GOVT 2305
Federalist #10 and
the Republicanism
In the previous section we looked
over the nature of Constitutions
and analyzed the broad design of
the United States Constitution, as
well as the alleged failures of the
Articles of Confederation.
This section is the first of a few
where we dig deeper into specific
design features within the United
States Constitution.
We will look separately
at these four principles:
Republicanism
Separated Powers
Individual Liberty
Federalism
This week:
Republicanism
In other words: Indirect Democracy
or Representative Democracy
For a reminder:
What is a Republic Again?
A republic is a type of government
where the citizens choose the
leaders of their country and the
people (or at least a part of its
people) have an impact on its
government. -Wikipedia
More specifically, it means that the
preferences of the general population are
filtered through representative institutions.
Try to memorize the “filter” as an analogy.
In brief, a republic attempts to filter out
short-term, unstable, radical ideas in order
to ensure that the actions of government
reflect long term, stable concerns.
As we will see, the principle concern by the
framers of the Constitution was that
powerful, permanent majorities would be
able to control all aspects of governing
power, become tyrannical, and disregard
the rights of the majority.
In short: a republic is argued to be better
able to prevent the tyranny of the majority.
In a republic, people do not rule
directly, as in the Athenian
democracy, rather they do so
though elected representatives.
Read Pericles on Athenian
Democracy here.
We will consider this topic by reading
through Federalist #10 which argues
that the Constitution successfully limit
the dangers posed by factions
motivated by personal, narrow
interests, not the overall interests of
the nation. It does so by filtering their
preferences through a legislative
system that will break apart majority
factions.
Please note that I expect you read
through Federalist #10 and be
prepared to answer a handful of
questions regarding its text.
Text
Wikipedia
GradeSaver
SparkNotes
A faction, as the term was used by
Madison, is similar to what we would
call today interest (or advocacy)
groups.
As we will see, the Constitution is
designed in part to impact how groups
form in the nation and how capable
those groups are to creating instability.
Consequently, this allows us to
take an early look at interest
groups, what they are, how they
form, and how they are – or are
not – effective.
At root, this section concerns a
conflict that exists between the
concept of popular sovereignty and
democracy.
While we know from our
discussion of natural rights that a
government must rest on the
people, history tells us that the
people can provide an unstable
basis for government.
Classical authors argued that
democracies inevitably turned
chaotic and out the chaos emerged
a tyranny that would keep the
peace. Read criticism of the
Athenian democracy here.
The Framers of the Constitution
were aware of these arguments.
The democratic system was
believed to be the reason Greece
was defeated in the Peloponnesian
War.
A democratic assembly was also
responsible for the execution of
Socrates.
Hamilton, in Federalist #9, stated: “It is
impossible to read the history of the petty
republics of Greece and Italy without
feeling sensations of horror and disgust at
the distractions with which they were
continually agitated, and at the rapid
succession of revolutions by which they
were kept in a state of perpetual vibration
between the extremes of tyranny and
anarchy.”
The framers of the Constitution
were also aware that being
wealthy property owners, they
were in a minority.
A democratic majority could take
their property, which they saw as a
violation of their unalienable
rights.
Recall the tension between
majority rule and minority rights.
In a democracy the nature of
minority rights can be defined by
the majority.
The real problem, as the framers of
the Constitution saw it, lied in
human nature.
As we will see later, Madison thought we
far more likely to “vex and oppress” each
other than to cooperate. This would be
fatal in a direct democracy, but
manageable in an indirect democracy.
A tyrannical system can suppress
divisions in society because they
are powerful and ruthless enough
to eradicate them.
Stalin, for example, dealt with
opposition groups by killing them.
That’s one way to solve the
problem.
Democracies, which naturally
require a degree of individual
freedom, allow these divisions to
take center stage and lead to
conflict. Utter chaos – civil wars –
can lead some to conclude that a
tyrannical leader is preferable to
random violence.
This was Thomas Hobbes
conclusion in The Leviathan,
written during the British Civil
Wars.
Democracy can lead to tyranny.
Tyranny of the Majority
The word “democracy” therefore
wasn’t a compliment.
Think about how people use the
term “socialism” today, it was
similar.
The goal of the U.S. Constitution is
to maintain popular rule, to ensure
that it did not crumble into
tyranny.
The question was how.
Madison would argue that the
answer to these problems was in
designing a “well-constructed
union.”
