication

Communication increases cooperation rates in
SDs (Sally 1995)
 Why?
 Must communication

be strategy-relevant?
Irrelevant communication (“cheap talk”)
 Roth (1995): 2-min., face to face, social discussion
 Led to same amounts of increase in cooperation as relevant
communication
 Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee (1977): 10-min., face to
face, fact-related discussion

Led to same amount of cooperation as no communication
Irrelevant Content

Compare 2 types of irrelevant communication
 Personal
 Impersonal

Hypothesis:
 Among
in-group pairings, participants who engage in
personal communication will display higher levels of
trust and trustworthiness than those who engage in
impersonal communication.
Experiment Participants

188 Ss – sophomore or junior business or
economics majors
Ss: Nankai University – China
 50 Ss: Seoul National University – Korea
 44 Ss: University of Tokyo – Japan
 44 Ss: University of Pennsylvania - US
 50
Experiment Procedures Communication

Participants randomly assigned to one of
four color-coded groups (~ 12 members)
 Personal
communication: Ss told to introduce
themselves and to discuss, from a list
provided, a question pertaining to their
birthdays
 Impersonal communication: Ss told to answer
from the given list, questions obtained from
the world almanac
Experiment Procedures – Trust
Game


Participants randomly assigned to roles (sender
/ responder), and directed to separate rooms
Received written instructions for game,
experimental fee, and 2 colored index cards
 Numbered
card represented color of Ss own
discussion group, and ID number
 Blank card represented color of partner’s discussion
group
Experimental Procedures
Double-blind
 Controls (Roth et al. 1999):

 Ss
pool equivalency
 Currency effects: 2,000 yen, 1,000 won,
10 yuan, $10 dollars
 Language effects
 Experimenter effects
 Comprehension
Experimental Questionnaire
Senders: Completed after sending money
but before receiving any back
 Responders: Completed before receiving
money from senders
 Hypothetical games (next study)

Measures of Cultural Orientation

Cultural orientation: Broad measures of culture
reflecting two fundamental differences in culture (Hofstede
1980; Triandis et al. 1988)

Competition vs. Cooperation


“To what extent does it feel like you are competing or
cooperating with the responder (sender) in this experiment?”
Priority on self vs. group

“What is more important to you in this experiment, maximizing
the amount of money that you and the (sender) responder will
gain, or maximizing the amount of money you alone will gain?”
Experimental Results

Dependent Variables:
 Trust: Amount
sent by sender
 Trustworthiness: Proportion of total wealth
returned by responder

