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Text: The People’s Republic of China should <insert the plan/advantage CP plan
plank that resolves the aff’s terminal impacts>
Solvency – Chinese investment solves 100% of the case – efficient and reliable.
Gallagher Associate Professor of International Relations 2013.
(BA, Northeastern University; MA, PhD, Tufts University) Specialization: Economic
Development, Trade and Investment Policy, International Environmental Policy, Latin America.
30 May 2013 [Kevin, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/povertymatters/2013/may/30/latin-america-risky-chinese-dragon]
The Chinese president, Xi Jinping, travels to the US and Latin America this week, for the first
time since he took office in March. What a difference a decade makes. Ten years ago, there
would hardly have been any fanfare about a Chinese visit to the region. Now, for Brazil, Chile
and others, China is the most important trade and investment partner. China-Latin America
trade surpassed $250bn (£165bn) last year. Although China's impact in Africa receives the most
attention, China trades just as much in Latin America as in Africa, and has more investments in
the region. Chinese finance in Latin America – chiefly from the China Development Bank and
the Export-Import Bank of China – is staggeringly large and growing. In a recently updated
report, colleagues and I estimate that, since 2005, China has provided loan commitments of
more than $86bn to Latin American countries. That is more than the World Bank or the InterAmerican Development Bank have provided to the region during the same period. China's
presence is a great opportunity for Latin America, but it brings new risks. If the region can seize
the new opportunities that come with Chinese finance, countries could come closer to their
development goals, and pose a real challenge to the way western-backed development banks
do business. However, if Latin American nations don't channel this new trade and investment
toward long-term growth and sustainability, the risks may take away many of the rewards. First,
the positive side. Chinese trade and investment is partly a blessing for Latin America because it
diversifies the sources of finance – finance that for too long has relied on the west. The US and
European economies have been anaemic since 2008, and trade with China has tugged Latin
American growth rates to impressive levels. Every 1% increase in Chinese growth is correlated
with a 1.2% increase in Latin American growth. Chinese finance is more in tune with what
Latin American nations want, rather than with what western development experts say they
"need". Whereas the US and international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank
and IMF tend to finance in line with the latest development fads such as trade liberalisation
and micro-anti-poverty programmes, Chinese loans tend to go into energy and infrastructure
projects in a region that has an annual infrastructure gap of $260bn. Neither do Chinese loans
come with the harsh strings attached to IFI finance. The IFIs are notorious for their
"conditionalities" that make borrowers sign up to austerity and structural adjustment
programmes that have had questionable outcomes on growth and equality in the region. But
there are risks. While the Chinese do not attach policy conditions to their loans, they have
required that borrowers contract Chinese firms, buy Chinese equipment, and sometimes sign oil
sale agreements that require nations to send oil to China in exchange for the loans instead of
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local currency. Chinese investment accentuates the deindustrialisation of Latin America. Large
scale, capital intensive commodities production is not very employment-intensive, nor does it
link well with other sectors of an economy. Dependence on commodities can cause a
"resource curse" where the exchange rate appreciates such that exporters of manufacturing
and services industries can't compete in world markets – and thus contribute to
deindustrialisation and economic vulnerability. Producing natural resource-based commodities
also brings major environmental risk. Many of China's iron, soy and copper projects are found in
Latin America's most environmentally sensitive areas. In areas such as the Amazon and the
Andean highlands, conflict over natural resources, property rights and sustainable livelihoods
have been rife for decades. In our report, we find that Chinese banks actually operate under a
set of environmental guidelines that surpass those of their western counterparts when at
China's stage of development. Nevertheless, those guidelines are not on par with 21st century
standards for development banking. Stronger standards should be in place at a time when
environmental concerns are at an all-time high. With every opportunity comes a challenge. Latin
Americans have access to a new source of finance that gives them more leeway to meet their
own development goals. If Latin America doesn't channel some of the finance to support
macroeconomic stability, economic diversification, equality and environmental protection, this
new source of finance could bring great risk.
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Investment
U.S. China FDI high now—Empirics Prove Upward Trend
Kavilanz, Senior Writer at CNN/Money and Degree from New York University,
‘12
Parija, 7/26/12, http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/25/investing/china-investingus/index.htm, 7/7/13, ARH)
Chinese direct investment in the United States could hit a record high in 2012, according to a
new research report released Wednesday. Total Chinese foreign direct investment in the U.S. is
on pace to reach at least $8 billion this year, according to the report from research firm
Rhodium Group. That would top the previous record of $5.7 billion reached in 2010, said Thilo
Hanemann, research director with Rhodium Group, which tracks all acquisitions and
investments in manufacturing facilities, warehouses, labs and offices by foreign companies in
the United States valued at $1 million or higher. Hanemann said this year's pending multi-billion
dollar acquisitions include Dalian Wanda's $2.6 billion dollar bid for movie theater chain AMC
and Chinese aerospace manufacturer Superior Aviation's $1.8 billion bid for Wichita, Kan.-based
aircraft maker Hawker Beechcraft. "If those two deals happen, we may even cross $8 billion this
year," said Hanemann. Chinese investors are targeting a variety of American industries for
investment. These include advanced manufacturing and oil and gas -- led by Sinopec's (SHI)
$2.5 billion stake in Devon Energy (DVN, Fortune 500) projects. Other industries in focus are
renewable energy, aerospace, electronics and banking. Hanemann says changes in China's
economy, which is growing at its slowest pace since the recession, are forcing Chinese
companies to look for faster growth opportunities in developed economies such as the United
States.
FDI high now—Empirics prove
PTI, The Economic Times and established economic analysis journal, ‘12
(7/30/13, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-0730/news/32942497_1_chinese-fdi-chinese-investment-china-s-fdi, 7/7/13, ARH)
China's investments in the US are expected to hit a record high this year surpassing the
previous level of about USD 5.7 billion despite various political and security concerns, says a
study. Chinese investment, or outbound FDI, in the US reached USD 3.6 billion in the first half
of this year and is expected to cross USD 8 billion, according to a study by New York based
Rhodium Group. The investments so far covered 33 projects. Of these, 12 were acquisitions and 21 involved
green-field investments, according to the highlights of the report published in the state-run 'China Daily' today. The report cautioned
that the main challenge US businesses will face in pursuing infrastructure projects will be finding the logistical and legal means to
participate more directly without sparking national security concerns. Rhodium's research director Thilo Hanemann said there is
deep concern in the US over Chinese FDI in the telecom sector, and with recent incidents involving ZTE such sentiment won't fade
anytime soon. The company was recently accused of selling equipment to Iran from US companies Hewlett-Packard, Dell, Cisco
Systems and Juniper Networks, in violation of US export controls. Rhodium, which monitors Chinese FDI in the US, said that the
large-scale investments could make 2012 a record year with over USD 8 billion, beating the USD 5.7 billion record set in 2010. Ge
Shunqi, deputy head of the Institute of International Economics at Nankai University in Tianjin, told China Daily that with the US
investment from China is particularly welcomed. "Chinese
investment in the US offers great potential and will help stabilise growth in the next decade,"
he said. Sang Baichuan, director of the Institute of International Business at the University of
International Business and Economics, believed that a new era was dawning. "After decades of
growth, Chinese enterprises are capable of entering the developed US market and China's
large foreign reserves will also be of benefit," he said.
economy trying to get out of the doldrums,
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Lingering resentment towards US makes China the ideal choice for investment
Regenstreif, senior editor at Reuters, 6/12/13
[Gary, 6/12/13, Reuters, “The looming US-China rivalry over Latin America”,
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latinamerica/, Accessed 7/2/13, ML]
The United States, Latin America’s largest trading partner throughout much of its history, still
retains this position. Washington has now signed free trade agreements with more than a third
of the hemisphere’s nations and annually exchanges more than $800 billion in goods and
services with Latin America — more than three times the region’s commerce with China.¶ In
Obama’s first term, however, the administration was widely viewed as neglecting Latin America.
And China has moved in fast.¶ China built its annual trade with the region from virtually nothing
in 2000 to about $260 billion in 2012. In 2009, it overtook the United States as the largest
trading partner of Brazil, the region’s powerhouse — largely through massive purchases of iron
ore and soy.¶ Other data is telling: In 1995, for example, the United States accounted for 37
percent of Brazil’s foreign direct investment. That dropped to 10 percent in 2011, according to
the Council of the Americas, which seeks to foster hemispheric ties.¶ Washington’s renewed
ardor is at least partly because of the fear that China will repeat in Latin America the economic
success it has built in Africa. China has been able to present itself as a benevolent partner
there, which has played well against the West’s history of meddling in domestic affairs. ¶ “It’s
about influence and leverage,” said Eric Farnsworth, vice president of the Council of the
Americas, “…The region matured and expects to be treated in real partnership rather than [in
the] patronizing way it happened in the past.Ӧ The challenges facing Beijing and Washington
lie in how each approaches the region. Washington confronts lingering resentment about its
historic regional interference, stretching back to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, and its continuing
desire to mix business with policy — which muddies its approach to trade and investment.
Washington’s domestic problems, its pivot to Asia and a host of global crises, also serve as
distractions that could keep its actions in Latin America from matching its words — as has
happened before.¶ China, meanwhile, is largely viewed in the region as unencumbered by
ideology. It approaches opportunities almost exclusively on commercial terms there. Biden, in
a May 29 speech in Rio de Janeiro, gushed about the progress made by Latin America and
trumpeted the region’s growing international stature.¶ “In the U.S.,” Biden said, “the discussion
is no longer what it was when I was first elected as a young man: What could we do for the
Americas? That’s long since gone. The issue now is: What can we do together? We want to
engage more. We think there’s great opportunity. We’re optimistic.”¶ As with many new starts,
a recognition of past mistakes is in order. “For many in Brazil,” Biden said, “the United States
doesn’t start with a clean slate. There’s some good reason for that skepticism. That skepticism
still exists and it’s understandable. But the world has changed. We’re moving past old
alignments, leaving behind old suspicions and building new relationships.”
Chinese Willing to Invest—Precedents Prove
Ellis, Author for the NDU Press and Assistant Professor of National Security
Studies, ‘11
[Evan, First Quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html,
7/2/13, ARH]
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China's combination of massive sustained trade surpluses and high internal savings rates gives
the PRC significant resources that many in Latin America hope will be invested in their
countries. Chinese president Hu Jintao helped to generate widespread awareness of the
possibility of Chinese investment in the region during his trip to five Latin American countries in
2004, specifically mentioning tens of billions of dollars in possible investment projects. A
public controversy over whether his use of the figure $100 billion was actually referring to trade
or investment has only called more attention in Latin America to China as a potential source of
funds. Although the expected Chinese investment was initially slow to materialize, today,
thanks to China's growing familiarity with doing business in Latin America, and its enormous
financial reserves (including a foreign currency surplus that had reached $2.5 trillion by mid20105), the PRC has begun to loan, or invest, tens of billions of dollars in the region, including
in high-profile deals such as: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; $16.3 billion commitment to
develop the Junin-4 oil block in Venezuela's Orinoco oil belt $10 billion to Argentina to
modernize its rail system; $3.1 billion to purchase the Argentine petroleum company Bridas $1
billion advance payment to Ecuador for petroleum, and another $1.7 billion for a hydroelectric
project, with negotiations under way for $3 billion to $5 billion in additional investments more
than $4.4 billion in commitments to develop Peruvian mines, including Toromocho, Rio Blanco,
Galleno, and Marcona $5 billion steel plant in the Brazilian port of Açu, and another $3.1 billion
to purchase a stake in Brazilian offshore oil blocks from the Norwegian company Statoil; a $10
billion loan to Brazil's Petrobras for the development of its offshore oil reserves; and $1.7 billion
to purchase seven Brazilian power companies. For Latin America, the timing of the arrival of
the Chinese capital magnified its impact, with major deals ramping up in 2009, at a time when
many traditional funding sources in the region were frozen because of the global financial
crisis. Moreover, as Sergio Gabrielli, president of the Brazilian national oil company Petrobras
has commented, China is able to negotiate large deals, integrating government and private
sector activities in ways that U.S. investors cannot.
Chinese Investment better than U.S. – Growth Proves
Gallagher, professor of international relations at Boston University and a
research fellow at the Global Development and Environment Institute, 5/30/13,
[Kevin, 5/30/13, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/povertymatters/2013/may/30/latin-america-risky-chinese-dragon, 7/2/13, ARH]
First, the positive side. Chinese trade and investment is partly a blessing for Latin America
because it diversifies the sources of finance – finance that for too long has relied on the west.
The US and European economies have been anemic since 2008, and trade with China has
tugged Latin American growth rates to impressive levels. Every 1% increase in Chinese growth
is correlated with a 1.2% increase in Latin American growth. Chinese finance is more in tune
with what Latin American nations want, rather than with what western development experts
say they "need". Whereas the US and international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the
World Bank and IMF tend to finance in line with the latest development fads such as trade
liberalization and micro-anti-poverty programs, Chinese loans tend to go into energy and
infrastructure projects in a region that has an annual infrastructure gap of $260bn. Neither do
Chinese loans come with the harsh strings attached to IFI finance. The IFIs are notorious for
their "conditionalities" that make borrowers sign up to austerity and structural adjustment
programs that have had questionable outcomes on growth and equality in the region.
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Chinese Investment k2 Relations in the Region
Mi, Writer for EnglishNews.cn and Xinhuanet.com, 6/5/13
[Li, 6/5/13, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/05/c_132432058.htm, 7/2/13,
ARH]
Chinese President Xi Jinping's ongoing trip to Latin America and the Caribbean has ushered in
a new chapter in the region's fast-growing bilateral relations with China. The trip also proves
that the two sides can be each other's opportunities in their long-term comprehensive
cooperation. In the past decade, the development of bilateral trade testifies to the win-win
cooperation China and its Latin American partners have vowed to seek. China is now the
second largest trading partner of Latin America and a leading source of investment in the
region. It is the largest trading partner of Brazil and Chile. Free trade agreements have been
signed between China and Chile, Peru as well as Costa Rica respectively. Even amidst the global
economic downturn and the European debt crisis, bilateral trade reached 261.2 billion U.S.
dollars in 2012, increasing by 8.1 percent year-on-year. It is expected to reach 400 billion
dollars in 2017. It is undeniable that China's demand for commodities revived the growth
engine for resource-rich Latin America in recent years. However, Latin America is not just
China's raw material corner, nor is China Latin America's one-time bonanza. To enhance
cooperation across such geographical distances is not bricolage. The trade structures of China
and Latin American countries are highly complementary. They offer a wide range of
cooperation opportunities that have been expanded beyond energy to include, among other
things, finance, agriculture, infrastructure, science and technology, aerospace, and tourism.
The economic exchange between China and Latin America has also found a balance between
trade and investment, evolving from the trade-dominated mode at the very beginning. China's
investment in Latin America has reached around 65 billion dollars and created much-needed
jobs in the region. The infrastructure projects funded by Chinese banks and built by Chinese
contractors set good examples that China and Latin America have already been on track for
comprehensive cooperation in the long term.
Chinese influence is preferred over that of the U.S. in Latin America
Ellis, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies at the National Defense University, 2011
[R. Evan, National Defense University, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”,
Accessed July 5, 2013, S.M.]
China's historical status as a "leader of the developing world" positions it as the natural ally of
the new generation of Latin American populist leaders, such as Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa,
and Evo Morales. During his first trip to Beijing after being elected president, for example,
Morales proclaimed himself to be a "great admirer of Mao," while Chávez has exclaimed that
Mao and South American revolutionary icon Simón Bolívar would have been "great friends."
While these leaders may primarily be seeking Chinese investments and commodity purchases,
the position of the PRC as a geopolitical "alternative" to the United States shapes the way that
they court the Chinese. In permitting such hopes, the PRC has, to date, been careful not to
associate itself directly with the anti-U.S. activities or rhetoric of these regimes, so as not to
damage its strategically important relationship with the United States and the West.
Nonetheless, the relationship cannot avoid some flavor of the relationships between the
Soviet Union and its Latin American client states during the Cold War. Bolivia turned to China
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to purchase K–8 combat aircraft, for example, after the United States blocked its ability to
procure aircraft from the Czech Republic.
China is seen as a role model in Latin America
Ellis, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies at the National Defense University, 2011
[R. Evan, National Defense University, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”,
Accessed July 5, 2013, S.M.]
The tremendous, sustained economic growth that the PRC has enjoyed since opening up to
the world in 1978 has caused many in Latin America to look to China's integration of
capitalism and authoritarian politics as a development model , even while the U.S.
combination of liberal democracy, free markets, and privatization is increasingly seen as
ineffective for solving the region's endemic problems, such as corruption, poverty, and
inequality. For traditional Latin American elites, the Chinese model is particularly attractive
because it suggests that it is possible to achieve prosperity and growth without relinquishing
political power.
Increased China and Latin American business
The Economist, weekly newspaper on international politics and business, 13
[The Economist 6/6/13, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economistexplains/2013/06/economist-explains-3 PB]
XI JINPING'S first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean as China’s president, from May 31st to
June 6th, took him tantalisingly close to Beijing’s strongest ideological allies in the region, Cuba
and Venezuela. Yet he steered clear of both of them. Instead of visiting Cuba, as his predecessor
Hu Jintao did on his first presidential trip to the region, Mr Xi stopped off in an English-speaking
Caribbean nation, Trinidad and Tobago, which (as if to rub it in) is only a short hop from Caracas.
He then travelled to Costa Rica and Mexico (pictured)—two countries that are at least as much a
part of America’s orbit as Cuba and Venezuela are part of the “Beijing Consensus”. Why this
snub to two friendly nations that have been lavished with Chinese largesse in recent years,
especially at a time when both are struggling to come to terms with the death in March of Hugo
Chávez, the Cuba- and China-loving Venezuelan leader? The short answer is: for simplicity’s sake.
Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raised distracting questions when Mr Xi meets
Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, and neither socialist government was likely to
express publicly any offence at being left off the itinerary. The beauty of having a chequebook as
thick as China’s is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder, you can always mollify them
with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuela’s oil minister announced that he had
secured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion already
provided by Beijing. Not quite in the same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana
Times reported this week that China was also planning to invest in Cuban golf courses, the
island’s latest fad. However, as our story on Mr Xi’s visit to Latin America points out, he may
have had other reasons for picking the destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to
respond to Mr Obama’s “pivot” to Asia by showing that China is developing its own sphere of
influence in America’s backyard. China’s business relationship with Latin America gets less
attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According
to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexico’s National Autonomous University, Latin America
and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct
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investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin Gallagher of
Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and
Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship
China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the region’s commodities,
importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and
Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico,
a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of
Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports.
But as wages in China have increased and high energy prices have raised the cost of shipping
goods from China to America, Beijing may be looking for bases such as Mexico and Costa Rica
where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade agreements with the United
States. This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an immediate threat to
Venezuela and Cuba? Probably not: China will continue to need their staunch ideological
support over issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it does suggest that China’s economic interest
in the region is broadening, especially along the Pacific coast. If that proves to be the case, Cuba
and Venezuela, deprived of the charismatic Chávez to court Beijing on their behalf, will have to
work hard to stay relevant.
China soft power expanding in Latin America due to great economic and
cooperative success- China key to Latin American economic success.
Ellis 09
Dr. R. Evan Ellis is a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation
with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin America’s
relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, [Dr. R. Evan ellis 2009
http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html PB]
The reemergence of China as a dominant global actor highlights longstanding ambiguities in U.S.
thinking regarding what constitutes national security. People's Republic of China (PRC)
policymakers have emphasized the "peaceful" nature of China's rise and have generally avoided
military or political actions that could be seen by the United States as "threatening."
Nonetheless, the economic, institutional, and cultural battles through which the PRC has
advanced its position have both leveraged and contributed to an erosion of the U.S. strategic
position globally. The advance of China and the multidimensional strategic challenge that it
poses are most effectively characterized by one of the most loosely defined and misunderstood
buzzwords in the modern parlance: soft power. The concept of soft power was introduced in
1990 by Harvard Professor Joseph Nye, who defined it as "a dynamic created by a nation
whereby other nations seek to imitate that nation, become closer to that nation, and align its
interests accordingly."1 Although the term is used to refer to a range of concepts, this article
analyzes Chinese soft power in terms of the willingness of governments and other actors in the
international system to orient themselves and behave in ways that benefit the PRC because they
believe doing so to be in their own interests. Such a definition, by necessity, is incomplete. There
are many reasons why other actors may decide that actions beneficial to the PRC are also in
their own interests: they may feel an affinity for the Chinese culture and people and the
objectives of its government, they may expect to receive economic or political benefits from
such actions, or they may even calculate that the costs or risks of "going against" the PRC are
simply too great. Soft power is a compelling concept, yet it operates through vaguely defined
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mechanisms. In the words of Nye, "in a global information age...success depends not only on
whose army wins, but on whose story wins."2 The implications of soft power in the
contemporary environment are difficult to evaluate because they involve a complex web of
interconnected effects and feedback in which the ultimate results of an action go far beyond the
initial stimulus and the ultimate importance of an influence goes far beyond what is initially
apparent. This article examines Chinese soft power in the specific context of Latin America. The
United States has long exercised significant influence in the region, while the PRC has
historically been relatively absent. Nonetheless, in recent years, China's economic footprint in
Latin America, and its attempts to engage the region politically, culturally, and otherwise, has
expanded enormously. Understanding the nature and limits of PRC soft power in Latin America
casts light on Chinese soft power in other parts of the world as well. The Nature of Chinese Soft
Power In general, the bases of Chinese soft power differ from those of the United States, leading
analysts to underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those
factors that are the sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the world's youth for
American music, media, and lifestyle, the widespread use of the English language in business
and technology, or the number of elites who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions.
It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is,
inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and
investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3its
influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather
on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft
power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular
situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chávez
in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while
countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an
important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The
core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread
perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and
technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and
will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into
seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment
influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as
a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China as a development model
affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these
cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors:
the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the
general population. Hopes for Future Access to Chinese Markets. Despite China's impressive
rates of sustained growth, only a small fraction of its population of 1.3 billion is part of the
"modern" economy with the resources that allow them to purchase Western goods. Estimates
of the size of the Chinese middle class range from 100 million to 150 million people, depending
on the income threshold used, although the number continues to expand rapidly.4 While selling
to Chinese markets is a difficult and expensive proposition, the sheer number of potential
consumers inspires great aspirations among Latin American businesspeople, students, and
government officials. The Ecuadorian banana magnate Segundo Wong, for example, reportedly
stated that if each Chinese would eat just one Ecuadorian banana per week, Ecuador would be a
wealthy country. Similar expressions can be found in many other Latin American countries as
well. In the commodities sector, Latin American exports have expanded dramatically in recent
years, including Chilean copper, Brazilian iron, and Venezuelan petroleum. In Argentina, Chinese
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demand gave rise to an entire new export-oriented soy industry where none previously existed.
During the 2009 global recession, Chinese demand for commodities, based in part on a massive
Chinese stimulus package oriented toward building infrastructure, was perceived as critical for
extractive industries throughout Latin America, as demand from traditional export markets
such as the United States and Europe fell off. Beyond commodities, certain internationally
recognized Latin American brands, such as José Cuervo, Café Britt, Bimbo, Modelo, Pollo
Campero, and Jamaican Blue Mountain coffee, sell to the new Chinese middle class, which is
open to leveraging its new wealth to "sample" the culture and cuisine of the rest of the world.
