Topic U
Cuba
Yes Cuba Engagement Now
Congress is engaging Cuba now – wants Obama to repeal embargo and travel ban
Tampa Tribune 13 [“Castor to Obama: Reform “outdated” Cuba embargo, travel ban”, April 23rd, 2013,
http://tbo.com/article/20130423/SERVICES02/130429992/1438, Chetan]
U.S. Rep. Kathy
Castor of Tampa, fresh back from a trip to Cuba, has told President Barack Obama in a letter that the
U.S. travel ban and trade embargo against Cuba are outdated, unproductive and harmful and should be
reformed. In the four-page letter, Castor never quite says “lift the embargo” or “end the travel ban,” but she comes very close. “America's
policy of isolation toward Cuba, i.e. the travel ban and embargo of the last 50 years, has resulted in little change,” she writes.
“It is time to refresh America's relationship with Cuba and develop a more humane and smarter approac h than
the outdated Cold War policies of the past.” Castor also quotes the Human Rights Watch organization saying the embargo “continues
to impose indiscriminate hardship on the Cuban people and has done nothing to improve human rights in
Cuba.” She asks Obama to “heed the words of many of the Cuban dissidents I have spoken to who urge America to give greater attention to its
island neighbor, lift the embargo and promote modernization of civil society in Cuba.” As she has before, Castor argues in the letter that
Cuba has made “significant changes” in allowing free enterprise for its citizens; that the travel restrictions
violate the rights of Americans; that Cuba is not a “state sponsor of terrorism”; and that a policy of
engagement would improve America's diplomatic standing in the region. She also notes Cuba's quick return of the two
Hakken children abducted by their father in Tampa recently, and her own constituents' frequent need for help in making visits and contacts with
family members in Cuba in instances of family emergencies.
No Cuba Engagement Now
US is not engaging Cuba now – just placed them on the terrorist list which prevents
economic assistance and imposes financial restrictions
Reuters 5-31 [“Cuba says inclusion on U.S. terrorist list 'shameful'”, May 31st, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-cuba-usa-terrorism-idUSBRE94U05020130531, Chetan]
(Reuters) - In what has become an annual ritual, the
United States on Thursday kept Cuba on its list of "state sponsors of
terrorism" and Havana reacted angrily, calling it a "shameful decision " based in politics, not reality. Cuba said in a
statement that the U.S. government was pandering to the Cuban exile community in Miami against its own
interests and the wishes of the American people. "It hopes to please an anti-Cuban group, growing smaller all the time, which tries
to maintain a policy that now has no support and doesn't even represent the national interests of the United States," said the statement issued by
Cuba's foreign ministry. Iran, Sudan and Syria also are on the list , which is published annually by the U.S. State Department. Cuba
has been on it since 1982. The terrorism designation comes with a number of sanctions, including a prohibition on
U.S. economic assistance and financial restrictions that create problems for Cuba in international commerce ,
already made difficult by a U.S. trade embargo imposed against the island since 1962. The State Department's explanation for Cuba's inclusion on
the list discounted most of the reasons from previous years and said "there was no indication that the Cuban government provided weapons or
paramilitary training to terrorist groups." In the past, the report fingered Cuba for harboring rebels from the Marxist-led FARC, or Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia, and members of Basque separatist groups. This year, it noted that Cuba is sponsoring peace talks between the FARC
and the Colombian government and has moved to distance itself from the Basques. Washington's primary accusation was that
Cuba harbors and provides aid to fugitives from U.S. justice. Cuba does not deny that it has fugitives from
the United States, but said none had been accused of terrorism.
Mexico
Yes Mexican Engagement Now
Obama is engaging Mexico on oil agreements now
Marketplace 5-2 [“As Obama visits Mexico, the slippery topic of oil comes up”, May 2nd, 2013,
http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world/obama-visits-mexico-slippery-topic-oil-comes, Chetan]
Obama is in Mexico today, meeting with that country’s leader Enrique Peña Nieto. They’ll be talking immigration,
border security and trade. But analysts say their conversation will likely turn to one touchy topic: Oil and gas reserves in Mexico. Twenty years after the North American
Free Trade Agreement, Mexico’s oil reserves have remained closed to U.S. investment, but that may soon be changing.
There’s pretty much one brand of gasoline you’ll see in Mexico: Pemex, the state fuel monopoly. But Pemex is in trouble. Mexico’s oil production has been
dropping, and in less than 10 years, the country could be importing more oil than it exports. Analysts say the fossil fuel reserves are there. Mexico remains one of the world’s top 10 oil
producers. There could also be tens of billions of barrels in untapped deep-sea oil reservoirs. The country has, ”The proven fourth largest shale gas
reserves in the world,” said Michael Shifter is president of Inter-American Dialogue. Shifter said Pemex lacks the technology to tap those reserves. International companies have the
expertise, but Mexico’s constitution prohibits joint ventures in the sector. Shifter said reforms maybe on the way. ”I think if there are joint ventures, U.S.
companies would be very attracted to the opportunities in Mexico ,” he said. Arturo Sarukhán, who was Mexican ambassador to the U.S. until
January, said he expects Mexico to introduce oil and gas reforms in July or August this year. ”This is a big strategic game changer,”
said Sarukhán, who is now the chairman of Global Solutions, a consultancy within the Podesta Company. He said those joint ventures could change the oil and gas game globally. ”By
bringing Mexico’s energy assets to the table, overnight Canada, Mexico and the United States become the largest
producer of oil on the face of the earth, far outstripping Saudi Arabia,” he said. That should ensure that oil and gas keep flowing for years to come.
President Barack
Congress is working on foreign aid and trade deals with Mexico now
Seelke 13 [Clare Ribando Seelke - Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Mexico and the 112th Congress”,
January 29th, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32724.pdf, Chetan]
Congress maintained an active interest in Mexico . The Obama Administration asked for
$269.5 million in assistance for Mexico in its FY2013 budget request. The Senate and House Appropriations
Committees’ versions of the FY2013 foreign aid measure, S. 3241 and H.R. 5857, each recommend increases in aid to
Mexico , with human rights conditions similar to P.L. 112-74. Congress held oversight hearings, issued reports, and introduced legislation on
Legislative Action The 112th
how to bolster the Mérida Initiative and on related U.S. domestic efforts to combat gun trafficking, money laundering, and drug demand.
Violence in northern Mexico has kept border security on the agenda , with P.L. 112-93 increasing penalties for
aviation smuggling, P.L. 112-127 tightening sentencing guidelines for building border tunnels, and P.L. 112-205
providing statutory authority for the bilateral Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) program. Mexico’s recent accession to
negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement generated congressional interest . Congressional
consideration of the Trans-boundary Hydrocarbons Agreement did not occur.
Venezuela
Yes Venezuela Engagement Now
Obama is engaging Venezuela on anti-drug and counterterrorism efforts now
Sullivan 4-9 [Mark P. Sullivan - Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for
Venezuela and U.S. Relations”, April 9th, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf, Chetan]
Despite tensions in relations, the Obama Administration maintains that it remains committed to seeking
constructive engagement with Venezuela, focusing on such areas as anti-drug and counterterrorism efforts. In
the aftermath of President Chávez’s reelection in October 2012, the White House, while acknowledging differences with President Chávez,
congratulated the Venezuelan people on the high level of participation and the relatively peaceful election process. Subsequently, in November
2012, the State Department’s Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Roberta Jacobson, engaged in a conversation with
Vice President Maduro about improving bilateral relations, including greater cooperation on counternarcotics issues. In early January 2013, the
State Department reiterated that the United States remained open to dialogue with Venezuela on a range of
issues of mutual interest. In light of the setback in President Chávez’s health, a State Department spokesman maintained on January 9,
2013, that “regardless of what happens politically in Venezuela, if the Venezuelan government and if the
Venezuelan people want to move forward with us, we think there is a path that’s possible.”11
Obama is extending an olive branch to Venezuela now
Washington Post 13 [“U.S. seeks better relations with Venezuela, but says they may not come soon”, March
6th, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-06/world/37500568_1_vice-president-nicolas-madurovenezuelan-president-hugo-chavez-venezuelan-constitution, Chetan]
The Obama administration is treading carefully in response to the death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez,
extending an olive branch while warning there may not be any early improvement in relations between the two
countries. Chavez played “an outsized role in that government and therefore his absence” could have “outsized
implications,” a senior State Department official said Wednesday. The official said the administration was
anxious to begin “step-by-step” talks about issues of “mutual interest,” including antidrug efforts,
counterterrorism and commercial relations.
No Venezuela Engagement Now
No engagement post-Chavez – election year
Sullivan 4-9 [Mark P. Sullivan - Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for
Venezuela and U.S. Relations”, April 9th, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf, Chetan]
some observers contend that Chávez’s passing and the beginning of a new political era in Venezuela could ultimately lessen tensions in
U.S.-Venezuelan relations, there is no expectation that this will happen quickly . In fact, State Department officials have cautioned
that the upcoming electoral campaign could delay any forward movement in improving bilateral relations.14 Just
hours before Chávez’s death on March 5, Vice President Maduro announced that two U.S. military attachés were
being expelled from Venezuela for reportedly attempting to provoke dissent in the Venezuelan military and even appeared to blame Chávez’s
sickness on the United States. State Department officials strongly denied the Venezuelan charges regarding the attachés, and ultimately responded on March 11 by expelling
two Venezuelan diplomats (a consular official in New York and a second secretary at the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington). 15Hostility toward the United States
was often used by the Chávez government as a way to shore up support during elections, and it appears that
this is being employed by the PSUV once again in the current presidential campaign. On March 20, 2013, Foreign Minister Elias
Jaua said that Venezuelan officials would no longer be talking about improving U.S.-Venezuelan relations with Assistant
While
Secretary of State Jacobson because of comments that Jacobson had made in a Spanish newspaper; Jacobson had said that “Venezuelans deserve open, fair and transparent elections.” A senior
bizarre accusations and behavior raises doubts over whether bilateral relations will be
able to be improved with a Maduro government.16 Another strange accusation by Maduro is that two former U.S. State Department officials were plotting to
U.S. official reportedly said that such
kill Capriles and to blame it on the Maduro government; the State Department strongly rejected the “allegations of U.S. government involvement to harm anyone in Venezuela.”17 Looking
ahead, some observers contend that anti-Americanism could also be a means for PSUV leaders to mask internal problems within Chavismo, and even could be utilized as a potential new PSUV
government led by Maduro deals with a deteriorating economy.
No engagement with Venezuela – Obama is keeping the US out
Fox News 5-5 [“Obama Says The U.S. Will Not Get Tangled In Venezuela's Politics”, May 5th, 2013,
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/05/05/obama-says-us-will-not-get-tangled-in-venezuela-politics/,
Chetan]
President Barack Obama said the U.S. has not and will not get tangled up in Venezuela's political conflict.
