Fairness
Fairness exists to ensure participation from both sides – our
framework allows for storytelling, they just have to ground it in a
topical affirmative
Burch, 8 - Assistant Professor, Cumberland School of Law (Elizabeth, “CAFA'S IMPACT ON
LITIGATION AS A PUBLIC GOOD” 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2517, May, lexis)
Given this shortcoming, the second procedural justice component is fairness. Fairness
arguments are typically offered as policy reasons to trump pursuit of certain
reform proposals and aggregate social goals; n101 however, I use fairness here (and in
assessing CAFA) as a supplemental constraint rather than a substitute . Employing a
deontological conception of fairness to balance utility aids in, not only distributing
procedural costs and correcting procedural errors, but also in ensuring that the procedural
system does not disproportionately favor or burden plaintiffs or defendants. n102
Put differently, process should disperse the risk of error and the cost of access as evenly as
possible. Neither party [*2535] should have an advantage . n103 This idea of "fairness"
as avoiding lopsided distribution of error can be likened to the concept of "neutrality." n104 To
be sure, some imparity in distributing risks may be inevitable.
Finally, although analogous to fairness, participation - manifested as adequate representation in
the class context - humanizes process. n105 In its simplest form, participation necessitates
that those who are bound by a decision have an opportunity to take part (and be
heard) in adjudication. n106 Moreover, it encompasses inherent rights to present evidence,
observe the proceedings, cross-examine witnesses, and hear the judge's decision. n107 And
participation, even in class litigation, affords litigants dignity by granting them a
forum in which to tell their story. n108 "Storytelling" has been criticized when used
to demonstrate satisfaction with process as a proxy for "justice." n109 I use the term here,
however, for its cathartic value only when situated within this larger [*2536]
procedural fairness framework .
Procedural fairness is most important—it establishes expectations for
preparation and facilitates respectful and productive dialogue
between well-prepared opponents.
Massaro 89 — Toni M. Massaro, Professor of Law at the University of Florida, 1989 (“Legal
Storytelling: Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?,”
Michigan Law Review (87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099), August, Available Online to Subscribing
Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)
B. The Rule-of-Law Model as Villain
Most writers who argue for more empathy in the law concede that law must resort to some
conventions and abstract principles. That is, they do not claim that legal rules are, as rules,
intrinsically sinister. Rather, they argue that we should design our legal categories and
procedures in a way that encourages the decisionmakers to consider individual persons and
concrete situations. Generalities, abstractions, and formalities should not dominate the process.
The law should be flexible enough to take emotion into account, and to respond openly to the
various "stories" of the people it controls. We should, as I have said, move toward "minimalist"
law.
Yet despite their acknowledgment that some ordering and rules are necessary,
empathy proponents tend to approach the rule-of-law model as a villain. Moreover,
they are hardly alone in their deep skepticism about the rule-of-law model. Most modern legal
theorists question the value of procedural regularity when it denies substantive justice. n52
Some even question the whole notion of justifying a legal [*2111] decision by
appealing to a rule of law, versus justifying the decision by reference to the facts of
the case and the judges' own reason and experience. n53 I do not intend to enter this
important jurisprudential debate, except to the limited extent that the "empathy" writings have
suggested that the rule-of-law chills judges' empathic reactions. In this regard, I have several
observations.
My first thought is that the rule-of-law model is only a model . If the term means absolute
separation of legal decision and "politics," then it surely is both unrealistic and undesirable. n54
But our actual statutory and decisional "rules" rarely mandate a particular
(unempathetic) response. Most of our rules are fairly open-ended . "Relevance," "the
best interests of the child," "undue hardship," "negligence," or "freedom of speech" -- to name
only a few legal concepts -- hardly admit of precise definition or consistent,
predictable application. Rather, they represent a weaker, but still constraining
sense of the rule-of-law model. Most rules are guidelines that establish spheres of
relevant conversation , not mathematical formulas .
Moreover, legal training in a common law system emphasizes the indeterminate nature of rules
and the significance of even subtle variations in facts. Our legal tradition stresses an
inductive method of discovering legal principles. We are taught to distinguish
different "stories," to arrive at "law" through experience with many stories, and to
revise that law as future experience requires. Much of the effort of most first-year law
professors is, I believe, devoted to debunking popular lay myths about "law" as clean-cut
answers, and to illuminate law as a dynamic body of policy determinations constrained by
certain guiding principles. n55
As a practical matter, therefore, our rules often are ambiguous and fluid standards
that offer substantial room for varying interpretations . The interpreter, usually a
judge, may consult several sources to aid in decisionmaking. One important source
necessarily will be the judge's own experiences -- including the experiences that seem to
determine a person's empathic capacity. In fact, much ink has been spilled to illuminate that our
stated "rules" often do not dictate or explain our legal results. Some writers even have argued
that a rule of law may be, at times, nothing more than a post hoc rationalization or attempted
legitimization [*2112] of results that may be better explained by extralegal (including, but not
necessarily limited to, emotional) responses to the facts, the litigants, or the litigants' lawyers,
n56 all of which may go unstated. The opportunity for contextual and empathic
decisionmaking therefore already is very much a part of our adjudicatory law,
despite our commitment to the rule-of-law ideal.
