Ideational dynamics and gradual transformative policy changes: The
Ideational dynamics and gradual transformative policy changes: The case of state responsibility in immigration and integration policies in Israel
Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
By
Ilana Shpaizman
Submitted to the Senate of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem
November 2014
Ideational dynamics and gradual transformative policy changes: The case of state responsibility in immigration and integration policies in Israel
Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
By
Ilana Shpaizman
Submitted to the Senate of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem
November 2014
ii
This work was carried out under the supervision of:
Professor Itzhak Galnoor
iii
Acknowledgements
This dissertation was made possible thanks to the help of many. First, my advisor, Itzhak
Galnoor, who taught me how to become an independent researcher, encouraged me to take responsibility for my research and whose words of wisdom helped me not only to accomplish this mission but also to express my thoughts more accurately. The members of my academic committee, Jonny Gal and Zeev Rozenhak, have provided helpful feedback.
I also thank Moshe Maor, Sharon Gilad, Anat Gofen and Roni Holler for their useful comments on various sections of this work as well as for expressing their interest and words of encouragement. I thank Derek Beach who taught me the logic behind qualitative research, revealing a whole new world to me. Finally, David Levi-Faur not only provided comments and encouragement as my academic committee member, but also his aspiration to build the graduate school at the Hebrew University led to the creation of many classes and platforms enabling me to better understand the academic world and my place in it.
For the financial support which allowed me to dedicate my time for research I am grateful first and foremost to the Harry and Silviya Hoffman Leadership and Responsibility
Program which not only gave me the opportunity to do what I love but also provided me environment of support and learning and enabled me to meet amazing people who work to make this world a better place. I am also grateful to the Federmann School of Public Policy and Government who believed in me from the start and provided me with an academic home; to Cherick Center Hertzel Fellowship and the European Forum, whose support was crucial in the final stage of this project; and lastly to Eshkol Centre who supported me during the initial stages of this project.
I am deeply indebted to the former and current workers at the Ministry of Immigrant
Absorption, the Ministry of Finance, The Ministry of Housing and Construction, local authorities and the Jewish Agency who were happy to share their experience and knowledge with me. To the Knesset Archive staff who provided me with full accesses to
Knesset Committee minutes and to the State Archive staff who helped me find relevant material. Finally, I am indebted to the Sadna Leyeda Tzibury who created the wonderful
“
Hashambir
” of open budget and revealed the open data world for me. i
I thank my students at the Policy Analysis workshops and the Thesis Writing Workshop whose questions honed my analytical and theoretical skills and made me love academic teaching.
My family and friends were a critical factor in this project’s success. Inbal Hakman not only believed in me and encouraged me but also made my life easier by helping in so many ways. My in-laws Ayala and Itzik Shpaizman encouraged and supported me, and my parents, Janna and Avishay Litvak, believed in me from my first day of my undergraduate studies and did and still do all they possibly can to in order for me to peruse my dream.
I thank my “doctorate children”, Eyal, Neta and Tamar, who have taught me that time is more flexible than we think and that it is possible to balance and enjoy both worlds.
Last and not least, I thank my husband and friend, Eran, whose support, encouragement, patience, words of wisdom, companionship and endless belief have made this all possible. ii
Abstract
Analytical framework
This research is about policy change. It seeks to add another layer to policy dynamics research and highlight the important role played by ideas in policy by analysing how ideational dynamics affect single and combined modes of gradual transformative policy change. Specifically, it examines the role of ideas in transforming state responsibility in
Israel’s recent immigration and integration policies.
Most socio-economic policy changes in Western economies in the last 50 years have evolved gradually, usually during periods of relative stability, ultimately leading to a significant shift from the status quo. Changes in state responsibility are a key example.
This type of change is termed “gradual transformative”.
Due to their gradual nature these changes are often hidden. Hence, despite their prevalence, more often than not they remain unnoticed both by research and by decision makers. Research on gradual transformative changes is still in its infancy, and our understanding of it is partial.
There are five modes/strategies of gradual transformative change: (1) Layering: When new institutions, mechanisms or practices grow on top of old mechanisms; (2) Conversion:
When rules remain formally the same but are interpreted and enacted in new ways; (3)
Displacement: Reactivation of previously neglected practices with different logic of action which gradually replace traditional arrangements; (4) Drift: A gap created between the original aims of the policy and the new environment as a result of deliberate neglect of the policy makers, who decide not to adapt the policy to the changing environment; and (5)
Exhaustion : gradual institutional breakdown. This research examines the first four modes.
Most available accounts of gradual transformative change are more descriptive than explanatory. Specifically, they fail to account for combinations and patterns of several modes of change. In addition, they address only one aspect of the deliberate neglect mechanism behind drift (use of veto points to block change) and ignore others. Finally, they do not address the direction and content of policy change.
Ideas can fill these gaps because they shape actors’ policy preferences to affect policy content and institutional development. However, more often than not ideational scholarship iii
focuses on abrupt rather than gradual ideational change. Moreover, although the literature notes the importance of ideas in explaining the modes of change, it does not provide a theoretical basis for their role.
Scope and method
The present research is based on process tracing of five cases of Israeli immigration and integration policies which have undergone significant change during 1989-2010: (1) immigration encouragement, (2) returning residents, (3) initial absorption, (4) employment, and (5) absorption of immigrant scientists. In each case I examine the gradual transformative changes in state responsibility and the causal pathway through which ideas lead to specific modes or combinations of modes of change. The examined cases reveal three new combinations of modes of change: (1) Conversion through layering; (2)
Conversion and layering; and (3) Displacement through layering, in addition to one single mode: policy drift. In order to test the findings with regard to Israeli policy in a broader context I present immigration and integration policies changes in Canada, Sweden and the
Netherlands and the ideas behind these changes.
Findings
The findings indicate first, that despite their uniqueness, Israeli immigration and integration policies are gradually converging with conventional Western immigration policies.
Second, state responsibility for immigration and integration can simultaneously increase and decrease in tandem with the ideas surrounding the policy and their dynamics. Third, the content and direction of policy change correspond to those of ideational change, even when running counter to actors’ strategic interests or changes in electoral politics. Fourth, combinations of modes of gradual transformative change are distinct from single modes in terms of the extent of the associated policy change, and result, among other things, from change in ideas of problem definition and policy solution and the interaction between the two. Fifth, policy drift results from active attention shift from the need to adjust the policy to the changing reality through deliberate crises fomented by policy opponents. Drift becomes possible when problem definition ideas become stagnant and when policy solution ideas are reinforced. iv
These findings demonstrate that gradual transformation change can take place through more sophisticated and complex strategies than the existing research suggests. Specifically, it can take place through combinations of several modes and through the politics of attention and inattention. Consequently, more hidden venues for policy change are revealed. In addition, by systematically analysing ideational dynamics at different levels of generality, we are better equipped to understand how ideas affect policy in general and gradual changes in particular, reinforcing the importance of ideas as another explanatory factor for gradual transformative changes. In summary, this research goes beyond the existing typologies for explaining gradual transformative change, proving once again that the deeper we delve into policy process the more we find. v
Table of Contents
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Chapter 5: Displacement through Layering – Initial absorption ............................... 73
Chapter 6: Drift - KAMEA: Absorption of immigrant scientists .............................. 85
Chapter 7: Immigration and Integration Policies in Canada, Sweden and the
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Comparative Conclusion: Israel, Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands .................... 132
viii
List of Tables and Figures
Tables
Table 1: Immigrants by period of immigration and last continent of residence…………45
Table 2: Emigrants and returning residents 1990-2010...………………………………..54
Table 3: Israel, Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands compared………………………137
Table 4: Policy outcome of gradual transformative change modes and combinations....147
Table 5: Ideational dynamics behind combinations of modes of change ..................….
148
Figures
Figure 1: Percentage of immigrants by major occupations 2004-2010………………….48
Figure 2: Canada: Annual number of immigrants by category………………………….98
Figure 3: Percentage of permanent immigrants in Canada by category ………...………99
Figure 4: Changes in the CIC budget 1995-2010……………………………………….106
Figure 5: Sweden: Annual number of immigrants by category 1990-2010……..………112
Figure 6: Sweden: Government spending per immigrant 1996-2010…...……………...114
Figure 7: The Netherlands: Annual number of immigrants by category1990-2010........120
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ACRONYMS
CIAD Committee of Immigration, Absorption and Diaspora Affairs
CIC
CST
FSU
JAFI
Citizenship and Immigration Canada
Committee of Science and Technology
Former Soviet Union
Jewish Agency for Israel MOIA Ministry of Immigrant Absorption
KAMEA Klitat Madanim Olim, Absorption of Immigrant Scientists
MK Member of Knesset
MOF Ministry of Finance
MOIA Ministry of Immigrant Absorption x
Introduction
Main theoretical concepts
How and why does policy change take place? These questions have been occupying policy researchers for decades. In this research I seek to add another layer to policy dynamics research and underline the important role ideas play in policy, by analysing how ideas and ideational change affect policy changes in general and various modes of gradual transformative policy change in particular. Specifically, it examines changes in state responsibility for immigration and integration.
As opposed to the incremental approach suggested by Lindblom (1959), which considers policy process as mostly stable and adaptive, today it is more common to conceive of the policy process in terms of punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner & Jones, 2010) – long periods of stability characterized by small and adaptive changes are interrupted by short periods of abrupt significant change in policy tools, programs and goals. These abrupt policy changes occur at critical junctures, usually as a result of exogenous shock such as crisis or war, which shakes the system and moves it to a different place. After a short period of instability, the system stabilizes into a new equilibrium. One explanation for this dynamics is disproportionate information processing, otherwise referred to as “the politics of attention” (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005).
Although most punctuations take place during periods of crisis, such periods can also maintain stability, because under conditions of uncertainty dramatic changes are risky. As a result, decision makers will prefer to maintain the existing situation rather than transform it (Boin & Hart, 2003).
The main criticism against the punctuated equilibrium approach is that it explains stability rather than change. Because it focuses on stable institutions which prevent change, the only way to promote change according to this framework is by unpredictable exogenous shock.
Consequently, it cannot explain or predict endogenous factors of change. Moreover in order to understand change one should look not only at the process of change (incremental
1
or abrupt) but also at the result of change (continuity or discontinuity) (Capano & Howlett,
2009; Hacker, 2004; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 1999).
Consequently, lately attention has been drawn to more hidden facets of policy change: changes which evolve gradually, and eventually lead to significant shift in the status quo.
These are called “gradual transformative changes” and may evolve through five distinct modes/strategies: (1) Layering: When new institutions, mechanisms or practices grow on top of the old; (2) Conversion: When rules remain formally the same but are interpreted and enacted in new ways; (3) Displacement: Reactivation of previously neglected practices with different logics of action which gradually replace traditional arrangements; (4) Drift:
A gap created between the original aims of the policy and the new environment as a result of deliberate neglect by policy makers, who decide not to adjust the policy to the changing environment; and (5) Exhaustion : Gradual institutional breakdown (Streeck & Thelen,
2005). I focus on the first four.
Two factors explain why change proceeds in one of those modes rather than another: status quo bias of the political environment and the policy's level of discretion (Hacker 2004;
Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Hacker et al. 2013). Despite their important contribution, existing explanations for the evolvement of the various modes of change are somehow simplistic so that some cases do not conform to their theoretical predictions (see for example Steinlin and Trampusch 2012) . More specifically, it seems that each combination of political and institutional factors is linked to only one mode of change. Thus they have difficulties explaining more complex policy change process, in which several strategies are employed (Van der Heijden, 2010). In addition, apart for layering (Van der Heijden, 2011) the other modes of change are underdeveloped. Specifically, most research ignores displacement and examines only one aspect of the deliberate neglect mechanism behind policy drift. Most important ly, the existing literature is more descriptive than explanatory because among other things it does not address the direction and content of change (Béland,
2007; Schmidt, 2010). Consequently, although gradual transformative policy changes characterize most institutional changes in socioeconomic policies over the past 50 years
(Streeck & Thelen, 2005), our understanding of these changes remains partial.
2
Ideas, defined as causal beliefs (Béland & Cox, 2011) can fill these gaps, because they shape actors’ policy preferences and institutional development. Ideas can be examined through three levels of generality: (1) policy solution ideas; (2) problem definition ideas; and (3) public philosophies (Mehta, 2011). Ideas at all three levels can influence political behaviour and outcomes, both by helping to determine actors' motivations, interests and goals and by shaping institutional constraints and opportunities. Moreover, there are times when ideas constrain actors' behaviour even if the actors do not hold these ideas (Béland
& Cox, 2011; Berman, 2013; Hay, 2006).
Although the literature notes the importance of ideas in explaining modes of change, it does not provide theorization for their role. As for ideational scholarship, more often than not, it explains abrupt policy changes (e.g. Hall 1993; Blyth 2002) at the expense of gradual ideational change that can lead to transformative results (Carstensen, 2011). Finally, existing theories on gradual ideational change (e.g. Carstensen 2011; Mehta 2011) are still somewhat underdeveloped both theoretically and empirically.
State responsibility is one policy aspect which has undergone ideational and gradual transformative policy change in many Western countries. The result of this change has mostly been decrease in state responsibility. State responsibility is a dynamic concept, which ranges on a continuum from full state responsibility to none. It can be examined from three different perspectives. The first is the extent of government involvement as funder, regulator or producer of certain services or benefits (Clarke, 2004; Savas, 2000;
Starr, 1989). The second refers to the division of labour/social responsibility between the private and the public sphere in different fields (Clarke, 2004). The third is the universality/selectivity of a given policy (Gilbert, 2002; Gilbert & Gilbert, 1989).
One social field in which changes in state responsibility are evident is immigration and integration policies. Until recently immigration and integration policies have been adopted according to national models based on the nation’s history, values and norms (Freeman
1995). In the last decade more convergence is evident between various immigration countries in order to deal with common problems set by the growing flows of immigrants and their integration (Freeman 2006; Joppke 2007). Immigration and integration policies have strong ideational components because they address issues such as national identity
3
and social cohesion, and since the policy making is often influenced by national norms and values (Freeman 1995).
Research aims
The aim of this research is to expand our understanding of gradual transformative modes of change and the impact of ideas and ideational dynamics on these changes in particular.
Specifically, it tries to examine gradual transformative change and ideational dynamics from a more dynamic perspective, paying attention not only to single modes of change but also to patterns or combinations of several modes and to ideational dynamics, both between different levels of generality and within the same level.
Based on four gradual transformative modes of change – layering, conversion, displacement and drift (defined and described in Chapter One, pp. 11-14) – I develop and examine three new combinations of modes of gradual transformative change: (1) conversion through layering; (2) conversion and layering; and (3) displacement through layering. In addition, I also examine one single mode – policy drift.
The main research question is: How do ideas and ideational change affect gradual transformative policy change ? Specifically, I focus on four sub-questions:
(a) What is the difference between combinations of modes of change and single modes of change as described by Streeck and Thelen (2005)?
(b) What is the role of agenda setting in policy drift?
(c) How do ideas and ideational change bring about the evolution of (1) conversion through layering, (2) conversion and layering, (3) displacement through layering, and (4) drift?
(d) How do ideas and ideational change affect changes in state responsibility in immigration and integration policies in Israel?
Using process tracing of five cases in Israeli immigration and integration policies in the period 1989-2010, I analyse the modes and combinations of change and suggest ideational mechanisms as causal pathways leading from ideas to modes or combinations of modes of change (Gerring, 2008) for each. In addition, in order to assess the findings from the Israeli
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case in a broader context, I present immigration and integration policies changes in three other immigration countries: Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands.
The research presents five arguments. First, Israeli immigration and integration policies underwent gradual transformative change resulting in convergence with other immigration countries. Second, state responsibility for immigration and integration simultaneously increases and decreases in accordance with the ideas behind the policy; specifically, the relations between global ideas of the “race for talent” and local public philosophies. Third, the content and direction of policy change correspond to those of ideational change, even when running counter to actors’ strategic interests or changes in electoral politics. Fourth, combinations of gradual transformative change are distinct from single modes of change in the extent of the policy change: these combinations are the result, among other things, of ideational change in policy solution and problem definition ideas and the interaction between the two. Fifth, policy drift can be a result of active attention shift from the need to adjust the policy to the changing reality through crisis formation by policy opponents; drift becomes possible when problem definition ideas become stagnant and when policy solution ideas are reinforced.
Scope and method
This research is based on a process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; George & Bennett,
2005; Mahoney, 2012) of the Israeli immigration and integration policies from 1989-2010.
More specifically, it focuses on changes in state responsibility for immigration and integration, and on the ideas behind these changes.
Despite the fact that Israel has non-ethnic migrants such as refugees, asylum seekers and temporary low-skilled labourers, all references to immigrants in Israel in this work are exclusively to ethnic (Jewish) immigrants. This is due to the fact that there is almost no formal policy in place for other immigrant groups and the existing policy is mostly ad hoc
(Avinery et al, 2009).
The proposed ideational mechanisms behind each combination or mode of gradual transformative change are examined through five case studies within Israeli immigration and integration policies, which underwent a most significant change during the examined
5
period: (1) immigration encouragement, (2) returning residents, (3) employment, (4) initial absorption, and (5) absorption of immigrant scientists. The analysis is based on various policy documents such as government decisions, regulations, Knesset committee protocols, state budgets, government work plans and correspondence, as well as interviews conducted with key decision makers.
Structure of the research
Chapter One presents the analytical framework. First, it describes the punctuated equilibrium framework, the most common conception of policy change and the mechanism behind it, focusing on concepts of path dependence, the politics of attention and the role of crisis. Second, it presents the gradual transformative framework, its modes of change and main weaknesses. Third, it elaborates on policy ideas, their role in policy dynamics, the different levels of generality, and the underdeveloped field of gradual ideational change.
Lastly, it describes recent trends in state responsibility in social policy and changes in immigration and integration policies in particular. Special attention is devoted to the “race for talent” global ideas and policies (Shachar, 2006).
Chapter Two presents the dissertation’s hypothesis and methodology. In each mode or combination of modes of change, the ideational conditions for the evolvement of the combination/mode are suggested. In addition, in each combination the distinction between the combination and the single modes composing it is presented. Then the chapter elaborates on the methodology employed. Detailed descriptions of the process tracing method in general and process tracing of ideas in particular are presented, followed by elaboration on the collected material on which the inferences were based and the analysis was made. Lastly, the main concepts and their observable indicators are presented.
Chapters Three through Six present the empirical analysis. This section begins with general description of the Israeli immigration and integration policies and ideas, followed by detailed analysis of the five cases from the Israeli policy. In each case, first the policy changes are described followed by a description of the ideational dynamics behind these changes. Chapter Three presents the conversion through layering combination, using two cases: immigration encouragement and returning residents. Chapter Four analyses the conversion and layering combination though the case of assistance in employment. The
6
analysis revolves around three subfields: subsidized employment, vocational training and entrepreneurship. Chapter Five examines the displacement through layering combination using the case of initial absorption. Chapter six analyses policy drift through the case of
KAMEA, the absorption of immigrant scientists program.
Chapter Seven describes the relationship between ideas and policy in three other immigration countries: Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands. Note that this section is strictly illustrative. Since the comparison was made using different sources and methodology its structure is different than the previous chapters. First, the reasons for comparing the countries are presented followed by detailed methodology of the analysis made. Then the policy and ideational dynamics in each country are presented. Finally, the main findings from the three countries as well as from Israel are compared.
Chapter Eight presents the main conclusions. First, the findings on ideas and changes in state responsibility for immigration and integration are presented. Second, the effect of ideas on gradual transformative change in each combination or mode is discussed. Third, the main research contributions are highlighted, pointing out research limitations and possible directions for future research.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review
Policy change and punctuated equilibrium
As opposed to the incremental approach suggested by Lindblom (1959), which considers policy process as mostly stable and adaptive, today it is more common to conceive of the policy process in terms of punctuated equilibrium– long periods of stability characterized by small and adaptive changes are interrupted by short periods of abrupt significant change in policy tools, programs and goals. These abrupt policy changes occur at critical junctures, usually as a result of exogenous shock such as crisis or war, which shakes the system and moves it to a different place. After a short period of instability the system stabilizes into a new equilibrium (Baumgartner & Jones, 2010).
One explanation for this dynamics is disproportionate information processing, otherwise referred to as “the politics of attention” (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). One should distinguish between objective change in the environment and paying attention to this change and to the signals it produces. Governments collectively and decision makers individually are not always aware of changes in the environment or consider them important enough to pay attention to. They often misinterpret or ignore important signals until they become severe. This misinterpretation is consequence of the decision makers’ bounded rationality (Simon, 1982). Decision makers operate in information rich environment with limited and selective attention filtering change signals. Bounded rationality leads to disproportional information processing in which some signals are ignored and other over emphasized. Once attention is turned to one issue, governments and decision makers pay less attention to other issues. Consequently, mistakes are made and then corrected. This correction occurs usually when there is some crisis or when public attention is turned to a certain problem. During these periods decision makers’ attention is turned to previously ignored signals and policy punctuation may occur (Jones &
Baumgartner, 2005).
Punctuated equilibrium theory divides scholars into those examining policy during periods of punctuation and those examining policy during periods of equilibrium. The latter argue that policy dynamics is mostly path dependent. Once created its changes are incremental,
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adaptive, and take place within the existing institutional structure without changing it. This is because policy is constrained by past choices and positive feedback mechanism in which there are increasing returns to those who follow the policy path (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson,
2004). One of the most common examples for institutional path dependence is the resilience of the welfare state in the last three decades. Even when the welfare state is under more severe pressure than before, its structure is still stable because of the positive feedback effect (Pierson, 2004). When the policy is path dependent, path breaking can take place mostly during periods of crisis.
Crisis and policy change
Crisis is not necessarily an objective situation but rather a “politically mediated moment of decisive intervention and structural transformation” (Hay, 1999, p. 323). In order to resolve a crisis it should be acknowledged and identified. Hence crisis leads to change only when the contradictions between policy and reality are recognized and narrated by agents of change as a crisis. Correspondingly, not every policy failure or contradiction between policy and reality is a crisis, because the identification of the moment of crisis by agents of change is integral to the transformation process. The perception and narration of crisis does not necessary correspond to the actual failure, or may correspond to some parts of it but not others (Boin, 2005; Hay, 1999).
The three main components of crisis are threat, uncertainty and urgency (Boin et al 2009).
Crisis takes place when policy makers experience a serious threat to the basic values and structures of the system. This causes pressure for urgent and vital decision making under conditions of uncertainty. Crisis and its chaotic and ambiguous nature provide an opportunity for potential agents of change to suggest new policy solutions and reconstruct the existing system (Boin, 2005).
However, this perception that crisis enables agents of change to overcome institutional and political barriers can be seen as somewhat naïve, since crisis poses not only opportunities but also risks. Thus, in periods of crisis reform is not necessarily the decision makers’ priority, because what they want is to bring things back to normal. As a result, they stick to the existing ideas and methods and try to maintain and not destroy existing institutions.
Uncertainty impedes the search for new solutions and makes actors stick to familiar
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practices . Thus, successful crisis leaders are those who restore the confidence in the existing institutions and practices (Boin & Hart, 2003). In addition, in some instances the contradictions are acknowledged and perceived, but no intervention takes place. In these situations the old is dead but the new has not been born yet (Hay, 1999). All that corresponds to findings that the response to crisis is characterized mostly by incremental change, and that fundamental changes are the exception rather than the rule (Hooren, et al.,
2014).
Gradual transformative change
The main criticism against the punctuated equilibrium approach and the path dependence framework is that they explain stability better than change. Because they focus on stable institutions which prevent change, the only way to promote change they offer is by exogenous shock (usually crisis) that occurs unpredictably. Consequently, they cannot explain or predict endogenous factors of change. In addition, these approaches make scholars think of change in one of two ways: either as minor and continuous or as very major and abrupt. This way of thinking ignores gradual changes during periods of relative stability that may add up to major discontinuities. Thus, in order to understand change one should look not only at the process of change (incremental or abrupt) but also at the result of change (continuity or discontinuity) (Capano & Howlett, 2009; Hacker, 2004; Streeck
& Thelen, 2005).
Streeck and Thelen (2005) call incremental change that results in discontinuity "gradual transformative change", that is, change that leads to a significant shift from the status quo over time. This type of change, which unfolds without dramatic disruptions like wars or revolutions, is usually a result of endogenous factors within the institutional framework which it transforms, and characterizes most of the socioeconomic institutional changes in advanced Western political economies in the last 50 years (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010;
Streeck & Thelen, 2005).
Streeck and Thelen (2005) identify five major modes or strategies of gradual transformative change: layering, conversion, displacement, drift and exhaustion . This
10
research addresses the first four.
1
The evolution of each mode is a function of the political context; strong/weak status quo bias and institutional characteristics; and high/low level of discretion in implementation and enforcement (Hacker, 2005; Hacker et al., 2013;
Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Status quo bias can be a result of multiple veto points and strong veto players (Tsebelis, 2002), or of vested interests or feedback effects that make it difficult to change past decisions (Pierson, 2004). The level of discretion is among other things a function of the ambiguity of formal rules (Hacker et al., 2013; Mahoney & Thelen,
2010).
Layering
Layering happens when new institutions, mechanisms or practices are attached to existing institutions without replacing them. The new practices, which are usually based on different logics of action, are first introduced at the margins of the system in order to complement or repair it, but gradually, because of differential growth, these practices extend and gradually transform the institutional structure and status. Since the new layer does not replace the old policy, it does not provoke counter mobilization by the defenders of the status quo. Over time and by default, the old layer crowds out or erodes. One example of layering is when private pension is added to public pension, and over time the former becomes more significant than the latter (Schickler, 2001; Streeck & Thelen, 2005).
Layering is more likely when there is low level of discretion, when actors who cannot change existing institutions are forced to add institutions to existing ones (Hacker, 2005;
Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). As for status quo bias, Hacker (2004, 2005) argues that low bias enables adding new practices to the existing ones, while Mahoney and Thelen (2010) argue that layering is more likely when there are strong veto rights that block any formal change, since layering does not require making direct changes in the existing institutions.
Conversion
Conversion is active transformation of existing institution or policy through redirection to new ends and purposes. Thus, formal institutions or policies remain the same but their
1 Exhaustion has not been studied because this mode addresses institutional breakdown and not transformation. Moreover, it is ignored by all scholars of gradual transformative change, including Mahoney and Thelen (2010).
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impact changes. Conversion is required among other things when the institution has outlived the conditions prevalent at the time of its foundation, causing a gap between it and the environment. In order to adjust the institution to the changing environment there is need for active redirection and reinterpretation of the policy/institution (Hacker et al., 2013;
Streeck & Thelen, 2005). For example, Béland (2007) demonstrates that the American social security system has converted from an income maintenance programme to a retirement wage programme without changing its policy tools. Since conversion enables continuity it enjoys support by institutional innovators and also prevents objection by the defenders of the status quo. In addition it is the preferred strategy for actors who wish to effect policy change beneath the radar (Hacker et al., 2013).
Conversion is more likely when the rules are more ambiguous and there is high level of discretion. This is because it gives agents of change the opportunity to exploit the ambiguity to redirect policies to new directions. The second condition for conversion is high status quo bias that makes it harder to formally change existing policies (Hacker,
2004; Hacker et al., 2013). There is also a contradictory view that considers conversion the result of weak veto options that enable institutional redirection (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010).
Displacement
Institutions are often incoherent, i.e. more and less dominant practices and logics of action coexist. In some cases the different practices conflict, mostly because they have been created at different times and under different circumstances. Displacement occurs when traditional and dominant practices are discredited or pushed aside in favour of different arrangements. Such change occurs through rediscovery or reactivation and cultivation of alternative practices. The practices can also be from another field or place. As the new practices become more dominant through defection of actors from old to new practices, they move from the periphery to the centre and supplant old practices. Displacement can occur also through “invasion” of foreign practices adapted and cultivated by local actors.
In displacement, new and old practices continue to coexist, but the availability of the former and their growing dominance calls into question the previously dominant and sometimes even taken-for-granted practices (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). As opposed to conversion, layering and drift where the old policies remain in place, in displacement they
12
are ultimately replaced (Van der Heijden, 2010). An example for displacement can is the growing use of outsourcing in various policy domains, which questions and in some fields even displaces the more traditional practice of service provision directly by the government.
Displacement is more likely when there are weak veto possibilities, because agents of change need to actively cultivate the rediscovered practices and change the existing institutions by making the old practices less dominant. In addition, it is more likely when there is low level of discretion because displacement does not require change in the interpretation or enforcement of rules (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010).
Drift
In order for the institution/policy to survive, it has to constantly be refocused and maintained in response to the changes in the environment. Without such reshaping they can be subject to erosion. Actors who wish to change an institution with significant barriers to change can do it not through direct attack on the institution but rather through blocking attempts to adapt the institution to the changing environment (Hacker, 2004, 2005).
Drift is a gap created between the original aims of the policy and the new environment as a result of deliberate neglect by policy makers, who decide not to adapt the policy to the changing environment. Thus, policies remain the same while their impact changes. Drift is seen as more than just inaction. It requires that the circumstances change in a way that affects the policy, that actors recognize these changes and the gap created, have alternatives to close the gap, and eventually try to make adjustments in the institution and fail to do so.
Usually the failure will be the result of political actors’ pressure to exploit veto points in the political process (preventing legislation) or keep an issue off the agenda (Hacker et al.,
2013; Hacker, 2004, 2005). Hence, the mechanism behind drift is deliberate neglect.
In drift, sometimes doing nothing in the parliament or government means doing plenty in the environment. One type of environmental change that can lead to drift is demography.
Many policies are designed around particular distributions within the relevant population.
Over time these distributions may change significantly and transform the policy’s impact
(Hacker et al., 2013). For example, Hacker (2004) demonstrates how despite changes in
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American labour market attempts to adapt the policy to the new reality were blocked. As a result, more risks were transferred from the state to the individuals, without at all changing the welfare state’s structure. Drift is thus a valuable tool for politicians to promote change through non-decision without being noticed by the wide public or disorganized interests
(Hacker & Pierson, 2010).
Drift is more likely when there is strong status quo bias that prevents formal institutional change and low level of policy discretion that makes it harder to adapt the institution to the changing reality (Hacker et al., 2013; Hacker, 2004, 2005). There is also a contradicting view that considers drift a result of high level of discretion, because agents of change can use their discretion in order to prevent any attempt to close the gap (Mahoney & Thelen,
2010).
Weaknesses of the existing literature
Despite its important contribution in moving policy dynamics research beyond punctuated equilibrium and revealing more hidden process of policy change, the existing literature is still somewhat underdeveloped. First, displacement is an underdeveloped concept. Most research (e.g. Hacker, 2004, Béland, 2007) neglects it and even Thelen argues that it is rare in the politics of reform in advanced political economies (Thelen, 2009) – a puzzling statement considering the fact that Streek and Thelen (2005) devoted several chapters to addressing displacement (Van der Heijden, 2010).
Second, although the literature on drift mentions agenda setting as one of the means for blocking change (by keeping the issue off the agenda), it is not theorized enough. Existing accounts on drift focus almost entirely on deliberate neglect through usage of veto points or lobbying efforts of powerful interest groups and on the policy supporters’ efforts to actively update the policy (Hacker & Pierson, 2010). Specifically, the literature tends to ignore the fact that problems are prioritized among other things through information processing and the politics of attention (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). Thus, since drift can take place through agenda shifting, neglect can be also be the result of attention shift rather than failed efforts to update the institution. Consequently, it is possible that more sophisticated and hidden strategies for policy drift are ignored.
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Third, existing explanations for the evolvement of various change modes are partial and somewhat simplistic.
It seems that each combination of political and institutional factors is linked to only one change mode. Thus they have difficulty explaining more complex policy change processes, in which several strategies are employed (Van der Heijden, 2010). For example, Béland, (2007) found out that the US social security policy had first changed through layering and then through drift, and Falleti, (2010) demonstrated healthcare reform evolution in Brazil through layering followed by conversion. This criticism characterizes many institutional works based on typologies, because in a typology each case must fall into a certain cell, while in reality variables are more continuous in space-time (Radaelli et al., 2012). Moreover, change resulting from the combination of several modes might be distinct from that resulting from each mode separately.
Fourth, existing accounts are still mostly descriptive rather than explanatory, as they do not address the content of change or its direction. For example, why do agents of change choose to layer certain policies rather than others? Or why is specific change more or less conservative in nature (Béland 2007; Schmidt 2010)? Among other things, this gap is due to historical institutionalism’s tendency to examine only institutional and material constraints on policy change, and when examining the motivations of agents of change, focus on their strategic interests. Yet institutional development and actors’ views on which polices are more or less feasible are shaped also by the ideas behind the institutions and by actors’ wider motivations and beliefs (Hay 2006; Schmidt 2010). However, existing explanations tend to downplay or ignore the role of ideas in their theorization of gradual transformative change. For example, although Hacker and Pierson (2010) argue that neoclassic ideas have shaped the content and direction of policy change, they see the rising prominence of these ideas only as “helping to provide intellectual backing for demands already voiced…” (Hacker & Pierson, 2010, p. 175).
Interestingly, some of the authors contributing to the edited volumes by Streeck and Thelen
(2005) and Mahoney and Thelen (2010) (e.g. Palier 2005; Falleti 2010) do provide evidence for the importance of ideas in explaining the various modes of gradual institutional change. Furthermore, Rocco and Thurston (2014), who examine empirical indicators of conversion, layering and drift, also note that agents of change can use
15
intellectual resources in order to promote or prevent change. However, all these authors only note the importance of ideas and do not theorize how they affect policy (Schmidt
2010). Thus, a more comprehensive account is required, one that will take into fuller account the significant role played by ideas in institutional change, and close the gap between theory and empirical evidence.