Unfortunately, most products that Latin America has available to export, including light
manufactures and traditional products such as coffee and tropical fruits, are relatively
uncompetitive in China and subject to multiple formal and informal barriers to entry. Despite the
rift between hopes and reality, the influence of China in this arena can be measured in terms of
the multitude of business owners who are willing to invest millions of dollars and countless
hours of their time and operate in China at a loss for years, based on the belief that the future of
their corporations depends on successfully positioning themselves within the emerging Chinese
market. The hopes of selling products to China have also exerted a powerful impact on political
leaders seeking to advance the development of their nations. Chilean presidents Ricardo Lagos
and Michelle Bachelet, for example, made Sino-Chilean trade relations the cornerstone of
Chile's economic policy, signing the first free-trade pact between the PRC and a Latin American
nation in November 2005. Peruvian president Alan Garcia made similar efforts to showcase that
nation as a bridge to China when it hosted the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in
November 2008. Governments in the region have also invested significant sums of money in the
China-related activities of trade promotion organizations such as APEX (Brazil), ProChile,
ProComer (Costa Rica), Fundación Exportar (Argentina), and CORPEI (Ecuador), among others, as
well as representative offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other Chinese cities, with the
objective of helping their nationals to place products in those countries. Latin American leaders,
from presidents to mayors, lead delegations to the PRC and fund elaborate pavilions in Chinese
culture and trade shows such as the Canton Trade Fair and the Shanghai World Expo in an effort
to help their countries' businesses sell products in the PRC. Hopes for Future Chinese
Investment. China's combination of massive sustained trade surpluses and high internal
savings rates gives the PRC significant resources that many in Latin America hope will be
invested in their countries. Chinese president Hu Jintao helped to generate widespread
awareness of the possibility of Chinese investment in the region during his trip to five Latin
American countries in 2004, specifically mentioning tens of billions of dollars in possible
investment projects. A public controversy over whether his use of the figure $100 billion was
actually referring to trade or investment has only called more attention in Latin America to
China as a potential source of funds. Although the expected Chinese investment was initially
slow to materialize, today, thanks to China's growing familiarity with doing business in Latin
America, and its enormous financial reserves (including a foreign currency surplus that had
reached $2.5 trillion by mid-20105), the PRC has begun to loan, or invest, tens of billions of
dollars in the region, including in high-profile deals such as: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela;
$16.3 billion commitment to develop the Junin-4 oil block in Venezuela's Orinoco oil belt $10
billion to Argentina to modernize its rail system; $3.1 billion to purchase the Argentine
petroleum company Bridas $1 billion advance payment to Ecuador for petroleum, and another
$1.7 billion for a hydroelectric project, with negotiations under way for $3 billion to $5 billion
in additional investments more than $4.4 billion in commitments to develop Peruvian mines,
including Toromocho, Rio Blanco, Galleno, and Marcona $5 billion steel plant in the Brazilian
port of Açu, and another $3.1 billion to purchase a stake in Brazilian offshore oil blocks from
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the Norwegian company Statoil; a $10 billion loan to Brazil's Petrobras for the development of
its offshore oil reserves; and $1.7 billion to purchase seven Brazilian power companies. For
Latin America, the timing of the arrival of the Chinese capital magnified its impact, with major
deals ramping up in 2009, at a time when many traditional funding sources in the region were
frozen because of the global financial crisis. Moreover, as Sergio Gabrielli, president of the
Brazilian national oil company Petrobras has commented, China is able to negotiate large deals,
integrating government and private sector activities in ways that U.S. investors cannot .6
Influence of Chinese Entities and Infrastructure in Latin America. Although the presence of
Chinese corporations and workers in Latin America pales by comparison to that of the United
States, it is growing and exerting an increasing weight in select countries. Particularly in states
such as Ecuador and Venezuela, Chinese corporations are becoming increasingly critical for the
functioning of the extractive industries that generate significant portions of the state's
revenue. In Ecuador, Chinese petroleum and service companies directly operate seven oil
blocks, are a partner in others through consortiums, and account for almost 40 percent of
nonstate oil production, while China Railway Road and Tongling are ramping up for a $3 billion
project in the recently opened Ecuadorian mining sector. In Venezuela, Chinese companies are
one of the key actors maintaining oil production in the mature oilfields of Maracaibo and
Anzoátegui, a vital current revenue stream for the Chávez regime. In the Orinoco belt in the
south of Venezuela, Chinese investment, technology, and manpower, including Chinese-made
drilling rigs, are a key to the development of that nation's future oil potential, while a May
2010 agreement makes Chinese companies key players in the extraction of Venezuelan iron,
gold, bauxite, and coal.7 Although Chinese companies have yet to attain the level of "key
employers" or have a major role in many Latin American communities, they play a growing role
in strategically important sectors in many Latin American countries. For example, in
telecommunications, the Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE are increasingly important
product, service, and infrastructure providers,8 and in logistics, companies such as China
Shipping, China Overseas Shipping, and Hutchison Whampoa play increasingly vital roles in Latin
America's foreign trade. Ironically, Latin American Chinese communities have played a relatively
limited role in this expanding influence. Although there are large, historically rooted Chinese
communities in countries such as Peru, Ecuador, Panama, and Brazil, Chinese immigrants have
traditionally sought to keep a low profile in these societies. The structure of these communities
has also served to channel new Chinese immigrants into certain traditional occupations, such as
restaurants, the retail sector, or farming, with the result that ethnic Chinese today have a fairly
narrow involvement in emerging China–Latin America trade, even in key hubs for trade such as
Colón, Iquique, or Ciudad del Este. Beyond business ties, the PRC has an important and growing
presence in the region's military institutions. In addition to frequent visits by senior-level officers
and defense leaders, Mexico and almost all of the countries of South America send officers to
professional military education courses in the PRC, including a 5-month course for midgrade
officers taught in Spanish in Beijing. Chinese-made clothing and nonlethal equipment are also
becoming increasingly common within Latin American militaries. In addition, thanks to
opportunities provided by the regimes of Ecuador, Venezuela, and Bolivia, the PRC has begun to
sell sophisticated hardware in the region, such as radars and K–8 and MA–60 aircraft. As
happened in commercial industries such as motorcycles, cars, and consumer appliances, Chinese
military goods companies such as Norinco are likely to leverage their experience and a growing
track record for their goods to expand their market share in the region, with the secondary
consequence being that those purchasers will become more reliant on the associated Chinese
logistics, maintenance, and training infrastructures that support those products. Beyond Chinese
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corporations and military ties, the PRC is also taking on a progressively important role in regional
institutions, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), Inter-American Development
Bank (IADB), and United Nations peacekeeping operations in Haiti. Although the PRC has only
observer status in the OAS, for example, its delegation is a strong contributor to the activities of
the body.9 With respect to the IADB, China has leveraged its seat at the table as an opening for
doing business in the region, such as the $10.2 billion currency swap with Argentina, which it
signed on the sideline of the IADB's annual meeting in March 2009. Also, through its initial
financial contribution to the IADB, the PRC became part of a special committee overseeing loans
to highly impoverished countries in the region, affording it expanded contacts with and subtle
pressures over countries that do not currently recognize the PRC diplomatically, including Haiti,
Honduras, and Nicaragua. In the case of Haiti, Chinese leverage is further bolstered by having
had police forces on the ground there since 2006, through PRC participation in the United
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.10 Hopes for the PRC to Serve as a Counterweight to the
United States and Western Institutions. China's historical status as a "leader of the developing
world" positions it as the natural ally of the new generation of Latin American populist
leaders, such as Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa, and Evo Morales. During his first trip to Beijing
after being elected president, for example, Morales proclaimed himself to be a "great admirer of
Mao," while Chávez has exclaimed that Mao and South American revolutionary icon Simón
Bolívar would have been "great friends." While these leaders may primarily be seeking Chinese
investments and commodity purchases, the position of the PRC as a geopolitical "alternative"
to the United States shapes the way that they court the Chinese. In permitting such hopes, the
PRC has, to date, been careful not to associate itself directly with the anti-U.S. activities or
rhetoric of these regimes, so as not to damage its strategically important relationship with the
United States and the West. Nonetheless, the relationship cannot avoid some flavor of the
relationships between the Soviet Union and its Latin American client states during the Cold War.
Bolivia turned to China to purchase K–8 combat aircraft, for example, after the United States
blocked its ability to procure aircraft from the Czech Republic.11 China as a Development Model.
The tremendous, sustained economic growth that the PRC has enjoyed since opening up to the
world in 1978 has caused many in Latin America to look to China's integration of capitalism and
authoritarian politics as a development model, even while the U.S. combination of liberal
democracy, free markets, and privatization is increasingly seen as ineffective for solving the
region's endemic problems, such as corruption, poverty, and inequality. For traditional Latin
American elites, the Chinese model is particularly attractive because it suggests that it is
possible to achieve prosperity and growth without relinquishing political power. As with other
Chinese sources of soft power, the impact of the "Beijing Consensus" in Latin America relies on
perceptions rather than realities; differences between the two regions—including the relative
submission to authority in the Chinese work culture, Chinese willingness to save rather than
spend, and another part of the world serving as the market for Chinese exports—make the
Chinese success story difficult to repeat in Latin America. Affinity for Chinese Culture. The PRC
has actively promoted Chinese culture and language throughout the world, including through
such landmark events as the 2008 Olympics in Beijing and 2010 World Expo in Shanghai, visited
by an estimated 5 million foreign tourists,12 as well as establishing more than 282 Confucius
institutes worldwide, including 20 in Latin America. Cultural exchanges are a featured part of
China's dealings with Latin America, consistent with the "nonthreatening" character that Beijing
wishes to emphasize in these interactions. Despite PRC "marketing efforts," by contrast to the
global impact of U.S. culture, Chinese culture is arguably one of the PRC's weakest levers of soft
power in Latin America, with interest in Chinese culture arguably reflecting, more than driving,
China's influence in the region. Although some Chinese culture is reaching the Latin American
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mainstream, perceptions of it in Latin America are generally limited and superficial, sometimes
based on media reports or experiences with ethnic Chinese living in those countries. Such
perceptions are often mixed, including respect for the Chinese work ethic, a sense of mystery
regarding Chinese culture, and often a sense of mistrust arising from the perceived differentness
of that culture and commercial competition from Chinese products. China as "the Wave of the
Future." Perhaps China's greatest source of soft power is the most intangible. China's
emergence as a key global player is a phenomenon that has assumed almost mystical
proportions within Latin America. The rapid growth in PRC trade with and investment in Latin
America, and the expansion of contacts at all levels, only reinforce the perceived significance
of "China's rise," as observed from Latin America. In addition to opportunism for commerce,
Latin America's belief in the rise of China and its globally transformational implications draws
the attention of the people and leaders of the region to the PRC and shapes their course of
action. Costa Rican president Oscar Arias, for example, established regular diplomatic relations
with the PRC as a necessary part of ensuring the relevance of his country as an international
actor. At the popular level, the rise of China is most likely behind a swelling interest in the
Chinese language in the region. The dedication of 5 or more years by students to gain a basic
capability in the Mandarin language and its character set, for example, is arguably driven by
their calculation that the ability to communicate in Chinese will be fundamental to the pursuit of
opportunities in the PRC, and with Chinese businessmen and government officials, in the future.
Use of Chinese Soft Power One of the most important questions associated with the rise of
China is how it is likely to use its growing soft power. Although such an endeavor is, by nature,
speculative, Chinese interests and patterns of behavior to date suggest the continued use of
that influence in at least the following areas: diplomatic recognition of Taiwan access to Latin
American markets protection of Chinese investments in and trade flows from the region
protection of Chinese nationals working against the consolidation of U.S. influence in the region
and its institutions. Although the Chinese government repeatedly states its commitment to
noninterference in the internal affairs of partner nations, in reality the PRC is as interested in
such issues as any other outside country. Only the issues that the PRC focuses on, and the ways
in which China applies pressure, differ. Diplomatic Recognition of Taiwan. For the PRC, the
government of Taiwan represents an important issue of political legitimacy and internal
security. Currently, 12 of the 23 nations in the world that diplomatically recognize the
government of Taiwan are found in Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the People's
Republic of China does not publicly threaten to block investment in or loans to countries that do
not recognize the PRC, China repeatedly emphasizes the issue in its public diplomacy in the
region, and makes such investments and market access difficult for those countries that do not
recognize it, while simultaneously nurturing expectations regarding the opportunities that
diplomatically recognizing the PRC could bring. When Costa Rica changed its diplomatic
recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in May 2007, for example, it received an aid package that
included an $83 million soccer stadium, the purchase of $300 million in government bonds,
various highway, public works, and aid projects, and a $1 billion joint venture to expand the
country's petroleum refinery, as well as PRC aid in facilitating access to Chinese markets by
traditional Costa Rican products such as coffee. In part, such Chinese generosity was directed
toward the other countries in the region that still recognized Taiwan in order to demonstrate
the types of benefits that could be made available if they too were to change their diplomatic
posture.13 Although the PRC and Taiwan have informally agreed to refrain from the use of
economic incentives to competitively "bid" for diplomatic recognition, since Costa Rica's switch,
the allure of the PRC has prompted declarations of interest in changing diplomatic posture by
Panamanian president Richard Martenelli, Paraguayan president Fernando Lugo, and Salvadoran
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president Maricio Fuenes—although all did so prior to assuming office. Access to Latin American
Markets.Latin American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies
because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic
growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region has
also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value
added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and
telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free
trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in
Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and
Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically wellconnected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese
markets and investments among key groups of businesspeople and government officials in
those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance. In
Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of
the few people in the country who could call President Chávez on the telephone and get an
instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company. Protection of Chinese
Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, China has applied more explicit
pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods. It has specifically
protested measures by the Argentine and Mexican governments that it has seen as
protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a
longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other
damages for Argentina.14 China has also used its economic weight to help secure major projects
on preferential terms. In the course of negotiating a $1.7 billion loan deal for the Coco Coda
Sinclair Hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, the ability of the Chinese bidder SinoHidro to self-finance
85 percent of the projects through Chinese banks helped it to work around the traditional
Ecuadorian requirement that the project have a local partner. Later, the Ecuadorian government
publicly and bitterly broke off negotiations with the Chinese, only to return to the bargaining
table 2 months later after failing to find satisfactory alternatives. In Venezuela, the Chávez
government agreed, for example, to accept half of the $20 billion loaned to it by the PRC in
Chinese currency, and to use part of that currency to buy 229,000 consumer appliances from the
Chinese manufacturer Haier for resale to the Venezuelan people. In another deal, the PRC
loaned Venezuela $300 million to start a regional airline, but as part of the deal, required
Venezuela to purchase the planes from a Chinese company.15 Protection of Chinese Nationals.
As with the United States and other Western countries, as China becomes more involved in
business and other operations in Latin America, an increasing number of its nationals will be
vulnerable to hazards common to the region, such as kidnapping, crime, protests, and related
problems. The heightened presence of Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle
region of Ecuador, for example, has been associated with a series of problems, including the
takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November
2006, and protests in Orellana related to a labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental
in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35 police officers and forced the declaration of a
national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in Valencia and Maracay,
Venezuela, became the focus of violent protests associated with the Venezuelan recall
referendum. As such incidents increase, the PRC will need to rely increasingly on a combination
of goodwill and fear to deter action against its personnel, as well as its influence with
governments of the region, to resolve such problems when they occur. Blocking the
Consolidation of U.S. Influence in the Region and Its Institutions.The rise of China is intimately
tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is
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highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC
leadership see the country's sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the
regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block
global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China's attainment of
observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to
obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used
"against" Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese
markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical
effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area
of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged. Finally, the PRC benefits
from the challenges posed to the dominance of the United States in the region by regimes
such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and its trade and investment with those regimes help
to keep them economically viable. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the PRC is careful to avoid
association with the anti-U.S. rhetoric and projects of those regimes, which could damage its
more strategically important relationship with the United States. Limits to Chinese Soft Power
The growth and exercise of soft power by the People's Republic of China have limits that are
important to recognize. As with the sources of Chinese soft power, those limits are not the same
as the limits to U.S. soft power. Limits to Chinese soft power in Latin America principally arise
from the significant gap between the two cultures, the associated difficulty in learning each
other's culture and language, a lack of understanding of each side by the other, and a pervasive
sense of mistrust of the Chinese within Latin America generally. The cultural gap between China
and Latin America touches upon many areas, from differing consumer preferences limiting the
appeal of Latin American exports such as coffee and beef, to different attitudes toward
authority in business and administrative dealings, which contribute to labor problems and other
difficulties where the PRC has operated in Latin America. One of the most significant barriers
between the PRC and Latin America is language. Whereas a relatively significant portion of Latin
Americans have some ability in English, very few speak or read Chinese, and even fewer Chinese
can communicate in Spanish, although the number is growing.16 Although Chinese-language
programs are proliferating in Latin America, the difficulty of and time required for learning
Mandarin and the Chinese character set are a powerful impediment to the growth of ties
between the two cultures. Compounding the language barrier is a relative lack of Chinese
knowledge regarding Latin America. Apart from major governmental institutes—such as the
China Academy of Social Sciences, which currently has the world's largest Latin America studies
program—and truly multinational Chinese corporations—such as Hong Kong–based Hutchison
Whampoa, China Shipping, China Overseas Shipping, Huawei, and ZTE—the general knowledge
of the region among Chinese businesspeople and government functionaries is limited, restricting
the ability of the PRC to develop broad and sophisticated programs to advance its objectives in
the region. Perhaps most importantly, despite the best efforts of Chinese businesspeople and
politicians to reach out to Latin America, they are too frequently perceived as "not one of us"—a
reality reflected even in Chinese communities, which often remain only partly integrated,
despite deep historical roots in many Latin American cities such as Lima and Guayaquil. Such
distance often translates into a persistent mistrust, even where both sides perceive benefits
from cooperation. Latin American businesspeople commonly express misgivings, suggesting that
the Chinese are aggressive and manipulative in business dealings, or conceal hidden agendas
behind their expressions of friendship and goodwill. Chinese companies in Latin America are
often seen as poor corporate citizens, reserving the best jobs and subcontracts for their own
nationals, treating workers harshly, and maintaining poor relations with the local community. In
the arena of China–Latin America military exchanges, it is interesting to note that Latin
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American military officers participating in such programs are often jokingly stigmatized by their
colleagues in ways that officers participating in exchange programs in the United States are not.
Finally, Chinese influence is diluted by increasing interactions between Latin America and other
extraregional actors, such as India, Russia, Iran, and others. Although the PRC is arguably the
most significant new suitor of the region, it is not the only alternative. For Nicaragua and
populist regimes in the Andean region, Russia provides important alternatives with respect to
arms purchases and energy sector investments. An $18 billion commitment by a Russian
consortium to develop the Junin-6 oilfield in Orinoco, for example, may have helped to
accelerate China's subsequent commitment to invest $16.3 billion in Junin-4. In addition to
Russia, India is increasingly engaging in commercial opportunities, particularly in high
technology, services, and commodity sector investments, while challenging the PRC monopoly
over "south-south" developing country partnerships in the region. When China cut off purchases
of Argentine soy oil, for example, it was India that picked up the slack. Analysts looking for signs
of imminent Chinese coercion or intervention in Latin America are likely to be disappointed.
Nonetheless, Chinese soft power in Latin America still raises important national security issues,
even if the PRC does not explicitly seek to subvert or marginalize the United States as part of its
reemergence onto the world stage. In Latin America, as elsewhere, China's currently modest
influence is providing it with triumphs of ever-growing scale in strategically important business,
culture, and technology arenas. Although no specific event may directly threaten the U.S.
national interest, the collective effect is to restructure the global flows of value added and
influence in a manner beneficial to China, making the ability of the United States to successfully
pursue its own national goals and interests increasingly dependent on the acquiescence of the
PRC. For analysts focused on the "rise" of China in Latin America and elsewhere, the issue is not
whether China is a threat, or whether it has the right to pursue its national interests in Latin
America and other parts of the world. Rather, it is important to recognize the dynamics that this
reemergence creates in a region with close human, geographical, and economic ties to the
United States, and to prepare to mitigate the risks, meet the challenges, and rise to the
opportunities that China's entry into Latin America makes possible.
Chinese investment in L.A. resources good- more efficient and flexible and
boosts economy.
Gallagher Associate Professor of International Relations 2013.
(BA, Northeastern University; MA, PhD, Tufts University) Specialization: Economic
Development, Trade and Investment Policy, International Environmental Policy, Latin America.
30 May 2013 [Kevin, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/povertymatters/2013/may/30/latin-america-risky-chinese-dragon]
The Chinese president, Xi Jinping, travels to the US and Latin America this week, for the first
time since he took office in March. What a difference a decade makes. Ten years ago, there
would hardly have been any fanfare about a Chinese visit to the region. Now, for Brazil, Chile
and others, China is the most important trade and investment partner. China-Latin America
trade surpassed $250bn (£165bn) last year. Although China's impact in Africa receives the most
attention, China trades just as much in Latin America as in Africa, and has more investments in
the region. Chinese finance in Latin America – chiefly from the China Development Bank and
the Export-Import Bank of China – is staggeringly large and growing. In a recently updated
report, colleagues and I estimate that, since 2005, China has provided loan commitments of
more than $86bn to Latin American countries. That is more than the World Bank or the InterAmerican Development Bank have provided to the region during the same period. China's
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presence is a great opportunity for Latin America, but it brings new risks. If the region can seize
the new opportunities that come with Chinese finance, countries could come closer to their
development goals, and pose a real challenge to the way western-backed development banks
do business. However, if Latin American nations don't channel this new trade and investment
toward long-term growth and sustainability, the risks may take away many of the rewards. First,
the positive side. Chinese trade and investment is partly a blessing for Latin America because it
diversifies the sources of finance – finance that for too long has relied on the west. The US and
European economies have been anaemic since 2008, and trade with China has tugged Latin
American growth rates to impressive levels. Every 1% increase in Chinese growth is correlated
with a 1.2% increase in Latin American growth. Chinese finance is more in tune with what
Latin American nations want, rather than with what western development experts say they
"need". Whereas the US and international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank
and IMF tend to finance in line with the latest development fads such as trade liberalisation
and micro-anti-poverty programmes, Chinese loans tend to go into energy and infrastructure
projects in a region that has an annual infrastructure gap of $260bn. Neither do Chinese loans
come with the harsh strings attached to IFI finance. The IFIs are notorious for their
"conditionalities" that make borrowers sign up to austerity and structural adjustment
programmes that have had questionable outcomes on growth and equality in the region. But
there are risks. While the Chinese do not attach policy conditions to their loans, they have
required that borrowers contract Chinese firms, buy Chinese equipment, and sometimes sign oil
sale agreements that require nations to send oil to China in exchange for the loans instead of
local currency. Chinese investment accentuates the deindustrialisation of Latin America. Large
scale, capital intensive commodities production is not very employment-intensive, nor does it
link well with other sectors of an economy. Dependence on commodities can cause a
"resource curse" where the exchange rate appreciates such that exporters of manufacturing
and services industries can't compete in world markets – and thus contribute to
deindustrialisation and economic vulnerability. Producing natural resource-based commodities
also brings major environmental risk. Many of China's iron, soy and copper projects are found in
Latin America's most environmentally sensitive areas. In areas such as the Amazon and the
Andean highlands, conflict over natural resources, property rights and sustainable livelihoods
have been rife for decades. In our report, we find that Chinese banks actually operate under a
set of environmental guidelines that surpass those of their western counterparts when at
China's stage of development. Nevertheless, those guidelines are not on par with 21st century
standards for development banking. Stronger standards should be in place at a time when
environmental concerns are at an all-time high. With every opportunity comes a challenge. Latin
Americans have access to a new source of finance that gives them more leeway to meet their
own development goals. If Latin America doesn't channel some of the finance to support
macroeconomic stability, economic diversification, equality and environmental protection, this
new source of finance could bring great risk.