Even when law is clear and relatively inflexible, however, it is not necessarily
"unempathetic." The assumed antagonism of legality and empathy is belied by our experience
in rape cases, to take one important example. In the past, judges construed the general, openended standard of "relevance" to include evidence about the alleged victim's prior sexual
conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involved the defendant. n57 The solution to this
"empathy gap" was legislative action to make the law more specific -- more formalized. Rape
shield statutes were enacted that controlled judicial discretion and specifically defined relevance
to exclude the prior sexual history of the woman, except in limited, justifiable situations. n58 In
this case, one can make a persuasive argument not only that the rule-of-law model does explain
these later rulings, but also that obedience to that model resulted in a triumph for the human
voice of the rape survivor. Without the rule, some judges likely would have continued to respond
to other inclinations, and admit this testimony about rape survivors. The example thus shows
that radical rule skepticism is inconsistent with at least some evidence of actual judicial
behavior. It also suggests that the principle of legality is potentially most critical for people who
are least understood by the decisionmakers -- in this example, women -- and hence most
vulnerable to unempathetic ad hoc rulings.
A final observation is that the principle of legality reflects a deeply ingrained, perhaps
inescapable, cultural instinct. We value some procedural regularity – “law for
law's sake" – because it lends stasis and structure to our often chaotic lives. Even
within our most intimate relationships, we both establish "rules," and expect the
other [*2113] party to follow them . n59 Breach of these unspoken agreements can
destroy the relationship and hurt us deeply , regardless of the wisdom or
"substantive fairness" of a particular rule. Our agreements create expectations ,
and their consistent application fulfills the expectations. The modest
predictability that this sort of "formalism" provides actually may encourage
human relationships . n60
Their argument can’t be negated. This proves our argument — they
refuse to invite us to the argumentative table.
Subotnik 98 — Daniel Subotnik, Professor of Law at the Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center at
Touro College, holds a J.D. from Columbia University School of Law, 1998 (“What's Wrong With
Critical Race Theory?: Reopening The Case For Middle Class Values,” Cornell Journal of Law
and Public Policy (7 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 681), Spring, Available Online to Subscribing
Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)
B. And the Consequences
Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on
the relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material
suggests, the central CRT message is not simply that minorities are being treated
unfairly, or even that individuals out there are in pain—assertions for which there
are data to serve as grist for the academic mill—but that the minority scholar
himself or herself hurts and hurts badly.
An important problem that concerns the very definition of the scholarly enterprise
now comes into focus. What can an academic trained to [*694] question and to
doubt n72 possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"?
n73 "No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"? "Other people hurt too"? Or, most
dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting
yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well-being of minority groups
in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real
conversation. But, writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges
of race and power... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our lives is...
ultimately obliterating." n74
"Precarious." "Obliterating." These words will clearly invite responses only from fools
and sociopaths ; they will, by effectively precluding objection , disconcert and
disunite others. "I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated
effects. First, it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that
law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even
silly n75 - destructive and, above all, self-destructive arti [*695] cles. n76 Second, by
emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt"
discourages fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves from their pain in order
to gain perspective on their condition. n77
[*696] Last, as we have seen, it precludes the possibility of open and structured
conversation with others . n78
[*697] It is because of this conversation-stopping effect of what they insensitively call
"first-person agony stories" that Farber and Sherry deplore their use. "The norms of
academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the
researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article
by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice
would be to put the scholar's experience on the table , along with other relevant
material , but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny .
If through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting
academic debate , why do they not have greater influence on public policy? Discouraging
white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race, n80 I
suggest, has generated a kind of cynicism in white audiences which, in turn, has had
precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. It drives the
American public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively
rejected .
In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be
sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are
certain. First, the kinds of issues raised by Williams are too important in their
implications [*698] for American life to be confined to communities of color. If
the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts
and actions of the majority elements in society, it would seem to be of great
importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse to bring
about change . Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of
legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest
scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally,
the streets and the airwaves.
* CRT = Critical Race Theory
* CRAT = CRT’s Advocates
Decision Making
The primary purpose of debate should be to improve our skills as
decision-makers. We are all individual policy-makers who make
choices every day that affect us and those around us. We have an
obligation to the people affected by our decisions to use debate as a
method for honing these critical thinking and information processing
abilities.
Austin J. Freeley and David L. Steinberg – John Carroll University / U Miami – 2009,
Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, p. 1-4,
googlebooks
After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives
and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if
Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by
United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military* action against Iraq continued in
various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an
attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi
regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to
support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.¶ Meanwhile,
and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over
whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family
or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools;
elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of
law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these* situations called for decisions to
be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.¶ Decision
making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It
requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make
countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard
to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of
friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making
bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make
decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical
decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.¶ We all
make many decisions every day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a highperformance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have
for dinner, what candidate to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices.
Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or
diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?¶ Is
the defendant guilty as accused? The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what
information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions
are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television
program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue
all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our
decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision
making. In 2006, TIME magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its
selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather
on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information.
Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other
"wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian
control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of
information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our
needs?¶ The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical
decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking
enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to
evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of
information, as well as better advocates.¶ Colleges and universities expect their students
to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to
that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.¶ Much of the most
significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place
in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision
in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen
to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the
decisions of others.¶ Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability
to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in
ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is
concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate
school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or
vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often,
intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others.
We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a
vote for our favored political candidate.
A limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key
to productive inculcation of decision-making and advocacy skills in
every and all facets of life---even if their position is contestable that’s
distinct from it being valuably debatable---this still provides room for
flexibility, creativity, and innovation, but targets the discussion to
avoid mere statements of fact
Steinberg & Freeley 8 *Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on
criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND **David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of
Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for
Reasoned Decision Making pp45Debate is a means of settling differences , so there must be a difference of opinion or a
conflict of interest
policy, there
before there can be a debate.
If everyone is in agreement
on a tact or value or
is no need for debate : the matter can be settled by unanimous
consent . Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus
two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential
prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues,
there is no debate . In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear
identification of a question or questions to be answered . For example, general argument may
occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration . How many illegal immigrants are in the
United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our
communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social
services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage
illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal
immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do
illegal immigrants do work that American workers are
unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law
enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation
of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should
we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national
identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely
you
can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of
illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense.
However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular
question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy . To be discussed and
resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly . Vague understanding results in
unfocused deliberation and poor decisions , frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the
failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration
debate during the summer of 2007 .
Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially
disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are
overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to
maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful
decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups
of
concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express
their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their
discussions , they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of
clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow . But if a precise question is
posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is
opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more
judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary
debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a
program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program"
They provide
specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.
To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing
more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate.
and
placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly
defined . If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global
warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis
for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than
the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear
argumentation . If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some
purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.
Although we now have a general subject , we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad , too
loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels,
government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context?
What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question
might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?"
The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition
such as "Resolved: That the
United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that
fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative
interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing
interpretations of the controversy ; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging . The point is
that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of
difference , which will be outlined in the following discussion.
Organizational Decision Making
That skill set is vital to actualizing change outside the confines of the
debate space.
Algoso, 11 (Dave, Director of Programs at Reboot, MPA, International Development Blogger, “Why I got an MPA: Because
organizations matter,” 5/31, http://algoso.org/2011/05/31/why-i-got-an-mpa-because-organizations-matter/)
organizations matter . Forget the stories of heroic individuals written in your middle school civics textbook.
Nothing of great importance is ever accomplished by a single person. Thomas Edison had
Because
lab assistants, George Washington’s army had thousands of troops, and Mother Teresa’s Missionaries of Charity had over a million
staff and volunteers when she passed away. Even Jesus had a 12-man posse. In different ways and in vastly different contexts, these
were all organizations. Pick your favorite historical figure or contemporary hero, and I can almost
their greatest successes occurred as part of an organization . Even the
most charismatic, visionary and inspiring leaders have to be able to manage people, or find someone
who can do it for them. International development work is no different. Regardless of your issue of interest —
guarantee that
whether private sector investment, rural development, basic health care, government capacity, girls’ education, or democracy
promotion — your work will almost always involve operating within an organization. How
well or poorly that organization functions will have dramatic implications for the results of your work. A
well-run
organization makes better decisions about staffing and operations; learns more from its
mistakes; generates resources and commitment from external stakeholders; and structures itself to better promote
its goals. None of this is easy or straightforward. We screw it up fairly often. Complaints about NGO management and
government bureaucracy are not new. We all recognize the need for improvement. In my mind, the greatest challenges
and constraints facing international development are managerial and
organizational, rather than technical. Put another way: the greatest opportunities and leverage points lie in how we run our
organizations. Yet our discourse about the international development industry focuses largely on how much money donors should
commit to development and what technical solutions (e.g. deworming, elections, roads, whatever) deserve the funds. We give short
shrift to the questions around how organizations can actually turn those funds into the technical solutions. The closest we come is to
discuss the incentives facing organizations due to donor or political requirements. I think we can go deeper in addressing the
management and organizational issues mentioned above. This thinking led me to an MPA degree because it straddles that space
between organizations and issues. A degree in economics or international affairs could teach
you all about the problems in the world, and you may even learn how to address them. But if you don’t
learn how to operate in an organization, you may not be able to channel the resources needed
to implement solutions . On the flip side, a typical degree in management offers relevant skills, but without the content
knowledge necessary to understand the context and the issues. I think the MPA, if you choose the right program for you and use
your time well, can do both.
Dogmatism
Most problems are not black and white but have complex, uncertain
interactions. By declaring that _____ is always bad, they prevent us
from understanding the nuances of an incredibly important and
complex issue. This is the epitome of dogmatism
Keller, et. al,– Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago 2001
(Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U.
of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student
debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active
learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)
John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial
advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from
holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by
exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt,
confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force
comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p.