Commenting in an interview with Spanish-language network Telemundo that's set to air Sunday, Obama said the U.S. hasn't tried "in
any way" to interfere with the recent election of Nicolas Maduro as Venezuela's president. On Saturday Venezuela's government
accused Washington and the Obama administration of being behind violence that has followed its recent presidential election. A foreign ministry
statement said that Obama's "fallacious, intemperate and interventionist declaration" will lead toward deteriorating relations between the
countries and "confirms to the world the policy of aggression his government maintains against our country." The statement read by Foreign
Minister Elias Jaua on state television referred to comments the U.S. president made to Spanish-language television network Univision during his
trip to Mexico and Costa Rica. In the interview that aired Friday, Obama wouldn't say if the United States recognizes Nicolas
Maduro as Venezuela's new president following elections that have been disputed by the opposition. When asked, he replied
that it's up to the people of Venezuela to choose their leaders in legitimate elections.
Links
Latin America
Latin America Aid Unpopular
Congress is reducing foreign aid to Latin America now – any increase will be a political
fight
Meyer and Sullivan 12 [Peter J. Meyer - Analyst in Latin American Affairs and Mark P. Sullivan - Specialist
in Latin American Affairs, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and
FY2013 Appropriations”, June 26th, 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf, Chetan]
it is uncertain if Congress will approve a
FY2013 foreign aid appropriations measure
At this juncture
stand-alone
, or whether
such legislation will be rolled into an omnibus appropriations measure that combines several appropriations bills. With increasing frequency, Congress has included the language of
the lack of floor action on the individual bills
has reduced the opportunities for Members to consider and amend regular appropriations measures. For example, for FY2012 foreign aid appropriations, neither chamber
appropriations bills that have not first received House or Senate floor action in omnibus appropriations measures. In these cases,
approved individual State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bills before such appropriations were include in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L.
112-74). If similar action is taken for FY2013, it would continue the pattern of reduced opportunities for Members that are not on the Appropriations Committees to consider and debate foreign
Latin America and the Caribbean. To date in the FY2013 foreign aid appropriations process, the
Administration has requested a 9% reduction in foreign aid to Latin America and the Caribbean while House and
Senate Appropriations Committees have approved bills that would likely further reduce U.S. assistance going to
the region, although by how much is unclear. The House bill, H.R. 5857, would reduce the Administration’s worldwide foreign aid request by almost 12% while the Senate
aid legislation, including assistance to
bill, S. 3241, would reduce overall foreign aid by almost 5%. Potential automatic spending cuts stemming from the implementation of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25) could result
in further cuts in worldwide foreign assistance, including aid to Latin America and the Caribbean. Further reductions in assistance to the region beyond the Administration’s FY2013 request
would force the Administration to make even more difficult choices about where to prioritize assistance and scale back some of its foreign aid programs in a critical neighboring region where the
United States has extensive ties and diverse economic, political, and security interests.
Congress lacks political will to continue foreign aid levels
Meyer and Sullivan 12 [Peter J. Meyer - Analyst in Latin American Affairs and Mark P. Sullivan - Specialist
in Latin American Affairs, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and
FY2013 Appropriations”, June 26th, 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf, Chetan]
When considering foreign assistance levels for Latin American and Caribbean nations, Congress might examine the issues
of political will and program sustainability. According to the State Department’s first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), the United States should “assess
and monitor host nations’ political will to make the reforms necessary to make effective use of U.S. assistance to ensure our assistance is being targeted where it can have the most impact.”76
Unless partner nations are willing to implement complementary reforms and take ownership and sustain programs as aid is reduced and withdrawn, the results of U.S. assistance will likely be
The nations of Latin America and the Caribbean have a mixed record in terms of demonstrating political will
program sustainability
limited and short-lived.
and ensuring
. The Colombian government, which has benefitted from high levels of U.S. assistance for more than a decade, has undertaken numerous
reforms and raised revenue. As a result, the United States is able to carry out a managed transition of its assistance programs in the country in which aid is slowly reduced as Colombia takes over
financial and technical responsibility.77 Similarly, USAID is closing its mission in Panama, and closing out its voluntary family planning programs in a number of other Latin American countries
because partner nations have developed the capacity to manage and fund the programs on their own.78 Despite these successes, numerous GAO reports over the past decade indicate that
political will has often been lacking in the region, especially with regard to raising sufficient government revenue
to sustain efforts initiated with U.S. support. A 2003 study of U.S. democracy programs in six Latin American nations found “cases in which U.S.-funded training programs,
computer systems, and police equipment had languished for lack of resources after U.S. support ended.”79 Likewise, a 2010 study of counter-narcotics programs found that several countries in
the region were unable to use U.S.-provided boats for patrol or interdiction operations due to a lack of funding for fuel and maintenance.80 Even MCC-funded projects, in which assistance is
contingent on partner nation actions, have run into problems with program sustainability. A July 2011 study of the MCC compact in Honduras found that the lifespan of roads built to improve
small farmers’ access to markets may be relatively limited as the municipalities where they were constructed lack the equipment, expertise, and funding for road maintenance.81
Cuba
Cuba Engagement Unpopular
US-Cuban engagement sparks political backlash in the Cuban Lobby – Obama easing
travel restrictions proves
NY Times 10 [“U.S. Said to Plan Easing Rules for Travel to Cuba”, August 16th, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/17/world/americas/17cuba.html?_r=3&hp&, Chetan]
Obama
is planning to expand opportunities for Americans to travel to Cuba
WASHINGTON — The
administration
, the latest step
aimed at encouraging more contact between people in both countries, while leaving intact the decades-old embargo against the island’s Communist government, according to Congressional and
administration officials. The officials, who asked not to be identified because they had not been authorized to discuss the policy before it was announced, said it was meant to loosen restrictions
on academic, religious and cultural groups that were adopted under President George W. Bush, and return to the “people to people” policies followed under President Bill Clinton. Those
policies, officials said, fostered robust exchanges between the United States and Cuba, allowing groups — including
universities, sports teams, museums and chambers of commerce — to share expertise as well as life experiences. Policy analysts said the intended
changes would mark a significant shift in Cuba policy. In early 2009, President Obama lifted restrictions on travel and remittances only for Americans
with relatives on the island. Congressional aides cautioned that some administration officials still saw the proposals as too politically volatile to announce
until after the coming midterm elections, and they said revisions could still be made. But others said the policy, which does not need legislative approval, would be announced before Congress
political backlash from outspoken groups within the Cuban American
lobby — backed by Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey — that oppose any softening in Washington’s position toward
Havana. Those favoring the change said that with a growing number of polls showing that Cuban-Americans’ attitudes toward Cuba had softened as well, the administration did not expect
returned from its break in mid-September, partly to avoid a
much of a backlash. “They have made the calculation that if you put a smarter Cuba policy on the table, it will not harm us in the election cycle,” said one Democratic Congressional aide who has
“This is not the
time to ease pressure on the Castro regime,” he said, referring to President Raúl Castro of Cuba, who took office in 2006 after his brother, Fidel, fell ill. Mr.
Menendez added that promoting travel would give Havana a “much needed infusion of dollars that will only allow the
Castro brothers to extend their reign of oppression.”
been working with the administration on the policy. “That, I think, is what animates this.” Mr. Menendez, in a statement, objected to the anticipated changes.
The Cuba Lobby has huge sway and will block other legislation in backlash to the plan
The Register 4-21 [“The Cuban chill”, April 21st, 2013, http://www.registerguard.com/rg/opinion/2974077078/cuba-lobby-policy-china-political.html.csp, Chetan]
Policy toward Cuba is frozen in place by a domestic political lobby with roots in the electorally pivotal state
of Florida. The Cuba Lobby combines the carrot of political money with the stick of political denunciation to
keep wavering Congress members, government bureaucrats, and even presidents in line behind a policy that, as
President Obama himself admits, has failed for half a century and is supported by virtually no other countries. (The last time it came to a vote in the U.N. General Assembly, only Israel and the
Pacific island of Palau sided with the United States.) Of course, the news at this point is not that a Cuba Lobby exists, but that it astonishingly lives on — even during the presidency of Obama,
the Cuba Lobby isn’t one organization
but a loose-knit conglomerate of exiles, sympathetic members of Congress and nongovernmental
organizations, some of which comprise a self-interested industry nourished by the flow of “democracy promotion” money from the U.S. Agency for International Development. And
who publicly vowed to pursue a new approach to Cuba, but whose policy has been stymied thus far. Like the China Lobby,
like its Sino-obsessed predecessor, the Cuba Lobby was launched at the instigation of conservative Republicans in government who needed outside backers to advance their partisan policy aims.
In the 1950s, they were Republican members of Congress battling New Dealers in the Truman administration over Asia policy. In the 1980s, they were officials in Ronald Reagan’s
administration battling congressional Democrats over Central America policy. At the Cuba Lobby’s request, Reagan created Radio Martí, modeled on Radio Free Europe, to broadcast
propaganda to Cuba. He named Jorge Mas Canosa, founder of the Cuban American National Foundation, to lead the radio’s oversight board. President George H.W. Bush followed with TV
Martí. Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., and Rep. Dan Burton, R-Ind., authored the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, writing the economic embargo into law so no president could
change it without congressional approval. Founded at the suggestion of Richard Allen, Reagan’s first national security adviser, CANF was the linchpin of the Cuba Lobby until Mas Canosa’s
death in 1997. “No individual had more influence over United States policies toward Cuba over the past two decades than Jorge Mas Canosa,” The New York Times editorialized. In Washington,
CANF built its reputation by spreading campaign contributions to bolster friends and punish enemies. In 1988, CANF money helped Connecticut’s Joe Lieberman defeat incumbent Sen. Lowell
Weicker, whom Lieberman accused of being soft on Castro because he visited Cuba and advocated better relations. Weicker’s defeat sent a chilling message to other members of Congress:
challenge the Cuba Lobby at your peril. In 1992, according to Peter Stone’s reporting in National Journal, New Jersey Democrat Sen. Robert Torricelli, seduced by the Cuba Lobby’s political
Today, the political action arm of the Cuba Lobby
is the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, which hands out more campaign dollars than CANF’s political action arm did even at its height —
money, reversed his position on Havana and wrote the Cuban Democracy Act, tightening the embargo.
more than $3 million since 1996. In Miami, conservative Cuban--Americans long have presumed to be the sole authentic voice of the community, silencing dissent by threats and, occasionally,
violence. In the 1970s, anti-Castro terrorist groups such as Omega 7 and Alpha 66 set off dozens of bombs in Miami and assassinated two Cuban-Americans who advocated dialogue with Castro.
Reports by Human Rights Watch in the 1990s documented the climate of fear in Miami and the role that elements of the Cuba Lobby, including CANF, played in creating it. Like the China
the Cuba Lobby has struck fear into the heart of the foreign-policy bureaucracy . The congressional wing
of the Cuba Lobby, in concert with its friends in the executive branch, routinely punishes career civil servants
who don’t toe the line. One of the Cuba Lobby’s early targets was John “Jay” Taylor, chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, who was given an unsatisfactory annual
Lobby,
evaluation report in 1988 by Republican stalwart Elliott Abrams, then assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, because Taylor reported from Havana that the Cubans were serious
about wanting to negotiate peace in southern Africa and Central America. In 1993, the Cuba Lobby opposed the appointment of President Bill Clinton’s first choice to be assistant secretary of
state for inter-American affairs, Mario Baeza, because he once had visited Cuba. Clinton dumped Baeza. Two years later, Clinton caved in to the lobby’s demand that he fire National Security
Council official Morton Halperin, who was the architect of the successful 1995 migration accord with Cuba that created a safe, legal route for Cubans to emigrate to the United States. One chief
of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Cuba told me he stopped sending sensitive cables to the State Department altogether because they so often leaked to Cuba Lobby supporters in Congress.