This would involve creating a
republic with strong independent
but accountable legislative
institutions that rest between the
people and the law.
So while it is true that the U.S. is a
democracy, the democratic design
is such that the electorate has a no
capacity to instantaneously change
policy.
While the Preamble begins with
“We the People,” much of the
remainder of the U.S. Constitution
protects government from the
people.
That is what a republic does.
Before we continue, let’s recall
what “democracy” means.
It means, in Greek, rule of the
people, and as is practiced today
has three main components. We
introduced these previously.
1 - Universal Adult Suffrage
2 - Majority Rule
3 - Minority Rights
Obviously we can question whether
the U.S. qualified as a democracy at
that point given restrictions on
suffrage.
We discuss these in the section on
elections. For now it is important to
know that restricted suffrage was a
deliberate choice by the framers.
The framers of the Constitution
were worried about the excesses
of democracy, and sought instead
to limit the direct impact of the
population, while still retaining the
basic democratic framework.
“The evils we experience flow from
the excess of democracy.” –
Elbridge Gerry
He was referring to the problems
the nations was allegedly suffering
from under the Articles of
Confederation.
From the Constitutional Convention:
Mr. HAMILTON. This question has already
been considered in several points of view.
We are now forming a republican
government. Real liberty is neither found
in despotism nor the extremes of
democracy, but in moderate governments.
The people who attended the
Constitutional Convention believed
that the policies proposed by the
democratic legislatures in the
states were harmful to the future
stability of the union.
The legislatures were, for example,
debasing currency to allow for
easier payments of debt even
though this policy, in their opinion,
harmed long term economic
development.
James Madison would mention
these specifically in the latter parts
of Federalist #10.
Paper Money
The Abolition of Debts
Redistribution of Property
In a republic, a variety of
institutions lay between the
population and the formulation,
implementation and adjudication
of the law. Collectively these are
supposed to limit efforts to harm
the minority.
On the national level
this includes:
A Bicameral Congress
A Singular Executive
An Appointed Judiciary
These are established in the first
three articles of the U.S.
Constitution ,and they are
structured in such a way to be
independent of each other.
This introduces a topic we will cover more
thoroughly in the next section.
Each institution is put in office
through a separate process, which
insulates them in different ways
from the national electorate
House – the people
Senate – the states
President – the electoral college
Courts - appointment
And each institution has a different
term length, which also insulates it
from the national electorate:
House – 2 years
Senate – 6 years
President – 4 years
Courts - Lifetime
The longer the term, the greater
the insulation. (Think about this
like the length of a dog’s leash.)
The Anti-Federalists wanted the
shortest terms possible – yearly if
possible.
The fact that only one third of the
Senate is up for election every two
years shields that institution from
ever being subject to the
immediate preferences of the
electorate.
The fact that the federal courts
serve for life, in addition to being
appointed, means that they never
face the electorate.
The U.S. Constitution is full of
factors which place distance
between governing institutions and
the people.
Jacksonian Democracy stood
opposed to this.
As a consequence, the people do
not rule, rather they elect
representatives to rule for them
and then have the periodic
opportunity to replace or retain
them.
This raises a question about what
“popular sovereignty” actually
means. Are the people always
sovereign, or is their sovereignty
limited to the decisions they make
in periodic elections?
This issue was brought up before in the
introductory slides.
Again, while the people are indeed
sovereign, the range of their power
is limited.
This checks the power of the
majority.
Think of republicanism as a check
on the power of the people.
Again, we explore this issue by
reading through one of the more
influential of the Federalist Papers
Federalist #10
The Utility of the Union as a
Safeguard Against Domestic
Faction and Insurrection
- written by James Madison
- wikipedia.
The Text of Fed #10
Wikipedia: Fed #10
James Madison wrote Fed 10 and
argued that the “well constructed
union” created in the Philadelphia
Convention would prevent the
United States from falling prey to
the excesses of democracy.
Democracies, historically, have
been unstable, violent, and short
lived. Majorities are able to
oppress minorities. Policy can shift
radically based on shifts in popular
sentiment.
Although people must be free to
participate politically, the general
public must be unable to
destabilize government. Majorities
must be unable to undermine the
rights of the minority.
How can this be best done?
And why does Madison care?
The wealthy are a minority and in a
democracy their property may be
subject to redistribution and the
money owed them might be
subject to being forgiven.