45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that learning requires openness to
divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a
purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the
certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from
new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the
result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to
help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and
experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process
begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then
integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will
be facilitated" (p. 28).
The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to
learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate
stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values
underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students
must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing
tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a
reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.
Predictable Limits
Predictable Limits - The resolution proposes the question the negative
is prepared to answer and creates a bounded list of potential affs for
us to think about. Debate has unique potential to change attitudes
and grow critical thinking skills because it forces pre-round internal
deliberation on a of a focused, common ground of debate
Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003,
When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative
Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf
What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar
unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in
the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had
become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this
circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to
brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic
posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people
to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from
the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier
stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury
process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually
all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this
one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s
engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in
the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance
of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31
Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue
much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts
or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand
approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we
have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or
incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand,
in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group
deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated
by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The
suggestion here is
that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine
ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’,
we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and
evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the
update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked
in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward
something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the
reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been
calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored
memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’.
Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion.
The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one.
And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process,
often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that
elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping
and reshaping of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial
processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and
inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to
internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have
about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence
(perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this
more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy
consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to
divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with
talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in
our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer
focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internalreflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a
more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions
might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a
considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary
Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation –
‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to
attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what
extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered
deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive,
open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’
juries the need to participate (or the anticipation of participating) in formally
organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those
attributes. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less
formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all
cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in
which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary
politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics
involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that
has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass
politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted.
• A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are
invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited
set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for
much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the
‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a
very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest
and voter apathy). •
In a citizens’ jury, we think and listen in anticipation of the
discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a
discursive setting where they will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-
political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’
juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better
– more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features
that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways
that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like)
in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for
debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a
‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss
public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are
doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to
practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those
features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact
that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.
Switch Side Debate
The purpose of debate should be determined by the unique role this
forum can play—instrumental switch side debate generates unique
critical thinking benefits—err neg because the benefits of their
advocacy could be achieved in alternate forums
Muir 93 [Star Muir, communication studies at George Mason University, 1993, Philosophy and
Rhetoric 26.4, p. 291-2]
Firm moral commitment to a value system, however, along with a sense of moral identity, is founded in reflexive assessments of multiple perspectives.
Switch-side debate is not simply a matter of speaking persuasively or organizing ideas clearly
(although it does involve these), but of understanding and mobilizing arguments to make an effective case.
Proponents of debating both sides observe that the debaters should prepare the best possible case they can, given the facts and information available to
them. This
process at its core, involves critical assessment and evaluation of arguments; it is a
process of critical thinking not available with many traditional teaching methods.
We must progressively learn to recognize how often the concepts of others are discredited by the concepts we use to justify ourselves to ourselves. We
must come to see how often our claims are compelling only when expressed in our own egocentric view. We can do this if we learn the art of using
concepts without living in them. This
is possible only when the intellectual act of stepping outside our own
systems of belief has become second nature, a routine and ordinary responsibility of everyday
living. Neither academic schooling nor socialization has yet addressed this moral
responsibility, but switch-side debating fosters this type of role playing and generates reasoned moral
positions based in part on values of tolerance and fairness.
Switch side debate—a forum of discussion that facilitates political
agonism where the negative can respond to the aff is the most
intellectually effective way to overcome moral hazards and make
decisions--the process here is more important than the substance of
their arguments.
Gutmann 96 Amy Gutmann , is the president of Penn and former prof @ Princeton, AND
Dennis Thompson is Alfred North Whitehead Professor of Political Philosophy at Harvard
University, Democracy and Disagreement, 1996 , pp 1
Of the challenges that American democracy faces today, none is more formidable
than the problem of moral disagreement. Neither the theory nor the practice of democratic politics has so far found
an adequate way to cope with conflicts about fundamental values. We address the challenge of moral
disagreement here by developing a conception of democracy that secures a central
place for moral discussion in political life . Along with a growing number of other political theorists, we call
this conception deliberative democracy . The core idea is simple: when citizens or their representatives disagree
morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions. But the meaning and implications of the idea are complex .
Although the idea has a long history, it is still in search of a theory. We do not claim that this book provides a comprehensive theory of deliberative
democracy, but we do hope that it contributes toward its future development by showing the kind of deliberation that is possible and desirable in the
face of moral disagreement in democracies. Some scholars have criticized liberal political theory for neglecting moral deliberation. Others have
analyzed the philosophical foundations of deliberative democracy, and still others have begun to explore institutional reforms that would promote
deliberation. Yet nearly all of them stop at the point where deliberation itself begins. None has systematically examined the substance of deliberationthe theoretical principles that should guide moral argument and their implications for actual moral disagreements about public policy. That is our
subject, and it takes us into the everyday forums of democratic politics, where moral argument regularly appears but where theoretical analysis too
rarely goes. Deliberative democracy involves reasoning about politics, and nothing has been more controversial in political philosophy than the nature
of reason in politics . We do not believe that these controversies have to be settled before deliberative principles can guide the practice of democracy .
