Slides - Channel 9

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MCS Cybersecurity Team – Who We Are

Microsoft Windows

Developers

Microsoft Network

Security

Forensic Investigators

& Trainers

Microsoft Security

Support

Red Team Members

Delivery Consultants

Intelligence Officers

Corporate Compliance

Managers

IR for major networks

Malware Analysts

Law Enforcement

Officers

Internet Security

Researchers

Service Lines

Application Security

Customized

Solutions

& Training

Infrastructure Security

10+ Years of Tailored Best Practices and

Specialized Intellectual Property

Service Channels

Unique knowledge transfer and value-add for

Microsoft and its customers, partners and acquisitions

Global Delivery: Staffed Locations

Canada Europe India Functional Capacity

Specialization

Application Security

Infrastructure Security

Dedicated PMs

TOTAL

Totals

30

16

3

49

US- Redmond, ACE HQ

United States

China

Australia

Our Mission: to protect key assets by lowering overall information security risk for Microsoft and its customers through advisory services

Targeting Phishing

Pass the

Hash

Custom

Malware

Application

Exploit

Power:

Domain

Controllers

Data:

Servers and

Applications

Access:

Users and

Workstations

1. Bad guy targets workstations en masse

2. User running as local admin compromised,

Bad guy harvests credentials.

3. Bad guy starts “credentials crabwalk”

4. Bad guy finds host with domain privileged credentials, steals, and elevates privileges

5. Bad guy owns network, can harvest what he wants.

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Know What

Matters

Effective

Workstation and

Server Defenses

Protect Key

Identities/Roles

Employ The

SDL

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“If you protect your paper clips and diamonds with equal vigor, you’ll soon have more paper clips and fewer diamonds”

-Attributed to Dean Rusk, US Secretary of State, 1961-1969

What the defender values

What the defender protects

What the attacker wants http://taosecurity.blogspot.com/2011/08/taosecurity-security-effectiveness.html

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Effective

Workstation and

Server Defenses

Windows 7

Standard User

Java 6

Ends side-by-side versioning

Office 2010

XML file format

Protected View

Adobe Flash Player 11

SSL Support

Random Number

Generator

Adobe

Acrobat Reader X

Applied Microsoft SDL

Protected Mode

Internet Explorer 9

SmartScreen Filter

Protected Mode

Adobe SPLC: http://blogs.msdn.com/b/sdl/archive/2009/06/17/microsoft-adobe-protecting-our-customers-together.aspx

Protect Active

Directory and

Key Identities

Domain Admin logs on to internet connected workstation

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Security of entire domain entrusted that workstation

Production Domain Admins

Leverage easy mechanisms

Use the privileged account to create additional accounts

Not just privileged, but VIP “mimicking” accounts

Accounts with backdoors into other accounts

Place malware and other binaries on DCs and member servers

Leverage existing management tools

Disable SID quarantining and/or selective authentication

Modify GPOs

Install backdoors in approved images/packages

Or slightly harder mechanisms sIDHistory manipulation

Migration APIs

Debugger attacks

Disk editors

Mechanisms by which accounts are granted temporary rights and privileges required to perform build or break-fix functions

• Powerful proxy accounts

• Not preferable

Can potentially secure using a subset of the Administrator account recommendations

• Defined roles with assigned rights and permissions

• Better approach

• Combinations of both

• Powerful proxy accounts

• Not preferable

• Temporary membership in privileged groups

• Password vaults

• APIs to replace hard-coded passwords

• Session management tools

• Local and service account management tools

For Day-to-Day Functions:

• Define roles

• Roles may have broad privilege

(e.g., reset passwords across broad swaths of accounts) or deep privilege (e.g., can activate privileged accounts), but not both

In Build & Break-Fix Scenarios:

• Temporarily populate privileged groups in some cases (e.g., fixing a member server, might grant support staff temporary local

Administrators membership)

• Temporarily use built-in privileged accounts

• Consider broad vs. deep

If role privileges are functional equivalents of built-in privileged groups, use timebound population of groups rather than creating permanent roles with high privilege.

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Security Program

Security Architect Led & Program Manager Supported

Infrastructure Security Application Security

http://northamerica.msteched.com

www.microsoft.com/learning http://microsoft.com/technet http://microsoft.com/msdn

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