17.7 (a)
Q: Can any of the five causes of action above be brought in your state? Check your state code
and opinions written by courts in your state. If you find older cases that have permitted any of
these actions, shepardize these cases to be sure that they still represent good law in your state.
A: Alienation of Affection: C.R.S 13-20-202. Civil causes abolished. All civil causes of action
for breach of promise to marry, alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and seduction are
hereby abolished. Source: L. 37: p. 403, § 1. CSA: C. 24A, § 1. CRS 53: § 41-3-1. C.R.S. 1963:
§ 41-3-1. However, in Destefano v. Grabrian (763 P.2d 275 (Co.1988)) the court ruled that the
actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation does not impede a person from
maintaining a customary breach of contract action or a recognized tort action simply because the
contravention arose from an improper liaison with the plaintiff's spouse or because one effect of
the alleged breach or tortious comportment was a disruption or breakup of his or her marriage.
What is precluded, however, is the refitting of the eliminated actions into other forms. One
cannot sue to recoup for injuries arising from ` desecration of the marriage bed' or from an
interloping with the marriage by simply casting the defendant's deportment as a breach of
contract, or casualness, or some other intentional tort. It is that kind of façade that the case law
counteracts."
In respects to child abduction or enticement: C.R.S 14-13.5-108. Provisions and measures to
prevent abduction. (1) If a petition is filed under this article, the court may enter an order that
must include:
(a) The basis for the court's exercise of jurisdiction;
(b) The manner in which notice and opportunity to be heard were given to the persons
entitled to notice of the proceeding;
(c) A detailed description of each party's custody and visitation rights, residential
arrangements for the child, and any child-custody determinations in effect;
(d) A provision stating that a violation of the order may subject the party in violation to
civil and criminal penalties; and
(e) Identification of the child's country of habitual residence at the time of the issuance
of the order.
(2) If, at a hearing on a petition under this article or on the court's own motion, the court
after reviewing the evidence finds a credible risk of abduction of the child, the court shall
enter an abduction prevention order. The order must include the provisions required by
subsection (1) of this section and measures and conditions, including those in subsections
(3), (4), and (5) of this section, that are reasonably calculated to prevent abduction of the
child, giving due consideration to the custody and visitation rights of the parties and the
child-custody determinations in effect at the time of the filing of the petition under this
article. The court shall consider the age of the child, the potential harm to the child from
an abduction, the legal and practical difficulties of returning the child to the jurisdiction if
abducted, and the reasons for the potential abduction, including evidence of domestic
violence, domestic abuse, stalking, or child abuse or neglect.
Q: Is there a family purpose doctrine in your state? If so, what are its components or elements?
C.R.S. 42-7-103 states [Family car doctrine inapplicable]. Where defendant holds the
automobile's title jointly with her husband, and the defendant is not the head of the household,
bare legal title alone is insufficient to justify the application of the family car doctrine. In the
landmark case of Lee v. Degler (169 Colo. 226, 454 P. 2d 937 (1969)) the Colorado Supreme
Court determined the family car doctrine (called the family purpose doctrine in the text as, “In
action by plaintiff against defendant widow of driver of other car involved in automobile
intersection collision, seeking to impose liability under family car doctrine, trial court acted
properly when it ruled as matter of law that family car doctrine could not be employed to impose
liability on widow for alleged negligence of her husband even though car was held in joint
ownership; especially, where husband was sole wage earner, had provided all money for car
purchase, had exclusive control of car and wife did not know how to drive and was not head of
household…Where a defendant is not the head of the household, bare legal it title alone is
insufficient to justify the application of the family car doctrine... is limited in its application to
those situations where the defendant is also the head of the household.”