Instead, the diplomat flew to Miami so he could report to the department by telephone. During George W. Bush’s administration, the Cuba Lobby completely captured the State Department’s
Latin America bureau (renamed the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs). Bush’s first assistant secretary was Otto Reich, a Cuban-American veteran of the Reagan administration and favorite
of Miami hard-liners. Reich had run Reagan’s “public diplomacy” operation demonizing opponents of the president’s Central America policy as communist sympathizers. In 2002, Bush’s
undersecretary for arms control and international security, John Bolton, made the dubious charge that Cuba was developing biological weapons. When the national intelligence officer for Latin
America, Fulton Armstrong, (along with other intelligence community analysts) objected to this mischaracterization of the community’s assessment, Bolton and Reich tried repeatedly to have
When Obama was elected president, promising a “new beginning” in relations with Havana, the Cuba
Lobby relied on its congressional wing to stop him. Sen. Robert Menendez, D-N.J., the senior Cuban-American Democrat in Congress and now
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, vehemently opposes any opening to Cuba. In March 2009, he signaled his
willingness to defy both his president and his party to get his way. Menendez voted with Republicans to block
passage of a $410 billion omnibus appropriations bill, needed to keep the government running, because it relaxed the
requirement that Cuba pay in advance for food purchases from U.S. suppliers and eased restrictions on
travel to the island. To get Menendez to relent, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner had to promise in writing that the
administration would consult Menendez on any change in U.S. policy toward Cuba.
him fired.
Reforming Cuba policy will be a fight
Think Progress 4-9 [“How the GOP Response to Beyoncé’s Cuba Trip Highlights Broken Policy”, April 9th,
2013, http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/04/09/1838661/rubio-beyonce-cuba/, Chetan]
Experts at CAP and the Cato Institute alike agree that the policy has been an abject failure at achieving the goals the United States set out. On
taking office, President Obama sought to roll-back some of the harsher restrictions the previous administration placed on
Cuba, including removing a ban on remittances from Cubans in the U.S. to their families back home and reducing travel
restrictions on Americans with immediate family in Cuba. Every step towards reforming Cuba policy, however, has
been met with kicking and screaming , mostly from the GOP with some Democrats joining in. While the human rights
violations the Cuban regime continues to perpetrate are most certainly a concern, campaign funding may play a strong role in the
perpetuation of U.S. policies. A 2009 report from Public Campaign highlighted the nearly $11 million the U.S.-Cuba
Democracy Political Action Committee, along with a “network of hard-line Cuban American donors,” spent
on political campaigns since 2004. In the report, those candidates who received funding displayed a shift in voting patterns on Cuba
policy in the aftermath of the gift
Engaging Cuba on their energy development sparks huge backlash
Nerurkar and Sullivan 11 [Neelesh Nerurkar - Specialist in Energy Policy and Mark P. Sullivan - Specialist
in Latin American Affairs, “Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy Considerations”,
November 28th, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41522.pdf, Chetan]
On the opposite side of the policy debate, a number of policy groups and Members of Congress oppose
engagement with Cuba, including U.S. investment in Cuba’s offshore energy development . A legislative
initiative introduced in the 111th Congress, H.R. 5620, would have gone further by imposing visa restrictions
and economic sanctions on foreign companies and their executives who help facilitate the development of
Cuba’s petroleum resources. The bill asserted that offshore drilling by or under the authorization of the Cuban
government poses a “serious economic and environmental threat to the United States” because of the damage that an
oil spill could cause. Opponents of U.S. support for Cuba’s offshore oil development also argue that such
involvement would provide an economic lifeline to the Cuban government and thus prolong the continuation
of the communist regime. They maintain that if Cuba reaped substantial economic benefits from offshore oil
development, it could reduce societal pressure on Cuba to enact market-oriented economic reforms. Some
who oppose U.S. involvement in Cuba’s energy development contend that while Cuba might have substantial
amounts of oil offshore, it will take years to develop. They maintain that the Cuban government is using the
enticement of potential oil profits to break down the U.S. economic embargo on Cuba.78
Congress HATES any cooperation with Cuba over oil drilling – several bills have been
brought to sanction companies that even try
Nerurkar and Sullivan 11 [Neelesh Nerurkar - Specialist in Energy Policy and Mark P. Sullivan - Specialist
in Latin American Affairs, “Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy Considerations”,
November 28th, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41522.pdf, Chetan]
five
legislative initiatives have been introduced taking different approaches, and two congressional hearings have been held examining the issue.
H.R. 372 (Buchanan), introduced January 26, 2011, would amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to authorize the Secretary of
the Interior to deny oil and gas leases and permits “to persons who engage in activities with the government
of any foreign country that is subject to any sanction or an embargo” by the U.S. government . The intent of
the legislation is to provide a disincentive to companies involved, or contemplating becoming involved, in
Cuba’s oil development, although the scope of the legislation is much broader and could affect other oil companies, including U.S. companies, not involved in Cuba. Because
Interest in Cuba’s offshore oil development has continued in the 112th Congress as foreign oil companies have moved forward with plans to begin exploratory drilling. To date,
the bill does not define “sanction,” the term could be used to refer to such U.S. restrictions as export controls or limits on foreign assistance. With this use of the term, many countries worldwide
could be construed as being subject to a U.S. sanction, and as a result, any energy company that engages in activities with one of these countries could be denied an oil and gas lease in the United
States under the proposed legislation. S. 405 (Bill Nelson), the Gulf Stream Protection Act of 2011, introduced February 17, 2011, would require a company that is conducting oil or gas
operations off the coasts of Cuba to submit an oil response plan for their Cuba operations and demonstrate sufficient resources to respond to a worst case scenario if the company wanted to lease
drilling rights in the United States. The bill would also require the Secretary of the Interior to carry out an oil spill risk analysis and planning process for the development and implementation of
oil spill response plans for nondomestic oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico. The Secretary of the Interior would be required, among other things, to include recommendations for Congress on a joint
Ros-Lehtinen),
the Caribbean Coral Reef Protection Act of 2011 (identical to a bill introduced in the 111th Congress and noted above), was introduced May 26, 2011, and would impose visa
restrictions on foreign nationals and economic sanctions on companies that help facilitate the development of
Cuba’s offshore petroleum resources . The bill would exclude from the United States aliens who invest $1 million or more that contributes to the enhancement of the
ability of Cuba to develop its offshore oil resources. It would also require the imposition of sanctions (two or more from a menu of listed sanctions) if the
President determined that a person had made an investment of $1 million on or after January 10, 2005, that contributed to
Cuba’s offshore oil development.
contingency plan with the countries of Mexico, Cuba, and the Bahamas to ensure an adequate response to oil spills located in the eastern Gulf of Mexico. H.R. 2047 (
Cuba Engagement Popular
Congress supports opening travel to Cuba and other engagement
CDA 4-30 [Center for Democracy in Americas, “Members of Congress ask White House to expand Cuba travel
policy”, April 30th, 2013, http://www.democracyinamericas.org/blog-post/members-of-congress-ask-white-houseto-expand-cuba-travel-policy/, Chetan]
Representative Sam Farr (D-CA) today sent a letter signed by 59 Members of Congress
to President Barack Obama, asking the Administration to expand its current policy for travel to Cuba . The letter
encourages President Obama to allow all categories of permissible travel to Cuba, including people-to-people
travel, to be carried out under a general license. “There are no better ambassadors for democratic ideals than the American people,” said Congressman Farr.
“By including all forms of permissible travel under a general license, more Americans can engage in the kind of
people-to-people diplomacy that can promote democratic change and advance human rights.” In 2009, President Obama announced Reaching Out to the Cuban People, a set
Office of Rep. Sam Farr, WASHINGTON, DC – U.S.
of policy changes that fully restored the rights of Cuban-Americans to visit their families in Cuba and send them unlimited remittances. This has resulted in the reunification of thousands of
families and has provided the capital for Cubans to take advantage of economic reforms in Cuba and start their own businesses. In 2011, President Obama took another important step by
reauthorizing purposeful travel for all Americans, fostering meaningful people-to-people interaction between American and Cuban citizens. But these trips require a specific license granted to
specialized travel service providers. Unfortunately, the licensing process has reportedly been expensive, slow, cumbersome, and arbitrary, causing delays and – in some cases cancellations- of
trips that enable Americans to exercise their right to purposeful travel to Cuba. Earlier this year, Cuba removed the restrictions on most Cubans’ foreign travel, including travel to the United
States, a move that the United States and many in the international community had been pushing for. The letter calls upon the President to use his executive authority to included people-to-people
A pragmatic policy of citizen diplomacy can be a powerful catalyst for democratic
development in Cuba,” said Farr. “This change is the next step in supporting a 21st century policy of
engagement in US-Cuba relations.”
travel under a general license. “
Oil companies massively support Cuban drilling cooperation and lobby for it---determines
Congressional sentiment
Sadowski 11 [Richard Sadowski 11, J.D., Hofstra University School of Law, Fall 2011, “IN THIS ISSUE:
NATURAL RESOURCE CONFLICT: CUBAN OFFSHORE DRILLING: PREPARATION AND PREVENTION
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED STATES' EMBARGO,” Sustainable Development Law &
Policy, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol'y 37, p. lexis]
A U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Cuba's offshore oil fields hold at least four and a half billion barrels of recoverable oil and ten trillion
cubic feet of natural gas. n29 Cupet, the state-owned Cuban energy company, insists that actual reserves are double that of the U.S. estimate. n30
One estimate indicates that Cuba could be producing 525,000 barrels of oil per day. n31 Given this vast resource, Cuba has already leased
offshore oil exploration blocks to operators from Spain, Norway, and India. n32 Offshore oil discoveries in Cuba are placing
increasing pressure for the United States to end the embargo. First, U.S. energy companies are eager to compete
for access to Cuban oil reserves. n33 [*38] Secondly, fears of a Cuban oil spill are argued to warrant U.S. investment
and technology. n34 Finally, the concern over Cuban offshore drilling renews cries that the embargo is largely a failure and harms human
rights.¶ ECONOMICS: U.S. COMPANIES WANT IN¶ For U.S. companies, the embargo creates concern that they will lose
out on an opportunity to develop a nearby resource. n35 Oil companies have a long history of utilizing political
pressure for self-serving purposes . n36 American politicians, ever fearful of high energy costs , are especially
susceptible to oil-lobby pressures . n37 This dynamic was exemplified in 2008, when then-Vice President Dick Cheney told the
board of directors of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that "oil is being drilled right now sixty miles off the coast of
Florida. But we're not doing it, the Chinese are , in cooperation with the Cuban government. Even the communists have
figured out that a good answer to high prices is more supply " n38¶ This pressure for U.S. investment in oil is
exacerbated by America's expected increase in consumption rates. n39 Oil company stocks are valued in large
part on access to reserves. n40 Thus, more leases, including those in Cuban waters , equal higher stock valuation.
n41 "The last thing that American energy companies want is to be trapped on the sidelines by sanctions while
European, Canadian and Latin American rivals are free to develop new oil resources on the doorstep of the
United States." n42
Cuba Trade Unpopular
Reforming US-Cuba trade laws cause fierce political fights
NY Times 12 [“Easing of Restraints in Cuba Renews Debate on U.S. Embargo”, November 19 th, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/americas/changes-in-cuba-create-support-for-easingembargo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, Chetan]
And Cuba has a long history of tossing ice on warming relations. The latest example is the jailing of Alan Gross, a State Department contractor
who has spent nearly three years behind bars for distributing satellite telephone equipment to Jewish groups in Havana. In Washington, Mr. Gross
is seen as the main impediment to an easing of the embargo, but there are also limits to what the president could do without Congressional action.
