Pyrrhonian Scepticism
Prof. Tom STONEHAM
Thanks to Prof Wang Shunning for inviting
me to give these lectures.
I would like the cultural exchange to go in
both directions.
In particular, I very much want to find out how
people in China respond to scepticism and
the issues I raise.
To begin this process, I will pause for
discussion after each section of the lecture.
Historical Context
•
•
Pyrrho lived 360-270 BC (roughly)
•
Aristotle lived 384-322 BC
•
Alexander died in 323 BC
The school of Pyrrhonism was not founded until
almost 200 years later, by Aenesidemus
•
•
It flourished for a while, but the dominant schools
were Academic, Epicurean and Stoic
Around the beginning of the 3rd century AD, two
important records of Pyrrhonism were created:
•
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent
Philosophers
•
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism
Second Flourishing
• In 1562, Sextus’s Outlines was translated into
Latin by Henri Estienne (aka Stephanus)
• While Diogenes Laertius and Sextus in greek had
been available for a over a century, this seems to
have been a seminal moment in the history of
western philosophy
• Influence increased by Montaigne’s great sceptical
work Apology for Raymond Sebond (1580)
• Ambivalent relation to church (sceptical fideism)
• Endorsed by some 17c. philosophers of science as
congruent with scientific method (e.g. Gassendi)
• Bayle’s Historical and Critical Dictionary (1697)
shows Pyrrhonist character of new science
Lecture Plan
1. From curiosity to tranquillity (ataraxia)
• The goals of Pyhrronian scepticism
2. The Ten Modes
• Causing perplexity (aporia) and suspension
of belief (epoche)
3. The Problem of the Criterion
• The impossibility of ever finding truth
4. Is Scepticism Self-defeating?
• The ‘purgative’ metaphor
Zetetikos
• Sextus tells us that the sceptic starts as
someone who wants to know the truth
• A rational enquirer uneasy with a state of
ignorance
• “Men of talent, troubled by the anomaly in things
and puzzled as to which of them they should
rather assent to, came to investigate what in
things is true and what false, thinking that by
deciding these issues they would become
tranquil.” I.12
Ataraxia
• The zetetikos then discovers that for every
question she investigates, there are
equally good (‘equipollent’) arguments on
both sides (‘opposed accounts’).
• This causes puzzlement (‘aporia’) not
tranquillity (‘ataraxia’)
• However, for one with a true sceptical
disposition, the puzzlement gives way to
tranquillity by accepting that she should
simply suspend belief (‘epoche’)
The story of Apelles
Apelles “was painting a horse and wanted
to represent in his picture the lather on the
horse’s mouth; but he was so unsuccessful
that he gave up, took the sponge on which
he had been wiping off the colours from his
brush, and flung it at the picture. And when
it hit the picture, it produced a
representation of the horse’s lather.” I.28
• Tranquillity (ataraxia) “followed fortuitously”
I.26 from suspension of judgement
(epoche)
Discussion
Under certain conditions (enough effort to
resolve issue), the move from aporia
(puzzlement) to epoche (suspension of
belief) may be rationally compelling.
But the move to ataraxia (tranquillity) is
fortuitous.
If we lack the sceptical disposition, are we
doomed to unhappiness?
Example: Keynesian vs. Hayekian economics
=Equipollent arguments but no tranquillity?
2. The Ten Modes
• To help others reach epoche (suspend
judgement), sceptics offer ‘Modes’
• These are techniques for finding opposing
accounts which will appear equipollent
2. The Ten Modes
“I make no affirmation about their number or their
power – they may be unsound and there may be
more than those I shall describe.” I.35
And equipollence does not mean that both
sides will seem equally evident (convincing)
to you:
“what we investigate is not what is apparent but
what is said about what is apparent … if we do
propound arguments directly against what is
apparent, it is not because we want to reject what
is apparent” I.19-20
2. The Ten Modes
• To help others reach epoche (suspend
judgement), sceptics offer ‘Modes’
• These are techniques for finding opposing
accounts which will appear equipollent
• The modes are not offered as philosophical
arguments for a sceptical conclusion (cf.
Descartes’ evil demon)
• But ways of bringing about the
psychological state of puzzlement (aporia)
The List:
1. Variations among animals
2. Differences among humans
3. Differing constitutions of the sense-organs
4. Circumstances
5. Positions, intervals, and places
6. Admixtures
7. Quantities and preparations
8. Relativity
9. Frequent or rare encounters
10.Persuasions and customs and laws
Mode One: Animals
“But if the same objects appear dissimilar
depending upon the variation among animals,
then we shall be able to say what the existing
objects are like as observed by us, but as to what
they are like in their nature we shall suspend
judgement.
