Lecture 4 Foreign Direct Investment © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 1 1. Foreign Direct Investment 2. The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 2 DaimlerChrysler – Group Sales by Region - 2004 Units in ‘000s NAFTA US 62.3% 71.1% West Europe 20.5% Germany 9.9% Japan 1.1% WORLD Total = 3,903 Is this an accurate picture of the firm’s global footprint? © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 3 Mercedes – Group Sales by Region 2004 Units in ‘000s NAFTA US 18.5% 19.9% West Europe 66.6% Germany 32.2% Japan 3.5% WORLD Total = 3,903 What is the unit value of Mercedes relative to Chrysler? © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 4 What is Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)? FDI occurs when a firm invests directly in facilities to produce and/or market a product or service in a foreign country. FDI is not the investment by individuals, firms or public bodies in foreign financial instruments (PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT) © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 5 A firm buying a firm in another country FDI Taxonomy A firm setting up a de novo operation in another country Controlling interest Minority interest MODE Greenfield Acquisition Whollyowned 1 3 Partially owned 2 4 © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 Targets necessary 6 Flow vs Stock of FDI Flow: Amount of FDI over a period of time (one year). Stock: Total accumulated value of foreign owned assets at a given point in time. © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 7 FDI outflows, 1982-2002 © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 8 FDI flows by region © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 9 FDI outflows by select country 1998-2001 © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 10 World GDP, exports and FDI World GDP and FDI 1990-2001 (index = 100 in 1990) © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 11 Secular pattern FDI Growth > Trade growth > Output growth Gross Fixed Capital Formation A summary of the total amount of capital invested in factories, stores office buildings, and the like. All things being equal, the greater the capital investment in an economy, the more favorable its future growth prospects are likely to be. © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 13 Inward FDI flows As a percentage of gross fixed capital formation, 2000 © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 14 FDI Inflow for Selected Countries % of total capital investment, 2005 45 40 35 UK Sweden Chile Argentina China India Japan 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2005 © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 15 MACRO Why is FDI growing more rapidly than world trade or output? World political and economic change Wider acceptance of MNC operations Movement of operations to the most efficient location © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 16 MICRO Why is FDI growing more rapidly than world trade or output? Growing power of regional economic blocs Improved logistics EU, NAFTA, Mercosur, etc. Strategy of extra-bloc firms to become ‘domestic’ – ‘tariff-jumping’ Most international trade is intra-firm Movement of operations to the most efficient location © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 17 Two Forms of FDI HOME Backward Vertical FDI Location 1 Stage 1 Horizontal FDI Forward Vertical FDI © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 HOST Location 2 Stage 0 Location 2 Stage 1 Location 2 Stage 2 18 FDI – composition changes FDI been growing in terms of volume, but it has also been changing in its composition Increasingly FDI represents a considerable amount of transfer of knowledge Know-how and skills Scientific knowledge Organizational knowledge Multinational firms do not like to give up control of this knowledge © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 19 Impediments to the Sale of Knowhow Risk giving away know-how to competitors Impediments to the sale of knowhow Licensing implies low control over foreign entity Know-how not amenable to licensing © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2001 HFDI, When and Why? Transportation too costly? Most cited: Market Imperfections (Internalization Theory). Impediments to the free flow of products between nations. Impediments to the sale of know-how. Follow the lead of a competitor - strategic rivalry. Product Life Cycle - however, does not explain when it’s profitable to invest abroad. Location specific advantages (natural resources). © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 21 HFDI, Where? The Stage Theory of FDI Firms first expand into host countries that are culturally close to the home country US, Australia, New Zealand British firms Canada, Mexico US firms © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 22 The Stage Theory: Wal-Mart International INTERNATIONAL DISCOUNT STORES Argentina 0 Brazil 0 Canada 144 Mexico 347 Puerto Rico 9 China 0 Germany 0 SUPERCENTERS 6 5 0 27 0 2 21 SAM'S CLUB 3 3 0 28 5 1 0 International Totals: 61 40 500 Wal-mart has since withdrawn from Germany © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 23 HFDI – A Decision Framework How high are transportation costs and tariffs? Low Export High Is know-how amenable to licensing? No Horizontal FDI Yes Horizontal FDI No Horizontal FDI Yes Is tight control over foreign operation required? No Can know-how be protected by licensing contract? Yes License Case: FDI and the Irish miracle FDI in Ireland grew from $164m (1985) to $24b (2000) (roughly 150 fold!) By 2000 two-thirds of Irelands top exporters were MNEs Reasons for Ireland’s success Member of EU (access to EU markets) Highly educated workforce; Good infrastructure In 1985, Ireland was the 2nd poorest W.European country. Today it is the 