The 1992 Cuban Democracy Act conditioned the waiving of sanctions on the introduction of democratic changes inside Cuba. The 1996 HelmsBurton Act also requires that the embargo remain until Cuba has a transitional or democratically elected government. Obama administration
officials say they have not given up, and could move if the president decides to act on his own. Officials say that under the Treasury
Department’s licensing and regulation-writing authority, there is room for significant modification. Following the legal logic of Mr. Obama’s
changes in 2009, further expansions in travel are possible along with new allowances for investment or imports
and exports, especially if narrowly applied to Cuban businesses. Even these adjustments — which could also include travel
for all Americans and looser rules for ships engaged in trade with Cuba, according to a legal analysis commissioned by
the Cuba Study Group — would
probably mean a fierce political fight. The handful of Cuban-Americans in Congress for whom
more American
Foreign Relations
Committee, proposed an even tighter embargo. “The sanctions on the regime must remain in place and, in
fact, should be strengthened, and not be altered ,” she wrote in an e-mail. “Responsible nations must not buy into
the facade the dictatorship is trying to create by announcing ‘reforms’ while, in reality, it’s tightening its grip
on its people.”
the embargo is sacred oppose looser rules. When asked about Cuban entrepreneurs who are seeking
support, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the Florida Republican who is chairwoman of the House
The Cuba Lobby will make sure the embargo stays in place and will block other legislation
to make sure it does
The Register 4-21 [“The Cuban chill”, April 21st, 2013, http://www.registerguard.com/rg/opinion/2974077078/cuba-lobby-policy-china-political.html.csp, Chetan]
After the pop icons’ recent trip to the island to celebrate their wedding anniversary, the Cuba Lobby’s
congressional contingent — Sen. Marco Rubio, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, all Florida Republicans —
castigated the couple, demanding that they be investigated for violating the half-century-old U.S. embargo. (The trip had been
authorized by the U.S. Treasury Department as a cultural exchange.) Still, celebrity trips to Cuba make headlines, and condemnation by the Cuba Lobby is always quick to follow. But what
seems like a Hollywood sideshow is actually symptomatic of a much deeper and more dangerous problem — a problem much like the one that afflicted U.S. policy toward China in the 1950s and
an aggressive foreign policy lobby was able to prevent rational debate about an anachronistic policy
by intimidating anyone who dared challenge it. The China Lobby and its allies in Congress forced Presidents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower to purge
’60s. Then, as now,
the State Department of its most senior and knowledgeable “China hands,” while continuing to perpetuate the fiction that the Nationalist government in Taiwan was the “real” China, rather than
the communist government on the mainland — a policy stance that persisted long after the rest of the world had come to terms with Mao Zedong’s victory. The result was a department that had
little real knowledge about Asia and was terrified of straying from far-right orthodoxy. This state of affairs contributed directly to the debacle of Vietnam. Today, U.S. relations with Latin
America are suffering from an equally irrational policy toward Cuba — a policy designed in the 1960s to overthrow Fidel Castro’s government and which, more than 50 years later, is no closer to
Policy toward Cuba is frozen in place by a domestic political lobby with roots in the electorally pivotal
state of Florida. The Cuba Lobby combines the carrot of political money with the stick of political
denunciation to keep wavering Congress members, government bureaucrats, and even presidents in line
behind a policy that, as President Obama himself admits, has failed for half a century and is supported by virtually no other countries. (The last time it came to a vote in the U.N. General
success.
Assembly, only Israel and the Pacific island of Palau sided with the United States.) Of course, the news at this point is not that a Cuba Lobby exists, but that it astonishingly lives on — even
the Cuba Lobby
isn’t one organization but a loose-knit conglomerate of exiles, sympathetic members of Congress and
nongovernmental organizations, some of which comprise a self-interested industry nourished by the flow of “democracy promotion” money from the U.S. Agency for
during the presidency of Obama, who publicly vowed to pursue a new approach to Cuba, but whose policy has been stymied thus far. Like the China Lobby,
International Development. And like its Sino-obsessed predecessor, the Cuba Lobby was launched at the instigation of conservative Republicans in government who needed outside backers to
advance their partisan policy aims. In the 1950s, they were Republican members of Congress battling New Dealers in the Truman administration over Asia policy. In the 1980s, they were
officials in Ronald Reagan’s administration battling congressional Democrats over Central America policy. At the Cuba Lobby’s request, Reagan created Radio Martí, modeled on Radio Free
Europe, to broadcast propaganda to Cuba. He named Jorge Mas Canosa, founder of the Cuban American National Foundation, to lead the radio’s oversight board. President George H.W. Bush
followed with TV Martí. Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., and Rep. Dan Burton, R-Ind., authored the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, writing the economic embargo into law so no
president could change it without congressional approval. Founded at the suggestion of Richard Allen, Reagan’s first national security adviser, CANF was the linchpin of the Cuba Lobby until
Mas Canosa’s death in 1997. “No individual had more influence over United States policies toward Cuba over the past two decades than Jorge Mas Canosa,” The New York Times editorialized.
In Washington, CANF built its reputation by spreading campaign contributions to bolster friends and punish enemies. In 1988, CANF money helped Connecticut’s Joe Lieberman defeat
incumbent Sen. Lowell Weicker, whom Lieberman accused of being soft on Castro because he visited Cuba and advocated better relations. Weicker’s defeat sent a chilling message to other
members of Congress: challenge the Cuba Lobby at your peril. In 1992, according to Peter Stone’s reporting in National Journal, New Jersey Democrat Sen. Robert Torricelli, seduced by the
Cuba Lobby’s political money, reversed his position on Havana and wrote the Cuban Democracy Act, tightening the embargo.
Today, the political action arm of the
Cuba Lobby is the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, which hands out more campaign dollars than CANF’s political action arm did
even at its height — more than $3 million since 1996. In Miami, conservative Cuban--Americans long have presumed to be the sole authentic voice of the community, silencing dissent by threats
and, occasionally, violence. In the 1970s, anti-Castro terrorist groups such as Omega 7 and Alpha 66 set off dozens of bombs in Miami and assassinated two Cuban-Americans who advocated
dialogue with Castro. Reports by Human Rights Watch in the 1990s documented the climate of fear in Miami and the role that elements of the Cuba Lobby, including CANF, played in creating
the Cuba Lobby has struck fear into the heart of the foreign-policy bureaucracy . The
congressional wing of the Cuba Lobby, in concert with its friends in the executive branch, routinely punishes
career civil servants who don’t toe the line. One of the Cuba Lobby’s early targets was John “Jay” Taylor, chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, who was
it. Like the China Lobby,
given an unsatisfactory annual evaluation report in 1988 by Republican stalwart Elliott Abrams, then assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, because Taylor reported from Havana
that the Cubans were serious about wanting to negotiate peace in southern Africa and Central America. In 1993, the Cuba Lobby opposed the appointment of President Bill Clinton’s first choice
to be assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, Mario Baeza, because he once had visited Cuba. Clinton dumped Baeza. Two years later, Clinton caved in to the lobby’s demand that
he fire National Security Council official Morton Halperin, who was the architect of the successful 1995 migration accord with Cuba that created a safe, legal route for Cubans to emigrate to the
United States. One chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Cuba told me he stopped sending sensitive cables to the State Department altogether because they so often leaked to Cuba Lobby
supporters in Congress. Instead, the diplomat flew to Miami so he could report to the department by telephone. During George W. Bush’s administration, the Cuba Lobby completely captured the
State Department’s Latin America bureau (renamed the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs). Bush’s first assistant secretary was Otto Reich, a Cuban-American veteran of the Reagan
administration and favorite of Miami hard-liners. Reich had run Reagan’s “public diplomacy” operation demonizing opponents of the president’s Central America policy as communist
sympathizers. In 2002, Bush’s undersecretary for arms control and international security, John Bolton, made the dubious charge that Cuba was developing biological weapons. When the national
intelligence officer for Latin America, Fulton Armstrong, (along with other intelligence community analysts) objected to this mischaracterization of the community’s assessment, Bolton and
When Obama was elected president, promising a “new beginning” in relations with
Havana, the Cuba Lobby relied on its congressional wing to stop him. Sen. Robert Menendez, D-N.J., the senior Cuban-American
Democrat in Congress and now chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, vehemently opposes any opening to Cuba. In March 2009, he
signaled his willingness to defy both his president and his party to get his way . Menendez voted with
Republicans to block passage of a $410 billion omnibus appropriations bill, needed to keep the government running,
because it relaxed the requirement that Cuba pay in advance for food purchases from U.S. suppliers and
eased restrictions on travel to the island. To get Menendez to relent , Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner had to promise
in writing that the administration would consult Menendez on any change in U.S. policy toward Cuba.
Reich tried repeatedly to have him fired.
The pro-embargo lobby has control over Congress and the White House – reforming policy
is impossible
US-Cuba Politics 5-14 [“United States Cuba Relations – Why U.S. Cuba Policy Does Not Change:
Asymmetrical Absurdity”, May 14th, 2013, http://www.uscubapolitics.com/2013/05/united-states-cuba-relationswhy-us.html, Chetan]
Over the last decade we have seen many attempts to change U.S. Cuba policy beginning with lifting the travel ban. All
have failed . Most recently, we have seen the efforts to remove Cuba from the Terror List, a designation that Cuba does not deserve and only
serves to keep costs higher between the two countries, also fail. Conversely, we have seen the hand of the pro-embargo
hardliners grow bigger and stronger . Legislation to expand Cuba travel is consistently blocked or thwarted
in Congress. Funding for clandestine “Democracy” programs like the ones that got Alan Gross into a Cuban prison, still continue to be
funded. The pro-embargo voting bloc raises money and elected six Members of Congress to be their vanguards
on the floors of Congress. Their capacity to even reach into the White House, the Executive Branch, and establish
themselves in gateway leadership positions in the Congress all speak to a well concerted political effort.
Government officials and policy makers have to tow the hard line through the veiled and actual threats of
holding up Presidential appointments or congressional funding. Intelligence and reason have taken a back slide to
raw political power . Meet the consequences of distorted politics.