Since on occasion citizens and their representatives already engage in the kind of reasoning that those principles recommend, deliberative democracy
simply asks that they do so more consistently and comprehensively. The best way to prove the value of this kind of reasoning is to show its role in
arguments about specific principles and policies, and its contribution to actual political debates. That is also ultimately the best justification for our
conception of deliberative democracy itself. But to forestall possible misunderstandings of our conception of deliberative democracy, we offer some
preliminary remarks about the scope and method of this book. The aim of the moral reasoning that our deliberative democracy prescribes falls between
impartiality, which requires something like altruism, and prudence, which demands no more than enlightened self-interest. Its first principle is
reciprocity, the subject of Chapter 2, but no less essential are the other principles developed in later chapters. When
citizens reason
reciprocally, they seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake; they try to find
mutually acceptable ways of resolving moral disagreements. The precise content of reciprocity is
difficult to determine in theory, but its general countenance is familiar enough in practice. It can be seen in the difference between acting in one's selfinterest (say, taking advantage of a legal loophole or a lucky break) and acting fairly (following rules in the spirit that one expects others to adopt). In
many of the controversies discussed later in the book, the possibility
of any morally acceptable resolution
depends on citizens' reasoning beyond their narrow self-interest and considering
what can be justified to people who reasonably disagree with them. Even though the quality of
deliberation and the conditions under which it is conducted are far from ideal in the controversies we consider, the fact that in each case some citizens
and some officials make arguments consistent with reciprocity suggests that a deliberative perspective is not utopian. To clarify what reciprocity might
Citizens who
reason reciprocally can recognize that a position is worthy of moral respect even
when they think it morally wrong. They can believe that a moderate pro-life position on abortion, for example, is
demand under non-ideal conditions, we develop a distinction between deliberative and non deliberative disagreement.
morally respectable even though they think it morally mistaken . (The abortion example-to which we often return in the book-is meant to be
illustrative. For readers who deny that there is any room for deliberative disagreement on abortion, other political controversies can make the same
point.) The presence of deliberative disagreement has important implications for how citizens treat one another and for what policies they should
adopt. When
a disagreement is not deliberative (for example, aboutapolicy to legalize discrimination against blacks
do not have any obligations of mutual respect toward their
opponents. In deliberative disagreement (for example, about legalizing abortion), citizens should try to accommodate the moral convictions of
their opponents to the greatest extent possible, without compromising their own moral convictions. We call this kind of accommodation an
economy of moral disagreement , and believe that, though neglected in theory and practice, it is essential to a
morally robust democratic life. Although both of us have devoted some of our professional life to urging these ideas on public
and women), citizens
officials and our fellow citizens in forums of practicalpolitics, this book is primarily the product of scholarly rather than political deliberation. Insofar as
it reaches beyond the academic community, it is addressed to citizens and officials in their more reflective frame of mind. Given its academic origins,
some readers may be inclined to complain that only professors could be so unrealistic as to believe that moral reasoning can help solve political
problems. But such a complaint would misrepresent our aims. To begin with, we
do not think that academic
discussion (whether in scholarly journals or college classrooms) is a model for moral deliberation in
politics. Academic discussion need not aim at justifying a practical decision, as deliberation must. Partly for this reason, academic discussion is
likely to be insensitive to the contexts of ordinary politics: the pressures of power, the problems of inequality, the demands of diversity, the exigencies
of persuasion. Some critics of deliberative democracy show a similar insensitivity when they judge actual political deliberations by the standards of
ideal philosophical reflection. Actual deliberation is inevitably defective, but so is philosophical reflection practiced in politics. The appropriate
comparison is between the ideals of democratic deliberation and philosophical reflection , or between the application of eachin the nonideal
circumstances of politics. We do not assume that politics should be a realm where thelogical syllogism rules. Nor do we expect even the more
appropriate standard of mutual respect alwaysto prevail in politics. A deliberative perspective sometimes justifies bargaining, negotiation, force, and
even violence. It is partly because moral argument has so much unrealized potential in democratic politics that we believe it deserves more attention.
Because its place in politics is so precarious, the need to find it a more secure home and to nourish its development is all the more pressing. Yet because
it is also already' pert of our common experience, we have reason to hope that it can survive and even prosper if philosophers along with citizens and
public officials better appreciate its value in politics. Some readers may still wonder why deliberation should have such a prominent place in
democracy. Surely, they may say, citizens should care more about the justice of public policies than the process by which they are adopted, at least so
long as the process is basically fair and at least minimally democratic. One of our main aims in this book is to cast doubt on the dichotomy between
policies andprocess that this concern assumes. Having good reason as individuals to believe that a policy is just does not mean that collectively as
citizens we have sufficient justification to legislate on the basis of those reasons. The moral authority of collective judgments about policy depends in
Deliberation is the most
appropriate way for citizens collectively to resolve their moral disagreements not
only about policies but also about the process by which policies should be adopted.
Deliberation is not only a means to an end, but also a means for deciding what means are morally
required to pursue our common ends.
part on the moral quality of the process by whichcitizens collectively reach those judgments.
