Running head: COMPLEMENTARITY IN NEGOTIATIONS
The Benefits of Dominance Complementarity in Negotiations
Word Count: 9,706
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. ii
ABSTRACT
We investigated the hypothesis that dominance complementarity can lead people to reach
mutually beneficial outcomes in negotiations. We argue that dominance complementarity should
improve interaction partners’ ability to coordinate the exchange of information in pursuit of their
goals. Across three experiments, participants were best able to discover integrative agreements in
negotiation exercises when one negotiator was instructed to behave dominantly and the other
negotiator was instructed to behave deferentially. Dominant negotiators assertively stated their
preferences for different outcomes, while deferential negotiators asked more questions in
response to dominant counterparts than non-dominant ones. Improved information exchange
mediated the relationship between dominance complementarity and improved joint outcomes in
the final study. The findings demonstrate that the benefits of dominance complementarity can
extend beyond the relational to the material.
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 1
The Benefits of Dominance Complementarity in Negotiations
Consciously or unconsciously, negotiators may assert dominance to extract value from
their counterparts. They may raise their voices, interrupt their counterparts, move themselves to
physical positions associated with higher power, and expand their body postures to make
themselves appear larger. By asserting dominance in these ways, negotiators hope to increase the
portion of the “pie” they receive, as people concede more to dominant negotiators than nondominant negotiators (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981; Camras, 1984; Komorita and Brenner, 1968;
Pruitt, 1981; Sinaceur and Tiedens, 2003). Similarly, negotiators may display submissive and
deferential behavior, such as maintaining a compact physical space and speaking in a soft voice,
when they seek to preserve the quality of their relationships with more powerful interaction
partners (Anderson, Ames, & Gosling, 2008; Holtgraves & Yang, 1990; 1992).
While expressing dominance may help negotiators to claim value from their counterparts
and expressing deference may help to preserve relationships with their counterparts, no research
to date has shown that expressions of dominance and submissiveness can help people to discover
integrative solutions to resource allocation issues and, thereby, create value in negotiations. In
fact, expressions of dominance are often cast as value-claiming moves that may be best reserved
for distributive negotiations among competitive strangers (Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Valley,
Neale, & Mannix, 1995). Likewise, negotiators wishing to maximize their objective outcomes
within negotiations are rarely counseled to express submissiveness or deference.
We propose that displays of dominance and deference may be functional in ways that
extend beyond claiming value in negotiations or preserving relationships with counterparts. We
suggest that expressions of dominance and submissiveness can help negotiators create value
when these expressions occur within the dynamic of dominance complementarity. Dominance
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 2
complementarity exists when people behave oppositely of their interaction partners in terms of
dominance and submissiveness – a dynamic that occurs frequently in social dyads and groups
(Bales, 1950; Bales, Strodtbeck, Mills, & Roseborough, 1951; de Waal, 1982; Dryer &
Horowitz, 1997; Goodall, 1996; Lonner, 1980; Michels, 1915; Murdock, 1945; Wright, 1994).
In the present research we hope not only to offer prescriptive advice for people approaching
negotiations but also to provide a descriptive account of how this pairing of dominance and
submissiveness can affect coordination in social tasks. We also hope to contribute to
Interpersonal Theory (e.g., Wiggins, 1979) by demonstrating objective, material benefits to
dominance complementarity.
The Dynamic of Dominance Complementarity
The Interpersonal Circumplex Model maps social behavior in a two-dimensional space
along the orthogonal dimensions of affiliation and control (Carson, 1969; Kiesler, 1983;
Wiggins, 1979; 1982). Circumplex theorists hold that people assimilate on the affiliation
dimension by behaving agreeably with those behaving agreeably toward them and by quarrelling
with those quarrelling with them. Conversely, people are expected to contrast with others on the
control dimension, behaving submissively toward others who behave dominantly and behaving
dominantly toward others who behave submissively (Carson, 1969; Horowitz, Locke, Morse,
Waikar, Dryer, Tarnow, & Ghannam, 1991; Horowitz, Wilson, Turan, Zolotsev, Constantino, &
Henderson, 2006; Kiesler, 1983; Tiedens & Jimenez, 2003).
This tendency to respond to dominance with submissiveness and to submissiveness with
dominance may be useful in social tasks requiring coordination. Previous research (e.g.,
Tiedens, Chow, & Unzueta, 2007) has speculated that dominance complementarity facilitates
performance on coordinative tasks, as complementarity creates a sense of hierarchy within a
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 3
dyad or group and hierarchy as a relational form can help people efficiently coordinate activity
and allocate resources (Leavitt, 2004; Iber, 2006; Michels, 1911). In line with this prediction, de
Kwaadsteniet & van Dijk (2010) showed that status differences (e.g. boss vs. intern) help people
to coordinate their choices in coordination exercises. They showed that low-status individuals
tailor their behavior to accommodate the likely behavior of high-status individuals and that this
deference leads to improved coordination. Given that dominance is used as a status cue (e.g.,
Bales, 1950), it may be useful for one person in a dyad to establish that he/she is taking the lead
in the conversation by expressing verbal and non-verbal dominance and the other person in the
dyad to establish that he/she is following that conversational lead by expressing verbal and nonverbal submissiveness.
Estroff and Nowicki’s (1992) findings provide some support for this perspective. They
compared the performance of people that complemented each other both on the affiliation and
control dimensions of behavior (i.e., similar affiliation and dissimilar
dominance/submissiveness) with the performance of people that were anticomplementary on
both dimensions (i.e., contrasting levels of affiliation and similar levels of
dominance/submissiveness). They found that participants in complementary dyads outperformed
those in anticomplementary dyads on the relatively coordination-intensive task of solving jigsaw
puzzles, but did not outperform those dyads on the less coordination-intensive word-generation
task. However, in these studies complementarity on the control dimension was always
confounded with complementarity on the affiliation dimension. Moreover, the tasks they used
were not designed to measure coordination. Their findings therefore cannot address the specific
impact of dominance complementarity on performance on social tasks.
More recent research has found that dyads who behaved complementarily along the
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 4
warmth dimension of behavior in an unstructured interaction were able to complete a subsequent
task more quickly and more accurately than were dyads who did not behave complementarily
(i.e. assimilate) on the warmth dimension, (Markey, Lowmaster, & Eichler, 2010). This research
did not find such a relationship between dominance complementarity on the first task and
performance on the subsequent task. However, because this research examined the relationship
between complementarity at a previous time and performance at a later time, it doesn’t provide
clear information about whether dominance complementarity facilitates coordination as it occurs.
Dominance complementarity may improve coordination because people acting dominantly
and people acting submissively take different, and complementary, approaches to conversation.
