General Military Strategic,
Doctrinal, Operational, and
Leadership Concepts
Lsn 2 and 3
Agenda
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Key Theorists
Principles of War
Elements of Operational Design
Forms of Maneuver
METT-TC
Strategy
Strategic Leadership
Key Theorists
Clausewitz
Jomini
Clausewitz
• Carl von Clausewitz
– Prussian officer born in 1780
– Resigned his commission in
1812 and joined the Russian
Army to fight Napoleon
– Ideas on war were heavily
influenced by the mass popular
warfare of the French
Revolutionary period and
Napoleon’s Prussian adversary
Gerhard von Scharnhorst
– Died in 1831 and his wife
published his On War in 1832
Clausewitz
• War is neither an art nor a science
– It is a continuation of “policy” (or “politics”) by
other means.
– A form of social intercourse
• War is like a wrestling match
– It is “an act of force to compel our enemy to
do our will.”
– But it is not unilateral. It is a contest between
two independent wills.
Clausewitz
• Used a trinitarian analysis consisting of (1) primordial
violence, hatred, and enmity; (2) the play of chance and
probability; and (3) war’s element of subordination to
rational policy
– Often loosely expressed as “the people, the military, and the
government”
• Analyzed “absolute war” or “war in theory,” but then
noted that factors such as poor intelligence, chance,
friction, etc make war in practice different than war in the
abstract
• Argued one should focus his military efforts against the
enemy’s “center of gravity” (“Schwerpunkt”)
– Very important concept in American military doctrine
Jomini
• Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) was
a Swiss military theorist who sought to
interpret Napoleon
• Published the Summary of the Art of
War in 1838
– Became the premier militaryeducational text of the midnineteenth century and greatly
influenced Civil War generals
– “Many a Civil War general went into
battle with a sword in one hand and
Jomini’s Summary of the Art of War
in the other” (General J. D. Hittle)
• Product of the Enlightenment
Jomini
• Very geometrical and scientific approach
to war
• Stressed interior lines
– “those adopted by one or two armies to
oppose several hostile bodies, and having
such a direction that the general can
concentrate the masses and maneuver with
his whole force in a shorter period of time
than it would require for the enemy to oppose
them a greater force.”
Interior Lines
• The benefits of
interior lines
could be gained
either by central
position or
superior lateral
communications
Exterior
Lines
Interior
Lines
Principles of War
Principles of War
• British military officer J. F. C. Fuller developed a list
of principles based on the works of Clausewitz and
Jomini for use by the British Army in World War I
• The US Army modified them and published its first
list in 1921
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Objective
Offensive
Mass
Economy of force
Maneuver
Unity of command
Security
Surprise
Simplicity
Objective
• When undertaking any mission, commanders should
have a clear understanding of the expected outcome
and its impact. Commanders need to appreciate political
ends and understand how the military conditions they
achieve contribute to them.
– Ensure that all actions contribute to the goals of the
higher headquarters.
– Example: The Emancipation Proclamation changed
the Federal objective of the war from merely restoring
the Union to also ending slavery.
Offensive
• Offensive operations are essential to maintain the
freedom of action necessary for success, exploit
vulnerabilities, and react to rapidly changing situations
and unexpected developments.
– Offensive actions are those taken to dictate the
nature, scope, and tempo of an operation.
– Offensive action is key to achieving decisive results; it
is the essence of successful operations.
– Example: Lee’s two invasions of northern territory
represented offensive strategies.
Mass
• Commanders mass the effects of combat power
in time and space to overwhelm enemies or gain
control of the situation.
– Time: applies the elements of combat power
against multiple targets simultaneously
– Space : concentrates the effects of different
elements of combat power against a single
target
– Example: Grant had a huge advantage in
mass over Lee toward the end of the war.
Economy of Force
• Commanders never leave any element without a
purpose. When the time comes to execute, all
elements should have tasks to perform.
– Economy of force requires accepting prudent risk in
selected areas to achieve superiority in the decisive
operation.