Monetary amounts across countries
standardized on scale from 0 to 1,000
units
Amount Sent
Independent Variable
Intercept
Communication
Groups
China
Japan
Korea
Comm*Groups
Comm*China
Comm*Japan
Comm*Korea
Groups*China
Groups*Japan
Groups*Korea
Gender
Economics Educaton
Adjusted R2
# of Observations
**p<.01
* p<.05
^ p<.10
Estimate
457.45
278.23
221.61
278.67
237.19
69.96
29.76
-108.99
-142.42
-3.51
-328.16
-309.03
-137.41
-81.40
41.20
St Dev
53.06
52.93
53.53
37.18
38.59
36.59
26.69
37.94
38.07
36.55
38.00
38.85
36.59
37.30
34.25
0.06
92
t Value
13.44
2.51
-0.90
1.41
0.62
0.46
0.20
1.28
-0.63
0.78
-2.53
0.97
-1.00
-0.30
-0.53
**
*
^
*
Country x Social Distance
Amount Sent
(Country by Social Distance)
1000
900
Amount Sent
800
700
600
Ingroup
Outgroup
500
400
300
200
100
0
China
Japan
Korea
US
Cultural Orientation
Independent Variable
Intercept
China
Japan
Korea
Groups
Communication
Proposer
Adjusted R2
Number of
Observations
**p<.01
* p<.05
Estimate
9.1590
1.9140
0.6740
0.3940
0.0060
0.3520
0.3510
St Dev
1.2200
1.4600
1.5200
1.4500
1.2900
1.2800
1.2800
0.12
184
t Value
7.57 **
2.05 *
-0.33
-0.31
0.59
-0.25
-0.16
Cultural Orientation x Social
Distance
Amount Sent
(Cultural Orientation by Social Distance)
1000
900
Amount Sent
800
700
600
Ingroup
Outgroup
500
400
300
200
100
0
Collectivist
Individualist
Cultural Orientation
Cultural mediation
Independent Variable
Intercept
Communication
Groups
Cultural Orientation
China
Japan
Korea
Culture*China
Culture*Japan
Culture*Korea
Comm*Culture
Groups*Culture
Comm*China
Comm*Japan
Comm*Korea
Comm*Groups
Groups*China
Groups*Japan
Groups*Korea
Gender
Economics Education
Adjusted R2
Number of
Observations
**p<.01
* p<.05
Estimate
460.24
108.43
-65.16
-316.65
28.35
27.76
10.55
-38.31
-20.28
-32.31
-9.25
-73.94
72.67
-27.20
11.89
3.00
-29.00
-28.33
-51.54
-61.25
54.20
St Dev
48.23
47.65
47.47
48.08
33.85
34.08
32.42
33.74
33.91
34.22
24.22
34.03
33.41
33.58
33.94
24.19
24.55
34.47
32.28
65.33
33.70
0.29
92
t Value
14.76
2.28
-1.37
-1.98
0.84
0.81
0.33
-1.42
-0.60
-0.94
-0.38
-2.17
1.18
-0.81
0.35
0.12
-1.18
-0.82
-1.30
-0.60
-0.43
**
**
*
*
Communication – Main effect
Amount Sent
(Communication by Social Distance)
1000
Amount Sent
900
800
700
.
600
500
400
Ingroup
Outgroup
300
200
100
0
Personal
Communication
Impersonal
Communication
Proportion Returned
Independent Variable
Intercept
Communication
Groups
China
Japan
Korea
Comm*Groups
Comm*China
Comm*Japan
Comm*Korea
Groups*China
Groups*Japan
Groups*Korea
Gender
Economics Education
Adjusted R2
Number of
Observations
**p<.01
* p<.05
Estimate
0.1053
0.1331
0.1512
0.2140
0.1155
0.0587
0.1345
-0.0544
-0.0030
-0.0162
-0.1821
-0.0638
-0.0481
-0.0985
0.0261
St Dev
0.0369
0.0318
0.0315
0.0230
0.0244
0.0241
0.0158
0.0231
0.0233
0.0231
0.0224
0.0232
0.0223
0.0200
0.0240
0.13
92
t Value
10.60
1.99
1.30
2.08
1.34
1.35
-2.13
-0.59
0.03
-0.18
-2.03
-0.69
0.54
2.46
-0.21
**
*
*
*
*
**
Country x Social Distance
Proportion Returned
(Country by Social Distance)
0.50
Proportion Returned
0.45
0.40
0.35
0.30
Ingroup
Outgroup
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
China
Japan
Korea
US
Cultural Orientation x Social
Distance
Proportion Returned
(Cultural Orientation by Social Distance)
Proportion Returned
0.50
0.40
0.30
Ingroup
Outgroup
0.20
0.10
0.00
Collectivist
Individualist
Cultural Orientation
Cultural Mediation
Independent Variable
Intercept
Communication
Groups
Cultural Orientation
China
Japan
Korea
Culture*China
Culture*Japan
Culture*Korea
Comm*Culture
Groups*Culture
Comm*China
Comm*Japan
Comm*Korea
Comm*Groups
Groups*China
Groups*Japan
Groups*Korea
Gender
Economics Educaton
Adjusted R2
Number of
Observations
**p<.01
* p<.05
^ p<.10
Estimate
0.1742
-0.0413
0.0244
0.0200
0.0177
0.0311
0.0682
-0.0045
-0.0219
0.0004
-0.0140
-0.0208
-0.0240
-0.0009
0.0003
-0.0023
-0.0266
0.0034
-0.0001
0.0356
0.0351
St Dev
0.0903
0.0204
0.0538
0.0085
0.0693
0.0595
0.0566
0.0045
0.0214
0.0211
0.0206
0.0524
0.0208
0.0200
0.0063
0.0059
0.0145
0.0044
0.0059
0.0185
0.0125
0.41
92
t Value
1.93
-2.02
0.45
2.35
0.26
0.52
1.20
-1.00
-1.03
0.02
-0.68
-1.79
-1.16
-0.05
0.05
-0.39
-1.84
0.77
-0.01
1.93
0.56
**
**
**
^
**
Effect of Communication
Proportion Returned
(Communication by Social Distance)
0.50
Proportion Returned
0.45
0.40
0.35
0.30
Ingroup
0.25
Outgroup
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
Personal
Communication
Impersonal
Communication
Discussion

The interaction of cultural orientation with
social distance
 Culturally
influenced definitions and methods
of group formation may moderate extent to
which ingroup bias in trust is demonstrated
(see also Buchan, Croson & Dawes, AJS,
2002)
 Implications for research methods used
Discussion


The content of non-strategy relevant
communication influences the level of trust
displayed
3 explanations for this result:
 Social

Decreasing social distance = higher trust
 Social

Distance (Hoffman, McCabe & Smith 1996)
Identity (Brewer 1991; Tyler and Dawes 1993)
Group identity increases expectations that members of
ingroup will return money
Discussion
 Proposed
explanation for
communication effect
Personal
communication prompts
greater “otherregardingness” (Bohnet &
Frey 1999)
Examination of outgroup results reveals
“carryover” effect of communication
 A representative heuristic at play? (Kahneman & Tversky

1972)
Conclusion
“Cheap Talk” isn’t so cheap
 Our results regarding trust and
trustworthiness concur with Schelling
(1968) who suggested, the more we know,
the more likely we are to care.

