TITLE TWELVE: Crimes Against Civil Status of Persons
Manuel vs. People (G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005)
Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975, who,
according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen
again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only
21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in Baguio
City without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first marriage. In the course of their marriage, things
got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him. She
then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense being that his
declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good
faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for
the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him
sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,
000.00 for moral damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for
bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any
malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTC’s decision.
Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages
was affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioner’s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no
judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the
award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.
Held:
1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice
or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith
of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or
criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know
the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the
present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the
presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present
spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a
subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee
spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. The court rules against the petitioner.
2. The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and
after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused
injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they
undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general
welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy,
she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant circumstances of the case,
the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.
Diego vs. Castillo (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673, August 11, 2004)
Facts:
·
January 9, 1965: Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr., both Filipinos,
solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City.
·
February 15, 1978: Jorge filed a Decree of Divorce in Texas.
·
June 4, 1987: Crescencia Escoto using the name Lucena Escoto married Manuel P. Diego before the
Rev. Fr. Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City.
·
The sister of Manuel P. Diego filed a criminal case of bigamy against Escoto
·
RTC: Acquittal since state failed to prove guilt beyond whisper of a doubt and gave credence to the
defense of the accused that she acted without any malicious intent for believing in good faith that her
marriage was already annulled by a foreign judgment
·
An administrative case is filed against Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for Knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment under Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal Code
Issue:
W/N Castillo should be liable against Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
NO. Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is FINED P10,000 with a STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely
·
The law requires that
(a) the offender is a judge;
(b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision;
(c) the judgment is unjust;
(d) he knew that said judgment is unjust
·
even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused, he still cannot be administratively
charged lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose
·
As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.
·
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient
defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.
·
error committed by respondent Judge being gross and patent, the same constitutes ignorance of
the law of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary action
People vs. Abunado (G.R. No. 159218, 30 March 2004)
Facts:
Salvador Abunado married Zenaida Biñas on December 24, 1955. In 1966, Salvador separated
from Zenaida. On September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceña. Several years later in 1988,
Narcisa left the country to work in Japan. On January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage
with Zenaida. When Narcisa returned in 1992, she discovered that Salvador left their conjugal home and
now has an extramarital affair with a certain Fe Corazon Palto. Narcisa also learned of Salvador’s
marriage to Zenaida in 1989. On January 19, 1995, Salvador filed an annulment case against Narcisa.
That same year, on May 18, 1995, Narcisa filed a complaint for bigamy against Salvador and Zenaida.
Salvador, however, claimed he cannot be liable for bigamy since Narcisa has consented to his marriage
with Zenaida. Salvador moreover, argued that his petition for annulment was a prejudicial question
hence, proceedings in the bigamy case should first be suspended to give way to the civil case for
annulment.
Issue:
Whether or not the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial to the case.
Held:
Void marriages, as a rule, are ipso facto void. As an exception, however, Article 40 of the Family
Code considers a void marriage valid for purposes remarriage until a judicial declaration of nullity is
obtained before contracting a subsequent marriage.
Under Article 40 of the family Code, the marital vinculum of a previous marriage that is void ab
initio subsists only for purposes of remarriage. For purposes other than remarriage, marriages that are
void ab initio, such as those falling under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code, are void even without a
judicial declaration of nullity. As the Court held in Cariño v. Cariño [226 SCRA 572]:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes
other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
Cariño, penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago herselg, contradicts the statement in her
present ponencia that “under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.” I believe the ruling in Cariño is correct and
should not be disturbed. As Justice Jose C. Vitug explained in his recent textbook on Civil law (Volume I):
The phrase “for purposes of remarriage” is not at all insignificant. Void marriages, like void contracts, are
inexistent for the very beginning. It is only by way of exception that the family Code requires a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before a subsequent marriage is contracted.
Thus, the general rule is if the marriage is void ab initio, it is ipso facto void without need of any
judicial declaration of nullity. The only recognized exception under existing law is Article 40 of the Family
Code where marriage void ab initio is deemed valid for purposes of remarriage, hence necessitating a
judicial declaration of nullity before one can contract a subsequent marriage. Article 40 of the Family
Code applies only to a situation where the previous marriage suffers from nullity while the second
marriage does not. Under Article 40, what requires a judicial declaration of nullity is the previous
marriage, not the subsequent marriage.
Article 40 does not apply to a situation where the first marriage does not suffer from any defect
while the second is void.
Morigo vs. People (G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004)
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but
after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They
got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in
Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo
was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending
posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage
with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.
Issue:
Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before
his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.
Held:
Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage
contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he
contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the
case filed.
Mercado vs. Tan (G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000)
Facts:
The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial court’s judgment, as follows:
"From the evidence adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent
Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City
Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibañez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed
by the parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was ‘single’. There is no dispute either
that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married
man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April
10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in
connection therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10,
1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil marriage
between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by
Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated
when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent
Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.
"On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel
with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present
case before this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information
dated January 22, 1993.
"On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the
Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V.
Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G.
Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
Issues:
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict petitioner.
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of
petitioner.
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt.
Held:
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision "plainly makes a subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance,
and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable
marriages."
The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code
and Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision, expressly
requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows:
"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void."
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such marriage void
was necessary. Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law
authority and member of the Civil Code Revision Commitee has observed:
"[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the marriage of a
person may be null and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact before that person
can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86,
143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision changes the old rule that where
a marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity
(People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033)."
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon – that there is no need
for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family
Code. Such declaration is now necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that
declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy.
Garcia vs. CA (G.R. No. 119063 January 27, 1997)
Facts:
On 28 August 1991, petitioner Jose G. Garcia filed with the (Quezon City Prosecutor's Office an
"Affidavit of Complaint" charging his wife, private respondent Adela Teodora P. Santos alias "Delia
Santos," with Bigamy, Violation of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, and Falsification of Public
Documents. However, in his letter of 10 October 1991 to Assistant City Prosecutor George F. Cabanilla,
the petitioner informed the latter that he would limit his action to bigamy. After appropriate
proceedings, Assistant Prosecutor Cabanilla filed on 8 January 1992 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of (Quezon City an information, dated 15 November 1991, charging the private respondent with Bigamy
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or before the 2nd day of February, 1957, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being previously united in lawful
marriage with REYNALDO QUIROCA, and without the said marriage having been dissolved, (or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
JOSE G. GARCIA, which marriage has [sic] discovered in 1989, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's order
granting the motion to quash the information for bigamy based on prescription.
Held:
Finally, the petitioner draws our attention to the private respondent's several trips abroad as
enumerated in the certification of the Bureau of Immigration, and cites the second paragraph of Article
91 of the RPC, viz.: "the term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago." We agree with the Court of Appeals that these trips abroad did not constitute
the "absence" contemplated in Article 91. These trips were brief, and in every case the private
respondent returned to the Philippines. Besides, these were made long after the petitioner discovered
the offense and. even if the aggregate number of days of these trips are considered, still the information
was filed well beyond the prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the challenged decision of 13
February 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14324 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.