– Economy of force involves the discriminating
employment and distribution of forces.
– Example: The South decided to make the west an
economy of force theater in spite of the arguments
of the Confederate Western Concentration Bloc
(Beauregard, Longstreet, et al)
Maneuver
• As both an element of combat power and a principle
of war, maneuver concentrates and disperses combat
power to place and keep the enemy at a
disadvantage. It includes the dynamic, flexible
application of leadership, firepower, information, and
protection as well.
– Achieves results that would otherwise be more costly
– Keeps enemies off balance by making them confront new
problems and new dangers faster than they can deal with
them.
– Example: Chancellorsville represented the classic
envelopment while Fredericksburg and Pickett’s Charge
showed the costliness of the frontal attack.
Unity of Command
• Unity of command means that a single
commander directs and coordinates the actions
of all forces toward a common objective.
– Develops the full combat power of a force
– Usually requires giving a single commander
authority
– Example: Grant and Porter cooperated as an
army-navy team at Vicksburg.
Security
• Calculated risk is inherent in conflict. Security protects
and preserves combat power.
– Does not involve excessive caution
– Measures taken by a command to protect itself from
surprise, interference, sabotage, annoyance, and
threat
– Example: Fears for the security of Washington
influenced Lincoln’s decision-making during the
Peninsula Campaign.
Surprise
• Surprise results from taking actions for which an
enemy or adversary is unprepared.
– It is only necessary that the enemy become
aware too late to react effectively.
– Contributions to surprise include speed,
information superiority, and asymmetry.
– Example: Sherman’s March to the Sea put the
Confederates on the “horns of a dilemma”
because Sherman’s true destination was
unknown.
Simplicity
• Plans and orders should be simple and direct. Simple
plans executed on time are better than detailed plans
executed late.
– Clear and concise plans cut down on
misunderstandings
– Example: Grant’s orders to Sherman in the Atlanta
Campaign are classic in their simplicity and clarity.
Elements of Operational
Design
Elements of Operational Design
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Synergy
Simultaneity and depth
Anticipation
Balance
Leverage
Timing and tempo
Operational reach and approach
Elements of Operational Design
(cont)
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Forces and functions
Arranging operations
Centers of gravity
Direct versus indirect
Decisive points
Culmination
Termination
Elements of Operational Design
(cont)
• Synergy
– Seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve
concentrations in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining
the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with
minimum casualties
– Example: Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign relieved
pressure on Lee outside of Richmond.
• Simultaneity and depth
– Place more demands on adversary forces than can be handled
both in terms of time and space
– Example: It was not until the end of the war that Grant brought a
grand strategy to the Federal effort that pressured the
Confederacy and Lee simultaneously from all directions.
Elements of Operational Design
(cont)
• Anticipation
– Remain alert for the unexpected and opportunities to exploit the
situation
– Example: Grant failed to anticipate the Confederate attack at
Shiloh and will be surprised and defeated the first day.
• Balance
– Maintain the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a
manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness
– Example: Trying to defend its entire territory proved impossible
for the Confederacy and led it to develop an “offensivedefensive” strategy.
Elements of Operational Design
(cont)
• Leverage
– Gain, maintain, and exploit advantages in combat
power across all dimensions
– Example: Grant’s numerical advantage allowed him
to maintain constant pressure on Lee in 1864-1865.
• Timing and tempo
– Conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that
best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the
adversary
– Example: The speed of Sherman’s March to the Sea
thwarted any meaningful resistance.
Elements of Operational Design
(cont)
• Operational reach and approach
– The distance over which military power can mass
effects and be employed decisively
– Example: The superior Federal Navy allowed the
North to blockade the South.
• Forces and functions
– Focus on defeating either adversary forces or
functions, or a combination of both
– Example: Sherman’s March to the Sea targeted
Confederate functions of war-making ability and will at
the same time Grant’s Overland Campaign targeted
Lee’s forces.
