Maurizio Geri, GPIS PhD student, second year
A possible Iranian-Turkish rapprochement for more stability in the Middle East?
“Conflicts are created, conducted and sustained by human beings. Therefore they can be ended by human beings” 1
(George Mitchell, Obama Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, 2009-2011)
This paper wants to analyze how a possible rapprochement between Iran and Turkey, the two
non-Arab Muslim regional powers of the Middle East, could affect the order and stability in the Middle
East in the near future. Iran, in post Ahmadinejad’s Presidency, had a strategic shift from a hard foreign
policy to a current soft diplomacy with President Rouhani, that could lead to a nuclear deal with the US
and the West, giving back to Iran the legitimacy to stay in the international community. Turkey, who
always represented a bridge between West and East and since one decade with the AK party started to
rediscover its Middle Eastern identity, could become the first ally of Iran, given their ties in geography,
history and economy but also in strategic interests. The paper argues that these changes in domestic and
foreign politics would create a rapprochement between Iran and Turkey, and this in turn would represent
an occasion for the US and Europe, as a strategic starting point to involve them in many of the unresolved
conflicts of the region (especially in the case of Syria/Iraq and ISIS, but in the future also for the
Israel/Palestine conflict).
The paper analyzes also what sort of relationship could Turkey and Iran, but mostly Iran, place
towards Israel and Saudi Arabia, who are the two main regional powers and may feel having less strong
Western support in this possible shift. Finally the paper tries to draw some conclusions: could really Iran
and Turkey represent the leadership needed to stabilize the Middle East in the future?
1
Charles Kupchan. How enemies become friends: the sources of stable peace. Princeton UP, 2012.
1
Introduction
Today the ME is in chaos more than ever. After the failure of the Arab Spring (in particular in Libya
and Egypt), the American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Syrian civil war that became a proxy war with
regional and external powers involved, and the birth of a new terrorist group that founded the so called
“Islamic state”, the instability, insecurity and precariousness of this crucial region is under the view of all.
Actually this region remains the most important one for the world order and for this the US have been
pulled back there, even if they wanted to “pivot to Asia”. Will the Middle East implode as a title of a recent
book of Mohammed Ayoob suggests2? Or will this region be able to find a way for stability and peace
during this century? We don’t know yet but what is sure is that now the disruption and the instability are
stronger than ever. And as scholars suggests3 managing the situation, more than solving this “unraveling”
of the regional order, is the best we can expect. But how did we arrive at this point?
As Mansfield and Snyder argue4, states during transitions from autocracies to democracies are
more likely than other of being involved in war. Opposite than the “Democratic peace theory”, they state
that, at least at the beginning, new democracies have more probability to fight, because of different
reasons (among which intense exclusionary nationalism rise, aggressive foreign policy and elites
competition). Therefore, is their conclusion, instead of facilitating just ‘free and fair’ elections it is better
to help countries in transition to build the institutions that democracy requires (for example the rule of
law). The book was published in 2005, much earlier than the Arab Spring, and if someone wanted to help
the Arab Spring to succeed, and not become an “Arab Winter”, would have had enough time to plan. But
external help is not enough: we need good leaderships, empowered civil societies and inclusive processes
of government that after decades of autocratic governments is not easy to have (actually it seems that
only Tunisia had them).
2
Mohammed Ayoob. Will the Middle East implode? Polity, 2014.
Haas, Richard, The Unraveling, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2014.
4
Edward Mansfield. Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War. The MIT Press, 2007
3
2
Unfortunately though, problems of democratic transitions are not the only reasons why we
currently have more instability in the Middle East than 10 years ago. American wars, Western
interventions, proxy wars of regional powers, sectarianism and radicalization of groups, economic disaster
and arms smuggling made their big parts too. Iraq and Afghanistan, are among the first 10 failed states in
the world5 (and who would not be after 10 years of war). Libya, where Western powers hurried up to
remove Gheddafi from power without thinking to the post-intervention, is on the verge of a catastrophe.
Both Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two main Muslim regional powers that reside on an opposite spectrum
(one Arab one Persian, one Shia one Sunni, one republic the other monarchy and so on) have their
responsibility in the disaster of Syrian conflict. Besides this in the last few years Al Qaeda gave space to a
stronger and even more ideological terrorist group, facilitated by the stronger sectarianism in the region
(and covert support from Turkey and Saudi Arabia for different reasons) that for the first time can claim a
territory calling it the “Islamic State”, dreaming to rebuild the Islamic Caliphate. Finally the economic
global crisis, increased by the economic local disaster, and the Western interest in the arms trade instead
of economic cooperation, didn’t help the region to find ways to de-escalate violence but on the contrary
they made it worst.
