Cognition and Emotion
November 12-19, 2009
What is emotion?
• Communication mechanisms that maintain social
order/structure
• Behavior learned through operant or classical
conditioning or nonassociative learning, not involving
deliberate cognitive mediation
• Appraisal of biopsychosocial situation
• Complex physiological response
• Integrated, three-response system construct
– Motor behavior
– Physiological activity/arousal
– Cognitive appraisal
Areas of Inquiry
• Effect of emotion on performance (e.g.,
memory, perception, attention)
• Information processing characteristics of
emotional disorders (e.g., anxiety,
depresion)
• Emotion and social learning
• Cognitive neuroscience of emotions
– cognitive structure of emotion
– neuropsychological studies
– cognitive aspects of emotion (e.g., appraisal)
Introduction & History
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James-Lange theory
Cannon-Bard theory
Schacter & Singer studies (2-factor theory)
Facial feedback hypothesis
Neurobiological contributions (Davis, LeDoux)
Neuropsychological perspectives
– Somatic markers
– Emotional signal processing
• Information-processing theories
James-Lange
• "My theory ... is that the bodily changes follow directly the
perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the
same changes as they occur is the emotion. Common sense
says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a
bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, and
angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says
that this order of sequence is incorrect ... and that the more
rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry
because we strike, afraid because we tremble ... Without the
bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be
purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional
warmth. We might then see the bear, and judge it best to run,
receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we should
not actually feel afraid or angry"
Cannon-Bard
• We feel emotions first, and then feel
physiological changes, such as muscular
tension, sweating, etc.
• In neurobiological terms, the thalamus
receives a signal and relays this both to
the amygdala (a limbic structure) and
the cortex. The body then gets signals
via the autonomic nervous system to
tense muscles, etc.
Two-Factor Theory (e.g.,
Schacter & Singer)
• When trying to understand what kind of
person we are, we first watch what we do and
feel and then deduce our nature from this.
This means that the first step is to experience
physiological arousal. We then try to find a
label to explain our feelings, usually by looking
at what we are doing and what else is
happening at the time of the arousal. Thus we
don’t just feel angry, happy or whatever: we
experience feelings and then decide what they
mean.
Cognitive Appraisal Theory (e.g.,
Lazarus)
• In the absence of physiological arousal, we
decide what to feel after interpreting or
explaining what has just happened. Two
things are important in this: whether we
interpret the event as good or bad for us, and
what we believe is the cause of the event.
• In primary appraisal, we consider how the
situation affects our personal well-being. In
secondary appraisal we consider how we
might cope with the situation.
Somatic Marker Theory
• Bodily states play a role in decisionmaking and reasoning
• “Somatic markers” link memories of
experience (cortex) with feelings
(limbic)
• Attempts to account for ‘automatic’ or
‘unconscious’ biases
TRADITIONAL MODEL
Personality Traits
Emotional Processing
Mood States
MEDIATOR MODEL
Personality Traits
Mood States
Emotional Processing
MODERATOR MODEL
Personality Traits
Mood States
Emotional Processing
Fear Conditioning
Davis: Cortical influences on basic startle pathway
Davis: Role of the amygdala in conditioned fear
Amygdala activation in Anxiety
disorders
LeDoux: direct thalamo-amygdala
connections, bypassing cortex
Preattentive Perception of
Threat: Öhman
• Distinction between automatic v.
controlled information processing
• Draws on animal work (LeDoux) - direct
thalamic-amygdala connection
• Threat: biological and ‘derived’
• Data:
– responses to masked stimuli
– slowed RT to threat words in shadowing
Ohman’s Information-Processing Model for Fear
and Anxiety
Emotion and Memory
“Bambi” (1942) named #20
in Time’s list of the Top 25
Horror Movies of All Time
“Kids were so frightened by these films
that they wet themselves in terror.
Bambi has a primal shock that still
haunts oldsters who saw it 40, 50, 65
years ago.”
Flashbulb Memories
• Distinct, vivid, recollections of shocking
events, and associated personal activities
• Long-lasting? Accurate? Special?
– Brown & Kulick (1977): special encoding
mechanism (NOW PRINT!)