Ideas, ideational dynamics and policy
Ideas are causal beliefs (Béland & Cox, 2011). Ideational scholars believe that actors have nonmaterial interests and goals that affect the way they act. In addition, there are times when ideas constrain actors' behaviour even if the actors do not hold these ideas. Thus, ideas can influence political behaviour and outcomes both by helping determine actors' motivations, interests and goals and by shaping institutional constraints and opportunities
(Béland & Cox, 2011; Berman, 2013). Ideas are represented through discourse. There are two discursive interactions: coordinative discourse among policy actors and communicative discourse between political actors and the public (Schmidt 2008). 'Policy makers constantly work within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them but also the very nature of the problem they are meant to be addressing...' (Hall 1993, p. 279). Thus, ideas provide cognitive and normative causal propositions that help define the problem, exclude other problem definitions, direct attention and act as roadmaps for decision makers, helping them choose among different alternatives (Berman, 1998; Béland, 2005,
2007; Béland & Cox, 2011).
Most ideational research examines abrupt rather than gradual policy change (e.g. Hall
1993; Blyth 2002) and argues that ideas affect policy in a punctuated equilibrium process: in periods of stability, they remain stable and help maintain the status quo; in periods of crisis, however, they help promote abrupt change by providing actors with new objectives, justifications and legitimacy for a new policy (Seabrooke, 2009; Wincott, 2011). As a result of this notion, most ideational research has examined the effects of ideas in periods of uncertainty and crisis (see for example, Berman, 1998; Blyth, 2002; Hall, 1993; Jacobs,
2009).
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Although following Hall (1993) most ideational research believes that after a crisis there will be paradigmatic change, lately there has been empirical evidence suggesting otherwise. Research has found, for example, that despite the 2008 economic crisis not only did neo-liberal ideas not change, but were reinforced with a relatively short period of time.
The various problems arising at the 2008 crisis were reframed so that they will be in accord with neo-liberal ideas (Blyth, 2013; Schmidt & Thatcher, 2013). Consequently, crisis can lead not only to ideational change but also to ideational reinforcement. One explanation for the lack of change could be that although it seems that a dominant paradigm has failed, no new paradigm is available. As a result, decision makers reconstruct existing ideas instead of looking for new ones. Another explanation is that there are powerful actors who push against paradigmatic change. As Blyth puts it, "It is politics, not economics, and it is authority, not facts that matter for both paradigm maintenance and change” (2013 p, 210).
Thus the crisis and its narration recruit old ideas in order to prevent significant policy change (Hay, 1999).
Because of this focus on crisis and abrupt paradigmatic change, research often ignores gradual ideational change. For example, Wincott (2013) examined the idea of 'the golden age of the welfare state' and found that both scholars and policy makers took it for granted, ignoring gradual ideational changes taking place during the so-called 'golden age'. As a result, despite its inaccuracy the idea continued to influence research as well as policy making.
Ideas may be classified into three levels of generality (Mehta, 2011; Schmidt, 2011). Policy solutions are the means for solving the problem and accomplishing the objectives. These ideas can change relatively quickly when a window of opportunity opens for new agenda.
Here, change is usually the result of discrepancy between ideas and reality (Schmidt, 2010).
When actors understand that the existing policy solution ideas fail to properly address a problem, existing ideas erode and the actors start looking for new ones, more consistent with the new reality. In turn, these ideas turn the attention to fresh policy alternatives (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Jacobs 2009).
Problem definitions frame the policy goal and scope of possible solutions, and are at the same analytical level as programmatic beliefs (Berman, 1998) or paradigms (Hall, 1993).
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For any issue there is usually more than one problem definition, each addressing different aspects of a given situation. Policy makers often use symbolic representation such as metaphors which imply prescription or synecdoche, when the whole problem is represented by one of its parts, to define the problem (Stone, 1988). These ideas usually change during periods of crisis when one paradigm is replaced by another (Schmidt, 2008). This paradigmatic shift brings about change not only in policy tools but also in policy goals
(Hall, 1993).
Finally , public philosophies are beliefs about the purpose of government or public policy in light of a certain set of assumptions about society and the market. These ideas are also called core values (Cox, 2004) or worldviews (Campbell, 1998). They are often independent of agency since they include societal values (Kuisma, 2013).
While ideas at the first two levels are 'foreground ideas' because they tend to be constantly discussed and debated, public philosophies usually remain in the background, acting as underlying assumptions that are widely shared, rarely contested or changed and not open to criticism (Campbell, 1998; Schmidt, 2008). Public philosophies are the slowest to change, since they include changes in the core values of the society (Schmidt, 2008).
Moreover, they constrain significant policy change, because each change is evaluated according to a 'logic of appropriateness' (March & Olsen, 2004) to these ideas. Hence, policy makers either will not pursue a change that contradicts these ideas because they think the public and political system will consider it illegitimate, or because they themselves consider it so. Furthermore, when the policy is rooted in public philosophies there is a tendency to expand these ideas so that policy changes will appear consistent with them (Cox 2004). For example, Cox (2004) has demonstrated how Swedish decision makers gained legitimacy for policy changes by expanding the public philosophies behind the Swedish welfare state. Accordingly, public philosophies are path-dependent: once created they are constantly reinforced. As a result, public philosophies behind a policy make for strong status quo bias (Pierson, 2004).
The interaction between the levels can flow downwards: public philosophies shape how specific problems are defined, which in turn affects which policy solution ideas are available. It can also flow upwards: When success or failure resulting from policy solution
18
ideas is extended beyond the original policy it can be used to question or expand the problem definition. Expansion may occur 'if they (the new policies) find a way to reconcile multiple goods that previously seemed incommensurable' (Mehta 2011, p. 43). In addition, several problem definitions can create a public philosophy, while constant discrepancy between the problem definition and reality might lead to gradual change in public philosophy. This more dynamic conception of ideas corresponds to Carstensen's (2011) theory of gradual ideational change, which views ideas not as stable entities, but as a web of related elements with varying importance. Hence, gradual ideational change may occur when there is change in the relative importance of the different elements within an idea, or in the composition of elements that constitute it.
Despite Mehta and Carstensen’s important contribution in moving ideational research beyond punctuated equilibrium, gradual ideational change is still relatively underdeveloped. Carstensen provides only illustrative evidence for his theory, while Mehta himself 'does not claim to have a theory that would explain when these outcomes are likely'
(Mehta, 2011, p. 43), and provides only examples of how this might work. This research addresses these gaps.
State responsibility
State responsibility is a dynamic concept, which ranges along a continuum from full responsibility to none. It can be examined from three different perspectives. The first is the extent of government involvement as a provider of funds, regulator or producer of certain services or benefits: the more involved the state is, the greater its responsibility (Savas,
2000; Starr, 1989). For example, when the state both funds welfare services and provides them to the public its responsibility is greater than when it only funds the services and the provision is made through private organizations. The second perspective is an elaboration of the first and refers to the division of labour/social responsibility between the private and the public sectors in different spheres (Clarke, 2004). For example, when the state intrudes in areas previously reserved for civil society or the private market its responsibility increases. The third perspective is the universality/selectivity of a given policy. The more universal the policy, i.e. services provided to all the citizens regardless of their economic situation, the broader the state responsibility (Gilbert, 2002). For example, when the state
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changes the eligibility for child benefits from all citizens to citizens from low socioeconomic status its responsibility decreases. These perspectives imply that when examining state responsibility one should look at more than just the amount of government spending and examine also the degree of de-commodification, i.e., the degree of individual independence of the market (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Thus, the less de-commodification the more state responsibility decreases.
An example of changes in government responsibility from different perspectives is the changes taking place in the welfare state. The welfare state has shifted in the last three decades from expansion to retrenchment. As a result, state responsibility decreased. This retrenchment is evidenced among other things in reduced benefits received by the citizens.
However, it is worth noticing that retrenchment is evident not through the social expenditure as share of the GDP, which remained more or less stable, but rather through more incremental methods that seem technical, in order to avoid significant public and political opposition. For example, privatization of various services, changing the entitlement criteria for various benefits, pension reforms or incremental cutbacks – all without replacing the whole system. Most changes were due to economic pressure and rising unemployment as well as new ideas of the new right (Pierson, 1996).
Yet despite this relative stability, the incremental changes were significant. In the last few decades the state has moved from being a welfare state to being an 'enabling state' characterized by public support for private responsibility (individuals, the market and the voluntary organizations). In this 'enabling state' social policies are designed to enable people to work and become more self-reliant, and to expand the role of the market and the voluntary sector in providing social protection. Thus state responsibility is being reduced
(Gilbert, 2002). One of the justifications provided for this process is 'load shedding' – the belief that the government should be small since this will likely reduce demands on the state (Savas, 2000; Starr, 1989).
Moreover, there is a shift in the distribution of various benefits from universal to selective and from ‘in-cash’ to ‘in-kind’. In addition, there is also increase in private programs and decrease in public programs. Lastly, the existing policy failed to adapt to the changing
20
reality, exposing the citizens to new social risks and expanding the private realm at the expense of the public one (Clarke, 2004; Green-Pedersen, 2004; Hacker, 2004). Thus, although the main structures remained stable, in some fields policy outcomes have changed or new policy tools have become more dominant. Consequently, the policy’s ability to achieve the goals has weakened and state responsibility has eroded. All this has occurred not through formal revision, but rather through drift, conversion or layering (Béland, 2007;
Green-Pedersen, 2004; Hacker, 2004). In addition, the incremental changes have shifted the conception of social rights from citizens’ universal right to achievement-oriented rights
(see for example the logic behind “welfare to work” programs). Thus the change has not only been in the policy tools and aims but also in the underlying principles (Cox, 1998).
One of the social policy domains in which change in state responsibility has been most evident is immigration and integration.
Immigration and integration policies
Immigration policy
Immigration policy is the regulation of the flow of immigrants (Hammar, 1985). Until recently, immigration and integration policies have been made according to national models based on the nation’s history, values and norms (Freeman 1995). The last two decades have seen greater convergence between various immigration countries in order to deal with common problems posed by the growing flows of immigrants. This convergence is also promoted by the European Union, which has become an important factor in this context by positing common basic principles for immigration and integration policies
(Freeman, 2006b; Joppke, 2007).
Specifically, a new immigration policy paradigm has emerged: human mobility across borders is a permanent phenomenon and thus a zero immigration policy is impossible. The new paradigm aims at managing immigration, with instrumental focus on the potential socioeconomic contribution of immigrants to the host countries (Shachar & Hirschl, 2014).
Correspondingly, since the end of the 1990s the Western world has been practicing a dualistic immigration policy, with relaxed entry and residence requirements for high-
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skilled immigrants
2
and barriers and stringent requirements for low-skilled immigrants
(Castles & Miller, 2009; Iredale, 2001; Joppke, 2007; Mahroum, 2001, 2005; McLaughlan,
Salt, & Britain, 2002; Shachar & Hirschl, 2014; Shachar, 2006). Although the policy practices of this paradigm differ between countries, there are common principles: the state simultaneously increases its control of low-skilled immigrants and opens its borders to high-skilled and rich immigrants. Migration is based on a scale of attractiveness and priority is given to those with employability potential over those with needs (Shachar &
Hirschl, 2014)). As a result, immigration policy no longer plays a passive gate-keeping role but rather an active one aimed at recruiting high-skilled immigrants. Shachar calls this “the race for talent” (Shachar, 2006).
The “race for talent” means promoting selective immigration programs designed to attract high-skilled and wealthy migrants who will contribute to the receiving country’s knowledge-based economy. This group gets special treatment in visa, citizenship and employment opportunities. This process began in the United States, Canada and Australia, and today it encompasses most of the EU countries The “race” also includes incentives for emigrant professionals to return to their countries of origin. Such incentives are in place, for example, in South Korea, Taiwan and Ireland. They reflect an attitude change, since the emigrants are now treated as ‘lost children’ and potential contributors to the national economy. (McLaughlan et al, 2002; Mahroum, 2005; Shachar, 2006).
The main arguments for high-skilled immigration policies are economic, since skilled immigrants contribute to countries’ economic vitality and growth (Freeman, 2006b). While policies towards refugees, asylum seekers and family-reunion immigrants are politically contested in many countries, policies towards high-skilled immigrants remain largely consensual and disputed only on technocratic grounds.
2 High-skilled immigrants are usually defined as having a university degree or extensive experience in a desirable profession such as information technology. Lately wealthy immigrants willing to invest in the host country have been added to this category (Iredale, 2001; Mahroum, 2005; Shachar & Hirschl, 2014; Shachar,
2006).
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Integration policy
The immigrant integration policy addressed in this research is what Hammar (1985) calls
“direct immigrant policy”: “Special measures on behalf of immigrants” (Hammar, 1985, p. 10). These measures include wide range of services for example: language, vocational training, general counselling, civic integration courses and services etc. Immigrant integration policy can involve various approaches of intervention. In the prescriptive approach, the government makes the immigrants follow certain steps during their integration process. In the proactive approach, the government encourages or discourages, but does not require, certain adaptations to the host society. Finally, in the laissez faire approach, the government leaves the matter of immigrant integration entirely to immigrants, the market, or the host society’s private sector (Schmidt, 2007).
The aim of immigrant integration policy in the Western world today, for both low- and high-skilled immigrants, is to make the immigrant self-sufficient and as independent of the state as possible. As a result, responsibility for integration is often shifted from the state to the individual immigrant and his/her community, by privatizing integration services. Thus the burden of adjustment is transferred to the individual immigrant, particularly in the first stage after entering the country (Arat-Koc, 1999; Hawthorne, 2005; Joppke, 2007).
Consequently, the immigrant's integration is seen through the perspective of economic instrumentalism. The more autonomous (non-state dependent) the immigrant, the more competitive the state will be in the global economy. It follows that the focus in integration policy is now on employment, in order to make full use of human capital in the global market (Joppke, 2007). This tendency can be found in countries with large-scale immigration such as Canada, Australia and the Netherlands (Arat-Koc, 1999; Bruquetas-
Callejo et al., 2007).
Along with the decrease in state responsibility for immigrant integration (mostly in providing and funding services), there is an increase in government responsibility through regulation. Many European countries (for example, the Netherlands, Finland, France,
Denmark, Austria and Germany), have introduced mandatory civic integration policies whereby immigrants must enrol in a course, or take an exam upon arrival, and sometimes even before entering the country, in order to obtain a permanent residency permit. The
23
differences between countries concern two main issues: whether the state or the immigrants pay for civic integration, and whether there are negative sanctions or positive incentives involved in participation (Joppke, 2007; Zincone et al., 2012) .
***
In this chapter, I laid the conceptual and theoretical groundwork for analysing the influence of ideas on gradual transformative changes in state responsibility in Israeli immigration and integration policy by critically discussing the gradual transformative change framework and by pointing to the unfulfilled potential of policy ideas in expanding our understanding of these changes. This unfulfilled potential, as well as the gaps between theory and empirical evidence presented, will form the basis for the hypothesis presented in Chapter Two. In addition, I will use the conceptualizations of ideas at different levels of generality and of modes of gradual transformative change presented in this chapter as the building blocks for constructing the combinations of modes of change, the hypothesis on their unique characteristics and evolvement, and suggest empirical indicators for those concepts. Methodologically, the lack of theorization regarding the role of ideas in gradual transformative change will be used in order to explain why theory building process tracing is the appropriate approach for this research. The distinction between different perspectives on state responsibility and the elaboration of current trends in immigration and integration policies presented will subsequently serve the empirical analysis in Chapters Three to
Seven.
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Chapter 2: Hypotheses and Methodology
Hypotheses
General
This part presents research hypotheses for the modes and combinations of modes of change found in the Israeli case based on the definitions described in previous chapter: (1) conversion through layering, (2) conversion and layering, (3) displacement through layering, and (4) drift.
3
The hypotheses are of three general types:
(a) Unique characteristics of the combinations . Since as mentioned, earlier combinations of several modes of change were described but not analysed or explained, it is important to distinguish them from the single modes.
(b) Ideational mechanisms (causal pathway connecting the cause and the effect) behind the modes and combinations of modes of change. Each mechanism is presented through set of insufficient but necessary conditions, a combination of which is likely to produce the mode/combination of modes of change.
(c) The power of global ideas in local policies .
Conversion combinations: (a) Conversion through layering; (b) Conversion and layering
1. When the mode of change is composed of both conversion and layering, institutional purpose will be expanded and not replaced
In layering, new policies are added to old ones and do not replace them. In conversion, old policy tools are redirected to new purposes. When combined, layering and conversion produce both old and new policy aims as well as old and new policy tools. As a result, the policy aim expands so that it includes both old and new elements.
2.
Conversion through layering is a result of the following conditions:
3 The hypothesis are based on the existing literature and on the analysis of the empirical material from the five cases in Israel immigration and integration policies. This corresponds to theory building research where empirical material and existing literature are used to build hypothesized theory and then test it using the empirical evidence. More on theory building process tracing see p. 30.
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(a) Change in problem definition and policy solution ideas;
(b) Top-down followed by bottom-up interaction between the policy solution and problem definition ideas; and
(c) Expansion of the existing problem definition.
The interaction between problem definition and policy solution ideas can be both upward and downward flowing. When these two interactions are combined together, change in problem definition ideas turns decision makers’ attention to new policy solution ideas. The policies resulting from these ideas can gradually expand the existing problem definition if they find a way to reconcile multiple goals. This reconciliation is possible as long as the new policy solution ideas do not contradict the public philosophies behind the policy. This is because public philosophies shape the way problems are defined, so that under each public philosophy several problem definitions coexist. The expansion in the existing problem definition expands the policy goal.
3. Conversion and layering is result of the following conditions:
(a) Change in policy solution and problem definition ideas;
(b) Top-down interaction between problem definition and policy solution ideas; and
(c) Change in the relative salience of different problem definitions.
A problem definition idea is not a coherent core but rather a combination of several problem definitions, each highlighting different aspect of the problem. Gradual change in a problem definition idea can be realized through change in its composing parts and/or change in their relative importance. Conversion and layering can be a result of both these processes. When new problem definition components are added actors' attention is turned to new policy solution ideas and as a result new policies are introduced. At the same time, old problem definition components remain and so do old policy solution ideas. When the new problem definition ideas become dominant, the main policy aim changes and old ideas remain in the margins. Consequently, a gap between policy aims and tools is created. In order to close this gap old policy tools are redirected to new purposes. However, since the
26
old problem definition still coexists (even if in the margins) old policy tools continue serving old and new purposes.
Displacement through layering
4. When the policy is displaced through layering the displacement takes place only at the new policy layer.
In layering, new policies are added to the old policy and do not replace it. In displacement, marginal or neglected practices become dominant and eventually replace the old practices . The combination of the two modes includes old policies. Thus, the reactivation of old practices can take place only at the new policy layer, and the mechanism behind displacement through layering is differential growth of renewed practices on top of old practices.
5. Displacement through layering is a result of the following conditions:
(a) Partial change in problem definition ideas;
(b) Change in the relative salience of different policy solution ideas; and
(c) Top-down and bottom-up interactions between the policy solution and problem definition ideas.
Displacement occurs when there is change in the relative salience of different practices within the same institution. The change is usually a result of reactivation and cultivation of neglected practices. In order for neglected practices to become dominant, they need to become appropriate again. This appropriateness is possible when there is change in problem definition ideas which affects the scope of plausible policy solution ideas. When the change in problem definition is partial, new/renewed policy solution ideas will coexist with the old. When there is change in the relative salience of different policy solution ideas, and previously neglected policy solution ideas become dominant, neglected policy tools are reactivated. However, since the change in problem definition was partial the reactivation is partial as well, and is added to the existing policy. As a result of this reactivation, the existing problem definition is questioned. This reinforces additional change in policy solution ideas, followed by policy change.
27
Drift
6. Drift is a result of the following conditions:
(a) Crisis created by policy opponents;
(b) Stagnation in problem definition and reinforcement in policy solution ideas;
(c) Active attention shift from the need to adapt the policy to changing reality.
Drift takes place when actors deliberately prevent the institution from adjusting to the changing reality, among other things by keeping the issue off the policy agenda. One way to keep an issue off the agenda can be through politics of attention, i.e. deliberately shifting the attention of the institution's defenders towards a certain problem and away from the need to adjust the institution. This shift in attention takes place when there are more severe issues facing policy supporters (e.g., crisis) requiring immediate response, making them misinterpret the severity of the signals on changes in the reality because of their limited attention.
In order for the policy to be adjusted to the changing environment new policy solution and problem definition ideas are needed to provide decision makers with new or adapted roadmaps. However, during periods of crisis the existing ideas might stagnate. This is because during these periods actors tend to be occupied with maintaining the existing situation more than with looking for new roadmaps. When the problem definition stagnates, the policy aim will not be updated in response to changing reality. In addition, when policy solution ideas are reinforced decision makers will not only ignore new policy tools, but also defend the maintenance of old ones. Consequently, drift takes place.
Global and local ideas
7. Global ideas can overcome local ideas under at least one of the following conditions:
(a) The global ideas do not contradict public philosophies;
(b) There is change in the public philosophies behind the policy; or
(c) There are no public philosophies behind the policy.
Public philosophies constrain significant policy change. Thus, any policy change should be aligned with these ideas, unless there is change in the public philosophies. However,
28
when there are no public philosophies behind the policy, if global ideas contradict local ideas the prevailing ideas will be the ones more appropriate and consistent with the present reality.
Methodology
General
This chapter presents the methodology and data used for the analysis of the influence of ideational dynamics on changes in state responsibility in Israeli immigration and integration policies.
4
The research examines five cases in Israeli immigration and integration policies (1) immigration encouragement, (2) returning residents, (3) initial absorption, (4) employment, and (5) absorption of immigrant scientists. These cases were selected purposefully based on two main criteria: (1) They formed the main issues on the agenda of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption
5
(hereinafter MOIA or the ministry ) as seen in its work plans, reports and budget objectives. (2) They underwent gradual transformative policy changes. This corresponds to the characteristics of case oriented research where the selected cases selected purposefully, they are positive - cases where the outcome occurs, they are substantively the more important cases within the population and they are usually not predetermined at the beginning of the research process (Goertz &
Mahoney, 2012; Ragin, 2004). The analysis starts in 1989, when the large immigration wave from the Former Soviet Union (hereinafter, FSU ) began, and ends in 2010. The rationale behind the selection of this period is that the large immigration wave can be seen as an exogenous shock, leading to significant policy changes. Since then there have been no further immigration waves (see Table 1, p. 45) or other exogenous shocks in this field.
Hence, the period can be seen as relatively stable and so appropriate for examining gradual transformative changes.
State responsibility for immigration and integration can be seen as a typical case for examining how ideas affect gradual transformative policy change. A typical case is a representative case in which both X and Y are present (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). As
4 Because the comparative part of this research is illustrative, the data and method used for it are slightly different. Thus, its methodology is presented before the comparative empirical analysis in Chapter Seven.
5 MOIA is officially the responsible agency for policy making in immigration and integration.
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noted above, state responsibility is one policy aspect in which gradual transformative changes are evident. In addition, immigration and integration policies have strong ideational components. The address issues such as national identity and social cohesion and the policy making is often influenced by national values and norms as well as by global ideas. Consequently, the presence of strong ideas behind the policy and of gradual transformative change makes this case typical.
Process tracing
The analysis offered here is based on process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; George &
Bennett, 2005; Jacobs, 2011), one of the most important causal inference tools in qualitative case study research. This method aims at revealing the causal relationship between independent variables and outcomes in a case study research design (Beach &
Pedersen, 2013). In order to unpack the causal relations the researcher establishes that a certain event or process took place, that a different event or process took place after the initial event and that former was the cause of the latter. The inferences in process tracing are made by looking at specific pieces of evidence (causal process observations) which are part of a temporal sequence of events that have value in proving or disproving hypotheses
(Mahoney, 2012).
There are three variants of process tracing; theory testing, theory building and explaining outcomes. The three differ among other things by the types of inferences made and the theory’s place in the inferences. This research is based on theory building. This type is used when we know that there is a connection between X and Y but we do not know the mechanism connecting the two. It aims at building general theoretical explanations based on empirical evidence. In this design the researcher first collects empirical evidence and becomes familiarized with the case and then conceptualizes a hypothetical causal mechanism whereby X is linked with Y and tests it against the empirical evidence. Theory building studies do not claim that the suggested causal mechanism is sufficient to explain the outcome (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). The selected case is typical, because in a typical case the puzzle of interest is not the connection between X and Y but rather the causal mechanism operating within the case (Seawright & Gerring, 2008).
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This design is appropriate for this research because we know that ideas affect the mode of gradual transformative change (see for example Bèland, 2007), but do not know how ideas determine which mode or combination of modes is involved.
Process tracing in ideational research
Process tracing in ideational research poses several challenges. First, it is hard to determine causality because one should establish whether the policy change has been affected by ideas or only used as a rationalization strategy by the political actors whose choices have been guided by other factors (Jacobs 2011; Parsons 2002). Second, it is hard to distinguish between the influence of material and ideational factors because often there is correlation between ideas and material conditions that can lead the policy to the same direction. Third, it is difficult to observe the mechanism through which ideas affect policy, since a large part of it takes place inside the heads of the decision makers. In order to overcome these challenges the analysis uses three strategies (Jacobs, 2011):
1.
Analysing mostly private discourse: The most observable implication of ideas is discourse. Discourse can be used as evidence for the ideas actors hold and sometimes for suggestions that actors apply a specific set of ideas in the decision making process. Thus one should examine discourse during the decision making process that is congruent with the ideas. However, since discourse can be misleading, close attention must be paid to the context in which the ideas are expressed in order to distinguish between sincere reasoning and crafted talk. It is more likely that communication in private setting (private discourse) will be more sincere than public discourse; hence it is important to rely as much as possible on the former.
2.
Examining the temporal structure of the causal process: Paying attention to temporal process in order to rule out the suggestion that ideas were post hoc justifications. The temporal process can be traced by finding the ideas’ intellectual origin, examining actors’ statements over long periods of time or attending to the sequence of steps in the decision making process. In addition, one should also make sure that decision makers were not only familiar with the idea but also influenced by it.
31
3.
Unpacking the dependent variable: Asking how the actors would act if they were motivated by material rather than ideational factors and examining a “fit” between the outcome and the alternative hypothesized behaviours. In doing so, the interpretation is confronted with other plausible explanations.
Data
Interviews
The author conducted 29 interviews between June 2010 and August 2012. Eighteen were conducted with past and present decision makers from MOIA – three ministers, five director generals, two deputy director generals and eight department directors. Three interviewees were decision makers from the Ministry of Finance (hereinafter, MOF ), two from the Ministry of Housing and Construction, three from the Jewish Agency for Israel
(hereinafter, JAFI ) and three were directors of immigration and integration units at local authorities with high immigration rates.
The interviewees were selected for their policymaking roles covering the entire period.
They were promised anonymity. The interviews were open, starting from the general question, “What do you think were the main policy changes in immigration and integration policies during your period as a decision maker in this field?” Each interview was taped and transcribed and lasted one hour on average.
Policy documents
The policy documents used were all publicly available documents on immigration and integration: (1) Permanent Knesset (parliamentary) committees: Committee of
Immigration, Absorption and Diaspora Affairs (hereinafter, CIAD ); Committee of Science and Technology (hereinafter, CST ); Finance Committee; Economy Committee; and
Labour, Welfare and Health Committee.
6
(2) MOIA archival documents including reports and regulations. (3) Documents from the archive of Minister of Absorption Yair Tzaban
(1992-1996) including meeting summaries, correspondence with other ministers and directors, work plans of various departments and units, budget proposals and explanations.
(4) MOF archival documents from 1990-1995 including meeting summaries,
6
Until the end of 1990 most Knesset committees were closed to the public. Thus, the minutes from that period can be considered private discourse.
32
correspondence between MOF and MOIA directors and budget proposals.
7
(5)
Government decisions. (6) MOIA regulations. (7) MOIA annual budgets. (8) MOIA work plans.
8
(9) Laws. (10) Coalition agreements. (11) MOF and MOIA press releases. (12)
Ministerial committee reports. (13) MOIA research reports. (14) Reports of Israel’s Central
Bank.
The analysis
The analysis took place through three stages. First, based on the policy documents and the interviews, a policy dynamics process for each case was charted. Using the empirical indicators explained below, each process was classified into one or two gradual transformative modes of change. Second, an analysis of the ideational dynamics behind each case was conducted, specifically focusing at ideational change and stability at different levels of generality and on the interactions between levels. Third, the relationship between the two processes in each case was examined, followed by construction of a causal mechanism for each case. Lastly, the evidence for the existence and function of each part of the suggested mechanisms was examined (Mahoney, 2012), specifically focusing at the sincerity of the discursive account, the primacy of ideas and the plausibility of alternative explanations.
Because the Israeli Archives Law enables disclosure of government documents only after
15 years, these are available only up to 1996; thus, there is little private discourse evidence.
In order to compensate for this shortcoming, the metaphors used by the decision makers in their reasoning were analysed. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1981), our entire conceptual system is metaphorical in nature. These metaphors guide the way we think, act and how we perceive the world. Despite our everyday use of metaphors they are mostly used subconsciously (Lakoff & Johnson, 1981); consequently they can reveal actors’ true beliefs as opposed to crafted talk.
To ensure that the reasoning provided in the interviews was reliable and not affected by selection bias, or by the time elapsed between the events and the interview, the interviews,
7 The documents were collected in 2010-2011.
8 General government work plans by ministries were formulated only from 2007. However, there were more specific work plans of the various departments from the beginning of the period under examination.
33
Knesset protocols and archival documents were triangulated. In addition, close attention was paid to the context in which the actors expressed their opinions, in order to consider
“who is speaking to whom, for what purpose and under what circumstances” (George &
Bennett, 2005, p. 100).
In order to ascertain that ideational change preceded policy change, the actors' familiarity and with exposure to the ideas preceding the policy were examined. In addition, it was predicted that despite changes in the environment, before the ideational change no policy change took place. To exclude alternative material explanations, the consistency between policy change and political and other interests of the decision makers was evaluated, i.e. the fit between the direction and content of policy change and the political interests of the change agents, as under “ideational process tracing strategies” in p. 31.
Observable indicators of the main concepts
In this part, the observable indicators of the main concepts presented in Chapter One are explained.
Ideas
Ideas were uncovered using qualitative analysis of the reasoning behind the policy (Jacobs,
2009; Schmidt, 2006) as seen in the interviews, press releases, archival documents, explanations to the annual budget of MOIA, work plans, explanations to government decisions and Knesset committees protocols. The reasoning was classified into three levels of generality (Mehta, 2011):
1.
Policy solution ideas: The means for accomplishing the objectives, evidenced by suggestions for various tools or explanations for implementing various tools.
2.
Problem definition ideas: The way a problem is framed. This is evidenced by the problems that are highlighted and the causal reasoning provided by decision makers as well as by the metaphors used (Stone, 1988).
3.
Public philosophies: Beliefs about the purpose of government or public policy in light of a certain set of assumptions about society and economy. These ideas were drawn from previous studies on Israeli immigration and integration policies
(Hacohen, 1987, 2003; Leshem & Shuval, 1998; Pikar, 2013). The identified
34
ideas were, for example, Israel as an asylum for all Jews in the world, immigration as part of nation building, support for unlimited Jewish immigration (open door policy), and belief in the government's responsibility to care for all incoming immigrants. These ideas were evidenced by decision makers’ reasoning.
Constraining power of public philosophies: If there were no suggestions to change the policy core (for example, open door policy) during the period studied, regardless of changes in the environment and in the minister in office, this was considered as the effect of public philosophies on policy (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962).
Ideational change: Change is evidenced by the use of metaphors, causal reasoning, problem definition, or advocacy of policy tools with different logics of action relative to the beginning of the examined period, suggested earlier by various actors and dismissed, or originating in other fields.
Gradual ideational change: Evidenced by change in the composition and/or relative importance of the different parts of the idea (problem definitions or policy solutions)
(Carstensen, 2011) compared to the beginning of the examined period.
Ideational reinforcement: When problem definition and/or policy solution ideas become a symbol or a synecdoche and/or when they become taken for granted compared to the beginning of the examined period. The latter is evidenced by lack of criticism against existing ideas.
Ideational stagnation: When actors continue using the same reasoning for the policy despite changes in the reality that cast doubt on the relevance of existing ideas.
Relative ideational salience: Salient ideas are problem definition and policy solution ideas which are addressed frequently and repeatedly by many decision makers in various platforms.
Discrepancy between ideas and reality: Repeated expressions by various decision makers
(both political and bureaucratic) that question existing ideas and connect the questioning to changes in the reality (for example, changes in the number or type or immigrants).
35
Global ideas : Ideas on immigration and integration shared by several countries, whose influence spread during the examined period.
1.
Global immigration ideas: ‘the race for talent’ ideas
(a) Policy solution ideas with economic reasoning, emphasizing immigration as an economic growth strategy.
(b) Problem definition ideas addressing global competition for skilled immigrants.
(c) Economic metaphors (for example, profit, cost-benefit, investment, growth, etc.)
2.
Global integration ideas
(a) Policy solution ideas suggesting reduced government involvement and increased personal responsibility.
(b) Problem definition ideas addressing the need for personal responsibility and selfreliance.
(c) Cost-benefit reasoning on integration issues.
(d) Economic metaphors.
Policy change
Gradual or abrupt change in policy tools, objectives or allocated resources taking place during the research period, resulting in policy shift from the status quo (Capano & Howlett,
2009). When the change process is step-wise it will be termed gradual transformative.
Change in policy tools: Programs with different logics of action, which have either never been proposed before or introduced and ignored. These programs were inferred from government decisions, MOIA regulations, reports provided by decision makers from
MOIA to Knesset committees and description of new programs in the interviews.
Change in policy aims: Change in the content and/or priority of MOIA objectives and/or target population as presented in the annual ministry budget, the ministry’s work plans, official website and reports to Knesset committees.
Change in MOIA’s annual budget: From 1989-1991 the examined budget was the annual budget proposal as legislated in the Knesset. From 1992 the examined budget was the
36
executed budget reported by the Accountant General at the end of each fiscal year.
