Accounting for the Environment: Experiences from Southern Africa R M HASSAN Centre for Environmental Economics and Policy Analysis in Africa (CEEPA), University of Pretoria Ecological and Environmental Economics Program (EEEP), ICTP, Trieste, Italy September 23, 2003 What is the Problem? ● Current information and measures of economic performance ► The system of national accounts (SNA) GDP – GNI – Employment → Widely used * Strategic targets for growth and development * Evaluation of economic performance and progress What is wrong with the SNA? • Includes produced outputs that are traded in the market and hence excludes: – Products directly harvested from open access resources by communities for own consumption escaping trade and market exchange (Fuel wood, wild food, etc.) – Indirect use benefits and ecological services (watershed protection, carbon sink, nutrient cycling, bio-habitat functions, etc.), which do not pass through the market and their values are usually attributed to the wrong economic activities (recipient sectors) – Other values (cultural, aesthetic, etc.) • Domestic production (work at home) Major shortcoming: Sustainability • Exclude depletion/depreciation of natural (N) and human (H) capital as part of total national wealth (W) – GDP includes income from extracted resources (minerals, fish, timber) but not the corresponding value of these assets lost to the economy (reduced future stocks) • Social welfare loss due to depletion of natural capital • Measures of performance wrong and very misleading – High income and consumption (LARGE GDP) financed through liquidation of natural assets is desirable – NDP = GDP - K better but excludes N and H – On a descending course in long-term social welfare and sustainability if GDP > NDP Curse of the resource rich • Resource-rich countries have performed worse economically than resource-poor countries over the past 30 years Number of Annual per capita GDP countries growth 1960-1990 Resource-rich Large economies 10 Small economies, of which 55 Non-mineral exporter 31 Ore-exporter 16 Oil-exporter 8 1.6% 1.1% 1.1% 0.8% 1.7% Resource-poor Large economies Small economies 7 13 3.5% 2.5% All countries 85 1.6% Correcting measures of performance • Sustainable income (NDP) & consumption (C) NDP = C + W (Unsustainable path if C > NDP) >> Declining wealth (W < 0 ) - Saving bank account So, C ≥ 0 does not guarantee sustainability • NDP ≥ 0 non-declining NDP better BUT – NDP includes only K (W = K = produced assets) • Broadening the definition of capital (total wealth) – W=K+N+H – Weak sustainability - intact W (W ≥ 0, i.e. some components may decline but net change should not be -ve • Substitution between K, N and H – Strong sustainability (at least some of N intact) • Ecological thresholds – Complementarities Greening the SNA • Correcting measures of current income (current accounts) – Accounting for flow environmental benefits • Missing values of environmental G&S (non-traded) • Green GDP (environmentally adjusted) • Correcting measures of change in wealth (asset accounts) – Expanding the definition of capital • Include natural capital (e.g. minerals and biological assets – forest, fish, wildlife, etc.) • Include other capital (human, etc.) – weak sustainability paradigm – substitution between different forms of capital Indicators of sustainability: genuine savings • Gross vs. genuine saving rates for eastern and southern Africa, 1997 Zimbabwe Zambia Uganda Tanzania South Africa Namibia Mozambique Malawi Kenya Ethiopia Botswana -10.0 -5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 Savings rate, % of GDP Gross saving Series1 Genuine saving Series2 25.0 30.0 35.0 Genuine saving and mineral depletion, 2000 30 20 Genuine saving, %GNI 10 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 -10 -20 -30 y = -0.7191x + 10.134 R2 = 0.6366 -40 -50 Mineral & energy rents, %GNI 60 Policy instruments for prudent use of N • Managing the resource rent (RR) – RR defined: Contribution of endowments to value • Value of scarcity (e.g. rare talents) • Residual after other costs including wage and normal profit – Capture – Recovery: Who should get the rent? • Extraction rates depend on how much rent is generated and how much has been recovered by GOV (!) – How to use the rent? • Current consumption vs. reinvestment: Financing sustainable development to compensate the future for depletion of exhaustible resources Experiences from SA: Extraction of minerals • Botswana (diamond extraction on steady increase: 25% extracted) • SA (extraction slowed down remaining with 80% f gold and 90% of coal reserves) Figure 1. Mineral Reserves in Botsw ana and South Africa 1980-99 (index 1980=1) Percent 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 1980 1982 1984 Botswana diamond 1986 1988 1990 1992 Year South Africa gold 1994 1996 1998 South Africa Coal Recovery of minerals’ rent • Bots (76%), Namibia (50%), SA (45%) Percent Figure 2. Recovery of mineral rents 1966-1997 (Percent) 180 150 120 90 60 30 0 1966 1975 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 YEAR Botswana Namibia South Africa Spending minerals’ rent: Botswana • SBI = non-investment spending / non-mineral revenue • SBI > 1 indicates unsustainable consumption (non-inv. exp. > non-min. rev., i.e. liquidation of minerals finances current consumption) 1.80 1.60 Human Capital, Reccur. Exp. part of SBI SBI 1.40 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 19 76 /7 7 19 78 /7 9 19 80 /8 1 19 82 /8 3 19 84 /8 5 19 86 /8 7 19 88 /8 9 19 90 /9 1 19 92 /9 3 19 94 /9 5 19 96 /9 7 19 98 /9 9 20 00 /0 1 0.00 Spending minerals’ rent: SA • The Capital Component (CC) of the RR – El Serafy’s user cost approach – Follows the Solow-Hartwick Rule that requires a component of the rent to be reinvested to maintain stock of assets intact • The CC of minerals rent for the 1996-1993 period was compared to capital formation in the mining industry (total mining investments) of SA • The results indicated that the mining sector in SA invested more than twice the CC of minerals rent >> The CC has been fully reinvested in alternative forms of capital (Blignaut and Hassan, 2002) Components of Wealth Table 1. Components of total wealth in Namibia, Botswana and South Africa (1981-1996) Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Botswana (Billion 1993 Pula) Total % Natural Wealth 15.2 53.1 20.0 62.1 25.4 67.2 29.8 68.6 31.7 63.2 34.1 60.1 36.5 57.5 41.9 57.4 44.9 53.6 50.8 53.5 52.5 49.4 53.2 47.1 53.2 43.7 56.2 43.5 59.4 44.2 64.5 42.7 South Africa (Billion 1993 Rand) Total % Natural Wealth 1028 2.4 1079 2.8 1120 2.8 1160 3.0 1188 3.0 1201 3.1 1213 3.2 1226 3.2 1245 3.1 1272 3.8 1279 3.5 1293 3.9 1302 4.2 1313 4.2 1330 4.3 1221 4.9 Namibia (Billion 1990 N$) Total % Natural Wealth 25.0 7.1 25.3 6.4 25.3 6.1 25.1 5.8 25.6 7.5 26.2 10.3 26.6 11.4 27.2 13.1 27.6 14.1 29.0 17.3 28.5 15.7 28.9 15.5 29.1 14.8 29.4 13.7 28.9 10.3 29.7 10.6 Change in value of assets in Botswana (1980-96) 7 6 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 YEAR Total wealth Natural wealth Pula Billion 5 Change in value of assets in South Africa (1981-95) 60 40 30 20 10 0 -10 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 YEAR Total wealth Natural wealth Plantations Rand Billion 50