Recent embargo repeal bill proves backlash to opening trade with Cuba
House 5-12 [Billy House - National Journal Daily Extra PM “Cuba Bill Ties Embargo to Prisoner's Release”,
May 12th, 2013, lexis]
A veteran House Democrat introduced a bill last week to lift the 50-year-old U.S. embargo against Cuba. But in a new twist,
the bill would tie such a move to the "immediate" and "unconditional" release of an American from a Cuban prison and the removal of Cuba from the State Department's list of states that sponsor
terrorism. "Cuba is no longer a threat to the United States, and the continuation of the embargo on trade between the two countries declared in 1962 is not fulfilling the purpose for which it was
established," Rep. Bobby Rush, D-Ill., said in announcing his legislation. While Rush's bill generally follows in the footsteps of the United States-Cuba Trade Normalization Act that he initially
lifting of the embargo to the
will surely draw the ire of Cuba-policy hard-liners inside
such opposition is almost certain to block the bill from becoming law, it may also draw
introduced in 2009, Rush certainly is not the only lawmaker to craft legislation to ease relations with the island nation off Florida. But by linking any
release of American prisoner Alan Gross, a Maryland man arrested in Cuba in 2009, Rush
and out of Congress.
While
attention to issues that have all but frozen any efforts to improve relations between the two countries. Gross had been working as a government subcontractor for the U.S. Agency for
International Development as part of a democracy-building program, only to be arrested and prosecuted for alleged crimes against Cuba in providing satellite phones and computer equipment
without a permit. The Cubans claim his activities were aimed at destabilizing their government, and he is currently serving a 15-year prison sentence. Meanwhile, the State Department continues
to list Cuba as a sponsor of terrorist groups, as it has since 1982. State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell told reporters recently that the administration "has no current plans to remove Cuba
from the list," despite calls for that. The list also includes Iran, Sudan, and Syria. U.S. lawmakers who were part of a bipartisan congressional delegation that traveled to Cuba in February say
their discussions with President Raul Castro revealed there is interest in improving relations, but they acknowledge that the imprisonment of Gross and the State Department designation loom as
major impediments. Rep. Chris Van Hollen, D-Md., was on that trip, and he is one of two lawmakers to directly meet with Gross, who is from Van Hollen's district. In an interview with National
the
inability to resolve the matter serves the interests of hard-liners in both countries, who would prefer not to see
improved relations.
Journal, Van Hollen said, "The continued detention of Alan Gross has been a significant obstacle to improved relations between the U.S. and Cuba." But the congressman said
Cuba trade reforms are a long way off – Congress won’t back it
Szakonyi 12 [Mark Szakonyi – Journal of Commerce, “How Obama Can Promote US Exports to Cuba”,
November 13th, 2012, lexis]
President Barack Obama must walk a delicate path in his second-term effort to normalize relations with Cuba. He cut a
moderate trail in his first term, allowing Cuban-Americans to make unlimited visits to relatives on the island and send loved ones remittances.
But the trade barriers are far from being flung open . Despite Fidel Castro's ailing health and Cuba's sluggish attempts to
country remains defiant of the U.S. 50 years after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Although
Obama enjoyed strong backing from Cuban-Americans in Florida in the Nov. 6 elections, the formidable exile block in Congress
remains, as Foreign Policy's Jose Cardenas notes. He adds that the Castro brothers have failed to make any changes that
would deserve U.S. conciliations on its trade ban. The Cuban government said the U.S. "empire" would continue to try to destroy
the Castro Revolution no matter the outcome of the presidential election, according to the Miami Herald. "That said, to contemplate any
serious re-evaluation of relations on the U.S. part as long as the regime systematically represses the Cuban people - to say
reform its market ahead of fiscal peril, the
nothing of the continued unjust incarceration of U.S. development worker Alan Gross -- and relentlessly continues to thwart U.S. interests in
international fora
is just self-delusion," Cardenas wrote.
Rubio will never support easing the embargo – sees it as key to pressure the Castro regime
Human Events 10 [“Exclusive Human Events Interview with Marco Rubio”, May 7th, 2010,
http://www.humanevents.com/2010/05/07/exclusive-human-events-interview-with-marco-rubio/, Chetan]
HE: When we spoke a year ago, we discussed Cuba. When would
you approve of lifting the economic embargo against
Cuba? Rubio: When Cuba joins the rest of the civilized world in how it treats its people. That is freeing
political prisoners, it means free and fair elections They can choose any form of government they like, but they have to have
freedom of the press, freedom of religion, freedom of expression. The fundamental rights that we believe are endowed to every human being by
our Creator. That’s
the kind of country that I’m interested in us having a relationship with. And the embargo
serves as leverage for us to be able to accomplish that. You have, as we speak right now, a number of dissidents and
hunger strikes in Cuba. And their brave wives are marching every Sunday. And they’re being beaten, taunted, hassled and
harassed. These are women. They’re called the women in white. They’re providing an extraordinary example of just how
repressive this regime is and how it’s on the wrong side of history. HE: So I take it you mean the recognition of the end of the embargo
has to come with the end of the Castro brothers? Rubio: Not only the end of the Castro brothers, but also political reform in
the return of political freedom to the people of Cuba. The embargo gives us leverage to negotiate that . Cuba
trades with every other country in the world. The fact of the matter is that the U.S. embargo is not the reason their economy is failing. Their
economy is failing because they’ve embraced a combination of socialism and incompetence, which may be an oxymoron because they’re both the
same thing. The point being that I would love for the United States to have a close economic relationship with a free Cuba. I think we’re going to
see that very soon, God willing.
Plan’s massively controversial --- GOP hates it
Hanson 10 (Stephanie, Associate Editor and Coordinating Editor – CFR, “U.S.-Cuba Relations”, Council on
Foreign Relations Report, 1-11, http://www.cfr.org/publication/11113/uscuba_relations.html)
Ending the economic embargo against Cuba would require congressional approval. Opinions in Congress are
mixed: A group of influential Republican lawmakers from Florida--Lincoln Diaz-Balart, his brother Mario
Diaz-Balart, and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen--is strongly anti-Castro. Still, many favor improving relations with Cuba. In 2002, a bipartisan group of
senators, the Congressional Cuban Working Group, proposed a set of measures that included lifting the travel ban and allowing private financing of food and agriculture sales. In 2003, both the
House and Senate voted to lift the travel ban, but the measure was removed after President Bush threatened a veto. In 2009, Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN), the top-ranking Republican on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, released a report calling for U.S. policy changes. He said: "We must recognize the ineffectiveness of our current policy and deal with the Cuban regime in a way
that enhances U.S. interests" (PDF) What is the likelihood that the United States and Cuba will resume diplomatic relations? Given the range of issues dividing the two countries, experts say a
long process would precede resumption of diplomatic relations. Daniel P. Erikson of the Inter-American Dialogue says that though "you could have the resumption of bilateral talks on issues
the near term. Many
recent policy reports have recommended that the United States take some unilateral steps to roll back
sanctions on Cuba. The removal of sanctions, however, would be just one step in the process of normalizing
relations. Such a process is sure to be controversial, as indicated by the heated congressional debate spurred
in March 2009 by attempts to include provisions easing travel and trade restrictions in a large appropriations
bill. These provisions passed in a March 10 vote. "Whatever we call it--normalization, detente, rapproachement--it is
clear that the policy process risks falling victim to the politics of the issue," says Sweig. At the start of 2010, there were
several bills before Congress that aimed to lift travel restrictions, but experts think it's unlikely that these
measures will pass (MiamiHerald).
related to counternarcotics or immigration, or a period of détente, you are probably not going to see the full restoration of diplomatic relations" in
Cuba Aid/Assistance Unpopular
All foreign aid to Cuba is for democracy assistance which causes political fights, none goes
to the government
PolitiFact 11 [“The U.S. gives foreign aid to Cuba and Venezuela, even though those countries are our enemies”,
February 9th, 2011, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/mar/23/ted-poe/ted-poe-decries-usaid-venezuela-cuba/, Chetan]
In a House floor speech on Feb. 9, 2011,
Rep. Ted Poe, R-Texas, took aim at American aid to foreign countries. Poe has introduced a bill to require
it’s time to reconsider our foreign aid
separate votes on aiding specific countries, thus ending the practice of bundling foreign aid into a single bill. "Maybe
that we
send to countries throughout the world," Poe said in the floor speech, which has attracted attention in conservative circles on the Internet. "There are about 192 foreign countries in the world, …
Poe proceeded to name some examples of countries where many Americans might
be uncomfortable sending taxpayer money, including Egypt, Pakistan, Russia and China. But two of the nation’s in Poe’s speech caught our eye -Venezuela and Cuba. Critics of Venezuela’s leader, Hugo Chavez, call him a dictator. Meanwhile, Cuba has been a communist country for decades , led
by Fidel Castro and now his brother Raul. In its widely followed rankings, the group Freedom House rates Venezuela toward the bottom of the
nations it classifies as "partly free," while Cuba sits at the lower end of its "not free" scale. And both nations have strained relations with the United States. So Poe
suggested these as two examples of what’s wrong with U.S. foreign aid. "We give money to Venezuela. Why do we give money to Chavez and
Venezuela? He hates the United States. He defies our president, makes fun of our nation. We don’t need to give him any foreign aid. We give $20 million to Cuba. Why do we give
money to Cuba ? Americans can’t even go to Cuba. It’s off-limits. It’s a communist country. But we’re
dumping money over there." We looked at budget documents for foreign aid and talked to experts in the field, and here’s what we found. Poe is correct that U.S. foreign
and we give foreign aid to over 150 of them."
aid flows into both countries. In fiscal year 2010, the Venezuela account showed $6 million, while the Cuba account showed $20 million. For fiscal year 2012, the administration has requested a
little less for Venezuela -- $5 million -- and the same $20 million amount for Cuba. To give a sense of context, the 2010 funds allocated for Venezuela amounted to less than 1/100th of 1 percent
of the total U.S. foreign-aid budget, and the figure for Cuba was about 4/100 of 1 percent of the U.S. foreign aid budget. The percentage of the entire federal budget is even more minuscule. Still,
even if the amount is small, taxpayer money is taxpayer money, so Poe has a point. However, Poe also said in plain language that "we give money to Chavez." And while he didn’t say it in as
explicit a fashion, Poe implied that the U.S. sends aid to the Cuban regime. This is where it gets more complicated. The funding for both nations comes from the Economic Support Fund, which,
according to the State Department, "supports U.S. foreign policy objectives by providing economic assistance to allies and countries in transition to democracy. Programs funded through this
no
U.S. aid goes to the Cuban government. In an explanation of its proposed budget, the administration writes that "Cuba is the only non-democratically elected
government in the Western Hemisphere and one of the most politically repressed countries in the world. In view of these challenges, U.S. assistance for Cuba aims to
empower Cuban civil society to advocate for greater democratic freedoms and respect for human dignity."
The $20 million designated for Cuba "focuses on strengthening independent Cuban civil society
organizations, including associations and labor groups. … To advance the cause of human rights in Cuba, U.S. assistance provides
humanitarian assistance to political prisoners and their families … The United States supports nascent pro-democracy groups, the use of
account promote stability and U.S. security interests in strategic regions of the world." Let’s take Cuba first. A spokesman for the U.S. Agency for International Development confirmed that
technology, and new information-sharing opportunities." A 2006 review by the Government Accountability Office noted that the aid is such a threat to the regime that it has to be kept under tight
wraps on the island. "Given the Cuban government’s repressive policies and opposition to U.S. democracy assistance, grantees employed a range of discreet delivery methods," GAO reported. In
the money being sent to Cuba is designed to foster democracy in what is currently an undemocratic country -- not to support the
other words,
government. Poe’s failure to note that distinction as he attacks aid to "Cuba" strikes us as misleading.