9
Change in different budget regulations was examined from two perspectives: (1) Change in the real budget (indexed to the 2010 consumer price index – the end of the research period); (2)
Change in the proportion of the resources allocated out of the total budget (of MOIA or a specific department).
The total MOIA budget was calculated without direct absorption payments.
10
This is because these payments are only a direct function of the number of incoming immigrants and so do not reflect ministry priorities.
A third perspective should have been change in the allocated recourses per immigrant.
However, this analysis was almost impossible to make, because the entitlement period and the target population for the different benefits have changed over the years. For example, while employment budget in 1992 was allocated to immigrants for up to three years of residency, this budget was allocated in 2010 to immigrants for up to ten years of residency, to immigrants from Ethiopia for up to 15 years of residency and to returning residents.
However, an effort was made to analyse the change per immigrant by examining change in specific “in-cash” benefits – transfer payments made in cash (for example, vocational training vouchers, see Chapter Four), or by examining the change in allocated resources relative to the increase/decrease of the target population.
Modes of gradual transformative policy change
11
Layering new institutions, mechanisms or practices are attached to existing ones without replacing them, gradually transforming their structure and status. Evidence for policy layering includes:
9 The reason for this difference is that Accountant General’s reports are available only from 1992. When available, I preferred using them because they include all transfers made during the fiscal year, making it the most reliable source on allocated resources. The analysis of Accountant General’s data was based on the reports as well as on the Open Budget website, budget.msh.gov.il
.
10 On direct absorption payments, see Chapter Five, p. 74.
11 The observable indicators for layering, conversion and drift are taken from Rocco & Thurston (2014).
However, their paper does not address displacement, as is the case in other research on gradual transformative change (Béland, 2007; Hacker, 2004). Hence, the observable indicators for displacement are adaptations based on Mahoney and Thelen (2010) and Streeck and Thelen (2005).
37
1.
High initial institutional flexibility . When it is relatively easy to change existing rules or regulations, add new rules, or remove the old. This is indicated by (a) the content of the guidelines/regulations and their status (law, permanent/temporary regulations/government decisions); (b) historical accounts demonstrating that changes such content changes have been made before the examined period.
2.
New policies grow faster than old ones . This is indicated by increase in allocated resources or in the number and scope of new programs. At the same time, old programs do not decrease but do not increase either, evidenced by relative stability in the number and scope of programs and allocated resources.
3.
Change agents with material or discretionary capacities to sponsor and carry out modest changes. This is indicated by at least one of the following: (a) change agents’ proven capability to obtain additional resources; and (b) change agents’ proven capability and authority to initiate new government decisions, laws or regulations.
4.
At the end of the examined period we find: (a) New policies which become more significant than old ones as indicated by the allocated resources or MOIA work plans; and (b) Old policies which stagnate or erode as indicated by allocated resources, their place in MOIA work plans or their absence from MOIA periodical reports to the Knesset committee.
Conversion Rules remain formally the same but are interpreted and enacted in new ways, redirecting them towards new functions or purposes. Evidence for policy conversion includes:
1.
High initial institutional flexibility . This is indicated by the capability to change policy objectives, upgrade or rearrange various units in the ministry add/remove target populations.. This capability is examined through historical accounts that demonstrate that such changes have been made before and during the examined period and through the status of policy guidelines (laws, temporary regulations, permanent regulations, government decisions).
2.
Change agents with capacity (for example political power) to change the institutions’ purpose. This is indicated by their proven capability to add/remove
38
regulations, initiate legislation, promote organizational change and change the ministry’s target population or its mission statement.
3.
At the end of the examined period we find: (a) Stability in policy programs; and (b)
Change in policy aims and/or target population.
Displacement Rediscovery or reactivation of practices with different logics of action, which gradually replace traditional arrangements. Evidence for policy displacement includes:
1.
High initial institutional flexibility: The institution is flexible enough to enable coexistence of more and less dominant practices with different logics of action, as well as change in the relative dominance of different practices. This is indicated by
(a) coexistence of different regulations, sometimes with contradictory logics of action for different immigrant groups, and (b) historical accounts demonstrating that the dominance of various practices has changed in periods of relative stability before the examined period.
2.
Change agents with proven capacity to change the relative dominance of different practices, indicated by: (a) shifting allocated resources, (b) changing entitlements and benefits, (c) shifting existing policy tools to new target populations.
3.
At the end of the examined period we find: (a) Previously neglected or marginal practices are reactivated through cultivation, indicated by adjustment of neglected or marginal programs or logics of action to new target populations; and (b) These practices gradually become dominant and replace old once, indicated by their growing scope and allocated resources compared to old practices which decrease in scope and funding.
Drift A gap created between the original policy aims and the new environment as a result of deliberate neglect by policy makers, who decide not to adapt the policy to the changing environment. Evidence for policy drift includes:
1.
Low initial institutional ambiguity or flexibility indicated by rigid, detailed and specific laws or regulations, which leave little room for discretion in interpretation/enforcement or capability to change the existing rules.
39
2.
High status quo bias indicated by strong veto players – politicians and interest groups observed to have enough power to block significant policy change. The power of veto players is indicated by the extent of failure/success in maintaining the policy in face of powerful opposition. For example, if the veto players succeed in overcoming the prime minister’s objections they can be seen as powerful.
3.
Change agents with (a) formal position and discretionary power over formal institutional resources (legislature, budget, regulations), who (b) can keep institutional update off the policy agenda, as can be seen in the Knesset committee minutes on the subject, where the need to update the institution is either marginal or missing.
4.
At the end of the examined period we find: (a) Policy stability (no change in the programs, aims or resources); (b) Discrepancy between the policy and the reality indicated by a gap between the policy aims as stated in formal policy documents and the number of immigrants or their profile; (c) Decision makers’ awareness of the gap as indicated in their statements in formal documents or/and Knesset committees; and (d) The policy becomes marginal as indicated by its place in
MOIA objectives and/or coalition agreements, or by the number of meetings of
Knesset committees on the subject.
Crisis
Crisis occurs when policy makers experience serious threats to the system’s basic values and structures (Boin, 2005). Following Hay (2006), the crisis addressed in this research will be subjective. Its empirical indicators will be based on actors’ expressions and actions.
(a) Expressions of decision makers at various platforms using words like crisis, disaster or other words conveying urgency and severity
(b) Rapid response to what is perceived by decision makers and/or interest groups as crisis, indicated evidenced by urgent Knesset committee meetings and/or intervention by higher-rank decision makers (such as the prime minister).
40
Immigration and integration policies and change in state responsibility: definitions
Immigration policy: Laws, regulations, government decisions and programs aimed at immigrants and returning residents before entering the country or aimed at encouraging more immigrants to come to the country.
Integration policy: Assistance programs, transfer payments and benefits allocated directly to immigrants after arrival.
Change in state responsibility:
1.
Decrease in state responsibility is indicated by reduction in one or more of the following during the examined period: (a) funding, (b) entitlement period, (c) entitlement population, and (d) decision to transfer the regulation, financing or provision of integration or immigration services from the government to private organizations, or to the immigrants themselves.
2.
Increase in state responsibility is indicated by (a) operating in a new field (in the sphere of immigration and integration), (b) increasing involvement (financial and/or regulatory) in a field under the MOIA’s responsibility, (c) expanding the entitlement period, and (d) expanding the entitlement population.
41
Chapter 3: Conversion through Layering
General setting: Israeli immigration and integration policies
Israel is defined as an ethnic immigration state – it 'welcomes newcomers as immigrants
…only if they qualified ex ante as co-ethnics, that is, members of the state defining majority nation' (Joppke & Rosenhek, 2003, p.1 ). Israel's is an 'open door' immigration policy – open to all Jews. Israeli integration policy is characterized as 'categorical universalism' – every member of that category (Jewish immigrant) is entitled to some benefits regardless of economic status (Gal 2008). Two institutions are in charge of the policy: JAFI, an international, semi-governmental philanthropic organization, and MOIA, which may be seen as a kind of “government for immigrants”, since it has departments parallel to other government ministries such as employment, education, welfare, and housing (Mashal,
1971).
Immigration and integration policies are rooted in Zionist ideology, which views the State of Israel as an asylum for all Jews, and considers immigration as the main nation-building instrument. Even before its establishment in 1948, decision makers viewed the 'gathering of exiles' as one of the main missions of the Jewish state in making. Consequently, it was believed that Jewish immigration should not be restricted under any circumstances.
Through the years, and despite the enormous costs of large-scale immigration, any explicit suggestion to restrict immigration was dismissed as taboo (Hacohen, 1987, 2003). When the government did decide to restrict immigration this was usually done as secretly as possible (Pikar, 2013). In addition, although immigration was seen as a tool for both demographic and economic growth (see for example Ben Porat, 1989), the latter was never the main objective but rather a desirable by-product of Jewish immigration
Moreover, state responsibility for immigrant integration was part of the national ethos. For example, during the 1990s large numbers of elderly immigrants arrived from the FSU. Not only did the government not decrease its responsibility for their integration, but it even built public hostels for some of the immigrants who could not afford housing (Borukhov,
1998). Thus, the interrelated Zionist public philosophies of immigration and integration created strong status quo bias.
42
These public philosophies are formally manifested in two laws. The Law of Return (1950) entitles any Jew, a descendant or a spouse of a Jew to immigrate to and become a citizen of Israel. This law is a keystone of the State of Israel and thus, despite the fact that a simple majority can change it, all attempts to do so have failed.
12
Second, the Absorption Basket
Law (1994) entitles all Jewish immigrants to an amount aimed to facilitate their initial economic integration.
Besides the laws, the policy is based on regulations and government decisions which determine special immigration and integration programs and specify their target populations and terms of entitlement. Despite the fact that the detailed regulations offer almost no room for discretion, since the establishment of MOIA in 1968 they were frequently revised by its ministers, director generals or their deputies, who were authorized to add new regulations, or change and remove old ones in order to adapt the policy to the changing reality. As a result, MOIA has permanent regulations which change in the margins and temporary regulations which are updated frequently. This flexibility is deliberate. For example, from 1997-2002 efforts were made to pass an immigration absorption bill that will regulate all the benefits immigrants are entitled to. However, both
MOF and MOIA opposed this bill since it would reduce the ministries’ flexibility.
13
Immigration encouragement
Policy changes
Until 2002 JAFI was responsible for immigration recruitment or promotion overseas,
(“immigration encouragement” in Hebrew) and upon arrival the responsibility for integration was transferred to MOIA. This division of labour was clear as far as the ministry was concerned, indicated by the fact that its officials were invited to Knesset meetings on immigration encouragement in their capacity as responsible for integration.
14
For the most part, JAFI’s policy was universal and it treated all eligible immigrants equally. Its policy was mostly reactive: providing information to immigrants wishing to immigrate. The
12 Plenum minutes are available at main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/plenum.
13 CIAD meetings, 04.06.2002, 26.06.2000, 19.06.2000, 13.03.2000, 22.02.2000, 30.07.1997, 04.02.1997,
Knesset Archive and www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/search.asp
14 See for example CIAD meeting on “immigration encouragement from South Africa”, 24.2.1998, when only the director of MOIA’s Housing Dept. was invited, Knesset archive.
43
policy focus was almost entirely on 'rescue immigration' of Jews in distress, rather than on
'choice immigration’, mostly from Western countries. In addition, most resources were directed to the FSU and only a small percentage was allocated to Western countries.
15
During the examined period, the annual number of immigrants decreased gradually from a peak of 200,000 in 1990 to 18,000 in 2010 (see Table 1). Moreover, from 2002 (after the economic crisis in Argentina), most potential immigrants were 'immigrants by choice', mostly from the US (Della Pergola, 2010). Although these changes began at the late 1990s and were apparent to decision makers, as seen in their reports to the Knesset, 16 until 2005
JAFI and the ministry kept following the same policy.
The gradual change started in 2002 when the deputy minister of absorption and JAFI introduced a temporary immigration encouragement programme for immigration from
France, South Africa and Argentina, according to which immigrants coming during 2002 will receive additional assistance in integration (as will be elaborated in chapter 5 on the initial absorption). Although this programme was temporary, it engaged MOIA in immigration encouragement for the first time.
17
15 Report of Deputy Minister of Absorption, Yuli Edelstein, to CIAD, 08.05.2001, and of Salay Meridor,
Chair, JAFI, 01.11.1999, available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx
16 Report of Salay Meridor, Chair, JAFI, to CIAD, 01.11.99, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/search.asp
17 CIAD, 14.01.2002, http://www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx, and Prime Minister’s
Office, Government decision no.1225, Programme for Encouraging Immigration from Argentina, France and
South Africa, 06.01.2002, Prime Minister’s Office Archive.
44
Table 1: Immigrants by period of immigration and last continent of residence
18
Year
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Total
(including unknown origin)
24,050
Asia
20
1,185
Africa
1,861
Europe
16,766
America
&
Oceania 19
4,147
199,516
176,100
77,057
76,805
940
622
891
1,728
4,472
20,251
4,075
1,431
189,650
152,142
68,962
70,315
4,315
3,023
3,006
3,283
79,844
76,361
70,919
66,221
56,730
76,766
60,201
43,473
1,719
1,247
11,791
9,769
7,712
8,324
7,376
5,500
1,928
1,772
1,998
2,283
3,514
2,681
2,509
3,573
72,553
68,987
52,475
49,903
42,155
62,147
46,954
30,794
3,593
4,330
4,587
4,248
3,316
3,580
3,359
3,604
33,570
23,273
20,899
21,183
19,269
18,131
13,701
14,574
16,634
3,859
2,872
2,444
2,071
1,777
1,575
1,338
1,516
1,415
2,949
3,342
3,878
3,766
3,801
3,795
1,892
561
1,937
18,021
12,626
11,149
11,279
9,872
8,848
7,109
8,565
9,128
8,737
4,430
3,428
4,065
3,813
3,894
3,361
3,932
4,154
Until 2004 immigration encouragement was never explicitly stated as one of MOIA’s objectives and its main focus was on integration issues such as housing, employment and social assimilation.
21
In 2004, Minister Tzipi Livni convinced Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to allocate 100 million NIS for a four-year immigration encouragement project, in spite of
18 Central Bureau of Statistics, www.cbs.gov.il/reader/?MIval=cw_usr_view_SHTML&ID=635
19 Immigrants from Western Europe, North America and Oceania are considered by MOIA and JAFI immigrants from Western countries
20 Until 1996 immigrants from the Asian republics of FSU were included in Europe as from 1996 they were included in Asia.
21 MOF, MOIA budget proposal, MOF archive.
45
a severe cross-government budget cut. The main programme in this project was ‘group immigration’. Under this programme, MOIA would proactively contact potential immigrants from Western countries. In addition to the regular assistance, these immigrants would be entitled to more Hebrew teaching hours, special employment assistance, social and communal services and a group coach to help them in their first year in Israel.
22 As a result of the project, in 2005-2006 immigration encouragement was presented in the budget as one of the ministry's 'additional objectives'.
23
At first, there was only one group immigration programme for a small number of French immigrants. From 2005, the programme was expanded to include additional countries of origin.
24
In that same year, the future director general convinced the government to initiate another programme offering financial support to NGO's promoting immigration from
France and North America. This programme grew from 10 million NIS in 2005 to 30 million NIS in 2010.
25
From 2010, the target audience of the group immigration programme changed from immigrants from specific Western countries to immigrants with specific occupations, like doctors and engineers.
26
This made Israeli immigration policy more similar to that of other immigration countries which attract skilled immigrants by offering various economic incentives (Shachar, 2006).
These changes were accompanied by significant increases in the total budget. In 2004 the immigration encouragement budget was 17.6 million NIS, less than 1% of total ministry’s budget; by 2005 it amounted to 72 million and by 2010 it totalled 128 million, more than
14% of the total.
27
Importantly, this was not a result of increase in the number of immigrants, since it actually decreased from 22,806 in 2005 to 18,755 in 2010 (see Table
1). The selective proactive programmes were added to the existing universal reactive
22 MOIA, Regulation no. 243: Group Immigration 2004-2009, 10.05.2004, www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/Procedures/Pages/default.aspx
23 MOF, MOIA budget proposal, www.mof.gov.il/BudgetSite/StateBudget/Pages/Fbudget.aspx
24 See fn. no. 20.
25 Prime Minister’s Office, Government decisions no. 1353, 2385, 4417, Support for immigration encouragement programmes, www.pmo.gov.il/PMO/Archive/Decisions.
26
MOIA, Regulation no. 305: Immigration 2010, 01.06.2010, www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/Procedures/Pages/default.aspx
27 MOF budget execution data, www.ag.mof.gov.il/AccountantGeneral/BudgetExecution/BudgetExecutionTopNav/BEHistoryDataHistory
/BEHistoryData/default.htm
46
policy, rather than replacing it. However, although the Law of Return did not change and
JAFI continued to provide information and assist those who wanted to immigrate as it did before,
28
it decreased its immigration encouragement activities and in 2010 turned its efforts from immigration to Jewish education.
29
As a result, MOIA became the chief actor in immigration encouragement policy.
From 2007 onward, immigration encouragement became MOIA’s primary objective as articulated both in the budget and in the annual work plans.
30 Thus, by the end of the research period MOIA was gradually converted to a new purpose – from integration per se to the encouragement of skilled immigration. This is also evident in the change made in the ministry’s name, from “The Ministry of
Immigrant Absorption” to” The Ministry of
Immigration and Absorption”.
31
This conversion was enabled through layering, such that with each additional policy with proactive and selective logic of action MOIA moved further toward immigration encouragement.
Two questions remain unanswered. First, what can explain this policy change and its direction? Although environmental changes were necessary for the change to occur, they are an insufficient explanatory factor because most significant policy changes occurred in
2005-2010, at a time when the number of immigrants, their origin and occupation did not change significantly (see Table 1 and Figure 1). Political interests are also insufficient: in
2004-2010 there were five ministers from three different parties, but the policy continued in the same direction. Moreover, the latest minister, Sofa Landver, was a member of a party representing veteran immigrants, mostly from the FSU, such that the policy changes were contrary to her direct political interests. Hence, another explanatory factor is required. The second question is why MOIA changed not only its function but also its purpose? Why was layering accompanied by conversion? An analysis of the ideational dynamics at different levels of generality can provide answers to these two questions.
28 Overview of the activities of The Jewish Agency for Israel, to the Committee of Immigration, Absorption and Diaspora Affairs, 16.06.2009, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx.
29 CIAD, 22.12.2010, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/data/html/alia/2010-12-22.html, interview with director at JAFI, 10.08.2012; and “Promising the Future” – Building the Jewish Agency, October 2010, www.jafi.org/NR/rdonlyres/C01EE965-BD04-4A5E-A41A-2D7B16AC6282/0/Strategicplanhebrew.pdf.
30 MOF, MOIA Budget Proposal, www.mof.gov.il/BudgetSite/StateBudget/Pages/Fbudget.aspx and MOIA annual work plans 2008-2010, www.pmo.gov.il/IsraelGov/YearPlans/Pages/plans2008.aspx
31 MOIA official website, www.moia.gov.il
47
Figure 1: Percentage of immigrants by major occupations, 2004-2010
32
0,3
0,2
0,1
0
0,6
0,5
0,4
1
0,9
0,8
0,7
5,61%
14,36%
6,17%
8,00%
26,43%
21,19%
5,18%
12,61%
7,01%
8,50%
26,93%
22,12%
3,85%
12,42%
6,66%
8,26%
26,04%
21,49%
3,05%
10,96%
9,05%
9,99%
25,61%
22,49%
3,06%
10,18%
8,24%
9,49%
31,38%
24,89%
3,18%
10,53%
6,41%
8,15%
33,48%
29,62%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Scientific and academic professions
Clerks and managers
Technical and Free professions
Sales person
Agriculture, industry and service provision Unprofessional
Ideational dynamics
At the beginning of the period under examination (1989), the problem definition was that only push factors (such as anti-Semitism or economic crisis) increase Jewish immigration to Israel. The metaphor used was ‘competition’ for immigrants between countries, and decision makers believed that failing these factors, Israel was bound to lose. Consequently, their attention was focused on prospective immigrants in distress. The policy solution ideas were to make sure that the push factors 'pushed' them to Israel rather than elsewhere.
Although decision makers believed it was important to improve integration so that those already in Israel would not emigrate, this element was marginal in the ideas behind immigration policy, indicated by the fact that immigration and integration were discussed as two distinct processes.
33
These ideas did not change for most of the examined period.
From 2002, as a result of the decrease in immigration, decision makers began questioning
32 Central Bureau of Statistics, www.cbs.gov.il/reader/shnaton. The percentages are out of the total number of immigrants employed prior to immigrating. The decrease in the percentage of unprofessional immigrants and industry workers is due among other things to the decrease in the number of immigrants from Ethiopia who from 1992 entered Israel as a result of periodical government decisions rather than the Law of Return.
33 Reports of Uri Gordon, Director of Immigration Department, JAFI, 30.01.1989; Yair Tzaban, Minister of
Absorption, 03.05.1993; Avraham Burg, Chair, JAFI, 19.11.1996 to the CIAD, Knesset Archive. See also
MOF, MOIA Budget Proposal, MOF Archive.
48
2,86%
9,86%
6,25%
8,26%
30,70%
29,07%
2010
the existing policy solution and problem definition ideas. JAFI executives began saying they had to re-examine their policy tools. Several meetings were held in CIAD, in which members accused JAFI of failure given the falling number of immigrants, and requested it change its approach.
34
MOIA officials also started to publically assert that the world in general, and Israel and the Jewish world in particular, were changing. Hence, if Israel wanted to continue attracting immigration, it should invest more in proactive immigration encouragement.
35 These suggestions were accompanied by repeated suggestions by Deputy
Ministry of Absorption, Yuli Edelstein, to CIAD, that perhaps Israel could win the
'competition' after all.
36
Since JAFI’s acknowledgement of failure was public, it was more likely driven by its belief that the existing solutions did not work rather than by other interests.
As a result, the decision makers’ attention was gradually diverted to 'immigration by choice'. They started to believe that the number of immigrants was determined by pull factors such as better conditions in the receiving country, and the problem definition changed to Israel’s attractiveness. For example:
Israel today has the potential and ability to compete with other welfare states. It is attractive today and can be even more attractive, depending on what we do to encourage the immigrants to come here.
37
However, attractiveness was not conceived in terms of economic conditions, but rather of making the immigrants feel at home. Consequently, policy solution ideas focused on making the immigrant feel comfortable, providing personal guidance before and after immigration, and creating a peer group for support during the integration process.
38
These ideas were not new and decision makers were familiar with them since they had been implemented in previous ad-hoc programmes to promote immigration from France and
34 Reports of Salay Meridor, Chair, JAFI, to CIAD, 28.07.2003, 15.10.2002, 22.05.2002, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/search.asp
35 Interview with MOIA Director , 06.08.2010.
36 Report of Deputy Minister of Absorption, Yuli Edelstein, to CIAD, 14.01.2002, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/search.asp
37 Report of Minister of Absorption, Zeev Boim, to CIAD, 31.01.2007, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx
38 Reports of Ministers of Absorption Tzipi Livni and Zeev Boim to CIAD, 28.07.2004, 02.11.2005,
14.06.2006, 31.01.2007, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx
49
South Africa.
39
When these ideas became widely accepted by decision makers, their attention was turned to fresh policy alternatives based on pull rather than push factors.
From 2007 the problem definition was narrowed from attractiveness for immigrants in general to attractiveness for ‘economic immigrants’. Decision makers emphasized economic benefits for immigrants from Western countries, who were presented as
'economic resources', 'bonds' and 'assets':
When I went to the Minister of Finance I told him: ‘You should invest in these immigrants [from North America] the same way you invest in a bond. You invested
300 million NIS in the absorption basket and you made 600 million’.
40
These metaphors implied that the solution should be further investment in skilled immigrants. This discourse intensified even more when the minister started presenting the ministry as an economic rather than a social ministry .
41
These ideas were imported from global immigration policies that considered skilled immigrants as an economic resource.
The decision makers were familiar with these ideas as indicated by their reference to global competition, both at Knesset committee meetings and in the interviews.
Another set of metaphors was borrowed from the fashion world, emphasizing the need for selective in addition to universal assistance:
In order to attract skilled immigrants the ministry should be like a department store which specializes in ‘tailor-made suits’ alongside ‘mass-produced clothes’.
42
These ideas led to expanding selective programmes aimed at professional immigrants, in addition to the universal programmes. As a result of the new immigration encouragement policies, decision makers began questioning MOIA’s entire approach of universal assistance and separation between immigration and integration.
39 CIAD, 14.01.2002, http://www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx and Prime Minister’s
Office, Government decision no.1225, Programme for Encouraging Immigration from Argentina, France and
South Africa, 06.01.2002, Prime Minister Office Archive.
40 Interview with MOIA Director, 31.05.2012.
41 Reports of Minister of Absorption, Sofa Landver, to CIAD, 12.10.2009, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/search.asp
42 Interview with MOIA Director, 31.05.2012.
50
I believe in providing public services at different levels. I think skilled immigrants require more focused and intense assistance than unskilled immigrants do. If I have for example an engineer coming from Argentina and a homemaker, I will not use the same tools for both. I will give the homemaker a voucher for vocational training and she will manage. The engineer, on the other hand, needs special treatment because I need engineers in Israel.
43
At the end of the examined period immigration and integration were discussed as a single process, the metaphor used was ‘continuum’ and the main problem definition was further expanded. For example, when asked about the future of MOIA, one director said:
I don't see the future of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption in adding social workers to work with immigrants, but I do see the future in connecting immigration and integration and thus seeing the big picture. I believe it's more important to both the ministry and country, and if it were up to me, that's where I'd go.
44
This expansion was possible because the new policy solution ideas did not question the public philosophies on which immigration and integration policies were based. Decision makers continued to justify the policy using Zionist notions of nation building and gathering of exiles.
45
Thus, it was possible to reconcile integration with attracting skilled immigrants.
***
The belief the Israel can win the competition for skilled immigrants led to introduction of new selective immigration encouragement programs, which were layered on top of universal programs. The new programs questioned the existing problem definition of separation between immigration and integration, eventually leading to expansion of MOIA aim. This expansion was possible since it did not question the existing public philosophies of ingathering of exiles and immigration as a tool for nation building.
43 Ibid, Ibid.
44
Interview MOIA Director, 28.05.2012.
45 See for example, reports of Ministers of Absorption Sofa Landver and Eli Aflalu, 12.10.2009, 13.10.2010,
03.11.2008, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/search.asp
51
Returning residents
Policy changes
MOIA was responsible for returning residents since 1986. However, this issue was one of the least significant on its agenda, as evidenced by its small annual budget (two million
NIS), the small unit in charge and its marginal place in MOIA objectives, as stated in the annual budget.
46
MOIA policy was reactive and its activities included assistance to children of returning residents, some minor assistance in employment (subject to socioeconomic status) and keeping in touch with Israeli émigré communities.
47
Through the entire examined period the number of emigrants was bigger than number of returning residents
(see Table 2), creating a significant target population.
Since 2002 there has been constant decrease in the number of emigrants and increase in the number of returning residents (see Table 2). Furthermore, the constant decrease in immigration turned decision makers’ attention to returning residents as another source of potential immigration.
48
The policy change started marginally when in 2005 MOIA increased subsidies to youth programmes for former residents. In 2006, for the first time in the examined period returning residents were included in MOIA's budget statement.
49 In 2007, MOIA decided to launch a large campaign abroad, calling on emigrants to return, and also held employment fairs, mostly in the US. In the same year, the small returning residents unit was replaced by a new, large department. Subsequently, returning residents became
MOIA's first priority, as indicated in its work plan.
50
46 MOF, MOIA budget proposal, http://www.mof.gov.il/budgetsite/statebudget /Pages/Fbudget.aspx
and
Budget execution data, www.ag.mof.gov.il/AccountantGeneral/BudgetExecution/BudgetExecutionTopNav/BEHistoryDataHistory
/BEHistoryData/default.htm
47 Report of Nadia Prigat, Director of Returning Residents Unit, to the CIAD, 18.01.1993, 14.02.1994,
20.12.2004, Knesset Archive and Returning Residents Unit execution report, 22.06.1995, Government
Archive.
48 Interviews with two directors in the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, 09.05.2012, 28.05.2012.
49 Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Immigrant Absorption Budget Proposal, www.mof.gov.il/BUDGETSITE/STATEBUDGET/Pages/Fbudget.aspx
50
Ministry of Immigrant Absorption www.pmo.gov.il/IsraelGov/YearPlans/Pages/plans2008.aspx
work plan 2008,
52
In 2008, a special programme was launched that included tax subsidies and health insurance payments for returning residents.
51
This programme was initiated mostly by Erez
Halfon, who was not only the ministry's director general in 2006-2010, but also had good relationship with the Prime Minister's Office where he had worked as an assistant to Prime
Minister Sharon before coming to MOIA.
In 2010, MOIA decided to equalize the benefits received by returning residents to those of new immigrants, including tax exemptions on various products and educational assistance for children.
52 In addition, the budget allocated to returning residents grew from three million NIS in 2004 to 14 in 2010.
53
During the same period the actual number of returnees did not change significantly (see Table 2). Although not stated explicitly, the policy tools used suggest that the new policies targeted emigrants of higher socioeconomic status
(Cohen, 2009), in line with policies in other countries.
As in immigration encouragement, all the new programmes and funds were added to existing integration services rather than replacing them.
54
However, the change was more than just adding policies, since the new policies gradually converted MOIA to the new purpose of assisting returning residents. At the end of the examined period not only did returning residents become one of MOIA's main objectives but its official goal was changed from assistance to immigrants to assistance to immigrants and returning residents, as evidenced by its work plans and website.
55
Environmental changes cannot by themselves explain this policy change. There were periods in the past when the number of immigrants was even lower (for example in the mid-1980s) and MOIA did not engage in an active return policy. In addition, there was no significant change in the number of immigrants or emigrants from 2006 to 2010. Political interests are also insufficient as an explanation because the minister in 2010, Sofa Landver,
51 Report of Erez Halfon to CIAD, 19.12.2007, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/search.asp
52 Prime Minister's Office, Government decision no. 1687: Encouragement of Returning Residents,
16.05.2010, www.pmo.gov.il/PMO/Archive/Decisions/2010/02/des1687.htm
53 MOF, Budget execution data, www.ag.mof.gov.il/AccountantGeneral/BudgetExecution/BudgetExecutionTopNav/BEHistoryDataHistory
/BEHistoryData/default.htm
54 MOF, MOIA annual budget proposal, www.mof.gov.il/budgetsite/statebudget/Pages/Fbudget.aspx
55
MOIA official website www.moia.gov.il and MOIA work plans 2008-2010, www.pmo.gov.il/IsraelGov/YearPlans/Pages/plans2008.aspx
53
was from a party representing FSU immigrants, while most returning residents are from the US; moreover, there was significant public opposition to the new policy in 2008.
56
The fact that the minister at that time did not withdraw the programme demonstrates that her motives were more than just political. Moreover, as in immigration encouragement, it is not clear why the change in function was accompanied by change in purpose – in other words, why layering was accompanied by conversion. Here, too, ideational analysis can suggest an answer.
Table 2: Emigrants and returning residents, 1990-2010 (in thousands)
57
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
20.0
19.7
19.5
21.2
27.2
27.3
25.4
24.2
21.5
Emigration
24.7
22.8
23.1
27.2
19.1
24.7
20.9
22.4
21.1
19.1
15.9
15.6
7.2
6.5
6.8
8.4
7.8
8.3
9.1
10.0
10.5
Return
10.5
11.5
10.5
10.8
9.0
7.9
8.0
9.6
9.3
10.6
11.0
10.2
56 Interview with MOIA director, 28.05.2012.
57 Central Bureau of Statistics, www.cbs.gov.il/www/publications/alia/t3.pdf
. Systematic data collection on emigration and return by the Central Bureau of Statistics began only in 1990. The data refers to Israelis who were abroad more than a year and returned to Israel after more than a year.
54
Ideational dynamics
The positive attitude towards immigration and its important place in the national ethos have made emigration from Israel a negatively perceived phenomenon. This is evidenced by the respective Hebrew terms aliyah (going up) and yerida (going down) as well as by a clause in each government guideline since 1981, stating that "the government views emigration from Israel as a negative phenomenon and will do everything in its power to fight it".
58
The problem definition at the beginning of the examined period was, to use the prevalent metaphors, "waging war" on the emigration "epidemic", and most policy solutions ideas were aimed at preventing emigration. Incentives for returning residents were dismissed because it was believed that providing incentives to this population would only encourage further emigration (Cohen, 2009).
59
In addition, decision makers thought that return depended on macro factors such as the economic situation in Israel and abroad, so that incentives would not be effective.
60
In 2004 decision makers started to question these ideas. That year, the first official MOIA delegation visited emigrants in North America, making decision makers realize the potential rather than just the negative aspects of this population. Moreover, one of the major decision makers was a returning resident himself, and he believed that 'this is a global world and people are moving from place to place. This is no reason to boycott them'.
61
Consequently, from 2004 onward, MOIA decision makers and politicians from several parties began to point out that the situation had changed and that the government should do more to bring back emigrants, given that the traditional discourse did not fit the new reality.
62
Moreover, during 2004-2010 CIAD held only one meeting on emigration prevention, compared to three or four the year before. All that time negative public attitudes towards emigrants persisted, as indicated by the objection to the 2008 programme expressed in the letters of complaints sent to the ministry.
63 Hence it is more likely that
58 The 24th government’s guidelines, 1988, www.knesset.gov.il/docs/heb/coalition.htm
59 Another example is a 1998 bill by MK Itzhak Cohen, Returning Israelis on the 50th Anniversary, which was dismissed and criticized in CIAD, 03.11.1998, Knesset Archive.