The Boundaries of Trust:
Own and Others’ Actions
in the US and China
Nancy R. Buchan, University of
Wisconsin
Rachel T.A. Croson, University of
Pennsylvania
Exploring the Boundaries of Trust

Putting Fukuyama’s ideas to test (1995)
levels vary by country – US > China
 Location of trust boundary varies by country
 Trust



US boundary is wide – including non-kin
China boundary is close and tight – limited to family
members
Trust: “…the expectation of cooperative
behavior based on commonly shared norms.”
Trust Games with Hypothetical
Targets

Examining trust and trustworthiness within
naturally occurring social networks

7 targets varying in social distance (similar
to Kollock 1998)




Parent
Sibling
Cousin
Student know well
 Student from another university
 Stranger from hometown
 Stranger from another country
Intentions and Expectations

2 types of measures collected:




Intention
Expectation

Senders: “Imagine you were doing this experiment with the following responders. Please
state how much you would send the responder, and how much you would expect to receive
back from the responder.”

Responders: “Imagine you were doing this experiment with the following senders. Please
state how much you would expect to receive from the sender, and how much you would
return to them.”
Measures elicited during play of actual trust game
Focusing on China and the US since they represent Fukuyama’s
starkest predictions.
Social Distance Hypothesis

Although decreases in trust and trustworthiness
are expected as social distance increases for
both American and Chinese participants, the
drop in levels of trust and trustworthiness among
Chinese participants between family and nonfamily members will be significantly greater than
the drop in trust and trustworthiness among
American participants.
Social Norm Hypothesis

Ostrom (2003): “Once some members of a
population acquire norms of behavior, the
presence of these norms affect the expectations
of other players,” (p.41).

Expectations of the trusting actions of others will
decrease as social distance increases in both the US
and in China.
Expectations of the trustworthy actions of others will
decrease as social distance increases in both the US
and in China.

Method of Analysis




Mixed-model repeated ANOVA
Amounts sent standardized scale 1-10 units
Converted absolute amounts returned to
proportions returned.
Covariates:
 Exposure
to game theory
 Gender – replicating prior results (Croson and
Buchan AER 1999, previous study)
Comparison with Actual Game


Actual game: participants
paired with anonymous
student from same
university
Hypothetical: Between
“Student you know well,”
and “Student from
another university”
US
Actual
Student Know
Well
Student Another
University
China
Actual
Student Know
Well
Student Another
University
Amount
Sent
Proportion
Returned
4.95
7.31
22%
35%
4.04
22%
6.62
8.12
35%
35%
5.41
30%
Amount Sent – Sender’s Intentions
As social distance
increases, amounts sent
decrease (F(7,308)=70.17,
p<.01)

China’s tighter boundary
of trust?

No social distance x target
interaction
Figure 2: Amount Proposers Would Send Across Countries
10
9
8
7
Amount

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Parent
Sibling
Cousin
Student You
Knew Well
Student from
Another
University
Responder
China (n=24)
United States (n=22)
Stranger from Stranger from
Home Town Another Country
Amount Sent – Responder's
Expectations
As social distance
increases, expectations
decrease (F(7,315)=36.6,
p<.01)

Significant country x
recipient interaction
(F(7,315)=10.64, p<.01)
Figure 3: Amount Responders Expect to Receive Across Countries
10
9
8
7
Amount

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Parent
Sibling
Cousin
Student You
Knew Well
Student from
Another
University
Proposer
China (n=25)
United States (n=22)
Stranger from
Home Town
Stranger from
Another
Country
Proportion Returned – Responder’s
Intentions

As social distance
increases, amounts sent
Figure 4: Proportion Responders Would Return Across Countries
1.00
0.90
0.80
decrease (F(7,315)=20.06,

China’s tighter boundary
of trust?