Now is key for Chinese investment in Latin America—it’s a win-win for both
sides
Bifani, expert in legal and risk management, No date
[Darin, “Chinese Investment in Latin American Infrastructure: Synergies, Opportunities and
Challenges” http://www.liquarterly.com/60/infrastructure-financing/chinese-investment-inlatin-american-infrastructure-synergies-opportunities-and-challenges.html]
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Despite the distance between them, China has become LatAm’s third most important
commercial partner behind the United States and the European Union. Following a long period
of modest activity, Chinese investment in LatAm skyrocketed to approximately US$15 billion in
2010 and annual bilateral trade increased 12-fold from the year 2000 to approximately US$118
billion. While a significant amount of Chinese investment in LatAm has involved buying natural
resources to support its industrial growth and help feed its approximately 1.3 billion people,
China has also agreed to provide billions of dollars in connection with important LatAm
infrastructure projects, including rail upgrades in Argentina, electricity acquisitions in Brazil
and dam construction in Costa Rica. In many ways, this investment could not have come at a
better time, as LatAm needs new capital sources to finance massive infrastructure
improvements to sustain economic momentum gathered over the last decade, take full
advantage of recently signed Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and ramp up commercial relations
with new trade partners. China, on the other hand, needs to secure massive amounts of
resources to maintain domestic economic growth, create new export markets for its products
and diversify global credit exposures.
22
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Energy
China’s Development Bank is capable of funding Latin America energy and oil
projects – Brazil proves
Cerna, staff writer at the China Research Center, 11
[Michael, 5-15-11, China Research Center, “China’s Growing Presence in Latin
America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region”,
http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-americaimplications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/, accessed 7-2-13, HG]
China’s thirst for natural resources has sent the country in search of sustainable supplies of oil,
soy and iron ore. In South America, China has found some of the most well-endowed partners in
the world. China is devouring Latin American commodities and eyeing a market of 500 million
people. “Countries in South America have arable land and need our technology and
investment, and they welcome our companies. It’s a win-win solution,” said Wang Yunkun,
deputy director of the Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee of the National People’s
Congress, as reported by MercoPress. In 2006, more than 36% of Chile’s total exports were
directed toward Asia, with China taking 12% of the total. Chile was the first Latin American
country to complete a major bilateral trade agreement with China (Santiso, 2007). Since then
China has looked beyond Chile, also targeting Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina and Peru.¶ In
2009, China became Brazil’s largest single export market, eclipsing the U.S. for the first time in
history. Later, Brazil’s then-president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, and his Chinese counterpart, Hu
Jintao, signed an agreement that allowed the China Development Bank and Sinopec to loan
Brazil’s state-controlled oil company, Petrobras, $10 billion in return for as many as 200,000
barrels a day of crude oil for ten years (Economist, 2009). This is but one example of how China
is seizing lending opportunities in Latin America when traditional lenders such as the InterAmerican Development Bank are being pushed to their limits. “Just one of China’s loans, the
$10 billion for Brazil’s national oil company, is almost as much as the $11.2 billion in all
approved financing by the Inter-American Bank in 2008,” according to The New York Times.¶ It
was not only in Brazil that China went after oil. In order to meet rising industrial needs and
consumer demand, China has pursued investments and agreements with a variety of Latin
American oil producers. In 2007 Venezuela agreed to a $6 billion joint investment fund for
infrastructure projects at home and for oil refineries in China able to process Venezuelan
heavy crude oil (Santiso, 2007). Venezuela planned to increase oil exports to China by 300,000
barrels per day. Then in 2009, Venezuela announced a $16 billion investment deal with the
Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for oil exploration in the Orinoco River to
develop heavy crude oil resources (Economist, 2009). Meanwhile, the CNPC has invested $300
million in technology to use Venezuela’s Orimulsion fuel in Chinese power plants. This
exemplifies Venezuela’s desire to break away from the U.S. During a visit to China in 2004,
President Chavez said shifting exports to China would help end dependency on sales to the
United States (Johnson, 2005).
Chinese Fill U.S. void—Empirics Prove
Mallen, Columnist for International Business Times and BBC, 6/28
[Patricia, 6/28/13, http://www.ibtimes.com/reporters/patricia-rey-mallen, 7/2/13, ARH]
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
23
As if to confirm the declining hegemony of the United States as the ruling global superpower,
China is gaining influence in its hemispheric "backyard," Secretary of State John Kerry's
unintentionally insulting designation for Latin America. China has had its sights on Latin
America for the past decade and is now positioning itself as a competitive trade partner in the
region. The populous, rapidly developing Asian nation covets oil, soybeans and gold, of which
Latin America has plenty, and has been slowly but steadily increasing its presence and its
trade with several countries there. The U.S., whose history of blocking outside political
influence in Latin America going back to the Monroe Doctrine, has been directing its attention
elsewhere, as Michael Cerna of the China Research Center observed. “[The U.S.'] attention of
late has been focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, and Latin America fell lower and lower on
America’s list of priorities. China has been all too willing to fill any void,” Cerna said.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
24
Transportation
China has the capability to fund transportation projects in Latin America
Cerna, staff writer at the China Research Center, 11
[Michael, 5-15-11, China Research Center, “China’s Growing Presence in Latin
America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region”,
http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-americaimplications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/, accessed 7-2-13, HG]
China’s investments have been in the area of transportation, with an eye toward making
resource deliveries more efficient. China is partnering with Brazil to improve Brazil’s railways
and establish a rail link to the Pacific to cut transportation costs of iron ore and soybeans.
Other countries also are benefitting from Chinese investment. China is proposing to build a rail
link in Colombia to rival the Panama Canal. The 220- kilometer line would connect Cartagena,
on the northern Atlantic coast of Colombia, with its Pacific coast, making it easier for China to
pass goods through Latin America and import raw materials. China is currently Colombia’s
second-largest trade partner after the U.S., with bilateral trade rising from $10 million in 1980 to
more than $5 billion in 2010, according to The Guardian’s Tania Branigan. At the same time, a
consortium of three companies from China, (as well as companies from Japan and South Korea)
are bidding on a high speed rail project in Brazil to connect Rio, Sao Paulo and Campinas,
which shows that China’s focus goes beyond the coastal countries.¶ In addition, China signed a
$10 billion agreement with Argentina in July 2010 to refurbish two major rail lines, according
to Global Intelligence Report. China signed an agreement to take a 40% stake in a Venezuelan
rail project worth $7.5 billion in 2009. This project to connect oil-producing regions in
Venezuela to the capital will assist China in maintaining a steady energy supply from
Venezuela. There are also opportunities not paid for by China, but beneficial to the Asian
country nonetheless. In January 2011, Peru completed work on a road that connects the
mountainous country to Brazil. This has the potential to boost Peruvian and Brazilian trade with
Asia. Peru itself has had a free trade agreement with China since 2008.
25
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
Cuba
China and Cuba want to increase and maintain cooperation
UPI 13
[UPI 6/19/13 http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/06/19/China-andCuba-seek-greater-cooperation/UPI-69371371651113/ PB)
BEIJING, June 19 (UPI) -- Chinese President Xi Jinping said his country would like to work
more closely with Cuba on international and regional issues. Xi told Cuba's visiting first
vice president, Miguel Diaz-Canel, that China would like to forge a good partnership with
Latin American and Caribbean nations, the official Chinese news agency Xinhua
reported. The Chinese leader called for stronger cooperation between China and Latin
America. As for China and Cuba, Xi said he would like to maintain a bilateral high-level
exchange of visits, increase party-to-party exchanges and enhance political trust. Diaz-Canel
said Cuba places great importance on building ties with China. He concludes his three-day
visit to China on Wednesday.
China and Cuba looking to further expand cooperation
China Daily 13
[China Daily 6/2/13 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/201306/02/content_16557336.htm PB]
HAVANA - A senior Communist Party of China (CPC) official said here Saturday China was
willing to expand cooperation with Cuba in various fields to promote both countries'
economic development. Cuba was the first Latin American country to establish diplomatic
ties with China, Guo Jinlong,a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central
Committee, said when he met Mercedes Lopez Acea, vice president of the Cuban
Council of State and first secretary of the Havana Provincial Committee of the Cuban
Communist Party (CCP). Guo said the CPC was ready to maintain high-level exchanges
with the CCP and share experience in state governance and party building. As twin cities
and capitals, Beijing was willing to work jointly with Havana to deepen cooperation and
expand cultural and people-to-people exchanges, said Guo, who is also secretary of the
CPC Beijing Municipal Committee. Lopez said the relationship between Cuba and China,
which was based on mutual understanding and mutual respect, had become a model of
bilateral ties. Each country faced the task of building socialism with its own national
characteristics, she said, adding Cuba was ready to further boost exchanges and
cooperation with China. Guo also met Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz, vice president of the Cuban
Council of Ministers, on Thursday afternoon. A CPC delegation led by Guo arrived here
Thursday. He will also visit Brazil.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
26
China and Cuba have had economic success and can work well together—
increases benefit from China doing the plan
Erikson, Senior advisor, US Dept. of State 05,
[Daniel Erikson 2/13/05 http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume15/pdfs/erikson.pdf
PB]
Cuba’s international relations have undergone significant shifts in recent years, with old
alliances unraveling and new partnerships emerging. In particular, the Cuban government of
Fidel Castro has embarked on a path of deeper engagement and cooperation with Venezuela
and China that has transformed those two countries into the most important international
allies of Cuba today. Since 2001, the rising influence of Venezuela and China constitute the
most significant realignment of Cuba’s foreign relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union
in the early 1990s. This is all the more striking because it has occurred against the backdrop of
modest U.S. efforts to tighten existing sanctions and hasten change in Cuba. A second major
shift in Cuba’s international profile is its deepening ties with the People’s Republic of China, a
country of 1.3 billion people that has achieved sustained growth through introducing market
reform into its communist political system. China has prioritized Cuba as a key partner in Latin
America, and quickly surged to become the island’s third largest trading partner after
Venezuela and Spain. China’s interest in Cuba has led to frequent high-level meetings, a series of
economic cooperation agreements, and growing exchanges in the areas of science, technology,
and defense. China plans to invest millions in Cuba to help secure needed commodities such as
nickel and agricultural products, and it has been a strong supporter of Cuban positions in
international forums such as the United Nations. The emergence of China as an economic
power has strongly benefited the Cuban economy and become a crucial component of the
island’s economic planning. Cuba’s strong ties with Venezuela and China contrast sharply with
its deteriorating relations with other partners. While the European Union remains an important
economic player, Cuba’s dissident crackdown in 2003 and subsequent hostile rhetoric have
cooled relations considerably, despite moves by Spain to help improve ties. In Latin America,
Cuba has experienced a partial renaissance as a large swathe of South American countries have
elected center-left leaders, including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. While most
countries have been hesitant to deepen ties with Cuba Cuba is a longstanding ally of China. On
September 1, 1960, Fidel Castro announced the severing of diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor
of a relationship with China, and the two countries established diplomatic relations on
September 28, 1960. Cuba was the first Latin American country to recognize China, and the two
countries maintained generally cordial relations from the 1960s to the 1980s, despite periodic
tensions caused by Cuba’s near total embrace of the rival Soviet Union. In December 1984,
China dispatched resident military attaches to Cuba, initiating what has become a series of
friendly military contacts. In November 1988, China and Cuba ceased to require passport visas
for travel by their citizens between the two countries. Cuba’s trade with China topped $600
million dollars in 1990, but subsequently declined to less than $270 million by 1995, due to the
collapse of Cuba’s sugar industry.10 In February 1995, China and Cuba signed an Agreement on
Cultural, Educational, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, paving the way for frequent cultural
and sports exchanges. The first joint venture between the two countries was a plant for
manufacturing plastic slippers that was established in Cuba in July 1997, with Chinese
investment of $2.12 million. The enterprise produced 4 million plastic slippers annually and
other cooperative ventures ensued. The China-Cuba Joint Commission on Economic and Trade
Cooperation has met more than a dozen times at the ministerial level. The 2001 visit to Cuba by
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
27
Chinese President Jiang Zemin played a crucial role in reinvigorating the economic and political
alliance between the two countries. During this trip, the two countries signed an Economic and
Technical Cooperation Agreement, which granted Havana a $6.5 million line of interestfree
credit, which would be paid over a five year period ending in April 2006. China also granted an
additional $200 million to modernize and expand Cuba’s telecommunications at the local
level. In addition, a $24 million inter-bank agreement was concluded to finance the Miramar
Hotel project located on Havana’s Malecón. The two countries also signed four bilateral
agreements in the areas of sports, educational exchanges, maritime affairs, and preventing tax
evasion and double taxation.11 In 2003, Fidel Castro flew to China and appeared bemused when
he arrived for his first state visit in more than a decade, telling the head of the Chinese
legislature Li Peng that “I can’t really be sure just now what kind of China I am visiting, because
the first time I visited your country appeared one way and now when I visit it appears another
way.” He added, “You can say that every so often, your country undergoes great changes.”12
The media also noted that, although Jiang Zemin and Fidel Castro both addressed each other as
“comrade,” they were dressed in spiffy business suits. Hu Jintao took pains to reassure the
Cuban leader that their countries’ socialist bond remained profound, affirming that “as socialist
countries led by the Communist parties, China and Cuba share the same ideals and faith. China
and Cuba are economically complementary. China imports sugar, nickel, and medicines from
Cuba, while exporting rice, kidney beans, and electrical, industrial, and textile products. In 2002,
trade turnover between the two countries reached $430 million, which included China’s
exports of $310 million and imports of $120 million.14 The following year, China added Cuba to
its list of official tourism destinations. At the China International Fair for Investment and
Cooperation held in the port city of Xiamen in September 2004, the delegation from Cuba’s
Ministry of Foreign Investment and Cooperation presented 41 proposals for joint ventures with
Chinese enterprises, in sectors including medical equipment, sugar products, fishing, furniture,
and footwear and garments.15 At that time, the two countries already boasted 10 joint ventures
in operation, including six in Cuba and four in China, in addition to three cooperative production
contracts. The joint ventures in China focused on pharmaceuticals, advanced medical devices,
biotechnology, and genetic engineering.16 With the help of Chinese investment, Cuba is due to
double its nickel and cobalt production over the next four years During this visit, Hu and Castro
signed 16 agreements for cooperation in the areas of nickel and mineral processing and
exploration. The accords call for Cuba to provide 4,400 tons of nickel annually to China. In
addition, China will invest $500 million in a new Cuban nickel plant in Moa, Holguín province.
China granted the Cuban government a 10-year extension to repay four interest-free loans that
Beijing had provided during the island’s severe economic crisis from 1990 to 1994. China agreed
to provide a $6 million grant to Cuban hospitals, and materials for school uniforms valued at
an additional $6 million. China offered to ship 1 million television sets to Cuba.
28
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
Mexico
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
29
Mexico Says Yes
Mexico willing to trade with China
Knowland, writer for the ICFI, 6/10
[Don, 6/10/13, http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/10/xime-j10.html, 7/2/13, ARH]
“Access to strategic raw materials is key to understanding the dynamic of relations with
China,” said Hugo Beteta, director for Mexico and Central America of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. “Clearly there is an interest by
China in Mexican oil.” “China is the principal consumer of coal, gas, oil, of secondary industries
like cement, steel, concrete,” said Juan Carlos Rivera, director of Mexico’s Center for Business
with Asia at the private Monterrey Technological Institute. “Evidently (China) is looking to
satisfy their market needs.” Not coincidentally, Xi’s visit to Mexico comes just as the Mexican
government is bent on opening up the state oil company Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, to
private and foreign investment in order to stem decreasing production by funding deepwater
drilling. Peña Nieto will soon present an energy reform bill to the Mexican Congress allowing
that. Of the roughly 2.5 million barrels of crude a day that Pemex presently produces, about
1.2 million are exported. Some 75 percent of those exports go to the US, but only 7 percent to
the Far East, including China. China is looking for much more. During Peña Nieto’s April visit to
China, Pemex signed its first long-term contract with a Chinese company, agreeing to ship
30,000 barrels a day to the state oil company Sinopec. This week Pemex said the Export-Import
Bank of China would provide it with a $1 billion credit line to buy ships and offshore equipment.
It also signed a memorandum of understanding with state-owned Xinxing Cathay International
Group to explore ways to work together on pipelines. For its part, Mexico is looking to diversify
its trade and investment, which have long been dominated by the US. It also recognizes
China’s rise as a geopolitical player far beyond Asia.
Mexi-Sino Relations occurring through Chinese Investment
Ellis, principal and founding partner of Dezan Shira & Associates, 6/7/13
[Chris, 6/7/13, http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2013/06/07/china-mexico-talk-ofstrategic-partnership-deal-but-much-remains-to-be-done.html, 7/2/13, ARH]
Therefore, the prospect of Chinese companies seeking partnerships with Mexican businesses to
then sell onto the lucrative U.S. market looms large. But does it? The two leaders released a
statement suggesting that Chinese-Mexican bilateral relations would enter into a new phase
and were “being upgraded.” Xinhua published the official statement through China Daily that,
in condensed form, promised both sides “will view their relations from a strategic and longterm perspective” and “accommodate each other’s concerns.” Along with that are statements
to “maintain exchanges between high-level leaders and political parties,” as well as “agree to
increase mutual investment in key areas such as energy, mining, infrastructure and high
technology.” China has stated it “supports the increase of imports from Mexico, while Mexico
welcomes Chinese enterprises to invest in Mexico and promises to create favorable conditions
for Chinese investors.” Frankly, Mexico needs to address the issue. Current Mexico-China trade
figures for 2012 show an imbalance of some US$50 billion in China’s favor and according to the
Mexican Central Bank, Mexico imported US$57 billion worth of Chinese goods last year, while
Mexico sold just US$5.7 billion to China. Although China is Mexico’s second largest trade
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
30
partner, and therefore important, the size of the two economies and populations should also be
taken into account. With Mexico sporting a population of about 115 million against China’s 1.3
billion, it means that Mexico purchases Chinese goods at a value of US$496 per capita, while
China averages US$4 per capita in buying Mexican goods. That’s a sizable disparity.
China and Mexico willing to Cooperate—History Proves
Cordoba, Nasdaq analyst and columnist, ‘13
[Jose, 6/4/13, http://www.nasdaq.com/article/mexico-china-seek-to-jump-start-trade20130604-01265#ixzz2XwwmHflY, ARH]
Both Mr. Xi and Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto are trying to make their mark as
reformers. In a recent speech, Mr. Xi said China could stay "dynamic" only by keeping up with
the times. Since assuming power in December, Mr. Pena Nieto has pushed through a number of
long-stalled reforms. At the top of his agenda: opening up Mexico's energy sector to private
investment, which would spur an investment boom and an increase in economic growth.
"Mexico and China are two countries ascending in a new international order," said Mr. Pena
Nieta as he welcomed Mr. Xi. The Chinese leader said both countries are ancient civilizations
and share a similar history of struggle for independence that had created between the two
peoples a natural affinity, which make them "good friends and great partners."
31
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
China Says Yes
Mexican Oil k2 Chinese Relations
Associated Press, Established News Source, 6/3
[AP, 6/3/13, http://azstarnet.com/news/world/oil-likely-on-agenda-as-chinese-leader-visitsmexico/article_3bfe1f5d-670b-5f91-8bb3-4f6ca1ec7f7f.html, 7/2/13, ARH]
China has invested heavily in resource-rich Latin America in recent years, striking major trade
deals with governments from Venezuela to Argentina. Now its president is reaching out to one
of the few countries in the region where ties have been slow to develop: Mexico. President Xi
Jinping's three-day visit starting Tuesday comes as Mexico debates opening its highly regulated
energy sector to more foreign investment. China's president has said he plans to address
Mexico's large trade deficit with the Asian power and discuss ways to increase Mexican
exports. Analysts say that could mean oil, which Mexico has and China needs to fuel its
expanding economy and the cars of its growing middle class. "Access to strategic raw
materials is key to understanding the dynamic of relations with China," said Hugo Beteta,
director for Mexico and Central America of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean. "Clearly there is an interest by China in Mexican oil."
Presidents Nieto and Xi are both extremely interested in economic engagement
– Mexico created a special unit for Chinese investment and China has promised
$80 billion before 2018
Latinos Post, 6-5-13 [Latinos Post, “Mexico Signs Unprecedented Agreements With China,”
http://www.latinospost.com/articles/20770/20130605/mexico-signs-unprecedentedagreements-wit.htm accessed 7-2-13 UR]
The governments of Mexico and China signed a series of agreements Tuesday relating to
energy, tourism, trade and investments designed to strengthen and balance the relationship
between the two nations, which is currently in a negative balance for Mexico, Reuters reports.¶
In addition, the agreements establish the creation of a high-level business group that will
encourage bi-national dialogue and investment for both countries. Mexico will also create a
special unit within the Ministry of Economy, whose mission will be to specifically strengthen
economic exchange with China.¶ Among the agreements is a memorandum on energy
cooperation signed by the heads of the Mexican Energy Secretariat and the National
Commission for Development and Reform of the People's Republic of China.¶ The agreement
also creates and strengthens the China Business Committee Latin America, with Mexico as one
of the main representatives.¶ The agreement also determined that the Mexican company Altos
Hornos will export steel to the Asia-Pacific through Salina Cruz, Oaxaca, for which the platform
will be reconfigured to meet transporting these goods.¶ China promised to invest up to $80
billion in Mexico between 2013 and 2018 in the realms of communications and transport
infrastructure. The Asian nation would be interested in participating in projects such as the
construction of high-speed rail systems, mainly in Queretaro and Toluca, that would eventually
connect them with Mexico City.¶ In addition, China has lifted the barriers for Mexican products
such as pork, tequila and other goods in the food sector.¶ The Asian nation also established that
they will push forward with purchases of $1 billion in Mexican products. Xi Jinping described
Mexico as China's "good friend" in Latin America.¶ Mexico and China also opened the
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
32
Unjamming agreements that had been frozen for nearly a decade, which relate to the textile,
clothing, footwear and food sectors.¶ In academic matters, China and Mexico agreed to intensify
exchanges of students and teachers, and China will award 300 scholarships to Mexican students.
The first 100 will be awarded in 2014.¶ Enrique Peña Nieto President welcomed the agreements
reached with the Chinese and stressed that the agreements in dozens of areas come to
"intensify the bonds of friendship and respect between our peoples."¶ "We take a new step in
our trade relationship with China, one that will bring greater prosperity for our nations,
development and opportunities for trade and larger cooperation," president Enrique Peña
Nieto added.