AT: Topical Debate Undermines Conviction
Conviction emerges from discussion, not prior to it – debate exists to
establish and refine positions so that ideas may be subsequently
chosen
Galloway, 7 –professor of communication at Samford University (Ryan, “DINNER AND
CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS
AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28
(2007), ebsco)
Those who worry that competitive academic debate will cause debaters to lose their convictions,
as Greene and Hicks do in their 2005 article, confuse the cart with the horse. Conviction is not a
priori to discussion, it flows from it. A. Craig Baird argued, “Sound conviction depends upon a
thorough understanding of the controversial problem under consideration (1955, p. 5). Debate
encourages rigorous training and scrutiny of arguments before debaters declare themselves an
advocate for a given cause. Debate creates an ethical obligation to interrogate ideas from a
neutral position so that they may be freely chosen subsequently.
Defending an argument in a debate doesn’t force you to be a real life
proponent of it – only subjecting your views to examination can
establish their validity
Baird, 55 – Professor of Speech at the University of Iowa (C. A., “The college debater and the red china issue,” Central States Speech Journal, 6(2), 5-7)
A second indictment of you debaters is that if you discuss recognizing Red China you may fall victim to the
Communistic propaganda. The assumption is that you may become inoculated. You may become brainwashed. The issue here is
whether you may be gullible enough to swallow the "wrong" side of any subject — whatever that "wrong" side
is—if you happen to argue it.
This criticism is a vote of non-confidence in you. It amounts to the expression of the ancient
distrust of democratic participation. The implication is that we Americans, even if we are reasonably well trained, are
nevertheless incompetent to decide important questions. We cannot be trusted to push out into the
troubled seas of propagandist^ conflict.
Our only reply at this point is to invite those who fear open discussion on important issues, to read again any
treatise on American government. We furthermore suggest a reading again of the great documents of our heritage.
The principles in all of these documents steadily affirm that ours is a government by talk; that the
secret voting is accompanied by popular assemblies and the free exchange of ideas and
arguments; that all citizens share the right and ability to think, communicate, and decide, and
that we can rely upon the molding of public opinion through these avenues of our democratic
system.
My other recommendation to those who look askance at free discussion and debate is to read again John Stuart Mill's Liberty of Thought and Expression. According
to Mill, the opinion or side which we ignore or sidestep may be true. Or, continued Mill, the forbidden
side or opinion which we ignore or sidestep may be partly true. Or, concluded Mill, even if one
hundred per cent truth is on our side, our opinions or conclusions become valid and properly
significant only if we subject them to examination. Indeed, as Mill suggested, our beliefs and convictions,
unless under continual review, may become enfeebled or lost, and so "inefficacious for good."
Sound conviction can only happen after thoroughly researching and
debating both sides of an issue – it is hypocritical and immoral not to
require debaters to defend both sides
Muir, 93 – Department of Communications at George Mason
(Star A., “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate,” Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4. Gale Academic Onefile)
In a tolerant context, convictions can still be formed regarding the appropriateness and utility of
differing values. Responding to the charge that switch-side debaters are hypocritical and
sophistical, Windes responds with a series of propositions:
Sound conviction depends upon a thorough understanding of the controversial problem under
consideration. . . . This thorough understanding of the problem depends upon careful analysis of the
issues and survey of the major arguments and supporting evidence. . . , This measured analysis and examination of the evidence and argument
can best be done by the careful testing of each argument pro and con. . . . The learner's sound
conviction covering controversial questions [therefore] depends partly upon his experience in defending and/or
rejecting tentative affirmative and negative positions.""*
Sound conviction, a key element of an individual's moral identity, is thus closely linked to a
reasoned assessment of both sides. Some have even suggested that it would be immoral not to
require debaters to defend both sides of the issues."" It does seem hypocritical to accept the basic
premise of debate, that two opposing accounts are present on everything, and then to allow students the comfort of their
own untested convictions. Debate might be rendering students a disservice, insofar as moral education is
concerned, if it did not provide them some knowledge of alternative views and the concomitant
strength of a reasoned moral conviction.
AT: Resolution is Bad
Even if the resolution is wrong, having a devil’s advocate in
deliberation is vitally important to critical thinking skills and
avoiding groupthink
Hugo Mercier and Hélène Landemore- 2011
(Philosophy, Politics and Economics prof @ U of Penn, Poli Sci prof @
Yale), Reasoning is for arguing: Understanding the successes and
failures of deliberation, Political Psychology,
http://sites.google.com/site/hugomercier/publications
Reasoning can function outside of its normal conditions when it is used purely internally. But it is not enough for reasoning to be
done in public to achieve good results. And indeed the problems of individual reasoning highlighted above, such as
polarization and overconfidence, can also be found in group reasoning (Janis, 1982;
Stasser & Titus, 1985; Sunstein, 2002). Polarization and overconfidence happen because not
all group discussion is deliberative. According to some definitions of deliberation,
including the one used in this paper, reasoning has to be applied to the same thread of
argument from different opinions for deliberation to occur. As a consequence, “If the
participants are mostly like-minded or hold the same views before they enter into
the discussion, they are not situated in the circumstances of deliberation.” (Thompson,
2008: 502). We will presently review evidence showing that the absence or the silencing of dissent is a quasi-necessary condition for polarization or overconfidence to
occur in groups. Group polarization has received substantial empirical support. 11 So much support in fact that Sunstein has granted group polarization the status of
law (Sunstein, 2002). There is however an important caveat: group polarization will mostly happen when people share an opinion to begin with. In defense of his
claim, Sunstein reviews an impressive number of empirical studies showing that many groups tend to form more extreme opinions following discussion. The
examples he uses, however, offer as convincing an illustration of group polarization than of the necessity of having group members that share similar beliefs at the
outset for polarization to happen (e.g. Sunstein, 2002: 178). Likewise, in his review of the group polarization literature, Baron notes that “The crucial antecedent
condition for group polarization to occur is the presence of a likeminded group; i.e. individuals who share a preference for one side of the issue.” (Baron, 2005).