People expressing dominance are more likely to take the lead in conversations, they are more
expressive of their preferences, and they are more assertive in trying to influence their interaction
partners (Burgoon, Johnson, & Koch, 1998). They use subjunctive language less often than do
non-dominant people and are more certain and self-confident in the language that they use,
particularly when they are using language related to rejection (Weisfeld & Linkey, 1985; Zhou,
Burgoon, Zheng, Nunamaker, 2004). Within a task context, individuals acting dominantly set
the course for the conversation about the task. They clearly state their preferences, and the
conversation follows from their statements. People acting submissively use less assertive
language. Their statements tend to be more subdued. People expressing submissiveness follow
the lead of a dominant interaction partner and thus coordinate with the dominant partner. This
coordinative dynamic can be contrasted to interaction pairs in which both people express
dominance or both people express submissiveness. In the former case, interaction partners battle
for control making it difficult to work together. In the latter case, of two submissive interaction
partners, little gets accomplished as no direction is set.
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 5
Submissiveness and deference should not be confused with total passivity. Passivity
conveys a withdrawal from the interaction (which is unlikely to be productive in task settings),
whereas deference connotes cooperation with the interaction partner (Horowitz et al., 2006).
People who express submission and deference do not repress all action, rather they take actions
that demonstrate their willingness to follow the direction and lead of others. Because some
equate “submissiveness” with passivity, we use the term “deference” to refer to this state in
which people express a willingness to follow the lead of the other.
As Brown and Levinson (1985) describe in “Politeness Theory,” the ability to express
deference is an important social skill in that deference is the essence of being polite. Acts of
deference communicate respect for the other and the other’s wishes and express a concern for the
other’s standing. Deference requires attention to others’ preferences. While a dominant
negotiator might attempt to dissuade her counterpart from her preferences, a deferent one will
respect the counterpart’s preferences and may try to find solutions that take both the
counterpart’s interests and her own interests into account. This concern for both sets of interests
has been shown to drive value creation (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Although some negotiation
research thus might suggest that two deferential negotiators would be most successful in that
both would be searching for solutions that respect the others’ preferences, we suggest that when
both parties are deferential, a clear direction is not communicated by either party and preferences
are not communicated sufficiently transparently. Therefore, we suggest that dyads that are
characterized by one dominant member and one deferent member will be more successful than
other types of dyads at coordinating their search for sources of joint value. The present work
aims to provide the first solid evidence showing that dominance complementarity can improve
performance within social tasks requiring coordination and, in particular, within resource-
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 6
distribution tasks.
Coordination in Negotiations
People who can coordinate the exchange of information in social interactions are better
able to achieve their desired goals. By understanding others’ interests and expressing one’s own
interests, people can coordinate the give and take of information and discover ways to satisfy
both sets of interests. Nowhere is this more clear than in negotiations, which have often been
described as multi-party decision-making processes in which individuals must collaborate
through information sharing to recognize and achieve mutually beneficial outcomes (e.g. Carroll,
Bazerman, and Maury, 1988; Prietula & Weingart, 1994). In fact, Prietula and Weingart (2007)
describe the process of negotiation as a “collaborative search of a complex offer space, whereby
negotiators simplify and coordinate search via information contained in offer exchanges,
isolating sub-regions of the offer space for potential solutions ” (p. 3).
Dominance complementarity may enable negotiators to coordinate their of this offer
space more effectively If the dominant negotiator sets the framework of the conversation by
assertively stating her preferences, the counterpart can respond in a few ways. He could match
dominance with dominance and reject the statements of the counterpart or simply counter with
his own statements of preferences. Alternatively, the counterpart could attempt to find ways to
work around the dominant negotiators’ statement of preferences by asking questions and making
proposals that would allow the dominant negotiator to satisfy some of her preferences while also
allowing the deferential counterpart to satisfy some of his own preferences. We suggest this
latter, more deferential, approach may be a more effective way to coordinate the search for
mutually beneficial outcomes.
If negotiators within a dyad were better able to exchange information about priorities and
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 7
preferences, they should also be better able to find mutually beneficial agreements than if neither
negotiator assertively states his/her preferences and priorities. We therefore offer:
Hypothesis 1: Dyads that exhibit complementarity along the control dimension of behavior
create more value than do dyads in which both negotiators behave submissively.
Negotiators in dyads in which the negotiators behave complementarily should also be better able
to exchange information about priorities and preferences than if both negotiators assertively state
their own preferences and priorities and take little heed of their counterparts’ behavior. We
therefore put forth:
Hypothesis 2: Dyads that exhibit complementarity along the control dimension of behavior
create more value than do dyads in which both negotiators behave dominantly.
Comfort and Rapport
Dominance complementarity may also improve negotiation outcomes by improving the
comfort and rapport negotiators feel toward one another. Previous research has established both
that complementarity leads to elevated of rapport between interaction partners (Dryer &
Horowitz, 1997; Estroff & Nowicki, 1992; Horowitz et al., 1991; Sadler & Woody, 2003;
Tiedens & Fragale, 2003) and that elevated levels of rapport leave negotiators better able to
discover mutually beneficial agreements in integrative negotiations because moderate levels of
rapport leads to greater levels of trust and information sharing (Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson, &
Morris, 1999; Morris, Nadler, Kurtzberg, & Thompson, 2002; Valley, Neale & Mannix, 1995).
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 8
As such, negotiating dyads that pair dominance with submissiveness may be better able to reach
mutually beneficial solutions as a result of feeling rapport with their counterparts and feeling
comfortable within their interactions. We test whether dominance complementarity improves
joint outcomes through improved information exchange as argued above or through the
alternative mechanism of improved rapport.
Overview of Studies
Our studies examine the effects of dominant and deferent behaviors on negotiators’
performance. To examine these effects we instructed participants in our studies to display both
verbal and non-verbal behaviors that have been shown previously to signal either dominance or
deference in interpersonal interactions (see Hall, Coates, and LeBeau, 2005 for a review). In the
first experiment we test whether negotiators in dyads consisting of one dominant and one
deferential negotiator create more value than do negotiators in dyads in which both parties
behaved either dominantly or deferentially. In the second experiment we look more closely at
what negotiators do when engaging in dominance complementarity in a negotiation. In the third
experiment we test whether improved information exchange mediates the relationship between
dominance complementarity and improved negotiation performance.
Participants in all experiments engaged in two-party negotiation exercises in which there
was integrative potential, or the opportunity for negotiators to create value either by discovering
congruent issues or by trading-off issues that have different levels of importance to the two
negotiators. These exercises required negotiators to coordinate their information exchange to
discover mutually beneficial outcomes. The studies were designed to test if dominance
complementarity leads people to create material value in their interactions with others.
Study 1
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 9
In Study 1 we tested whether dyads in which one negotiator behaved dominantly and one
negotiator behaved deferentially (i.e., dyads characterized by dominance complementarity)
created more value than did dyads in which both negotiators behaved dominantly or both
negotiators behaved deferentially.