China and Mexico have agreed on a strategic partnership to increase economic
engagement
Channel News Asia, 6-5-13
[“China, Mexico presidents agree on 'strategic' partnership,”
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/china-mexicopresidents/698924.html accessed 7-2-13 UR]
Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart vowed to work jointly to access
international markets, like the lucrative US market, as part of a new strategic partnership.¶ Xi
on Wednesday begins his second day of a three-day visit to the Latin American economic
powerhouse, which will include a speech before Mexico's congress.¶ Xi arrived in Mexico after
visiting Costa Rica, and after meeting Caribbean leaders in Trinidad and Tobago. On Friday Xi
travels to the United States for a much-anticipated weekend summit with US President Barack
Obama.¶ China has in recent years aggressively pushed trade and investment ties with the
developing world, particularly Africa and Latin America, to secure raw materials to fuel its
economic growth and wield greater geopolitical influence in relation to the United States.¶ On
Tuesday Xi and Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto pledged to enhance diplomatic and
trade ties between the two countries, and to smooth over their long-standing rivalry on
exporting products to the United States.¶ "We expect to broaden investments of Chinese
capital in our country," Pena Nieto told reporters late Tuesday, a move that will create more
jobs and make Mexico "an important platform for exports to the countries with which we
have free trade agreements."¶ Mexico is a member of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), along with the United States and Canada.¶ Xi in turn praised the
"comprehensive strategic partnership" between the two countries.¶ In a joint statement
Mexico and China agreed to increase talks at various government levels "to deepen mutual
trust and conduct bilateral dialogues on strategic issues," Chinese state news service Xinhua
reported.
33
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
Energy
China is already posed for massive economic engagement with the Mexican
energy sectors
Reuters, 6-4-13
[Lizbeth, Universidad Autónoma de Baja California, Reuters, “China, Mexico vow broad
cooperation as Xi visits; no trade pact soon,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/05/uschina-mexico-idUSBRE95401T20130605 accessed 7-2-13 UR]
China and Mexico promised broad cooperation on issues ranging from energy to mining and
infrastructure during a state visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday, but any free-trade
pact between the emerging market powers is still some way off.¶ Mexico's government has
voiced worry about its massive trade deficit with China, an imbalance Mexican President
Enrique Pena Nieto wants to set right.¶ Mexico wants "to find a greater equilibrium in our trade
balance," Pena Nieto said during a joint address to the media with Xi. They did not take
questions.¶ He said the two countries had also agreed to defuse a standoff over textiles that had
resulted in litigation.¶ The two governments signed agreements to cooperate on commercial
defense, and agreed on access for Mexican tequila and Mexican pork to the Chinese market.¶
State oil monopoly Pemex said Export-Import Bank of China would provide it with a $1 billion
credit line to buy ships and offshore equipment. It also signed a memorandum of
understanding with state-owned Xinxing Cathay International Group to explore ways to work
together on pipelines.¶ More than 15 percent of Mexico's imports came from China in 2012 an amount worth $57 billion - while just 1.5 percent, or $5.7 billion, of Mexican exports went
to the Asian giant.¶ Xi said China planned to sign commercial contracts to buy an additional $1
billion worth of Mexican goods, but did not specify what.¶ "I think at this stage it is too early to
talk about a free-trade agreement," Meade told local radio.¶ "I think we are still at a stage at
which we are becoming aware of opportunities, opening a space for business dialogue, so it
does not seem to be the instrument or path which best serves us," he added, saying it was an
alternative to evaluate in the future.¶ Mexico ran a slight surplus with its global trading partners
last year, but posted a huge deficit with China, largely because of an influx of manufactured
goods.¶ Mexico and China have been direct competitors to supply the U.S. market with
manufactured goods and Mexican producers have fought to keep the Chinese off their turf.¶
"We have agreed on the importance of reinforcing mutual political trust, and broadening
cooperation," Xi said through a Spanish translator.
Nieto and Xi have already pledged to bilateral engagement in clean energy,
biotech and nanotech, education and social welfare
Global Times, 6-5-13 [“China, Mexico vow to enhance cooperation in culture, technology,”
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/786969.shtml#.UdOdDhbvx1M accessed 7-2-13, UR]
Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Pena Nieto on Tuesday
pledged to enhance bilateral cooperation in culture, education, technology and social
development.¶ In a joint statement released after talks between Xi and Pena Nieto, they
stressed the importance of culture in boosting mutual understanding between the two peoples.¶
The two leaders agreed to promote cultural and artistic exchanges in traditional and emerging
areas and cooperation in cultural industries.¶ The statement said that the two governments will
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
34
enhance educational exchanges in such areas as Spanish and Chinese teaching, adding that
they will also support youth exchanges.¶ China promised to offer 300 government scholarships
to Mexican students, while the National Autonomous University of Mexico will establish a
center of Mexican studies in Beijing Foreign Studies University.¶ In technology, the two sides
will promote cooperation in such areas as clean and renewable energy, the prevention and
control of environmental pollution, biotechnology and nanotechnology.¶ As developing
countries, China and Mexico face similar challenges in economic and social fields, the statement
said.¶ The two governments will promote cooperation in achieving sustainable and inclusive
economic growth, reducing poverty, narrowing gap between the rich and the poor and
improving social welfare, according to the statement.¶ The two leaders witnessed the signing
of a dozen agreements covering bilateral cooperation in energy, mining, infrastructure, trade,
investment, education and banking.¶ During talks earlier in the day, Xi and Pena Nieto agreed
to lift their countries' relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership.
China wants to do the plan to reduce their fat trade deficit
Associated Press, 6/2/13
[6-2-13, Fox News Latino, “China’s President Wants to Open the Floodgates of
Trade with Mexico”, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/money/2013/06/02/chinapresident-wants-to-open-floodgates-trade-with-mexico/, accessed 7-2-13, HG]
Over the last few years, China has invested heavily in resource-rich Latin America, striking
major trade deals with governments from Venezuela to Argentina.¶ And now the Asian
powerhouse is reaching out to Mexico, one of the few countries in the region where ties have
been slow to develop¶ On Tuesday President Xi Jinping begins a three-day visit to the region just
as Mexico debates opening its highly regulated energy sector to more foreign investment.¶
China's president has said he plans to address Mexico's large trade deficit with the Asian
power and discuss ways to increase Mexican exports. Analysts say that could mean oil, which
Mexico has and China needs to fuel its expanding economy and the cars of its growing middle
class.¶ "Access to strategic raw materials is key to understanding the dynamic of relations with
China," said Hugo Beteta, director for Mexico and Central America of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. "Clearly there is an interest by
China in Mexican oil."¶ The trip is part of a four-country regional tour that ends in the United
States. Xi started in Trinidad and Tobago, where he also met with leaders of other Caribbean
countries, and he arrives Sunday night in Costa Rica.¶ China and Trinidad have had diplomatic
ties for almost 40 years, and Trinidad is a major trading partner in the Caribbean for China. Costa
Rica is the only country in Central America to have diplomatic relations with China.¶ U.S. trade
still dwarfs China's for the three countries Xi is visiting. But China's trade with Costa Rica and
with Mexico has tripled since 2006, according to the International Monetary Fund.¶ Relations
with Mexico had been chilly in the past, especially when former President Felipe Calderon
hosted the Dalai Lama in 2011, something China's Foreign Ministry said "hurt the feelings of the
Chinese people and harmed Chinese-Mexican relations."¶ President Enrique Pena Nieto, who
took office in December, has been aggressive so far about changing that, and the two new
presidents reportedly hit if off on a personal level when Pena Nieto visited China and met with
Xi in April. That resulted in an unusually quick diplomatic follow-up, just two months into Xi's
presidency.¶ During the April talks, Xi said "he is committed to working with Mexican authorities
to help Mexico export more," Mexico's vice minister of foreign relations, Carlos de Icaza, told
The Associated Press.¶ That's key for Mexico, because its trade deficit with China is exploding, far
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
35
surpassing that of any other Latin American nation.¶ While China is looking to assure supplies of
raw materials, Mexico is looking to diversify its trade and investment, which have long been
dominated by its superpower neighbor to the north.¶ "In the new global geopolitical and
economic map, China is, and I think it has arrived to stay, the world's second economic power,"
De Icaza said. Mexico "has to understand and strengthen relations with a nation that has such
great strategic value."¶ De Icaza said the countries hope to sign at least a dozen agreements in
the fields of trade, energy, tourism, science and technology during Xi's visit.¶ Mexican exports
to China came to a bit over $5.7 billion in 2012, while its imports from that country stood at
almost $57 billion, according to statistics from Mexico's Economy Department. Cell phones,
video games and parts for electronics factories have been pouring into Mexico, which sends
China minerals such as copper and lead.
36
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
Infrastructure
China and Mexico are looking to elevate their partnership through economic
cooperation in energy, trade and infrastructure construction
Zhu, China Daily, 6-6-13
[Zhu Zhe, China Daily, China, Mexico boost relations: Countries sign series of agreements on
energy, trade and construction,” http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xivisit/201306/06/content_16573196.htm accessed 7-2-13 UR]
Xi said his meeting with Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto has been fruitful and produced a
consensus on many issues.¶ "Our joint announcement to elevate our strategic partnership to an
overall strategic partnership reflects both the reality of bilateral relations as well as shows the
direction of their future development," Xi told the media after meeting his Mexican
counterpart.¶ Xi, who last visited Mexico in 2009 as China's vice-president, arrived in Mexico City
after touring Trinidad and Tobago and Costa Rica, where agreements to develop ties were also
signed. The agreements and memorandum of understanding signed on Tuesday between
Mexico and China cover cooperation in energy, new-industry trade, infrastructure
construction, mining, trade, education, banking and entrepreneurial exchanges.¶ Pena Nieto
said Xi's official visit to Mexico proves the two countries have reached a high level of friendship,
trust and cooperation.¶ He said he believes China and Mexico will explore additional ways to
cooperate, and that Mexico will attract Chinese investment for large projects, including in
energy and infrastructure.¶ Pena Nieto, who took office in December, visited China in April to
attend the Boao Asia Forum in Hainan province, where he met Xi.¶ Trade between the two
countries was $36 billion last year, more than seven times what it was in 2003, when China
and Mexico established a strategic partnership.¶ Liu Yuqin, a researcher of Latin American
studies at the China Foundation for International Studies and former Chinese ambassador to
Ecuador, Chile and Cuba, said the elevation of the bilateral relationship is based on the two
countries' well-developed cooperation and shows that they consider each other important.¶ The
Sino-Mexican relationship has developed well in many areas, including the economy, politics
and culture, since they established diplomatic ties in 1972, Liu said.¶ "Despite some trade
friction, the two countries have more common interests and have a strong desire to resolve
differences through dialogue and negotiations," she said.¶ Liu said Mexico, an important
member of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, plays an important role in
promoting China's relations with this region.¶ "The enhanced China-Mexico relationship and
Mexico's positive response to the establishment of the China-Latin America Cooperation Forum,
which was advocated last year by former premier Wen Jiabao, is important to future
cooperation between China and the whole region," Liu said.¶ Theodore Kahn, a researcher at
Inter-American Bank, described Xi's visit to Mexico as a chance to "relaunch" the two countries'
relations after a decade.¶ "Both countries have something to gain by closer ties, but seizing the
opportunity will require dropping long-held preconceptions about the commercial relationship,"
Kahn wrote in The Diplomat on Tuesday.¶ "The arrival of new leaders in both countries presents
an opportunity to forge a closer, more fruitful alliance between two key emerging markets."
37
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
Oil
Chinese investment solves Mexican oil – they have an incentive to produce oil
to import
Associated Press, 6/2/13
[6-2-13, Fox News Latino, “China’s President Wants to Open the Floodgates of
Trade with Mexico”, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/money/2013/06/02/chinapresident-wants-to-open-floodgates-trade-with-mexico/, accessed 7-2-13, HG]
Overall trade between China and Latin America has expanded quickly over the past decade
and the continent now imports more from China than it does from the European Union,
according to the U.N. economic agency for the region.¶ Many countries balance those imports by
sending China raw materials: oil from Venezuela, copper from Chile, soybeans from Argentina.
But Mexico's exports go overwhelmingly to the huge U.S. market right on its border.¶ Beteta
noted that China imports three-quarters of the oil it consumes.¶ "China needs to guarantee oil
for its citizens' cars, but also obviously for its economy as a whole, which has a high energy
intensity, and Mexico is an oil power," he said.¶ At the same time, Pena Nieto's government has
said that it will soon present an energy reform bill to allow greater national and international
investment in its oil sector. It hasn't revealed the details of the initiative, but Beteta said it "has
awakened the appetite of many people."¶ State oil company Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex,
already has taken small steps to increase its relationship with China, which until recently had
been minimal.¶ Of the roughly 2.5 million barrels of crude that Pemex produces a day, about 1.2
million are exported. Energy ministry figures show that 75 percent of these exports go to the
United States and about 7 percent to the "Far East." It does not specify how much each specific
country in that region receives.¶ In April, during Pena Nieto's visit to China, Pemex signed its first
long-term contract with a Chinese company, agreeing to ship 30,000 barrels a day to the state
oil company Sinopec.¶ Mexico may have other goods and investment opportunities to offer as
well.¶ "China is the principal consumer of coal, gas, oil, of secondary industries like cement,
steel, concrete," said Juan Carlos Rivera, director of the Center for Business with Asia at the
private Monterrey Technological Institute. "Evidently (China) is looking to satisfy their market
needs."¶ Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla said her country is looking for agreements in the
areas of clean energy, public transportation and student exchanges after Xi arrives Sunday. The
government also wants to give a final push to negotiations for the joint construction of a $1.3
billion refinery on Costa Rica's Caribbean coast.
Sino-Mexican economic engagement is mutually beneficial and bolsters positive
American relations as well
Wu, Senior Research Fellow and Deputy Director, Department of American
Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies, 5-1-13
[Chunsi, University of Miami Scholarly Repository, Center for Latin American Studies, “China and
the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico
Relations,”
http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=clas_publicati
ons accessed 7-5-13 UR]
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
38
Firstly, the adjustment of China’s economic structure may help to change the false impression
of Chinese-Mex- ican trade relations and allow Mexico to further pursue interests in economic
cooperation with China. In regards to Chinese-Mexican relations, the common perception is
that the two countries compete with each other in the U.S. market due to the fact that their
exports are very similar. However, this may not necessarily be the case, as some scholars have
pointed out that the competition between China and Mexico has been exaggerated, and in fact
the two nations complement each other in more aspects than in which they compete (Xie
2005). Moreover, China does not want to become involved in trade conflicts with other
developing countries, given that it is trying to change the mode of its economic development
and update its export structure. With a stronger focus on bol- stering its domestic market and
supplying more high-value products to the world, China hopes that it can further coordinate its
own production with Mexico and other developing countries. In addition, China is able to
provide Mexico with new markets and investors. It would be erroneous, therefore, to simply
define Chinese-Mexican eco- nomic relations in terms of competition for the US market. China’s
increasing engagement with Mexico and Latin America has the potential to positively impact
numerous aspects of these transnational relations.
Furthermore, China’s involvement in North and Latin America can also help Mexico to reduce
certain nega- tive outcomes resulting from North American cooperation. Generally speaking, the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a beneficial arrangement for each of its three
signatories (The U.S., Mexico, and Canada), but this does not imply seamless cooperation
between them.1 In the case of Mexico, the country benefits from exporting manufactured
goods to the U.S., as well as receiving capital in the form of U.S. investments, but suffers
where bilateral agricultural interests are involved. Even more harmful to U.S.-Mexico relations
is the exercise of U.S. political influence. As Mexico’s economy becomes increasingly
dependent upon the U.S. market, the United States has more political leverage over Mexico,
creating some uncomfortable situations for Mexico on the international stage. For example,
during the administration of President Vicente Fox, in order to further develop its relations with
the United States, Mexico was forced to distance itself from left-wing Latin American
governments that have traditionally been its close allies, such as Cuba and Venezuela (Chen
2007). The gesture assuaged the United States to some extent, but ultimately Mexico’s
influence in Latin America decreased and the critical problems between Mexico and the U.S.
regarding immigration and drugs were not resolved. Indeed, Mexico’s over-dependence on the
U.S. market has been a political disadvantage in its relations with its northern neighbor.
Mexico needs outside players to balance the influence of the United States. In this context,
diversifying economic cooperation with China and other countries would be beneficial for
Mexico.
Thirdly, China can also act as a bridge that Mexico can use to engage with other East Asian
countries. East Asia is a region that has been attracting global attentions due to its strong
economic performance. The region has not only maintained a high growth rate, but it also has a
vast market with great potential, with over one billion people in the region entering into a socalled “middle class”. Therefore, the U.S. is increasing its investment in and shift- ing its
attention to Asia - actions that would benefit Mexico as well. However, it appears that Mexico
has not found an effective way to develop cooperative relations in East Asia. The U.S., for
example, does not seem overly eager to involve Mexico in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
Mexico therefore must depend on itself to step into the western region of the Pacific, making it
even more crucial for Mexico to strengthen its relations with East Asian countries. China, as a
major player in East Asia, has extensive economic and trade relations with other countries in the
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
39
region, and could help Mexico put its foot in the door, so to speak. China and Mexico, therefore,
have the potential to help each other achieve intra-regional cooperation.
On the whole, China and Mexico have numerous common interests that can help to promote
cooperation between the two nations in the age of globalization. There are undeniable
differences between them, but nothing that cannot be managed on the basis of mutual respect
and concession. The two countries need to recognize their importance in the context of
regional and global cooperation and make joint efforts to construct and maintain a healthy
and mutually beneficial relationship.
40
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
Venezuela
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
41
Venezuela Says Yes
Venezuela Seeks Chinese investment—Infrastructure Proves
Jingjie, columnist for the Global Times, 6/19
[Yang, 6/19/13, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/790171.shtml#.UdOPSb-D58s, 7/2/13,
ARH]
Venezuela's Deputy Minister of Aquatic and Air transport Luis Antero Rodriguez Guevara said in
Beijing Wednesday that he hopes more Chinese enterprises will participate in the planning
and construction of transport projects in the Latin American country. The Venezuelan official's
visit to China followed renewed momentum for bilateral economic cooperation built during
Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao's visit to Venezuela last month, which saw the signing of
deals on infrastructure construction, energy and telecommunications. Among the deals was a
$480 million loan agreement for the construction of a petrochemical wharf at Moron Port by
China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC). Rodriguez's visit to China is partly aimed at
exploring technical methods for the construction of a new container terminal at Cabello,
Venezuela's largest port, which is being undertaken by CHEC. The official laid out ambitious
plans to build Cabello into a gateway to South America and the Caribbean region, and asked the
Chinese side to assist in the future development of more ports, waterways and an artificial
island so as to make Venezuela a sea transport hub in the region. In a meeting with Rodriguez
on Wednesday, CHEC General Manager Mo Wenhe reacted positively to the proposal, noting
that the company believes Venezuela has all the conditions needed to reach that goal.
China is filling US void in Venezuela now
AFP ’13
[3/15 AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE- French Global News Network “Venezuela looks beyond US to
China as customer” http://www.rappler.com/world/23924-venezuela-united-states-china-oil Accessed 7/2]-DG
CARACAS, Venezuela - Woe is Venezuela, sitting atop the world's largest oil reserves.
Production is down and its top customer, the United States, is buying less. So here comes
China to the rescue, among others, as Venezuela seeks to diversify its markets. Under the
late Hugo Chavez, Washington and Caracas had a difficult diplomatic relationship, and
they have had no ambassadors in each other's capital since 2010. But oil makes the
world go round and a buck is a buck, so pragmatism prevailed. The US remained the
main destination for Venezuelan oil. But those exports have dropped, from 1.38 million
barrels in 2007 to 906,000 in 2012, according to figures from the US Energy Department.
That poses a problem for Venezuela. The United States pays cash, unlike countries of
the Caribbean and South America which import Venezuelan crude under preferential
terms or even trade oil for services like doctors and teachers, said analyst Diego
Gonzalez. The US is importing less from Venezuela because it wants to diversify its vendor
portfolio, said Rafael Quiroz, former director of the state oil company PDVSA. In 2012,
Venezuelan exports to the US dropped 11% to $37.4 billion, amid higher prices for
Venezuelan crude and derivatives, according to Venamcham, the Venezuelan-American
Chamber of Commerce. The United States is seeking energy efficiency in consumption and
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
42
has promoted investment and technology in non-conventional oil fields. It will achieve
energy independence in around 2020, when it will be the world's top oil producer, says
the International Energy Agency (IEA). "It is not easy to substitute a client like the
United States for any old client," said Gonzalez, president of the Center of Energy
Orientation. What is harder is to have Venezuelan crude keep going to Venezuelan
Citgo refineries in the US, as they do not exist in other countries. "That is hard to
transfer," said Gonzalez. Then there's China, with its booming energy demand. Venezuela
has developed serious economic and political cooperation with the Asian giant. Since 2008
exports of oil to China have doubled to 640,000 barrels a day. Of that, 264,000 are to pay off
loans totaling $30 billion that Beijing made to Caracas in recent years. The IEA, the
energy branch of the OECD, laments that Chavez left his country's oil industry in financial
difficulty, with infrastructure in dire need of investment and future oil production in part
mortgaged to China. The agency said the volume and the quality of the crude sent to
China vary from month to month and worry Beijing, which could delay payment if
problems are not resolved or get worse under the new post-Chavez government.
Venezuela's problems in satisfying its new and traditional markets stem from a lack of
investment to boost production. It is stagnant at about 3 million barrels a day (mbd),
Quiroz said, citing official figures. OPEC puts it lower, at 2.3 mbd. The government had
planned to raise production to nearly 6 million in 2012, but that goal was changed to
2019. Investment has been delayed to PVDSA and foreign joint ventures that operate as
minority partners in the Orinoco Oil Belt, a deposit along the river of the same name in
eastern Venezuela which is rich in heavy crude. Analysts say PDVSA, which was the
driving force of the Venezuelan government, was forced to finance Chavez's popular
social programs for the poor, to the detriment of investing in the oil industry. Quiroz
says the firm was distracted by activities that are not its core concern and "has no cash
flow or financial availability to make investments."
Chavez and Xi were besties- Ag, energy, housing, telecom, satellites, and
tourism prove
Kroth, contributor, Pravda ’12
[Olivia Kroth- contributor to Pravda.ru “Venezuela’s cooperation with Big Sister China” 6/17
http://english.pravda.ru/business/companies/17-06-2012/121403-venezuela_china-0/-Accessed
7/2]-DG
Since 2009, a boost in Sino-Venezuelan cooperation can be noted in agriculture, energy,
housing, telecommunications, trade, transport and tourism. Great energy projects have
seen the light of day during the last three years, from drilling oil in Venezuela's Orinoco
Basin to creating a Sino-Venezuelan company to manufacture oil tankers and an oil
refinery. "Venezuela has the largest oil reserves in the world," says President Hugo Chávez.