For we shall not be able ourselves to decide
between our own appearances and those of other
animals, being ourselves a part of the dispute and
for that reason more in need of someone to
decide than ourselves able to judge.” I.59
Pre-modern biology
Some examples of physiological variation:
“Of those [animals] produced without copulation, some are
produced from fire, like the little creatures which appear in
ovens, some from stagnant water, like mosquitoes, some
from wine turning sour, like gnats … some from slime, like
frogs, some from mud, like maggots, some from donkeys,
like dung beetles, … some from rotting animals, like bees
which come from bulls and wasps which come from horses.”
I.41
Some examples of behavioural variation:
“Vipers are numbed by the mere touch of an oak-branch, just
as bats are by the touch of a plane-leaf. Elephants avoid
rams, lions avoid cocks, sea-beasts avoid the crackling of
beans as they are pounded, tigers avoid the noise of drums.”
I.58
The argument explicated
1. Animals have different physiology to us, so
it is highly likely things appear differently to
them
• Behavioural differences back this up
2. There is no reason to think our
appearances are true and theirs false =
aporia
3. So we must treat ours as mere
appearances and suspend judgement =
epoche
“Irrational animals”
• “For good measure” (I.62), Sextus goes on
to counter the suggestion that because we
are rational and other animals not, our
appearances – or the judgements we make
on their basis – are to be preferred.
• Here he points out that one can point to
appearances of rationality in animals and
irrationality in humans to create another
aporia.
Mode Two: Humans
• Sextus starts by noting that – while not as
extreme as with animals – there are also
considerable physiological diversities
amongst humans
• But his main argument rests on difference
of preferences
“Since, therefore, choice and avoidance are
located in pleasure and displeasure, and pleasure
and displeasure lie in perception and appearance,
then when some choose and others avoid the
same things, it is apposite for us to deduce that
they are not similarly affected by the same things,
since otherwise they would have chosen and
rejected the same things in similar ways.” I.87
• And if the dogmatists try to say they are right and
the others wrong, there is no progress because
there is disagreement about who is right and no
way to decide ‘for they themselves are part of the
dispute’ I.90
Ideal Observers and 3rd Mode
• Some Dogmatists – e.g. Stoics – say that
we can conceive of a Sage – an ideal
person – and it is their appearances which
are true.
• To this Sextus replies: “that the senses
disagree with one another is clear” I.91
• E.g. perfume “gratifies the sense of smell
but displeases the sense of taste” I.92
• And there may be more senses than we
conceive I.97
Mode Nine: Frequency and rarity
• I skip to the 9th and 10th modes because of
their importance in religious and moral
debates, but the fourth should not be
ignored since it builds upon the 2nd and 3rd
by noting other sources of inter and intrapersonal variation
• The 9th notes that what we experience
often we find less surprising and less
valuable than what we experience rarely.
“The sun is surely a great deal more striking
than a comet; but since we see the sun
frequently and comets only rarely, we are
so struck by comets that we actually think
them to be portents, but are not struck at all
by the sun.” I.141
• While a good way of inducing aporia about value
judgements, this mode was also used to threaten
rational basis of Christianity (and Judaism and
Islam): miracles may only seem miraculous
because of their rarity
Mode Ten: Cultural variation
• In many ways this is the most modern of
Sextus’s modes, and one which gained greater
power as more of the world was explored in the
17th century
• In it he notes that both what is socially
acceptable and what is legal varies across
cultures
• Most of his examples have to do with sexual and
marital relations, something which particularly
challenged the political power of the church,
which controlled these things.
Moral epoche
• It is important to note that his conclusion from the
9th and 10th Modes is not relativism or nihilism,
but suspension of judgement
• But what should one do if one has suspended
judgement on what is right and wrong, what is
valuable or not?
• The sceptic says: whatever appears right to
you, which will probably be what accords with
your culture, upbringing and past experience
• NOT: whatever you want to do
•
Pyrrhonists do not question the appearances
Discussion
Do the modes work?
1. Perceptual variation modes:
•
•
We can identify some variation as illusion because it
leads to failed actions
•
We can identify some as greater acuity because it
leads to greater range of actions
•
Variation in preferences need not entail perceptual
difference (preference subjective)
•
Any remaining variation reflects plurality of properties
Challenge: is the criterion of successful action
invariant? Perhaps not if preferences subjective.