Accordingly, when groups do not share an opinion, they tend to depolarize. This has been shown in several experiments in the laboratory (e.g. Kogan & Wallach,
1966; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1978). Likewise, studies of deliberation about political or legal issues report that many groups do not polarize (Kaplan & Miller, 1987;
Luskin, Fishkin, & Hahn, 2007; Luskin et al., 2002; Luskin, Iyengar, & Fishkin, 2004; Mendelberg & Karpowitz, 2000). On the contrary, some groups show a
homogenization of their attitude (they depolarize) (Luskin et al., 2007; Luskin et al., 2002). The contrasting effect of discussions with a supportive versus dissenting
audience is transparent in the results reported by Hansen ( 2003 reported by Fishkin & Luskin, 2005). Participants had been exposed to new information about a
political issue. When they discussed it with their family and friends, they learned more facts supporting their initial position. On the other hand, during the deliberative
weekend—and the exposition to other opinions that took place—they learned more of the facts supporting the view they disagreed with. The present theory, far from
being contradicted by the observation that groups of likeminded people reasoning together tend to polarize, can in fact account straightforwardly for this observation.
When people are engaged in a genuine deliberation, the confirmation bias present
in each individual’s reasoning is checked, compensated by the confirmation bias of
individuals who defend another opinion. When no other opinion is present (or
expressed, or listened to), people will be disinclined to use reasoning to
critically examine the arguments put forward by other discussants, since they share
their opinion. Instead, they will use reasoning to strengthen these arguments or find
other arguments supporting the same opinion. In most cases the reasons each individual has for holding the same
opinion will be partially non-overlapping. Each participant will then be exposed to new reasons supporting the common opinion, reasons that she is unlikely to
criticize. It is then only to be expected that group members should strengthen their support for the common opinion in light of these new arguments. In fact,
groups of like-minded people should have little endogenous motivation to start
reasoning together: what is the point of arguing with people we agree with? In
most cases, such groups are lead to argue because of some external constraint. These
constraints can be more or less artificial—a psychologist telling participants to deliberate or a judge asking a jury for a well supported verdict—but they have to be
factored in the explanation of the phenomenon. 4. Conclusion: a situational approach to improving reasoning We have argued that reasoning should not be evaluated
primarily, if at all, as a device that helps us generate knowledge and make better decisions through private reflection. Reasoning, in fact, does not do those things very
well. Instead, we rely on the hypothesis that the function of reasoning is to find and evaluate arguments in deliberative contexts. This evolutionary hypothesis explains
why, when reasoning is used in its normal conditions—in a deliberation—it can be expected to lead to better outcomes, consistently allowing deliberating groups to
reach epistemically superior outcomes and improve their epistemic status. Moreover, seeing reasoning as an argumentative device also provides a straightforward
account of the otherwise puzzling confirmation bias—the tendency to search for arguments that favor our opinion. The confirmation bias, in turn, generates most of
the problems people face when they reason in abnormal conditions— when they are not deliberating. This will happen to people who reason alone while failing to
entertain other opinions in a private deliberation and to groups in which one opinion is so dominant as to make all others opinions—if they are even present—unable
to voice arguments. In both cases, the confirmation bias will go unchecked and create polarization and overconfidence. We believe that the argumentative theory
offers a good explanation of the most salient facts about private and public reasoning. This explanation is meant to supplement, rather than replace, existing
psychological theories by providing both an answer to the why-questions and a coherent integrative framework for many previously disparate findings. The present
article was mostly aimed at comparing deliberative vs. non-deliberative situations, but the theory could also be used to make finer grained predictions within
deliberative situations. It is important to stress that the theory used as the backbone for the article is a theory of reasoning. The theory can only make predictions about
reasoning, and not about the various other psychological mechanisms that impact the outcome of group discussion. We did not aim at providing a general theory of
group processes that could account for all the results in this domain. But it is our contention that the best way to reach this end is by investigating the relevant
psychological mechanisms and their interaction. For these reasons, the present article should only be considered a first step towards more fined grained predictions of
when and why deliberation is efficient. Turning now to the consequences of the present theory, we can note first that our emphasis on the efficiency of diverse groups
sits well with another recent a priori account of group competence. According to Hong and Page’s Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem for example, under certain
plausible conditions, a diverse sample of moderately competent individuals will outperform a group of the most competent individuals (Hong & Page, 2004).