"All the oil China needs is here in Venezuela." The Faja del Orinoco contains 520 billion
barrels of crude oil. The Orinoco oil belt has been divided into blocs, where oil is
extracted by Sino-Venezuelan joint ventures in which Venezuela's state oil company
PDVSA keeps at least a 60 percent controlling share. Officials from PDVSA meet regularly
with Chinese oil industry colleagues to plan further steps of oil extraction, building petroleum
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
43
platforms, oil refineries and a fleet of oil tankers. Currently Venezuela exports 400.000
barrels per day to China, the aim is to reach one million in 2025. Hugo Chávez speaks of
"gradualness and joint development." Sino-Venezuelan projects constitute part of a
"strategic long-term development plan, to be implemented in several stages until 2025,"
according to the Venezuelan President. China's Vice-President, Xi Jinping, says of Hugo
Chávez "his presence is a very positive attribute for commercial development between China
and Venezuela." Hugo Chávez has turned to Big Sister in order to diversify his country's oil
export markets. During his presidency, Venezuela has become the 5th largest Latin
American economy partner for China, and its 4th largest oil supplier. The Venezuelan
President loves China and is very impressed by Big Sister's economic development. He
lauds the Asian giant as being "the greatest motor that exists to drive the world beyond
the crisis of capitalism. Nobody can doubt that the center of gravity of the world has
been moved towards Beijing." Hugo Chávez also wishes for ALBA member states to get
more involved with Big Sister, encouraging them regularly at ALBA summits to "form a
united front" of Latin America with China. Sino-Venezuelan energy cooperation reaches
even further than oil. China is helping Venezuela to develop its electricity grid by increasing
hydro- and thermo-electricity production. The Chinese Sinohydro Corporation and the
Venezuelan state electricity company CORPOELEC cooperate in order to augment
Venezuela's hydro-electricity output. Furthermore, Chinese specialists give Venezuela
technical assistance and technology transfer to boost thermo-electricity production. A
thermo-electric plant of a capacity of 500 megawatts has already been installed in the
state of Mérida, three more plants with a capacity of 300 megawatts each are envisaged
in the country's north and east. In the field of agriculture, China assisted Venezuela in
building an irrigation project with the Guarico River in the state of Guarico. The Chinese
Heilongjiang Beidahuang State Farm Business Trade Group LTD formed a joint venture
food company in Venezuela to help with agricultural development, mainly the
production of grains, fruits, vegetables and milk. Currently Chinese agriculture experts
are studying the conditions of soil, water and vegetation in Venezuela for further
improvement. They also give training and technology to Venezuelan farmers. With Big
Sister's assistance, great housing programs were completed. About 4,000 new homes were
built in the state of Barinas with China's Citic Group. Another 20,000 new homes were
constructed in the Fuerte Tiuna District of Caracas. The Chinese company XCMG, one of
the largest construction equipment companies worldwide, sells modern equipment to
Venezuela: compacters, construction mixers, cranes, excavators and trucks. To fill the
new homes, adequate household appliances are needed. "My Well Equipped House" is
the name of the Venezuelan government policy to sell Chinese household appliances at
discount prices. In May 2010, a contract was signed that Venezuela will buy 300,000
household items from Haier Electric Appliances in China. In May 2012, President Hugo
Chávez approved the construction of the "Haier Venezuela" factory in the state of
Miranda. It will produce electrical kitchen appliances at affordable prices for the
population. Another area where Venezuela was able to make a huge leap forward with
Big Sister's assistance is telecommunications. In November 2008, the first telecom
satellite, Venesat-1, called "Simón Bolívar," was launched from Xichang in China. This
satellite links isolated Venezuelan communities, providing them with a means of
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
44
communication and educational services. With Venesat-1, the country gained independent
internet and telephone access. The satellite enabled two million new users to connect
to internet and phone services. The installed remote antennas help the government
markets Mercal, the army border protection bases and schools in the entire Venezuelan
territory. The range of Venesat-1 reaches from the Caribbean Sea to the southern tip of
the continent, thus strengthening Latin American unity. Venesat-1 has two land stations
and a television port. It is managed by Venezuela's state-owned telecommunications
company CANTV and shares Uruguay's orbit, according to an agreement between
Venezuela and Uruguay. In 2009, Venezuela inaugurated its first cellular phone factory
in the state of Falcón. The Venezuelan Telecommunications Corporation, VTELCA, was
constructed with Chinese technology and support. Venezuela's second satellite, VRSS-1
(Venezuela Remote Sensing Satellite), will be launched in October 2012, again from China. It
will serve for land observation, especially environmental management, urban planning and
climate monitoring. Ricardo Menéndez, Venezuela's Minister for Science and Technology,
says, "We are going to have a satellite that will enable us to monitor the national
territory 24 hours a day, something which has enormous potential in terms of providing
assistance in extreme situations, for example heavy rains." For 2013, the construction of
a Venezuelan satellite factory is being prepared in the state of Carabobo, as part of the
Venezuelan government's intent to reach technological sovereignty. Chinese and
Venezuelan experts are cooperating in this new enterprise. In transport, the "National
Railway Development Plan" comprises 8,500 miles of railway, connecting the remotest
parts of Venezuela with each other. The plan is to be implemented by the year 2030. It
includes 380 new railway stations and 550 new trains. They will transport 210 million
passengers and 190 million tons of cargo every year. This railway system is being built
with Chinese technology. The 800 million dollar project is financed by the ChinaVenezuela Strategic Development Fund which was set up in 2008. Besides trains, China
also offers cars to Venezuela. Four Chery dealerships recently opened on Venezuelan
territory, one in Caracas, three in other parts of the country, attracting Venezuelans to
buy either the "Arauca" or the "Orinoco" models, named after two rivers flowing
through Venezuela. Eighteen more Chery dealerships are in the planning. The cars are
assembled in Venezuela under an agreement with China. Five thousand vehicles were
already assembled in 2011, another 28,000 are planned until the end of this year. The
enterprise is financed jointly by Chery and a Venezuelan company. Venezuela has
ambitious intentions in tourism as well. President Chávez' government wants to attract more
Chinese visitors. A Venezuelan group participated in this year's International Tourism Fair in
Beijing. The Venezuelan stand presented posters and videos of Caribbean beaches,
Amazonian jungles, the snow-capped Andes peaks and the Llanos, the wide grasslands
in central Venezuela with their cattle herds and Llanero culture. Venezuela wants to
offer adventure and nature tours through the Llanos states of Apure, Barinas, Cojedes
and Guárico with their special fauna and flora to Chinese tourists who are interested in
ecological tourism. Alejandro Fleming, Venezuela's Minister for Tourism, reported
about the International Tourism Fair of Bejing in "Todo Venezuela" (All of Venezuela), a
TV program emitted by Venezuela de Televisión. The Minister said that representatives
of Chinese tourist agencies showed great interest in organizing tours to Venezuela.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
45
Many private Chinese guests also visited the stand, mainly to watch the videos showing
Venezuelan race driver, Pastor Maldonado, who won the Formula 1 in his race car.
Meanwhile, the first biography of Hugo Chávez in Mandarin has appeared, written by
the Chinese author Xu Shicheng who describes the Venezuelan President as "the great
leader of the Latin American Left in the 21st century." The book with the title
"Biography of Hugo Chávez: From the Bolivarian Revolution to the Socialism of the 21st
Century" was presented at the Venezuelan Embassy in Bejing in the summer of 2011.
Ambassador Rocío Maneiro and 300 guests attended the event, from Chinese
intellectuals to foreign diplomats. "It was a great challenge to write about someone so
active in the scene of world politics, someone who has achieved great economic,
political, social and diplomatic changes in his country. I tried to approach with great
honesty the main steps of his relations to Russia and China," the Chinese author said.
"Hugo Chávez has already become a part of Latin American history for having initiated
the appearance of left movements on the continent through elections. Since 1999, this
appearance of the Left has extended to Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru and
Uruguay. Chávez is an important statesman for Latin America and the world," Xu
Shicheng emphasized in an interview. The Chinese writer pointed out that the previous
analysis of Hugo Chávez' thoughts had helped him to understand his "exemplary
character" since joining the Military Academy. According to Xu Shicheng, the
Venezuelan President is a "very agile person" who has learned his lessons since coming
into power, and who has corrected his course, which helped him to win the referendum
of 2009. "For Hugo Chávez, I planned to contribute elements appraising his figure in the
frame of the thirteen years of his mandate," the author explained. Xu Shicheng has
pursued Latin American studies for more than 40 years and travelled on the continent
several times. Xu Shicheng congratulated Hugo Chávez for his 57th birthday. He remarked
that of all Latin American presidents, he is the one who visited China most often, six times
altogether, a fact that proves "the good relations between both countries." The biography has
already been translated into Spanish. The tome of 400 pages was published in the People's
Publishing House of China. Its extensive bibliography contains some speeches and essays from
the website "Líneas de Chávez." One of the Venezuelan President's many noteworthy
thoughts is that China and Venezuela pursue the "common goal of creating a balance in the
world, a multi-polar world. China and Venezuela have just one project and one vision: a new
world, a world of justice, a world of equality, a world of progress".
This will be a continuous trend- Maduro hasn’t changed anything
Xinhua 13
[People’s Daily Online “Future China-Venezuelan cooperation looks optimistic” 5/13
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8241211.html-Accessed 7/2]-DG
CARACAS, May 10 (Xinhua) --Officials from Venezuela and China have voiced confidence in
bilateral relations since President Nicolas Maduro took office in April, saying the two
countries' cooperation prospects look great. China and Venezuela established
diplomatic relations in 1974. In recent years, the two countries have expanded their
cooperation in energy, finance, infrastructure, technology and production. During his 14-year
mandate, the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez visited China six times and
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
46
boosted bilateral relations. After Maduro was sworn in last month, he said his government
will continue to attach great importance to its strategic partnership with China and will
further deepen and promote their cooperative relations in various fields. "The best way to pay
tribute to Chavez is to continue to deepen Venezuela and China's strategic relationship," he
said. The China Venezuela High Level Joint Commission was established in 2001 as a
high-level decision-making center of the cooperation between the two countries. A joint
development fund between the two nations was created in 2007. Han Deping, regional
chief of China Development Bank's American division, told Xinhua that the joint
development fund and the long-term financing loans are corner stones of cooperation
between the two countries. They not only help undertaking the financial risks for the
Chinese enterprises, but also solve the budget restriction for the Venezuelan
government, Han said. Wang Yong, China's economic and commercial counselor to
Venezuela, said trade volume between China and Venezuela amounted to over 23
billion dollars in 2012. Venezuela has become China's fourth largest trading partner in
Latin America. China has provided more than 30 billion dollars to Venezuela in financing
nearly 300bilateral cooperation projects in energy, agriculture, industry, technology and
infrastructure, he added.
47
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
China Says Yes
China willing to cooperate—Oil Proves
Blas, Commodities Editor for Financial Times, 6/13
[Javier, 6/13/13, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/47e7fad8-cdc3-11e2-831300144feab7de.html#axzz2Xwf1rMW2, 7/2/13, ARH]
“It is ironic,” says Robert McNally, a former White House oil official. “But as sanctions drive
Iranian oil off the market, it would be unreasonable to expect even Tehran’s friends like
Venezuela to forgo opportunities to replace those barrels.” Over the past two years, Venezuela
has nearly doubled its oil exports to China – the world’s second-largest oil consumer – and to
India – the fourth largest – to a combined total of almost 1m barrels a day. Over the same
period, Iranian oil exports to both countries have halved to roughly 500,000 b/d. Venezuela has
this year become the third-largest oil supplier to China and India, up from seventh position in
2011. Iran, which two years ago was the third top supplier to both Beijing and New Delhi, has
fallen to sixth and 11th, respectively.
There is a 500-year trade deal
Herald 6/2
[Latin America Herald Tribune “Venezuela, China Boost Joint Investment Fund to $12 Billion”
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=327952&CategoryId=10717-Accessed 7/2]-DG
CARACAS – President Hugo Chavez and Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping signed here
Wednesday an agreement to increase to $12 billion a bilateral strategic fund to finance
different projects in Venezuela. China will contribute $8 billion and Venezuela the remaining
$4 billion, which in large part will be destined to boost Venezuelan oil exports to the Asian
giant from the current 96,000 barrels per day to 1 million bpd in 2015, Chavez said. “We will
meet that goal, without doubt,” he added during the nationally broadcast accord signing
ceremony. The accord is “part of the strategic alliance,” the socialist head of state emphasized,
and “has no precedent in the history” of the South American country and, with it, “Venezuela is
ratifying its status as a partner supplying petroleum to China for the next 500 years.” Chavez
recalled for Xi that some 30 international oil firms currently are carrying out a quantification of
the reserves in Venezuela's Orinoco Belt, and at the end of last year the proven existence of 174
million barrels of crude had been verified. That volume represents about half of that which
Chavez said exists in the Belt, which will make his country “the largest petroleum reserve in the
world.” Venezuela is the world's fifth-leading oil exporter and one of the main suppliers of crude
to the United States. The strategic fund was set up at the beginning of the decade with $4 billion
contributed by China and $2 billion added by Venezuela. Xi participated with Chavez at the
start of a Venezuela-China Business Forum in Caracas at which representatives of both
countries will seek to strike business deals in the areas of trade, industry, technology and
energy
48
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
Generic
Chinese model of investment solves best in Venezuela – past models prove
Myers, program director at the InterAmerican Dialogue, 11
[Margret, 7-22-11, InterAmerican Dialogue, “How is China Changing Latin
America’s Energy Sector”,
http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2710, accessed 7-213, HG]
A: Margaret Myers, director of the China and Latin America program at the Inter-American
Dialogue: "China promotes a 'win-win strategy' when dealing with Latin America, promising
mutually beneficial bilateral relationships. Upon first glance, its recent agreements with
Ecuador and Venezuela appear mutually beneficial. Having spurned other creditors, Ecuador and
Venezuela are increasingly reliant upon China for infusions of capital. China uses 'loans-for-oil'
and other investment mechanisms to stake claims to the region's natural resources. Its
domestic urbanization and industrialization efforts are highly dependent upon resource
imports from across the globe. Barring rapid political transition in Ecuador or Venezuela, or a
significant economic downturn in China, these loan agreements are likely to materialize, and to
be used according to loan stipulations. But the extent to which they will benefit Ecuador and
Venezuela is less certain. The vast majority of China's investments in Latin America either
directly or indirectly support resource extraction. They are intended to guarantee China's
natural resource supply over the next decade. Countries like Chile, through sound
macroeconomic policy and effective governance over the extractive sector, have benefited
greatly from China's resource-related investment. But in the absence of institutional controls
and macroeconomic foresight, oil-tied investments in Ecuador and Venezuela are unlikely to
generate long-term, sustainable growth. Chinese funding may also have unexpected political or
environmental impacts. Many worry that environmental degradation will accompany Chinafunded projects. Also, Chinese loans thus far have enabled Correa and Chávez to increase
spending on popular social and infrastructure projects, sustaining some degree of domestic
political support. At present, few countries in Latin America would deny the immediate
benefits of a renminbi infusion. Chinese investment in Latin America continues to promote
growth, but long-term success will require strong institutions and responsible policy
formulation. As Latin American diplomats in China have noted, recipients of Chinese investment
must take measures to ensure that China's 'win-win' arrangements don't just mean China wins
twice."
Chinese investment empirically effective – avoids conflict
Ellis, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies, Modeling, Gaming, and
Simulation at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at National Defense
University, 11
[Evan, 9-30-11, China Brief, “China's Cautious Economic and Strategic Gamble in Venezuela,”
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0
be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=eta&tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=3&
tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38472&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=242a91cd668dc067ed
bebf7c313668e1#.Udg9e_myBsk, accessed 7-6-13, MM]
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
49
Perhaps more than any other country in Latin America, Venezuela is a test case for the ability
of the PRC to pursue its “resources and markets” agenda, while not being drawn into the
same struggles to protect its investments, nationals and other interests that caused trouble
for US relations with the Latin America for most of the previous century. Chinese Assistance to
Chavez Chinese aid to the current Venezuelan government involves a combination of cash,
loan-funded work, and investment commitments. The Chavez regime has used such support,
in part, to cover important short-term needs, generating symbolic benefits, and ensuring
future production in primary product export industries of interest to the PRC. Since 2008,
Beijing has loaned Venezuela $32 billion (only partially delivered), including three infusions of
$4 billion into the “heavy investment fund” first established in 2008, as well as a separate
$20.6 billion loan, half denominated in Chinese currency, facilitating the purchase of Chinese
goods and services. China Development Bank alone is reportedly supporting 137 separate
projects in Venezuela (Canal de Noticia, September 14). In addition, Chinese companies have
committed to invest $40 billion in the Venezuelan oil industry by 2016. The deals include
$16.4 billion to develop the Junin-4 oil block, Sinopec investments to develop the Junin-1 and
Junin-8 blocks and a commitment by China National Overseas Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to
develop the Mariscal Sucre gas deposits off the Eastern shore of Venezuela (El Universal,
December 2, 2010).
China and Venezuela have had previous success on oil projects—ensures good
and beneficial cooperation
Erikson, senior advisor for Western Hemisphere affairs at the U.S. Department
of State 2005
[Daniel Erikson 2/13/05 http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume15/pdfs/erikson.pdf
PB]
The burgeoning Cuba-China relationship has occurred in the context of China’s efforts to pursue
closer ties with Latin America as a whole, including Venezuela. Hugo Chavez made his first state
visit to China in October 1999, where he met with Chinese president Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu
Rhonji, and other leaders. His trip marked the first Venezuelan presidential visit to China since
1983, and Chavez brought 24 economic projects seeking cooperation with the Chinese. In 1999,
Venezuela was already the largest single recipient of Chinese investment in Latin America,
mainly concentrated in two Venezuelan oil fields under development by the China National
Petroleum Corporation. In April 2001, Chinese president Jiang Zemin visited Venezuela during
his six-country swing through Latin America intended to advance trade initiatives and drum up
opposition to a measure to censure China’s human rights practices at the United Nations. In
Chavez, he found a willing ally, who proclaimed his admiration for Mao, backed China’s effort to
host the 2008 Olympics, and most importantly, pledged to oppose the UN resolution. During the
visit, Chavez declared that “we don’t believe any country in the world has the right to condemn
another ... We are going to vote against the resolution.”20 Chavez also announced that he would
write a letter of condolence to the family of a Chinese fighter pilot who died in a collision with a
U.S. spy plane earlier that month. The agreements signed during the trip included a $60 million
investment in a tractor factory and a number of accords on energy, mining, agriculture, and
taxation. Chavez also said that the two countries discussed the joint manufacturing of Chinese
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
50
K-8 and Y-12 military training and cargo planes in Venezuela. In 2001, Venezuela’s trade with
China totaled $350 million while Chinese investment in Venezuela totaled $530 million in
2000.21 By 2000, trade between China and Venezuela had already hit $351 million, which
represented an 86 percent increase over the prior year.22 In May 2001, Chavez visited Beijing
for a second time for a five day visit, where Jiang remarked that China had “a positiveattitude
towards formulating a ten-year plan of cooperation between the two countries.”23 During this
trip, Chavez presented Jiang with Venezuela’s top honor, the Liberator’s medal. A deal was
struck for China to buy Venezuelan oil and provide a crucial loan for Venezuela’s farming
sector. Venezuela and China have also signed a Strategic Energy Plan that extends until 2011,
which lays out provisions for Venezuela to increase oil exports to China while boosting its In
December 2004, Hugo Chavez made his third visit to China, signing oil and gas deals that
allowed Chinese companies to invest $350 million in 15 oil fields located in eastern Venezuela,
as well as an additional $60 million investment in natural gas projects. Chavez also planned to
buy a satellite from China, and Information Minister Andrés Izarra later said that the satellite
would be placed into orbit within a year, thereby giving the country “full sovereignty in its
telecommunications.”25 Venezuela also sought to acquire Chinese radar to improve security
along its border with Colombia, and there are signs that security cooperation will continue.
While it is premature to speak of a China-Cuba-Venezuela axis in the Western Hemisphere, there
is little question that all three countries are seeking to strengthen bilateral ties with each other
to advance complementary political and economic interests.
Success due to China Latin America relations – US not key
Erikson, senior advisor for Western Hemisphere affairs at the U.S. Department
of State 05
[Daniel Erikson 2/13/05 http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume15/pdfs/erikson.pdf
PB]
During a speech in February 2005, Fidel Castro declared that Cuba was “rising again like a
phoenix” due to its economic ties with China and Venezuela.26 While the island’s economy
remains in the doldrums, it is true that Cuba’s economic strategy of forging ties with China and
Venezuela has reaped important dividends. Subsidized Venezuelan oil has not prevented
recurring blackouts in Cuba, but it has surely alleviated some of the island’s economic
deprivation. China’s large investments in the mining sector and growing interest in tourism
and agriculture also provide Cuba a needed boost. However, perhaps the most intriguing aspect
of these new alliances concerns the potential impact on Cuba’s eventual transition process once
the 78-year old Fidel Castro eventually leaves the stage. For many years, the United States has
positioned itself as the unrivalled actor in shaping Cuba’s post-Castro politics. While other
countries—especially Canada, Spain, and the broader European Union— conducted normal
business in Cuba, they similarly favored the island’s evolution towards a market-oriented
democracy. Latin American countries, for their part, have generally distanced themselves from
the Cuban system in pursuit of economic modernization and more democratic politics. Once the
Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Cuba found itself with trading partners but no true allies who
had an interest in perpetuating the Cuban system. In just a short period of time, this has
changed. Cuba now has two important allies with a stake in the existing system and an interest
in maintaining the island’s current political order. In Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Castro has
discovered an important partner with substantial resources. Venezuela has begun to
experiment with its ability to consolidate ties with the Caribbean countries to create a block of
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
51
votes at the Organization of American States, and it may find new ways to exercise power in
the inter-American system. If so, Venezuela could represent a counterbalance to U.S. actions
that may have some ability to influence other countries in the hemisphere. However,
Venezuela’s outreach to Cuba reflects a narrow decision taken by Chavez and his leadership
group. As such, any leadership change in Caracas would likely result in rolling back or even
breaking off this alliance. By contrast, the Chinese involvement in Cuba represents a consensus
decision by a ruling party that is seeking to advance its main interests in the Western
Hemisphere: securing natural resources to feed a rapidly growing economy and stripping Taiwan
of its remaining diplomatic allies in the Caribbean and Central America. Moreover, China has a
crucial veto on the UN Security Council that could potentially represent a counterweight to U.S.
efforts in pursuit of its objectives in Cuba. While the Cuban leadership appears to believe that
China’s friendship is based on socialist solidarity, this is probably incorrect. China is primarily
seeking a return on its investment, and if Cuba fails to deliver economic results then the
relationship will cool. In any case, the United States today remains far and away the most
important actor in shaping an international response to post-Castro Cuba. Still, U.S.
policymakers who dream of remaking Cuba should be aware that China and Venezuela are
poised to loom ever larger in Washington’s rearview mirror.
52
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
Energy
China has the capital and the experience to invest in the Venezuelan energy
sector
Myers, independent energy economist, 11
[Roger, 7-22-11, InterAmerican Dialogue, “How is China Changing Latin America’s
Energy Sector”, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2710,
accessed 7-2-13, HG]
China recently announced several loans worth billions of dollars to Ecuador and Venezuela-to
be paid back largely in the form of oil-for public works, energy and infrastructure projects.
These investments and others have made China the biggest credit source for the two
governments, often on terms that other financial institutions would spurn, analysts have
pointed out. Are China's big loans going to be good deals for the Latin American countries? Will
the money come through, and will it be used effectively for the intended purposes? Is China's
increased investment in Ecuador, Venezuela and other countries in the region playing out as
expected several years ago? What unexpected or new economic and political twists are on the
horizon resulting from evolving China-Latin America relations? ¶ A: Kirk Sherr, president of
Regester Larkin Energy: "China is not just lending to the region in return for oil, it also is
leveraging the goodwill synergies of these loans to support large equity investments in oil, gas
and electric companies. These loan agreements are important to China and they have a solid
track record of meeting their obligations-even when the recipient countries may not meet theirs
due to project delays and cost overruns. China has benefited on many fronts from its
relationship with the region, exporting more than it imports while also nailing down long-term
commodity resources. Energy security is a major issue for Beijing, and Latin American sourcing
is merely one part of a complex solution. According to the BP Statistical Review, China imported
nearly 5 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude from South and Central America in 2010,
compared to only 8,000 bpd in 2001. Over this same period, Chinese national oil companies
have extended their presence across the Latin America region, gaining valuable operating
experience. In Venezuela, especially, China has become a major force with the $16.3 billion joint
venture between PDVSA and China National Petroleum Corp. to develop the Junin-4 block of the
Orinoco oil belt. A number of twists and turns lie ahead, however, for China's engagement of the
region. Already, there is growing regional backlash against Chinese imports in Brazil.