Method
Participants and Experimental Design
A total of 198 male and female undergraduate students (50% female; Age: M = 21) at five
West Coast colleges participated in the experiment as part of class exercises. Twenty-six of the
dyads were all female, 46 were mixed gender, and 23 were all male. In some of the dyads, both
negotiators were instructed to act deferentially; in some of the dyads, both negotiators were
instructed to act dominantly; and in some of the dyads, one negotiator was instructed to act
dominantly while the other negotiator was instructed to act deferentially (i.e., dominance
complementarity). As such, the experimental design of the study included the between-dyad
variable of the dyad’s dominance/deference instructions (both deferential vs. complementary vs.
both dominant), and the within-dyad variable of company role (Tolliver vs. Radeco).
Procedure
Participants reviewed the preparation documents for a two-party, six-issue negotiation
exercise in which both negotiators play the role of representative of a company merging with the
other company to form one combined company. This exercise, used in Wiltermuth & Neale
(2006), does not contain role-based power or status differentials. The documents provided to
negotiators included: the description of the negotiation, the pay-off matrix, and a message stating
the number of points the negotiator would receive should they fail to reach an agreement.
Negotiators were instructed that they would negotiate over six terms that affected the
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 10
future of the combined company, including: the percentage of layoffs coming from each
company, the headquarters location, the factory location, the composition of upper management,
the pay basis, and the pension plan. Each issue contained five potential agreement positions, each
of which represented a different point level. Appendix 1 displays the payoff matrix for both
company roles. Participants were explicitly told that the goal of negotiation was to maximize
their own points. One issue, percentage of layoffs from each firm, was purely distributive in that
a gain for one negotiator represented an equal loss for the other negotiator. The headquarters
location was a congruent issue, in which both parties desired the same agreement position. The
four remaining issues were integrative, such that each issue was more important to one
negotiator than the other and as such could be combined to create value. Negotiators were also
told that if they fail to reach an agreement a neutral third party would decide the terms of the
merger, and that these terms would result in a number of points that would be moderately easy to
achieve through negotiation.
Dominance / Deference Manipulation. Half of the negotiators were instructed that
displaying behaviors signaling dominance can give negotiators the upper hand in a negotiation.
These participants were then told that behaviors signaling dominance include: taking charge of
the conversation, speaking in a loud voice, making sure your views are understood, interrupting
others often, reducing interpersonal distances (i.e., standing or sitting close to the counterpart),
and demonstrating bodily openness (keeping knees apart, stretching out legs, keeping elbows
away from the body, preventing hands from touching, keeping legs uncrossed).
Other negotiators were instructed that signaling deference can give negotiators the upper
hand in a negotiation. Specifically negotiators receiving the deference instructions were told
“Sometimes negotiators come on too strong and the result is that negotiators can lock horns.
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 11
Research shows that negotiators need to display behaviors that convey that they are not going to
attack the other and that the other does not need to fear them. That is, negotiators can be led
astray by being too tough and forceful. In this negotiation try to disarm your counterpart by using
behavior that conveys that you are not trying to dominate him or her.” They were then told that
behaviors signaling deference include: treating the counterpart respectfully, making the
counterpart feel competent, agreeing with the counterpart whenever possible (without sacrificing
your own goals), complimenting the counterpart, maintaining a compact physical space (keeping
knees together, keeping elbows in toward the body, bringing hands together, crossing legs),
maintaining interpersonal distances (i.e., standing or sitting a good distance from the
counterpart), and speaking in a soft voice. Both negotiators receiving dominance instructions and
deference instructions were counseled to display the listed behaviors during their negotiations.
Dependent Variables
The joint points created by the dyad and the points claimed by the individual negotiator
served as the primary dependent measures. After the negotiation we also asked participants to
indicate how deferentially and dominantly they and their counterparts behaved within the
negotiation. To measure negotiator dominance, we presented negotiators’ counterparts with the
list of dominance behaviors viewed by negotiators in the dominant conditions and asked them to
circle the behaviors exhibited by the focal negotiator. We also asked “How many of the above
behaviors did your counterpart exhibit in this negotiation?” and “How dominant was your
counterpart in this negotiation?” Additionally, we asked the focal negotiator to indicate how
dominantly he/she behaved. Participants responded to these questions using seven-point Likert
scales. We then combined these items with a count of the number of behaviors circled into a
negotiator dominance scale (α = .72). To measure negotiator deference, we presented
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 12
negotiators’ counterparts with the list of deferent behaviors viewed by negotiators in the deferent
conditions and asked them to circle the behaviors exhibited by the focal negotiator. We then
presented participants with the same items used to create the dominance scale, replacing the
word “dominant” with the word “deferential”. This allowed us to create a negotiator deference
scale (α = .70).
Results
Treatment of Data
As expected, company role did not significantly interact with dominance/deference
instructions to predict total points (p = .55). Consequently, company roles were combined in all
subsequent analyses. Similarly, the school at which the negotiation occurred did not have a
significant effect on negotiators’ total points. Four of the original dyads were excluded from the
final analysis for failing to follow the negotiation instructions. Individual level data in this study
and in Study 2 were analyzed using the mixed modeling technique advised by Kenny, Kashy and
Cook (2006). We tested for interdependence of data within dyads by calculating the correlation
between negotiators’ outcomes within dyads and found evidence of statistically significant
interdependence (r = -.24, p = .01) of outcomes. One dyad in each of the complementary and
both dominant conditions reached an impasse, as did three dyads in the both deferent condition.
As suggested by Tripp and Sondak (1992) we included these dyads in the analyses, using the
number of points that the instructions had provided as their alternative outcome should the
parties fail to reach an agreement.
Manipulation Check
Negotiators with instructions to behave dominantly scored higher on the dominance scale
(M = 3.80, SD = 1.09) than did negotiators without such instructions, (M = 3.40, SD = 0.98),
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 13
t(186) = 2.61, p = .01. Similarly, negotiators with instructions to behave deferentially scored
higher on the deference scale (M = 4.49, SD = 0.99) than did negotiators without such
instructions, (M = 4.01, SD = 0.93), t(184) = 3.30, p = .01.
Joint Outcomes
We had predicted that dyads in which one negotiator behaved dominantly and one
negotiator behaved deferentially would create more value than would dyads in which both
negotiators behaved either dominantly or deferentially. The F-Test of the 1 x 3 Framing (both
deferent vs. complementary vs. both dominant) one-way ANOVA on total points was significant,
F(2,88) = 5.19, p = .01. As predicted in Hypotheses 1 and 2, when one negotiator was instructed
to act dominantly and the other negotiator was instructed to act deferentially the dyads created
more total points (M = 8,090, SD = 1,596) than did dyads in which both negotiators were
instructed to act dominantly (M = 6,991, SD = 1,667; t(88) = 2.47, p = .02) or dyads in which
both negotiators were instructed to behave deferentially (M = 6,911, SD = 1,846), t(88) = 2.83, p
= .01. There was no difference between dyads in which both negotiators acted dominantly and
those in which both negotiators acted deferentially, t(96) = 0.15, p = .89.