So today we have a conundrum, from where nobody knows how to exit. Even Barak Obama
recently said that he didn’t have a clear strategy against the ISIS and John Kerry that the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict at this point seems the easiest thing to be solved. Among academicians someone speaks about
the start of a Middle Eastern “Thirty years’ war”6, like the one that started the nation states system in
Europe with the Peace of Westphalia, or about a Middle Eastern “Spring of the Nations”7, like the 1848
European revolutions for more democracy and justice. Neither one of the comparison is very encouraging
5
According to the “Failed States Index 2013” of the Fund for Peace, an American think tank.
Richard Haas, The New Thirty Years’ War, Project Syndicate July 21, 2014.
7
Jonathan Steinberg, 1848 ad 2011. Bringing down the old order is easy; Building a new one is tough. Foreign Affairs,
September 28, 2011.
6
3
for the future of the region, as the Thirty years’ war was the bloodiest war of Europe until then and the
1848 revolutions were repressed by reactionary forces. But as every chaos prelude to a new order sooner
or later also the stability in the Middle East will be reestablished, after the old post-Ottoman order ended
(even if some scholar argue that the Sykes-Picot order is not yet dead8). May be the Middle East will just
implode, as Ayoob is suggesting, or an external power will intervene to establish a new hegemony, or
regional powers will balance each other to create a regional order.
This paper argues that two regional powers currently on a rise, both internally and internationally,
Turkey and Iran, will play a fundamental role in the reestablishment of the future order in the Middle East.
This will not necessarily exclude more conflicts on the path to that order, but the increasing relationship
between these two powers, could create that regional leadership so needed in the Middle East today, to
be shared with the Arab world (entirely if the Arab League will find again its strong unity or with some
Arab strong powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt) and one day hopefully with Israel too.
Even if Turkey is neglected from the European Union (but steadily in the NATO) and Iran is
neglected from the international community (but in negotiation with it on the nuclear issue) there is no
doubt that they will have a strong role during the XXI century in the future order of the Middle East. Their
geography, history, power and vision make of them the two perfect candidate for the stability of that
region, but this will need also the inclusion of Israel and the Arab counterpart of Muslim world.
The role of Western powers in the Middle East
Leading historian Bernard Lewis argues9 that the ‘modern’ (and Western) history in the Middle
East started with the Napoleonic campaign in Egypt and Syria at the turn of XIX century. What those
campaigns showed, Lewis argues, was that even a small Western force could conquer and rule a Muslim
8
9
Simon, Stiven. The Middle East's Durable Map. August 26, 2014.
Lewis, Bernard. The end of modern history in the Middle East (Hoover Institution Press, 2011).
4
land, and that only another Western power (in that case the United Kingdom’s) could get it out. Even if
the view of ‘modernity’ could have been influenced by the “orientalism” of historians like Lewis (as
Edward Said argued) it is sure that since Napoleon’s invasion the ultimate power over the Middle East has
been always outside. From the Anglo-Russian entente of 1907 for the control of Persia and Afghanistan
to the Sykes-Picot agreements of 1916 that ended the Ottoman Empire and created two “spheres of
influences” for France and Great Britain, to the Mandates of the League of Nations, the Middle East has
always been controlled by a European power, with the American involvement coming later, after World
War II, and in particular in relation with a few regional powers: Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.
Today Europe has neither the power nor the will to play an important role in the Middle East, but
looking at the US presence in the region, it seems that effectively only another Western (or, maybe,
Eastern) power could pull the US away from the Middle East. In theory the US should have done its pivot
to Asia already (in the sense of ‘East Asia’ as Middle East is also part of Asia, the ‘Southwest Asia’ as China
defines it) but in practice the US cannot leave the Middle East quite yet. After the Arab Spring, the
American wars after 9/11, the Syrian civil war, and the rise of new terrorist groups like the “Islamic state”,
the instability, insecurity, and precariousness of the region is clear to all. The US presence as a referee
and international protector is still a need in the Middle East until the regional powers find it possible to
cooperate and solve their conflicts (often caused by Western interventions anyway). So who could exclude
the US from being the last decision maker in the Middle East in the future? China? The end of oil
dependency? Or will the regional powers ever be strong enough to deal with their conflicts by themselves?
When Napoleon arrived in Egypt there were only two sovereign states in the Middle East: Turkey
(with the Ottoman Empire) and Iran (with the Persian Empire). After two centuries, is it time for them to
take back their historic role as the two major powers of the region? Future will say but one thing is sure:
the involvement of the US in the area cannot go alone anymore (and cannot be so interventionist neither):
only with alliances can the US be effective in the region and Turkey and Iran could represent the two allies
5
that US misses today. But how to integrate them without creating problems of balance of power in the
Middle East?
The last Iraq war for example, besides destroying a state and creating ISIS, changed the traditional
balance of power among Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The Al-Maliki Shia government, not inclusive at all of
the Sunni minority, was one of the reasons of the radicalizations of extremist Sunni groups, besides
making the Gulf Countries weaker and feeling threatened by the Iranian growing influence. So it seems
that military solutions to solve the problem of Islamic terrorism or the security of Middle East are just
temporarily and often counterproductive to the regional stability. Today we are in a ‘post-American/postWestern world’10 in which the US and Europe cannot remain the hegemon everywhere but need to accept
multilateralism in the governance of the global and regional orders.
