PSYC18 2009 – Psychology of Emotion
Professor: Gerald Cupchik
Office: S634
Email: cupchik@utsc.utoronto.ca
Office Hours: Thursdays 10-11; 2-3
Phone: 416-287-7467
TA: Michelle Hilscher
Office: S142C
Email: hilscher@utsc.utoronto.ca
Office Hours: Thursdays 10-11 am
Course website:
www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~cupchik/psyc18.htm
Textbook:
Oatley, Keltner & Jenkins (2006, 2nd Ed.)
Understanding Emotions.
MIDTERM:
Thursday February 26th 12-2pm IN CLASS
See class website for more details…
Yerkes-Dodson Law
Let’s not forget John B. Watson’s contribution…
(the father of American Behaviourism)
Watson, the founder of Behaviourism developed a “pattern reaction
theory of emotion” (1919).
“An emotion is a hereditary pattern - reaction involving profound changes
of the bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly of the visceral and
glandular systems.”
Fear, rage and love are pattern
reactions;
complex
behavioural
responses to induction situations such
as loss of support, a loud noise, restraint
of free movement, stroking of sensitive
zones.
Like reflexes, emotion patterns can be
conditioned and extinguished.
Watson tests baby’s grasp reflex (ca.1916)
Cognition, Arousal and Emotion
From William McDougall to W.B. Cannon (1871-1945)
McDougall argued in An introduction to social psychology that emotional
excitements stimulated appropriate behavioural reactions (e.g., fear and the
instinct to flee; or anger and the instinct to fight).
Cannon extended McDougall’s instinctually based theory into the idea of an
emergency response that was more appropriate for an emerging behavioural
movement.
His primary concern was with “the significance
of bodily changes which occur in great
emotional excitement, such as fear and
rage…” which he conceived as bodily
preparations for supreme effort in flight or in
fighting.
From Gregorio Maranon to W.B. Cannon:
Emotion cold and hot!
Gregorio Maranon, a Spanish physician, examined the effects of inducing
changes in somatic states through injections of adrenaline which
stimulates the sympathetic nervous system.
He published the results of his research in 1924 in a French journal, Revue
Française D’Endocronologie, because he was an endocrinologist
interested in the effects of hypothyroidism.
Cannon was the first scholar in North America to lecture on this new
paradigm in 1922 at a meeting of the American Psychiatric Association in
Québec.
Maranon was generally interested in learning about emotional reactions to
injections of adrenaline.
His most important contrast is between:
1.“The subjective perception”, “en froid”, of somatic disturbance leading to
an unidentifiable emotional sensation.
This first type was observed most frequently (i.e., 79%) among his 210
subjects. Subjects were aware of the various post-injection phenomena
(e.g., tremor, shivering, coldness in the hands, dryness of the mouth, heart
palpitations) which “coincide with the autonomic symptomatology of
emotion (autonomic emotion) and experienced “being moved” without
experiencing a complete emotion (e.g., “as if I were awaiting a great
happiness,” or “as if I were frightened, however, I am calm”).
2. An entire, involuntary emotion having the same somatic elements as in
the previous case, but also a psychological, affective involvement.
His second degree reaction “not only perceives the autonomic somatic
manifestations of emotion, but he also, gradually or suddenly, feels his
mind invaded by an emotional flux”.
The “psychological emotion” is superimposed upon the “autonomic
reaction” and is apprehended as a complete affective state, usually of the
anxiety type, with abundant tears, sobs, and sighs”.
This complete emotional state is frequently accompanied by “a
psychological motif” to justify the feelings. To “produce it in other cases one
must suggest a memory with strong affective force” (e.g., speaking to the
patient “during the adrenal commotion” about sick children or dead
parents).
So the adrenal injection fosters “a situation of affective imminence”.
Sequence:
1) Initial psychological element
(sensation, idea, memory)
2) Production of autonomic or peripheral emotion
3) Consciousness of peripheral emotion by the brain
4) Authentic emotion when the consciousness of the autonomic emotion is
superimposed on the primary psychological element.