Individual Outcomes
To analyze individual outcomes, we first conducted a 2 Dominance/Deference
Instructions (dominance instructions vs. deference instructions) x 2 Counterpart
Dominance/Deference Instructions (dominance instructions vs. deference instructions) mixed
models analysis on points accumulated by individual negotiators. The main effects of
instructions and counterpart instructions were not significant, p’s > .5. Reflecting the increased
value creation, the instructions x counterpart instructions interaction was significant,
F(1,92)=14.8, p < .01. Negotiators behaving dominantly in the complementary (dominance v
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 14
deference) condition accumulated more value (M = 4,052, SD = 1,220) than did negotiators in
the both-deferent condition (M = 3,456, SD = 1,407; t(94) = 2.18, p = .03) or those in the bothdominant condition (M = 3,495, SD = 1,285), t(86) = 2.06, p = .04. Negotiators behaving
deferentially in the complementary condition also accumulated more value (M = 4,038, SD =
1,455) than did negotiators in the both-deferential condition (t(94) = 1.98, p = .05) and
marginally more than those in the both-dominant condition, t(84)=1.84, p = .07. The results
therefore showed a material benefit to behaving dominantly when facing a deferential
counterpart and a benefit to behaving deferentially when facing a dominant counterpart.
The dominance versus deference manipulation did not affect the percentage of total
points negotiators claimed, as dominant negotiators did not claim a significantly higher
percentage of the total points (51%) than did deferential negotiators in the complementary
condition (49%), t(84) = 0.47, p = .64.
Thus, gains to negotiators in the complementary
condition came from expanding the amount of value available to the dyad rather than claiming a
greater share of the value available.
Discussion
As predicted, dyads in which one negotiator behaved dominantly and one negotiator
behaved deferentially created more value than did dyads in which both negotiators behaved
either dominantly or deferentially. Results further indicated that the gains from complementarity
did not go solely to the dominant negotiator in the complementary dyad. Deferential negotiators
in the complementary condition accumulated significantly more value than did deferential
negotiators facing other deferential negotiators and marginally more value than did dominant
negotiators facing dominant negotiators. Complementarity, therefore, seemed to yield benefits
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 15
for both the dominant and deferent negotiators in a dyad.
Study 2
Study 1 provided some evidence for the basic phenomenon we proposed; negotiation
pairs characterized by dominance complementarity created more value than other pairs. Yet,
Study 1 provided little information about how this occurred. In the two following studies we
attempted to gain more information about what happens in these complementary dyads that
allows for better outcomes.
Many negotiations have integrative potential. To exploit integrative potential, negotiators
need to share information about their preferences and priorities (Bazerman & Neale, 1992). This
requires both stating one’s own preferences as well as eliciting and attending to information
about the counterpart’s preferences. We suggest that dominance complementarity may serve
negotiators well because it promotes this process of information exchange. The dominant
negotiator assertively puts forward information about her preferences. The deferent member
attends to that information, questioning the dominant negotiator so that he may satisfy some of
his own preferences while accommodating the strong preferences of the dominant negotiator. In
Study 2 we attempted to examine this process by asking negotiators about the exact verbal
strategies they used in the negotiation to see if negotiators in complementary pairs engaged in
different behaviors than negotiations in other kinds of pairs.
Method
Participants and Experimental Design
Ninety undergraduate students (68% female, Mage = 21) at a major West Coast University
participated in the exercise. The experimental design of the study included the between-dyad
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 16
variables of interpersonal dynamic (complementarity vs. both dominant vs. both deferent) and
the within-dyad variable of role (recruiter vs. candidate).
Procedure
Participants reviewed the preparation documents for the “New Recruit Exercise”, a twoparty, eight-issue negotiation exercise (Pinkley, Neale, and Bennett, 1994) in which one
negotiator plays the role of a job candidate and one negotiator plays the role of a recruiter. The
documents provided to negotiators included: the description of the negotiation, the pay-off
matrix, and a message stating the negotiator’s option should they fail to reach an agreement.
Negotiators were instructed that they would negotiate over eight issues related to the
employment contract. Each negotiator was given an alternative to a negotiated agreement that
would result in a number of points that would be moderately easy to achieve through negotiation.
In their instruction materials participants received instructions to behave either dominantly or
submissively. After completing the negotiation, participants completed a questionnaire
concerning their experience within the negotiation.
Dominance/Deference Manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to behave
either dominantly or deferentially. This yielded three conditions: the complementary condition
the both-dominant condition, or the both-deferent condition. The instructions to act dominantly
were a subset of those used in Study 1. We omitted the instructions to take charge of the
conversation, interrupt others often, and make sure their views were understood because we did
not want to dictate verbal strategies. Rather, we wanted to give the negotiators a sense of what
dominance could look like, but allow them to choose their own verbal strategies to match that
general style. Similarly, the instructions to act deferentially also only provided information
about non-verbal behavior. They stated that the negotiator should display reduced facial
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 17
expressiveness, maintain a compact physical space (keeping knees together, keeping elbows in
toward the body, bringing hands together, crossing legs), maintain interpersonal distances (i.e.,
standing or sitting a good distance from the counterpart), and speak in a soft voice.
Dependent Variables
The joint points created by the dyad served as a dependent measure in order to replicate
Study 1’s finding that that complementary pairs created more value. We also once again
examined the points claimed by the individual negotiators. We examined participants’ responses
to a questionnaire that included questions about the verbal strategies they used in the negotiation.
Specifically, participants rated, “How strongly did you assert your desires for different
outcomes?”, “How clear were your statements of preferences? “, “How much did you try to
control the conversation?”, “How much did you let your counterpart control the conversation?”,
“How much did you interrupt your counterpart?”, “How much did you make sure your views
were understood?”, and “How many questions did you ask during the negotiation?” As a
manipulation check, we also asked participants to indicate on a seven-point Likert scale how
much they engaged in each of the behaviors listed in the dominance and deference instructions.
Results
Treatment of Data
Because role did not affect negotiators’ points (p = .60), we combined the data from the
roles in all analyses. There was evidence of statistically significant interdependence (r = -.61, p
= .001) of outcomes within dyads. Three of the original dyads were excluded from the final
analysis for one of the negotiators’ failure to follow the negotiation instructions by accepting
deals that were worth far less than their alternatives to a negotiated settlement. Excluding these
dyads, one of which occurred in each condition, did not significantly affect the results.