So the US and Western countries should support democratization and economic development in
the Middle East in a way that facilitate cooperation and trust among regional countries, if they want to
help to build a better future for the Middle East (and an Iranian nuclear deal could be the first step towards
this new diplomatic approach). For a real long term stability the Middle East needs to build
interdependent relations on many levels: economic, cultural and political, but also militarily, to help to
create a sense of we-ness between Middle Eastern countries, besides religion and identity, and avoiding
the necessity of Western presence that so much disruption brought in the past. This process would need
leadership and while the leadership of the Arab League or the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) is not strong
enough (as we saw on how they dealt with Arab Spring or ISIS) a partnership between Iran and Turkey, as
some scholars argues11, could help in this process of building a shared regional leadership. So let’s analyze
these two countries more in depth to understand if this could be a possible scenario.
10
Serfaty, Simon. A world recast: an American moment in the post-Western world. Rowman & Littlefield, 2012.
Stephen Kinzer. Reset. Iran, Turkey and America’s future. Times books, 2010. Parsi, Trita. A single roll of the Dice:
Obama’s diplomacy with Iran. Yale UP, 2012.
11
6
Turkey and Iran: two very distinct countries?
Iran and Turkey seems to represent two very different countries. One is a democracy, one is a
theocracy; one is based on an Eastern religious ideology, the other on a Western-liberal ideology; one is
member of NATO, the other is in the list of “Axis of Evil”; one has a foot in Europe, the other stays between
the Persian Gulf and the heart of Central Asia. As some scholars argue, the two states seems to have
fundamentally different political identities and ideologies12.
But in reality the Western idea of rivalry based on Sunni/Shia divide (Turkey anyway has 25% of
Shia, even if Alevi branch and not Twelvers) or secular/religious regime (Iran has been secular for long
time before the Islamic revolution) is a quiet ethnocentric and superficial view and not a real deep analysis
in the relation between Iran and Turkey. If we look at the history and culture of those two societies there
could be more reasons for closeness that reasons for distance, as many other scholars argue13. First of all
they are both heir of great empires, with a deep civilization and history that the Arab world (a part Egypt)
cannot even up. They are both giant states with similar power, having Iran 77million inhabitants and
Turkey 75 (Saudi Arabia for example has only 29) and an important GDP, in particular Turkey that with
$1.167 billion GDP (purchasing power parity) is the largest economy in the Middle East (but also Iran, that
in 2013 had an estimated $987 billion GDP (purchasing power parity) even if because of sanctions its GDP
(official exchange rate) reached only $411 billions14). But mostly they have two political identities and
values that are not so different historically: these two countries share a long path of struggle for
democracy, actually they are the only two Muslim countries in the Middle East that share this history with
the Western world. Both populations rebelled and deposed their monarchs at the beginning of XX century:
Iran in 1905 with the Persian Constitutional Revolution, when the first Parliament was established, and
12
Larrabee F. Stephen and Alireza Nader. Turkish Iranian relationship in a changing Middle East. RAND 2013.
See: Graham Fuller. Turkey and the Arab Spring. Bozorg Press, 2014. Stephen Kinzer. Reset. Iran, Turkey and
America’s future. Times books, 2010. Abbas, Milani. The Myth of the Great Satan: A New Look at America's
Relations with Iran. Hoover Institution Press, 2010.
14
CIA fact book, From: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html
13
7
Turkey in 1908, with the Young Turk Revolution, when the old Parliament and the Constitution of 1876
were reestablished.
Iran in particular is a country that has democratic values beyond what we would think today. This
could be a surprise for Western thinkers, but as an interesting recent books of Stephen Kinzer argues, Iran
actually is “a nation that has more in common with the US than almost any of its neighbors”15. At the end
of the day before the coup orchestrated by US and UK in 1953, Mohammed Mossadegh had been
democratically elected16. Mossadegh, with his nationalist secular and liberal party, the National Front, had
decided to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, against the foreign exploitation. The UK refused to
compromise as the American oil company agreed instead to do in Saudi Arabia and Mossadegh was
overthrown, imprisoned for three years and died under house arrest in 1967. Since then the anger over
this humiliating act done by the West created the anti-imperialist, anti-Western and anti-dictatorship
foundations of the future Islamic Revolution17. The Iranian Revolution therefore was a surge for
democracy, to build a Republic against the monarchy, not a theocracy (as the ideologue of the revolution
Ali Shariati said18) even if Khomeini took the power hijacking the Revolution as dictators usually do19. Thirty
years after, the Green movement in 2009, anticipating the Arab Spring, demonstrated how democratic
values are still inserted in the Iranian society.