Cuban democracy assistance programs are corrupt and opaque – Congress has been very
critical of them
Collins 10 [Michael Collins is the program associate for the Americas Program of the Center for International
Policy, “Cuba: Democracy Promotion Programs under Fire as Fallout from Spy Arrest Continues”, May 12th, 2010,
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/cuba-archives-43/2488-cuba-democracy-promotion-programs-under-fire-asfallout-from-spy-arrest-continues, Chetan]
the United States has funded several programs that are designed ostensibly to promote democracy in Cuba. All are
managed by USAID. Gross's arrest has shone a spotlight on these programs, which have been questioned over the past few years
for issues of corruption and transparency . Many USAID programs in Cuba are run through the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). A congressional report
Since the early 90s
noted in 2009 that, "Unlike many foreign assistance programs, Transition Initiative programs are often initiated on short notice and are not always accurately detailed in budget justification
documents. The annual appropriations provisions for OTI require that the office give only five days' notice to Congress of new TI programs, and even ongoing programs are not reported at the
A 2006 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) offered stinging criticism of
r the lack of oversight in its Cuba aid program. According to the report, "Nearly all of the $74 million spent on contracts
to promote democracy in Cuba over the past decade has been distributed without competitive bidding or oversight in a program that
opened the door to waste and fraud." Some of the profligacy cited includes the purchase of a gas chainsaw, computer gaming equipment and software (including
same level of detail as other foreign assistance programs."
USAID fo
Nintendo Gameboys and Sony Playstations), a mountain bike, leather coats, cashmere sweaters, crabmeat, and Godiva chocolates. A Miami Herald article from the same year pointed out that
corruption that exists in the
Cuba democracy promotion programs came to a head in 2008, when Howard Berman, the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, placed
"most of the USAID money has remained in Miami or Washington—creating an anti-Castro economy that finances a broad array of activities." The
a hold on the $45 million due to be allocated to Cuban programs that year. Berman wrote a memo to the assistant secretary for Legislative
Affairs, questioning the "four-fold increase" in funding for Cuban democracy promotion programs given the fraudulent abuse and lack of adequate oversight reported by the GAO in 2006 and the
He requested the freeze be maintained until USAID responded to a list of questions regarding the
reported irregularities. Berman wanted answers on where the $74 million awarded for Cuba democracy promotion programs mentioned in the GAO report had gone. He also
media.
requested follow-up information and measures regarding the case of Felipe Sixto from the Washington-based Center for a Free Cuba (CFC). Sixto was discovered to have embezzled between
$500,000 and $700,000 from the grantee's total award of $7.3 million. Sixto, who was a special assistant for intergovernmental affairs during the George W. Bush administration, was given thirty
months in jail. Berman later unfroze the withheld funds saying that he had been given assurances by USAID and the State Department that it was "working to improve the program."
Cuban democracy promotion efforts are questionably legal and Kerry has put funding on
hold till there is accountability
Collins 10 [Michael Collins is the program associate for the Americas Program of the Center for International
Policy, “Cuba: Democracy Promotion Programs under Fire as Fallout from Spy Arrest Continues”, May 12th, 2010,
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/cuba-archives-43/2488-cuba-democracy-promotion-programs-under-fire-asfallout-from-spy-arrest-continues, Chetan]
Cuba democracy promotion programs have continued to be riddled with
problems. A recent article from the Miami Herald stated that, "The lack of clear rules allowed some of USAID's grantees to spend
95% of the millions of dollars they received to cover salaries, office overhead, and attend international
conferences, while Cuba's dissidents were left with crumbs. Many of those USAID grantees had funding automatically renewed without the benefit
of competition or an assessment of the impact their programs were having on the ground in Cuba." The issue of transparency looms large in these
programs. USAID's Cuba program is one of the only programs that does not fully disclose the names of the
organizations it funds or the amounts it provides. With other country projects such as Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, full up-to-date disclosure is given
In spite of the efforts of Rep. Berman, USAID's
regarding all aspects of the programs funded. In the case of Cuba, its list was last updated in July 2006. A GAO report in November 2008 stated that "continued efforts were needed to strengthen
USAID's oversight of U.S. democracy assistance in Cuba," yet it censored the names of active grantees, with the exception of two organizations whose names had already appeared in the media
The legality of such programs is also under scrutiny
due to corruption scandals.
. Julia Sweig, of the Council on Foreign Relations, described the types of
programs in which Mr. Gross was involved as a continuance of "Cold War tactics," stating that prior to 1989 these operations were carried out covertly, but with no Russian influence in Cuba,
the United States can carry them out overtly. John McAuliff, executive director of the Fund for Reconciliation and Development, points out that
not only are Alan Gross's
actions illegal under Cuban law; they are illegal under U.S. law as well . "The Foreign Agents Registration Act criminalizes any
unregistered agent of a foreign power (which this 'contractor' certainly was) who 'within the United States solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses contributions, loans, money, or other things of
value for or in the interest of such foreign principal.' In the United States such a foreign agent would be liable to a sentence of 5 years in jail and a fine of $10,000." Reviews and Recriminations
When the Obama administration took office, it promised to review controversial USAID programs. The arrest of
Gross seems to have spurred this task on. In July 2009, the State Department began its Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development review (QDDR) to assess diplomacy and development programs
at the State Department and USAID. In August 2009, President Obama signed a Presidential Study Directive (PSD) on Global Development Policy, authorizing a comprehensive review of U.S.
development efforts. Both reviews were due to be completed by now but have yet to surface. The reviews have been backed by proposed legislation that would increase oversight and
transparency at USAID, introduced by Howard Berman in the House of Representatives and John Kerry and Richard Lugar in the Senate. Since the arrest of Mr. Gross, Cuban democracy
promotion groups have accused the Obama administration of failing to hand over $40 million in funds allocated for democracy promotion efforts in Cuba. The director of a Miami-based group
that received over $12.5 million from USAID said his "small organization only has enough money to continue operating for a few more months." Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen recently
stated, "I continue to be concerned by reports that USAID programs in Cuba have come to a standstill since the arrest and imprisonment of U.S. citizen Alan Gross." Nine Republican
congressional representatives have accused the Obama administration of trying to appease the Cuban government by freezing the funds. State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley denied the
Despite repeated criticism, proven corruption, and
pending reviews of democracy promotion programs in Cuba , the Obama administration proceeded to set aside $20 million for its 2011 budget to
"promote self-determined democracy in Cuba." Funds are to be used "to provide humanitarian assistance to political prisoners , their
suggestion that the programs had been frozen but admitted that a full review was underway.
families, and other victims of repression; advance human rights; strengthen independent civil society organizations; and support information sharing into and out of Cuba." Furthermore, the State
John
Kerry, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, placed a new hold on U.S. democracy promotion programs in Cuba
until State Department officials "undertake a review of these programs, and while the committee investigates whether they're effectively
accomplishing our shared goal." Kerry's spokesman Frederick Jones commented that, "We all want democratic change in Cuba. The question is
whether American taxpayers are getting progress toward that goal." As the debate over the USAID programs
rages on , the Cuban government continues to denounce the programs as subversive and hostile. With Alan Gross's case unresolved and other contractors continuing similar activities,
Department recently notified organizations that they can start making trips to Cuba again, the Miami Herald reported. The trips were halted after the Gross arrest. On March 26, Senator
analysts say the Obama administration must tread carefully if it wants to avoid a repeat of the current debacle.
AT: Rubio
Rubio favors a hardline stance on Cuba – he hates any engagement
The Hill 12 [“Cuban-American senators hit brick wall with Obama administration on Cuba policy”, June 7 th,
2012, http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/americas/231487-cuban-american-senators-hit-a-brick-wall-withobama-administration-on-cuba-policy, Chetan]
The Senate's two Cuban-Americans spent Thursday morning talking past the Obama administration's top official for the Americas on the issue of
U.S. policy toward Cuba. Sens. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) and Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) were the only two senators who showed up for the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee subpanel hearing on freedom in Cuba. They called the administration's relaxing of travel
restrictions to Cuba “naive” and bashed the State Department's decision to grant visas to high-profile Cuban
officials, including President Raul Castro's daughter Mariela. “The Cuban people are no less deserving of America's
support than the millions who were imprisoned and forgotten in Soviet gulags ,” Menendez said. “I am compelled to ask
again today — as I have before — why is there such an obvious double standard when it comes to Cuba?” Rubio said
Castro government officials are master manipulators of U.S. policy and public opinion. The two senators favor
a hard-line stance against Cuba until regime change takes place. Critics of that policy argue that more than 50 years of U.S. sanctions
have only enabled Castro brothers Fidel and Raul to consolidate their power while impoverishing the Cuban people.
Rubio determines immigration passage
Politico 5-6 [“Gang of Eight plots path to Senate supermajority”, May 6th, 2013,
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/gang-of-eight-immigration-supermajority-90949_Page2.html, Chetan]
The second tier of senators, who are less likely to back the bill but could be swayed , includes John Barrasso of
Wyoming, John Thune of South Dakota, Mike Crapo and Jim Risch of Idaho and Johnny Isakson of Georgia. This is a group that could
vote yes if Rubio is still on board and other conservatives are falling into line. “ The key is Rubio ,” said Aguilar, executive
director of the Latino Partnership for Conservative Principles. “ Without Rubio, this bill would not get anywhere with
Republicans. He gives them the cover.”
Mexico
Mexico Trade Unpopular
Unions oppose expanding trade with Mexico
UAW 12 [United Automobiles, Aerospace & Agricultural Workers of America, “Japan's Expression of Interest in
the Proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Trade Agreement”, January 13 th, 2012, Chetan]
While the
United States is currently negotiating the trade agreement that covers relationships with eight other
countries—Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam—the Obama Administration has
repeatedly expressed its goal of building "an agreement that expands out progressively to include countries across the Asia-Pacific region."
UAW has serious concerns regarding the premature expansion of the TPP negotiations to include Japan, Mexico ,
our negotiators first demonstrate an ability to formulate and successfully
negotiate a "transformative agreement for the 21st Century," that will produce genuine benefits for
American workers and increase domestic production. The primary goal must be to maximize employment
opportunity for workers, not simply to maximize profits for multinational corporations looking to further
globalize their supply chains.