60 CIAD, 10.08.1989, 22.05.1989, 20.02.1989, Knesset Archive.
61 Interview with MOIA director, 28.05.2012.
62 CIAD, 27.12.2004, 02.11.2005, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx
63 Interview with MOIA director, 28.05.2012.
31.01.2007, 14.06.2006,
55
decision makers’ arguments were earnest, mostly because they were made in committee meetings open to the public.
From 2005 the problem definition changed from emigration prevention to promoting return. However,
You must strike the balance between an immigrant who's never lived here and an
Israeli citizen who's never left. You don’t want to create an incentive for Israelis to leave Israel in order to return and get the benefits they wouldn't have gotten if they hadn't left.
64
In addition, decision makers started to believe that return was a result of government policy and not only of macro factors. Correspondingly, policy solution ideas which focused on active encouragement were put forward. These ideas were not new, since the former director of the returning residents unit had expressed most of them publically at committee meetings from the mid-1990.
65
However, at the beginning of the examined period her ideas were dismissed as assistance to returning residents was seen as a prize to those who had gone astray. Only when the ideational change started were new policies introduced.
From 2006 decision makers started talking about the economic potential of returning residents, especially given their high skills and potentially rapid integration. The discourse on economic benefits changed the policy solution ideas from incentives as increasing emigration to incentives as increasing return.
66
In addition, emigration was placed in the broader global context of people moving from place to place, rather than in the ideological context of Zionism.
67
As a result, decision makers shifted their attention from the negative aspects of emigration to the positive benefits of return migration.
By 2007 this trend intensified, and the director general said that
The Ministry of Immigrant Absorption is the only social ministry that makes money for the State of Israel: 18,000 returning emigrants added
64 Interview with MOIA director, 06.08.2010.
65 Report of Nadia Prigat, Director of Returning Residents Unit, to CIAD, 18.01.1993, Knesset Archive.
66 Report of Erez Halfon, MOIA Director General, to CIAD, 19.12.2007, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx
67 Reports of Minister of Absorption, Zeev Boim, to CIAD, 31.01.2007, 14.06.2006, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx
56
two billion NIS to the GNP. According to our research, a returning emigrant brings in about 100,000 NIS in taxes.
68
However, the status of returning residents was still a bit inferior to that of new immigrants:
We try to maintain some gap between what a returning resident gets and what a new immigrant gets, for normative reasons, but still we can do more to encourage them to come back.
69
Alongside the economic reasoning, this policy was also rationalized by expanding the public philosophy of ‘immigration as a tool for nation building’. The returning residents’ policy was described as national cause, with returnees presented as contributing to Israel’s national strength.
70
In addition, decision makers constantly associated immigration encouragement and returning residents to give the impression that returnees were immigrants as well, and used positive and welcoming metaphors such as 'open doors' and
'open arms'.
71
At the end of the examined period, when the rights of immigrants and returning emigrants were almost equalized, the latter's lower normative status was dismissed:
For the first time we have equalized some of the benefits for immigrants and returning residents… I would like to say to each family: 'Come home, we want you here and you will get personal treatment just like any other immigrant…'.
72
***
The change in problem definition from emigration prevention to encouraging return made decision makers seek different policy solution ideas of economic incentives and proactive initiatives. Their gradual implementation narrowed the actual as well as normative gap
68 Report of Erez Halfon, MOIA Director General, to CIAD, 19.12.2007, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx.
69 Report of Minister of Absorption, Zeev Boim, to CIAD, 31.01.2007, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx
70 Report of Minister of Absorption, Sofa Landver, to CIAD, 10.11.2010, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx
71 Report of Minister of Absorption, Sofa Landver, to the Committee of Immigration, Absorption and
Diaspora Affairs, 19.12.2007, 10.11.2010, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx
72
Report of Minister of Absorption, Sofa Landver, to the Committee of Immigration, Absorption and
Diaspora Affairs, 10.11.2010, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/search.asp
57
between immigrants and returning residents. Once both populations were seen as equal it was only logical to expand the ministry goals from assisting immigrants to assisting returning residents as well. This expansion was possible not only because the new return programmes did not replace the old integration policies, but also because they both came to be legitimized by the same public philosophies.
58
Chapter 4: Conversion and Layering- Employment
Policy changes
General
The assistance in employment provided by MOIA is composed of (1) subsidized employment in the public sector; (2) consultation and vocational training; and (3) assistance to entrepreneurs. In all three areas, policy change was both in policy tools and in policy aims. From 1992 employment became the main issue on MOIA's agenda and the budget allocated for it increased from 238 million NIS in 1992 (18% of the total ministry's budget) to 156 million in 1997 (25%). However, since then it gradually decreased to 57 million in 2010 (7%).
73
This decrease was not a result of a decrease in the number of immigrants, because as explained below, during the examined period the number of potential beneficiaries increased.
Subsidized employment
From its establishment in 1971 the aim of the subsidized employment programme was to encourage the public sector to place immigrants who had trouble finding a proper job on their own.
74
In this programme the government subsidized vacancies in the public sector for a period of six months. The budget allocated for this programme increased from 47 million NIS in 1990 (12% of the total employment budget) to 65 million in 1995 (31%).
From 1996 it gradually decreased to 23 million in 2010 (21%).
75 This change is part of a more general government policy to reduce subsidized employment because it does not facilitate long term integration.
76
73 MOF, MOIA Budget Proposal, MOF Archive and MOF, Budget execution data, www.ag.mof.gov.il/AccountantGeneral/BudgetExecution/BudgetExecutionTopNav/BEHistoryDataHistory
/BEHistoryData/default.htm
74 Report of Yolanda Strauss, Director of Employment Department, to CIDA, 20.11.1990, Knesset Archive.
75 MOF, MOIA Budget Proposal, MOF Archive, and budget execution data, www.ag.mof.gov.il/AccountantGeneral/BudgetExecution/BudgetExecutionTopNav/BEHistoryDataHistory
/BEHistoryData/default.htm
76 Report of Minister of Industry and Trade, Moshe Nisim, to CIAD, 08.08.1990, Knesset Archive.
59
Another change affected the programme's target population. At the beginning of the examined period subsidized employment was aimed at doctors, teachers and immigrants with an academic degree. This corresponded to the occupational profile of immigrants coming in the 1990s who had trouble finding a job.
77
Through the years, the budget allocated to academics decreased from 16% out of the program’s total budget in 1992 to
4% in 2010. Similarly, the budget for teachers decreased from 28% of the program’s budget until 1997 to 12% in 2010. As teachers’ and academics’ relative importance decreased, the subsidy to doctors increased from 47% of the budget in 1992 to 83% in 2010. In addition, in 2005 MOIA added subsidized employment during internship for professions requiring licence such as doctors, engineers and lawyers for a period of 6-12 months. In 2008 it also added two years' subsidized employment for medical interns.
78
Hence, at the end of the examined period although the government subsidized fewer vacancies for immigrants in the public sector, the resources allocated to doctors grew significantly at the expense of other groups.
In addition, at the end of the examined period, the policy aim of helping immigrants find a job became marginal and another more important goal was added: filling up the existing shortage in doctors by recruiting doctors from abroad and subsidizing their employment during the first period after arrival. For example, from 2006 assistance to doctors appeared as one of the employment budget objectives and from 2008 MOIA declared that this population was one of its main target populations.
79
Consequently, the existing policy tool of subsidized employment was gradually converted to the new aim. However, it did not replace the old aim, but rather marginalized it.
This change cannot be explained only by the change in the immigrants’ occupational profile, because not only did it not change significantly from the mid-2000s (see Figure 1, p. 48), but also the percentage of doctors coming in 2000s was much smaller than their
77 Ekshtein Committee Report, 'Employment vouchers, for subsidizing immigrants’ integration in proper vacancies', sapir.tau.ac.il/papers/sapir-wp/96-4.pdf and Baranover Committee Report on Immigrants’
Employment, 1992, Government Archive.
78 MOIA, Regulation no. 270, Assistance to immigrant medical interns, 01.07.08 and Regulation no. 265,
Assistance to immigrants and returning residents during internship, 01.11.2005, www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/Procedures/Documents/6117AssistanceInPromoting
Employment/TemporaryOrder27/6117_265.pdf
79
MOF, MOIA Budget Proposal, www.mof.gov.il/budgetsite/statebudget/Pages/Fbudget.aspx
60
percentage at the beginning of the examined period
80
Political interests also cannot explain this change because most immigrant teachers were veteran immigrants from FSU – the last minister's potential electorate, while newly arrived doctors were mostly from France and
South America. Moreover, from the beginning of the examined period immigrant teachers were a stronger interest group than immigrant doctors.
81 Their power was manifested among other things in their success in promoting a special policy for immigrant teachers at the Ministry of Education, 82 while immigrant doctors did not have their own interest group and despite the numerous meetings on immigrant doctors held in CIAD during the examined period, their achievements in promoting changes in the current accreditation and licencing policy were minor.
83
Vocational training
At the beginning of the large immigration wave, MOIA's main aim was to help individual immigrants in training and employability skills in order to reduce unemployment. In the mid-1990s, with the decrease in immigrants’ unemployment rates, the main aim became reducing immigrants’ underemployment and fulfilling their potential. The target population was veteran immigrants.
84
Vocational training was provided at first by the
Ministry of Labour and from the mid-1990s by private organizations which contracted with
MOIA. This contracting out was perceived by MOIA as inefficient, since the immigrants were obliged to wait for a minimum number of registrants in order to start a training course, and MOIA was engaged in many complicated bureaucratic bidding procedures with various organizations.
85
Until 1998 the entitlement period was up to three years of residence. In 1998 it expanded to five years and in 2001 to ten.
86
80 Central Bureau of Statistics, www.cbs.gov.il/www/saka_y/07_05.pdf
81 Their political power can be seen among other things in the special meeting of the Committee of
Education held to celebrate the Immigrant Teachers’ Organization's 20 th anniversary, 06.03.2012, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/search.asp
82 Ministry of Education’s Regulations on Immigrant Teachers, cms.education.gov.il/EducationCMS/Applications/Mankal
83 Besides immigrant doctors’ lack of power, this is also a result of the power of Israeli Medical
Association which opposes any changes in the current accreditation and licensing policy.
84 MOF, MOIA Budget Proposal, www.mof.gov.il/budgetsite/statebudget/Pages/Fbudget.aspx and MOF
Archive.
85 Interview with three MOIA directors, 26.09.2010, 06.08.2010, 10.07.2010.
86 Prime Minister's Office, Government Decisions no. 3818, 166, Entitlement period for assistance in employment for immigrants, 28.05.1998, 17.05.2001, Prime Minister's Office Archive.
61
In 2005, MOIA decided to privatise vocational training, and introduced the 'Voucher
Project', where each immigrant received a voucher worth 10,000 NIS for any vocational training on the private market.
87
Thus, responsibility for finding an appropriate vocational training was transferred from the government to the immigrant. From 2005, the project became one of the major vocational training tools for immigrants. This is indicated in the budget: in 2005, the vouchers made up only 5% of the Employment Department's budget
(4 million NIS); in 2008 this rose to 45% (25 million,); in 2010, after severe budget cuts across the ministry, it constituted 35% of the department's budget (19 million).
88
In addition, in 2010 MOIA decided to include not only immigrants but also returning residents in the entitlement group.
89
Thus, the number of potential beneficiaries increased.
Nevertheless, the budget allocated for this project decreased from 26 million NIS in 2006 to 10 million in 2010.
90
As a result, the voucher value was reduced from 10,000 to 7,000
NIS for new immigrants (up to five years of residence) and 5,000 NIS for veteran immigrants (more than five years).
91
Moreover, from 2004, the entire employment integration budget decreased from 124 million NIS in 2004 to 57 million in 2010, which significantly reduced the employment integration assistance. Consequently, at the end of the examined period the universal assistance in employment decreased.
This decrease did not affect all immigrants equally. In 2005-2008, immigrants who entered
Israel through the special immigration encouragement programmes described in Chapter
Three received not only the voucher, but also additional employment integration assistance
87 Report of Minister of Absorption, Tzipi Livni, to CIAD, 27.12.2204, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx
88 MOF, Budget execution data, www.ag.mof.gov.il/AccountantGeneral/BudgetExecution/BudgetExecutionTopNav/BEHistoryDataHistory
/BEHistoryData/default.htm
89 Prime Minister's Office, Government Decision no. 1942, Entitlement period for assistance in employment and entrepreneurship, 8.7.2010, www.pmo.gov.il/Secretary/GovDecisions/2010/Pages/des1942.aspx
90
MOF, Budget execution data, www.ag.mof.gov.il/AccountantGeneral/BudgetExecution/BudgetExecutionTopNav/BEHistoryDataHistory
/BEHistoryData/default.htm
91 MOIA, Regulation no. 258: 'Voucher Project', 03.05.2010, www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/Procedures/Pages/default.aspx
62
of 2,000 NIS.
92
In addition, immigrants who came through the special immigration encouragement programme in 2010 received a voucher of 8,000 instead of 7,000 NIS.
93
The main target population has also changed from unemployed veteran immigrants to newly arrived immigrants, returning residents and potential immigrants, what the ministry has called since 2008 'special groups in accordance to the needs of the labour market'.
94
As a result, in addition to the existing policy tools MOIA set employment fairs abroad and connected potential immigrants and returning residents with employers prior to immigration.
95 Hence, while the universal policy stagnated or even eroded, a selective policy which grew faster than the universal policy was added.
In addition, from 2006 the policy aim expanded from reduction of underemployment, which became marginal, to immigration encouragement and increase in the number of returning residents through assistance in employment prior to immigration. This expansion took place by redirecting existing policy tools to new aims. For example, in MOIA work plans from 2008-2009 one of the main aims was to increase the number of returning residents and the policy tools for fulfilling this aim were assistance in employment and entrepreneurship. The same can be seen in MOIA's budget objectives.
96
Since policy aim was expanded and not replaced old tools were serving both old and new aims. At the same time new tools serving the new aim were added to old tools.
The decision to allocate more resources to immigrants from Western countries entering through the special programmes and at the same time reduce the resources and transfer more responsibility to veteran immigrants is puzzling, given the Israeli political system,
92 MOIA, Regulation no. 243: Group Immigration 2004-2009, 15.06.2004, www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/Procedures/Pages/default.aspx
93 MOIA, Regulation no. 312: Vocational training for immigrants coming through the Immigration 2010 programme, 15.08.2010, www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/Procedures/Pages/default.aspx
94 MOF, MOIA Budget Proposal, www.mof.gov.il/BudgetSite/StateBudget/Pages/Fbudget.aspx
95 CIAD, 17.11.2009, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/search.asp, and interview conducted with a MOIA director, 25.05.2012.
96
MOIA, Work Plan for 2008-2009, plans.gov.il/PlanningsHistory/Pages/Archive.aspx and MOF, MOIA
Budget Proposal, www.mof.gov.il/BudgetSite/StateBudget/Pages/Fbudget.aspx
63
where there is a significant immigrants' political party (13-15 seats out of 120 in parliament from 2004), whose voters are mostly veteran immigrants from the FSU.
Entrepreneurship
The assistance given to immigrants who want to open their own business is composed of a loan for opening the business and consultation and guidance provided by private organizations and financed by MOIA. This programme started in 1993, aiming at assisting immigrants who had trouble finding employment. In 1989 the budget allocated to entrepreneurship was 18 million NIS (11% out of the entire employment budget). Each immigrant was entitled to five counselling hours and a loan of 13,000 NIS (about 29,000 in 2010). The entitlement period for this assistance was three years of residence.
97
Through the years this area gradually expanded and became one of the main employment policy tools: its share in the total employment budget in 1999 was 25% out of the total employment budget and by 2010 it rose to 30%.
98
The number of counselling hours increased to twenty hours and the loan increased to 60,000 NIS in 2004 (more than 70,000 in 2010) and to 100,000 in 2010. Moreover, from 2009 immigrants were also entitled to an additional loan three years after receiving the first loan.
99
This was among other things due to the change in the businesses opened from small to medium size.
100
The entitlement period increased to five years of residence in 1998 and ten in 2001.
101
Another expansion took place in 2009, when MOIA decided that not only potential immigrants but also
97 MOIA, Programme for encouraging immigrant entrepreneurship: Budget proposal and work plan,
20.08.1992, Government Archive.
98 MOF, Budget execution data, www.ag.mof.gov.il/AccountantGeneral/BudgetExecution/BudgetExecutionTopNav/BEHistoryDataHistory
/BEHistoryData/default.htm
99 Reports of Iris Huminer, Director of Entrepreneurship Unit, to CIAD, 03.07.2006, 09.01.2007, 30.07.2008, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/search.asp, MOIA, Regulation no. 289, Increase in the assistance provided to immigrants and returning residents, 5.1.2010, www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/Procedures/Documents/6139AssistanceForEntrepre neurs/TemporaryOrder24/6139_289.pdf and Regulation no. 6.139, Assistance to immigrants entrepreneurs
15.7.98,www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/Procedures/Documents/6139AssistanceFor
Entrepreneurs/AssistanceTable24/276139.pdf
100 Report of Iris Huminer, Director of Entrepreneurship Unit, to CIAD, 17.11.2009, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/search.asp
101
Prime Minister's Office, Government decisions no. 3819, 166, Entitlement period for assistance in employment and entrepreneurship for immigrants, 28.05.1998, 17.05.2001, Prime Minister's Office Archive.
64
returning residents could receive guidance and a loan for opening their own business.
102
Thus, the entire scope of state responsibility expanded.
In addition, as in vocational training, the entrepreneurship programme’s aims were expanded to immigration encouragement.
103 This can be seen in MOIA's work plan where entrepreneurship is presented as a tool to encourage potential immigrants and returning residents to come to Israel 104 and in MOIA's official website which presents the entrepreneurship assistance as a 'business absorption package'.
105 As a result, in 2004
MOIA launched a website to help potential immigrants and returning residents open their own business after immigration/return, and also held consultations and fairs abroad. In order to finance these activities MOIA added a special budget of 6.5 million NIS in 2005.
This sum increased to more than 11 million in 2006 and then gradually decreased to 6.2 million in 2010 (most likely due to this budget's low execution rate – 33% in 2009).
106
This was a significant change since at the beginning of the examined period most immigrants used the entrepreneurship programme several years after arrival, usually after having failed to find a proper job and after having become familiar with the Israeli business environment.
Since entrepreneurship became an immigration encouragement tool in 2008, the government introduced new tax exemptions for ten years for immigrants and returning residents on all their assets abroad, in order to encourage wealthy immigrants and returning residents to come to Israel and open their own businesses.
107
This changed the target population from weak immigrants who use entrepreneurship as a last resort to wealthy immigrants and returning residents. In that, Israel became more similar to other Western countries which encourage business migration (Shachar & Hirschl, 2014).
102 MOIA, Regulation no. 6139, Assistance for immigrant entrepreneurs, www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/Procedures/Documents/6139AssistanceForEntrepre neurs/GeneralRegulation24/0613905.pdf
103 MOF, MOIA Budget Proposal, www.mof.gov.il/BudgetSite/StateBudget/Pages/Fbudget.aspx
104 MOIA, Work Plan for 2008-2010, plans.gov.il/PlanningsHistory/Pages/Archive.aspx
105 See www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/Subjects/BusinessAndTax/Pages/Israel-Invests-in-you.aspx
106 MOF, Budget execution data, www.ag.mof.gov.il/AccountantGeneral/BudgetExecution/BudgetExecutionTopNav/BEHistoryDataHistory
/BEHistoryData/default.htm
107 Income Tax Order, Amendment No. 168, (2008), www.knesset.privatelaw/data/17/3/396_3_1.rtf
65
As in subsidized employment and vocational training these changes also cannot be explained only by change in the immigrants’ profile (business immigrants), since the change in profile followed policy change. Nor can it be explained by political interests because, as noted earlier, from 2004 there were five ministers of absorption from different parties all pursuing the same policy. In addition, most of the business immigrants and returning residents come from North America or France and not from the FSU.
The analysis of changes in assistance in employment leaves three questions unanswered.
First, why, despite the increase in the number of potential beneficiaries (due to entitlement extension), enabling MOIA's existence in face of decrease in the number of immigrants, it still changed its main target population to potential immigrants and returning residents?
Second, since the policy changes correspond to most of the criteria for conversion suggested by Rocco & Thurston (2014) (see Chapter Two, pp. 37-40), why was the policy aim expanded and not replaced? Third, why was converting old policy tools to new aims accompanied by layering of new tools?
Ideational dynamics
From the beginning of the examined period decision makers believed that participation in the labour market was a key for successful integration. The main problem definition was the immigrant's relative disadvantage in the labour market. Thus, policy solution ideas were aimed at closing the gap between the immigrants and veteran Israelis by offering various forms of training, counselling and guidance to immigrants. The metaphors used were
‘bridge’ and 'lever’, which implied temporary assistance. The state was responsible to provide immigrants with a 'fishing rod' or 'spring board' and it was the immigrants’ responsibility to use them. Policy solution ideas focused on training and counselling and were aimed mostly at increasing immigrants' personal benefits from participation in the labour market (i.e. improving their economic status or self-esteem).
108 Decision makers also acknowledged that immigrants’ participation in the labour market could benefit the economy, because it would fulfil the potential of the human capital arriving and save future
108 Bank of Israel, (1990), Economic policy during immigration, Jerusalem. CIAD, 20.11.1990, 01.01.1992,
26.10.1992, Knesset Archive.
66
costs. However, these benefits were long term and secondary.
109
The only exception was entrepreneurship, which was presented as a tool that immediately contributed both to the immigrant and to Israel’s economic growth.
110
There was also secondary problem definition: specific immigrant groups – single mothers, immigrants over 45 as well as doctors and teachers – could not participate in the labour market on their own. The policy solution ideas for this problem can be divided in two opposite types: increase in state responsibility and increase in personal responsibility. Both types were suggested by the same decision makers. While decision makers believed that most immigrants would integrate on their own, they also thought that the government should interfere in the margins and help distinct immigrant groups by subsidizing employment mostly in the public sector.
111
For example:
There are specific immigrant groups, which cannot enter the labour market on their own. I'm talking about doctors, teachers, artists, social scientists, and some of the engineers… This programme gives us an opportunity to equalize between the immigrant and the veteran Israeli.
112
Ideas on increase in personal responsibility were suggestions to solve the problem of unemployment by encouraging entrepreneurship. While subsidized employment was aimed at the first period after arrival, entrepreneurship was seen as a last resort tool.
What characterizes the immigrants we are working with is that they are willing to be more flexible, to modify their occupation, since they say that time is running out and see the opportunity given to them as a key to their successes.
113
109 Report of Michael Bruno, Bank of Israel, Governor, to CIAD, 25.06.1991 and reports of Minister of
Absorption, Yair Tzaban, to CIAD, 26.10.1992, 03.08.1992, 03.05.1993, Knesset Archive.
110 Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, Programme for encouraging immigrant entrepreneurship: Budget proposal and work plan, 20.08.1992, Government Archive.
111 The justifications for subsidized employment can be seen both in the Knesset committee minutes which were closed to the public and in private correspondence and closed meetings of MOIA. Thus, it is likely that the reasoning is sincere.
112 Report of Yolanda Strauss, Director of Employment Department, to the CIAD, 20.11.1990, Knesset
Archive.
113
Report of Uri Horowitz, Director of Immigrant Entrepreneurship Unit, to CIAD, 25.01.1994, Knesset
Archive.
67
The reasoning behind entrepreneurship is economic and the logic of action is cost-benefit, while subsidized employment is a tool for opening new vacancies with minimal government investment.
114
From 1997, as a result of the decrease in the number of unemployed immigrants, the problem of underemployment was added. The logic was that if the government invested in immigrants and helped them fulfil their potential by helping them find an appropriate job, they would contribute to Israel’s economic growth. Underemployment became one of the most severe issues, as indicated by the metaphors of 'crime' and 'failure'.
The main problem we see is underemployment... I think that this problem can be called a national crime. I have calculated the financial value of all the years of education of immigrants from the Former Soviet Union and I have come up with a sum of 24 billion NIS. I believe that we've lost about 20 of these 24 billion because the state does not use them....
115
The policy solution ideas were: expanding vocational training and guidance provided to the immigrants as well as extending entitlement period. The short entitlement period did not allow many immigrants to take up their rights. Moreover, the decision makers believed there was unfulfilled potential of immigrant entrepreneurs and that the extension would help to fulfil it.
116
These ideas did not change until the mid-2000.
Unlike other fields in Israeli immigration and integration policies, the ideational change in this field was not a result of discrepancy between ideas and reality. Veteran immigrants continued to suffer from underemployment
117
and no evidence was found for decision makers’ criticism of existing ideas. The change was a result of a more general discrepancy between the ideas behind immigration encouragement and the decrease in the number of immigrants (as demonstrated in Chapter 3). As a result, decision makers’ general attention was turned towards immigration encouragement, making the prevalent ideas behind
114 Letter from Minister of Absorption, Yair Tzaban, to the Minister of Finance, Abraham Shohat, Extension of immigrants’ entitlement for a loan to open their own businesses from three to seven years, Jerusalem:
23.10.94, Government Archive and CIAD, 25.01.1994, Knesset Archive.
115 Report of Yossi Farhi, Director of the Employment Service, to CIAD, 17.03.1998, Knesset Archive.
116 Letter from Tzaban, to Shohat, Extension of immigrants’ entitlement.
117 CIAD, 17.11.2009, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx.
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employment more marginal. From the mid-2000s decision makers no longer mentioned the problem of immigrants’ disadvantage in the labour market, but rather the problem of global competition for skilled immigrants. In addition, the problem of lost human capital of those who already in Israel, or unfulfilled potential of immigrant entrepreneurs, almost disappeared from the agenda while the issue of attracting potential human capital appeared.
Consequently, the policy solution ideas in employment were evaluated through the lens of immigration encouragement; i.e. whether a certain solution encourages or discourages immigration. Moreover, participation in the labour market was perceived as a key not only to successful integration, but also to immigration encouragement and increasing the number of returning residents. The suggested solutions were policies activated before immigration.
For example, in 2008 MOIA received an additional 33m NIS for employment support. Part of this amount was aimed at assisting veteran immigrants through the Voucher Project.
However, MOIA Director General associated this increased funding with efforts to increase the number of returning residents;
I am glad the Ministry of Finance acknowledged the economic opportunity in assisting immigrants and returning residents and transferred the additional money needed for their participation in the labour market. The tremendous successes of the ministry’s operation for bringing back returning residents created new priorities in the Ministry of Finance that will contribute directly to
Israel’s economic growth.
118
Since most of the potential audience of this press release were veteran immigrants, this association was probably a result of the general director’s beliefs and not of other interests.
Another example can be seen in the way another director general described the damage of budget cuts to the Voucher Project:
118 Erez Halfon, Ministry of Immigrant Absorption Director General, press release, 12.08.2008, www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/SpokesmanMessage/Pages/default.aspx
69
We are aware of the importance of the voucher program, since it helps immigrants integrate into the labour market. Moreover, we are also aware of the negative consequences of the budget cuts not only to the programme but also to the whole integration process and the efforts made to encourage more immigrants and returning residents to come to Israel.
119
Given the fact that this quote is from a letter sent to an organization representing veteran underemployed immigrants, it is more likely that the association made between the Voucher Project and immigration encouragement expresses true beliefs.
As the main problem definition became competition for skilled immigrants, two new secondary problems of barriers to immigration/return of skilled and wealthy immigrants were added: labour market uncertainty and international taxation issues.
120
The idea that one of the main barriers facing wealthy immigrants was the difficulty to transfer their property to Israel (because of either Israeli or the country of origin’s tax policy) was not new;
121
however, until this period it was marginal and referred to mostly in connection with potential immigrants from South Africa. As the number of immigrants from Western countries increased, its relative salience increased as well. As a result, the policy solution ideas revolved around reducing labour market uncertainty and changing the Israeli tax policy. This turned the decision makers’ attention to new tools of assistance from abroad and tax exemptions.
In this attention shift towards immigration encouragement, the influence of ‘race for talent’ ideas is clearly evident. Decision makers used economic reasoning: the immigrants were called ‘engines’ and ‘cranes’ of the Israeli economy.
122
They have also performed costbenefit analysis to justify the policy, emphasizing that the government spent little with substantial returns. For example, in 2009 MOIA conducted a study to examine the economic contribution of returning residents compared to government investment. Its
119 Letter of Dimitry Apartzev, Ministry of Immigrant Absorption Director General, to the Forum for
Reduction of Underemployment, 28.10.2009, received from the Forum for Reduction of Underemployment.
120 Interview conducted with MOIA director, 21.07.2010.
121 See for example the meeting of CIAD on immigration from South Africa, 06.11.2001, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/search.asp
122 Interview with MOIA director, 28.05.2012.
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findings were used to justify the 2010 government decision on returning residents.
123
In addition, one can see a clear preference for high-skilled immigrants and returning residents who will contribute to the country. For example,
The immigration today is of higher quality than previous immigration waves, because they come not only for Zionist reasons but also for economic reasons.… 124
Although some argue that Israel always preferred skilled and wealthy immigrants and returning residents (Cohen, 2009), this was rarely stated explicitly. Given that the statement above was given publicly at a meeting on the situation of veteran immigrants, where the
Minister of Absorption (from a party whose electorate are veteran immigrants) was present, it is more likely that the above quote represented the speaker’s true beliefs.
Furthermore, the policy focus shifted from immigrants’ benefits from successful integration to the state’s benefits, i.e. economic growth.
125
In addition, potential immigrants were perceived as signals for other immigrants. The causal logic was that you had to invest more in “strong” immigrants (wealthy or high skilled immigrants) in order to encourage other immigrants to follow them.
126
When decision makers’ attention was turned to the competition for skilled immigrants, it became more legitimate to prioritize skilled and wealthy immigrants and to use economic policy tools.
In the end you are competing with other countries which are looking for ‘brains’.
Israel is not the only one looking for Jewish doctors. Therefore, professional immigrants should get additional assistance and prioritized treatment. It is
123 Prime Minister’s Office, Government decision no. 1687: Encouragement of returning residents,
16.05.2010, www.pmo.gov.il/PMO/Archive/Decisions/2010/02/des1687.htm. Another example is a report of the Prime Minister’s Office presented in 2012 to summarize the 2010-2012 returning residents’ programme. In the report it is specifically stated that the government invested 67m NIS in various employment services and gained 175m annually, www.pmo.gov.il/Secretary/govmes/.../back.pp
124 Report of Gilad Avrahami, Director of Employment Department, to CIAD, 17.11.2009, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/search.asp
125 See for example, the reasoning used by Roni Bar-On, Minister of Finance, in the press release on the tax exemption program, 09.09.2008, ozar.mof.gov.il/ita2013/1999to2008/2008/hodaa100908.htm
126 Interview with MOIA director, 28.05.2012.
71
legitimate to give more where you think that it is what the Israeli market needs, as long as you keep the basic level for all other immigrants.
127
Yet all that time the new rationale did not replace the old, and decision makers presented the various employment programs as both assisting veteran immigrants and encouraging potential immigrants to immigrate.
128
For example, when talking about entrepreneurship,
Director General Mirla Gal expressed both rationales simultaneously:
***
In the area of employment support, partial change in problem definition ideas turned the decision makers’ attention to new policy solutions such as assistance in employment prior to immigration and redirected existing policy tools to the new aims of immigration encouragement and increasing the number of returning residents. At the same time, since the change in problem definition ideas was partial, old ideas preserved old objectives of helping veteran immigrants participate in the labour market and old policy tools. As a result, new policy tools were added to the old ones, and the latter served both new and old policy aims. As the new problem definition ideas became salient, the new policy layer of assisting skilled immigrants and returning residents expanded while the old layer of assisting veteran immigrants stagnated and even eroded.
The aim is first of all to create an environment that encourages immigrants to open their own businesses because we believe that successful entrepreneurship provides a foundation for economic and social integration in the Israeli society. In addition, the Business IL Programme was aimed at preparing potential immigrants and returning residents for immigration or encouraging those who did not think about it – perhaps as a result of this programme they would immigrate or come back.
129
127 Interview with MOIA director, 28.05.2012.
128 Examples for this combination of old and new rationales are also evident in reports submitted to CIAD by several MOIA directors, 17.11.2009, where they rationalized the policy as both immigration encouragement and assistance to veteran immigrants, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/search.asp
129
Report of Mirla Gal, MOIA Director General, to CIAD, 21.06.2005, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/search.asp
72
Chapter 5: Displacement through Layering – Initial absorption
Introduction: settlement packages
Initial integration or ‘settlement packages’ are sets of social services or benefits aimed at assisting the immigrants in the first period after arrival. Two main dimensions can differentiate between the packages: degree of choice and the conditionality of the services offered. The first dimension refers to the level of discretion immigrants have over the manner in which they provide for their own needs. The main distinction here is between
‘in-kind’ and ‘in-cash’ benefits. In the former, the service itself is provided to the recipient.
In-kind benefits limit the recipient’s degree of choice while granting the provider broader discretion. The justification for in-kind services is usually higher efficiency and better protection for recipients unable to ensure that their own needs are properly met. In-cash services, on the other hand, are direct money transfers enabling recipients total discretion over spending them (Gal & Leshem, 2000).
The second, conditionality dimension refers to conditions which differentiate between those included and excluded from the services or benefits. Such conditions include, for example, means tests, participation in certain programmes, and labour market status. In most immigration countries settlement packages contain mostly conditional in-kind benefits and services (Gal & Leshem, 2000).
Policy changes
During the 1980’s most of the immigrants arriving were settled in ‘absorption centres’ that provided for their basic needs during the first period after arrival. In these centres, they received not only housing but also various in-kind services such as Hebrew classes, career counselling and cultural activities. During their stay, they were eligible for a conditional living allowance subject to their participation in Hebrew classes. In 1986 the government decided to shift to a ‘direct absorption’ policy.