So even if today Turkish and Iranian political systems externally seem different, traditionally the
identity are not so different, and their domestic politic shifts today could also increase this closeness, with
15
Kinzer, 2010, Op. Cit. P. 6
Keddie, Nikki. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. Yale UP, 2006.
17
This coup, besides being imperialistic, has been considered also a major misstep in American foreign policy, driven
by British oil interests and American fears over communism (See Stephen Kinzer. All the Shah's Men: An American
Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Wiley, 2008). The Tudeh communist party played an important role in
supporting Mossadegh nationalization of oil companies but finally it didn’t have much power and so Eisenhower
fears were played upon by the British.
18
Abbas, Milani. The Myth of the Great Satan: A New Look at America's Relations with Iran. Hoover Institution
Press, 2010.
19
According to Nikki Keddie (1979 Op. Cit.) some representative of the National Front had also some hopes that US
President Carter could have supported the revolution. Iranian people are believed to be one of most pro-American
population in the Middle East (Moaveni, Azadeh, Stars (and Stripes) in Their Eyes, Washington Post, June 1, 2008)
16
8
more Islamism in Turkey and more moderation in Iran. For example with the new administration of Hassan
Rouhani, President of Iran since 2013 after 8 years of Ahmadinejad, Iran decided to start diplomatic
negotiations to solve the problem of West sanctions imposed because of its nuclear program. Rohuani
doesn’t seem a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” as Benjamin Netanyahu described him at the UN General
Assembly, but a pragmatic leader, who knows that if he wants to bring Iran back to international arena
has to avoid the harsh politics and stigmatizing narrative of his predecessor (exactly like Obama with
Bush). He wants to maintain the request for respect of Iranian position as a growing leader in the region,
but at the same time he seems to accept to give in about the nuclear threat20. Obviously the Supreme
Leader, the ayatollah Khamenei, is still in charge and any deal has to be accepted by him, but the fact that
he chose Rouhani as a moderate is a sign of gradual change in the regime.
Besides this, Iran, respect to the rest of the Middle East, have a civilization of thousands of years,
one of the first ones of the world, formed by a Indo-European people (Aryan) with the first monotheistic
religion (Zoroastrianism). Iran has for its history of old civilization a patriotism different and stronger than
any recent nationalism in Arab countries, in part similar to the Turkish one. In Iran the common identity
is much more important than the ethnic divisions (on the contrary of the Arab world) as all the minorities,
Baluchi, Turks, Arabs etc. feel belonging to Iranian identity before their ethnical one (so not so different
to the Turkish identity). Not for nothing Iran maintained the Farsi language during the Islamization in the
seventh century, and so was not Arabized as all the other countries where Islam spread (in all north Africa
for example). And when Iran became Shia, in the sixteen century, because a Shiite dynasty started to rule
the country creating the Safavid monarchy, Iran was able to build a strong national and territorial identity,
becoming a nation-state similar to the European ones, very differently from the rest of Middle East. So as
we can see Iran is not so distant from Turkish identity and values and the current shifts in domestic and
foreign policies makes it even closer to Turkish approach.
20
See: The Economist, The revolution is over, Report, November 1, 2014.
9
On the other side Turkey today, with the new presidency of Recep Erdogan (president after 8
years as Prime Minister) is a growing country, economically and politically, that wants to use better his
very important geostrategic position as the joining link between Europe and Asia. This country seems to
wish to project its power again, after a century of hibernation, to try to resolve regional conflicts in the
Middle East with dialogue, and even, as some scholars argue, to become the pivot state in the Middle
East21. The current group of leaders at the beginning of this century has taken the end of cold war as
stimulus for redesign Turkish approach to the world. Actually the Justice and Development Party (or AK
party) was founded in 2001 as a social conservative political party, developed from the tradition of
Islamism but officially abandoning this ideology in favor of ‘conservative democracy’. When this party won
a landslide victory in its first national election in 2002, its leaders came to power with a different world
view respect to the model of authoritarian, secular and nationalist paradigm of the Kemalistic Turkey,
seen in decay. Both Erdogan and Ahmed Davutoglu, the current Prime Minister, today have a strong
mandate from their people that they want to use to give back Turkey some of the big power it had in the
past (before the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire). And this seems to pass from a recuperation of
the Turkish Islamic and Middle Eastern identity, and also from a new alliance with Iran, first of all because
of its geographical, political and religious affinity. In fact recently, again since the winning of AK Party,
Turkey seemed to shift his gaze from Europe to the Middle East (and at the same time also from secularism
to Islamism, even if gradually) and the possible rapprochement between the two countries seemed to
receive new lymph.