Canada, or any other nation, before
Pushing expanded free trade measures with Mexico is alienating Democrats and pro-union
lobbies
Perez-Rocha 12 [Manuel Pérez Rocha is an associate fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington
D.C, “Don't Expand NAFTA”, July 26th, 2012, http://www.fpif.org/articles/dont_expand_nafta, Chetan]
With Canada and Mexico joining the TPP, the agreement is looking more and more like a substitute for the FTAA. So it is not surprising that opposition to the
TPP is growing as quickly as it did against that former attempt to expand the neoliberal model throughout the Western hemisphere. The intense secrecy o f the TPP
negotiations is not helping the Obama administration make its case. In their statement, North American unions “call on our governments to work
with us to include in the TPP provisions to ensure strong worker protection s, a healthy environment, safe food and products, and the
ability to regulate financial and other markets to avoid future global economic crises.” But the truth is that only big business is partaking in
consultations, with 600 lobbyists having exclusive passwords to online versions of the negotiating text. A majority of Democratic representatives
(132 out of 191) have expressed that they are “troubled that important policy decisions are being made without full
input from Congress .” They have written to U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk t o urge him and his staff to “engage in
broader and deeper consultations with members of the full range of committees of Congress whose jurisdiction touches on
the wide-ranging issues involved, and to ensure there is ample opportunity for Congress to have input on critical policies that will have broad ramifications for years to come." In their letter, the
representatives also challenge “the lack of transparency of the treaty negotiation process, and the failure of
negotiators to meaningfully consult with states on the far-reaching impact of trade agreements on state and
local laws, even when binding on our states, is of grave concern to us.” U.S. Senators, for their part, have also sent a letter complaining of the lack of congressional access to the negotiations.
What openness and transparency can we in Canada and Mexico expect when the decision to join the TPP, under humiliating condit ions, was made without any public consultation? NAFTA turns
20 years old in 2014. Instead of expanding it through the TPP we must learn from NAFTA’s shortcomings, starting with the historic lack of consultation with unions and producers in the three
member countries. It is necessary to correct the imbalances in NAFTA, which as the North American union statement explains enhanced corporate power at the expense of workers and the
environment. In particular, we need to categorically reject the investor-state dispute settlement process that has proven so costly, in real terms and with respect to our democratic options in
Canada and Mexico.
The unions’ statement of solidarity provides a strong foundation for the growing trinational opposition
to the TPP
in Leesburg, Virginia, and beyond.
Mexico Aid Unpopular
Aid to Mexico is put on hold due to human rights violations – won’t get approved in
committees
Seelke 13 [Clare Ribando Seelke - Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Mexico and the 112th Congress”,
January 29th, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32724.pdf, Chetan]
There have been ongoing concerns about the human rights records of Mexico’s federal, state, and municipal
police. For the past several years, State Department’s human rights reports covering Mexico have cited credible reports of police
involvement in extrajudicial killings, kidnappings for ransom, and torture.83 While abuses are most common at the municipal and state
level, where corruption and police collaboration with criminal groups often occurs, federal forces—including the Federal Police—have also committed serious
abuses. Individuals are most vulnerable to police abuses after they have been arbitrarily detained and before they are transferred to the custody of prosecutors, or while they are being held in
preventive detention. Some 43% of Mexican inmates are reportedly in pre-trial detention.84 The Calderón government sought to combat police corruption and human rights abuses through
increased vetting of federal forces; the creation of a national police registry to prevent corrupt police from being re-hired; the use of internal affairs units; and the provision of human rights
training. In 2012, the government also announced new protocols on the use of force and how detentions are to be handled that were designed to prevent abuses. A January 2009 public security
efforts
to reform municipal police forces have lagged behind. There has also been increasing concern that the Mexican military, which is less accountable to
law codified vetting requirements and professional standards for state police to be met by 2013, but progress toward meeting those standards has been uneven. With a few exceptions,
civilian authorities than the police, is committing more human rights abuses since it is has been tasked with carrying out public security functions. A November 2011 Human Rights Watch
(HRW) report maintains that cases of torture, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings have increased significantly in states where federal authorities have been deployed to fight
organized crime.85 According to Mexico’s Human Rights Commission (CNDH), the number of complaints of human rights abuses by Mexico’s National Defense Secretariat (SEDENA)
increased from 182 in 2006 to a peak of 1800 in 2009 before falling slightly to 1,695 in 2011. The Trans-Border Institute has found that the number of abuses by SEDENA forces that have been
investigated and documented by CNDH has also declined since 2008-2009, particularly in areas where large-scale deployments have been scaled back.86 In contrast, complaints of abuses against
the Secretariat of the Navy (SEMAR) reported to CNDH increased by 150% from 2010 to 2011 as its forces became more heavily involved in anti-DTO efforts.87 While troubling, only a small
percentage of those allegations have resulted in the CNDH issuing recommendations for corrective action to SEDENA or SEMAR, which those agencies say they have largely accepted and acted
upon.88 A June 2011 constitutional amendment gave CNDH the authority to force entities that refuse to respond to its recommendations to appear before the Mexican Congress. In addition to
groups have criticized the Mexican government for
failing to hold military and police officials accountable for past abuses .89 In addition to taking steps to reform the police and judiciary, the
expressing concerns about current human rights abuses, Mexican and international human rights
Calderón government took some steps to comply with rulings by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) that cases of military abuses against civilians should be tried in civilian
courts. While a few dozen cases90 were transferred to civilian jurisdiction and former President Calderón asked SEDENA and SEMAR to work with the Attorney General to accelerate transfers,
most cases were still processed in the military justice system.91 Military prosecutors have opened thousands of investigations into allegations of human rights abuses as a result of complaints
filed with the CNDH, with few having resulted in convictions.92 A reform of Article 57 of the military justice code was submitted by then-President Calderón in October 2010 mandating that at
least certain human rights violations be investigated and prosecuted in civilian courts. A more comprehensive proposal that required that all cases of alleged military human rights violations be
transferred to the civilian justice system was approved by the Mexican Senate’s Justice Commission in April 2012; however, the bill was subsequently blocked from coming to a vote. In
September 2012, another proposal to reform Article 57 was presented in the Mexican Senate, but not enacted. Enacting a reform of Article 57 of the military justice code may become more
urgent now for the Peña Nieto Administration now that Mexico’s Supreme Court is in the process of establishing binding legal precedent for determining jurisdiction in cases involving alleged
military human rights violations against civilians. Human rights defenders and journalists have been particularly vulnerable to abuses by organized crime, sometimes acting in collusion with
corrupt government authorities. Recently, several prominent human rights defenders have been harassed, attacked, and even killed, including members of the high-profile Movement for Peace
Increasing violent crimes targeting journalists, combined with high levels of
impunity for the perpetrators of those crimes, have made Mexico the most dangerous country in the Western
Hemisphere for journalists. Crimes against journalists range from harassment, to extortion, to kidnapping and murder. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) has documented 58
with Justice and Dignity led by Javier Sicilia.
murders of journalists and at least 10 cases of journalists disappearing in Mexico since 2000. Threats from organized crime groups have made journalists and editors fearful of covering crimerelated stories, and in some areas coverage of the DTOs’ activities have been shut down.93 The Calderón government and the Mexican Congress took some steps to better protect human rights
defenders and journalists, but many human rights organizations have called upon the Peña Nieto Administration to do more. The Calderón government established a special prosecutor within the
Attorney General’s Office to attend to crimes against freedom of expression and created mechanisms to provide increased protection for journalists and human rights defenders. Those
mechanisms have yet to be effectively implemented. The Mexican Congress enacted a law to make crimes against journalists a federal offense and a law to require the federal government to
provide protection to journalists and human rights defenders who are “at risk” of being victimized and to their families. Another law approved by the Congress in 2012, but not promulgated by
the Calderón government, would require the state to track victims of organized crime and provide assistance to victims and their families. Human rights organizations expressed satisfaction after
President Peña Nieto signed that law, commonly referred to as the “victims’ law,” in January 2013, but said that the real test of his government’s commitment to human rights will be in how that
and other laws are implemented. Human Rights Conditions on U.S. Assistance to Mexico In 2008, Congress debated whether human rights conditions should be placed on Mérida assistance
beyond the requirements in §620J of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961. That section was re-designated as §620M and amended by the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 (P.L.
112-74). It states that an individual or unit of a foreign country’s security forces is prohibited from receiving assistance if the Secretary of State receives “credible evidence” that an individual or
unit has committed “a gross violation of human rights.” The FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-252), which provided the first tranche of Mérida funding, had less stringent
human rights conditions than had been proposed earlier, largely due to Mexico’s concerns that some of the conditions would violate its national sovereignty. The conditions required that 15% of
INCLE and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance be withheld until the Secretary of State reports in writing that Mexico is taking action in four human rights areas: 1. improving
transparency and accountability of federal police forces; 2. establishing a mechanism for regular consultations among relevant Mexican government authorities, Mexican human rights
organizations, and other relevant Mexican civil society organizations, to make consultations concerning implementation of the Mérida Initiative in accordance with Mexican and international
law; 3. ensuring that civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities are investigating and prosecuting, in accordance with Mexican and international law, members of the federal police and military
forces who have been credibly alleged to have committed violations of human rights, and the federal police and military forces are fully cooperating with the investigations; and 4. enforcing the
prohibition, in accordance with Mexican and international law, on the use of testimony obtained through torture or other ill-treatment. Similar human rights conditions were included in FY2009FY2011 appropriations measures that funded the Mérida Initiative.95 However, the first two conditions are not included in the 15% withholding requirement in the FY2012 Consolidated
Congress has yet to pass a final FY2013 appropriations measure. It
remains to be seen whether an omnibus bill would include the conditions on aid to Mexico that are in the Senate
Appropriations Committee’s version of the FY2013 foreign operations ppropriations measure S. 3241 (S.Rept. 112-172). Those
Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74). As previously mentioned,
conditions would retain the condition related to torture, as well as require the State Department to report that Mexico has reformed its military justice code and is requiring police and military
officials to immediately transfer detainees to civilian judicial authorities. Thus far, the State Department has submitted three 15% progress reports on Mexico to congressional appropriators (in
August 2009, September 2010, and August 2012) that have met the statutory requirements for FY2008-FY2012 Mérida funds that had been on hold to be released. Nevertheless, the State
has twice elected to hold back some funding pending further progress in key areas of concern. In the
September 2010 report, for example, the State Department elected to hold back $26 million in FY2010 supplemental funds as a matter of policy until
further progress was made in the areas of transparency and combating impunity .96 Those funds were not obligated until the fall of
2011. In the August 2012 report, the State Department again decided to hold back all of the FY2012 funding that would have been
Department
until it can work with Mexican authorities to determine steps to
address key human rights challenges. Those include: improving the ability of Mexico’s civilian institutions to investigate and prosecute cases of human rights abuses;
subject to the conditions (roughly $18 million) as a matter of policy
enhancing enforcement of prohibitions against torture and other mistreatment; and strengthening protection for human rights defenders.97
Venezuela
Venezuela Engagement Unpopular
Engaging Venezuela now is unpopular – Maduro is seen as a Castro puppet
Sullivan 4-9 [Mark P. Sullivan - Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for
Venezuela and U.S. Relations”, April 9th, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf, Chetan]
observers have criticized the Obama Administration for making overtures to engage with Maduro, contending
that U.S. policy should focus on attempting to ensure that the upcoming election is free and fair. A Washington Post editorial from early March 2013 contended that “further wooing
of Mr. Maduro should wait until he survives the scrum in his own party, wins a free vote and demonstrates
that he is more than a Castro puppet.”19 While it is likely that any improvement in relations will remain on hold during
the election process, some analysts maintain that it is important for U.S. policymakers to remember that taking sides in Venezuela’s internal politics can be counter-productive.