130
The plan was to integrate the immigrants directly into Israeli society and allow them the freedom of choice in their integration
130 There are several reasons for this decision which are beyond the scope of this research. What is important in this context is that this decision was not a result of any crisis or large immigration wave, since it took place during a period of stability and low annual immigration. See Gal & Leshem (2000).
73
process;
131
specifically, the freedom to choose where to live, their specific rented apartment and the course of their integration process. MOIA’s role in this policy was mostly reactive: to address specific problems when asked to. This policy was put into practice in 1989 and from 1991 it became the main integration track (Doron & Kargar, 1993; Gal, 2008; Gal &
Leshem, 2000).
132
The major policy tool used in this policy was the 'absorption basket’, which provided incash benefits to facilitate economic integration during the first year after arrival. Initially the basket included several components made conditional on proof of expenditure, participation in Hebrew lessons or job seeking. This conditional system was replaced in mid-1990 by an unconditional grant paid to every immigrant family. The amount was a function only of family size, independently of the immigrants’ country of origin or economic status. Along with the absorption basket, each immigrant was entitled to other benefits, such as tax exemptions in the first years after arrival, educational assistance for children, Hebrew lessons and vocational training programs. These were also universal and the only criterion for eligibility was duration of Israeli residency (Gal, 2008; Gal and
Leshem, 2000). Thus Israeli policy shifted from partly conditional in-kind services to an unconditional in- cash benefits system or 'categorical universalism' Gal (2008), where all category members are entitled to some benefits regardless of their economic status. As a result, immigrants’ personal responsibility increased.
There were two relatively minor exceptions to this universal policy: immigrants from
Western countries who did not receive an absorption basket rather various tax exemptions and in-kind services and immigrants from Ethiopia who were absorbed through the old system of absorption centres. The latter received additional benefits, for example more assistance hours for school children and longer eligibility period for employment support, as well as more guidance than the other immigrants (Gal & Leshem, 2000).
The direct absorption policy created several problems. First, there were groups of immigrants who required more intense counselling and guidance (for example, single
131 Eliezer Leshem, (1986), Master Plan for Immigration Absorption, MOIA.
132 Almost all immigrants were integrated through this track expect for immigrants from Ethiopia who were settled in absorption centres.
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mothers and elderly). Second, many immigrants had difficulty planning their integration process upon arrival. For example, many did not take Hebrew classes because they wanted to find a job, while others used their eligibility for vocational training before deciding on their future occupation. Third, the shift from in-kind to in-cash benefits enabled constant erosion of the provided benefits, especially during periods of economic pressure (Doron &
Kargar, 1993; Gal & Leshem, 2000).
As a result of these problems, MOIA initiated several policy changes in 1993-1998. First, the government decided to provide additional assistance in housing and employment to weaker immigrants, such as the elderly, disabled or single parents.
133
Second, the entitlement period for Hebrew lessons and employment support was extended from three to five, and then to seven and eventually ten years after arrival. Moreover, in 2001 elderly immigrants became entitled to housing indefinitely.
134
Third, in 1994 the Absorption
Basket Law was passed, including a provision of annual update of the basket.
Material factors cannot by themselves explain these changes. First, at that time, Israel had a budget deficit due to the large number of immigrants arriving in a short period of time.
Thus, from an economic perspective it would have been more rational to shorten rather than extend the entitlement period. Second, the ministers of absorption in the relevant period – Yair Tzaban from 1992 and Yuli Edelstein from 1996 – were appointed following immigrants’ protests due to their dissatisfaction with integration policies.
135
Hence, from a political perspective the ministers should have made more radical changes, specifically increase government involvement in integration as the immigrants demanded. Third, there
133
MOIA, Regulation no. 4.063, Grants to immigrants in need, 02.05.1995, www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/Procedures/Documents/4063GrantsForTheNeedyOl im/GeneralRegulation14/40631.pdf and Prime Minister Office, Government Decision no. 1886, Entitlement criteria for public housing for immigrants, 09.09.1993, Prime Minister’s Office Archive.
134 Prime Minister’s Office, Government Decisions no. 3818, 3819, 166, Entitlement period for assistance in employment and entrepreneurship for immigrants, 28.05.1998, 17.05.2001, Government decision no. 4694,
Second chance for Hebrew studies, Government Decision no. 4695, Entitlement period for Hebrew studies,
07.01,1999, Government Decision no. 243, Entitlement period in housing, 07.01.2001, Prime Minister’s
Office Archive.
135 In 1992 immigrants from the Former Soviet Union elected Prime Minister Rabin as a result of their disappointment from the absorption policy of the 1988-1992 Likud government. In 1996 immigrants’ dissatisfaction was manifested to the election of an immigrant party, Is rael Beayliya, which gained seven sits in the Knesset out of 120, and MK Yuli Edelstein, veteran FSU immigrant, was appointed as the
Minister of Absorption
75
was no significant increase in the number of weak immigrants during this period which required policy changes.
136
Thus another explanatory factor is needed.
Until 2000 initial absorption was the main MOIA objective, as seen in its annual budget proposal. From 2000, due to the decrease in the number immigrants and growing integration problems of veteran immigrants, the focus shifted to long-term integration issues such as housing and employment.
137 In addition, the decrease in the number of immigrants (especially from the FSU – the largest source of immigrants since 1989), shifted government attention to immigrants from Western countries – the largest source of potential Jewish migration (Della Pergola, 2010). As a result, in 2002 these immigrants became eligible for the absorption basket as well.
138
At the same year, MOIA introduced a special integration programme for immigrants from Argentina, France and South Africa, which included additional assistance in housing, Hebrew and employment as well as an additional adaptation grant for immigrants from Argentina.
139
Although this programme was temporary (one year), it introduced a new logic of action: selective additional assistance to strong immigrants. Yet the dominant practice of laissez-faire policy did not change.
As part of efforts to increase the number of immigrants, Minister Tzipi Livni introduced the One-on-One Absorption Programme in 2004. This was a universal programme for all immigrants with up to three years of residency. Its aim was to increase immigrants’ satisfaction with their integration process and thus encourage more immigrants to come.
The programme changed the structure of MOIA’s service provision to a one-stop shop, i.e., the immigrants would be required to meet only one MOIA representative who would help them with all integration aspects. In addition, each immigrant would have a personal integration consultant who would prepare a personal integration programme with him/her.
Moreover, MOIA officials were supposed to become more proactive and contact each
136 Reports of Ministers of Absorption, Yair Tzaban and Yuli Edelstein, to CIAD, 15.05.1995, 25.11.1996,
27.10.1997, 20.10.1998, Knesset Archive.
137 MOF, MOIA Budget Proposal, MOF Archive.
138 Prime Minister’s Office, Government Decision no. 2658, 'Absorption basket' to immigrants from all countries, 03.11.2002, Prime Minister’s Office Archive
139 Prime Minister’s Office, Government Decision no.1225, Programme for encouraging immigration from
Argentina, France and South Africa, 06.01.2002, Prime Minister’s Office Archive.
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immigrant upon arrival.
140
This proactive policy contradicted the dominant logic of the direct absorption policy.
This change did not derive from technological changes, since computerized databases enabling these changes had been available since the end of the1990s. The decrease in the number of immigrants is also not a satisfactory explanation, since the significant decrease
(from 61,000 to 44,000) began earlier in 2001. Moreover, MOIA’s flexible budget 141 decreased from 1,400m NIS in 2003 to 939 in 2004 and 917 in 2005.
142 Thus, the programme was not the result of additional funding. Nor could it have been a result of political interests since the programme was introduced by Minister Tzipi Livni who left
MOIA even before it was implemented.
One-on-One was launched in June 2004; however, after less than a year only the one-stop shop element remained of the original programme. From 2005 the minister, director general and other MOIA directors stopped mentioning the programme in their reports to
CIAD. One reason for this was budget cuts, which prevented its implementation.
143
However, this explanation is insufficient, since the minister could have abolished the entire programme or make it selective towards weaker immigrants or apply it only to newly arriving immigrants during their first year of residence. None of these options was implemented.
Thus, although it seemed that the programme disappeared, its main principles of personal treatment and proactive integration were implemented selectively from 2005 for immigrants from Western countries arriving through the special immigration encouragement programs. These immigrants received additional in-kind services in education, Hebrew and employment, additional in-cash rent benefits paid subject to a rental
140 Report of Tzipi Livni, CIAD, 27.12.2004, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx
141 I.e., the budget which is not tied to the number of immigrants (the budget without the absorption basket payments).
142 MOF, Budget execution www.ag.mof.gov.il/AccountantGeneral/BudgetExecution/BudgetExecutionTopNav/BEHistoryDataHistory
/BEHistoryData/default.htm
143 Interview with MOIA director, 09.05.2012.
77
agreement, and a personal mentor. In addition, as part of the programme they were obligated to settle as a group in a city chosen from a list provided by MOIA.
144
These special immigration encouragement programs represented significant change: first, until 2005, only immigrants in distress were entitled to additional assistance, and any additional assistance provided to strong immigrants was rare and temporary. Second, the proactive policy and state intervention in choosing the place of residence contradicted the practice of minimal government involvement. Third, adding in-kind services and conditional benefits reduced the immigrants’ freedom of choice, which had been one of the main principles of direct absorption. Note that the number of immigrants participating in these programs was relatively small – about 3,000 immigrants out of ~19,000 a year.
145
In addition, there was some criticism by immigrant MKs that too many resources were invested in immigrants from the West.
146
Hence, the minister did not have any political interest in promoting these programs.
From 2005-2010 selective policy in which strong immigrants received additional assistance expanded: for example, support for children increased from 1,800 to 2,200 NIS per child. In vocational training, the assistance increased from 8,200 to 9,000 NIS.
147
Accordingly, the budget for group immigration programs increased from 19 million NIS in 2005 to 32 in 2010.
148
In addition, in 2010 the government decided that immigrants coming through the special programs would also receive an additional adjustment grant
144 MOIA, Regulation no. 243: Group Immigration 2004-2009, 10.05.2004, www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/Procedures/Documents/1001BasicAssistanceRegula tions/TemporaryOrder1/1001_243.pdf
145 Each group immigration programme had a limited number of participants, as can be seen in the regulations.
146 CIAD, 14.06.06, 31.01.07, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/Protocol_search.aspx
147 MOIA, Regulation no. 243: Group Immigration 2004-2009, 10.05.2004, www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/Procedures/Documents/1001BasicAssistanceRegula tions/TemporaryOrder1/1001_243.pdf and Regulation no. 305: Immigration 2010,
01.06.2010,www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/Procedures/Documents/1001BasicAssist anceRegulations/TemporaryOrder1/1001_305.pdf
148 MOF, Budget Execution data www.ag.mof.gov.il/AccountantGeneral/BudgetExecution/BudgetExecutionTopNav/BEHistoryDataHistory
/BEHistoryData/default.htm
78
conditional on their participation in Hebrew lessons.
149
At the same year, MOIA decided that in addition to the personal mentor, ministry officials should contact each immigrant personally a few days after their arrival, to find out what services and assistance they require.
150
In addition, as explained earlier in the immigration encouragement case, from 2005 the government supported organizations that encouraged immigration from Western countries.
One of the main criteria for government support was that the supported organization provide additional financial assistance to the immigrants whose immigration it encouraged.
151
This support increased in 2010 from 1000 to $1400 per immigrant.
152
The
2010 decisions on group immigration and support for private organizations were made by a minister from an immigrant party, whose main electorate were veteran immigrants, mostly from FSU. These immigrants still experienced difficulties in education and employment.
153
Thus, the minister had little political interest assisting potential and newly arrived immigrants from Western countries.
This new selective policy was added to the existing universal policy. As the new policy expanded, the old policy stagnated and even eroded. For example, the absorption basket was not updated between 2000-2010 (Gal, 2008), and as explained earlier employment assistance also decreased. As a result, at the end of the period one could identify a thin layer of universal assistance (the "absorption basket" and other benefits) and a thicker layer of selective additional assistance to skilled and weak immigrants. The selective policy reactivated past practices of conditional benefits, more government involvement and more in-kind services, which were always present in integration policy for immigrants from
Ethiopia. By the end of the examined period, these practices were adjusted to a new reality
149 MOIA, Regulation no. 305, Immigration 2010, 01.06.2010, www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/Procedures/Documents/1001BasicAssistanceRegula tions/TemporaryOrder1/1001_305.pdf
150 Interview with MOIA director, 31.05.2012.
151 The immigration encouragement process includes the actual immigration and the support the organization provides to the immigrant before and after immigration.
152 Prime Minister’s Office, Government decisions no. 4417, 2385, 1353, Support for immigration encouragement programs, 20.11.05, 23.09.07, 7.2.10, www.pmo.gov.il/secretary/govdecisions
153 See for example, CIAD meetings in 17.11.2009 (employment), 28.02.2011 (education), 19.07.2010
(housing), www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/search.asp
79
of strong immigrants from Western countries. Consequently, while at the universal level the old laissez-faire practices where still dominant, the expansion of the new policy layer gradually displaced the old practices. Hence, state responsibility on the universal level stagnated or even decreased, while its responsibility on the selective level increased.
Given all these changes, two questions remain unanswered: What can explain the direction of these changes? And why did the displacement occur only at the selective layer, leaving most of the immigrants out?
Ideational dynamics
The initial absorption policy was embedded in the public philosophy of state responsibility for integrating all immigrants. The power of this idea can be seen for example during the
1990s when due to the large number of immigrants from the FSU (500,000 between 1990-
1994), the government imposed an additional tax for a three- year period in order to finance the absorption basket. Nevertheless there was no significant opposition to this policy, mostly because the (Jewish) public strongly identified with it (Gal & Leshem, 2000).
Until 1986 immigrants were perceived by decision makers as incapable of managing their integration process. As a result, government involvement was seen as not only positive but necessary. The main idea behind the direct absorption policy was the opposite: greater freedom of choice and independence from the state.
154
The problem definition was excessive government involvement in the integration process.
The metaphors used by decision makers to rationalize the policy were ‘the immigrant is not a child’, and does not need ‘big brother’ to tell him/her what to do. The causal logic was that immigrant satisfaction would increase if government involvement decreased. The policy solution ideas were aimed at increasing the immigrants’ freedom of choice (for example, reactive policy and in-cash benefits). One of the decision makers called this policy ‘integration through the airport ATM’.
155 In addition, at the beginning of the examined period all immigrants (regardless of their occupation) were seen as beneficial for
154 Eliezer Leshem, (1986), Master Plan for Immigration Absorption, MOIA.
155 Interviews with the Direct Absorption policy makers, 9.9.2009, 25.08.2010, 27.06.2010, 08.10.2010,
08.07.2010, 26.09.2010 and CIAD, 23.05.1989, 06.02.1989, 27.02.1989, Knesset Archive.
80
the Israeli economy. However, the benefits could be realized only in the long run, as indicated by the metaphor of ‘cultivating fruits’.
156
The direct absorption policy was influenced by global ideas of the New Right emphasizing the importance of the free market, individual freedom and limited state role (Doron &
Kargar, 1993). These neo-liberal ideas led to the introduction of in-cash universal benefits
(the absorption basket) (Gal & Leshem, 2000), alongside the in-kind benefits associated with Zionist ideology.
Beside these ideas, there was also a more marginal idea that government involvement was beneficial for certain immigrant groups who could not make it on their own.
157
This idea was applied mostly to immigrants from Third World countries such as Ethiopia.
The idea of minimal involvement started to erode in 1992 as integration problems increased. There was growing criticism by MKs and immigrant organizations that minimum involvement was leading to disaster, since many immigrants could not take manage immediately upon arrival. However, the decision makers did not suggest abandoning the approach entirely, but rather expanding the idea of proactive government involvement to other groups of weak immigrants.
158
Minister Tzaban, for example, said:
I am not sure that the universal direct absorption model was right. In fact, I have serious doubts. I am certain we will find out that it was right for the majority of immigrants, however for some groups it was a terrible mistake.
159
Because the new ideas implied, inter alia , an increase in MOIA’s work during periods of great immigration, we may assume MOIA decision makers would not have expressed these ideas unless they really believed in them.
156 Report of Michael Bruno, Bank of Israel Governor, to CIAD, 25.06.1991, Knesset Archive.
157 Interviews with MOIA directors, 25.08.2010, 10.08.2010, 21.09.2010, Ministry of Finance, 03.08.2010 and Ministry of Housing and Construction, 29.08.2010.
158 Reports of Minister of Absorption, Yair Tzaban, to CIAD, 3.5.93, 11.10.93, 15.05.95, Knesset Archive.
159 Report of Minister Yair Tzaban, to the Committee of Finance, 10.12.1992. Knesset Archive.
81
As integration problems increased another problem definition was added: immigrants’ bounded rationality in the first period after arrival.
160
This led to policy solution ideas aiming at extending the entitlement period.
161
Until 2004 the dominant ideas behind direct absorption were questioned mostly regarding weak immigrants. From the mid-2000s due to decrease in the number of immigrants, different motives (choice and not distress immigrants) and global immigration policy changes – specifically the ‘race for talent’ – decision makers began questioning these ideas regarding strong immigrants as well. The immigrants were seen as clients, the problem definition was immigrants leaving Israel, and the aim of integration was to increase their satisfaction in order to prevent them from leaving. Unlike the past, however, the causal logic was that immigrants’ satisfaction would increase with greater government involvement. The policy solution ideas were personal treatment, guidance and a more proactive approach. For example:
The new integration conception is that you need to be more proactive, to wrap the immigrant. What is important is not the technical aspect but rather the psychological ones, personal treatment and support.
162
However, because the new ideas were aimed at skilled immigrants, they led to questioning the existing direct absorption approach, i.e. the problem definition of government involvement, only towards high skilled immigrants. For example, although decision makers mentioned that MOIA could provide personal treatment to all immigrants due to the decrease in their numbers, the actual need to change the policy was emphasized only with reference to strong immigrants.
163
For example:
Today the immigrants have alternatives. It is not like in the past when Jews came to Israel… today there is also ‘head hunting’ in the world. If you are a good physician you can practice medicine in Canada or in Australia – everyone needs
160 For example, correspondence between Minister of Absorption, Yair Tzaban, and Minister of Finance,
Abraham Shohat, on extending the entitlement period for various services, 23.10.94, Government Archive.
161 Note that while the idea to extend the entitlement period was raised in 1994, it was only implemented in
1998.
162 Interview with MOIA director, 28.05.2012
163 Interviews with MOIA directors, 09.05.2012, 28.05.2012, and 31.05.2012.
82
doctors… Thus if you want to bring immigrants you have to make them feel at home and provide the economic conditions needed.
164
Consequently, a new logic of action was introduced: selective policy tools to skilled immigrants, based on ‘race for talent’ ideas:
The main policy change was that the government decided to focus on strong immigrants from Western countries who can contribute to the country .You must remember that it is a global world today and the immigrants do not have to come to Israel, they have a choice.
165
Yet the selective and proactive policy solution ideas were not new and the decision makers were familiar with them either from integration policy to immigrants from Ethiopia or from the indirect absorption before 1989.
We use policy tools similar to the tools which were before the direct absorption when MOIA workers met the immigrants at the airport and literally gave them a key to their new house. Today we are coming back to it.
166
Although decision makers believed that immigrants’ rationality at the first period after arrival was bounded, their freedom of choice was not reduced because it was one of the main policy aims. However, once the main policy aim became contribution to economic growth, the problem definition changed from immigrants’ dependence on the government to failing to maximize their economic potential. Consequently, cost-benefit logic was introduced:
I come to the treasury and I tell them: If I invest in these immigrants [who come through the special programmes] it is a totally economic issue – if I invest in them
I reduce the time it takes them to move from taking from the state to giving to the
164 Interview with MOIA director, 28.05.2012.
165 Interview with MOIA director, 09.05.2012.
166 Interview with MOIA director, 09.05.2012.
83
state. Instead of being on welfare I make the immigrant pay taxes as soon as possible….
167
The metaphors changed from ‘fruits’, which require a long-term investment, to bonds and assets – from which the returns are quicker.
168 Correspondingly, the policy solution ideas were aimed at assisting the immigrant to integrate quickly and not at increasing freedom of choice. This is evidenced among other things by the fact that as opposed to the beginning of the examined period, from the mid-2000s freedom of choice is not mentioned in MOIA official statements on new integration programs. Correspondingly, when the main problem definition became failing to maximize immigrants’ potential, it was seen as more legitimate for the government to intervene more heavily in integration.
Thus, as opposed to the beginning of the examined period when many decision makers criticized conditional benefits, no one opposed them now.
***
At the end of the examined period policy solution ideas with new selective logic of action were added to existing universal policy ideas. Some of these new ideas were modifications of previously neglected ideas of government involvement. Since the modified ideas became dominant only at the selective policy layer, they turned actors’ attention to the renewed practices only at this level. Consequently, while there was ideational change in the ideas behind integration policy towards weak and strong immigrants, the ideas behind the policy concerning most immigrants did not change.
167 Interview with MOIA director, 31.05.2012.
168 Interview with MOIA director, 27.07.2010.
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Chapter 6: Drift - KAMEA: Absorption of immigrant scientists
Policy change
MOIA’s Centre for Absorption in Science (hereinafter, the centre ) is in charge of assisting the integration of immigrant scientists in the private and public sector. It was established in 1973 in order to fulfil immigrant scientists’ potential and prevent them from emigrating and in that contribute to Israel’s economic growth. The centre runs several assistance programmes all aimed at finding an appropriate placement for the scientists, usually by short-term subsidy of the vacancy. From its establishment in 1973 the centre and its programmes enjoyed strong and broad-based political support.
169
This analysis will focus on the centre’s main programme for absorption of outstanding immigrant scientists in the public sector ( Klitat Madanim Olim , better known and referred to hereinafter in its acronym form, KAMEA ).
At the beginning of the examined period the centre subsidized three years’ employment in the public and private sector for all immigrants recognized as scientists by the ministry.
170
From 1989-2009 more than 15,000 scientists immigrated to Israel. Most arrived during the first five years of the massive immigration wave. As large numbers of scientists arrived in a relatively short time, MOIA decided to extend the subsidy for 300 outstanding scientists employed in the public sector (mostly universities) for another three years.
171
However, as time passed decision makers realized that the universities would not integrate these scientists in the regular tenure track.
172
Immigrant scientists were perceived by the public and the decision makers as the elite and leaders of immigrants from the FSU. They were also a powerful interest group.
Consequently, MOIA was under intense public and political pressure by immigrants, scientists, NGOs and politicians to find a long-term solution for scientists’ integration. For
169 Omri Ingber, (2010), The integration of immigrant scientists from the 1990s and the 2000s in Israel,
MOIA, www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/Statistics/Pages/ScienceData.aspx and interviews with MOIA directors, 25.04.2012, 30.10.2010, 26.09.2010.
170
See www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/Subjects/ResearchAndScience/Pages/ScientistDefinition.aspx for eligibility criteria.
171 CIAD, 12.12.1994, 27.02.1996, 07.03.1996, Knesset archive.
172 This was due, among other things, to the universities’ financial crisis and the immigrant scientists’ inability to teach in Hebrew – reasons that are beyond the present scope.
85
example, in 1995 Minister of Absorption, Yair Tzaban, sent a letter to Minister of Finance,
Abraham Shohat:
Today there is going to be a protest of immigrant and non-immigrant scientists in
Tel Aviv against the budget cuts in the Gilady [three-year subsidy] Programme. We must find a way to solve this problem immediately, or else the damage will be severe.
173
As a result of this pressure, in 1997 the government decided to extend its assistance to 500 outstanding scientists by subsidizing most of their employment in the public sector until retirement. This programme was called KAMEA ,
174
and was designed to insure that the best and the brightest would be able to practice science even when they could not compete with veteran Israelis for university positions.
175
From its establishment, MOF objected to KAMEA, because it believed that long-term assistance reduced universities’ responsibility for integrating the scientists and expanded the universities beyond their optimal size.
176
It also believed that after six years of assistance (three years for all scientists and another three for outstanding scientists) the best scientists would certainly be able to integrate on their own.
177
Nonetheless, the programme enjoyed strong support by a coalition composed of the heads of the universities, MKs from the immigrant party Israel Bealiya and other parties, as well as the immigrant scientists themselves. This coalition not only pushed for launching KAMEA – despite MOF’s and also Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s objection – but also made sure that it would continue.
178
Thus, it created significant barrier to policy change.
173 Letter from Minister of Absorption, Yair Tzaban to the Minister of Finance, Abraham Shohat, “Budget cuts in Gilady Program”, 24.02.1996, Government archive.
174 KAMEA was initiated by Minister Tzaban who obtained Prime Minister Shimon Peres’s support.
However, because of MOF’s objection Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu abolished the programme right after the 1996 election. The program was finally launched subsequently thanks to massive political pressure.
175 Prime Minister’s Office, Government decision no. 2241: Immigrant Scientists Absorption Program,
27.06.1997, Prime Minister’s Office archive.
176 CIAD, 27.02.1996, 09.01.1996, Knesset archive.
177 Interviews with MOF directors, 02.09.2010, 18.10.2010, interviews with MOIA directors, 17.11.2010,
31.10.201, CIAD, 27.02.1996, 09.01.1996, 07.03.1996, 04.06.1997, Knesset archive.
178 See for example the parliamentary coalition agreement in 1996, where KAMEA appeared as one of the clauses, www.knesset.gov.il/docs/heb/coalition.htm, CIAD 04.06.1997, 31.01.1998, Knesset archive.
86
Besides the 1997 government decision, the programme was based on strict regulations that determined the eligibility and the procedure for recruiting the scientists. In addition, the scientists’ employment was based on contracts between MOIA and the universities renewed every three years. Consequently, most cost commitments were multi-annual,
179 allowing little year-on-year flexibility. Nonetheless, despite the centre’s long-term contracts with the universities, the budget remained annual and they were budgeted anew each year, and so MOF had discretion power over the program’s financial resources.
KAMEA was designed as a revolving-door programme, such that with each scientist retiring another entered. However, from 1995 the number of immigrant scientists decreased from 1.4% of annual immigrants to less than 0.5%. Their profile also changed: in 1995 more than 50% had a PhD; from 1996, this percentage dropped and at the end of the examined period was less than 30%. Consequently, from 2007 the number of scientists entering the programme was lower than the number of scientists retiring. Moreover, the average age of scientists entering KAMEA in 1998 was 35-45. Since the number of retirees increased while the number of entrants decreased, the programme was in danger of closing.
180
Nonetheless, KAMEA regulations and target population did not change and it continued to be the centre’s main programme (more than 78% percent of its budget).
181
The decision makers were aware of the gap between KAMEA and the changing reality.
This is evident in reports by the centre’s director Omri Ingber to the Knesset committees and in his 2010 summary report.
182
Moreover, the centre had alternatives to close this gap.
For example, when asked by a CST member how to adapt the programme to the changing reality, Ingber explained that there was a future plan to expand it by allowing universities
179 MOIA, Regulation no. 163: Absorption of Immigrant Scientists – KAMEA, 01.04.1998, www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/Procedures/Documents/7131ScienceAbsorptionCen ter/TemporaryOrder5/7131_163.pdf.
180 Omri Ingber (2010), The integration of immigrant scientists from the 1990s and the 2000s in Israel, www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/Statistics/Pages/ScienceData.aspx. See also report of
Omri Ingber, Director of Centre for Absorption of Immigrant Scientists, to CST, 10.11.2004, 10.09.2009, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx.
181
MOF, Budget execution data, www.ag.mof.gov.il/AccountantGeneral/BudgetExecution/BudgetExecutionTopNav/BEHistoryDataHistory
/BEHistoryData/default.htm
182
See for example ref. 178 www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx
as well as CIAD 10.09.2009,
87
to recruit not only scientists already living in Israel, but also scientists from abroad.
183
Another suggestion was to reduce KAMEA’s size and maintain a smaller programme that would serve as a last resort for outstanding scientists unable integrating on their own in the universities.
184
However, no attempt was made to follow up on these suggestions. From
2002, Ingber, the minister and KAMEA’s supporting coalition were preoccupied with
KAMEA’s survival in its original form. The reason for that was the underfunding crisis.
In 2002, as part of a cross-ministerial budget cut, KAMEA’s annual budget was cut from
97 to 83 million NIS.
185 Consequently, from 2002 each fiscal year’s costs were underfunded. After intense political pressure, including several urgent meetings in the
Knesset, personal intervention by the Minister of Absorption and sometimes even the
Prime Minister, the lacking budget was refunded.
186
This underfunding created uncertainty and a constant sense of crisis. University representatives as well as immigrant scientists and MKs used words such as crisis, danger and fear to describe the year-on-year situation.
They argued that each year scientists and the universities feared that KAMEA scientists would lose their job. One MK even said that although MOF did not ‘kill’ the programme it certainly ‘tortured’ its participants.
187
In 2001-2009 there were eight meetings at the
CIAD and CST to discuss the issue. These meetings were all convened in November and
December, when the budget bill was discussed in the Knesset. During this period KAMEA and its funding was one of the mains issues on CIAD’s agenda. Even when CIAD was supposed to discuss other issues, it decided to focus specifically on the underfunding issue.
188
The underfunding crisis made the decision makers and support coalition focus entirely on KAMEA’s maintenance. Consequently, the gap between KAMEA and reality remained.
183 CST, 10.11.2004, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx
184 Interview with MOIA director, 25.04.2012.
185 MOF, MOIA Budget Proposal 2002, www.mof.gov.il/budgetsite/statebudget/Pages/Fbudget.aspx
186 CIAD, 27.12.2004, 09.02.2004, 29.05.2002, 31.12.2001, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx.
187 Expressions used by CIAD Chair, MK Kolet Avital ,27.12.2004, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx.
188 See for example the reaction of MK Marina Solodkin at the CIAD meeting on the contribution of immigrant scientists, 09.02.2004, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx
88
In 2010 the government decided to launch the KAMEA Second-Generation Programme.
The new programme was rationalized by the need to adapt the centre’s assistance to the new reality: the centre would subsidize university employment for five years. After five years, the universities would either hire the scientists in a regular tenure track or let them go. The entitlement was restricted to scientists who did not receive any assistance from the centre. Thus, the target population of the new programme are mostly potential immigrant scientists or newly arrived immigrants (rather than veteran scientist as before). As for the old KAMEA, the government decided to put an end to the constant underfunding by reallocating the missing budget on a permanent basis. However, it was also decided that no new candidates would enter the program, so that it would gradually close as the scientists retired.
189
The neglect that led to KAMEA’s decay was deliberate. However, the programme was put to death not by actively blocking any attempt to adapt the institution to the changing environment (as in other examples of policy drift), but by turning the actors’ attention away from the need to adapt the policy by creating a constant crisis and feeling of uncertainty due to underfunding. This process was deliberate because throughout the period, at the beginning of each fiscal year, MOF knew that the crisis is temporary and eventually the budget gap would be closed. For example, in a CIAD meeting in 2004, a MOF representative said:
This [underfunding] problem had been solved every year and it would be solved this year as well, this is not a real budget cut… 190
One of the Ministers of Absorption even referred to it as a budget ‘goat’,
191
i.e. a clause deliberately introduced order to have some slack during negotiations. Hence, MOF used the underfunding in order to pressure the minister to close KAMEA or prevent its
189 Prime Minister’s Office, Government decision no. 2048: Immigrant Scientists Absorption Program,
15.07,2010, www.pmo.gov.il/Secretary/GovDecisions/Pages/default.aspx and also MOIA and the Council for Higher Education, “Call for opening a second-generation program for absorption of immigrant scientists
(KAMEA) in public higher education institutions”, 22.05.2009, MOIA Archive.
190 Report of Sagi Balasha from MOF to CIAD, 27.12.2004, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx.
191 CST 22.12.2009, 10.09.2009, 22.12.2004, 09.02.2004, CIAD, 27.12.2004, 09.05.2002 and interview with
MOIA director, 26.09.2010, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx.
89
updating.
192
This strategy turned out to be successful. Despite the available alternatives for updating the program, the centre’s director argued that these should be discussed only after the underfunding crisis would end.
193
Moreover, the constant crisis not only prevented the updates but also eroded the minister’s and the supporting coalition’s willingness to oppose
MOF’s attempts to close KAMEA. This is evidenced by the fact that despite the severe pressure to maintain KAMEA during the examined period, at the end of the period examined not even one committee meeting was dedicated to discuss Second-Generation
KAMEA and its consequences. Consequently, as the gap between the policy and reality kept growing and the supporters’ power weakened, KAMEA drifted and decayed.
KAMEA’s drift is puzzling. During the entire period, all the parties in the supporting coalition had a vested interest in maintaining it. The universities wanted MOIA to subsidize the scientists without fully integrating them in their academic staff. The MKs wanted the scientists’ political support, and MOIA wanted to maintain the programme because of its relatively generous funding and prestige. In addition, all parties knew that the crisis was temporary. Nevertheless, they did not try to adapt it to the changing reality. The crisis blinded them and did not generate change. An ideational analysis can provide an answer for this puzzle.
Ideational dynamics
From its introduction KAMEA’s logic of action differed from other MOIA assistance programs. It was designed as a selective program, and its logic of action was providing more resources to fewer people. Two problem definitions guided the decision makers initiating KAMEA: first, the inability of Israeli universities to integrate the scientists in the regular tenure track; and second, that immigrant scientists could not compete with their
Israeli colleagues because they were not familiar with the Israeli scientific culture, and had trouble teaching Israeli students. In addition, it was believed that if immigrant scientists did not integrate properly they would emigrate; conversely, it was also believed that if the
192 Interviews with MOIA directors, 25.04.2012, 28.05.2012 and MOF director, 02.09.2010.
193 Report of Omri Ingber, director of Centre for Integration in Science, to CST, 27.12.2004, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx
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scientists found their place in Israeli academia this would promote further immigration.
194
Thus ‘the race for talent’ ideas had guided this policy even before they influenced other fields. Since KAMEA was built on a logic of action which was more similar to the selective logic guiding current assistance programs, it is not surprising to see that the ideas behind the programme did not change during the examined period, but were rather reinforced.