Additionally, China faces significant regional risk from implications of possible regime change in
its allies, Venezuela and Cuba. On the other hand, if Chinese shale gas addresses more of their
energy needs, their interest in the region may wane over time."¶ A: Roger Tissot, independent
energy economist: "A simplified explanation of the transmission mechanism that has
sustained growth in 'ChinAmerica' was China's purchase of U.S. bonds to keep U.S. interest
rates low, the U.S. dollar high, the Chinese currency low and, thus, Chinese exports strong.
This engine of growth, of course, was not sustainable in the long term. Despite calls for a
revaluation of the currency, China is still reluctant to allow rapid revaluations. On the other
hand, the weakness of the U.S. economy and the uncertainty regarding its debt and the dollar
are sufficient incentives for China to look at diversifying its portfolio. Investing in Wall Street and
other western financial markets would only expose China to the risks of financial institutions
afflicted with bad debts and highly indebted economies. Investing in natural resources is a
more attractive option. China needs oil to fuel its rapid economic growth. Although it has
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
53
closer and more economic supply sources, investing in these countries offers an attractive
alternative, despite the risks. First, it increases the global supply of oil while securing a share of
the incremental production and profits to Chinese national oil companies. Second, it hedges
against future price spikes. Third, it offers Chinese companies new markets for their products
and services. And fourth, it reduces the challenges of direct ownership or flawed joint ventures,
which were the preferred strategies by Chinese NOCs in their earlier quest for resources. In this
case, pressure is on the host country to realize the investments, particularly since China has
increased its oversight of these loans. China is aware that payment of the loans is likely to
continue in any post-Chávez administration. Thus, China wants to ensure the loans benefit the
entire country and not just the political class in power currently. For the host countries, Chinese
financing is often the 'lender of last resort.' It is not a cheap one, but due to the concern the
international financial community has over Venezuela and Ecuador, and the large risk premiums
they would charge, Chinese lending is an attractive option."
54
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
Oil
Chinese investment key to solve oil – empirics prove China is key to funding and
solving in the long-term
Associated Press, 11
[6-5-11, Newsmax, “China Shops for Latin American Oil, Food, Minerals”,
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/LT-Latin-AmericaChina/2011/06/05/id/398851, accessed 7-2-13, HG]
Recent deals have made China a key financier to the governments of Venezuela and Argentina.
At the same time, Chinese companies have secured a decade's worth of oil from Venezuela
and Brazil, and steady supplies of wheat, soybeans and natural gas from Argentina.¶ China is
breaking new ground by aggressively locking down commodities around Latin America
through large loans, investments and other financial arrangements, said Orville Schell, director
of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society in New York.¶ "I don't know of any
other government which has done this sort of securing of rights for commodities and natural
resources so systematically around the Third World as China, and they've used a whole host of
new financial instruments to do this," Schell said.¶ "China's been very, very prolific in spreading
its investments around Africa and Latin America, even though the terms aren't ideal."¶ Ernesto
Fernandez Taboada, director of the Argentine-Chinese Chamber of Production, Industry and
Commerce, said China is simply making sure it has the resources it needs to continue growing its
economy, which, by some accounts, is projected to surpass the U.S.'s by 2020.¶ "For China, this
is a strategic, long-term investment," Fernandez Taboada said. "They're thinking in the future,
not just in the moment. These oil investments, for example, are for 15 to 20 years."¶ Some of the
largest investments have gone to Brazil and Argentina, but China has extended even bigger
loans to Venezuela, agreeing to provide more than $32 billion to President Hugo Chavez's
government.¶ Venezuela will pay its debt in oil, and in increasing amounts of it during the next
decade. The infusion of cash has swiftly made China Venezuela's biggest foreign lender, enabling
Chavez to boost spending ahead of next year's presidential election.
Chinese investment in Venezuelan oil has empirically benefitted both countries
Zhao, Global Times, 3-13-13
[Zhao Qian, People’s Daily, “After Chavez, Sino-Venezuelan cooperation will not stop,”
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90778/8164901.html accessed 7-2-13 UR]
Chinese experts have offered reassurance over the outlook for investment in Venezuela.¶
"Chavez's chosen successor Nicolas Maduro is favored to win, and the previous policies are
expected to be maintained during the new president's term of office," Wu Changsheng, director
of the Latin American Research Center at the China Foundation for International Studies, told
the Global Times Thursday.¶ Wu said that even if Venezuelan opposition leader Henrique
Capriles should come to power, cooperation between China and Venezuela would still
continue, as it is a win-win solution for both countries.¶ China's imports of crude oil from
Venezuela reached an average of 460,000 barrels per day in December last year, accounting for
8.3 percent of China's total imports, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) said in a
statement.¶ In the same statement, Venezuela's Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez was quoted as
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
55
saying that exports from Venezuela to China will rise to 1 million barrels per day by 2015.¶
China's average daily oil imports reached 6.12 million barrels by the end of last year, according
to the General Administration of Customs.¶ Venezuela has also benefited from China's
investment.¶ Venezuela's Congress voted in May last year to double the amount the
government can borrow from China under a deal that lets the nation pay off Chinese loans
with oil. A deal was signed in 2008 to let Venezuela borrow as much as $4 billion from the
China Development Bank at any given time, but the vote in May doubled that to $8 billion,
Reuters reported.¶ Calls to the China Development Bank by the Global Times were not returned
by press time Tuesday.¶ In the past 10 years, Venezuela's GDP has risen to about $300 billion.
This represents substantial growth compared to the 1990s, when GDP was under $100 billion,
said a press release from the Venezuelan Embassy in the US in December last year.¶ Nelson
Merentes, president of Venezuela's Central Bank, said in the press release that the country is
among the top five in terms of economic growth in Latin America, given that GDP grew 5.5
percent between January and September 2012. ¶ Merentes noted the construction sector is one
of the drivers of the Venezuelan economy. "China Development Bank's credit loans have
played an important role in Venezuela's economic development," Wu said.
And, Venezuela has a 3-year oil loan
Armas, contributor, El Universal ‘12
[Mayela H Armas- contributor for El Universal Translated by Gerardo Cardenas
http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/120510/venezuela-assigns-230000-bpd-of-oil-to-repaydebt-with-china-Accessed 7/2]-DG
The financial agreement between Venezuela and China was amended. Now, the instrument
provides that, in order to pay back the three-year loans agreed with the Asian country,
Venezuelan shipments of oil cannot be less than 230,000 bpd. Last February, Venezuela's
Executive Office expanded cooperation agreements with China and authorized an amendment
thereof. On Tuesday, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs handed over a document entitled
"Second Protocol to Amend the Venezuela-China Joint Financing Fund" for approval by
Congress. However, discussion of the document was postponed until next week in the
regular session of the National Assembly. Based on the report delivered to deputies,
the amendment ensures the renewal of the loan facility with the Chinese Development
Bank in order to transfer USD 12 billion to the Joint Fund (which is also known as Heavy
Fund). It further details the commitments that Venezuela has to undertake to pay the
loans with the Asian bank. Article 5 of the amendment reads as follows: "The Republic is
committed through the seller (Pdvsa) to sell fuel and crude oil in an amount not lower than
230,000 barrels per day by the date on which the obligations undertaken with regard to the
loan facility have been completed." Pdvsa's 2011 management report summarized part
of the agreements and mentioned that in 2012 Venezuela would assign 230,000 barrels
to pay back the debt. Therefore, the amendment would be ratifying that oil shipments
may not be below this limit. Rafael Ramírez, the minister of Petroleum and Mining and
Pdvsa President, has said that the agreements with China are flexible. "We have
estimated (the delivery of) a higher amount of barrels. However, if oil prices rise, a
lower amount of barrels will be shipped," he said last February. However, the
agreements set a minimum limit for deliveries. The amendment of the agreement with
China, which will be discussed in the National Assembly, reiterates that the revenues
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
56
from oil sales to China will be deposited in an escort account. According to the report,
"the buyer (China) will deposit the money for the purchase of oil in an escort account,
which will be used to facilitate the repayment of principal and (debt) interest."
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
**Answers to Answers**
57
58
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
AT- Perm
No US-China cooperation in Latin America- interests conflict
Ellis, professor of national security studies at the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies, 12
[R. Evan, May 2012, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, “The United States, Latin America
and China: A ‘Triangular
Relationship’?”,http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2
e-may.pdf, Accessed 7/2/13, ML]
The interdependence of the United States, the PRC and ¶ Latin America does not imply that the
United States and ¶ China should treat Latin America as a “unitary actor.” Nor ¶ should the
United States and China necessarily “pact” with ¶ respect to their collective treatment of Latin
America, even ¶ were this possible given the divergent interests and commercial competition
among US and PRC interests in the region. ¶ Likewise, it is unlikely and inadvisable that Latin
America, ¶ through an entity such as UNASUR or ECLAC, should coordinate with the PRC to assert
a joint position toward the ¶ United States, just as it is unrealistic and inadvisable for the ¶ United
States, through the Organization of American States ¶ or other multilateral forums, to forge such
a joint position ¶ with the states of Latin America toward the PRC.¶ If it is neither advisable nor
feasible for two parties in the ¶ triangle to develop a coordinated posture toward the third, ¶
it is also not necessarily in the strategic interests of any one ¶ party to seek to ensure that all
three actors are automatically represented in the arenas in which they interact. For ¶ example,
for the United States to bring the PRC into current ¶ bilateral security relationships or
multilateral security institutions as a partner could send an undesirable signal that it ¶
unequivocally encourages and facilitates PRC engagement. ¶ Such a US posture could
accelerate a process that should be ¶ approached cautiously in order to best serve US
interests. ¶ Similarly, China’s pursuit of commercial and strategic interests with countries such
as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia ¶ may be favored by an engagement that excludes the
United ¶ States, just as part of the point of China’s interactions ¶ with multilateral regional
bodies, among them UNASUR, ¶ CELAC and ALBA, is that these forums, by design, exclude ¶ the
United States.
Bilateral investment in Latin America won’t access geopolitical and economic
benefit
Regenstreif, Reuters, 6-12-13 [Gary, Reuters, “The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin
America,” http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalryover-latin-america/ accessed 7-2-13 UR]
Though the U.S. and Chinese presidents heralded a “new model” of cooperation at their
weekend summit, a growing competition looks more likely. The whirlwind of activity before
President Barack Obama met with President Xi Jinping in the California desert revealed that
Beijing and Washington’s sights are set on a similar prize — and face differing challenges to
attain it.¶ Their focus is Latin America and the prize is increased trade and investment
opportunities in a region where economic reforms have pulled millions out of poverty and into
the middle class. Latin America is rich in the commodities and energy that both China and the
United States need, largely stable politically and eager to do deals.¶ Consider the travel itinerary:
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
59
Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica last month. Vice President Joe Biden recently went to
Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil. Chile’s president paid Obama a visit last week, Peru’s
leader arrived Tuesday and Brazil’s is due in October.¶ Meanwhile, just after Biden left Trinidad,
Xi arrived, part of a tour that also took him to Costa Rica and Mexico to promote trade and
cooperation.¶ Both U.S. and Chinese officials, however, are finding a more self-confident Latin
America, able to leverage its new strength to forge better agreements and find multiple
trading partners. That will likely force Washington to work harder to maintain its leading
trade position against China — which has money to burn in the region.¶ “There is a more
energetic [U.S.] tone, a more optimistic mood about economic agenda in second term than [the]
first time,” Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington policy
group, told me. “There’s something happening in the region and the U.S. wants to be part of it.
Whether there’s a well-thought-out vision or policy remains a question. But there is more of an
affirmation of the region and a willingness to engage.”¶ The United States, Latin America’s
largest trading partner throughout much of its history, still retains this position. Washington has
now signed free trade agreements with more than a third of the hemisphere’s nations and
annually exchanges more than $800 billion in goods and services with Latin America — more
than three times the region’s commerce with China.¶ In Obama’s first term, however, the
administration was widely viewed as neglecting Latin America. And China has moved in fast. ¶
China built its annual trade with the region from virtually nothing in 2000 to about $260 billion
in 2012. In 2009, it overtook the United States as the largest trading partner of Brazil, the
region’s powerhouse — largely through massive purchases of iron ore and soy.¶ Other data is
telling: In 1995, for example, the United States accounted for 37 percent of Brazil’s foreign
direct investment. That dropped to 10 percent in 2011, according to the Council of the
Americas, which seeks to foster hemispheric ties.¶ Washington’s renewed ardor is at least partly
because of the fear that China will repeat in Latin America the economic success it has built in
Africa. China has been able to present itself as a benevolent partner there, which has played
well against the West’s history of meddling in domestic affairs.¶ “It’s about influence and
leverage,” said Eric Farnsworth, vice president of the Council of the Americas, “…The region
matured and expects to be treated in real partnership rather than [in the] patronizing way it
happened in the past.Ӧ The challenges facing Beijing and Washington lie in how each
approaches the region. Washington confronts lingering resentment about its historic regional
interference, stretching back to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, and its continuing desire to mix
business with policy — which muddies its approach to trade and investment. Washington’s
domestic problems, its pivot to Asia and a host of global crises, also serve as distractions that
could keep its actions in Latin America from matching its words — as has happened before.¶
China, meanwhile, is largely viewed in the region as unencumbered by ideology. It approaches
opportunities almost exclusively on commercial terms there.¶ Biden, in a May 29 speech in Rio
de Janeiro, gushed about the progress made by Latin America and trumpeted the region’s
growing international stature.¶ “In the U.S.,” Biden said, “the discussion is no longer what it was
when I was first elected as a young man: What could we do for the Americas? That’s long since
gone. The issue now is: What can we do together? We want to engage more. We think there’s
great opportunity. We’re optimistic.”¶ As with many new starts, a recognition of past mistakes is
in order. “For many in Brazil,” Biden said, “the United States doesn’t start with a clean slate.
There’s some good reason for that skepticism. That skepticism still exists and it’s
understandable. But the world has changed. We’re moving past old alignments, leaving behind
old suspicions and building new relationships.Ӧ China has particular interest in Mexico, the
region’s second-largest market. Beijing has been competing with Mexico to supply the U.S.
market with manufactured goods. But China is now looking to work with Mexico City —
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
60
investing in infrastructure, mining and energy because of the expected reforms that would open
the oil industry to foreign investment.
No US-China cooperation in Latin America- interests conflict
Ellis, professor of national security studies at the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies, 12
[R. Evan, May 2012, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, “The United States, Latin America
and China: A ‘Triangular Relationship’?”,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf,
Accessed 7/2/13, ML]
The interdependence of the United States, the PRC and ¶ Latin America does not imply that the
United States and ¶ China should treat Latin America as a “unitary actor.” Nor ¶ should the
United States and China necessarily “pact” with ¶ respect to their collective treatment of Latin
America, even ¶ were this possible given the divergent interests and commercial competition
among US and PRC interests in the region. ¶ Likewise, it is unlikely and inadvisable that Latin
America, ¶ through an entity such as UNASUR or ECLAC, should coordinate with the PRC to assert
a joint position toward the ¶ United States, just as it is unrealistic and inadvisable for the ¶ United
States, through the Organization of American States ¶ or other multilateral forums, to forge such
a joint position ¶ with the states of Latin America toward the PRC.¶ If it is neither advisable nor
feasible for two parties in the ¶ triangle to develop a coordinated posture toward the third, ¶ it
is also not necessarily in the strategic interests of any one ¶ party to seek to ensure that all three
actors are automatically represented in the arenas in which they interact. For ¶ example, for the
United States to bring the PRC into current ¶ bilateral security relationships or multilateral
security institutions as a partner could send an undesirable signal that it ¶ unequivocally
encourages and facilitates PRC engagement. ¶ Such a US posture could accelerate a process
that should be ¶ approached cautiously in order to best serve US interests. ¶ Similarly, China’s
pursuit of commercial and strategic interests with countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador and
Bolivia ¶ may be favored by an engagement that excludes the United ¶ States, just as part of
the point of China’s interactions ¶ with multilateral regional bodies, among them UNASUR, ¶
CELAC and ALBA, is that these forums, by design, exclude ¶ the United States.
China solves best – empirics prove that China has better cooperation
Cuban Research Institute, 9
[6/9, Cuban Research Institute, “Cuba and China:
Lessons and Opportunities for
the United States”, http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/cubachina-hearn.pdf, accessed 7-5-13, HG]
China often pays for developing country natural resources with trade credits, construction
equipment, infrastructure upgrading, and technical training rather than hard currency (Robles
2005). The significance of such exchanges does not lie in their capacity to generate short-term
commerce, but rather in the more encompassing goal of building stable alliances, political trust,
and economic growth over the long term. This is facilitated by direct collaboration between the
Cuban and Chinese governments, whose state-owned enterprises do not duplicate, undercut, or
compete with each other. Even China’s more strictly commercial goals in Cuba, such as filling
Cuban homes and stores with Chinese electronic appliances, have been accomplished in close
collaboration with the Cuban state.¶ Cuban officials argue that the state is more capable than
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
61
the market of developing human capital and protecting the social commitments of the health
and education systems. Chinese officials are familiar with the role of public services in building
the legitimacy of the state, and have designed collaborative industrial projects in Cuba that
outwardly emphasize a combination of cultural, economic, and social outcomes. The Chinese
government’s awareness of Cuban political culture is an integral element of its commercial
success in Cuba, while by contrast, as Eusebio Leal has said, “we’ll never allow McDonald’s to
hang its billboards in Old Havana” (interview, 29 April 2002). During Hu Jintao’s visit to Havana
in November 2008, the headline of the newspaper Granma read, “Example of Transparence and
Pacific Cooperation” (Granma International 2008:1). Adopting a similar tone, Chinese officials
maintain that their objective in Cuba and Latin America is mutually beneficial economic
partnership and “south–south cooperation” (Jiang 2008, Robles 2005, Yang 2008). Diplomatic
engagement with Cuban political culture has clearly advanced China’s commercial goals.
US-China cooperation causes crowd out – bilateral ties solve best
Ellis, professor of national security studies, 12
[R. Evan, “The United States, ¶ Latin America and China: ¶ A “Triangular
Relationship”?”http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2
e-may.pdf, pg. 3 date accessed 7/7/13 IGM]
The triangle concept downplays the importance of other ¶ actors whose interaction with the
United States, China ¶ and Latin America are also important. These include India, ¶ Russia, Iran
and Europe. While the triangle does not exclude ¶ these other actors per se, the focus on the
interaction among ¶ China, the United States and Latin America tends to conceal ¶ how other
states, as well as non-state actors, play key roles ¶ in that dynamic. For example, the
sometimes competing, ¶ sometimes complementary balance in Brazil’s relationships ¶ with
India and China, played out in the Brazil-Russia-IndiaChina (BRICS) and India-Brazil-South Africa
(IBSA) forums, ¶ is arguably as relevant to Brazil’s foreign policy as is its relationship with the
United States. Similarly, although much of ¶ the foreign policy of the Chávez regime is defined in
terms ¶ of its opposition to US “imperialism,” Venezuela’s reliance ¶ on Russian arms, Chinese
money and its “anti-US” alliance ¶ with Iran occupy roughly equal importance. With respect to
Argentina, when the PRC ceased taking in that nation’s ¶ exports of soy oil, India stepped up its
purchases, helping ¶ to save Argentina from a much more significant economic ¶ problem and, in
the process, weakening the PRC’s ability to ¶ pressure the Argentine government.
Cooperation is ineffective and hurts relations
Xia, Professor of Political Science at the Graduate Center and the College of
Staten Island, 6
[Ming, “"China Threat" or a "Peaceful Rise of China"?”
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-politics-007.html, date accessed 7/7/13 IGM]
Will China become a threat to the United States, Japan, and surrounding countries? The reason
for American concern mainly arises from its hegemonic status in the world politics and the
ideological incompatibility of China with the Western value system. China's stunning economic
growth has convinced the West that it is just a matter of time until China becomes a world
superpower. But its ideological orientation makes China a revolutionary power that is
threatening both to the United States' status and global structure. Three different logics have
been constructed to substantiate the "China threat" thesis. First, ideological and cultural factors
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
62
make China a threat. For neo-conservatives in the Bush Administration, the mere factor that
China still sticks to communism makes view it adversely. Samuel Huntington has added a
cultural factor: in the clash of civilizations, the "unholy alliance between Islamic and Confucian
civilizations" is the most fundamental threat to the West. For people using this logic, the
sensible response from the U.S. is, in the short run, a containment policy, and confrontation is
possible if needed; in the long run, the promotion of a peaceful transformation within China.
Second, geopolitical and geoeconomic factors. For many realists, even China has shed off its
ideological straitjacket, as a great power in size (territory, population, and economy), China has
to pursue its own interest and respect. Nationalism may still drive China into a course of clash
with the United States, if the latter refuses to accommodate or share the leadership with China
as a rising power. Some scholars fear that democracy can unleash strong nationalism and
popular nationalism can make China even more aggressive toward the United States. Third, the
collapse of China. Opposed to the previous two perspectives, some people are concerned that if
China suffers a Soviet-style sudden-death syndrome and spins out of control, it can create an
even worse scenario. The sheer size of the population makes refuge problem, the failed state
and the followed crises (warlordism, civil war, crime, proliferation of nuclear weapons, etc)
impossible for the world to deal with. Due to these three different considerations, the United
States often oscillates from demonization to romaticization of China, from containment to
engagement. The U.S.-China relationship has shifted from conflict, to confrontation, to
competition and back to conflict, but so rarely features with cooperation. One American China
specialist characterizes the bilateral relationship as "the sweet-and-sour Sino-American
relationship."
Perm doesn’t solve - engagement is zero sum
Regenstreif, Reuters editor, 6/12
[Gary, “The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin America” http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/, date accessed 7/7/13
IGM]
Though the U.S. and Chinese presidents heralded a “new model” of cooperation at their
weekend summit, a growing competition looks more likely. The whirlwind of activity before
President Barack Obama met with President Xi Jinping in the California desert revealed that
Beijing and Washington’s sights are set on a similar prize — and face differing challenges to
attain it.
Their focus is Latin America and the prize is increased trade and investment opportunities in a
region where economic reforms have pulled millions out of poverty and into the middle class.
Latin America is rich in the commodities and energy that both China and the United States
need, largely stable politically and eager to do deals.
Consider the travel itinerary: Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica last month. Vice President
Joe Biden recently went to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil. Chile’s president paid
Obama a visit last week, Peru’s leader arrived Tuesday and Brazil’s is due in October.
Meanwhile, just after Biden left Trinidad, Xi arrived, part of a tour that also took him to Costa
Rica and Mexico to promote trade and cooperation.
No perm solvency – US-China can’t cooperate – ideological difference
Ellis, professor of national security studies 6/7
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
63
[Evan, “U.S.-China Competition Heats Up as Chinese President Xi Tours Latin America”
http://www.manzellareport.com/index.php/world/687-u-s-china-competition-heats-up-aschinese-president-xi-tours-latin-america, date accessed 7/7/13 IGM]
The coincidence between this week’s Latin American trips by U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden
and Chinese President Xi Jinping highlight the undeclared competition between the U.S. and
China in Latin America, and across the globe. The new competition is a struggle over the
economic, legal, and political norms that will prevail as the global center of gravity shifts from
the Atlantic to the Pacific in the course of the twenty-first century.