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 18
Manipulation Checks
Participants receiving instructions to act dominantly indicated that they engaged in the
listed nonverbal dominance behaviors (α = .86) more often (M = 4.61, SD = 0.98) than did
participants with instructions to act deferentially (M = 2.28, SD = 1.51); t(67.2) = 8.13, p = .001.
Participants receiving instructions to act deferentially indicated that they engaged in the listed
nonverbal deferent behaviors (α = .91) more often (M = 6.01, SD = 1.26) than did those
receiving instructions to act dominantly (M = 2.99, SD = 1.20); t(77) = -11.18, p = .001.
Joint Outcomes
The overall F-Test of the 1 x 3 Interpersonal Dynamic (complementarity vs. both
dominant vs. both deferent) ANOVA on the total value created was marginally significant,
F(2,39) = 2.58 p = .09. Consistent with predictions, dyads in the complementarity condition
created significantly more points (M = 9,814, SD = 1,424) than did those in the noncomplementary conditions (M = 8,743, SD = 1,474), (t(39) = 2.22 p = .03). They created
significantly more points than did dyads in the both-dominant condition (M = 8,614, SD =
1,739), (t(39) = 2.16, p = .04) and marginally more points than did dyads in the both-deferent
condition (M = 8,871, SD = 1,204), t(39) = 1.69, p = .10.
Individual Outcomes
We conducted a 2 Dominance/Deference Instructions (dominance instructions vs.
deference instructions) x 2 Counterpart Dominance/Deference Instructions (dominance
instructions vs. deference instructions) mixed models analysis on points accumulated by
individual negotiators. The main effects of instructions and counterpart instructions were not
significant, p’s > .5. Reflecting that complementary dyads created more total value, the
instructions x counterpart instructions interaction was significant, F(1,39)=4.91, p = .03.
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 19
Negotiators behaving dominantly in the complementarity condition did not earn significantly
more points (M = 5,093, SD = 1,777) than did those behaving deferentially, (M = 4,721, SD =
1,441), t(80) = .61 p = .55.
Verbal Behavior within the Dyads
We conducted a 2 Dominance/Deference Instructions (dominance instructions vs.
deference instructions) x 2 Counterpart Dominance/Deference Instructions (dominance
instructions vs. deference instructions) mixed models analysis to examine the effect of these
instructions on negotiators’ use of verbal behaviors. We found main effects of dominance
instructions on how strongly negotiators asserted their preferences (F(1,68.4) = 3.98, p = .05),
how clearly they stated their preferences (F(1,63.9) = 3.10, p = .08), how controlling they were
of the conversation (F(1,54.9) = 3.29, p = .08), how much they let their counterparts control the
conversation (F(1,67.9) = 7.43, p = .01), how often they interrupted their counterparts (F(1,74.6)
= 5.75, p = .02), and how much they made themselves understood by their counterparts
(F(1,63.3) = 4.80, p = .03). Specifically, negotiators with instructions to act dominantly
indicated that they asserted their preferences more strongly(M = 5.21, SD = 0.88 vs. M = 4.51,
SD = 1.54; t(64.4) = 2.46 p = .02), stated their preferences more clearly (M = 5.36, SD = 1.01 vs.
M = 4.68, SD = 1.54; t(69.5) = 2.33 p = .02), were more controlling of the conversation (M =
4.82, SD = 1.21 vs. M = 4.05, SD = 1.97; t(65.0) = 2.10 p = .04), interrupted the counterparts
more often (M = 2.92, SD = 1.74 vs. M = 2.13, SD = 1.59; t(77.0) = 2.14 p = .04), and made
themselves more understood (M = 5.46, SD = 1.21 vs. M = 4.55, SD = 1.77; t(69.1) = 2.67 p =
.01) than did negotiators with instructions to act deferentially. Dominant negotiators engaged in
this verbal dominance regardless of whether they were negotiating with a dominant or deferent
counterpart. Negotiators with instructions to act deferential indicated that they let their
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 20
counterpart control the interaction more (M = 4.10, SD = 1.81) than did their dominant
counterparts (M = 3.03, SD = 1.29), t(70.5) = -3.05 p = .01, regardless of whether they were
negotiating with a dominant or deferent counterpart. Neither the main effect of counterpart’s
dominance/deference instructions nor the interaction of the negotiator’s instructions and the
counterpart’s instructions were significant for any of the above variables.
Negotiators instructed to behave deferentially responded to their counterparts’ dominance
by asking more questions. Specifically, negotiators instructed to behave deferentially asked more
questions of their counterparts when they faced counterparts instructed to behave dominantly (M
= 9.00, SD = 5.42) than they did when facing counterparts who were also instructed to behave
deferentially (M = 6.41, SD = 3.33), t(74.0) = 1.98 p = .05.
Discussion
Study 2 provided further support for the notion that dyads that behave complementarily
on the dominance dimension of behavior outperform those in which both parties behave
dominantly or those in which both parties behave deferentially. It also provided evidence that
dominance complementarity in negotiations is characterized by the dominant negotiator
assertively stating preferences and the deferent negotiator responding to those statements with
questions. The combination of dominant negotiators making assertive statements and deferent
negotiators following up on those statements with questions likely promotes better information
exchange and allows complementary pairs to test creative solutions.
Although Studies 1 and 2 show that complementary pairs create more value than pairs
characterized purely by dominance or those purely by deference, these studies leave open the
possibility that negotiators would be better able to create value if they were to refrain from acting
dominantly or deferentially altogether within the negotiation context. Previous research has
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 21
argued that, under some conditions, differences in power within a dyad can impair negotiators’
abilities to discover sources of joint value (de Dreu & van Kleef, 2003; Giebels, de Dreu & van
de Vliert, 1998; but see Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2001). Given that people with power often
express dominance and people without power often express deference (e.g., Bales, 1950), the
pairing of dominance and deference expressions within a dyad may also impede value creation
relative to situations in which neither dominance nor deference is expressed by either negotiator.
We hypothesize, however, that the improved coordination effected by dominance
complementarity will improve information exchange relative to situations in which neither
negotiator expresses dominance or deference. Specifically, we propose the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Dyads that exhibit complementarity along the control dimension of behavior
create more value than do dyads with no behavioral instructions
We further assert that the increased information exchange sparked by dominant
negotiators stating their preferences will improve information exchange relative to situations in
which neither negotiator makes an effort to behave dominantly or deferentially. As a result, we
believe that complementary dyads will outperform other dyads. We put forth:
Hypothesis 4: Improved information exchange mediates the relationship between dominance
complementarity and improved value creation.
Study 3
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 22
Studies 1 and 2 illustrated that dominance complementarity can improve people’s abilities
to create value in their social interactions. This result may be surprising given that Maddux,
Mullen, & Galinsky (2008) have shown that mimicking a counterpart’s behavior (i.e., acting the
same as the counterpart) can improve negotiation outcomes, as dominance complementarity
involves people acting differently from one another.