From its introduction, KAMEA was more than just another policy tool: it was a symbol for
Israel’s investment in immigrants and for their important place in Israel’s agenda.
195 As a noun, “KAMEA” in Hebrew means “talisman”, or “good luck charm”. For example, when a discussion on long-term integration programs for immigrant scientist started, Minister
Tzaban said:
There is no need for all scientists to integrate in the universities, but those 200-300 excellent scientist, if they lose their job it will be a loss, because these scientists are the display window for the whole immigration. It will hurt the immigration prestige if those scientists, that everyone agrees can contribute to the country, do not integrate.
196
This symbolic position intensified as the underfunding crisis began. KAMEA became a synecdoche. It was portrayed as a solution not only to the problem of immigrant scientists having trouble finding proper job (most of them not in KAMEA and neither in the public sector),
197
but also as a solution for all immigrant integration problems in the labour market.
It was called a ‘national programme’, ‘display window’ or a ‘flagship’ of the entire integration process.
198
When asked why is it so important to maintain KAMEA, a MOIA director answered that this programme signals potential high-skilled immigrants that Israel
194 Omri Ingber, (2010), The integration of immigrant scientists from the 1990s and the 2000s in Israel,
MOIA, www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/Statistics/Pages/ScienceData.aspx, CIAD,
27.02.1996, Knesset archive, Prime Minister’s Office, Government Decision no. 2241: Immigrant Scientists
Absorption Program, 27.06.1997, Prime Minister’s Office Archive, CIAD, 13.01.1998, Knesset archive.
195 See for example CIAD, 13.01.1998, 04.11.1996, 04.06.1997, Knesset archive.
196 Report of Minister of Absorption, Yair Tzaban, to the Committee of Finance, 24.11.1994, Knesset archive.
197 Omri Ingber, (2010), The integration of immigrant scientists from the 1990s and the 2000s in Israel,
MOIA, www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/InformationAndAdvertising/Statistics/Pages/ScienceData.aspx
198 Interview with MOIA director, 25.04.2012 and CST, 10.09.2009, 22.12.2009.
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wants them and that MOIA believes that “If scientists cannot find their place in Israel no one can find their place.”
199
Moreover, decision makers and the supporting coalition gave the impression that solving the problem of KAMEA’s constant underfunding would solve the problem of Israel’s attractiveness in the ‘race’. For example, in one of the meetings on the 2002 budget cuts,
Prof. Gilady, one of the initiators of KAMEA, said:
What is worse is that [the underfunding] will cause future damage. We are talking about immigration from France, Argentina and South Africa. If you tell them that this programme is closing down they will have nothing to come for.
200
This reasoning continued until almost the end of the examined period. For example, in
2009 MOIA Director General said:
KAMEA’s benefits go beyond the integration of the scientists taking part in the program. It also affects immigration encouragement. Thus, this problem is not only about funding but it is a strategic problem.
201
Making KAMEA a synecdoche made it more resilient to change and contributed to the policy solution ideas’ reinforcement. In addition, while the reality changed, the decision makers continued to justify the programme using problem definition ideas relevant to the beginning of the massive immigration wave in the early 1990s. They did not address the need for KAMEA given the changing reality, and no one questioned its importance.
For example, in 2004 Prof. Gilady explained why the government should continue subsidizing the program:
There were those who claimed that if the scientists are that good you should let the market integrate them. However, we argued that although they are indeed
199 Interview with director at the Ministry of Absorption, 17.11.2010.
200 CIAD, 31.12.2001, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx
201
Report of Dimitry Apartzev, Director General, to CST, 22.12.2009, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx
92
excellent scientists, the market is too small; it can handle 20, 30 people a year but not the thousands [scientists] we are talking about.
202
In his arguments, Gilady ignored the changing reality, where the number of scientists who could apply for KAMEA was several dozens a year rather than thousands. Even if Gilady and others used this reasoning only to persuade the public and the decision makers, it still demonstrates their inattention to the need to adapt the programme to the changing environment, and in that to protect their interests.
***
Despite the powerful supporting coalition and direct political interests of all the parties involved, MOF managed to close KAMEA down. Its discretion over KAMEA’s budget enabled it to perpetuate a sense of crisis, which prevented ideational change. Under the crisis, KAMEA became a synecdoche reinforcing existing policy solution ideas and making problem definition stagnate. This prevented any questioning of the existing approach, turned decision makers’ attention away from the need to adapt the programme to the changing reality and enabled the drift.
202
Report of Prof. Gilady, to CIAD, 27.12.2004, www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/heb/protocol_search.aspx
93
Chapter 7: Immigration and Integration Policies in Canada,
Sweden and the Netherlands
Introduction
This chapter examines the findings on the role of ideational dynamics and changes in state responsibility in immigration and integration policies in the Israeli case in the context of three other immigration countries: Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands. The description is illustrative and is not intended to establish causality.
Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands are immigrant-receiving countries. They were the first to design and implement direct immigrant integration policies (Hammar, 1985). In addition, at the beginning of the examined period immigration issues in all three countries were mostly technocratic, and not politically controversial. Furthermore, the three are dealing with similar problems: high levels of immigrant unemployment and the effort to remain among the leading economies in the Western world. Besides these similarities, the three differ in five key aspects. First, in each country there is a different dominant group of immigrants in terms of its socioeconomic makeup: skilled professionals in Canada, labour migrants in the Netherlands and refugees and asylum seekers in Sweden. Second, whereas
Canada is a ‘classic immigration country’ which encourages immigrants to settle permanently, Sweden and the Netherlands are ‘ad-hoc immigration countries’ (Castles &
Miller, 2009). Third, Sweden and Canada did not develop a guest-worker system after the
Second World War, whereas the Netherlands did, differentially affecting the relations of the receiving society to immigrants. Fourth, the three welfare states are of distinctly different types: liberal (Canada), social-democratic (Sweden) and corporatist (the
Netherlands) (Esping-Andersen, 1990), affecting the ideas that guide immigration and integration policies. Finally, Sweden and the Netherlands are both EU countries, and thus take part in the EU effort to coordinate integration and immigration policies; Canada on the other hand, largely designs its own policy.
At the beginning of this research process, these characteristics had motivated me to choose the three countries as cases for comparison with Israel. However, with time I have realized that while in Israel the policy changes were gradual transformative, in the other countries
94
they were abrupt or incremental. Thus, despite the similarities in policy direction and content as demonstrated below, the policy dynamics differs. Consequently, this chapter examines only the influence of ideas on the rate of change (incremental or abrupt) and on its direction, but cannot reinforce our confidence in the findings on the combinations and modes of gradual transformative change found in Israel.
Methodology
The analysis is based on the following documents: (1) annual budgets; (2) laws; (3) regulations; (4) press releases of immigration ministries; (5) public speeches of immigration and integration ministers; (6) investigation committee reports; (7) official websites; (8) official information provided to immigrants (9); statistical data; (10) ministry work plans; (11) OECD reports; (12) immigrant integration index reports (MIPEX; www.mipex.eu
); (13) programme evaluation reports; and (14) the research literature on immigration and integration policies in the three countries.
203
The immigration and integration budget in each country was analysed from three perspectives: (1) real change in the various programs (indexed to the CPI of each country);
(2) Relative change in the budget as a share of the total budget or of specific programme budgets; (3) Change per immigrant: the change in the total immigration and integration budget and specific clauses in the budget compared to the annual number of immigrants.
The last analysis is only a proxy, because some of the services provided to the immigrants are budgeted on a multiannual basis.
204
A decrease in state responsibility was indicated by a decision to transfer the regulation, financing or production of integration or immigration services from the state to private organizations, or to the immigrants themselves. An increase in state responsibility was indicated by a decision to increase (financial and/or regulatory) involvement, as evidenced by government decisions, official declarations and national budgets. A change was
203 Because of language barrier, there were more documents on Canadian policy than on the other countries.
In order to overcome this barrier the Swedish and the Dutch cases were based more on the research literature as well as on consultations with leading scholars in the field.
204 The Netherland’s budget underwent multiple changes during the examined period. The ministry in change was changed twice and so were the budget clauses and target population. Moreover, in the last couple of years a significant part of it was spent outside the country. Thus, I had difficulty tracing the changes, and in particular found it virtually impossible to analyse budget change per immigrant.
95
considered abrupt when the shift in state responsibility took place in one or two steps. A change was considered incremental when the change in state responsibility took place in a few stages during the examined period. When there was no significant change in the status quo, it was regarded as policy continuity.
Ideas and ideational change were identified using qualitative content analysis focusing on the reasoning provided by the decision makers in the various documents (Jacobs, 2009), and based on secondary analysis of the literature on immigration and integration policies.
Ideational change was considered in one of two cases: first, when there was a change in the reasoning behind the policy, and/or the problem definition, the guiding principles or the policy tools considered appropriate for solving the problem; second, when new ideas were introduced in the policy sphere, originating mostly from other policies or countries.
205
In each country several components were examined: (1) the policy at the beginning of the examined period; (2) ideas about policy tools, policy problem definitions and public philosophies at the beginning of the examined period; (3) ideational change and stability at all three levels of generality of ideas; and (4) policy change and stability in immigration and integration policies. The latter included changes in the allocated budget; government regulation; service provision; division of labour between the national and the local level, and between the state, the private market and the immigrant; policy goals; and the nature of state intervention (for example, from mandatory to proactive).
205 The ideational analysis is based mostly on public discourse. As such, its inferential power is limited and suggestive rather than enabling to establish a causal path between ideas and policy. In order to establish causality in future research more private discourse material is required.
96
Canada
Setting and general information
Canada is an immigration country which encourages immigrants to permanently settle in it. The number of immigrants arriving each year is determined by the government at the beginning of each year. In 1990-2010 the annual number of immigrants ranged from
200,000-250,000. In 2010, 280,000 people immigrated to Canada.
206
The Canadian government classifies immigrants in four categories: (1) Economic immigrants including entrepreneurs, skilled professionals and investors; (2) Family reunion immigrants – spouses, children and second-degree relatives of citizens or permanent residents; (3)
Refugees; and (4) Temporary migrants: foreign students, temporary workers, tourists and temporary refugees. Through the years, the number of economic immigrants increased and the number of family reunion immigrants decreased (see Figure 2). In 2010 more than 60% of the total immigrants each year were economic while only 20% were family reunion (see
Figure 3). In the temporary category there was significant increase in the number from 112,
000 in 1990 to 192,000 in 2008, followed by a decrease due to the economic crisis, to
182,000 in 2010 (see Figure 2). Most immigrants in this category are temporary workers, mostly low-skilled. At the beginning of the examined period the ratio between the number of permanent and temporary migrants was 1.9, and in 2008 it decreased to 1.28. Moreover, from 2006 the annual number of temporary immigrants has been is higher than economic immigrants.
207
Canada can select only economic immigrants because refugees enter the country based on international agreements and family reunion immigrants arrive if they have a family member who can act as their ‘sponsor’, i.e. subsidize their living expenses during the first period after arrival. Economic immigrants, on the other hand, enter the country based on the Point System, a selective system whereby each immigrant must earn a minimum number of points based on occupation, work experience, language proficiency, education
206 This number does not include temporary residents such as students and labour migrants on which I will elaborate later.
207
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Canada Facts and Figures: Immigration overview: Permanent and temporary residents, 1992-2010, www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/menu-fact.asp
97
200
150
100
50
0 etc. The weighting of points and the minimum threshold can be changed in order to meet current economic or labour market needs (Adelman et al., 1994).
Immigrant integration services (called settlement policy) were introduced in the 1950’s.
From 1994 the authority in charge of immigration and integration issues has been
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (hereinafter, CIC ). Its policy making is based on the
1970 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. It includes three main programmes: (1)
Language; (2) Settlement programs: orientation, consultation, information provision and employment support; and (3) Guidance. All these services are contracted out by the provinces or the federal government to private organizations (both non- and for-profit).
The funding for language programs is federal but the funding for the other services is a combination of federal, provincial and private funding (Adelman et al., 1994; Richmond
& Shields, 2005; Schmidt, 2007).
Figure 2: Canada: Annual number of immigrants by category
208
250
Family reunion
Economic
Refugees
Temporary migrants
208
CIC, Canada Facts and Figures: Immigration overview: Permanent and temporary residents, 1990-2010, www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/menu-fact.asp
98
Figure 3: Percentage of permanent immigrants in Canada by category
209
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Refugees
Economic
Family reunion
Canadian policies are guided by several public philosophies:
210
(1) Mosaic : Canadians view their society as a mosaic that gives various ethnic groups the right to maintain and develop their culture.
(2) Community: Each person is viewed not only as an individual but as part of a family or community. The state is responsible to strengthen and maintain the communities and at the same time allow them to develop autonomously.
(3) Positive government involvement : Government involvement is perceived as positive and necessary to address the various challenges facing Canadian citizens.
However, it is believed that provinces have the right for autonomy the same as communities. Moreover, local authorities know better than the federal government what their needs and preferences are. As a result, Canada is one of the most defused countries in the Western world.
Immigration is perceived as part of the unique Canadian identity. From Canada’s establishment as an independent state, it has been viewed as a tool for nation building both demographically and economically. Thus immigration is seen as beneficial not only for the immigrants themselves but also for the entire nation (Reitz, 2004). Despite the large
209 Ibid, Ibid.
210 The account of Canada’s public philosophies is based on Lipset (1990).
99
number of immigrants, immigration is not a politically polarized issue and its priority on the public and political agenda is relatively low. This is because the main issue on the agenda is the relationship between the Anglophone and Francophone communities and the issue of multiculturalism (Adelman et al., 1994). Three main principles guide the Canadian immigration and integration policies: 211
(1) Contribution: The main aim of the immigration policy is to select those immigrants who can contribute to Canadian economy.
212 Canada’s economic objectives can be divided into the long-term objectives of changing the workforce composition and dealing with the problem of aging society, and short-term objectives – meeting specific demands in the labour market (Green & Green, 1999; Troper, 1993).
(2) Responsibility and independence: Canadian policy emphasizes self-reliance and independence from the state. This is evidenced among other things in the terms used for each immigrant group. While most immigrant groups are defined by the reason entitling them to settle (refugees, family reunion and temporary labour), high-skilled immigrants are defined by government’s expectations: to be independent and contribute to the economy. Correspondingly, the responsibility for integration lies with the immigrants and their communities, and state responsibility is relevant only before immigration (during the selection process).
(3) Reciprocity between (1) the receiving society and the immigrants in the integration process; (2) the federal government and the provinces, where the federal government funds the services and the provinces provide them; and (3) provinces and private agencies, mostly immigrant community organizations.
While in immigration policy towards permanent immigrants all three ideas were found, in immigration policy towards temporary labour migrants only the contribution idea was found. Thus this area will be discussed separately.
211 The account of ideas behind the integration policy is based on the research literature as well as policy documents, mostly Reports on Plans and Priorities www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/rpp/index.asp
and Annual Report to Parliament on
Immigration, www.cic.gc.ca/english/about_us/reports.asp
212 This is true only for economic immigrants. Refugees are seen as entering Canada because it is a
‘compassionate nation’.
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Ideational and policy changes
One of the main issues on decision makers’ agenda at the beginning of the examined period was immigrants’ participation in the labour market. Many immigrants were underemployed and their wages were lower than veteran Canadians’. Consequently, their contribution to the economy was lower than expected. The problem definition was that because of the current point system the immigrants coming to Canada did not fit the labour market. Thus the policy solution ideas were to change the point system so that the immigrants coming would be better able to integrate in the labour market. This causal reasoning did not change during the entire period. As a result, decision makers’ attention was turned towards immigration rather than integration policy. At the beginning of the examined period, the ‘right’ immigrant was one who had specific skills needed in the
Canadian market. Thus the point system prioritized immigrants with specific skills and work experience (Adelman et al., 1994; Green & Green, 1999).
However, despite this policy the economic crisis of the 1990s increased unemployment and underemployment among immigrants. In addition, while until 1990 Canada competed for skilled immigrants mostly with the United States and Australia , from the 1990s and more so from 2000s it competed increasingly with Europe (Shachar, 2006). Furthermore, there was a global shift to a knowledge and technology economy based on high human capital.
Thus specific skills were not sufficient to compete in the global economy. Consequently, decision makers believed that there was a gap between the ideas guiding the policy and the new reality.
213
As a result, in 1994 the government initiated a public audit on immigration and integration policies.
214
The result of this audit was a report called ‘Not Just Numbers’ (1995), which included several recommendations for amendments in the existing immigration act. The suggested policy was termed the ‘human capital model’. This model emphasized general skills such as language proficiency and education over specific skills. The problem definition was modified: the skills of the selected immigrants has been too narrow, making
213 Not just numbers: A Canadian framework for future immigration (1995), Immigration Legislative
Review, www.chba.ca/uploads/Policy%20Archive/1998/1998-02-28.pdf
214
A public audit is a policy making process which includes public participation through various meetings and hearings.
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it harder for them to find an appropriate position, while the new reality required more flexible skills, enabling immigrants to move from one occupation to another. Thus shortterm economic goals of meeting specific demands were replaced by long-term economic goals of advancing Canada towards a knowledge-based economy. The ‘right’ immigrant became one with flexible skills who could adjust to the changing reality.
215
Accordingly, in 2002 the point system changed, reflecting the shift toward the human capital approach and the shift from specific to general skills. The number of points allocated to education increased from 12 in 1986 to 25 in 2002. Language proficiency increased similarly, from 12 to 24 points. Another change can be seen in the Canadian work experience, which rose from eight to 21 points. Lastly, the clause on specific skills, worth
18 points in 1998, was eliminated in 2002.
216
This change in the point system affected state responsibility. Until 2002 the government monitored the demand for immigrants based on their specific skills and labour market demands. Thus it was responsible (although not entirely) for immigrants’ employment.
From 2002 the responsibility was shifted to the immigrants who were expected to be more flexible in their employment preferences.
Another change affected the personal responsibility and independence idea. From the mid-
1990s, economic benefits from immigration were accompanied by their costs. Decision makers argued that the selected immigrants should be those who would contribute to the economy at the least cost. For example, “Not Just Numbers” states:
Our policy model for selecting self-supporting immigrants is one that maximizes the long term potential benefits for Canada, while minimizing any short term costs associated with their establishment in Canada.
217
215 Not just numbers: A Canadian framework for future immigration, (1995), Immigration Legislative
Review, www.chba.ca/uploads/Policy%20Archive/1998/1998-02-28.pdf
216 Benjamin Dolin and Margaret Young, (2002), Canada’s Immigration Policy, Law and Government
Division, BF-109E, publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp190-e.htm
217
Not just numbers: A Canadian framework for future immigration, (1995), Immigration Legislative
Review, www.chba.ca/uploads/Policy%20Archive/1998/1998-02-28.pdf
102
Consequently, the funding for integration services received by private agencies decreased
(Richmond & Shields, 2005). Another result of this idea can be seen in the right of landing fee, a tax paid by each immigrant upon landing, introduced in 1995. This tax decreased the
‘integration load’ since the immigrants subsidized part of their integration services (Arat-
Koc, 1999). According to CIC work plans, the aim of this tax was to enable maintaining the same level of services as provided before the budget cuts.
218
In addition, in 1998 the government decided that immigrants had to prove their ability to support themselves and their family before entering. This shift in responsibility from the state to the immigrant increased in 2008, when the government decided that an immigrant without a promised work place or Canadian work experience would not be able to apply for permanent residency as an economic migrant.
219
Another policy change is evident in immigration policy objectives, as stated in the new immigration act introduced in 2002. While the objectives of the old act emphasized the enrichment of Canada’s social and cultural diversity, the new aim was more economic: to enable Canada to benefit as much as possible economically, culturally and socially from immigration, as well as support the development of a prosperous economy.
220
These changes can be seen in light of the growing influence of the global ‘race for talent’ ideas and policies. From the mid-2000s decision makers addressed more intensively the global competition for skilled immigrants, and the immigration policy aim became making
Canada more attractive to future immigrants. Moreover, the immigrants were expected not only to contribute to the economy without adding to the social load, but also to do it as fast as possible, so that Canada could advance its position the world. The metaphor used was
‘unlocking the potential’, implying a quick process while ignoring more long-term implications of integration.
221
218 CIC, Report on Plans and Priorities 1995, www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/rpp/index.asp
219 CIC, Reports on Plans and Priorities www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/rpp/index.asp
and
Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration www.cic.gc.ca/english/about_us/reports.asp
220 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (S.C. 2001, c. 27), laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/i-
2.5/index.html
221 CIC, Reports on Plans and Priorities www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/rpp/index.asp
and
Annual Report to Parliament on Immigrationת www.cic.gc.ca/english/about_us/reports.asp
103
In accordance to the general perception that integration problems are the result of problems in immigrant selection, from the mid-2000s, the problem definition was modified and another aspect added: immigrants’ expectations and lack of preparation prior.
Consequently, the government initiated various programs such as orientation and language classes and provided information on employment prior to immigration. As opposed to other countries, these programs were not mandatory.
In addition, the government also identified another obstacle in the selection process: lack of information on Canadian labour market, specifically, the process of accreditation. As a result, in 2007 the government decided to establish a special department in charge of accreditation and vocational training. Some of the departments’ activities increased state responsibility for integration. For example, it subsidized a limited number of internships in the public sector in order for the immigrants to have Canadian work experience as well as become familiar with the local labour market. In addition, the department coordinated among several institutions, both private and public, to develop a more coherent policy for accreditation and simplify procedures. However, most if its activities focused at providing information on accreditation process prior to immigration. The rationale was to enable immigrants to act rationally before immigrating by planning the entire immigration and integration process and choose the place of residence subject to the labour possibilities.
222
Thus the main idea remained self-reliance and personal responsibility.
As for the reciprocity idea, although it did not change, the effect of one of its aspects
(relationship between the federal and the provincial level) increased. One of the main changes in immigration and integration policies is the transfer of responsibility from the federal government to the provinces. This process started in 1991, when the federal government signed an agreement with Quebec, making the latter responsible for selecting skilled migrants and providing all integration services (including language classes), while the federal government continued to fund the services.
223 By 2010 most of the provinces signed similar agreements. The main reason for this delegation was to make integration
222 CIC official website www.cic.gc.ca/english and Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration, www.cic.gc.ca/english/about_us/reports.asp
223
Immigration: The Canada and Quebec accord, BP 252E, Law and Government Division, March, 1991, www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/laws-policy/agreements/quebec/can-que.asp
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services more efficient by reducing redundancy of services and adjusting them to local needs.
224
On the one hand, this process enabled more suitable services; on the other, the reduction in federal regulation created inequality between provinces. As a result, immigrant responsibility increased. This can be seen among other things in the 2006 evaluation report on settlement services.
225
Although the idea of personal responsibility became more prominent during the examined period, CIC budget dynamics demonstrates that its policy influence was not always consistent. From 1995-2010 the CIC budget increased from 791 to 1,530 million CAD.
226
The most significant increase is evidenced in the ‘Grants and Contributions’ item which includes all funding for federal and provincial services. This item gradually increased from
342 million CAD in 1995 (43% of CIC’s total budget) to 461 million in 2005 (51%), and
969 million in 2010 (64%).
227
Within the item there are two significant changes. First, in
‘Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation’, which includes services regulated directly by the federal government and not by the provinces: during most of the examined period the funding remained relatively stable (about 18 million CAD) despite the increase in the number of immigrants. In 2002, however, the budget increased to 30 million CAD, in 2006 to 108 million and in 2008 to 198 million. One of the reasons for this increase was the 2006 evaluation report which found that settlement services were underfunded and that the budget had not been updated for a long time. Second, in the language classes’ budget: there was a decrease from 130 million CAD in 1995 to 117 million in 2005. From 2006 the budget rose to 109 million CAD and in 2008 it reached 283 million (see Figure 4).
228
Moreover, not only did integration funding increase, but immigrants’ financial contribution
224 Ibid, Ibid.
225
CIC, Evaluation of the Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program (2005), www.cic.gc.ca/English/resources/evaluation/isap/index.asp
226 Annual budget proposals were available only from 1995; thus the budget analysis began that year, www.budget.gc.ca/pdfarch/index-eng.html
227
The last increase is among other things a result of the transfer of the Multicultural Unit to the CIC in 2008.
However, this does not explain the entire increase, because the budget increase can be seen in all CIC regulations, as seen in Figure 4.
228
In 2009 this clause was unified with other integration clauses in order to increase the flexibility of integration services.
105
decreased as well, when as part of the aim to increase the number of immigrants the government reduced the right of landing fee by 50% in 2006.
229
The same pattern can be seen in the division of resources by CIC goals as stated each year at the annual budget proposal. During the examined period integration was the CIC’s main goal and 40%-70% of resources were dedicated to it. Besides a slight decrease in 2000-
2002, its proportion continued to increase and in 2008-2010, it was almost 70% of the CIC budget. The increase in allocated resources is evident also in the budget per immigrant.
The total integration budget increased from 1,359 CAD per immigrant in 1995 to 3,484 in
2010.
230
Figure 4: Change in the CIC budget 1995-2010 (in CAD)
231
CIC department total
1 800,00
1 600,00
1 400,00
Grants and contributions
Adjustment assistance
(refugees)
Immigrant settelement and adaptation
Language instruction for newcomers
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 200,00
1 000,00
800,00
600,00
400,00
200,00
0,00
Thus it seems that along with the ideas on personal responsibility prior to immigration there is policy that increases state responsibility in funding of integration services. What can explain this gap between ideas and policy? Political explanation is insufficient in this case, since increase in allocated resources took place under different ministers. Another possible
229 Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration, www.cic.gc.ca/english/about_us/reports.asp
230 CIC Annual Budget proposal, www.budget.gc.ca/pdfarch/index-eng.html
231 CIC Annual Budget proposal, www.budget.gc.ca/pdfarch/index-eng.html
106
explanation can be that the ideas publicly expressed by decision makers were expressed for political reasons and were not the decision makers’ true beliefs. This explanation is also insufficient because during the examined period there was no public demand to increase personal responsibility. On the contrary, underfunding of settlement services and changes in the point system were criticized by the public and experts, the main criticism being that successful integration required more resources and more state responsibility.
232
Moreover, more often than not public demand for more personal responsibility is result of dissatisfaction with increase in immigration (as in the Dutch case, see below). In Canada, however, there was no demand to reduce the number of immigrants and immigration is still perceived as positive. Consequently, it seems that decision makers did not have any political interest in expressing ideas contrary to their true beliefs.
I suggest an ideational explanation for this puzzle: Canadian immigration and integration policies are guided by different ideas, some more salient than others. Specifically, the contribution idea is more important than the personal responsibility idea. Thus when these two ideas collide, i.e. when increasing personal responsibility will decrease immigrants’ contribution, decision makers choose the latter. As a result, the allocated resources increased and the Right of Landing Fee decreased, in order to increase the immigrants’ contribution to the Canadian economy.
Temporary migrant workers
At the beginning of the examined period the target population of the temporary residents programme were agricultural and household workers. As opposed to permanent residents
(economic immigrants), the number of temporary residents was not subject to government decision, but to current market demands. The aim of this programme was to meet labour shortages in economic sectors where it was hard to recruit Canadians or permanent residents. In order for employers to recruit a temporary resident, they had to obtain a permit from the federal labour department. This permit was given only after the employer convinced the department that they did all they could order to find Canadian or permanent
232 See for example research findings (Arat-Koc, 1999; Lee, 2008; Morris, 1997; Richmond & Shields, 2005;
Shields, 2003), and newspapers articles at www.huffingtonpost.ca/2012/12/19/canada-immigration-foreignskilled-workers_n_2293003.html,
107
residents for the position, and that the salary and conditions promised to the temporary resident would be the same.
Change in this sphere is evident from 1994, when Canada signed the NAFTA agreement with the United States and Mexico. This agreement exempted temporary skilled workers from these countries from the permit requirement. In 1997, as a result of labour demand in the high-tech industry, new regulations were introduced, according to which high-tech employees did not need working permits. In addition, in 1998 the government decided that spouses of high-skilled temporary workers would automatically receive a work permit, in order to encourage more temporary workers to come to Canada. As a result, two policy tracks were created: one for low-skilled temporary workers who required a permit and one for high-skilled temporary workers who did not (Fudge & MacPhail, 2009). Despite these changes, during the 1990s temporary foreign workers were a marginal issue on the agenda and until 2006 CIC decision makers did not address it in their work plans or speeches.
The analysis of the ideas behind this policy reveals several issues. First, decision makers use ‘race for talent’ ideas to rationalize changes. They argue that the world undergoes rapid changes, hence the need for flexibility in meeting short-term labour shortages. Second, their policy on temporary migrants is different than that on permanent immigrants. While permanent immigrants are presented as contributing to the country not only economically but also culturally and socially, temporary residents contribute only economically. Thus, the idea that immigrants are an economic resource is more prominent in the temporary residents’ policy. Third, while reciprocity is one of the main ideas guiding policy making towards permanent immigrants, this idea is absent in the case of temporary residents.
233
From 2006 decision makers began referring to some temporary residents as immigrants.
When addressing immigration issues they grouped permanent and temporary residents together. In addition, they used the same reasoning of contribution to the Canadian economy and improving its human capital.
234 However, this change was only towards
233 CIC, Report on Plans and Priorities, www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/rpp/index.asp
234 CIC, Reports on Plans and Priorities, www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/rpp/index.asp
108
skilled temporary residents who constituted about half of the temporary foreign workers population.
235
In 2006 employers intensified their pressure on the government to streamline the recruitment procedure of temporary low-skilled workers. As a result, the government decided to establish regional units aimed at helping employers obtain permits. That same year the government appointed a special committee to determine a list of occupations in which employees would not need to prove that maximum effort was made to recruit local employees. In 2007 CIC decided to sign agreements with the provinces on temporary residents similar to those signed on permanent residents. In these agreements the provinces were authorized to select part of the temporary workers based on local needs. The policy aim changed as well, and became similar to that of permanent residents: promote economic growth. Moreover, it was decided that employers could automatically extend the permit from one to two years. In addition, the government started a pilot project in which permits in 25% of relevant occupations would be issued within 12 days. In the following year, this percentage increased to 50%. All these policies were aimed at streamlining the recruitment process for employers. As a result, state responsibility for regulating the entrance of temporary residents decreased (Fudge & MacPhail, 2009). The same shift in responsibility from the state to the employers is evidenced in the budget. The permanent residence programme in 2004 was about 15% of CIC’s total budget. In 2010 it was only 5% (while the temporary residents’ percentage increased).
236
Another change was the introduction in 2008 of a new category of ‘experienced workers’.
This category enabled temporary high-skilled workers with at least two years of Canadian work experience to obtain permanent residency. This was significant because until 2008, temporary workers had to leave Canada after their permit had expired, and apply for permanent residency only outside the country. The number of temporary workers under this new category increased from 11.7% out of the entire temporary resident population in
235 CIC, (2007), Facts and Figures: Immigration Overview¸ Temporary and Permanent Residents, www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/menu-fact.asp.
236
CIC, Annual Budget Proposal, www.budget.gc.ca/pdfarch/index-eng.html
109
2008 to 32% in 2010.
237
In addition, while until 2007 temporary foreign workers were not on the CIC agenda, from that time they became part of the CIC mission statement.
238
In a relatively short period, temporary foreign workers became one of the main issues on the government agenda. At the same time, state responsibility for regulating the entrance of foreign workers decreased. As opposed to permanent migration, temporary migration is not part of the Canadian nation-building ethos. Hence, it was easier to promote significant changes in this sphere without causing opposition by the defenders of the status quo.
237 CIC (2008), Facts and Figures: Immigration Overview¸ Temporary and Permanent Residents, www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/menu-fact.asp.
238
See for example the minister’s annual report on plans and priorities submitted to parliament, 2008-2010, www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/index-eng.asp
110
Sweden
Setting and general information
Immigrants in Sweden constitute about 14% of the population. Most of the immigrants who arrived until 2008 were refugees. The annual number of immigrants has fluctuated, from more than 37,000 in 1990 to 91,500 in 2010. Since 2005 there has been a constant increase, as can be seen in Figure 5. Until the 1970s most immigrants came from Finland, and only few from outside Scandinavia. This made Swedish society relatively homogeneous, ethnically speaking. In addition, there was relatively political stability and consensus on social goals. Consequently, immigration was not a politically controversial issue. This situation continued through most of the examined period, as indicated by the fact that immigration was rarely mentioned in party platforms (Dahlstrom, 2004; Hammar,
1985).
From the end of the Second World War until the mid-1960s, Sweden was relatively open to immigration and there were few restrictions on labour migrants’ entrance and work permits. In the mid-1960s it began restricting immigration, mostly in order to protect the local labour market. Unlike other European countries, Sweden had no migrant worker system, and after the 1973 Oil Crisis, labour immigration outside of Scandinavia stopped completely. This policy continued until the mid-2000s. Beginning in the 1970s, however, the number of refugees entering Sweden increased, and it ruled that from the moment refugee status was granted, immigrants would receive permanent residency allowing them to work and even vote in local elections.
111
Figure 5: Sweden: Annual number of immigrants by category, 1990-2010
239
120 000
100 000
80 000
60 000
40 000
20 000
0 total refugee familly labour
In 1975 three main principles were laid out for Sweden’s integration policy:
(1) Equality : Efforts would be made to afford immigrants the same living standards as the rest of the population.
(2) Freedom of choice : Public initiatives would be taken to assure that immigrants are able to choose between maintaining their culture and adopting Swedish culture.
(3) Partnership : Immigrants and natives would benefit from working together (Hammar,
1985; Westin, 2000).
These principles were partly based on the following underpinning the Swedish welfare state or public philosophies:
(1) Universality: Availability of social programmes to all citizens.
(2) Solidarity : Programmes to remove class divisions and regional disparities.