Some
According to Cynthia Arnson of the Woodrow Wilson Center: “Supporting broad principles such as internal dialogue to overcome polarization for the rule of law is not the same as promoting a
particular political outcome, an approach that is destined to only backfire.”20 Other analysts maintain that it is important for U.S. policymakers to recognize the level of popular support in
Venezuela for President Chávez. While there was considerable controversy over past elections in which Chávez’s campaign unfairly utilized state resources and broadcast media, the margins of
his electoral victories in four elections over the years left no doubt that he had won those elections. His death, at least in the short to medium term, could deepen popular support for the PSUV. In
there could be an opportunity for U.S.-Venezuelan relations to get back on track
the aftermath of the presidential election,
. An
important aspect of this could be restoring ambassadors in order to augment engagement on critical bilateral issues, not only on anti-drug, terrorism, and democracy concerns, but on trade,
With Chávez’s death and an upcoming presidential election, the 113th Congress
is likely to maintain its strong oversight on the status of human rights and democracy in Venezuela as well as
drug trafficking and terrorism concerns, including the extent of Venezuela’s relations with Iran.
investment issues, and other commercial matters.
Engagement with Venezuela causes Republican backlash
Ros-Lehtinen 13 [Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Florida Republican, is chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa. “ROS-LEHTINEN: Venezuela after Chavez: What comes
next?”, March 14th, 2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/14/venezuela-after-chavez-what-comesnext/, Chetan]
Last year, it was
reported that the Obama administration was seeking to exchange ambassadors in an attempt to
normalize relations between the countries. The U.S. State Department’s approach was extremely premature ,
and it, unfortunately, legitimized Mr. Maduro without even questioning whether the Venezuelan Constitution was
being upheld. The Obama administration continued to send mixed messages and to undermine the opposition
by sending a delegation to attend Chavez’s funeral services last week, alongside enemies of the United States, such as Iranian leader Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad. Words matter, but actions matter more, and this decision not only sends mixed signals to the people of
Venezuela, but reiterates the failed policy of attempting to re-establish diplomatic relations. It is in our best interest if
political and economic reforms come to Venezuela, but all signs currently point to the contrary. As the leader of the Chavista
movement, Mr. Maduro could potentially be worse for the Venezuelan people and for U.S. national security
interests. Mr. Maduro still controls all branches of government, stifles free speech and was indoctrinated with socialist ideology. He has
traveled to Tehran and has strong ties with Iran, supports the Assad regime in Syria and has become a lap dog for Cuba’s Castro brothers.
Huge friction in US-Venezuelan relationship – we’ve sanctioned several government and
military officials for trafficking and refusing to cooperate with us
Sullivan 13 [Mark P. Sullivan - Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Venezuela: Issues for Congress”, January
10th, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40938.pdf, Chetan]
The United States traditionally has had close relations with Venezuela, a major supplier of foreign oil, but there has been friction in
relations under the Chávez government. Over the years, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about human rights,
Venezuela’s military arms purchases, its relations with Iran, and its efforts to export its brand of populism to
other Latin American countries. Declining cooperation on anti-drug and anti-terrorism efforts has been a
major concern. The United States has imposed sanctions: on several Venezuelan government and military
officials for allegedly helping the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) with drug and weapons trafficking;
on three Venezuelan companies for providing support to Iran; and on several Venezuelan individuals for
providing support to Hezbollah. Despite tensions in relations, the Obama Administration remains committed to seeking constructive
engagement with Venezuela, focusing on such areas as anti-drug and counter-terrorism efforts. In the aftermath of President Chávez’s reelection,
the White House, while acknowledging differences with President Chávez, congratulated the Venezuelan people on the high level of participation
and the relatively peaceful election process.
Venezuela Trade Unpopular
Strong opposition to Venezuelan trade – Congress demands embargo
Mares 12 [David R. Mares - Institute of the Americas Chair for InterAmerican Affairs, University of California,
San Diego, “The United States-Venezuela Relationship”, January 19-20, 2012, Chetan]
The current political relationship decreases bilateral trade because Chávez seeks to build counter-balancing relations with
US rivals and only has oil to attract them. The relationship with China in particular is important because the Chinese are also willing to provide
tens of billions of dollars in credit to the Chávez government to spend as it sees fit, with Venezuelan oil in payment. In addition, Chávez diverts a
small quantity of oil to subsidized sales to the Caribbean and Central America to gain allies. These diversions for political reasons result in a
lower quantity available for market driven purchases, as are those of the US. The US Congress does have a small group of antiChavista legislators who demand that the US embargo Venezuelan oil, and emphasize the undemocratic
nature of the Chávez government and its Chinese, Russian and Iranian ties as threats to US national securit y. A
few think tanks (e.g., the Inter-American Security Watch) and interest groups are promoting these views. But so far they do not have a large
following in the Legislative and the Executive branches, where a lower profile in opposing Chávez is perceived to be more effective, or at least
less damaging to overall US interests.
Venezuela Aid/Assistance Unpopular
Congress opposes aid to Venezuela – seen as supporting Chavez’s governemnt
PolitiFact 11 [“The U.S. gives foreign aid to Cuba and Venezuela, even though those countries are our enemies”,
February 9th, 2011, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/mar/23/ted-poe/ted-poe-decries-usaid-venezuela-cuba/, Chetan]
Poe
took aim at American aid to foreign countries.
In a House floor speech on Feb. 9, 2011, Rep. Ted
, R-Texas,
Poe has introduced a bill to require
separate votes on aiding specific countries, thus ending the practice of bundling foreign aid into a single bill. "Maybe it’s time to reconsider our foreign aid that we send to countries throughout
the world," Poe said in the floor speech, which has attracted attention in conservative circles on the Internet. "There are about 192 foreign countries in the world, … and we give foreign aid to
Americans might be uncomfortable sending taxpayer money,
in Poe’s speech caught our eye -- Venezuela and Cuba. Critics of Venezuela’s leader, Hugo Chavez, call him a
dictator. Meanwhile, Cuba has been a communist country for decades, led by Fidel Castro and now his brother Raul. In its widely followed rankings, the group
Freedom House rates Venezuela toward the bottom of the nations it classifies as "partly free ," while Cuba sits at the lower
end of its "not free" scale. And both nations have strained relations with the United States. So Poe suggested these as two examples of what’s wrong with
U.S. foreign aid. "We give money to Venezuela. Why do we give money to Chavez and Venezuela? He hates the United States. He defies our president,
makes fun of our nation. We don’t need to give him any foreign aid . We give $20 million to Cuba. Why do we give money to Cuba? Americans can’t even go to
over 150 of them." Poe proceeded to name some examples of countries where many
including Egypt, Pakistan, Russia and China. But two of the nation’s
Cuba. It’s off-limits. It’s a communist country. But we’re dumping money over there." We looked at budget documents for foreign aid and talked to experts in the field, and here’s what we
found. Poe is correct that U.S. foreign aid flows into both countries. In fiscal year 2010, the Venezuela account showed $6 million, while the Cuba account showed $20 million. For fiscal year
2012, the administration has requested a little less for Venezuela -- $5 million -- and the same $20 million amount for Cuba. To give a sense of context, the 2010 funds allocated for Venezuela
amounted to less than 1/100th of 1 percent of the total U.S. foreign-aid budget, and the figure for Cuba was about 4/100 of 1 percent of the U.S. foreign aid budget. The percentage of the entire
federal budget is even more minuscule. Still, even if the amount is small, taxpayer money is taxpayer money, so Poe has a point. However, Poe also said in plain language that "we give money to
Chavez." And while he didn’t say it in as explicit a fashion, Poe implied that the U.S. sends aid to the Cuban regime. This is where it gets more complicated. The funding for both nations comes
from the Economic Support Fund, which, according to the State Department, "supports U.S. foreign policy objectives by providing economic assistance to allies and countries in transition to
democracy. Programs funded through this account promote stability and U.S. security interests in strategic regions of the world." Let’s take Cuba first. A spokesman for the U.S. Agency for
International Development confirmed that no U.S. aid goes to the Cuban government. In an explanation of its proposed budget, the administration writes that "Cuba is the only nondemocratically elected government in the Western Hemisphere and one of the most politically repressed countries in the world. In view of these challenges, U.S. assistance for Cuba aims to
empower Cuban civil society to advocate for greater democratic freedoms and respect for human dignity." The $20 million designated for Cuba "focuses on strengthening independent Cuban
civil society organizations, including associations and labor groups. … To advance the cause of human rights in Cuba, U.S. assistance provides humanitarian assistance to political prisoners and
their families … The United States supports nascent pro-democracy groups, the use of technology, and new information-sharing opportunities." A 2006 review by the Government Accountability
Office noted that the aid is such a threat to the regime that it has to be kept under tight wraps on the island. "Given the Cuban government’s repressive policies and opposition to U.S. democracy
assistance, grantees employed a range of discreet delivery methods," GAO reported. In other words, the money being sent to Cuba is designed to foster democracy in what is currently an
In its $5
million budget request for 2012, the administration said it wants to "strengthen and support a Venezuelan civil
society that will protect Democratic space and seek to serve the interests and needs of the Venezuelan people. Funding will enhance citizens’ access to objective information, facilitate
undemocratic country -- not to support the government. Poe’s failure to note that distinction as he attacks aid to "Cuba" strikes us as misleading. Now let’s look at Venezuela.
peaceful debate on key issues, provide support to democratic institutions and processes, promote citizen participation and encourage democratic leadership." Another administration document
says aid helps "strengthen the capacity of non-governmental organizations to monitor and report on government performance" -- in other words, to be a watchdog of the government, not a
supporter. The U.S. AID spokesman confirmed that no money goes to the Venezuelan government. So far, this sounds a lot like the situation with aid to Cuba. But there’s a difference. The same
administration document goes on to say that this civil-society funding "will involve both government and opposition supporters and will be open to all regardless of political perspectives,"
providing some support for Poe’s statement. Still, most observers see the State Department’s openness to funding representatives of Chavez’s government as more of a diplomatic nicety, since
foreign efforts to bolster democracy in a country with democratic shortcomings are typically framed with great rhetorical care. Indeed, there are strong signals that Chavez himself has no use for
U.S. funding. A 2010 study by FRIDE and the World Movement for Democracy, a pair of non-governmental organizations, noted that members of a local group called Súmate who had received
U.S. aid for a project on electoral observance "were accused of conspiracy and betrayal. The trial against them, which was initiated in 2003, is still pending." In a 2006 article based on Freedom
of Information Act requests, the Associated Press reported that Chavez accused his opponents of taking "gringo money" to undermine his regime. So, while it’s possible that some U.S. aid has
flowed to allies of Chavez, the bulk of U.S. aid goes to independent groups whose existence is more likely to undermine his authority than strengthen it. Where does this leave us? The one claim
U.S. aid could make its way to supporters of Chavez
for which Poe may have a point is that some
(though not the government per se), given how the U.S.
wrote the ground rules. However, Chavez has made his opposition to U.S. aid clear, and has even gone so far as to prosecute some opponents who have taken it. Meanwhile, the aid sent to Cuba
is certainly not going into the government’s coffers, and it, like the Venezuela aid, is considered far likelier to undercut the government than support it.