Consistent with previous research on the positive benefits of mimicking others (e.g.,
Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; LaFrance, 1979; van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van
Knippenberg, 2004; van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, & van Knippenberg, 2003), mimicry has
been shown to improve negotiator’s outcomes by improving rapport and trust (Maddux et al.,
2008) – two factors that can lead negotiators to share more information about their priorities.
However, mimicry of behaviors would theoretically increase trust only if the behaviors
mimicked do not signal dominance or deference. As Interpersonal Circumplex theorists (e.g.,
Horowitz et al., 1991) have repeatedly shown, people are especially likely to like their
interaction partners if they assimilate or mimic each other on the affiliation dimension of
behavior but are especially likely to dislike their interaction partners if they assimilate instead of
contrast on the control dimension of behavior. Thus, mimicking those forms of behavior that do
not inherently signal dominance and submissiveness could improve negotiators’ ability to
exchange information by creating rapport, while exhibiting dominant/submissive behaviors that
contrast with the behavior of a counterpart could improve coordination and thereby improve
negotiators’ ability to exchange information. To explore the idea that both mimicry and
dominance complementarity can be helpful, we included in Study 3 both a mimicry condition in
which one negotiator was instructed to mimic the counterparts’ actions and a complementary
condition in which one negotiator was instructed to act deferentially and one negotiator was
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 23
instructed to ask dominantly.
We also sought in Study 3 to ensure that increased attention to the counterparts’ behavior
did not lie behind the improved negotiation outcomes attained by negotiators in the
complementarity or mimicry conditions. We therefore included instructions to negotiators in all
conditions to attend to their counterparts’ behaviors. We also wanted to ensure that the
dominance and deference instructions did not affect negotiator outcomes or behavior by affecting
their aspirations or expectations entering the negotiation.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, we sought to further examine how complementary
dyads are especially able to discover integrative solutions. We provide evidence that improved
information exchange facilitates the discovery of these integrative solutions. We also examine
whether enhanced rapport is involved in the relationship between dominance complementarity
and value creation.
Method
Participants and Experimental Design
A total of 268 male and female undergraduate and graduate students at a major West Coast
University participated in the exercise. Forty-nine percent of participants were female and the
average age of participants was 22. The experimental design of the study included the betweendyad variables of behavioral instructions (control vs. mimicry vs. complementarity) and the
within-dyad variable of role (recruiter vs. candidate).
Procedure
Participants engaged in the same “New Recruit Exercise” (Pinkley, Neale, and Bennett,
1994) used in Study 2. The documents provided to negotiators included: the description of the
negotiation, the pay-off matrix, and a message stating the negotiator’s option should they fail to
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 24
reach an agreement. Participants also received a message containing their behavioral
instructions. Following the negotiation, participants completed a short questionnaire concerning
their experience within the negotiation.
Behavioral Instructions Manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to the control
condition, the mimicry condition, or the complementarity condition. Negotiators in half of the
control condition dyads received no behavioral instructions, while negotiators in the other
control condition dyads were instructed “research suggests that paying close attention to your
counterpart’s words and actions can dramatically enhance your negotiation performance. Thus,
your negotiation strategy should include monitoring the behavior of your counterpart.” We
included this heightened attention condition to ensure that increased attention paid to the
counterpart in the mimicry and complementarity conditions did not lead participants in those
conditions to outperform participants in the control condition. Participants in the mimicry and
complementarity conditions also received the advice that paying close attention to their
counterparts can improve negotiator performance.
One negotiator in each dyad in the complementarity condition was instructed that
displaying behaviors signaling dominance can give negotiators the upper hand in a negotiation.
These negotiators then saw the same list of non-verbal behaviors signaling dominance that was
used in Study 1. Similarly, one negotiator in each dyad in the complementarity condition was
instructed that negotiators can sometimes lock horns and that it is therefore advisable to behave
deferentially. They saw the same list of deference behaviors used in Study 1.
As in Maddux et al. (2008), one negotiator in each dyad in the mimicry condition was
instructed: “Successful negotiators recommend that you should mimic the mannerisms of your
negotiation partner to get a better deal. For example, when the other person rubs his/her face, you
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 25
should too – but wait a second or two before you imitate the other person. If he/she leans back or
leans forward in the chair, you should too. However, they say it is very important that you mimic
subtly enough that the other person does not notice what you are doing, otherwise this technique
completely backfires. Also, do not direct too much of your attention to the mimicking so you
don’t lose focus on the outcome of the negotiation. Thus, you should find a happy medium of
consistent but subtle mimicking that does not disrupt your focus.” The other negotiator in each
dyad in the mimicry condition was given no behavioral instructions.
Dependent Variables
As a manipulation check of dominance and deference, participants indicated whether the
dominant behaviors or deferent behaviors better characterized their behavior using a scale that
ranged from 1 (More like Set A) to 7 (More like Set B). Set A was comprised of the dominant
behaviors, while Set B was comprised of the deferent behaviors. Participants were also asked to
describe any instructions they may have been given about how to behave.
The joint points created by the dyad served as the primary dependent measure. We also
examined the points claimed by the individual negotiators. Additionally, as a measure of
information exchange, participants indicated, using a seven-point Likert scale, the amount of
information their counterpart revealed about the issues that were important or unimportant to him
or her. We also asked negotiators to indicate how many points they expected to accumulate and
aspired to accumulate coming into the negotiation. Lastly, participants indicated how much they
liked their counterparts and how comfortable they felt within their negotiations as measures of
rapport.
Results
Treatment of Data
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 26
Points earned by negotiators in the candidate role did not differ significantly from points
earned by negotiators in the recruiter role; we therefore combined the data from the roles in
subsequent analyses. As in the previous studies, there was evidence of statistically significant
interdependence (r = -.41, p = .001) of outcomes within dyads. Twelve of the original dyads
were excluded from the final analysis for one of the negotiators’ failure to follow the negotiation
instructions by accepting deals that were worth far less than their alternatives to a negotiated
settlement. Excluding these dyads, which were spread across conditions, did not significantly
affect the results. There was no difference in the joint outcomes attained by control condition
dyads instructed to pay heightened attention to their counterparts (M = 10,448, SD = 2,122) and
those not given those instructions (M = 10,330, SD = 1,738), t(122) = 0.21, p = .83. We
therefore combined these groups into a single control condition in all subsequent analyses.
Manipulation Checks
After the negotiation we asked participants to summarize the instructions they received.
Forty-eight percent of participants in the mimicry condition wrote that they were instructed to
mimic their counterparts. One participant in the heightened attention condition reported
mimicking his counterpart and no participants in the control or complementarity conditions
reported mimicking their counterparts.