Specifically, what explains the superiority of some groups of average people over smaller groups of experts is the fact that cognitive diversity (roughly, the ability to
interpret the world differently) can be more crucial to group competence than individual ability (Page, 2007). That argument has been carried over from groups of
problem-solvers in business and practical matters to democratically deliberating groups in politics (e.g., Anderson, 2006; Author, 2007, In press). At the practical
level, the present theory potentially has important implications. Given that individual reasoning works best when confronted to different opinions, the present theory
supports the improvement of the presence or expression of dissenting opinions in deliberative settings. Evidently, many people, in the field of deliberative democracy
or elsewhere, are also advocating such changes. While these common sense suggestions have been made in the past (e.g., Bohman,
2007; Sunstein, 2003, 2006), the present theory provides additional arguments for them. It also explains why approaches focusing on individual
rather than collective reasoning are not likely to be successful. Specifically tailored practical suggestions can also be made by using departures from the
normal conditions of reasoning as diagnostic tools. Thus, different departures will entail different solutions. Accountability—having to defends one’s
opinion in front of an audience—can be used to bring individual reasoners closer to a situation of private deliberation. The use of different aggregation
mechanisms could help identify the risk of deliberation among like-minded people. For example, before a group launches a discussion, a preliminary
If this procedure shows that people agree
on the issue at hand, then skipping the discussion may save the group some efforts and
reduce the risk of polarization. Alternatively, a devil’s advocate could be introduced in
the group to defend an alternative opinion (e.g. Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986).
vote or poll could establish the extent to which different opinions are represented.
AT: Debate Key to Social Change
Debate itself never a site for social change, but a place to develop
skills for change—bucking the topic prevents coalitions and creates
unproductive tension
Atchison and Panetta, 09 (Jarrod Atchison, Phd Rhetoric University of Georgia,
Assistant Professor and Director of debate at Wake Forest University, and Edward Panetta, Phd
Rhetoric Associate Professor University of Pitt and Director of Debate at Georgia, Intercollegiate
Debate and Speech Communication, Historical Developments and Issues for the Future,
“Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook
of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications Inc., 2009) p. 317334)
The final problem with an individual debate round focus is the role of competition. Creating community change through
individual debate rounds sacrifices the "community" portion of the change. Many teams
that promote activiststrategies in debates profess that they are more interested in creating change than winning debates. What is clear, however, is that
thevast majority of teams that are not promoting community change are very interested in winning debates. The
tension that is
generated from the clash of these opposing forces is tremendous. Unfortunately, this is
rarely a productive tension. Forcing teams to consider their purpose in debating, their style in debates, and their approach to
evidence are allcritical aspects of being participants in the community. However, the dismissal of the proposed
resolution that the debaters have spent countless hours preparing for, in the
name of a community problem that the debaters often have little control over,
does little to engender coalitions of the willing. Should a debate team lose because its director or coach has been
ineffective at recruiting minority participants? Should a debate team lose because its coach or director holds political positions that are in opposition to
the activist program? Competition
has been a critical component of the interest in
intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of
the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change.
Structural practices of debate make change from within the activity
impossible
Atchison and Panetta, 09 (Jarrod Atchison, Phd Rhetoric University of Georgia,
Assistant Professor and Director of debate at Wake Forest University, and Edward Panetta, Phd
Rhetoric Associate Professor University of Pitt and Director of Debate at Georgia, Intercollegiate
Debate and Speech Communication, Historical Developments and Issues for the Future,
“Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook
of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications Inc., 2009) p. 317334)
In addition to the structural problems, the collective forgetfulness of the debate community reduces
the impact that individual debates have on the community. The debate community is largely made up of participants
who debate and then move on to successful careers. The coaches and directors that make up the backbone of the community
are the people with the longest cultural memory, but they are also a small minority of the
community when considering the number of debaters involved in the activity. This is not meant to suggest that the activity is reinvented every
year-certainly there are conventions that are passed down from coaches to debaters and from debaters to debaters. However, the basic fact remains that
there are virtually no transcriptions available for the community to read, and, therefore, it is difficult
to substantiate the claim that the debate community can remember anyone individual debate over the course of several generations of debaters.
Additionally, given
the focus on competition and individual skill, the community is more
likely to remember the accomplishments and talents of debaters rather than a specific winning
argument. The debate community does not have the necessary components in place for a strong
collective memory of individual debates. The combination of the structures of debate and the collective forgetfulness means that
any strategy for creating community change that is premised on winning individual debates is less effective than seeking a larger community dialogue
that is recorded and/or transcribed. A second problem with attempting to create community change in individual debates is that the
debate
community is comprised of more individuals than the four debaters and one judge that are
present in every round. Coaches and directors have very little space for engaging in a discussion
about community issues. This is especially true for coaches and directors who are not preferred judges and, therefore, do not have
access to many debates. Coaches and directors should have a public forum to engage in a community
conversation with debaters instead of attempting to take on their opponents through the wins
and losses of their own debaters.