2nd richest. © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 25 FDI into China – Success story? Second Largest Recipient of FDI After US US Japan Taiwan Hong Kong Other © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 Hong Kong Other US Japan Taiwan 26 Changing Face of China’s Foreign Investment 1992 2002 Joint Ventures 70% 48% Wholly owned foreign subsidiaries 30% 52% Source: McKinsey & Co © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 27 FDI – China vs. the US China The US • High percentage from other developing countries • Largely greenfield • Largely asset seeking • Large amount of ‘round-tripping’ • High percentage from other developed countries • Largely by acquisition • Largely market seeking However, recently: • More market seeking FDI • More FDI from developed countries © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 28 The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 29 The Spectrum of Political Ideology Toward FDI Radical View Pragmatic Nationalism © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 Free Market 30 Radical View Marxist view is that MNE’s enslave less developed countries. Instrument of domination not development. Popular from WWII to the 1980s. Practiced by Eastern Europe, India, China, 3rd World Countries. Ended with the collapse of Communism. Bad performance by those countries vs. those with freer market approach © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 31 Free Market View Sees FDI as way to disperse production and flow of goods and services in the most efficient manner. Supported by Smith and Ricardo and ‘market imperfection’ explanations of FDI. However, all countries impose some restrictions on FDI. © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 32 Pragmatic View Lies somewhere between radical and free market views. Governments should maximize national benefits and minimize costs of FDI. © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 33 Ideology and FDI Ideology Characteristics Marxist roots Radical Views FDI as an imperialist tool Classical economic roots Free Market FDI as a tool for efficient location of operations Pragmatic Nationalism FDI has both benefits and costs © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 Host-Government Policy Implications Prohibit FDI Nationalize MNC subsidiaries No restrictions on FDI Court targeted MNCs Tailor incentives 34 What do the data tell us? – 1 MNC economic interests are overwhelmingly concentrated in the triad – North America, Europe and Japan/East Asia There is no evidence that triad governments are subject to ‘control’ by MNCs Competitive pressures cause MNCs to cancel each other out Activities outside the triad are too insignificant to justify expense of political activities E.g., a recent CIMA study found that most MNCs followed ‘whiter than white’ accounting practices © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 35 What do the data tell us? – 2 Globalization refers to FDI, not financial flows FDI flows are extremely stable MNC strategies tend to be regional, rather than global, reflecting regional trading blocs Fears of global homogenization are over-rated EU, NAFTA, Mercosur, APEC MNCs tend to be “flagship firms” – serve as hubs of extensive business networks/clusters © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 36 Benefits of FDI to Host Countries Resource-transfer effects Capital, technology, management Employment effects Balance-of-payments effects Economic growth © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 37 FDI and resource-transfer effects HOST Inflow of capital Subsidiary HOME Parent Spillover of technology and management practices © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 38 FDI and employment effects HOST Subsidiary Direct local jobs created Jobs created in local supplier & ancillary network Jobs lost in local firms that are driven out of business Jobs created due to increased income generation © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 39 FDI and balance of payments Taxes, tariffs and other HOST payments to the govt. Subsidiary (+) Local output replaces imports Subsidiary (+) exports (+) Inflow of capital (+) HOME Parent Repatriated profits (-) 3rd Country © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 40 Economic Growth Increased: productivity growth, product and process innovation, and greater economic growth, Stemming from increased competition of MNE’s investments. © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 41 How Do Countries Encourage FDI?* Risk insurance.(Home) Elimination of double taxation. (Home) Tax incentives.(Host) Low interest rates. (Host) Grants for land and training of workforce (Host) Stable government and stable policies (Host) *See http://sbm.temple.edu/~rmudambi/Publications/Mudambi%20IJEB.pdf © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 42 How Do Countries Discourage FDI? Limit capital outflows. (Home) Manipulate tax code to encourage domestic investment. (Home) Political restrictions on investing in certain countries. (Home) Ownership restraints. (Host) Performance requirements. (Host) © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 43 Vernon’s Obsolescing Bargain: Determinants of Bargaining Power Bargaining Power of Firm High Low Firms time horizon Long Short Comparable alternatives open to firm Many Few Value placed by host government on investment High Low © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 44 Takeaways FDI has been rising faster than GDP or trade Rising power of regional blocs; better logistics HFDI – customization VFDI – value chain disaggregation FDI as a powerful economic stimulant Examples – Ireland, China Pragmatic view of MNEs – use with care Potential benefits of FDI Resource transfer, employment, BOP, growth © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2007 45