(3) De-commodification: Citizens’ ability to live independently of the market. Thus the responsibility for individual welfare lay with the state (Cox 2004).
From the beginning of immigration flows to the country, Swedish decision makers did not consider immigrants as just temporary labourers but rather as settlers who wanted to build
239 Statistics Sweden, Migration internal and external 1990-2010, www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/Menu.aspx?px_db=ssd&px_language=en&rxid=8488a7cb-0149-4725-8f37-
1ee1387733e1 and OECD Statistics, www.stats.oecd.org
112
their permanent home in Sweden. Until the mid-1980s the Labour Ministry was responsible for immigrant integration, reflecting the concept that successful integration was indicated by incorporation into the labour market.
At the beginning of the examined period, immigrants were perceived as people in need, constituting neither a problem nor an asset to the economy. Consequently, the government’s main goal was to assist the immigrants with their basic needs and only then incorporate them into the workforce. From 1985 local authorities were responsible for the immigrants’ housing and employment, and received financial compensation from the central government (through the Immigration Ministry), which became the responsible organization. Because of the large numbers of immigrants, the government decided to divide the integration period into two phases. In the first 18 months after arrival, immigrants received a living allowance and were expected to learn the language. In the second phase, they were expected to assimilate into the labour market. In addition to the living allowance, the immigrant and his/her family were entitled to ‘introduction programmes’, which included language classes, civic orientation and assistance in finding a job. Living allowances were not conditional and were received regardless of their participation in the introduction programmes (Edin et al., 2004).
Integration policy change
The main problem decision makers faced throughout the period was the immigrants’ high unemployment rate. At the beginning of the examined period, the problem definition was that the state did not provide proper assistance to the immigrants. The immigrants continued to be seen as people in distress and the state was seen as responsible for their successful integration.
This perception ignored issues like immigrants’ personal responsibility or barriers in the
Swedish labour market. Accordingly, in 1991 the policy changed and the initial integration period during was extended to 24 months. Nevertheless, the unemployment rate among immigrants did not decrease. Although from 1997 the official aim of the integration policy was equal rights, obligations and opportunities for all regardless of ethnic or cultural
113
background,
240
the policy focus was more on rights than on obligations. In 2000 the OECD and the EU began warning Swedish decision makers against the consequences of high immigrant unemployment could (Lemaître, 2007). Policy change, however, began only in
2009 (Edin et al., 2004; Svantesson & Aranki, 2006).
This policy continuity is also evident in the national budget. The dynamics of the national resources allocated for integration is the same as that of the total budget, regardless of the annual number of immigrants. For example, during 2004-2007 the integration budget decreased, as did the total budget, while the number of immigrants increased from 56,000 in 2004 to more than 68,000 in 2007. Consequently, government spending per immigrant decreased as well from 145,000 SK in 2004 to 69,000 SK in 2007 (see Figure 6). Thus it seems that, despite the high unemployment rate, the government did not consider immigrant integration as more important than other societal problems.
Figure 6: Sweden: Government spending per immigrant, 1996-2010 (in SK)
241
Until 2008 each local authority decided on the programmes and services provided, and the criteria and standards for both provision and participation varied. Moreover, the central government did not set criteria for the local authorities on how to prioritize the integration funding received, and more than 90% of it was spent on living allowances. Eligibility
240 Ministry of Employment, (2011), Pocket facts 2010: Integration statistics, www.regeringen.se/sb/d/8281
241 Ministry of Finance, Budget Statement: Economic and budget policy guidelines, www.government.se/sb/d/2798/a/69938 . Budget data are available only from 1996.
114
criteria varied as well, with assistance conditional in some municipalities but not in others
(Valenta & Bunar, 2010; Wiesbrock, 2011).
In 2008, however, a gradual ideational change began. In addition to the perception of the immigrants as people in distress, new ideas emerged whereby immigrants were viewed as an economic asset. Although these referred mostly to high-skilled immigrants (as demonstrated below), they also affected the debate on refugees and their families. The expression used by decision makers was “sustainable immigration policy”, i.e. policy that could both assist the immigrants by reducing unemployment and assist the Swedish economy by contributing to the labour market. Hence immigration was associated not only with distress but also with economic vitality.
242
In addition, decision makers began viewing immigrants as individuals with ambitions and needs, rather than people in distress.
243
In 2008 the problem definition changed, and two problems were now linked together: lack of proper coordination and regulation in introduction programmes, and lack of personal responsibility for integration. The latter reflected, among other things, the influence of global ideas about personal responsibility and self-reliance, which affect Sweden as well as other Western countries. However, unlike other countries, this lack of responsibility was not explained in Sweden by immigrants’ unwillingness to integrate but by a lack of incentives to look for a job, a problem for which the current policy was responsible.
244
Along with this ideational change, there was also ideational stability in public philosophies, specifically regarding de-commodification (Cox, 2004). This idea guided the decision makers towards maintaining a high level of state responsibility.
245
Corresponding to these ideas, a new integration policy was introduced in 2009. Its main goal was to speed the immigrants’ incorporation into the labour market by making them
242 Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality statements in www.government.se/sb/d/11503/a/137734 as well as in the annual budget statement,(2008), www.government.se/sb/d/2798/a/69938 and Ministry of
Justice, Migration policy fact sheet, (April 2011), www.government.se/sb/d/574/a/164916
243 Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, (2010), New policy for the introduction of newly arrived immigrants in Sweden, Fact sheet, www.government.se/sb/d/574/a/174594 Ministry of Justice, New rules for labor immigration, (2010), www.government.se/content/1/c6/10/72/00/2a13eb93.pdf
244 Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, (2009), Integration policy fact sheet: Government reform to speed up the introduction of new arrivals in Sweden, www.government.se/sb/d/11503/a/137734
245 Another evidence for the stability can be found in the 2009 budget proposal’s title: “Putting Sweden to work, safeguarding welfare”, www.government.se/sb/d/10494/a/111857
115
more active and improving the regulation and coordination between the various introduction services. The responsibility for regulating and coordinating the integration process was transferred to the Ministry of Employment, and the policy became more centralized as the local authorities became only service providers (Wiesbrock, 2011).
246
According to the new policy, each immigrant who receives permanent residency is directed through the employment agency to a place of residence corresponding to his/her qualifications and the labour market’s needs. If the immigrant refuses to move to the suggested area, s/he will not be entitled to a living allowance. In the permanent place of residence, the immigrant formulates a personal introduction programme, with the assistance of a special consultant. This programme includes a language course, civic integration and vocational training. The immigrant must follow the programme in order to receive the living allowance throughout the period. The local authority is responsible for supervising the immigrant. Living allowance is provided for 24 months, regardless of whether the immigrant has found a job or not. In addition, the government has decided to require a national exam in Swedish, with passing entitled to a financial grant.
In the new policy, along with the increase in immigrants’ personal responsibility, state responsibility for financing and regulating integration services has increased as well. This increase is also evident in the allocated budget. In 2009 the budget for integration services was 5.9 billion SK, and in 2010 it was 7.09 billion SK.
247
This is a significant increase given that the number of immigrants decreased from 98,000 in 2009 to 91,000 thousand in
2010. In sum, the new policy is based on individual responsibility accompanied by professional support and an incentive system.
248
Immigration policy change
The most significant policy change in Sweden concerned its policy towards high-skilled immigrants. The labour unions had objected to labour immigration from outside
246
Ministry of Finance, Budget statement and summary,(2009), www.government.se/sb/d/10494/a/111857 and Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, (2009) Swedish integration policy, Fact sheet, 2009, www.government.se/content/1/c6/13/77/34/5b7683a6.pdf
247 Ministry of Finance, Budget statement and summary, 2009-2010, www.government.se/sb/d/10494/a/111857
248
MIPEX Country Report, Sweden, (2010), www.mipex.org.
116
Scandinavia, and later from outside the EU, ever since the 1940s. They feared such immigration would harm the local labour market and its employees. Immigrants from outside the EU who came to work in Sweden underwent a complicated procedure of obtaining a permit, during which the employers had to convince both the government and the unions that they had done all they could to find employees in Sweden or in the EU.
Moreover, the unions had the right to veto any permit. As a result, only about 300 permits were issued each year (Cerna, 2009; Gaillard, 2002).
During the examined period, the employers tried to persuade the decision makers to ease this strict policy. The unions, however, blocked all proposals, arguing that changes in immigration policy would harm local employees, and that a more permissive policy towards foreign labour would mean losing state control of immigration. The main idea guiding both the unions and the decision makers, who also rejected any change, was equality.
Despite the unions’ objections, the employers continued to advocate policy change. They argued that the current policy where the state decided which and how many workers were to be recruited did not meet the labour market’s needs and was also inefficient. They demanded the responsibility be delegated to them, as they understood the market’s needs better than the state. In 2003 popular pressure led the parliament to investigate this issue.
Its inquiry commission suggested modest changes in the existing policy, for example, a slight extension of work permit and improved coordination with employers on deciding which and how many workers to recruit. The main idea guiding the decision makers remained protection of the local labour market, and they continued to ignore the consequences of this strict policy for Sweden’s competitiveness, and its relation to issues such as the aging of the population (Cerna, 2009).
From the mid-2000s exogenous pressure from the OECD and the EU was added. The EU urged Sweden to change its strict policy, as part of the European effort to become more attractive to immigrants and compete with the United States (Shachar, 2006). The OECD published a country report where it warned Sweden that, with its aging population, if it did not change its policy and recruit foreign labour its economy would suffer (Tejada, 2004).
These pressures led to a certain ideational change. From 2003 a slight difference emerged
117
in the reasoning offered by decision makers for the labour immigration policy. Decision makers began to argue that under certain conditions foreign labour could be positive since it could meet shortages in specific occupations where there were no Swedish employees.
This idea of meeting specific demands was not new, as seen in the reasoning used earlier by the employers. Until 2003, however, decision makers rejected it. From 2006, though, they adopted another idea: employers knew the labour market’s needs better than the state or the unions, and should thus be made responsible for determining which workers could enter the country.
Most of the reasons given by decision makers for the need to change the policy were based on global ideas of ‘the race for talent’. They argued that Sweden was part of the global world and should thus adopt global policies. For example, when talking about labour migration in the annual budget it was argued that “Competition between countries means that it is sometimes necessary for Sweden to adjust its regulations in response to changes in other countries”.
249
Despite this trend of resembling other countries, when talking about low-skilled immigrants, especially refugees, decision makers always emphasized the difference between Sweden and other countries, since it did not try to restrict the flow of refugees.
Nevertheless, immigrants were no longer perceived as coming to reside in Sweden but as part of the global movement of people and goods. This subverted the de-commodification idea. Moreover, decision makers viewed high-skilled immigrants as a means to make the
Swedish labour market more flexible and better suited to the 21 st
century, thus rendering
Sweden more competitive and attractive in global competition.
250
In 2006 the Social Democratic Party, which traditionally objected to any change in immigration policy, lost the elections. In addition, the shortage of workers increased and so did EU and OECD criticism of the strict Swedish policy. The economic crisis of 2008 was the last straw, stimulating more ideational change followed by policy change.
Beginning in 2008, labour immigration to Sweden was framed as part of the solution to the
249 Ministry of Finance, Budget statement 2007: Economic and budget policy guidelines, www.government.se/sb/d/2798/a/69938
250 Ibid, Ibid.
118
global economic challenges. The main argument was that if Sweden did not act quickly it would not survive the next crisis.
251
Moreover, not only that the benefits of opening
Sweden to labour migration were now seen as outweighing the costs, but failure to change the policy was considered disastrous. For example, an expert report to Sweden’s
Globalization Council predicted as follows:
The reforms [proposed in 2008] appear likely to boost public finances…. They would enable Swedish businesses to meet their employment needs and thus
Swedish costumers to obtain the goods and services they desire…. Ultimately a choice is between an open, dynamic and progressive society and a closed, stagnated and reactionary one. (Legrain, 2008, p. 41)
In 2008 a new act was passed whereby employers could seek employees in any country.
The requirement to make sure no potential Swedish or European employee could be hired was reduced to a requirement to advertise the vacancy in the media, and the unions’ veto was revoked. In addition, the government introduced a temporary residence permit for high-skilled immigrants so that they could find suitable jobs in Sweden (Cerna, 2009).
Thus the new policy marked an abrupt, significant shift from the status quo, with almost all regulatory responsibility delegated from the state to the private market. This policy followed a significant ideational change, involving not only ideas on policy problems and tools but also the Swedish public philosophies of equality and de-commodification.
251 Ministry of Justice, New rules for labour immigration, (2010), www.government.se/content/1/c6/10/72/00/2a13eb93.pdf
, Ministry of Finance, Budget Statement:
Economic and budget policy guidelines 2008, www.government.se/sb/d/2798/a/69938
119
The Netherlands
Setting and general information
Immigrants constitute about 11% of the Dutch population. There are five categories of immigrants in the Netherlands: (1) Migrant workers; (2) Refugees and asylum seekers; (3)
Repatriates from the former Dutch colonies; (4) Family members of migrant workers or refugees; and (5) High-skilled immigrants (Entzinger et al., 2012). The number of immigrants to the Netherlands increased from more than 63,000 in 1989 to 95,000 in 2001, and after a decrease from 2005 to 2009 rose again to 110,000 in 2010. Most of these are labour immigrants, refugees and their family members. The recent increase in the total number of immigrants is due to the increase in the number of immigrants from the EU. The
Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics does not distinguish among groups of immigrants except for refugees and asylum seekers. The number of refugees and asylum seekers increased from 26% of all immigrants at the beginning of the period to 55% in 1999, and then declined to 12% by 2010. These changes stem from the global situation as well as local policies aimed at decreasing the number of asylum seekers entering the country. The changes in the numbers of immigrants during the examined period can be seen in Figure 7.
Figure 7: The Netherlands: Annual number of immigrants by category, 1990-2010
252
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
Asylum seekers
Total
252 OECD Statistics, www.stats.oecd.org
120
Dutch society was traditionally split into various religious and cultural groups. These groups were autonomous and had their own schools, political parties, labour unions and so on (Lijphart, 1968). Although this tradition weakened during the 1960s, some of its pluralistic characteristics persisted. The Dutch welfare state is considered one of the most generous in the Western world. Despite its retrenchment since the 1980s and the rise of ideas of personal responsibility and obligation, one public philosophy that did not change was that the state should maintain its responsibility towards the weakest groups since they were unable of taking care of themselves (Becker, 2000).
Studies divide immigration and integration policies in the Netherlands into three periods, corresponding to the policy reforms implemented: (1) 1980-1990 – the ethnic minorities policy; (2) 1991-2000 – the integration policy; and (3) 2001-2010 – the new-style integration policy. During the examined period, immigration and integration policies became more closely connected to one another, hence the following analysis addresses the two simultaneously (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2007).
Until the 1970s there were two major groups of immigrants in the Netherlands: low-skilled migrant workers and repatriates from former Dutch colonies. Because of the economic recession of the 1970s, migrant workers almost stopped coming. At the same time, the policy on family reunion became more permissive; consequently, the total number of immigrants increased. Immigrants’ integration problems, however, intensified and in 1979 the government asked the Scientific Council for Government Policy (hereinafter, Scientific
Council ), a high-level advisory body to the government, to examine the immigrants’ situation. The result of this investigation was the ethnic minorities policy (Berkhout et al.,
2012; Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2007).
The idea guiding this policy was that improving the immigrants’ cultural situation will lead to an improving their socioeconomic situation (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2011). In addition, decision makers believed that immigrant organizations should take an active role both in policymaking and service provision, while the services should be funded by the state. As for immigration policy, family reunion was perceived as positive since family members
121
gave immigrants the support needed for successful integration.
253
As part of the new policy, the state funded language courses and sociocultural activities for immigrants, provided mostly by local immigrant organizations. Responsibility for coordinating integration services was transferred from the Welfare to the Interior Ministry, while responsibility for providing the services was in the hands of local authorities. Until the 1990s the issue of immigration and integration was mostly technocratic and politicians did not pay much attention to it (Scholten, 2013).
Integration policy, 1990-2002
From the mid-1980s the number of immigrants to the Netherlands increased. At the same time, immigration and integration issues became part of a growing debate on the future of the welfare state. In addition, the economic crisis at that time increased unemployment, particularly among the immigrants. As a result, decision makers began to question the effectiveness of the existing policy. The government, for its part, once more tasked the
Scientific Council with examining the immigrants’ situation (Entzinger et al., 2011;
Penninx, 2006).
The Scientific Council’s report articulated a significant ideational change. The policy’s main idea changed from multiculturalism to active citizenship. The focus changed from immigrants’ rights as groups to their obligation as individual citizens to integrate. In addition, there was a change in causal reasoning: from cultural emancipation that would lead to socioeconomic integration to socioeconomic integration that would lead to cultural integration. Furthermore, the problem definition changed from lack of accessibility of various institutions to a combination of lack of personal responsibility and institutional barriers to integration. Consistent with the public philosophy underpinning the Dutch welfare state the Scientific Council recommended that, along with the increase in personal responsibility, the state should take greater responsibility for regulating and funding integration services. The main policy focus in the recommendation was on employment and education, for both children and adults. As for immigration policy, the Scientific
253 Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, (1979), Ethnic Minorities, no. 17, www.wrr.nl/en/publicaties/publicatie/article/etnische-minderheden-a-rapport-aan-de-regering-b-naar-eenalgemeen-etnisch-minderhedenbeleid/
122
Council suggested making it more restrictive (Scholten, 2011b).
254
The council’s report did not suffice to cause policy change, but did stimulate public discourse that emphasized personal responsibility and active citizenship, and provided the foundations for the policy formulated in 1994.
In 1994 a new government was elected. It shifted the focus from respecting cultural diversity to promoting immigrants’ participation in society. The new policy’s goals were to promote active citizenship by increasing economic and political participation and improving the educational achievements of immigrant children. In addition, the responsibility for integration was divided between the professional departments of the central government and the local authorities, while the Interior Ministry retained responsibility for funding services and the setting general guidelines (Entzinger, 2006;
Penninx, 2006; Scholten, 2011a).
In 1998 a civic integration act was passed. It stipulated that an immigrant wishing to receive a residency permit had to take a civic integration course that would include language studies and acquaintance with Dutch culture, values and institutions. Local authorities were responsible for providing the courses and the central government for funding them. Thus the Netherlands became the first country to introduce mandatory civic integration courses.
As for immigration policy, as part of the shift from the group to the individual immigrant, the decision makers began to consider family reunions an obstacle to integration. As a result, restrictions on family reunion were imposed. In addition, refugees and asylum seekers were given limited social services in the first period after arrival so as to discourage additional refugees and asylum seekers from arriving (Penninx, 2006; Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2007).
New-style integration policy, 2003-2010
The end of the 1990s saw an increase in the number of immigrants, mostly refugees, coming to Europe in general and to the Netherlands in particular. At the same time, immigrant unemployment rates in the Netherlands were higher than in other European countries, and more often than not immigration to the Netherlands afforded direct access
254 Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, (1990), Immigrant policy: Summary of the 36 report, www.wrr.nl/fileadmin/en/publicaties/PDF-samenvattingen/Immigrant_Policy.pdf
123
to welfare services. In addition, delinquency rates among certain immigrant groups were higher than the national average (Joppke, 2007; Scholten, 2013). Finally, immigrants in different countries were involved in terrorist attacks, including 9/11 and the London bombings. All these factors increased negative feelings towards immigrants and were seen by the public as indicators of poor integration. Hence, in the Netherlands a public debate began in the media and later in parliament on immigrant integration and its failure. This debate intensified during 2001-2003 (Scholten 2013).
In 2002 the Scientific Council again examined the immigrants’ situation and found improvement regarding both employment and education. Despite the council’s emphasis on immigrants’ self-sufficiency, it recommended that responsibility for integration remain public. The council emphasized that the integration process was reciprocal, with both immigrants and the receiving society adapting to one another, and warned the decision makers against an assimilative policy.
255
The politicians, the media and the public, however, assessed integration and its results from a different perspective. They believed that successful integration entailed cultural integration, with immigrants adopting Dutch norms and values. Thus immigrant integration had failed because the immigrants continued to preserve their own values and norms.
Moreover, this failure endangered Dutch social cohesion, especially given the increase in the number of immigrants (both of the first and second generations) (Penninx, 2006;
Scholten, 2011b).
In the 2002 election campaign, immigration became for the first time one of the main issues on the agenda. This was manifested among other things by the growing popularity of Pim
Fortuyn, a radical right-wing politician. After Fortuyn’s assassination in 2002, his party won a significant number of parliamentary seats. The right-wing coalition of 2003 was unstable, however, and fell apart after three months. Nevertheless, public and political engagement in immigration and integration issues continued and the new government
255 Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, (2002), The Netherlands as immigration society, report no. 60, www.wrr.nl/fileadmin/en/publicaties/PDFsamenvattingen/The_Netherlands_as_immigration_society.pdf
124
continued to focus on cultural instead of economic gaps between the immigrants and the receiving society (Penninx, 2006; Scholten, 2013).
Beginning in 2002 the focus shifted from active citizenship to common citizenship.
Immigrants’ culture, which in the 1980s was considered an important factor in their integration, was now perceived as an obstacle (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2011). The main ideas were the personal responsibility of the individual and the failure of immigration, for which the immigrant was to blame. Other prominent ideas were independence and selfreliance. In addition, the focus on obligations instead of rights that began in the 1990s intensified even further. The immigrants were not only expected to participate in Dutch economy and politics but also acquire Dutch norms, culture and values.
Those wishing to settle in the Netherlands must participate actively in Dutch society; they must learn to speak Dutch, understand Dutch values and comply with
Dutch norms. [...] Once admitted to the Netherlands, they will be expected to exert themselves to acquire a deeper understanding of Dutch society.
256
All the responsibility for integration lay on the immigrants’ shoulders. Later the decision makers began to believe that the immigrants did not want to integrate, and the state had to coerce them to do so. Consequently, the idea of reciprocity was abandoned (Vasta, 2007).
The emphasis on immigrant crime rates as a manifestation of integration failure led in 2003 to the transfer of responsibility for integration from the Interior Ministry to a special minister for integration in the Justice Ministry. In 2003 the new minister introduced his new policy, which was called new-style integration policy.
Although based on the same principles of personal responsibility and active citizenship as in the 1990s, the focus shifted from education and employment to adjustment to Dutch norms and values. One of the main changes was the shift to a more prescriptive policy (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2007).
256 Coalition agreement for second Balkenende government, ‘Participation, Employment, Deregulation’,
16.05.2003, House of Representatives, session 2002-2003, 03 28637, no. 19. This quote is taken from
Summary Evaluation: Civic Integration in the Netherlands, June 2010, ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/docl_21763_316312897.doc
125
In 2004 the state increased its regulatory responsibility by requiring immigrants to take language and civic integration exams as a condition for obtaining permanent residency.
Although mandatory civic integration was not new in the Netherlands, until 2004 its enforcement was relatively weak. In 2005 the policy became even more prescriptive when potential family-reunion immigrants were required to take a civic integration exam even before coming to the Netherlands in order to receive temporary residency status.
257
This made the civic integration exams a tool for immigration control, since the exams posed a significant barrier to potential immigrants (Joppke, 2007). In 2006 the civic integration exam was also made mandatory for veteran immigrants who had studied less than eight years in the Netherlands. In 2011 the target audience of the civic integration policy was further expanded when the government decided that immigrants from the EU who wished to receive welfare services were also subject to the Civic Integration Act and had to take the exam (Entzinger et al., 2012).
From 2003 the policy became more centralized and civic integration became the main policy tool, as evident in the national budget. Until 1997 there was no specific budget clause for immigrant integration, and the budget was divided between various professional units. Since 2003 there has been a specific clause for integration in the budget of the Justice
Ministry. This clause includes civic integration programmes as well as other services aimed at decreasing socioeconomic gaps between immigrants and the receiving society. The civic integration programme, which includes the exams and some of the preparation courses provided by the local authorities to weak immigrant groups, constitutes 80%-85% of the total integration budget. Thus, although the explanation for the budget stated that integration had two aspects – the immigrant aspect, involving civic integration programmes, and the state aspect, involving the provision of tools to immigrants and the removal of institutional barriers – the funding for the second track is relatively marginal.
258
Along with the increase in state responsibility for regulating the integration process, there was also a decrease in state responsibility. “Personal responsibility” and “independence”
257 The Civic Integration Abroad Act, 2005, wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0019587/geldigheidsdatum_23-12-
2010
258 Ministry of Justice budget proposal 2003-2010, www.rijksbegroting.nl/algemeen/rijksbegroting/archief
126
were the main terms used by decision makers. The causal reasoning was that if the immigrants were responsible for their integration process, their motivation to integrate would increase and they would integrate better.
259
Thus from 2002 the responsibility for providing the civic integration courses was transferred to the private market. In 2004 the state stopped paying the fees for the courses, and in 2008 it also cancelled the 70% refund given to those immigrants who passed the civic integration exam. In 2010 immigrants’ responsibility increased even more when they were required to pay not only for the civic integration course but also for the exam and the residency permit. The high costs of the exam and the permit were intended as another means of discouraging potential immigrants from coming (Entzinger et al., 2011; Vasta, 2007).
In 2007 the problem definition changed again: it was now the high number of immigrants coming to the country. Family-reunion immigrants were seen as especially problematic since it was believed that they obstructed immigrants’ integration efforts.
260
The idea was that as long as the government was unable to monitor immigration flows properly, the immigrants already in the Netherlands would be unable to integrate. As for civic integration abroad, the decision makers did not regard it as a tool to help immigrants integrate into the new society but as a barrier or filter potential immigrants. For example, the evaluation report on Civic Integration Abroad stated explicitly that “The obligation to take an examination is expected to make people think more carefully about whether it is worthwhile to seek admission to the Netherlands” 261
Accordingly, from 2007 the central government focused more on immigration control than on integration. Integration became more individualized and responsibility was transferred to the immigrants and local authorities. This is evident, among other things, in the amount
259 See for example explanations to the budget 2002-2010, www.rijksbegroting.nl/algemeen/rijksbegroting/archief
260 Letter of the Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment to the House of
Representatives, Government strategy on marriage and family migration, 2.10.2009, ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/resources/detail.cfm?ID_ITEMS=21770 and Letter of the Minister of Interior and
Kingdom Relations to the House of Representatives on Integration, engagement and citizenship,
17.06.2011, www.government.nl/documents-and-publications/press-releases/2011/06/17/integrationpolicy-based-on-dutch-values.html
261 Letter of the Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment to the House of
Representatives, Evaluation of the Civic Integration (Preparation Abroad) Act, 2010, ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/docl_9949_712168290.doc
127
of attention given to integration. From 2008 both government regulations and media coverage dedicated to this issue decreased significantly (Scholten 2013).
The most significant change since 2007 concerned the responsibility of local authorities.
In 2007 their job was to provide information on civic integration courses and exams, organize the facilities needed, assist the weak immigrants who were not capable of finding and funding the courses on their own, and fine those who did not participate in the civic integration programme. In 2008 the local authorities’ discretion was expanded when the central government delegated the responsibility for setting eligibility criteria for funded civic integration courses, as well as deciding who would provide the courses and how many would be offered. As a result, local authorities provided funded courses to numerous immigrants, not necessarily those in distress. Thus the main consumers of civic integration courses were not the immigrants but rather the local authorities, and state responsibility was decreased less than the central government intended. In 2009 the local authorities’ responsibility increased even more when the central government ruled that they not only could determine who would receive funded courses, but also had the power to force immigrants to participate in a course (Scholten, 2013).
During the examined period, programmes such as vocational training or assistance to immigrant children in school did not change significantly. This especially pertains to programmes provided by local authorities. Moreover, even programmes such as mothertongue instruction to immigrant children, which began during the ethnic minorities’ policy in the 1980s, continued to be publicly funded. This continuity is also evident in the national budget. From 2003 there was no significant change in the integration budget or in the civic integration budget. When there was marginal increase/decrease in the integration budget, it was mostly related to the increase/decrease in the number of immigrants (Entzinger,
2006).
262 As a result, a gap emerged between the decision makers’ declarations on personal
262 Ministry of Justice budget proposal 2003-2010, www.rijksbegroting.nl/algemeen/rijksbegroting/archief .
In addition, in a correspondence with Rinus Pennix he argued, that policy change was mostly in the politically visible domains (for example civic integration act) while in other issues like housing and education there was mostly continuity (email correspondence, 02.05.2013).
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responsibility and the actual policy, with various integration services continuing to be funded by the state.
The literature explains this gap in terms of the difference between the political and administrative levels. Whereas politicians are more radical, administrative decision makers are more practical, and their goal is to ‘keep things together’. Consequently there are decision makers, mostly at the local level, who see integration as a reciprocal process, and believe in the important role of immigrants’ culture in the integration process (Poppelaars
& Scholten, 2008). Another possible explanation is the discrepancy between private and public ideas. According to this explanation, the ideas used by decision makers do not represent their true beliefs. In issues that are less politically visible, however, such as vocational training, decision makers act according to their true beliefs.
These explanations, however, do not account for the continuity in the civic integration program, which has been initiated by politicians and is a highly visible and debatable issue.
I would like to suggest another explanation: the constraining power of public philosophies behind the policy. As stated earlier, the public philosophy that the state should maintain its responsibility for the weakest groups in the society has not changed during the examined period, regardless of changes in the Dutch welfare state. This idea creates strong status quo bias for the decision makers, preventing them from totally eliminating state responsibility for integration. As a result, even when integration issues were high on the public and political agenda and the public expected the state to withdraw from the provision and funding of integration services, the state continued to provide and fund some of the services. Hence despite the significant ideational change in immigration and integration policies, in integration policy greater continuity is evident.
High-skilled immigration and integration policies
As opposed to the ideas on low-skilled immigrants that view immigration as a problem, ideas on high-skilled immigrants view such immigrants as an asset to the economy and society, contributing to making the Netherlands a leader in the knowledge-based economy of the 21 st century. Thus the Netherlands should become more attractive to immigrants in
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order to persuade the best and brightest to immigrate (Scholten 2011).
263
These ideas are global and can be traced from the beginning of 2000. Since their emergence, ideas on highskilled immigrants have remained mostly technocratic and rarely evoked public interest.
Thus, along with efforts to decrease the number of low-skilled immigrants (often refugees or family-reunion immigrants) there were efforts to increase the number of high-skilled immigrants.
Until 2000 the Netherlands had no coherent policy for the recruitment of high-skilled immigrants. For the most part, decision makers reacted to employers’ demands to recruit workers in specific professions. Thus, the immigration policy for skilled and non-skilled immigrants was the same. In 2001 the government introduced a fast track for work permits for high-tech immigrants, reducing the time required to obtain such permits from ten to five weeks. In addition, the waiting period for residency permits was shortened from three months to three weeks and the entire procedure was simplified (McLaughlan et.al., 2002).
In 2004 the government introduced a coherent programme for recruiting high-skilled immigrants, stipulating that the state would grant residency permits to such immigrants in two weeks. The residency permit would be valid up to five years as long as the immigrant was employed . After five years the immigrant could apply for permanent residency
(Welsum, 2004). In 2007 this policy was extended to foreign students as well, who received a one-year permit to seek work.
Unlike low-skilled immigrants, high-skilled immigrants now do not have to take the civic integration exam. In addition, from 2001 some high-skilled immigrants have been entitled to a living allowance and in some cases tax exemptions for ten years. Incentives are given to employers to recruit workers from abroad, such as refunds for their expenses in seeking potential immigrants (Mahroum, 2001; McLaughlan et al., 2002). In 2010 the government decided to help local authorities integrate high-skilled immigrants by providing more information on housing and education, utilizing various community organizations.
264 In
263 New migration policy, a stimulus for the Dutch economy, press release, 06.07.2010, www.government.nl/documents-and-publications/press-releases/2010/07/06/new-migration-policy-astimulus-for-the-dutch-economy.html
264 Ibid, Ibid.
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sum, the dynamics of state responsibility towards high-skilled immigrants runs counter state responsibility towards low-skilled immigrants.
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Comparative Conclusion: Israel, Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands
This chapter is aimed at shedding more light on the findings from the Israeli case through analysis of immigration and integration policies in three other immigration countries. Since the changes in the three countries were either abrupt or gradual, but not gradual transformative, they can support our confidence only in the findings on ideational dynamics and not on policy change.
As this chapter has demonstrated Israel is part of the global policy convergence taking place in immigration policy. Yet this convergence is not in the policy tools but in the policy aims of increasing the economic benefits from high-skilled immigrants. While in Israel this aim is met through funding the integration process to maximize immigrants’ chances to properly participate in the labour market, in Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands this aim is met by allowing the best and the brightest to enter the country. Hence immigration policy in all four countries is based on the same global ideas of ‘the race for talent’.
In Israel, however, the influence of the race for talent ideas and policies was realized differently than in the other three countries. Israel has an open door policy to Jewish migrants. Thus, as opposed to other countries, it cannot offer ‘citizenship for talent’ and if it wants to participate in the global race for skilled immigrants, it has to offer other incentives. As a result, state responsibility for skilled migrants in Israel increased, not only in funding and service provision but also in regulation of integration services. At the same time in Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands state responsibility for high-skilled immigrants decreased (specifically through regulation reduction).
When comparing the results of change in state responsibility in the four countries at the end of the examined period to trends in current integration policy (see p. 23) (Joppke,
2007), we find that only Israel follows the global pattern to some extent, since it partly decreased state responsibility for integration services. Although in the Netherlands and
Canada ideas on decrease in state responsibility were salient, their implementation was only partial. Thus, it is interesting to find that it is Israel, with its public philosophy on state responsibility for integration of all immigrants, which follows global integration policy dynamics more than the three comparison countries.