The U.S.-China competition is not a resurrection of the cold war, where the U.S. and Soviet
Union actively promoted their respective concepts for a global order. Rather, it is an
unintentional, yet inevitable struggle.
Consistent with China’s millennial history, the principal goal of PRC is to advance Chinese
national power, wealth and security. Although the PRC does not seek to impose a new ideology
on the world, the mercantilist way that it is promoting its economic development, combined
with its lack of commitment to international norms that it “did not create” means that “China’s
rise” is wreaking havoc on the international system.
In Latin America, while many governments and private interests have benefitted from the PRC’s
entry into the region, that same engagement has indirectly undermined a range of U.S. policy
objectives there, including the promotion of democracy, human rights, free trade, and the
respect for contracts and rule of law.
Cooperation is impossible – ideological differences
Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University,
11 [Aaron L., 6/23, “U.S.-China: A Conflict of Ideology”
http://www.pkarticleshub.com/2011/06/23/u-s-china-a-conflict-of-ideology/, date accessed
7/7/13 IGM]
THE UNITED States and the People’s Republic of China are locked in a quiet but increasingly
intense struggle for power and influence, not only in Asia, but around the world. And in spite of
what many earnest and well-intentioned commentators seem to believe, the nascent SinoAmerican rivalry is not merely the result of misperceptions or mistaken policies; it is driven
instead by forces that are deeply rooted in the shifting structure of the international system
and in the very different domestic political regimes of the two Pacific powers.
Throughout history, relations between dominant and rising states have been uneasy—and often
violent. Established powers tend to regard themselves as the defenders of an international
order that they helped to create and from which they continue to benefit; rising powers feel
constrained, even cheated, by the status quo and struggle against it to take what they think is
rightfully theirs. Indeed, this story line, with its Shakespearean overtones of youth and age, vigor
and decline, is among the oldest in recorded history. As far back as the fifth century BC the great
Greek historian Thucydides began his study of the Peloponnesian War with the deceptively
simple observation that the war’s deepest, truest cause was “the growth of Athenian power and
the fear which this caused in Sparta.”
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
64
AT- International Fiat Bad
1. Disproves the Resolution- We test the word “United States”. The aff should
be able to defend the importance of the US as the agent in their solvency.
2. Literature Checks Abuse—we have a specific solvency advocate for our
counterplan, proving it’s predictable and grounded in the literature—this is the
best standard for debate
3. More Real World- History proves that multiple actors are capable of doing
the same actions.
4. Checks Aff Bias- They have infinite prep time. They should be able to find
evidence distinguishing their actor from others.
5. Reject the argument, not the team- The punishment should fit the crime. No
in-round abuse, and we have no jurisdiction over other teams.
Due to China’s increasing influence in Latin America, discussion of its role in the
region cannot be ignored
Hsiang, Associate Professor at Chihlee Institute of Technology, 9
[Antonio C., November 2009, Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Vol.1 Art.4,
“China Rising in Latin America: China Rising in Latin America: ¶ More Opportunities than ¶
Challenges”,
http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=jekem&seiredir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Daca
demic%2520policy%2520making%2520china%2520latin%2520america%26source%3Dweb%26c
d%3D15%26ved%3D0CEEQFjAEOAo%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fdigitalcommons.kennes
aw.edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1003%2526context%253Djekem%26
ei%3DmV3aUfDVNsf7iwKM8ICIAg%26usg%3DAFQjCNEPNrvP3qWQUvBu10HO1WfyXg0lAA%26s
ig2%3DbNZbSc9DP1molJbTn4c5KA%26bvm%3Dbv.48705608%2Cd.cGE%20%20search=%22academic%20policy%20making%20china%20latin%20america%22, Accessed
7/7/13, ML]
According to Jorge I. Domínguez, professor at Harvard University, there were two ¶ exogenous
shocks to established Latin American international relations at the ¶ beginning of the twentyfirst century. “The first was the growing distance between ¶ the region’s governments and the
administration of U.S. President George W. Bush over ¶ many issues….The second was the
dramatic entrance of the People’s Republic of China as ¶ a significant and, in some instances,
political partner.”1¶ The geo-strategic implications of ¶ this development are broad: China’s
presence in the region not only has serious impacts on ¶ the U.S.’s role in its “backyard,” it has
consequences for the security situation in the Taiwan ¶ Strait. ¶ China’s rise in Latin America has
been “prompting some to declare the end of the Monroe ¶ Doctrine—America’s traditional
insistence, voiced by President James Monroe in 1823, ¶ that any meddling by outsiders in its
hemisphere is ‘dangerous to our peace and safety.’ For some, China became the US’s new
challenger in Latin America. “Almost two centuries ¶ later, Monroe’s fears are finally coming
true, as extra-hemispheric powers such as Russia ¶ and China are beginning to foster a new
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
65
generation of intrusive relations with Latin ¶ American nations.”3¶ Similarly, for Mary Anastasia
O’Grady, columnist of The Wall Street Journal, “China is ¶ becoming a political rival of the U.S.
in its own backyard.”4¶ China is also “perceived …in ¶ the US as a growing rival for energy
resources, spreading its presence into the Middle East ¶ and, more recently, Latin America.”5¶
General Bantz Cradock, former head of the U.S. ¶ Southern Command, warned that China’s
influence in Latin America is “an emerging ¶ dynamic that could not be ignored.”6¶ Peter
Hakim, President of the Inter-American ¶ Dialogue, finds “many people in Latin America look to
China as an economic and political ¶ alternative to U.S. hegemony.”7¶ Hillary Clinton, the
secretary of state, has noted that China ¶ and Iran are making “disturbing” gains in the region. ¶
However, one of the important reasons for shrinkage of United States hegemony in its ¶
“backyard” is because Washington “goes wrong in Latin America through inattention, when ¶ it
fails to confront emerging problems before they turn into crises.” Not only during the ¶ Bush
administration, but nine months into Obama’s administration, “Western Hemisphere ¶ Affairs is
the only regional bureau in the State Department that does not have an Obama ¶ appointee
serving as assistant secretary of state and the most influential nation in the region, ¶ Brazil, has
no U.S. ambassador.”8¶ On the contrary, many Latin Americans prefer to see ¶ China’s
expanding ties to their region as an opportunity. Even for Washington, “the ¶ developing
trade between China and Latin American countries represents an opportunity—¶ if the U.S.
plays its cards right.”9
As US leadership in Latin America begins to decline, discussion of China as an
alternate regional hegemon is key- most real world
Hsiang, Associate Professor at Chihlee Institute of Technology, 9
[Antonio C., November 2009, Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Vol.1 Art.4,
“China Rising in Latin America: China Rising in Latin America: ¶ More Opportunities than ¶
Challenges”,
http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=jekem&seiredir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Daca
demic%2520policy%2520making%2520china%2520latin%2520america%26source%3Dweb%26c
d%3D15%26ved%3D0CEEQFjAEOAo%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fdigitalcommons.kennes
aw.edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1003%2526context%253Djekem%26
ei%3DmV3aUfDVNsf7iwKM8ICIAg%26usg%3DAFQjCNEPNrvP3qWQUvBu10HO1WfyXg0lAA%26s
ig2%3DbNZbSc9DP1molJbTn4c5KA%26bvm%3Dbv.48705608%2Cd.cGE%20%20search=%22academic%20policy%20making%20china%20latin%20america%22, Accessed
7/7/13, ML]
Because “many Latin American countries no longer look to Washington leadership,” the so
called Washington Consensus “has lost traction”.28 As a global rising power, China offers ¶ an
alternative model for Latin America’s development. Even though China has been hurt by ¶ the
2008 financial crisis, “its economic and financial powers have been strengthened ¶ relative to
those of the West. China’s global influence will thus increase, and Beijing will ¶ be able to
undertake political and economic initiatives to increase it further.”29 In fact, ¶ “Washington
seemed to adopt a Chinese-style solution to its escalating financial problems: ¶ greater state
intervention to restrict the movement of capital.”30¶ Thus, Beijing’s emergence as a global
economic power is seen throughout Latin America as ¶ offering an alternative from the
Washington Consensus model for economic development. ¶ The “Beijing Consensus” is the
brainchild of Joshua Cooper Ramo, a former senior editor ¶ and foreign editor of Time magazine
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
66
and later a partner at Kissinger Associates, the ¶ consulting firm of former Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger. According to Ramo, the ¶ Beijing Consensus has three features. The first is a
commitment to innovation and constant ¶ experimentation in reforms. The second, a
rejection of per capita GDP as the only measure ¶ of progress, as sustainability and equality
also count. And the third, a commitment to selfdetermination. Less developed countries
should therefore ensure their own financial ¶ integrity and keep great powers in check.31¶ The
Beijing Consensus has evolved to describe a plethora of alternative plans for economic ¶
development in the underdeveloped world. Ramo argues that China and India, who “most ¶
pointedly” ignored the World Bank and the IMF-championed Washington Consensus, “now ¶
have records that speak for themselves.”32 Consequently, the so-called the “Beijing ¶
Consensus” has been attracting attention in Latin America because of “China’s distinctive ¶
development model, . . . [which] posits far more state intervention in the economy and a greater
concern with political stability and strong government to guide the development ¶ process.”33¶
Chinese academics argue that there are three signs that likely predict a convergence ¶ between
China and Latin America. First, the background conditions are compatible because ¶ there are
no fundamental conflicts of interest or historical animosities between China and ¶ Latin
America. Second, the two regions have largely complementary economies. Third, ¶ China and
Latin America both value diversification in international economic and political ¶ relations. For
instance, both sides openly oppose “hegemonism,” “imperialism,” and power ¶ monopolies by a
few developed countries.34 ¶ Nevertheless, governmental ideological affinity is only of limited
concern in relations ¶ between China and Latin America. For example, after establishing
diplomatic relations with ¶ Chile’s Allende government, China did not see any problems with
maintaining relations ¶ with the subsequent Pinochet regime.
Our interpretation is most real world- massive rise in Chinese interaction with
Latin America
Hsiang, Associate Professor at Chihlee Institute of Technology, 9
[Antonio C., November 2009, Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Vol.1 Art.4,
“China Rising in Latin America: China Rising in Latin America: ¶ More Opportunities than ¶
Challenges”,
http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=jekem&seiredir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Daca
demic%2520policy%2520making%2520china%2520latin%2520america%26source%3Dweb%26c
d%3D15%26ved%3D0CEEQFjAEOAo%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fdigitalcommons.kennes
aw.edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1003%2526context%253Djekem%26
ei%3DmV3aUfDVNsf7iwKM8ICIAg%26usg%3DAFQjCNEPNrvP3qWQUvBu10HO1WfyXg0lAA%26s
ig2%3DbNZbSc9DP1molJbTn4c5KA%26bvm%3Dbv.48705608%2Cd.cGE%20%20search=%22academic%20policy%20making%20china%20latin%20america%22, Accessed
7/7/13, ML]
Based on evidence of the events taking place between China and Latin America, “Beijing’s ¶
goals in Latin America are: counterbalancing American hegemony by enhancing ¶ multilateral
relations; diversifying external relations to diversify their export strength; and ¶ maintaining
good relations with major producers of oil (Venezuela), food (Argentina and ¶ Brazil) and other
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
67
raw materials (copper in Chile, nickel and cobalt in Cuba, and pulp in ¶ Brazil).”35¶ It is no
accident that in March 2007, during the Inter-American Development Bank’s annual ¶ meeting in
Guatemala, the Bank’s President Luis Alberto Moreno signed an agreement of ¶ understanding
with Zhou Xiaochuan, the head of the People’s Bank of China, to formalize ¶ talks over Beijing’s
request to become a member. In November 2008, China became the ¶ third Asian nation to join
the bank, after South Korea and Japan. Even former U.S. ¶ Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson
asserts, “China obviously is a big player, a global ¶ economic player, and that’s obviously a
good thing for Latin America.”36 Hu Jintao was famously quoted in 2004 of saying that he
expected $100bn worth of ¶ Chinese investment in Latin America in the following 10 years.
Although the Chinese ¶ government later amended this to mean $100bn in bilateral trade, not
investment, trade ¶ between the two regions eclipsed the $100bn mark less than 3 years after
Hu’s initial ¶ pronouncement. As a sign of its long-term intent, China has been negotiating free
trade ¶ agreements (FTAs) with individual Latin American countries including 1) Chile, the first ¶
non-Asian country to sign a FTA with China in 2005; 2) Peru in November 2008; and 3) ¶ Costa
Rica, under negotiation since January 2009. ¶ World Bank economists report that the rise of
China and India is bestowing substantive net ¶ benefits on Latin America through higher
commodity prices, cheaper industrial inputs, and ¶ growing capital inflows. Moreover, if Latin
American governments adopt appropriate ¶ investment and trade strategies, including
negotiating bilateral free-trade agreements, Latin ¶ American exporters should be able to
successfully penetrate the burgeoning Asian ¶ commercial markets and better integrate
themselves into Asian-linked global production ¶ networks. No wonder economists from the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and ¶ Development (OECD), generally concur with their
World Bank counterparts that “as seen ¶ through the Latin American lens, China is closer to
heaven than hell.”
Latin America’s strategic utility to China means that discussion of China’s role is
inevitable- it’s already a key region for Chinese foreign policy
Hsiang, Associate Professor at Chihlee Institute of Technology, 9
[Antonio C., November 2009, Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Vol.1 Art.4,
“China Rising in Latin America: China Rising in Latin America: ¶ More Opportunities than ¶
Challenges”,
http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=jekem&seiredir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Daca
demic%2520policy%2520making%2520china%2520latin%2520america%26source%3Dweb%26c
d%3D15%26ved%3D0CEEQFjAEOAo%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fdigitalcommons.kennes
aw.edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1003%2526context%253Djekem%26
ei%3DmV3aUfDVNsf7iwKM8ICIAg%26usg%3DAFQjCNEPNrvP3qWQUvBu10HO1WfyXg0lAA%26s
ig2%3DbNZbSc9DP1molJbTn4c5KA%26bvm%3Dbv.48705608%2Cd.cGE%20%20search=%22academic%20policy%20making%20china%20latin%20america%22, Accessed
7/7/13, ML]
Latin America is now a key region for Chinese foreign policy. However, China has ¶ maintained a
low profile and avoided antagonizing the United States in the region. It is ¶ exaggerated to
accuse Beijing of challenging Washington’s “Monroe Doctrine” for three ¶ main reasons. First,
both sides find the trade relationship to be largely beneficial. Thus, the ¶ relation between
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
68
China and Latin America is characterized far more by expanding trade ¶ flows and business
connections than by establishing traditional military or political ties. ¶ Such an approach would
further allow China to side-step Washington’s Monroe Doctrine ¶ by pro-actively diffusing any
allegations of a Chinese challenge to Washington’s traditional ¶ sphere of influence. China
supports its trade-oriented goals by behaving as a “responsible ¶ stake-holder” in Latin America.
Compare with Russia’s “security and military-technical ¶ cooperation” with Latin American
countries, China’s engagements, from sending peacekeeping force to Haiti to donating aid to
Cuba, have been far more constructive. China’s ¶ purchase of regional commodities has also
been the main factor for Latin America’s ¶ economic growth in the last decade. In sum, “the
expansion of China … seems to be pulling ¶ and crowding in growth in the Latin American
region.”53¶ Second, China stands to gain tremendous international prestige by offering an
attractive ¶ alternative model for Latin American economic development. Beijing’s emergence
means ¶ that the Washington Consensus is possibly on the wane. As China formally became a
member of Inter-American Development Bank in 2009, Beijing now can contribute more to ¶
Latin America’s development and thus aid global recovery.¶
China’s role in Latin America is a nexus question for American policymakers
Farnsworth, Vice President of the Council of the Americas, no date
[Eric, Americas Quarterly, “Memo to Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America”,
http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth, Accessed 7/7/13, ML]
¶ What is China doing in the Americas? It’s a good question—and an increasingly important
one for policymakers in Washington. According to one U.S. analyst, it’s about “goodwill, good
business and strategic position.”1 Perhaps. But the jury is still out, mostly because China’s
interest in the Western Hemisphere is barely a decade old. For many years, beyond attempts to
wean Latin American and Caribbean nations away from support for Taiwan and efforts to build
Third World solidarity, China’s footprint in the Americas was light.¶ ¶ That has now changed.¶ ¶
Since then-President Jiang Zemin’s 13-day trip to Latin America in April 2001 and the
subsequent visits of President Hu Jintao in 2004 and 2011, Chinese engagement with the region
has exploded. Today, China is the top trade partner of Brazil and Chile, and the second trade
partner of Argentina and Peru.¶ ¶ By late 2010, Chinese enterprises had invested almost $44
billion in the region, according to China’s National Development and Reform Commission,
almost a quarter of which was invested in 2010 alone. Top investment targets included Brazil,
but also Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Innovative financing by
Chinese entities was often behind the deals—and in some cases, such as Ecuador and
Venezuela, investments took the form of loans secured by guaranteed future deliveries of oil.
That is a marked change from 2003, the year before Hu’s first visit, when China invested just $1
billion in all of Latin America.¶ ¶ By now the outlines of the story are well known. As part of the
dash for economic growth that the Chinese Communist Party believes will help to maintain its
legitimacy—an average annual rate of 9.8 percent from 1979 to 2009, including an 8.7 percent
growth rate in 2009 when much of the rest of the world faced economic collapse—Beijing is on
a global quest to lock in the natural resources that fuel its growth. From Southeast Asia to Africa
to Latin America and beyond, China is scouring the globe to invest in primary commodities. By
the end of 2011, more than $3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves provided an impressive
war chest from which to purchase the global assets that China’s leaders believe they need to
support economic growth—and thus political stability—for the medium to longer term.¶ ¶ As
China faces its own near-term leadership transition, efforts to purchase domestic political
stability with foreign trade and investment are likely to intensify.¶ ¶ At the same time, Latin
American nations that have been the primary trade and investment partners with China have
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
69
also gained handsomely, at least in the short term, in the sectors that produce primary goods.
Longer term questions abound regarding the balance and terms of trade, the nature of the
investments that China is making, and the values that are being promoted or undermined by
such investments.2 Additionally, nations that are not supplying significant amounts of
commodities to China, including Mexico and Central America, view China more as an aggressive
competitor than as an economic partner. The costs and benefits of trade with China are
unequally distributed across the Americas.¶ ¶ Should the United States React? Can It?¶ To the
extent that simple commercial exchange dominates the China story in the Americas, the
implications for the United States are minimal. A rational and appropriate response would
simply be to promote a level, transparent playing field for U.S. business and investors to
compete effectively with a new, well-financed competitor.
Discussion of extra-regional actors key to decrease perception of the US as a
terrorist
Farnsworth, Vice President of the Council of the Americas, no date
[Eric, Americas Quarterly, “Memo to Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America”,
http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth, Accessed 7/7/13, ML]
In part, this is because most Latin America specialists in the policy community are not well
versed in international relations theory or practice, and therefore do not focus on geostrategic
issues (Sabatini, March–April 2012, Foreign Affairs). They are development specialists,
historians, human rights advocates, sociologists, Spanish (though generally not Portuguese)
linguists, community activists, and the like. Some are uncomfortable with the idea that the U.S.
has legitimate national interests to pursue or values to promote, viewing the region through a
historical filter that highlights the U.S. as the primary threat to the region rather than as a
critical if imperfect driver of democratic governance and economic growth and opportunity.¶ As
a result, there may be a tendency to be suspicious of actions that promote U.S. economic and
national security interests, including trade and investment expansion, counternarcotics
programs, security assistance, and even democracy promotion in relation to Cuba and
elsewhere. It is within this intellectual construct that they place the growing influence of
extra-regional actors and also rising regional actors such as Brazil.¶ This overwhelming bias in
the policy and academic communities—a bias that does not generally inform U.S. policy in other
regions—continues to put U.S. policy in the region at a disadvantage. It focuses on things we
cannot fully change while neglecting initiatives that would accrue to our benefit.¶ For example,
the foundation of President Barack Obama’s policy in the Americas has consisted essentially of
support for social inclusion and microeconomic development, institutional strengthening, clean
energy development, and the promotion of equal partnership in hemispheric affairs.3 These are
worthy goals. But they cannot be the sole basis for an effective foreign policy, if for no other
reason than these goals require domestic actions to achieve and the tools that the U.S. has to
affect others’ domestic decisions are limited. That is increasingly true in a period of limited and
shrinking resources.¶ As well, such an approach does not take into account the reality that
nations such as Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela do not particularly want to have a
partnership with the U.S. at this juncture and that several are busily establishing hemispheric
institutions that purposefully exclude the United States and Canada. Others, particularly in
Central America and the Caribbean, have little capacity for a true partnership with Washington
no matter how much they and we might want one. The disparities in size, wealth and power are
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just too great.¶ There is no other region of the world where the U.S. pursues a similar course, nor
would any other regional policy and advocacy community accept it as the most appropriate
foreign policy framework.4 So far, we have gotten away with it: in the absence of strategic
challenges from the region, this policy approach has sufficed. But we may not have that luxury
much longer. As the U.S. has continued to look beyond this hemisphere in pursuit of what are
perceived to be more urgent foreign policy goals, China has entered the region aggressively
and is changing the game.
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***AFF- China Counterplan***
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Solvency - Generic
China influence in Latin America is ineffective and ignores environmental and
political concerns
Hilton, Latin America correspondent, 2/20
[Isabel, 2/20/2013 “China in Latin America: Hegemonic Challenge?” pg. 3,
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d56
92c8afbc054aad9.pdf, date accessed 7/2/13 IGM]
The environmental and ethical practices of Chinese companies have drawn unfavourable
comment. The first major ¶ Chinese mining company in the hemisphere was Shougang ¶ Group, which began
operations in Peru in 1992 with the ¶ purchase of the state-owned Hierro Peru for 14 times an ¶ independent valuation. Shougang
has contributed heavily ¶ to the poor reputation of Chinese companies, over fines for ¶
environmental damage for the contamination of water supplies, low wages and dangerous
working conditions. It has ¶ been the object of frequent strikes and protests.¶ Other companies have experienced problems
with community relations. After buying the Canadian company ¶ Corriente in 2010, Tongling and China Railway Construction ¶
Corporation proposed an open-pit mine in the province of ¶ Zamora Chinchipe in Ecuador. National protests followed ¶ an
agreement with the government, including a march ¶ on the capital by the country’s most powerful Indigenous ¶ movement,
Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del ¶ Ecuador (CONAIE).¶ Chinese
companies lack experience of
compliance with ¶ much higher environmental or community relations standards than prevail at
home. Some are adapting, hiring local ¶ managers, public relations (PR) and law firms, but they are ¶ likely to struggle for
some time with the cultural gaps and ¶ the lack of understanding of local concerns and
political ¶ considerations.
China’s investment masks larger problems associated with involvement in the
region – Brazil proves
Cerna, staff writer at the China Research Center, 11 [Michael, 5-15-11, China
Research Center, “China’s Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for
U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region”, http://www.chinacenter.net/chinasgrowing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-inthe-region/, accessed 7-2-13, HG]
Many in Brazil are concerned that the country’s trade surplus with China masks greater
problems. The concentration on commodities in Brazil’s exports raises the risk of the country’s
agricultural growth pushing the real exchange rate and redirecting capital and labor toward the
agriculture/natural resources sector at the expense of manufacturing. This is part of the reason
that Brazil’s currency looks so overvalued while its manufacturers are struggling to compete.