We also asked participants whether the set of dominant behaviors or the set of deferent
behaviors better characterized their behavior within the negotiation. With higher numbers on the
seven point scale indicating deference and lower numbers indicating dominance, participants
receiving instructions to act dominantly indicated behaving significantly more dominantly (M =
4.25, SD = 1.78) than did participants with only instructions to pay attention to their counterparts
(M = 4.88, SD = 1.47); t(240) = 2.03, p = .04.
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 27
Joint Outcomes
Means displaying total points for all conditions may be seen in Figure 1. The overall FTest of the 1 x 3 Interpersonal Dynamic (control vs. mimicry vs. complementarity) ANOVA on
the total value created was marginally significant, F(2,123) = 2.90, p = .06. Consistent with
Hypothesis 3, dyads in the complementarity condition created significantly more points than did
those in the control condition (t(123) = 1.99, p = .05) or those in the mimicry condition, t(123) =
2.28, p = .02. Total points created by dyads in the mimicry condition did not differ from those
gained in the control or heightened attention conditions, t(123) = -.61, p = .54.
Individual Outcomes
Table 1 displays negotiator points by condition and instructions. Negotiators behaving
deferentially in the complementarity condition claimed 49% of the available value, whereas
those behaving dominantly claimed 51%. Negotiators mimicking their counterparts in the
mimicry condition claimed 52% of the value, whereas their counterparts claimed at 48% of the
value. Neither the difference between points claimed by dominant and deferent negotiators nor
the difference between points claimed by mimicking and mimicked negotiators were significant,
p’s >.30. In sum, the effect of behavioral instructions on individual outcomes was not significant
in this experiment.
Information Exchange
We asked participants to indicate how much their counterparts shared information
concerning their prioritization of issues. Means displaying total points for all conditions may be
seen in Figure 2. The overall F-Test of the 1 x 3 Interpersonal Dynamic (control vs. mimicry vs.
complementarity) ANOVA on the information sharing was significant, F(3,123) = 4.32, p = .02.
In line with Hypothesis 4, negotiators in the complementarity condition shared significantly
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 28
more information than did negotiators in the control (t(123) = 2.29, p = .03) or mimicry
conditions, t(123) = 2.30, p = .03. Dyads in the mimicry condition did not share significantly
more information than did those in the control condition, t(123) = -.55, p = .58.
We tested if the increased information exchange in the complementarity condition dyads
mediated the relationship between complementarity and improved joint outcomes. Relative to
negotiators in the control condition, negotiators in the complementarity condition shared more
information about which issues were important/unimportant to them, B = .66, SE = .20, t(89) =
2.97, p = .01. Further, sharing information was associated with improved joint outcomes, B =
510.7, SE = 188.6, t(89) = 2.71, p = .01. The previously significant effect of complementarity on
joint outcomes (B = 879.0, SE = 412.0, t(89) = 2.13, p = .04) was reduced to non- significance
when we controlled for the amount of information negotiators shared, B = 541.6, SE = 417.3,
t(89) = 1.30, p = .20. A bootstrap analysis revealed that the 99% bias-corrected confidence intervals
for the size of the indirect effect excluded zero (94.5, 768.6), which suggested a significant indirect
effect (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; Preacher & Hayes, 2004). Heightened information
exchange also mediated the difference in total points created in dyads within the
complementarity condition and those in the mimicry condition, as is indicated by the 99% biasconfidence interval which did not include zero, (41.1, 943.7). Thus Hypothesis 4 received
support.
We examined which negotiators in the complementary dyads were primarily responsible
for the increased exchange of information. A mixed models analysis examining the effects of
dominance and deference instructions on the amount of information revealed (as judged by the
counterpart) showed a main effect for dominance. Negotiators receiving dominance instructions
shared more information about their preferences for different outcomes (M = 5.35, SD = 1.22)
than did negotiators who did not receive instructions to behave dominantly or deferentially, (M =
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 29
4.74, SD = 1.47), F(1,242) = 4.49, p = .04. Negotiators who received instructions to behave
deferentially did not share significantly more information (M = 4.78, SD = 1.53) than did
negotiators who did not receive instructions to behave dominantly or deferentially, F(1,242) =
.01, p = .91.
Alternative Explanations
We tested the alternative hypothesis that complementary dyads created more total value
because negotiators with instructions to act dominantly came into the negotiations with higher
expectations or aspirations. However, mixed models analyses revealed no significant main
effects or interactions when we examined the impact of dominance and deference instructions on
the numbers of points negotiators expected or aspired to accumulate, p’s > .30. Instructions to
mimic also did not have an effect on aspirations or expectations, p’s > .30.
We also tested the possibility that improved rapport explained the relationship between
dominance complementarity and improved negotiation performance. Mixed models analyses
revealed no significant main effects or interactions when we examined the impact of dominance
and deference instructions on liking of the counterpart or comfort within the interaction, p’s >
.25. Moreover, neither liking of the counterpart (r = .07, p = .46) nor comfort within the
interaction (r = .03, p = .77) correlated significantly with total points. Liking did correlate with
how much negotiators shared information about their preferences, r = .22, p = .01. Comfort in
the interaction did not correlate significantly with total points, r = .08, p = .23.
Discussion
Dyads in which one negotiator exhibited dominant non-verbal behavior and the other
negotiator exhibited deferent non-verbal behavior created more joint value than did other dyads.
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 30
Increased information exchange mediated the relationship between complementarity and
improved joint outcomes. Moreover, it was primarily the negotiator who expressed non-verbal
and verbal dominance that shared the majority of the information within the complementary
dyads. This is consistent with Burgoon, Johnson, & Cook’s (1998) findings that dominance
leads people to be more assertive and expressive of their preferences. The study advances our
understanding of how displays of dominance and submissiveness can influence negotiation
outcomes and lead people to create value in social interactions. First, it suggests that exhibiting
non-verbal signals of dominance and deference can be enough to alter how well a dyad creates
value. Second, it supports the idea that complementarity achieves its benefits through improved
information exchange.
Unexpectedly, dyads in the mimicry condition did not create more total joint value than
did dyads in the heightened attention or control conditions. This finding stands in contrast to
Maddux et al.’s (2008) finding that mimicry improves joint outcomes by strengthening the
rapport between the negotiators. It is possible that mimicking a counterpart’s behaviors helps
primarily when negotiators are faced with negotiations that are unlikely to yield agreements
because of narrow bargaining zones or clear divergence in interests.
General Discussion
Our studies indicate that the benefits of dominance complementarity extend beyond the
relational to the material. Across both studies, negotiating dyads created the most value when
one negotiator received instructions to act dominantly and the other negotiator had behavioral
instructions to act deferentially. Although previous research (Drolet & Morris, 2000) has argued
that displays of dominance and submissiveness can affect the relative distribution of resources
(i.e., value-claiming) in negotiations, our research is unique in demonstrating that these displays
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 31
of dominance and deference can also affect how successful people are in creating value in their
social interactions. Specifically, our results indicate that negotiators who contrast with each other
in terms of dominance and deference can create more value than do their peers in other dyads
because they exchange information more effectively.