The Turkish desire to enter the European Union since almost three decades has been frustrated
and this contributed to make of Turkey a state that wish to look to the ‘East’ besides the ‘West’. Turkey
relation with Middle East, after the Ottoman Empire was dismembered, became ‘alienated’ in some way,
21
Fuller, Graham. The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World. USIP, 2007
10
as Turkey started to look to Europe with its secularization process made by Kemal Ataturk (and also other
states of Middle East followed the European secular model, either with Nasserism or Ba’thism). Today
Turkey wants to look back to that relation with its Middle East and Islamic identity, to recuperate the links
that has lost during the XX century with a conception of community based on Islam beside ethnic
nationalism. Turkey may provide an imperfect model, but it is a more attractive option than the other
states in the region: in a region “hungry for leaders of genuine vision” and models of “competent
governance,” Turkey seems to have both, as Fuller argues22.
But besides similar political and religious cultures Turkey and Iran today seem to have similar
strategic interests too: both countries want a stable Middle East, in particular stable neighbors, Iraq, Syria
but also Afghanistan and Pakistan; both wants to limit influence of Russia from Caucasus region; and both
are against Sunni terrorist groups or radical groups supported by the Gulf monarchies. These two
countries share also similar domestic challenges as both regimes had their internal problems: Iran since
the Green Movement in 2009 and Turkey since the Gezi park protests in 2013; and this could give them
another strategic common interest in order to defend themselves from internal revolutions for example.
We don’t know what will be the future but whatever will be the momentum seems to build for a new
rapprochement among the two countries that could benefit all the Middle East.
Turkish-Iranian relationship: possible a rapprochement?
Turkey’s activism and soft power in the region have been building for more than a decade, and
with it the Turkish-Iranian cooperation. But according to some scholars, although the cooperation has
improved, the relationship remains at odds, in particular after the Arab Spring, on several issues, like for
example Syria23. As Aaron Stein, associate fellow at Royal United Services Institute (a UK based think tank)
22
23
Fuller, 2014, Op. Cit. P. 372-374.
Larrabee F. Stephen and Alireza Nader. Turkish Iranian relationship in a changing Middle East. RAND 2013.
11
said: “Iran is looking to deepen ties with its neighbors and Turkey has been looking to reset its thorny
relations with Tehran after burning bridges with its aggressive Syria policy. They are trying to
compartmentalize their problems and focus on areas where there is agreement, but there are limits to
what they can achieve”24. Middle East dynamics change fast though, and the new ISIS threat seems to
reduce the tensions between the two countries on Syrian issues and reopen perspectives of new
partnership.
Turkey tried to create good relationships with Iran with high level visit from both sides, trade deals
and cultural and economic accords since the start of the new millennium (and the new AK party rule).
Exports to Iran rose seven times, from $300 million to $2 billion, between 2002 and 200925 and in general
trade between Turkey and Iran rose from $1 billion in 2000 to $10 billion in 2010 (and the two sides plan
to triple the volume of trade to $30 billion)26. Iran is the second-largest supplier of natural gas to Turkey,
behind Russia and also provides close to 40 percent of Turkey’s imports for crude oil27. Energy needs for
Turkey are going up (and production going down) and this could create a dependence of Turkey on Iran,
as some scholars suggests28, also taking into account that Iran depend on Turkey for the exporting route
to the west. But non-energy trade is also substantial: in addition to oil and gas, Iran exports industrial
products to Turkey. Turkey is the fifth biggest destination for Iran’s nonoil exports and Iran is Turkey’s
third largest export market29.
The increased relation between Turkey and Iran can be seen also in the international arena:
Turkey, together with Brazil, was the only country able to make a deal, with the American avail, over Iran’s
24
See Wall street Journal article: http://online.wsj.com/articles/iranian-president-visits-turkey-to-bolster-ties1402336408
25
Turkish State Institute of Statistics.
26
From: RAND, Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East, 2013. P. 31-32
27
Idem.
28
F. Stephen Larrabee. The Turkish-Iranian Alliance That Wasn't. How the Two Countries Are Competing After the
Arab Spring. July 12 2012.
29
From: RAND, Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East, 2013. P. 31-32
12
nuclear program in 2010 (even if the US had second thoughts and changed their mind)30. Turkey and Iran
share a support for Palestinian cause and this, more than a division could be a potential space of
collaboration for a future deal with Israel. Finally in a way we could say that Turkish role with Iran is similar
to European role with Russia: the European dependence on energy from Russia keep Europe dialoguing
with Russia, also given the security guaranteed by NATO, and this could be the role of Turkey too, that is
in the same situation.
So it seems that there is space for a new rapprochement between Turkey and Iran, but will the
regional powers allow this rapprochement to happen? And is a rapprochement between these two
regional powers positive for the two main powers in the Middle East right now, Israel and Saudi Arabia,
or will they see it as a menace to their leadership? Let’s analyze the relation of Iran and Turkey with these
two countries, in order to draw some conclusions on the possible beneficial effects of the Turkish-Iranian
rapprochement in the stabilization of the Middle East.