This has pushed Brazil to pressure China to stop undervaluing the Yuan. China’s excessive
protectionism and undervalued currency has made it difficult for Brazilian companies to
compete. In fact, this was one of the priorities on President Rousseff’s agenda during her
inaugural visit.¶ While these issues were not solved on the first meeting, there were steps taken
to diversify China’s investment in Brazil as well as Brazilian investments in China. Twenty
bilateral agreements were signed between the two countries, with the largest deals coming in
the areas of telecommunication, aircraft and energy, according to Latin Trade. Brazil promised
to give China its long sought-after market-economy status recognition. Both sides pledged to
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
expand and diversify investments through company partnerships. Overall, President Rousseff
was pleased with the trip.
73
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Impact Turn - Instability Disad
China influence leads to regional crime and instability
Wise, University of Southern California, 2/20
[Carol, 2/20/2013, “China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores”
http://es.oxfordjournals.org/content/14/2/407.full, date accessed 7/2/13 IGM]
Ellis points to China’s trading relationship with the region as a driver of the expansion and
modernization of Latin American Pacific ports and the additional challenges that this has
raised. Despite the aura of dynamism surrounding this phenomenon, the rapid development of
these Pacific ports will put a strain on the infrastructure for services and foster the emergence
of “urban fringe” areas as the ports trigger rapid population growth. A further impact of
China’s relationship with Latin America will be the emergence of new patterns of organized
crime, as the growing commercial ties increase the channels of operations of Chinese criminal
organizations in the region, and allow for both the competition and collaboration with Latin
American criminal groups.¶ China’s growing engagement with Latin America will continue to
present opportunities and costs for both Latin America and the United States. In this context,
Ellis considers it vital that the PRC and the United States work together to advance their
interests in Latin America. This timely book implies that US and Chinese interests in Latin
America are actually more complementary than conflictual. Ellis suggests that the ball is now in
the US court in that its increased involvement with Latin America will be essential for
optimizing the opportunities and minimizing the costs inherent in China’s expanding presence
in Latin America.
Chinas investment into Latin America is financially and environmentally risky
Gallagher, professor of international relations at Boston University, 13
[Kevin, 5/30, “Latin America playing a risky game by welcoming in the Chinese dragon”, Date
accessed: 7/5/13, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/povertymatters/2013/may/30/latin-america-risky-chinese-dragon, LE]
Producing natural resource-based commodities also brings major environmental risk. Many of
China's iron, soy and copper projects are found in Latin America's most environmentally
sensitive areas. In areas such as the Amazon and the Andean highlands, conflict over natural
resources, property rights and sustainable livelihoods have been rife for decades.¶ In our
report, we find that Chinese banks actually operate under a set of environmental guidelines that
surpass those of their western counterparts when at China's stage of development.
Nevertheless, those guidelines are not on par with 21st century standards for development
banking. Stronger standards should be in place at a time when environmental concerns are at
an all-time high.¶ With every opportunity comes a challenge. Latin Americans have access to a
new source of finance that gives them more leeway to meet their own development goals. If
Latin America doesn't channel some of the finance to support macroeconomic stability,
economic diversification, equality and environmental protection, this new source of finance
could bring great risk.
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Terrorism Disad
China finances Latin American terrorist networks
Ellis, Ph.D. Army War College ‘12
[Evan Ellis- Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics, professor of
national security studies at Army War College with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies,
research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors “The United States, Latin
America and China: A ‘Triangular Relationship’?” Pg. 7 Accessed 7/7]-DG
Meanwhile, PRC
loans for regimes hostile to the United States, such as those of Hugo Chávez in
Venezuela, Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Evo Morales in Bolivia, provide these regimes with
liquidity that they would not otherwise have. This indirectly helps them persist in policies that are potentially
harmful to US interests, such as allegations that the Venezuelan government provided support for the Revolutionary Armed Forces
Peacekeeping Force in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the Angel de Paz bilateral humanitarian exercise between Peru and the PRC in November
2010 and the visit of the hospital ship USS Comfort to the region in December 2011, represents an important additional dimension
of this effect. At best, such initiatives send a subtle message to regional militar- ies that the United States is not the “only game in
town,” (although US failure to give greater priority to the region arguably undercuts US influence more than any Chinese initiative.
At worst, these
initiatives permit the Chinese to enhance their working knowledge of Latin
America’s mili- of Colombia (FARC) as well as to radical indigenous groups in Peru, Bolivia and
elsewhere. China’s willingness to sell
low-cost arms to countries such
as Venezuela has
undermined
the ability of the United States
to work with its allies to impose arms-purchase
controls on certain regimes. Chinese sales of K-8 and Y-8 aircraft to Venezuela, mentioned earlier, as well as sales of
mobile radar systems, are the two highest-visibility examples.16 Chinese loans to Venezuela have also indirectly
freed that government’s funds in other areas, making it easier for it to acquire large quantities
of military equipment from Russia, including Mi-17 helicopters, Su-24 fighter aircraft, Kalashnikov rifles, tanks and
armored vehicles. Beyond the nations of ALBA, Chinese military training and educational opportunities for virtually all Latin
American countries that diplomatically recognize the PRC have opened the door for officials of these militaries to obtain a diversity
of experience, undercutting to some degree their interest in working with the United States as a military partner.17
PRC is seeking to takeover competition in Latin America- this is a tactic for
expanding hegemony and isolating Taiwan
Marcella, Professor of third world studies, U.S. Army War College ‘9
[Gabriel Marcella- Professor of Third World Studies and Director of the Americas Studies in the
Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College, Cites Dr R. Evan
Ellis- Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics, professor of national
security studies at Army War College with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, research
focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors “China in Latin America: The Whats
and Wherefores by R. Evan Ellis” Date Specified is Publication of Ellis’ book- 4/15
http://www.americasquarterly.org/marcella-china-latin-america Accessed 7/7]-DG
China’s expanding role in Latin America has sparked a cottage industry among academics and
think tanks that are focused on the potential for geopolitical competition with the United
States. R. Evan Ellis’ China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores represents an important—although in some aspects,
overly alarmist—contribution to the growing literature in the field.Ellis, an assistant professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies at the National Defense University in Washington DC, has produced a remarkably detailed compendium—nearly
encyclopedic in scope—of China’s diplomatic, economic, military, and cultural activities in the region. He also draws on extensive
field research and interviews (including with Chinese diplomats) to explore the reasons for China’s interest and to examine why Latin
American countries are increasingly receptive to Chinese overtures. The book’s overall conclusion is that the
relationship
benefits both sides. China is eager to acquire primary resources (grains, oil, copper, iron, meat, and fish
meal) for its domestic market as well as find new markets for its exports, such as low-end
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manufactured and tech goods. According to the author, Latin America is also a potential arena for
strengthening Chinese foreign policy aims, such as securing international isolation of Taiwan
and developing “strategic alliances as part of China’s global positioning as it emerges as a
superpower.” In turn, Ellis notes, Latin American countries are motivated by the search for export markets, Chinese
investment capital to fuel development and the desire to “offset the traditional political,
economic and institutional dominance of the United States.” The author presents strong evidence for most
of his arguments. The book brims with statistics on trade and investment flows, amplified by the statements of government officials,
academics, journalists, and businesspeople. He notes that Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela are key
targets for Chinese “strategic” partnerships because of the value of trade and their regional
influence.
That causes a power struggle
Ellis, Ph.D. Army War College ‘12
[Evan Ellis- Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics, professor of
national security studies at Army War College with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies,
research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors “The United States, Latin
America and China: A ‘Triangular Relationship’?” Pg. 7 Accessed 7/7]-DG
Companies and projects in Latin America have been benefited from other actions,35 such as
the PRC government’s desire to diversify away from holding its foreign reserves primarily in
US treasury assets,36 including high-profile opportunities such the Commodity Investment Fund
in 2007. Still, although not a likely scenario, were the PRC to rapidly unload its holdings of US
treasury assets because of a loss of confidence in the United States’ ability to pay or a (possible
but improbable) scenario of escalating hostilities with the United States, a financial crisis could
be generated that would adversely impact Latin America—as well as the rest of the globe. In
the political realm, China’s relationship with the United States has conditioned how the PRC
behaves toward Latin America, just as Latin America’s relationship with the United States
conditions how it behaves toward the PRC, and Latin America’s relationship with China
conditions its behavior toward the United States. This is because the re-emergence of China in
the contemporary global system is tied to access to developed country markets and
technologies. Since the United States is one of the principal markets and technology sources,
it carries critical strategic value for the PRC. Whatever the truth regarding America’s
“decline,”38 the United States still retains considerable power in the global system, as well as
influence with allies and within global institutions. Theoretically it retains the ability to
significantly impair the re-emergence of the PRC, were a consensus to appear in the United
States to deny the PRC access to technology and markets and to use alliance structures and
institutions to motivate others to follow suit.
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U.S. Better
U.S. solves best – diversification of exports
Cerna, staff writer at the China Research Center, 11
[Michael, 5-15-11, China Research Center, “China’s Growing Presence in Latin
America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region”,
http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-americaimplications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/, accessed 7-2-13, HG]
“We reached our main goals, which were to open the doors for our more sophisticated products
to enter China and for working together in important fields such as science and technology,”
President Rousseff said upon her return to Brazil as reported by the People’s Daily Online. She
continued: “There’s a delicate balance between ‘cooperation’ and ‘competition’ between the
two sides.” These concerns also are shared by the rest of the region, in order to prevent China
from overwhelming local industries.¶ While China’s commodity-based trade structure is
currently lucrative, it does not encourage diversification of Latin America’s exports into more
value-added goods, manufactured products, and modern services. Economic relations are
dependent on often unstable commodity market demands. U.S. investment in the region is far
more diversified and spans a range of value-added activities, including manufacturing,
finance, telecom, retail and other services. Going back to a comparison with the United States,
while China accounts for 6.7% of the region’s total exports, the United States continues to be
the largest buyer, with a 40% share. Latin America’s exports to the U.S. are more diversified
and remain fairly balanced so it is better suited to survive a possible commodity cut-off in
Latin America. Roughly 24% of the region’s exports are raw materials, another 12% consists of
resource-based goods and 60% is manufactured products. Karen Poniachik of Latin Trade also
sees enormous risks for the region: “The steep overvaluation of the region’s currencies—due in
part to the flood of investment flows and export proceeds—is eroding the competitiveness of its
higher-value added goods and services. This could in turn fuel its already high level of
overdependence on commodities.”
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Solvency - Venezuela
China is backing away from investment in Venezuelan oil – too many loanassociated risks to solve
Katakey and Guo, Bloomberg, 3-6-13
[Rakteem and Aibling, Bloomberg, “Chavez’s Death Could Dim China’s Venezuelan Energy
Prospects,” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-06/chavez-s-death-could-dim-china-svenezuelan-energy-prospects.html accessed 7-2-13 UR]
China, the world’s second-biggest consumer of crude oil, is likely to delay deciding on new
investments in Venezuela’s energy industry to assess any change of political direction after
President Hugo Chavez’s death. ¶ “The death of Chavez could lead to oil supply uncertainties
from Venezuela and could jeopardize Venezuela’s oil exports to China in the short term,”
Gordon Kwan, a Hong Kong-based analyst with Mirae Asset Securities Ltd., said today in an email. His death in the long-term may affect investment in the industry by China, he said.¶ Staterun China Development Bank Corp. has agreed to lend Venezuela $46.5 billion since 2008,
representing half of the loans the country received in the period, according to a Jan. 13 report
from Massachusetts-based Tufts University. About 95 percent of the debt is backed by sales
contracts for crude, the report shows. Chavez, who transformed Venezuelan politics by
channeling record oil revenue to the poor, died at 58 after a struggle with cancer, raising the risk
of unrest and political infighting.¶ Yao Zhongmin, head of China Development Bank’s
supervisory board, said in Beijing today the Venezuelan loans carried risks, for which the bank
has a contingency plan. He didn’t give any details.
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Solvency - Say No
Latin American countries don’t want Chinese investment they’ll say no
Regenstreif, Editor, Special Projects Rueters, 6/12/13
[Greg, Rueters, “The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin America”
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latinamerica/ Date Accessed: 7/7/13]KG
China has particular interest in Mexico, the region’s second-largest market. Beijing has been
competing with Mexico to supply the U.S. market with manufactured goods. But China is now
looking to work with Mexico City — investing in infrastructure, mining and energy because of
the expected reforms that would open the oil industry to foreign investment. There are
obstacles ahead. One irritation that President Enrique Peña Nieto shared with Xi is that though
Mexico posted a trade surplus with its global partners, it ran a big deficit with China. China is
looking for even more however. It is eager to pursue a free trade agreement with Mexico, but
Mexico City said last week it was too soon. Meanwhile, Mexico’s trade with the United States
continues to flourish and it is due to displace Canada as the largest U.S. trade partner by the
end of the decade, according to the Dialogue. China is also considering joining negotiations for
the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, which aims to boost trade among the Americas, Asia
and Australia. The talks include the United States, Canada and other major economies on the
Pacific rim. Each superpower also brings baggage to the region. Washington still seeks to exert
pressure on its partners. It has told Brazil, for example, that it has the responsibility to use its
leverage with others, such as Iran. Meanwhile, “Chinese investment,” Farnsworth said, “doesn’t
always bring with it good governance practices or anti corruption or environmental concerns.”
Just as Latin America doesn’t want to rely too much on the United States, it also now doesn’t
want to depend too much on Beijing, particularly in light of the China’s current economic
slowdown.
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Perm - Do Both
The US should cooperate with China in Latin America- ensures that China acts
favorably
Erikson, Senior Associate for US Policy Director of Caribbean Programs InterAmerican Dialogue, 8
[Daniel P., 6/11/08, Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
“The New Challenge: China in the Western Hemisphere”, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG110hhrg42905/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg42905.pdf, Accessed 7/9/13, ML]
China’s emerging role in Latin America and the Caribbean is a new phenomenon ¶ that lacks easy
historical parallels. On the one hand, China is a strong economic ¶ and political partner of the
United States, but on the other, China is a non-democratic country that is viewed as a potential
rival to U.S. influence across the globe ¶ over the long term. Clearly, the United States does not
enjoy the same comfort level ¶ with China that it has with the European Union, but nor should
China’s presence ¶ in Latin America be interpreted as a de facto ‘‘threat’’ to U.S. interests.
Rather, China’s evolving role in Latin America reflects the increasingly complex mosaic of
international relationships that is a product of a more globalized world. China is poised ¶ to be
a major player in the Western Hemisphere for many years to come, irrespective of what actions
the U.S. does or does not take in reaction to Beijing’s growing ¶ influence. The proper U.S.
response will be to strengthen its ties with its neighbors ¶ in Latin America and the Caribbean,
maintain an open dialogue with China on ¶ issues of U.S. concern in the hemisphere, and
carefully monitor the evolution of China’s ties with Latin America and the Caribbean in
consultation with countries of ¶ the region. The primary goal of U.S. policy as its relates to China
in the Western ¶ Hemisphere should focus on ensuring that China acts as a responsible
stakeholder ¶ that contributes to the region’s economic prosperity while respecting the
democratic ¶ principles that are the guiding values of the Inter-American system.
Perm solves best—by working together the countries can collaborate on issues
that would otherwise be ignored.
Hormats, Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment,
12/6/12
( U.S. department of State, “The Future of U.S.-China Economic Relations”,
http://www.state.gov/e/rls/rmk/2012/201631.htm Date accessed: 7/9/13)KG
In fact, many of the compelling priorities for the United States and China following leadership
transitions in each of our respective countries are internal in nature – jobs, economic growth,
the environment, social equity – and will require imaginative and innovative solutions to
which many of you in this audience will contribute. We must find ways to ensure that U.S.China relations support these internal objectives in both countries, and that one side does not
seek to accomplish them at the other’s expense. As we move forward, I believe there are
several key areas where we can simultaneously advance U.S.-China economic relations,
strengthen the American economy, and help China accomplish its own domestic agenda. Fifth,
as China seeks to ensure a stable and reliable supply of energy and raw materials it will find it
hard to do that unless its companies abroad act in a manner consistent with global norms with
respect to labor practices, environmental concerns, and other aspects of good corporate
governance. In the developing world – Africa, Latin America, and Asia – the United States and
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China should promote international norms with respect to rule of law or transparency in their
investment and development activities. Good practices include: engaging with local
communities and civil society, recognizing the importance of broader social and
environmental responsibility, and creating economic opportunities and upward mobility for
local employees through on-the-job training and ongoing workforce development. I am hopeful
that we will be able to identify mechanisms through which we can encourage cooperation in
these important areas.
Perm solves best – it is uniquely key to U.S.-China cooperation
Miller, staff writer for the Center for American Progress, 9
[Stephanie, 6-3-9, Center for American Progress, “Cooperating with China in Latin
America”,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2009/06/03/6209/coop
erating-with-china-in-latin-america/, accessed 7-2-13, HG]
The United States and China also benefit from a secure region in which to operate. Problems
of crime and public insecurity are pervasive throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. During
the last decade, approximately 1.2 million people have been killed in Latin America and the
Caribbean as a result of crime, and each year 200 million people—one third of the region’s
population—are victims of crime.[1] What’s more, the Inter-American Development Bank
estimates that the region’s gross domestic product would be 25 percent higher today if it had a
crime rate similar to the rest of the world.¶ Thus, the United States and China, as important
investors in the region, could find ways to work together on helping Latin American and
Caribbean governments tackle crime and insecurity. And the United States should seek China’s
cooperation in the various institutions that comprise the Inter-American system—a system
that makes a fundamental commitment to democracy and human rights. The United States
could use these multilateral forums to ask China to uphold its policy paper commitments to
promote a more equitable economic world order, as well as democracy in the international
system.¶ China’s presence in Latin America and the Caribbean will continue to grow. So the
sooner the Obama administration can find ways to cooperate with China in the region the
better. Doing so would strengthen the United States’ standing in the region and would foster
trust with one of its most important global economic partners―who happens to be evolving
into a potential commercial rival to it south. In sum, focusing on an agenda that fosters mutual
respect and engages Latin America and the Caribbean and its associates in finding solutions to
regional and global challenges will not only deliver on the United States’ promise of seeking a
“new era of partnership,” but perhaps succeed in turning a rival into an ally.
Perm solves best – U.S.-China engagement in the region is the only way to
ensure maximum Mexican economic competitiveness
Seeking Alpha Investment, 12 [8-16-12, Seeking Alpha Investment,
“Mexico To Benefit From U.S.: China Tensions And Rising Wages In China”,
http://seekingalpha.com/article/812991-mexico-to-benefit-from-u-s-chinatensions-and-rising-wages-in-china, accessed 7-5-13, HG]
Mexico, which has attracted nearly USD115 billion foreign direct investments in the last five
years, is among the most attractive global investment destinations. This article discusses the
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reasons for being bullish on Mexico for long-term.¶ The investment rationale is primarily
backed by rising U.S.-China tensions, which will benefit Mexico's exports and an increasing
competitiveness of manufactured products in Mexico.¶ At the onset, I will summarize the
current relations between U.S.-China followed by a summary on U.S.-Mexico relations.¶ The
recent summoning of Robert S. Wang (Deputy Chief of the U.S. embassy in Beijing) by Zhang
Kunsheng (Chinese assistant foreign minister) over the South China Sea issue illustrates an
undertow in relations between the United States and China.¶ The [US State Department's]
statement showed total disregard of facts, confounded right and wrong, and sent a seriously
wrong message. It is not conducive to efforts by the parties concerned to uphold peace and
stability in the South China Sea and the Asia-Pacific region at large.¶ The message is pretty
direct and strong. Further, the intensity of allegations and counter allegations has increased
over time between the two largest economies. It is also noteworthy that geopolitical tensions
have risen significantly after the financial crisis.¶ From China being accused of being a currency
manipulator to the recent veto by China and Russia against the draft resolution on Syria,
indications of souring relations are clear.¶ The long-term implications of geopolitical tensions
between a rising power and an existing superpower can be of serious nature for the world. In
the short to medium-term, some countries stand to gain while others lose.
DIALOGUE WITH CHINA STRENGTHENS RELATIONS AND SOLVES
INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC PROBLEMS
CHINA DAILY 2007
[June 19, 2007, China Daily News http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/200706/19/content_897166.htm, accessed 7/02/13, JA]
The dialogue mechanism helps high-level diplomats from the two countries have frequent
contact and creates a close working relationship, which is conducive to guiding the direction
of overall relations, Sun Zhe, a professor at the Center for American Studies at Shanghai-based
Fudan University, said in an interview. "But we can't expect such meetings to produce solutions
to specific problems between the two countries," Sun added. Topics are not designated and the
two sides can discuss and exchange views on any bilateral, regional or global issues of interest.
However, some issues are sure to figure, said Tao Wenzhao, a researcher on American studies at
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. "China is likely to raise its concerns over the Taiwan
question with the election of the island's 'president' scheduled next year. Also, given the fact
that Taiwan leader Chen Shui-bian is still attempting to revise the island's 'constitution', no one
can expect what will happen," Tao said. "The US, on its part, will surely seek support from
China in resolving the Iranian nuclear standoff and the Darfur issue," he added
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CP Links to NB
Counterplan links to the net benefit – US can be mad too
Ratliff, Stanford University, 9
[William, “Search of a Balanced Relationship:
China, Latin America, and the
United States” Pg. 12 http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Publicacoes/22443.pdf, date
accessed 7/2/13 IGM]
One serious PRC foreign policy preoccupation today is that Chinese expansion¶ into the
Western Hemisphere will cause frictions with the United States and¶ revive the concerns first
spoken to in 1823 by the Monroe Doctrine. Today, no one¶ in Washington can expect to
prevent or reverse current international ties in the¶ Western Hemisphere, including massive
E.U. investments, but many do believe¶ the United States should resist what are perceived as
hostile or even potentially¶ hostile influences developing there. Some Americans already
consider China a¶ growing security threat in the Americas. Many others (in the United States)¶
believe, however, that China is too dependent on U.S. markets, too heavily¶ invested in
American debt, too concerned about potential unrest in Latin¶ America, and too determined to
play by the generally accepted international¶ rules to conduct policies in the Americas to
provoke Washington. One of China’s¶ leading Latin America experts and spokespersons has
written, “China understands well that Latin America is the backyard of the United States,” and
that¶ China should not challenge U.S. influence there. He continues, “China and Latin¶ America
have been opening to the outside world . . . in the age of globalization-¶ . . . cooperation
between China and Latin America will benefit regional peace¶ and development in Asia-Pacific
and Latin America. This outcome would certainly be in the favor of the United States” (S. X.
Jiang, n.d.).
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013
84
International Fiat Bad
International fiat is abusive and a voting issue
1. Not Predictable- there are an infinite number of international actors that the
aff could never be ready to debate.
2. Literature- The negative should have to produce solvency evidence that
speaks to the exact mandates of the plan in the context of their international
actor so that they can ensure predictability within the literature.
3. Explodes Negative Ground- There are hundreds of countries and
international organizations the negative could fiat; the aff could never be
prepared to debate all of them, putting us at a strategic disadvantage
4. Bad Advocacy Model- The judge should be a US policy maker that doesn’t
have international jurisdiction. Can’t vote on the CP.