– Niesser & Harsh (1992) Challenger study
– Although FM appear to be different subjectively
(they provide an intersection between personal
history and “History”), they are not necessarily
more accurate
– Confidence is not equivalent to accuracy
Flashbulb Memories of September 11, 2001
•http://www.nyu.edu/about/video.spotlight.html
http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=632
Challenger Disaster Study (Neisser &
Harsch, 1992)
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10
12
8
10
# Subjects
# Subjects
12
6
4
8
6
4
2
2
0
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Weighted Accuracy Score
2 2.332.67 3 3.333.37 4 4.33 4.67 5
Confidence Rating
Valence and Memory
• Negative events remembered in more
vivid detail than positive events
• Positive events more associated with
memory distortion and inconsistency
• Positive induced mood leads to greater
“false memory”
Event Valence Affects Memory Consistency
Kensinger & Schacter, 2006
Neural Substrates of Positive (Fusiform) and Negative
(frontal) rcollection; Amygdala active in both
Kensington & Schacter, 2006
Bower’s Network Theory – a
theory of emotional experience
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Emotions are nodes in a semantic network
Emotions stored as propositions
Emotion = activation of network
Activation spreads in selective fashion to
associated concepts
• When nodes activated above threshold level,
conscious experience of emotion results
Four Predictions from Bower’s
Theory
• Mood-state-dependent recall
• Mood congruity: learning best when
congruity between learner’s state and type of
material (best supported)
• Thought congruity: thoughts, associations
congruent with mood state
• Mood intensity: increases in intensity
(arousal) lead to greater activation of network
Mood Effects on Attention and
Memory
• Negative memory bias
– found with depressed and anxious
normals
– not consistently found with anxious
patients (active avoidance?)
• Mood vs. emotion
• Effects on processing capacity
(resources allocated to self-talk)
Emotion and Attention
Emotional Stroop
BOY BLOOD
TABLE
GASH
DOG ELBOW
LACERATE
NICE
RIVER
TREE
GUTS
PUS
CHURCH
GUILTY
CANDY
Basis of Dot Probe Results
• Selective attention to threat (McLeod)
• Failure to ‘disengage’ attention from
threat (Koster, et al 2004)
RT to N-N trials
Koster, et al (2004)
Weapon Focus
Weapon Focus
• Eyewitness’ inability to identify a
perpetrator when a weapon is used in a
crime
• Easterbrook hypothesis: narrowing of
attentional focus in emotional situations
• Arousal and central/peripheral detail
Basis of Weapon Focus?
• Simple selective attention
• All items attended to equally, but
weapon remembered better
• Cue-utilization (threat-arousalnarrowing)
• Unusualness/distinctiveness
• Effect sizes: lineup ident < feature
accuracy
Attention/Memory in Anxiety
and Depression
Emotion and Performance
• Performance impaired by high levels of state
anxiety
– Yerkes-Dodson Law
• performance is optimal with a ‘medium’ level of arousal
• ‘optimum’ level lower for hard tasks
– Cognitive Interference theory (Sarason): worry and selfpreoccupation interfere
– Processing Efficiency Theory (Eysenck): processing efficiency
= effectiveness/effort; worry reduces efficiency
• Performance in depression
– impaired both by task-irrelevant information and poor
effort/motivation
– most studies are of an anologue nature, though a few patient
studies are available
Anxiety and Attention
• Selective attention toward threat-related
material (selective attentional bias; e.g. dotprobe, emotional Stroop)
• Distractibility (  attentional control)
• Effects on breadth of attention (more local
spotlight)
• Interpretive bias: interpreting ambiguous
materials as threatening (e.g., “The doctor
examined little Emily’s growth”)
• Anxiety and preattentive processing
Depression
• Little evidence for attentional bias in
depression
• Interpretive/recall biases in depression
– Interpreting ambiguous situations as
negative
– Reduced predictions of success on
cognitive tasks
– Recall of past performance reduced
Siegle, 1999
Time Course of Attentional Bias in Depression
Siegle et al (2001)
Failure to Disengage from Negative Information in
Dysphoric Patients (Koster, et al, Emotion, 2005)
CV=RT(invalid) – RT(valid)
Discrete v. Dimensional Theories
of Emotion
Discrete Emotions Theory
• Emotions are distinct and unique states
(e.g., fear, anger, etc.)
• ‘Basic’ or ‘primary’ emotions - Tomkins
lists 8 (hap, sad, anger, fear disgust,
surprise, interest, shame)
• Search for response patterning in
emotions (Friesen, Ekman, etc.)
• Cross-cultural comparisons
Basic Elements of Discrete Emotions Theory
Bioinformational Theory (Lang)
• Emotions as action predispositions
• Dimensional view of emotions
– affective valence (appetitive-aversive
dimension)
– arousal (resource recruitement)
• Link between emotional and
motivational behavior
Discrete v. Dimensional Models (Christie, 2002)
A
W
Activation v.