Iranian relation with Israel and Saudi Arabia
An important issue that could work against the rise of Iran as a regional power is its rivalry with
Israel. To understand this rivalry we need to think not so much to the different religions, the different
regimes or the different relation with the Western world (even if all these elements may play an important
role). Iran and Israel have been friends for long time and as even some Israeli scholars argue31, without
the Ayatollah regime Iran would be a natural ally of Israel (as we saw democratic identities are common
to Turkey and Iran too, not only Israel, in the Middle East). But to understand the rivalry between the two
countries we need to think about another important element in international relations: the balance of
power in the Middle East, in particular after the Cold War and the Iraq war.
30
31
Parsi, 2012, Op. Cit.
Wilf, Einat: meeting at ODU. See also The new dis(order) of the Middle East. Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring 2014
13
Israel, the only nuclear power in the region, has hard time to accept the resurgence of Iran, now
that Iraq is not there anymore to balance it, and now that Russia and the US are not there anymore like
during the Cold War. Israel cannot accept a nuclear Iran, not so much because it fears an attack (today a
‘nuclear peace’ seems quite clear because of the possibility of the ‘second strike’) but because it cannot
accept the parity in the military power with the only other regional possible hegemon. This is the real
issue in the rivalry between Iran and Israel. So how can we solve this dilemma? The current negotiations
could bring an end to this, giving to Iran the possibility to have peaceful nuclear energy and to Israel the
guarantee that Iran will never have nuclear weapons. But the deal is not done yet, Israel keep saying that
he cannot trust Iran, and if Israel is not happy the deal will not be supported by the US. The future will say
but one thing is certain: the consequences of an Israeli preemptive attack would be much worse than a
nuclear Iran, so the US and the West have to keep convincing Israel of not striking. As some scholars
argue32, a nuclear Iran would not be so bad, at the end of the day containment is what worked with Soviet
Union, leading to its implosion, and could work with a nuclear Iran too, giving more stability to the region,
as also Waltz argue33.
Another issue is that if Israel wants to do a rapprochement with Muslim world often we think that
it has to choose either one or the other sect of Islam, Sunni or Shia, meaning Saudi Arabia or Iran. But this
doesn’t have to be the case: a new approach of Israel towards Muslim world would be exactly to look for
dialogue with both, and use dual diplomacy (like the twin pillar policy of Nixon, and like China seems to
want to be doing too34) to show that religious divisions are not so important when we look at international
relations and order. This could be useful also for a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, giving
again more stability to the region.
32
Pollack, Kenneth. Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy. Simon & Schuster, 2013.
Kenneth Waltz. Why Iran should get the bomb. Foreign Affairs, July-August 2012.
34
Geoffrey Gresh. China's emerging twin pillar policy in the Gulf. Foreign Policy, 11/7/2011
33
14
Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf monarchies in general, have been probably the most important
regional powers, together with Israel, influencing Middle East order (or disorder) since the end of
colonialism and protectorate in the middle of XX century. This because of several reasons but mostly the
presence of oil: Saudi Arabia is the biggest producer in the world, with 10 million barrels per day, and a
swing producer35; the consequent American support: Saudi Arabia has been the main US partner in the
Islamic Middle East since 1933, but in particular after WWII; and the geopolitical and religious power of
Saudi Arabia through the Muslim world (having Mecca and Medina and being in the middle between the
Persian Gulf and the Red Sea). But with the time the Wahhabism supporting Sunni extremist groups (with
the results of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS) made the US start to rethink their unconditional
support to the House of Saud.
Today therefore it seems that there could be a shift in the balance of power of the Middle East.
The fact that Iran seems being re-accepted in the international system (through the first interim
agreement on its nuclear program last year in Geneva) even if Israel is still opposing this detente, and the
fact that the new rapprochement between Iran and Turkey could create a strong partnership for the
future, seem to challenge the regional hegemony in the Middle East. Until now most of the power in the
Muslim Middle East resided in the southern part of the region, the Arabic peninsula (including Iraq that
today became a failed state) but today there could be a shift toward the north, and this doesn’t make
Saudi Arabia very happy obviously. Will this possible shift bring a major conflict between the two big
representatives of Islamic views or on the contrary will it bring a new accepted balance of power with
more regional stability for the future?
By and large there are probably two main areas of competition between these two countries: the
energy and the political front. On the energy front their combined oil and natural gas reserves are the
35
As the SA has major spare oil capacity it can take off oil from the market when price go too low, or flow into the
market when price go too high, so it is able to influence prices and balance the markets.
15
same, but Iran has the strategic advantage of controlling the Strait of Hormuz while Saudi Arabia has the
ability of being the swing producer and have the unconditional support of the US. In the future we don’t
know who will win the race, we will have to see how the energetic independence of the US but also the
energetic needs of China (who instead supports Iran) will impact this competition. Regarding the political
side obviously both countries look for primacy in the Islamic world, trying to expand their Sunni or Shia
sect and their political model (either monarchy or theocracy) but the dynamics of Middle East are
constantly changing. After the Arab Spring for example Iran seemed to win this competition through Al
Maliki in Iraq but today there is a more inclusive government in Iraq and in Syria the Tehran’s ally, Assad,
is on the road to failure. Finally there is the nuclear issue to be taken into account between the two
countries: Saudi Arabia, with the support of US and other countries, will build 16 nuclear reactors in the
next two decades36, for peaceful energetic reasons (like Iran says) but how peaceful the goals are is
difficult to say unless we have an external control. The future will say but for now these competitions have
not a real winner yet. But do we really need a winner at the end of the day?