Elements of Operational Design
(cont)
• Arranging operations
– Achieve dimensional superiority by a combination of
simultaneous and sequential operations
– Phases: Deter/engage, Seize initiative, Decisive operations,
Transition
– Example: Grant’s preliminary attempts, his maneuver, his
assaults on Vicksburg, and ultimately the siege combined to
produce a logical line of operation.
• Centers of gravity
– Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from
which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical
strength, or will to fight
– Destroying or neutralizing adversary centers of gravity is the
most direct path to victory
– Example: McClellan fought as if Richmond was the Confederate
center of gravity rather than Lee’s army.
Elements of Operational Design
(cont)
• Direct versus indirect
– To the extent possible, attack centers of gravity directly, but
where direct attack means attacking into an opponent’s strength
seek an indirect approach
– Example: Longstreet unsuccessfully tried to convince Lee to
threaten Washington or Baltimore by a turning movement rather
than continuing the offensive at Gettysburg.
• Decisive points
– Usually geographic in nature, but can sometimes be key events
or systems
– Give a marked advantage to whoever controls them
– Keys to attacking protected centers of gravity
– Example: By securing the flank at Little Round Top, Chamberlain
saved day for the Federals at Gettysburg.
Elements of Operational Design
(cont)
• Culmination
– Point in time and space at which an attacker’s combat power no
longer exceeds that of the defender or the defender no longer
can preserve his force
– Example: Lincoln was very frustrated that Meade did not pursue
Lee after Gettysburg but decisive battles were elusive in the Civil
War because of culmination.
• Termination
– Military operations typically conclude with attainment of the
strategic ends for which the military force was committed, which
then allows transition to other instruments of national power and
agencies as the means to achieve broader goals
– Example: The end of the Civil War led to Reconstruction.
Forms of Maneuver
Forms of Maneuver
• The five forms of maneuver are the
– envelopment,
– turning movement,
– infiltration,
– penetration, and
– frontal attack.
Envelopment
Envelopment
• The envelopment is a form of maneuver in which an
attacking force seeks to avoid the principal enemy
defenses by seizing objectives to the enemy rear to
destroy the enemy in his current positions.
• Envelopments avoid the enemy front, where he is
protected and can easily concentrate fires.
• Single envelopments maneuver against one enemy
flank; double envelopments maneuver against both.
Either variant can develop into an encirclement.
• Example: Chancellorsville
Turning Movement
Turning Movement
• A turning movement is a form of maneuver in which
the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy's
principal defensive positions by seizing objectives to
the enemy rear and causing the enemy to move out
of his current positions or divert major forces to
meet the threat.
• A major threat to his rear forces the enemy to attack or
withdraw rearward, thus "turning" him out of his
defensive positions.
• Turning movements typically require greater depth than
other forms of maneuver.
• Example: Peninsula Campaign
Infiltration
Infiltration
• An infiltration is a form of maneuver in which an
attacking force conducts undetected movement
through or into an area occupied by enemy forces
to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy
rear while exposing only small elements to enemy
defensive fires
– Typically, forces infiltrate in small groups and reassemble to
continue their mission.
– Infiltration rarely defeats a defense by itself. Commanders
direct infiltrations to attack lightly defended positions or
stronger positions from the flank and rear, to secure key
terrain to support the decisive operation, or to disrupt enemy
sustaining operations.
– Example: ?
Penetration
Penetration
• A penetration is a form of maneuver in which an
attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses
on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system.
– Commanders direct penetrations when enemy flanks are not
assailable or time does not permit another form of maneuver.
Successful penetrations create assailable flanks and provide
access to enemy rear areas.
– Because penetrations frequently are directed into the front of
the enemy defense, they risk significantly more friendly
casualties than envelopments, turning movements, and
infiltrations.
– Example: Sherman’s March to the Sea
Frontal Attack
Frontal attack
• The frontal attack is frequently the most costly form of
maneuver, since it exposes the majority of the attackers to
the concentrated fires of the defenders.
– As the most direct form of maneuver, however, the frontal attack is
useful for overwhelming light defenses, covering forces, or
disorganized enemy resistance.