Again, no social distance x
target interaction
0.60
Amount
p<.01)
0.70
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
Parent
Sibling
Cousin
Student You Student from Stranger from Stranger from
Knew Well
Another
Home Town
Another
University
Country
Proposer
China (n=25)
United States (n=22)
Proportion Returned – Sender’s
Expectations
Significant country x
recipient interaction
1.00
(F(7,308)=8.72, p<.01)
0.70
Figure 5: Proportion Proposers Would Expect To Have Returned Across Countries
0.90
0.80
Amount

0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
Parent
Sibling
Cousin
Student Student Stranger
You Knew
from
from
Well
Another
Home
University Town
Responder
China (n=24)
United States (n=22)
Stranger
from
Another
Country
What do these interactions mean?
Directly compare the actions senders or
responders report they would take with the
expectations about those actions from
responders or senders.
 Analysis: Repeated measures anovas
using intentions and expectations as the
DV, role as the IV (for both sending and
returning)

US Comparison
Returning
10.00
1.00
9.00
0.90
8.00
0.80
7.00
0.70
Amount
Amount
Sending
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
2.00
0.20
1.00
0.10
0.00
Parent
Sibling
Cousin
Student You
Knew Well
Student from
Another
University
Stranger from
Home Tow n
Stranger from
Another Country
0.00
Parent
Sibling
Cousin
Student You
Knew Well
Recipient
Student from
Another University
Stranger from
Home Tow n
Stranger from
Another Country
Recipient
Amount Proposers Would Send
Amount Responders Expect to Receive
Proportion Proposers Would Expect to Have Returned to Them
Proportion Responders Would Return
US Comparison




No significant effect of role for either sending or
returning – thus the levels of lines are the same.
Significant effect of counterpart for both sending
and returning – thus the slopes of the lines are
significant and negative.
Interactions are not significant – the slopes of
the lines are the same as each other.
Strong relationship between intended behaviors
and expectations in US.
China - Comparison
Returning
10.00
1.00
9.00
0.90
8.00
0.80
7.00
0.70
6.00
0.60
Amount
Amount
Sending
5.00
4.00
0.50
0.40
3.00
0.30
2.00
0.20
1.00
0.10
0.00
0.00
Parent
Sibling
Cousin
Student You
Knew Well
Student from
Another
University
Stranger from
Home Town
Stranger from
Another Country
Recipient
Amount Proposers Would Send
Amount Responders Expect to Receive
Parent
Sibling
Cousin
Student You
Knew Well
Student from
Another
University
Stranger from
Home Town
Stranger from
Another Country
Recipient
Proportion Proposers Would Expect to Have Returned to Them
Proportion Responders Would Return
China Comparison
Significant interactions for both sending
and returning – the slopes of the lines are
the different from each other.
 Intended actions are more responsive to
social distance than expectations.
 Weak relationship between intended
actions and expectations in China.

Discussion


Lack of support for Fukuyama’s tighter boundary of trust
in China
Strong support for influence of social distance in both
countries among natural groups


Counterpoint to findings in previous studies with experimental
groups
Stresses the importance of (embeddedness in) personal
networks of relationships in building trust (Granovetter
1985)

Trust in China can occur outside kin (despite “bamboo network”)

3 categories of interpersonal relationships based on expressive,
instrumental, or mixed ties (Bond and Hwang 1995)
The connection between own and
other’s actions
US: Responders’ expectations about
proposers’ reactions to social distance are
consistent with proposers’ actual
reactions, and vice versa.
 China: Expectations are systematically
less consistent.

 Actors
are sensitive to social distance, but
neither expects the other side to be.
Role of Norms

Apriori expectations:
 In
collectivist cultures strict norms governing
behavior in different contexts (Bond & Hwang 1986);
adherence to norm demanded (Bierbrauer et al.
1994).
 In
individualist cultures, variety of norms is
tolerated (Bierbrauer et al. 1994).

Test of variances yields no distinct pattern
Comparison of Individual’s Own
Actions with His Expectations

Correlation analysis: What a proposer says he
will send to each counterpart vs. what he
expects to receive from each.
United States
China
Parent
0.336
0.175
Sibling
0.709
0.153
Cousin
0.815
0.425
Student Student from
You Knew
Another
Well
University
0.764
0.775
0.465
0.731
Stranger
from Home
Town
0.808
0.641
Stranger from
Another
Country
0.833
0.394
Data from Actual Game
Correlation analysis: What proposers sent
vs. what they expected to receive back.
 US: r = .794, p<.01
 China: r = .384, p<.09

Possible Explanations

Projection (Dawes, McTavish & Shaklee
1977)
 Americans
are more likely than Chinese to
project own behavior onto others in situations
involving possibility of cooperation.

Avoidance of “Renqin” (King 1991)
 If
you do not wish to be indebted to others,
you do not expect favors from them.
Implications of micalibration

Central premise in trust research: trust is
based on positive expectations of
reciprocity (Rousseau et al. 1998)
 Perhaps
there are motivations for trust other
than expectations of reciprocity.
 Or, possibly the strength of expectations as a
motivation for cooperative behavior varies
across countries.