Implications for Interpersonal Theory
While researchers and lay people have suspected a link between dominance
complementarity and improved performance on social tasks (Tiedens, Unzueta, & Young, 2007),
the present research is the first to demonstrate such a link. Our research suggests that negotiating
dyads are better able to discover sources of joint value when one negotiator behaves dominantly
and another behaves deferentially, as negotiators share information more effectively under these
conditions. This functional benefit to dominance complementarity may be one of the reasons
people naturally gravitate to complementarity patterns of interaction when performing tasks that
benefit from coordination.
Our studies also indicate that it is not solely the dominant party who benefits from
complementarity. Because people are better able to discover mutually-beneficial tradeoffs when
people behave complementarily, even the person behaving deferentially can profit materially
from the complementarity.
Implications for Negotiator Strategy
Aside from showing that behavior along the dominant / submissive dimension of behavior
can affect people’s ability to discover sources of joint value, our results suggest a couple of
practical strategies for negotiators. Our results first suggest that negotiators should monitor the
behavior of their counterparts and adjust their behavior to contrast those of their counterparts
along the dominant / submissive dimension of behavior. Negotiators in Studies 1 and 2 who
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 32
faced dominant counterparts fared better when they responded to dominance with deference than
they did when they responded to dominance with dominance. Negotiators in Study 3 created
more value when one negotiator was instructed to act dominantly and the counterpart was
instructed to act deferentially than did dyads in the control condition or dyads in which one
negotiator was instructed to mimic his/her counterpart.
Our studies raise the question of whether negotiators should mimic their counterparts’
behavior or contrast that behavior, particularly as Maddux et al. (2008) showed that mimicry can
lead to improved negotiation outcomes by improving the trust between negotiators. We contend
that Interpersonal Circumplex Theory provides useful guidance on this issue. People are more
comfortable with those who assimilate with them on the affiliation dimension of behavior and
those who contrast with them on the control dimension (e.g., Tiedens & Fragale, 2003). As such,
negotiators may be well-advised to mimic behaviors that do not seem to signal dominance or
submissiveness and contrast behaviors that do seem to signal dominance or submissiveness.
Future research would be useful in establishing which specific behaviors negotiators should be
careful to mimic, which they should be careful to contrast, and which they can essentially ignore.
Mimicry may be an especially useful technique to improve negotiation outcomes when
bargaining zones are relatively narrow and easy compromises are not possible.
When
bargaining zones are wide and easy compromises are possible, negotiators who have established
rapport may value preserving their relationships with their counterparts and may not invest the
effort necessary to discover integrative agreements that capitalize on differences in negotiator
preferences. When such compromises are not possible, the rapport and trust fostered by mimicry
may enable negotiators to share their preferences more openly. Thus, mimicry may be more
effective when agreement is difficult to reach and less effective when agreement is as easy to
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 33
reach, as it was in Study 3.
The finding that complementarity, and not mimicry, improved the quality of joint
outcomes in Study 3 complements the finding that information exchange (and not improved
comfort or liking) mediated the relationship between complementarity and joint outcomes.
Consistent with previous research showing that rapport is not always reliably linked to dyadic
performance (e.g., Valley, Neale & Mannix, 1995; Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, Moag, &
Bazerman, 1999), our data revealed no relationship between either liking of the counterpart or
comfort in the interaction and the quality of joint outcomes. The data instead showed that
improved information exchange, in which the dominant negotiator shared most of the
information, was behind the improved joint outcomes.
Potential Boundary Conditions and Areas for Future Research
Our results may be due to the forms of dominance and deference that the participants were
instructed to use. These were rather subtle, non-antagonistic dominance cues, and this subtlety
may have contributed to their effectiveness. It is entirely possible that stronger, more
antagonistic displays of dominance would have impaired value creation either by evoking
dominance or by leading the target of the dominance displays to be threatened and, therefore,
reticent to share information. Thus, the message of this study is not necessarily to be
overpowering or harsh to one’s counterpart, but rather to display firmness lightly when
negotiating. Future research could productively explore not only how much dominance but also
which types of dominance (e.g., para-verbal, non-verbal, and verbal) are most useful in the
value-creation process.
Similarly, future work could explore the types of deference that are most effective in the
face of dominance. The type of submissiveness or deference we asked people to display was not
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 34
a passive, yielding style of submissiveness; rather, it was a less combative approach to achieving
their own goals within the negotiation. It would be interesting to know how a negotiator should
respond to passive or yielding styles of submissiveness and whether, and in which contexts, such
a style could ever be useful in a negotiation.
We gave negotiators instructions to exhibit outward signs of dominance or deference.
However, it is possible, and even likely, that giving these negotiators such instructions changed
their mental approaches to the task. The dominance (deference) instructions could have led
negotiators to have a promotion (prevention) focus (Higgins, 1997; 1998) or be in a powerful
(powerless) state of mind (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). Because both facial
expressions and physical postures associated with internal feelings can lead people to experience
those feelings (Flack, Laird, & Cavallero, 1999), it may be difficult to separate experimentally
the outward expressions of dominance and deference from the mindsets associated with
dominance and deference in actual dyadic interactions. Future research involving virtual reality
technology may allow researchers to disentangle the effects of mindsets and outward expressions
because an avatar’s expression of dominance need not be tied to an individual’s internal
experience.
Future research could also productively explore the interaction of dominance and power.
Dominance may be construed very negatively and elicit reciprocal dominance when expressed
by the lower power member of a dyad, as it may be seen as inappropriate. Along the same lines,
it would also be interesting to explore whether complementarity in terms of dominance and
deference is more likely to occur in cultures with large power distances (Hofstede, 2001) and if it
is more or less effective in facilitating the creation of value in those cultures. Expressing
dominance may be most useful when it leads negotiators away from simple compromises by
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 35
moving them from using communal-sharing or equality-matching relational styles to using an
authority-ranking relational style (Fiske, 1992).
Conclusion
The present research suggests that the dynamic of complementarity can be a useful lens
through which to consider the utility of dominant and submissive behaviors within social
interactions. While dominance behaviors have largely been cast as value-claiming moves best
reserved for competitive interactions with strangers (Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Valley, Neale &
Mannix, 1995), our studies suggest that expressions of dominance and deference can facilitate
value creation by allowing negotiators to better coordinate the exchange of information within
social interactions. As such, our findings contribute to theory by linking the control dimension of
interpersonal behavior with people’s abilities to discover sources of mutual benefit within social
interactions. Moreover, our findings suggest that the time and place for expressing dominance
and deference may extend well beyond competitive interactions with strangers.
Complementarity in Negotiations pg. 36
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