Why does Cannon favour Maranon’s work?
Functioning of the sympathetic nervous system and the natural release of
adrenaline was a major topic of research at the time.
Cannon’s friend, Colonel T.R. Elliot, whom he saw in France in 1917 during
WWI when he was serving with the Harvard Hospital Unit, had studied at
Cambridge University, “why adrenaline, when injected into the body…
mimics the action of sympathetic nerves.”
Maranon kept Cannon abreast of his work by sending him copies of his
work. Shows international cooperation across the ocean even back in the
early 20th century.
From Maranon’s viewpoint “cold awareness of emotional phenomena
which takes place in the first degree reaction definitely demolishes the
point of view of James and Lange” because though subjects accurately
described the peripheral symptoms in exact terms, they “were not moved”.
Maranon’s findings served as a basis for Cannon’s fifth criticism of William
James’ theory of emotion: “Artificial induction of the visceral changes
typical of strong emotions does not produce them.” (1927). He focuses on
the fact that while subjects may have experienced the sensations which
are concomitants of adrenaline injections, they were usually accompanied
by “as if” or “an indefinite affective state coldly appreciated”.
Maranon & the Two Factor Theory of Emotion
Randolph Cornelius (1991) maintains that Maranon proposed a two-factor
theory of emotion incorporating:
1. A bodily component (l’émotion végétative) associated with sympathetic
arousal (e.g., dry mouth, cold hands, increased heart rate
2. A psychological part (l’émotion psychique) which is superimposed on
the bodily component. This subjective element was described as a
“motive” (motif psychique) or “reason” (raison intellectuelle).
The co-presence of both components enabled the person to experience
“un état affectif complet”, a complete affective state.
Maranon argued that a psychological context must precede the
experience of bodily changes which place the person in a state of
“affective imminence”.
American Psychology After Maranon
Landis and Hunt (1932) criticized the way that Cannon used Maranon’s
findings.
They “call attention to a doctrine current in American psychology which
holds that the injection of adrenaline, while producing the organic state
typical of emotion, is nevertheless not capable of producing a genuine
emotion.”
They examined the original research in French and concluded “that in
some cases there was a definite and undeniable emotion produced upon
the injection of adrenaline” which was experienced “as genuine and
complete”.
They gave injections of adrenaline to people assessed as having a
“psychoneurotic personality” and concluded that “the injection of sufficient
amounts of adrenaline will reproduce roughly the organic picture usually
characterized as emotion.” In addition, “environmental factors undoubtedly
are reflected in and form an important part of the emotional experience.”
They agree with the conclusions of Cantril and Hunt (1932) who found
“most of their observers demanding a satisfactory reason for the emotion
before the emotional experience could be felt as complete” and so
“emotional awareness must be considered as a process involving higher
perceptual or intellectual functions.”
Cantril and Hunt (1932) described the purely physical effects of the
adrenaline injection.
Generally speaking, the “physical syndrome always consisted of a
muscular tremor localized particularly in the legs and hands, a tremor in
the voice, increased respiration, immediate slight decrease and
subsequent rise in the pulse rate, and an increase in the strength of the
heart beat.”
Example:
“Bodily feeling of extreme nervousness. The bodily feeling almost swamps
the psychic state, but the nervousness is wholly a matter of physical
symptoms. I feel nervous, but I am not nervous. The reason seems
lacking. I lack an object and the intellectual state is not fulfilled. To sum it
up, I feel vaguely nervous, excited, but any definite emotion is lacking, and
the excitement is a detached bodily affair.” (H)
A more “genuine emotion” is noticed by EH (note that subjects were
identified by their initials)…
“I seem oppressed with a vague fear of something - feeling much the
same as when I’ve lain awake all night, frightened that Bill might die. I am
oppressed with a nameless fear. I want to get away from it just as the
night of Bill’s illness I wanted to relax and sleep and tried to rationalize my
fears but that was impossible then and it is impossible now. It is decidedly
unpleasant.”