– It is often the best form of maneuver for hasty attacks and meeting
engagements, where speed and simplicity are essential to
maintain tempo and the initiative.
– Commanders may direct a frontal attack as a shaping operation
and another form of maneuver as the decisive operation.
– Example: Fredericksburg
METT-TC
METT-TC
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Mission
Enemy
Terrain and Weather
Troops and Equipment
Time
Civilians
Mission
• Seize Vicksburg in order to control the
Mississippi River and separate the
Confederacy in two
Enemy
• Pemberton
– Five divisions totaling 43,000 effectives
• Pemberton fell under Johnston’s
Department of the West
– Represented some potential for a relief force
• No ironclads and only a few wooden
gunboats
Terrain
• Vicksburg located astride the
railroad that linked Shreveport,
LA (and thus the three states
west of the river) to the eastern
transportation network
• Line of bluffs that dominated
the river favored defense
• Northeast and west of
Vicksburg was wetland that
would inhibit offensive
movement
Troops
• Army
– Grant had a
maneuver force of ten
divisions (44,000
effectives)
• Navy
– Porter’s Mississippi
River Squadron had
about 60 combat
vessels of which 20 to
25 would support the
Vicksburg operation at
any one time
Time
• Pemberton had ample time to prepare his
defense
• Grant needed to attack before his supplies
ran out and before Johnston could
reinforce
• Once the siege began, time benefited the
offense
Civilians
• About 5,000 lived in
Vicksburg
• Pemberton was
responsible for their
well-being
• Other civilians along
the Mississippi River
posed a guerrilla threat
to the Federal Navy
• Potential source of
intelligence
Strategy
Strategy
• Strategy is the pursuit, protection, or
advancement of national interests through
the application of the instruments of power
• Instruments of power (DIME)
– Diplomatic
– Informational
– Military
– Economic
Strategy
• Strategy is about how (way or
concept) leadership will use
the power (means or
resources) available to the
state to exercise control over
sets of circumstances and
geographic locations to
achieve objectives (ends) that
support state interests
• Strategy = Ends (objectives)
+ Ways (course of action) +
Means (instruments)
– Ways to employ means to
achieve ends
Strategy:
Confederates at Vicksburg
• End
– Deny Federal use of the Mississippi River
• Way
– Interdict river traffic at Vicksburg
• Mean
– Pemberton’s force at Vicksburg
Traditional Military Strategies
• Attrition
– The reduction of the effectiveness of a
force caused by loss of personnel and
materiel
• Exhaustion
– The gradual erosion of a nation’s will or
means to resist
• Annihilation
– Seeks the immediate destruction of the
combat power of the enemy’s armed forces
Strategic Leadership
Strategic Leadership Skills
• Interpersonal Skills
– Communicating
– Using Dialogue
– Negotiating
– Achieving Consensus
– Building Staffs
Strategic Leadership Skills
• Conceptual Skills
– Envisioning
– Developing Frames of Reference
– Dealing with Uncertainty and Ambiguity
Strategic Leadership Skills
• Technical Skills
– Strategic Art
– Leveraging Technology
– Translating Political Goals into Military
Objectives
Strategic Leadership Skills
• Interpersonal Skills
– Communicating
• “When you first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I never had
any faith, except a general hope that you knew better than I,
that the Yazoo Pass expedition, and the like, could succeed.
When you got below, and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, and
vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join
General Banks; and when you turned northward east of the
Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now which to make the
personal acknowledgement that you were right and I was
wrong.”
– Lincoln to Grant
Strategic Leadership Skills
• Interpersonal Skills
– Using Dialogue
• Pemberton preferred to command behind the scenes and had little
direct communication with his soldiers or subordinate commanders
– Negotiating
• Grant and Porter were able to achieve Army-Navy cooperation in
the absence of a hierarchical command relationship
– Achieving Consensus
• Pemberton’s superiors, Davis and Johnston, did not achieve
consensus on the proper strategy and gave Pemberton conflicting
guidance
– Building Staffs
• Grant received great benefit from his logistical staff that kept him
resupplied after he “cut loose” from his base
Strategic Leadership Skills
• Conceptual Skills
– Envisioning
• Success at Raymond convinced Grant to shift his decisive
point from the Confederate railroads to Jackson, which
allowed him to isolate Vicksburg from reinforcements.