According to some scholars an Iranian-Saudi collaboration is not unthinkable, to fight common
enemies like ISIS37. Other scholars argue that a rapprochement between Tehran and Washington, could
make smaller the American presence in the area and so make the Gulf States less dependent on the US
and possible even an entente between Iran and the Gulf states38. This because the US military presence
to protect the Gulf is creating a “catch 22” situation in which the Iranian threat perception is increased by
the American presence, that prevent the normalization of relations. The US presence promotes also the
GCC passivity in defense and strategic thinking and so limit the possibility for security integration for the
stabilization of the region, even if this is not the only reason, as past failed attempts demonstrate (like in
36
Mohsen Milani. Iran and Saudi Arabia Square Off. Foreign Affairs, October 2011.
Khatib, Lyna. Defeating Islamic State requires Saudi-Iranian compromise. Carnegie Middle East Center,
September 3 2014.
38
Özden Zeynep Oktav. The Gulf states and Iran: a Turkish perspective. Middle East Policy Council Journal, Volume
XVIII, Number 2, Summer 2011.
37
16
2004 when Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal thought to increase the GCC security forces, with a
greater role for Iran as well, without success39).
We don’t know if a normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia will ever be possible
but at least diplomatic signals of new openings among the two countries start to come out: Iranian Foreign
Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, for example, after a recent meeting in New York with his Saudi
counterpart, said that the Iranian-Saudi Arabian relationship should improve40.
Turkish relations in Middle East
What about Turkey relationship with its neighbors? Today, as earlier argued, under the President
Erdogan and in particular with AK party leader and new Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu41, Turkey seems
on a new track to regain its old ‘Ottoman identity’ even if through a different political landscape respect
to the past: mixing nationalism, Islamism, democracy, ethic and diplomacy, in order to put the country
back in power in the Middle East. Davutoglu lists his goals as the consolidation of democracy and the
“settlement of dispute” which directly or indirectly concern Turkey42. But will Turkey be able to do this in
the Middle East? We don’t know even if there are signal that it could succeed: Turkey has even being able
to start talks between Syria and Israel, Fatah and Hamas, Pakistan and Afghanistan in these years. How
that have been possible?
39
Embassy of Saudi Arabia, “Prince Saud’s address on security at Bahrain seminar,” speech, December 5, 2004,
http://www.saudiembassy.net/archive/2004/speeches/page1.aspx
40
“Both my Saudi counterpart and I believe that this meeting will be the first page of a new chapter in our two
countries' relations. We hope that this new chapter will be effective in establishing regional and global peace and
security.” Iran foreign minister hails "new chapter" in Saudi ties. The Daily Star, Lebanon, 9/22/2014
41
Davutoglu is an academic and diplomat besides a politician, who has been described as ‘part Machiavelli, part
Rumi’, that is a combination of political pragmatism and spiritual inspiration. From: International Crisis Group Report.
Turkey and Middle East. Ambitions and constraints. April 2010
42
Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in 2010”, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Fall 2009. See also the
official page of Turkish foreign policy with dialogue as one of its main points: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/resolution-ofconflicts-and-mediation.en.mfa
17
First of all today Turkey is a much more trusted country respect to Iran by the international
community, as it has played neutral and diplomatic roles, and has been considered a mediator in particular
since the new party is in power. Just to give some examples in 2005 Turkey and Spain launched the
“Alliance of Civilizations”, a conference on international dialogue that has been subsequently
institutionalized by the UN43. In 2010 Turkey with Brazil had brokered a deal with Iran over its nuclear
program, even if the deal was not accepted by the US. Again in 2010 Turkey and Finland launched the
“Mediation for Peace” initiative under the auspices of the UN and today the membership in the “Friends
of Mediation Group” reached 46 (38 countries and 8 regional and international organizations including
the UN). This started to give Turkey more trust and prestige as a country that looks for dialogue and
mediation for conflict resolution.
Also the Arab countries trust more Turkey than Iran (also because of being a Sunni country, like
the rest of Arab world) even if they have still some suspicions with new international approach of Turkey,
as the Gulf countries don’t want a hegemon Turkey neither. Turkey assertiveness in the Middle East
sometimes is seen as disturbance also by players like Egypt, with specific issues such as Israel and
Palestine, or as an attempt to present itself to media trying to gain popularity among the West. But Turkey
and Gulf countries today share more things than just the Sunni similarity, for example some strategic
interests like the attitude with ISIS, being both in the past supporters of ISIS and today fighters against it
(even if Turkey has not a clear position yet). Both Gulf countries and Turkey supported ISIS as a tool against
Assad regime in Syria, but now that ISIS is grown creating instability they have to fight against it (it
remembers in some way the parabola of the US with Mujahidin and Al Qaeda). Also the fact that Turkey
declared its policy of ‘zero-problems with neighbors44, makes the Arab world more relaxed with Turkey
respect to the relation with Iran.