A few theoretical implications would reveal its dependence upon the
following possible factors. These include:
(1) a “primary autonomic reaction” which may involve changes in the
vasomotor system, the respiratory system, the viscera, along with
peripheral changes such as sweating and muscular tremor.
(2) “secondary behavioural reaction patterns” including “flight, attack,
facial expression, and vocalization”.
(3) an “intellectual content” or “the presence in consciousness of some
object or situation to which the emotion is directed and around which the
emotion is intellectually organized. This involves the active participation of
the higher logical processes, probably centered in the cerebral cortex.
“The usual emotional state seems to involve a combination of (1) and (3)
but that the presence of an autonomic reaction “is the only sine qua non
for an emotion” while the behavioural reaction is “probably of secondary
importance”.
Unfolding Cognitive Behaviourism
Elizabeth Duffy (1941): “For many years the writer has been of the opinion
that emotion as a scientific concept, is worse than useless.”
As early as 1932 and 1934, she adopted the very behavioural/cognitive
view that it is impossible to distinguish “an emotional state from a mental
state”, with the term “mental state” referring to “intellective or cognitive
processes uncomplicated by affective reactions”.
Unfolding Cognitive Behaviourism
In 1934 Elizabeth Duffy distinguished four qualities attributed to emotion
which in her opinion were typical of mental states in general, and not
unique to emotional states.
They included:
(1) physiological mechanisms (e.g., activity of the thalamus as opposed to
the cerebral cortex)
(2) degree of arousal or intensity of the reaction
(3) disorganization that interferes with effective behaviour
(4) interpretive data (e.g., descriptions of the contents of consciousness or
of the kind of stimulus-response situation).
Unfolding Cognitive Behaviourism
Duffy contrasted excitation, activation, or arousal measured by overt
behaviour with inhibition, “restraint of the tendency to act.”
Accordingly, “increases in the degree of excitation tend to produce
increases in the speed and force (or intensity) of the activity in progress”
be it “muscular performance, a train of thought, or the expression of
emotion”.
Very high levels of arousal lead to uncoordinated reactions, and make the
person more sensitive to stimulation (physical, mental, or emotional).
Changes in the novelty or intensity of the stimulus situation will lead to
changes in excitation.
Unfolding Cognitive Behaviourism
Duffy’s goal was to “effect a rapprochement between the psychology of
the emotions and the psychology of thought, now too often separated by
the assumption that, while one may affect the other, they do not in any
sense represent harmonious manifestations of the same underlying
processes”. Thus, “we should cease our attempt to study emotion sui
generis and should study instead the variations in certain fundamental
aspects or dimensions of behaviour in general as these occur under
varying stimulation…”
The “experience which is labeled emotion is the conscious aspect of a
response, or group of responses, which the individual makes to a
stimulating situation which he interprets as having marked significance for
himself, favorable, or unfavorable.”
Unfolding Cognitive Behaviourism
Hence, according the Duffy, emotion is the individual’s response to
situations which promise well or ill for the attainment of his goals. The
term refers to how the individual feels and how he acts when his
expectations in regards to a situation are that it will, or will not, permit him
to reach some rather strongly desired goal. The strength or intensity of the
emotion is roughly proportional to the degree of importance of the
particular goal to the individual, and to the degree of threat or of promise
which the present situation bears with reference to that goal.”
High levels of activation will lead to disorganization, be it in response to a
new motor skill and in the solution of a difficult “mental problem”.
“The over-eager golfer, teeing off, makes a poor shot”
Unfolding Cognitive Behaviourism
Duffy’s contribution goes well beyond the significant formula:
EMOTION = ENERGY + DIRECTION
She specifies two sources for the subjective qualities of emotion:
(a) awareness of the bodily changes which occur in the process of
adjusting the energy level of the individual to the demands of the situation
AND
(b) awareness of the stimulus situation and of the set for response to that
situation.
Unfolding Cognitive Behaviourism
“Emotional” experience is merely the conscious counterpart of the
adjustments which the individual makes to stimulating conditions which
are of sufficient significance to produce a marked change in his energy
level and his “set” for response.