– Developing Frames of Reference
• Pemberton brought from Charleston a dictum that he must
not do anything to leave Vicksburg vulnerable.
– Dealing with Uncertainty and Ambiguity
• This was Pemberton’s chief failure. He was continually left
guessing by Grant’s diversions and maneuver and was
always a couple steps behind.
Strategic Leadership Skills
• Technical Skills
– Strategic Art
• Control of the Mississippi would separate the Confederacy
into two halves and controlling Vicksburg would give the
North control of the Mississippi
– Leveraging Technology
• At the time of the Vicksburg Campaign, the Confederacy had
no ironclads. The Federal Mississippi River Squadron
included thirteen ironclads.
– Translating Political Goals into Military Objectives
• The Anaconda Plan was rejected as a military strategy
because it failed to meet the political objective for a quick,
offensive war.
Writing Requirement
• 2,000 to 2,500 word battle or campaign
analysis
– You pick the battle or campaign
– Can be one we discussed in class or another,
but I must approve it
• On Lsn 14, bring in your introductory
paragraph
• Lsn 15 will be a writing workday (no class)
Analytical Writing
• GRE Analytical Writing Measure assesses
the applicant's ability to
 articulate complex ideas clearly and
effectively
 examine claims and accompanying evidence
 support ideas with relevant reasons and
examples
 sustain a well-focused, coherent discussion
 control the elements of standard written
English
Thesis
• “a position or proposition that a person ...
advances and offers to maintain by
argument"
• Webster’s Dictionary
Writing Style
• Put the recommendation, conclusion or reason for
writing -- the “bottom line” -- in the first paragraph, not
at the end. (BLUF)
• Use the active voice.
• Write for your audience, but, in general, keep it
simple
– Use short sentences (an average of 15 or fewer words).
– Understand the words you use
– Write paragraphs that average 6 to 7 sentences in length.
• Use correct spelling, grammar, and punctuation.
Organization: “M1A1 Paper”
• Intro… tell them what you’re going to tell
them
• Body… tell them
• Conclusion… tell them what you told them
Example
• Introduction
– Robert E. Lee defeated George McClellan in the Peninsula
Campaign because of the superior Confederate intelligence
system. This advantage manifested itself in terms of synthesis,
analysis, and collection. In terms of synthesis, Lee was able to
assemble John Magruder’s initial panicky reports and develop a
reconcentration of forces in response. In terms of analysis,
McClellan’s exaggerated estimates of Confederate troop
strength led him to be cautious when he should have pressed his
advantage. In terms of collection, Jeb Stuart’s cavalry gave Lee
had an intelligence gathering asset that McClellan could not
match. Lee’s superior intelligence system allowed him to act
faster and more accurately than McClellan could and gave Lee a
decisive advantage on the Peninsula.
Example
• Para 2
– Analysis (McClellan’s exaggerations)
• Para 3
– Synthesis (Magruder’s reports)
• Para 4
– Collection (Stuart)
Example
• Conclusion
– The key factor in the Confederate victory in the Peninsula
Campaign was superior intelligence. McClellan was cautious by
nature and his inaccurate magnifications of the Confederate
troop strength made him more so. Especially at this point in the
war, Confederate cavalry was far superior to its Federal
counterpart, and Stuart’s ride around McClellan’s army informed
Lee of a vulnerability he could exploit. Finally, Lee had the
personal ability to assemble complex and disorganized data into
a solution and he used this skill to make sense of Magruder’s
initial panicky reports. In all respects, intelligence gave the
Confederates an advantage and Lee turned this advantage into
victory on the Peninsula.
Next
• Civil War Causes and Initial Strategies