The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment Ram Mudambi IMBA BA 951 Spring 2005 © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2005 1 MACRO Why is FDI growing more rapidly than world trade or output? World political and economic change Wider acceptance of MNC operations Improved logistics Most international trade is intra-firm Movement of operations to the most efficient location © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2005 2 MICRO Why is FDI growing more rapidly than world trade or output? Growing power of regional economic blocs EU, NAFTA, Mercosur, etc. Strategy of extra-bloc firms to become ‘domestic’ ‘Tariff-jumping’ FDI © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2005 3 The Spectrum of Political Ideology Toward FDI Radical View Pragmatic Nationalism © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2005 Free Market 4 Radical View Marxist view is that MNE’s enslave less developed countries. Instrument of domination not development. Popular from WWII to the 1980s. Practiced by Eastern Europe, India, China, 3rd World Countries. Ended with the collapse of Communism. Bad performance by those countries vs those with freer market approach © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2005 5 Free Market View Sees FDI as way to disperse production and flow of goods and services in the most efficient manner. Supported by Smith and Ricardo and ‘market imperfection’ explanations of FDI. However, all countries impose some restrictions on FDI. © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2005 6 Pragmatic View Lies somewhere between radical and free market views. Governments should maximize national benefits and minimize costs of FDI. © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2005 7 Ideology and FDI Ideology Characteristics Marxist roots Radical Views FDI as an imperialist tool Classical economic roots Free Market FDI as a tool for efficient location of operations Pragmatic Nationalism FDI has both benefits and costs © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2005 Host-Government Policy Implications Prohibit FDI Nationalize MNC subsidiaries No restrictions on FDI Court targeted MNCs Tailor incentives 8 What do the data tell us? – 1 MNC economic interests are overwhelmingly concentrated in the triad – North America, Europe and Japan/East Asia There is no evidence that triad governments are subject to ‘control’ by MNCs Competitive pressures cause MNCs to cancel each other out Activities outside the triad are too insignificant to justify expense of political activities E.g., a recent CIMA study found that most MNCs followed ‘whiter than white’ accounting practices © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2005 9 What do the data tell us? – 2 Globalization refers to FDI, not financial flows FDI flows are extremely stable MNC strategies tend to be regional, rather than global, reflecting regional trading blocs Fears of global homogenization are over-rated EU, NAFTA, Mercosur, APEC MNCs tend to be “flagship firms” – serve as hubs of extensive business networks/clusters © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2005 10 Benefits of FDI to Host Countries Resource-transfer effects Capital, technology, management Employment effects Balance-of-payments effects Economic growth © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2005 11 FDI and resource-transfer effects HOST Inflow of capital Subsidiary HOME Parent Spillover of technology and management practices © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2005 12 FDI and employment effects HOST Subsidiary Direct local jobs created Jobs created in local supplier & ancillary network Jobs lost in local firms that are driven out of business Jobs created due to increased income generation © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2005 13 FDI and balance of payments Taxes, tariffs and other HOST payments to the govt. Subsidiary (+) Local output replaces imports Subsidiary (+) exports (+) Inflow of capital (+) HOME Parent Repatriated profits (-) 3rd Country © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2005 14 Economic Growth Increased: productivity growth, product and process innovation, and greater economic growth, Stemming from increased competition of MNE’s investments. © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2005 15 How Do Countries Encourage FDI?* Risk insurance.(Home) Elimination of double taxation. (Home) Tax incentives.(Host) Low interest rates. (Host) Grants for land and training of workforce (Host) Stable government and stable policies (Host) *See http://sbm.temple.edu/~rmudambi/Publications/Mudambi%20IJEB.pdf © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2005 16 How Do Countries Discourage FDI? Limit capital outflows. (Home) Manipulate tax code to encourage domestic investment. (Home) Political restrictions on investing in certain countries. (Home) Ownership restraints. (Host) Performance requirements. (Host) © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2005 17 Determinants of Bargaining Power Bargaining Power of Firm High Low Firms time horizon Long Short Comparable alternatives open to firm Many Few Value placed by host government on investment High Low © Ram Mudambi, Temple University, 2005 18