In sum, “the conscious experience of emotion appears, then, to be a
complex which includes awareness of the stimulus and its significance,
awareness of the set for response, and awareness of certain physiological
changes which are occurring in the individual.”
Although Duffy is known for the formula EMOTION = ENERGY +
DIRECTION (toward or away from a goal), in fact, there is a third
component, “discrimination” or “response to relationships in the situation”
which means “interpretation of the situation.”
A more comprehensive formula might read:
EMOTION = DISCRIMINATION + ENERGY + DIRECTION
Unfolding Cognitive Behaviourism
Papez’s (1937) psychoneural theory
Complex neural structure mediates between emotional behaviour and
experience.
Role of hippocampus and hypothalamus (amygdala) influencing the
cerebral cortex and adding emotional coloring to conscious experience.
Relates to reticular formation and limbic system. Receives impulses from
reticular formation and integrates information from the limbic system.
Unfolding Cognitive Behaviourism
Lindsley’s (1951) Activation Theory of Emotion & Motivation
His theory incorporated excited emotions, such as rage, fear and terror as
well as sleep, coma and drowsiness.
Really a theory of activation - a central neural process in the brainstem’s
Reticular Activating System.
Excitation of the diffuse projection system tones up the cortex as a whole.
Unfolding Cognitive Behaviourism
Lindsley’s (1951) Activation Theory of Emotion & Motivation
Continuum from:
Deep sleep, coma, death
Light sleep
Drowsiness
Relaxed wakefulness
Alert attentiveness
Lindsley emphasized the motivational aspect:
(1) General alerting - arousal process which is dynamic and energizing
(2) Sharpening of focus on stimulus cues which are associated with a goal
or with satisfaction of a need (relates to attention)
Attention - selective awareness of certain sensory messages with
simultaneous suppression of others (activation and inhibition model)
The brain integrates for consciousness, limited and relevant sensory
information concerned with objects of attention.
Central processes facilitate or block input from receptors (sort of like John
Locke meets the 20th century).
Relates to the excitatory level, level of energy mobilization, intensity of
drive, and degree of arousal.
Stanley Schachter (1922-1997)
Schachter was trained in the lineage of the
leading
scholars
in
experimental
social
psychology: Kurt Lewin & Leon Festinger.
He saw his project in relation to Cannon’s (1929)
criticism of James’ theory, to the effect that “the
same visceral changes occur in very different
emotional states and in non-emotional states”.
Schachter cited Maranon’s (1924) “fascinating
study,” as well as the work of Cantril and Hunt (1932) and Landis and
Hunt (1932) who “replicated” the findings.
Nisbett and Schachter (1966) stated: “In nature, of course, cognitive and
situational factors trigger physiological processes, and the triggering
stimulus usually imposes the label we attach to our feeling”. This sounds
like McDougall.
Stanley Schachter (1922-1997)
Schachter elaborated his cognitive analysis in terms of Festinger’s (1954)
notion of “evaluative needs”, that is, pressures to “understand and label
his bodily feelings” of “emotional excitement”… “in terms of his knowledge
of the immediate situation”.
This could involve a process of social
comparison to determine the relative
appropriateness of one’s feelings in a
given situation.
“The perception-cognition figure with a gun in some fashion initiates a
state of physiological arousal; this state of arousal is interpreted in terms
of knowledge about dark alleys and guns and the state of arousal is
labeled as fear”.
The Role of Arousal
Hohmann (1962) studied the emotional life of paraplegics and
quadriplegics with spinal cord injuries.
1. The higher the lesion, the less the visceral
innervation…
2. Expect decreasing manifestation of emotion as
height of lesion increases…
Interviewed respondents about feelings in situations
of sexual excitement, fear, anger, grief,
sentimentality.
Recall emotion arousing incident prior to injury and
comparable feeling after.
Results show that the higher the lesion the less the feeling of anger, fear,
sexual excitement and grief.
So, the less arousal from the viscera, the less the emotional experience.
Three Basic Propositions
1. In a state of arousal for which the individual knows no immediate
explanation, he will “label” this state and describe his feelings in terms of
available cognitions.