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As in Israel, evidence for the constraining power of public philosophies was also found in
Sweden and the Netherlands. In Sweden public philosophies of equality, universality and de-commodification continued to guide Swedish integration policy through the entire period. Thus, although global ideas on personal responsibility were introduced to the
Swedish integration policy, their influence was relatively minor. As a result, not only did state responsibility not decrease, but rather increased when the government decided to increase its funding, regulation and service provision. As for immigration policy, for a long time public philosophies constrained changes in high-skilled immigration policy. Despite the fact that employers’ pressure to change the immigration policy started long before the policy change took place, only when there was change in the public philosophies of equality and de-commodification, did the global ideas of ‘race for talent’ become prominent and the paradigm changed. This ideational change took place in a relatively short period and so was the trailblazing policy change of decrease in state regulatory responsibility for immigration. These findings provide another explanation for the abrupt policy change that goes beyond economic crisis and pressure of transnational organizations like the OECD and EU.
In the Netherlands similar constraining power is evident. The public philosophy behind the
Dutch social policy, i.e. state responsibility for the weakest groups in society, did not change, and constrained decision makers from further reducing state responsibility.
Consequently, the result of the change in integration policy was adaptation and not transformation, despite strong public opinion demanding sharper reduction in state responsibility. These findings question the common perception on the transformative change in the Dutch integration policy in the last two decades (Penninx, 2006; Vasta,
2007), and expand Poppelaars and Scholten's (2008) argument, that integration policy remained stable on the local level, also to the national level. Furthermore, it adds another explanation for the policy continuity to the ‘pragmatic thinking explanation’ suggested by
Poppelaars and Scholten (2008) for the constraining power of public philosophies. Along with similar findings on the power of ideas from the Israeli case, this highlights the importance of ideas in explaining policy dynamics, since it demonstrates that policy makers will sometimes pursue change that contradicts public opinion or their strategic interests because of the constraining power of ideas.
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In addition, the Swedish and the Dutch cases also support the finding that despite the growing influence of global ideas on local policies in general and on immigration and integration policies in particular, their effect is modified and sometimes even blocked by strong local public philosophies that guide the decision makers and direct their attention.
Hence, in order to overcome the constraint of public philosophies these should either change, as can be seen in Swedish immigration policy, or decision makers should find a way to bypass them, as in the Israeli case. Consequently, this bolsters our confidence in the hypothesis that global ideas can become prominent and prevail over local ideas as long as they do not contradict public philosophies, unless these change as well.
265
Furthermore, although the policy change in the three countries was incremental or abrupt and not gradual transformative as in Israel, the ideational analysis reveals that as in Israel, the direction and mode of ideational change corresponded to that of the policy change.
Specifically, abrupt ideational change corresponds to abrupt policy change and gradual ideational change corresponds to gradual policy change.
In Canada, there was gradual ideational change in the main problem definition (selection of immigrants as causing their successes/failure) and policy solution ideas. There was also change in the relative salience of the ideas. While at the beginning of the examined period the idea of personal responsibility was the most important, resulting in decreased state responsibility for immigration and integration, since the mid-2000s the idea of contribution grew more salient and thus state responsibility increased. Correspondingly, the policy changes were also gradual and adaptive. State responsibility for immigration regulation gradually decreased, as seen in the changes in the point system (shift from specific to general skills), and its responsibility for integration services increased in funding and simultaneously increased and decreased in various regulation aspects.
265 In Canada public philosophies did not change and were not challenged by global ideas either, among other things because the issue of temporary foreign labour was not part of the Canadian immigration ethos and as such not embedded in public philosophies.
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In Sweden, the change in policy solutions and policy problems ideas behind integration policy was also gradual. The problem definition was at first insufficient state assistance and later poor state coordination and the incentives for immigrants. Hence, the policy tools used were initially an increase in state assistance and, subsequently, an increase in coordination and a shift to a more proactive policy. However, the change in problem definition was only partial and the main principles remained in place. Correspondingly, the policy change was adaptive as well. These findings from the ideational dynamics in Israel,
Sweden and Canada provide more empirical evidence for the gradual ideational change model (Carstensen, 2011) and demonstrate once more that ideational change can be not only abrupt but also gradual.
As opposed to Israel, Canada and Sweden, the Netherlands experienced abrupt ideational change in policy solutions and policy problem definition ideas. At the beginning of the examined period the problem definition was lack of personal responsibility, which then changed to immigrants’ unwillingness to integrate and eventually, insufficient immigration monitoring. Correspondingly, the policy solution was initially an increase in personal responsibility and afterwards a shift towards a more prescriptive policy which increased state responsibility in regulation and not only forced immigrants to integrate but also obstructed potential immigrants. These policy changes were abrupt as well.
While the Israeli, Dutch and Swedish cases are examples of the influence of ideational change at different levels of generality, the Canadian case adds another layer of complexity, since it demonstrates that in order to understand the relationship between ideational change and policy change one should examine not only changes in the three levels of generality, but also changes in the relationship between ideational components within the same level.
In summary, besides the impact of ideas on policy change this comparative analysis has demonstrated that although the changes in Israeli immigration and integration policies are transformative, they are not unique. Moreover, it has shown that even when it seems that
Israel diverges from other countries, for example, in its increase in state responsibility for skilled immigrants, this divergence is based on the same global ideas as in other immigration countries. This is not to say that Israel has lost its uniqueness as an ethnic
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migration country, but that its uniqueness is being modified and adjusted to the global ideas and policies. Our findings from the four countries are summarized in Table 3.
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Table 3: Israel, Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands Compared
266
Israel
Rate of ideational change
Problem definition and policy solution
Gradual
Change ideas
Public philosophies No change
Canada
Gradual
Partial change
Sweden
Immigration policy – abrupt
Integration policy - gradual
Immigration policy - change
Integration policy - partial change
No change Integration policy- no change
Immigration policy - change
Constrained policy change Role of public philosophies
Ideas and actors’ strategic interests
Constrained policy change
Decision makers acted in accordance to the ideas even when it contradicted their interests
Global vs. local ideas Global ideas prevailed over local ideas
Did not affect policy
Ideas and interests did not contradict
Rate of policy change
Result of policy change
Gradual
Transformation
Ideas and interests did not contradict
Global ideas prevailed local ideas
Gradual
Adaptation
Immigration policy – global ideas prevailed local
Integration policy
-- local ideas prevailed global
Abrupt
Immigration policy – transformation
Integration policy – adaptation
The Netherlands
Abrupt
Change
No change
Constrained policy change
Decision makers acted in accordance to the ideas even when it contradicted their interests
Global ideas prevailed local
Abrupt
Immigration policy – transformation
Integration policy – adaptation ideas
266 The distinction between immigration and integration policies and between high- and low-skilled immigrants is shown only when there was a difference between the two.
137
State responsibility- immigration policy
State responsibility – integration policy
Increase- high skill immigrants; funding, service provision
No change– low skilled immigrants
Increase – high skilled immigrants funding, service provision and regulation
Decrease – low skilled immigrants funding and service provision
Decrease - regulation
Increase; funding
Increase and decrease in regulation
Decrease- high skill immigrants; regulation
Increase - low skilled immigrants; regulation
Decrease – high skill immigrants; regulation
Increase; funding, service provision and regulation
Increase; regulation
Funding and service provision – no change
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Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusions
I will now review the modes and combinations of modes of gradual transformative change, the role of ideas in explaining them and state responsibility in immigration and integration policies. First, I present the main conclusions on changes in state responsibility, followed by the main findings and contributions on each mode and combination of modes of gradual transformative change found. Third, the general conclusion is presented. Lastly, a number of directions for future research are suggested.
State responsibility for immigration and integration policies
The findings from the Israeli case confirm the argument that despite the path dependence characterizing social policies, significant changes in state responsibility can take place through conversion, layering and drift. However, while most research demonstrates that these changes are conservative in nature and include decrease in state responsibility (see for example Hacker, 2004), this research shows that in immigration and integration policies, along with the decrease there is also increase in state responsibility in funding, provision of services, regulation or some combination of these components. This is true not only in Israel but also in Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands.
In addition, the research supports the immigration and integration policies convergence thesis (Freeman, 2006; Joppke, 2007), in that it finds significant evidence for the effect of ideas and policies of the 'race for talent' not only in Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands, but also in Israel. If Israel, which perceives itself as a 'safe haven' for all Jews in the world and views immigration as an ideological mission of nation building, is influenced by the ideas and policies of the 'race for talent', this is certainly truer of countries that do not consider immigration part of their ideological identity.
Accordingly, when immigration and integration policy changes are examined through the lens of the global ideas of ‘the race for talent’, the coexistence of increase and decrease in state responsibility is better understood and so is the difference between the increase in state responsibility for skilled immigrants in Israel and the decrease in other countries. In a world where the immigrant is perceived as an economic asset and when the aim is
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economic growth, increased state responsibility is aimed at shedding the load of integration because immigrants are expected to be self-reliant.
Conversion and layering combinations
The Israeli cases of encouraging immigration and returning residents have demonstrated that institutions can be converted to new purposes through layering. In addition, the employment case has demonstrated that conversion and layering can also be occur simultaneously. Thus, contrary to Mahoney and Thelen (2010), each combination of political and institutional factors is linked to more than only one change mode. In addition, these cases expand our concept of gradual transformative change, since the combination of conversion and layering is qualitatively distinct from the manner in which Streeck and
Thelen (2005) account for each separately. This is because first, in these combinations the institutional aim is expanded rather than replaced. Second, the change is in both institutional practices and aims. However, since in layering new policies are added to old policies, conversion does not replace the institution’s purpose but rather expands it.
Consequently, change resulting from a combination of these two modes can be seen as more extensive than change resulting from only one mode.
In the Israeli setting of encouraging Jewish immigration, layering of selective immigration programmes not only changed the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption’s structure and function, but also gradually converted it to a new purpose and increased its responsibility
– from integration to integration and encouraging immigration by skilled professionals.
Moreover, in the area of returning residents, layering of active return policies eventually led to expanding the ministry’s aim as well as changing its responsibility from assisting immigrants to assisting immigrants and returning residents. In the field of assistance in employment, policy tools were redirected to new aims of encouraging skilled and wealthy immigrants and returning residents to come to Israel. In addition, new policy tools were designed to meet the new aim. However, despite the new aim, old policy aims did not perish and old policy tools continued to serve them. Specifically, the Ministry of Immigrant
Absorption continued to provide vocational training and assistance in entrepreneurship to veteran immigrants. Nonetheless, as all three Israeli cases demonstrate, as the new policy layer expanded and the new policy aim became more prominent, the old layer stagnated or
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even eroded. The result of this process was a universal thin policy layer with decreasing level of state responsibility and a thicker selective layer with increasing level of state responsibility mostly for skilled and wealthy immigrants.
Existing explanations of the various modes of change do not account for the evolution of these combinations, nor for their content or direction. Among other reasons, this is because they do not address ideational components important for understanding actors’ broader motivations and constraints. Thus, an analysis of ideas at different levels of generality and the interaction between those levels has been attempted here. The analysis reveals that both conversion through layering and conversion and layering result from change in problem definition and policy solution ideas. However, while in conversion through layering the interaction between the levels is both top-down and bottom-up, in conversion and layering the interaction is only top-down. In addition, the conversion and layering combination includes not only change in the problem definition components, but also change in their relative salience.
Specifically, in conversion through layering change in problem definition ideas turns the decision makers’ attention to different policy solution ideas. The policies resulting from these ideas gradually expand the existing problem definition and with it the policy goal.
This expansion is possible when the new policies do not question the existing public philosophies in which the old policies are grounded, enabling them to reconcile multiple goods. Since gradual ideational change is quite extensive, affecting both the problem definition and policy solution ideas, policy change is extensive as well.
In immigration encouragement, the idea that Israel can win the competition for skilled immigrants led to the introduction of new programmes which questioned the existing separation between immigration and integration and changed the ministry’s aim from integration to integration and promoting immigration by skilled professionals. In the area of returning residents, the change in problem definition from emigration prevention to return of former residents led to introduction of new active programmes which gradually narrowed the gap between immigrants and returning residents, thus making it reasonable to expand ministry’s target population. During that time, the Zionist ideas of immigration as a tool for nation building and the gathering of exiles were not questioned. On the
141
contrary, they were even expanded (as seen in the returning residents case), and as a result, the two aims could have been reconciled.
In conversion and layering new components are added to existing problem definition, turning actors’ attention to new policy solution ideas. As a result, new policies are introduced. At the same time old problem definition components remain and so do old policy solution ideas. When the new problem definition ideas become dominant, the main policy aim changes and old ideas remain in the margins. Consequently, a gap between old policy tools and the new policy aim is formed. In order to close this gap old policy tools are redirected to new purposes. However, since old problem definition still coexists (albeit in the margins) old policy tools continue to serve old and new purposes.
In employment support, decision makers became concerned not only with the problem of immigrant underemployment but also with the barriers facing skilled and wealthy immigrants in the labour market. Consequently, new policy solution ideas of selective assistance to skilled immigrants contributing to the Israeli economy emerged, followed by selective policies. As the influence of race for talent ideas and policy increased the new problem definition became more dominant, and old policy tools of vocational training and assistance to entrepreneurs were redirected to the new purpose. At the same time the old problem definition remained and old policy tools continued to serve both the old problem of veteran immigrants’ employment and new problem of barriers to potential skilled immigrants.
Conversion is more likely when institutional rules are ambiguous, providing actors with opportunity to convert the institution without replacing it. The conversion through layering combination demonstrates that even when the institutions are less ambiguous actors still can convert them to new purposes. Moreover, conversion and layering demonstrates not only that actors can overcome political or institutional barriers by using one mode to achieve another, but also that they can use two modes simultaneously. Thus not only that each set of institutional and political characteristics is linked to more than one mode of change, but also there are many more strategies for gradual transformative change than suggested by Streeck and Thelen (2005).
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Displacement through layering combination
The initial absorption case has demonstrated that policy can be displaced through layering when previously neglected practices are reactivated, cultivated and then gradually added to existing practices. As in the conversion combinations, it has supported the argument that each set of political and institutional characteristics can result in more than one mode of change. Furthermore, it has expanded our concept of gradual transformative change because the combination of displacement through layering is qualitatively distinct from the way each of them is described separately by Streeck and Thelen (2010). This is because in this combination displacement takes place only at the new policy layer and does not replace all policy practices. Consequently, change resulting from the combination of these two modes can be seen as less extensive than change through displacement alone.
In the Israeli setting initial absorption policy was partly displaced from direct absorption, where the responsibility for absorption lay in the hands of the private market and the immigrants, to indirect absorption, where the state increased its responsibility for integration both by funding and by producing more services and making the policy more conditional. This reactivation of indirect absorption was first applied to weak immigrant groups, and in that, expanded an available but marginal policy logic, and was then adjusted to the new global immigration reality by including strong immigrants as well. The reactivated practices were added to existing universal direct absorption practices aiming at all other immigrants.
Existing explanations for the evolvement of various modes of change cannot account for this combination, both because displacement is usually ignored in the literature, and because as in conversion combinations, available accounts do not explain the direction and content of change and overlook actors’ nonmaterial motivations. Thus, an ideational analysis was conducted. The analysis reveals that displacement through layering is a result of partial change in problem definition and in the relative salience of different policy solution ideas, as well as of top-down and bottom-up interactions between the two.
Specifically, partial change in problem definition ideas changes the scope of plausible policy solution, making previously neglected and marginal practices appropriate again.
When previously neglected policy solution ideas become dominant, neglected policy tools
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are gradually reactivated. As a result of this reactivation, the existing problem definition is questioned, reinforcing additional change in policy solution ideas followed by policy change. Since the change in problem definition is partial, displacement is partial as well, and the renewed practices do not entirely replace old practices but are rather added to them.
In initial absorption policy, the problem definition of excessive government intervention was changed regarding weak immigrants, and thus policy solution ideas aiming at increased intervention reappeared, followed by corresponding practices. As indirect absorption practices became more dominant, among other things as a result of changes in global immigration policies, the entire integration approach was questioned, enabling further change in policy practices which made the policy more conditional and expanded government intervention. However, since the questioning of the problem definition took place only in the context of weak or skilled immigrants the reactivated policies were added to the existing policies towards the rest of the immigrants. At the end of the process, the integration policy for skilled and weak immigrants was based on significant government intervention, while for most immigrants the logic of action continued to be laissez faire.
This case has provided further empirical evidence for displacement and contributed to our understanding of this mode and the conditions for its evolvement. This is important since displacement is a relatively understudied mode of change considered rare in current politics. Moreover, displacement is often ignored not only because it is perceived as rare, but also because it is believed to be very similar to layering. However, these two modes differ in the result of change. In displacement the new/renewed practices replace old practices while in layering they are added to old practices (Van der Heijden, 2010). The combination of displacement through layering reinforces this distinction, since it is clear from the Israeli case that displacement replaced old practices in the new layer while leaving them in the old. Emphasizing displacement as a distinct mode of gradual transformative change might lead to further development and understanding of this mode, either separately or combined with others.
Drift
Drift takes place when the opposing party has some resources that enable it to actively block change. The KAMEA case demonstrates that when actors have access to resources
144
enabling them to create what seems as severe problem, they can bring about drift not trough actively preventing institutional update in face of changing reality, but through a more sophisticated and hidden strategy of turning decision makers’ attention away from the need to update the policy and towards what seems to be the more urgent issue. This is due to the fact that actors prioritize policy problems according to their perception of their severity.
One way to construct severe problems can be through strategic crisis creation, since crisis demands immediate response.
In the case of KAMEA the Ministry of Finance could not formally change the programme because of the strong veto power of the supporting coalition. However, its (albeit temporary) discretion over the budget allocated for the programme enabled it to create a constant sense of crisis and uncertainty that made the supporters of KAMEA focus on preserving the programme and turned their attention away from the need to adapt it to the changing reality. The neglect was deliberate and was made not through the use of veto points or blocking legislation, but through active attention shift. Thus although the reality had changed and the actors were aware of this change and even had alternatives to close the gap, they did not try to do so since their opponents managed to keep the issue out of the agenda.
The ideational analysis not only supports the attention argument by demonstrating actors’ inattention to the need to adjust the policy, but also explains the mechanism through which crisis leads to this inattention. Crisis can prevent policy adaptation and change when there is ideational stagnation and reinforcement that prevents the actors from looking for new policy solution and problem definition ideas. In KAMEA the constant crisis blocked any attempt for policy change because KAMEA’s problem definition was not changed and actors continued to justify the programme using the same problem definition from the beginning of the examined period. Moreover, the policy solutions ideas became a synecdoche, making it harder to change the policy. Consequently, the ideational reinforcement in policy solutions ideas and ideational stagnation in problem definition ideas resulting from the crisis did not leave room for new ideas and thus prevented adaptation to the changing reality.
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Drift is usually a result of deliberate neglect, when actors deliberately block attempts
(usually legislative amendments) to update the institution in face of the changing reality by use of veto points. The KAMEA case expands this “deliberate neglect” mechanism beyond veto points, revealing that it can be more hidden and sophisticated than existing research suggests. In that it supports Hacker et al. (2013), who consider drift one of the hidden faces of institutional change. In addition, the case also suggests more extensive theorizing of the role agenda setting plays in policy drift. Thus, it connects between the punctuated equilibrium theory, specifically the politics of attention, and gradual transformative change, breaking down the deceptive dichotomy between the two and allowing more theoretical pluralism. Furthermore, it also extends our understanding of the role of crisis in policy dynamics, adding change prevention to its roles of generating change and maintaining stability. Lastly, this case also changes our understanding of the role ideas play in policy drift. Accordingly, drift is not only a result of ideational change (see for example
Béland, 2007), but also of ideational stagnation and reinforcement of the existing ideas, preventing actors from looking for new ideas in order to adjust the policy.
General conclusion
This research is about policy change. It aims at gaining better understanding of gradual transformative change and the role ideas play in this change by examining various modes and combinations of modes of change in Israeli immigration policy in 1989-2010. It is evident from the Israeli case that contrary to Mahoney and Thelen (2010), each combination of political and institutional factors is linked to more than only one change mode. Moreover, as can be seen in Table 4 below, the combinations of several modes of change are distinct from the way single modes are described by Streeck, Thelen, Mahoney and Hacker. The difference lies in the coexistence of old and new policy tools and/or policy aims. Thus, some combinations result in more extensive change than the single modes and some in less. Lastly, the research has also expanded our understanding of drift by adding the politics of attention and crisis creation as another way for institutional deliberate neglect.
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Table 4: Policy outcomes of gradual transformative change modes and combinations
267
Drift
Layering
Conversion
Displacement
Conversion through layering
Conversion and layering
Displacement through layering
Old tools/ practices
+
+
+
New/renewed tools/practices
+
+
+ +
+
+
+
+
Old aims
+
+
+
+
+
+
New aims
+
+
+
The ideational analysis at different levels of generality and the interaction between the levels not only highlight the important role of ideas in explaining institutional change in general, and gradual transformative change in particular, but also makes gradual transformative change literature more explanatory. The analysis reveals that the content and direction of policy change correspond to those of ideational change, even when running counter to actors’ strategic interests or changes in electoral politics. The same was found in the comparative analysis. In addition, as seen in Table 5 below, combinations of several modes of change are the result of partial change in problem definition and policy solution ideas, i.e. change in the relative importance of different components and/or change in the composition of the components. This is because partial change enables the coexistence of old and new policy aims and/or old and new policy tools characterizing combinations of modes of change. Lastly, it also reveals that different combinations are characterized by different interaction between the levels of generality.
267
The outcomes presented for the separate modes – conversion, layering and drift – are based on adaptation of Mahoney and Thelen, (2010), p. 16.
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Table 5: Ideational dynamics behind combinations of modes of change
Policy solution ideas
– change in components
Policy solution ideas – change in relative importance
Problem definition ideas – change
Problem definition ideas – change in relative in components importance
Top-down interaction
Bottom-up interaction
Conversion through layering
Conversion and layering
Displacement through layering
+
+
+ +
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
148
Accordingly, this research also contributes to ideational research by providing empirical evidence to support theories of gradual ideational change and more theorization on its role in gradual transformative change. In that, it helps move ideational research one-step beyond punctuated equilibrium. Furthermore, the analysis of public philosophies provides an additional, nonmaterial, explanation for choosing gradual strategies. Since public philosophies create strong status quo bias, which constrains policy change (this constraining power was found in the comparative analysis as well), in order to change the policy actors must find a way not to contradict public philosophies. One way to do it is to bypass them by applying various gradual strategies which maintain existing institutions, even if only partly.
This research aims at narrowing the gap between theory and empirical evidence by going beyond the existing typologies for the evolvement of gradual transformative change. It highlights the important role ideas play in this type of policy change. Furthermore, it demonstrates that gradual transformation change modes are more sophisticated and complex than the existing research suggests. Specifically, they take place through combination of several modes and through the politics of attention and inattention. In that it reveals more venues for policy change. Following Thelen’s and others, it seems that the deeper we delve into the policy process the more we find.
Suggestions for future research
Gradual transformative changes characterize most socioeconomic changes in the Western world in the last 50 years. However, their research is still in its infancy. Thus much more can be done to expand our understanding of this topic. The main issues for future research can be divided into two main categories: gradual transformative change as a cause and as an outcome. This research has focused on the latter; however, since it examined mostly the
Israeli case our ability to generalize from it to other cases is limited.
Consequently, comparative research is needed to test the suggested mechanisms in other countries and other social fields in which gradual transformative change takes place. In addition, this research examined only three combinations of gradual transformative policy change, hence future studies should consider additional combinations in order to gain fuller understanding of gradual transformative change. Furthermore, since not all gradual
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transformative changes take place through combinations of modes, it is important to identify other conditions (both material and ideational) for combinations of modes of change and distinguish between the conditions leading to combinations or to single modes of change. Lastly, this research suggests the politics of attention as another mechanism behind policy drift. Given its novelty, more elaboration on the role of the politics of attention in policy drift is needed, specifically, the conditions for active attention shift leading to drift.
Future research may also profit from examining gradual transformative modes as a cause.
For example: the effect of the various modes and combinations of gradual transformative change on different policy outcomes. Although each mode or combination of modes of change is different, the existing literature does not distinguish between the effects of each on different policy outcomes. Policy outcomes can be divided to two main types:
(1) Agenda expansion : When the government intrudes into areas previously reserved for civic society or the market in order to address problems; and
(2) Agenda thickening: After the government has intervened in a certain area, the political system centres on how much attention to devote to the area (for example by increasing its funding or regulation) (Jones, 2012).
This distinction corresponds to the “punctuated equilibrium” framework. However, I believe it can be relevant to gradual transformative change as well, and contribute to theoretical pluralism.
150
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ריצקת
תיטילנאה תרגסמה
לש םדיקפת לע ו , ללכב תוינידמ ייוניש לע םייקה עדיה תא ביחרהל ותרטמו תוינידמ ייונישב קסוע הז רקחמ
לע םיעיפשמ םיינויער םייוניש דציכ קדוב רקחמה .טרפב םייתגרדה םייביטמרופסנרט תוינידמ ייונישב תונויער
תוירחאב םייוניש לש ןחוב ה הרקמ תועצמאב , םייתגרדה םייביטמרופסנרט םייוניש לש םיסופד יבולישו םיסופד
.לארשיב הטילקהו הריגהה תוינידמב הנידמה
םינשה םישימחב יברעמה םלועב םיילכלכ םייתרבח םימוחתב םייתועמשמה תוינידמה ייונישמ דבכנ קלח
ידסומה הנבמה ךותב םישחרתמה םייתפסות םייוניש : םייתגרדה םייביטמרופסנרט םייוניש ויה תונורחאה
.
הנידמה תוירחאב םג ולח הז גוסמ םייוניש .
ווק סוטטסב תיתועמשמ הרומתל ךילהת לש ופוסב םיאיבמ ו ,םייקה
תליחת מ רבועש ןמזה ךשמו יתגרדהה םייפוא ללגב רתיה ןיב תאז .ןיעהמ םייומס הלא םייוניש תובר םימעפ
םימש םניא תופוכת תוטלחה ילבקמ ןהו םירקוח ןה , ךכמ האצותכ .ויתואצות תא םיאור רשא דעו יונישה ךילהת
. ולא םייונישל בל
לש ךילהת :
(layering)
תוּבכש .א : םייתגרדה םייביטמרופסנרט םייוניש לש תויגטרטסא/ םיסופד השימח םנשי
םימייק תוינידמ ילכ תיינפה : ) conversion)
הרמה .ב ; םימייקה םינונגנמה סיסב לע םייפולח םינונגנמ תחימצ
רחא סופדל ומוקמ הנפמ יטננימוד הלועפ סופד רשאכ תשחרתמ
(displacement)
הקתה .ג ; תורחא תורטמל
תואיצמה ןיבל תוינידמה ןיב רצונש רעפ :
(drift)
ףחס .
ד ; ןכל םדוק יטננימוד היה אל ךא תכרעמה ךותב אצמנש
; הנתשמה תואיצמל תוינידמה תא םיאתהל אלש םיטילחמש תוטלחהה ילבקמ לש תנווכמ החנזהמ האצותכ חטשב
.םינושארה םיסופדה תעבראב קסוע הז רקחמ .
תוינידמה לש תיתגרדה הסירק :
(exhaustion
( יוצימ .ה ,ףוסבלו
ןתמ ב אלו יונישה רואיתב רקיעב םידקמתמ םייתגרדה םייביטמרופסנרט םייונישב םיקסועה םירקחמה תיברמ
רפסמ לש בולישמ האצותכ ללוחתהל יושע הז גוסמ יוניש יכ םיארמה םיאצממה ףא לע ,ןכל .ותורצוויהל רבסה
,ףסונב .םתוא הריבסמ הניא ףאו םינושה םיבולישה תא הרידגמ הניא תמייקה תורפסה , תויגטרטסא/ םיסופד
םיפסונ םינונגנמ ונ כתייש יפ לע ףא תאז , וטו תויוכזב שומיש אוה ףחס תורצוויהל תורפסב ןחבנש דיחיה ןונגנמה
יפ לעו , ונוויכלו יונישה ןכותל רבסה תקפסמ הניא ףא תורפסה ,ךכמ הרתי .האצותה התואל איבהל םייושעש
.ויפואב ינרמש אוה יונישה יכ החינ מ בור
לע תוינידמה ירוחאמש תונויערה תעפשה תקידב איה הלא תונורסח ל הנעמ תתל ןתינ התועצמאב תחא ךרד
ןכות לע םיעיפשמ ו , םיברועמה םימרוגה תופדעה תא םיבצעמ תונויער ש ןוויכמ תאז .םינושה יונישה יסופד
יונישה יסופד תנבהב בושח דיקפת תונויערל יכ הארמ תורפסהש יפ לע ףא ,תאז םע .התוחתפתה לעו תוינידמה
.
םייתגרדה םייביטמרופסנרט םייונישב תונויער לש םדיקפתל םייטרואית םירבסה תקפסמ הניא איה ,םינושה
162
ךא שידקמו , םידח תוינידמ ייונישל םיאיבמה םידח םיינויער םייונישב בורל קסוע ינויערה רקחמה ,ךכמ הרתי
.תמייקה תוינידמב תיתועמשמ הרומת ללוחל ידכ םהב שיש םייתגרדה םיינויער םייונישל בל תמושת טעמ
היגולודותמ
הריגהה תוינידמב ןחוב ירקמ השימח ב
(process tracing)
"ךילהת רחא תוקחתה " תטיש לע ססובמ הז רקחמ
םיבשות ) 2 ( , הילע דודיע ) 1 ( : 1989-2010 םינשה ןיב םייתועמשמ םייוניש ולח םהב לארשיב הטילקהו
םייונישה ונחבנ םירקמהמ דחא לכב .םילוע םינעדמ תטילק ) 5 ( ו , הקוסעת ) 4 ( , תינושאר הטילק ) 3 ( , םירזוח
תורצוויהל תונויער ואיבה ותועצמאב יתביסה ןונגנמהו הנידמה תוירחאב ולחש םייתגרדהה םייביטמרופסנרט ה
תועצמאב הרמה ) 1 ( :םיסופד יבוליש השולש ופשח ןחובה ירקמ .םיסופד רפסמ לש בוליש וא םיוסמ סופד
לש סופד ההוז םירקמה דחאב , ןכ ומכ .תובכש תועצמאב הקתה ) 3 ( ו , תובכש םע בולישב הרמה ) 2 ( ,תובכש
תוירחאב םייוניש ונחבנ , ילא רשיה הרקמל רבעמ ,רתוי בחר רשקהב רקחמה יאצממ תא ןוחבל תנמ לע .ףחס
.וז תוינידמ ירוחאמ תונויערה ןכו דנלוהו הידבש ,הדנק לש הטילקהו הריגהה תוינידמב הנידמה
םיאצממ
הריגהה תוינידמל המוד הגרדהב תכפוה תילארשיה הטילקהו הריגהה תוינידמ ,התוידוחיי ףא לע ,תישאר
.םלועב תורחא תונידמב הטילקהו
ירוחאמש תונויערל םאתה ב , תינמז וב תמצמטצמו תבחרתמ הנידמה תוירחא הטילקהו הריגהה תוינידמב ,תינש
תוינידמה לע םיעיפשמ הריגה לע םיילבולג תונויער ובש ךילהת רכינ ,טרפב .
ה לא תונויערב םייונישלו תוינידמה
.
תוינידמה ירוחאמש ת וירוביצה תויפוסוליפה תא םירתוס םניא דוע לכ ,םיימוקמ תונויער רשאמ רתוי
.דבלב דחא סופדמ האצותכ ש יונישה ףקיהמ הנוש םיסופד רפסמ לש בולישמ האצותכ יונישה ףקיה ,תישילש
תוטלחהה ילבקמ לש בלה תמושת תא טיסהל הרטמב רצונש רבשמ תועצמאב רצוויהל יושע ףחס ,תיעיבר
תוינידמה תייעב תרדגה לע תונויערב ןואפיק לש האצות אוהו ,ה נתשמה תואיצמל תוינידמה תא םיאתהל ךרוצהמ
.תוינידמה ילכ לע תונויער לש קוזיחו
הריתסב םידמוע ןכותהו ןוויכה םיתיעל .
ונוויכ לעו יונישה ןכות לע םיעיפשמ ינויער יונישו תונויער ,תישימח
.תוטלחהה ילבקמ לש םייטילופה םיסרטניאל
תרדגה לעו תוינידמה ילכ לע תונויערב םייונישמ האצותכ םירצונ יוניש יסופ ד רפסמ לש םיבוליש ,תישיש
.םיינשה ןיב היצקארטניאהו תוינידמה תייעב
163
תומכחותמ תויגטרטסאב שומישמ האצותכ שחרתהל יושע יתגרדה יביטמרופסנרט יוניש יכ םיארמ ה לא םיאצממ
לש םינונגנמ תוטקונו יוניש יסופד רפסמ תובלשמש תויגטרטסא : םייקה רקחמה הארמ ש יפכמ רתוי תובכרומו
הללכה תומרב םיינויער םייוניש לש יתטיש חותינ ,ףסונב .תוטלחהה ילבקמ לש בלה תמושת לש הטסהו היינפה
םייתגרדה םייוניש לעו ללכב תוינידמ לע םיעיפשמ תונויער דציכ רתוי בוט ןיבהל רשפאמ תונוש
םייוניש לע וז תבכרומ תולכתסה .תוינידמה ךילהתב תונויערה תובישח תא קזחל ךכבו , טרפב םייביטמרופסנרט
רתסנה בר יכ םילגמ , תוינידמה ךילהתב רתוי םירבונש לככ יכ השוחתה תא תקזחמ םייתגרדה םייביטמרופסנרט
.הלגנה לע
164
םייתגרדה תוינידמ ייונישו םי ינויער םי יוניש
תוינידמב הנידמה תוירחא : םייביטמרופסנרט
לארשיב הטילקהו הריגהה
היפוסוליפל רוטקוד ראות תלבקל רוביח
תאמ
ןמזייפש הנליא
ם ילשוריב ת ירבעה הטיסרבינואה טאנסל שגוה
2014 רבמבונ
165