43
See: http://www.unaoc.org/
See: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/policy-of-zero-problems-with-our-neighbors.en.mfa. Even if some scholars argue
that Turkey passed from zero problems to zero friends, see: Piotr Zalewski, Foreign Policy, August 22, 2013. From:
44
18
Regarding the relation with Israel, since the AK party is in power in Turkey with its anti-Israel
rhetoric, the relation started to deteriorate respect to the past (it was at its lowest level during the Gaza
wars in 2005, 2008/2009 and 2014 and in particular during the Gaza flotilla raid in 2010, with 9 Turkish
activists killed by Israel). But Turkey remain the first Muslim majority country to have recognized the State
of Israel in 1948 and their economic and military collaboration remain a pillar of the partnership even
today, when the normalization of the relation is still in process and a rapprochement would be beneficial45.
Therefore Turkey has really the potentiality to become an intermediary between Iran and the rest
of the Middle East, and so a rapprochement between Turkey and Iran could really represent an element
of stability in the current conundrum of the Middle East. Actually Turkey could have also another element
of leverage for its new role in the Middle East and this is represented by the geopolitics of ex-Soviet
Republics of central Asia (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan)
mostly Muslim and in some way related to the Turkish ethnic group. The emergence of Turkic states from
central Asia after the dissolution of Soviet Union could be similar to the Arab world born from the end of
the British and French empires, creating a geopolitical shift in the greater Middle East. These are big
geopolitical issues anyway, that only the future will answer but what is clear is that a possible
rapprochement between the two rising powers in the Middle East, Iran and Turkey, can really contribute
to create more stability and order in the region.
Conclusions: shared leadership and empowered people
With this paper I tried to demonstrate that a rapprochement between Turkey and Iran, not
impossible and on the contrary already happening, could facilitate more stability and security in the
Middle East. Turkey and Iran rapprochement could represent a potential stable partnership that would
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/21/how_turkey_foreign_policy_went_from_zero_problems_to_z
ero_friends
45
Brookings Institute, Despite Gaza Conflict, Turkey and Israel Would Benefit from Rapprochement, July 22, 2014
19
elicit also Israel and Saudi Arabia cooperation, in a multilateral approach that is the only solution to the
conflicts in the Middle East in the long run. It is time to leave the Middle East ‘to govern itself’, to say it
with Sachs46? This could be the case during this century, but the US is still an important player and its
passing of the baton, if will ever happen, should happen gradually and obviously guaranteeing that the
American interests (in particular energy) are maintained.
But history is made of men and women, apart from states and alliances, and the people can make
it and remake it. Therefore besides than to shared leadership we need to turn to the wish of the people
of those countries to understand the future of the Middle East. What the people of Israel, Saudi Arabia
and Iran want: security, stability and progress or a never ending conflict? This has to be the main issue to
guide the vision of these countries. The Arab Spring brought many hopes, even if obviously it was not easy
to respond to such high expectations and democracy is always a long transition, a ‘never ending’ process.
But it demonstrated that people can change regimes and ask for what they believe not what their leaders
says (and this could happen in Iran and Saudi Arabia too in the future). Today we have new hopes, with
Rouhani elected in Iran and a possible nuclear deal next July 2015, and with Turkey more active in
international diplomacy and regional issues. But mostly we have hopes with the people. As Vali Nasr
explained in his recent book47, after colonialism and dictatorships, today maybe the time arrived when a
new business-minded middle class will shake the Muslim world economy and win the cold war against
extremism. And as Courbage and Todd48 argued in another interesting book, there is a current spread of
massive secularization and modernization throughout the Arab and Muslim world, similar to the history
of Christianity. Our hope is that this demographic, economic and political changes are signals that the
46
Jeffrey Sachs. Let the Middle East Govern Itself. Project Syndicate, September 1, 2014.
Vali Nasr, Forces of Fortune: The rise of the new Muslim middle class and what it will mean for our world. Free
Press, 2009
48
Youssef Courbage, and Emmanuel Todd. A convergence of civilizations: the transformation of Muslim societies
around the world. Columbia UP, 2011. They measure modernization on less fertility and more female literacy, and
in the Muslim world they saw that fertility is reduced and the female literacy is increased in last thirty years.
47
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Middle East wants to be free from conflict and divisions based on civilizations and religions, creating
instead stability, security and prosperity. And the rapprochement among great nations is the first step for
that, as we saw in Europe between France and Germany.
21
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