Approach/Withdrawal
P
N
Activation v. Valence
Neuropsychological Findings
• Neuropsychological studies of affective
competence (RHD)
• “Modular” organization of affective
systems (?)
• Modality-independent affective lexicon
• Valence-related asymmetries
Emotion and the Brain: Three
General Hypotheses
• Right Hemisphere dominance for
emotion
• Hemispheric laterality for mood
– Positive/approach: left hemisphere
– Negative/withdrawal: right hemisphere
• Automatic-controlled distinction (RH v.
LH
Negative - Neutral
Positive - Neutral
Localized “Damage” and Emotion
• Awakening from WADA
– Right Hemisphere: crying, anxiety
– Left Hemisphere: laughing, excitement
• Acute Structural Lesion (stroke)
– Right Hemisphere: indifference,
?secondary mania
– Left Hemisphere: depression (frontal)
Neuropsychiatric Disorders
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Depression
Secondary Mania
OCD
Anxiety
Aggression/disinhibition
Psychopathy/APD
Neuropsychological
Manifestations of Frontal Lobe
Lesions II
Inferior Mesial Region
A) Orbital Region (10, 11)
Lesions in this region produce
disinhibition, altered social
conduct, “acquired sociopathy”,
and other disturbances due to
impairment in fronto-limbic
relationships
B) Basal Forebrain (posterior
extension of inferior mesial
region, including diagonal band
of Broca, nucleus accumbens,
septal nuclei, substantia
innominata)
Tranel, 1992
Lesions here produce prominent
anterograde amnesia with
confabulation (material specificity
present, but relatively weak)
Neuropsychological Manifestations
of Frontal Lobe Lesions III
Lateral Prefrontal Region (8,9,46)
Lesions in this region produce
impairment in a variety of “executive”
skills that cut across domains. Some
degree of material-specificity is
present, but relatively weak.
A) Fluency: impaired verbal fluency
(left) or design fluency (right)
B) Memory impairments: defective
recency judgment, metamemory
defects, difficulties in memory
monitoring
C) Impaired abstract concept
formation and hypothesis testing
D) Defective planning, motor
sequencing
Tranel, 1992
E) Defective cognitive judgement and
estimation
Neuropsychological Manifestations
of Frontal Lesions I
Frontal Operculum (44,45,47)
A) Left: Broca’s aphasia
B) Right: ‘expressive’ aprosodia
Superior Mesial (mesial 6, 24)
A) Left: akinetic mutism
B) Right: akinetic mutism
Bilateral lesions of mesial SMA (6) and
anterior cingulate (24) produce more
severe form of akinetic mutism
Tranel, 1992
Phineas Gage
(1823-1861, accident in 1848)
Phineas Gage’s lesion reconstructed
(H. Damasio and R. Frank, 1992)
Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex
and Somatic Markers
• Somatic marker “biasing signals” are
regulated by VM premotor cortex; these
signals help regulate decision-making in
uncertainty
• Support from Iowa Gambling Task;
anticipatory SCR’s to selection of
“unfavorable” decks
– Impaired in VMPFC
Iowa Gambling Task
Actual Body Actions
Expected Body Actions
(Internal Model)
Problems with SMT
• Assertion that IGT preferences formed
“implicitly” is untenable
• Meaning of psychophsyiological
response is unclear (response to
feedback, risk indicator, post-decision
emotion reaction)
• Not all “normal controls” are normal
(Dunn et al., Neurosci Biobehav Reviews, 2006, 30, 239-271)
Mirror Neuron System
• Class of neurons in F5 (BA 44) and ventral premotor cortex that
discharge both:
– when animal performs object-directed action
– when animal observes OD action in others
• Subset appear to be “communicative” motor neurons
• Functions
– Imitation
– Action understanding
• Potentially important for understanding social learning and
imitation effects
• Being investigated in social-emotional impairments such as
autism, Asperger’s disorder, and schizophrenia
• May be important in “empathy”
Action Vision – Mirror Neuron
System
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004
Mirror Neuron
Responses to Action
Observation (Umiltá,
2001)
Full view (a,c)
Obstructed view (b,d)
Cortical-Subcortical Interactions
in Emotion
• General concept of limbic system as
“emotional effector”
• Question is, “what is the limbic
system?”
• Regulatory interaction between cortex
and subcortical structures
• Gating
• Selective engagement
General Organization of Frontal corticalstriatal-pallidal-thalamic-cortical loops
Blumenfeld, 2002
Orbitofrontal Loop
• Involved in social
and emotional
functioning
• Damage produces:
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Disinhibition
Hyperactivity
Emotional lability
Aggressiveness
Reduced selfawareness