2. Normative variation modes:
•
•
Some social variation, such as table manners, is
arbitrary
•
Legal variation a function of history, culture and
political goals
•
Moral variation: a relativist can explain easily
•
A moral realist can take similar approach as
perceptual realist
Or we challenge assumption about the bearers of
value: not objects/actions/people but hedonic states
3. The criterion of truth
• Much of Book II of the Outlines is devoted
to a discussion of the problem of the
criterion of truth
• Views about this vary wildly:
• some think it so obvious that as soon as
pointed out, it forces la crise pyrrhonienne
• others that it is incredibly difficult to make
convincing
• yet others that there is an easy solution
The Problem of the Criterion
1. If you want to claim that one
account/appearance is true (=
apprehending it) and the opposing one
false, then you must cite some criterion of
truth which one possesses and the other
lacks.
2. But your criterion must also be the true
criterion and not a false one
• To make this clear, Sextus notes that there
are opposing accounts of the criterion of
truth
Book II 18-20
3. So you must apprehend your criterion of
truth on the basis of some criterion.
4. Either this is the same one or a different
one.
5. If it is the same one, then you are saying
that the criterion is apprehended in virtue
of itself, which is circular.
6. If it is a different one, then GOTO 3 –
infinite regress is inevitable.
Example
• Proposed criterion of truth: leads to
successful actions
• Why think this is a/the criterion of truth?
• Either because using that criterion leads to
successful actions
• Which doesn’t answer question
• Or because it meets some other criterion
• Perhaps ‘what we have evolved to do’
• Why think this is a/the criterion of truth?
• And so on
• For Sextus,
• Either this argument moves you to attain
tranquillity (ataraxia)
• Or it doesn’t and you are ‘perpetually
troubled’ (I.27)
• He is just the doctor offering us medicines
• But we might think its ability to move
people is not arbitrary,
• but depends upon whether we can imagine
equipollent opposing criteria
• Pyrrhonism first flourished in the late Hellenistic
period when there were several rival ‘schools’ of
philosophy: Academics, Cynics, Stoics,
Epicureans to name just the major ones
• It saw a massive resurgence in the Reformation
when there were rival epistemologies backing
religious disagreements
• The rise of modern science was initially thought
to support Pyrrhonism but in fact it did the
opposite
• Since the 18th century, the problem of the
criterion has been largely ignored
Scientific Realism
• In our time, the criterion of truth is science
(including neoclassical economics)
•
or more precisely: being established by scientific
method (including logic)
• Scientific method is massively successful
• There seem to be no alternatives
•
hence the inclusion of economics in science
•
except, perhaps, for a specific class of religious
beliefs
• So the problem of the criterion doesn’t seem
pressing
Discussion
• The problem of the criterion seems
pressing in historical periods when there
are opposing accounts
• In 21st century scientific method and
neoclassical economics provide universally
accepted criteria
• But the problem as formulated doesn’t
actually rely upon there being opposing
accounts
4. Is Scepticism Self-defeating?
• Sextus distinguishes between Academics and
Pyrrhonists (I.3-4)
•
He reserves the word ‘sceptic’ for the latter, but
nowadays philosophers use it for both
• Academic Sceptics assert that nothing can be
known
•
•
Thus they seem to contradict themselves
More generally, if you offer an argument for a
sceptical conclusion, then you are committed to the
soundness of the argument
Self-defeat is success!
• Pyrrhonian Sceptics merely suspend belief
•
Even about the effectiveness of their arguments
• Sextus describes the things the sceptic says as a
purgative which expels itself as well:
• “we do not affirm definitely that they are true –
after all, we say that they can be destroyed by
themselves … just as purgative drugs … drive
themselves out too along with the humours.”
(I.206)
Discussion
• Is that true intellectual tranquillity?
•
Or merely accepting defeat and getting the relief
that comes when you stop ‘banging you head
against a wall’?
•
Is it really “better to be a human being dissatisfied
than a pig satisfied”? (Mill, Utilitarianism, Ch.2)
•
The Pyrrhonist holds that the intellectual urges which
drive us to Dogmatism about science, metaphysics or
religion are something to be overcome
• Montaigne is the best example of someone who
lived as a sceptic
•
He would say he is fully human, a paradigm. Is he?