2. Given a state of arousal with a completely appropriate explanation
(e.g., “I feel this way because of an injection of adrenaline), no evaluative
needs will arise and the individual is unlikely to label his arousal in terms
of alternate available cognitions.
3. Given the same cognitive circumstances, the individual will react
emotionally or describe his feelings as emotional only to the extent that he
experiences a state of physiological arousal.
Schachter and Singer (1962)
1. Manipulate state of arousal experimentally.
2. Manipulate extent of explanation of bodily state.
3. Creation of situations from which explanatory cognitions may be
derived.
The experimental paradigm involved giving people injections of either
adrenaline or a control solution, saline, under the guise of testing the
effect of a vitamin called Suproxin on visual acuity.
Schachter and Singer (1962)
Independent variables:
1. Arousal state - Placebo versus Epinephrine
Placebo = saline solution (no bodily effects)
Epinephrine = causes heart rate and systolic blood pressure to increase…
leading to the experience of tremor, palpitations, and sometimes flushed
or accelerated breathing.
Effects occur within 3-5 minutes.
Schachter and Singer (1962)
Independent variables:
2. Explanation - A doctor who gave injections to the male subjects either
provided accurate descriptions of the effects of the drug Suproxin,
misinformed subjects, or failed to tell them anything about the effects.
Informed = Precise explanation of the effects of the epinephrine
injection. Direct information from the doctor about subjective
experience.
Ignorant = Not informed about any side effects.
Misinformed = Wrong symptoms are described
subject…numb feet, itching sensation, slight headache.
to
the
Schachter and Singer (1962)
Independent variables:
3. Socially relevant cognitions - In case “evaluative needs” were
stimulated by the subject’s experience of the bodily effects of the drug,
given what they were told about it, two kinds of role models were
provided. These “stooges” were ostensibly in the same drug situation but
behaved in distinctly opposite manners during the waiting period before
having their vision tested.
Euphoric stooge = playfully crushes paper to play basketball, etc.
Bibb Latané, who served as the confederate in the euphoria condition,
“pointed out that the confederate exerted a great deal of pressure on the
subject to join him in the euphoric behaviour and that this constituted a
relevant situational inducement.”
Angry stooge = in response to a tasteless and inappropriately intrusive
questionnaire.
Schachter and Singer (1962)
Dependent variables:
The data comprised self reports of mood and observed behaviour.
Schachter and Singer maintained that the overall pattern of data in their
experiment support their version of the two-factor theory of emotion.
Results:
The major finding was that subjects in the Anger-Ignorant and EuphoricMisinformed conditions showed the highest self-report and greatest
behavioural display of the relevant emotion. No Anger-Misinformed
condition.
Schachter and Wheeler (1962)
Overview:
Male subjects viewed a slapstick film under influence of either
epinephrine, placebo, or chlorpromazine (a sympatholytic agent). They
measured laughter and ratings of funniness of the film.
Schachter and Wheeler (1962)
Independent Variables:
Arousal State-
Placebo
Epinephrine
Chlorpromazine
Dependent Measures:
Mirth = amount of laughter
Stimulus rating = how funny they found the film
Results:
Subjects laughed more in the epinephrine arousal condition but did not like it
more.
Cupchik and Leventhal (1974)
Showed that gender played a role in the relative independence of
expressive behaviour and evaluation for male subjects. Male and female
subjects were presented with single-frame cartoons with canned laughter
present or absent as a background.
Male subjects displayed more mirth but their evaluations were not affected
in the canned-laughter condition, while females showed both increased
mirth and evaluation. This implied greater interrelation between
expression and evaluative feelings for females compared with males.
After Schachter – Cognitive Social Psychology
& Attribution Theory
Schachter’s research spun off an entire industry having to do with making
accurate and inaccurate (misattribution) judgments of internal states.
For example, he did research on internalizers and
externalizers in relation to eating behaviour.
Internalizers respond to hunger cues in the gut
and externalizers respond to taste. We can also
say that externalizers respond to muscular
feedback related to satiety cues.