A similar sentiment would be expressed by
the Danbury, Connecticut Baptist
Association in 1801 in a letter to Jefferson.
They were concerned that the laws of
Connecticut at the time placed them, as a
minority, in a position where their religious
liberty would be determined by the
majority.
“what religious privileges we enjoy
(as a minor part of the state) we
enjoy as favors granted, and not as
inalienable rights; and these favors
we receive at the expense of such
degrading acknowledgements as
are inconsistent with the rights of
freemen.”
They wondered if Jefferson
believed that their freedom to
worship as they choose would be
protected. Jefferson responded in
his letter stating he believed that
the First Amendment created a
“wall of separation” between
church and state.
The point is that minority interests
are easily disregarded and
compromised by majorities.
How can this be dealt with
effectively?
Federalist #10 argues that the
republican system established in
the Constitution does so.
Here is a basic outline of the
argument in Federalist #10.
It should not substitute a full
reading of the document itself.
He begins with a statement of the
problem:
Factions have always destroyed
democracies. Groups form with
interest opposed to others or to
the overall interests of the people.
“By a faction, I understand a number of
citizens, whether amounting to a majority
or a minority of the whole, who are united
and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adversed to the
rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the
community.” - Madison
Think of factions as interest
groups, what we would call today,
special interests.
Factions can be dealt with by
focusing on causes or effects
By focusing on the causes we can
prevent factions from developing.
By focusing on the effects we allow
factions to form but ensure that
they cannot do damage to the
republic.
There are two principle causes of
factions:
Freedom
Diversity
Freedom allows people the right to
form into groups and participate
politically
Diversity refers to fact that people
are different in their ability to
process information and in the
nature of their interests.
But the elimination of freedom is
worse than the disease.
Freedom is essential.
The right to form factions would
later be made clear in the First
Amendment.
Congress shall make no law ….
Abridging the right of the people to
peacefully assemble and petition
government for a redress of
grievances.
He argues that diversity is
inevitable in a free society.
It is impossible to make people the
same if that was our goal.
Why?
1 - People reason in different, often
incorrect ways and develop different ideas
as a result. We tend to grow attached to
their ideas.
2 – Various interests evolve in a civilized
society and groups evolve around those
interests to protect them.
It is in our nature to form into
groups based on our self interest
and come into conflict with others
with opposing interests.
Plus:
It is in our nature to “vex and
oppress each other” and not to
cooperate for the common good.
We are self-interested by nature.
What’s worse, this affects people
in the legislature.
Legislators have their own interests
and are in a position to pass
legislation impacting those
interests.
The majority party in a legislature
can do what it chooses.
It can undermine the rights of the
minority if it chooses.
But this is inevitable in a free
society.
The conclusion:
The causes of faction cannot be
removed. Their impact can only be
addressed by focusing on their
effects.
This is a crucial point. Human
nature is written into the
constitutional order. It is accepted
and compensated for. We will see
this again when we read through
Federalist #51 and discuss
ambition.
So here is the question: How can
factions be allowed to exist, but
not allowed to undermine
stability? By focusing on their
effects, not causes.
How can freedom not undermine
stability?
“To secure the public good and
private rights against the danger of
such a faction, and at the same
time to preserve the spirit and the
form of popular government, is
then the great object to which our
inquiries are directed.”
He begins to address this question
by pointing out that there are two
types of factions:
Minority
Majority
The minority faction (which is les
than 50% of the population) can be
checked, in a democracy, by the
majority which can defeat them by
vote.
“If a faction consists of less than a
majority, relief is supplied by the
republican principle, which enables
the majority to defeat its sinister views
by regular vote. It may clog the
administration, it may convulse the
society; but it will be unable to
execute and mask its violence under
the forms of the Constitution.”
The minority can pose problems
for society, but it cannot become
tyrannical.
Bu the majority faction can
become tyrannical. It can dominate
elections and use government
offices to abuse minorities.
“When a majority is included in a
faction, the form of popular
Government, on the other hand,
enables it to sacrifice to its ruling
passion or interest both the public
good and the rights of other
citizens.”
So that’s the danger – the majority.
He focuses the bulk of his attention
on this.
Tyranny of the Majority
A democracy can become
tyrannical. I have repeated this
point and will continue to do so.
His principle insight: In order for
the majority to successfully act
against the minority, it has to have:
Impulse and Opportunity
Impulse: A common feeling to act
against an unpopular group.
Opportunity: The means to act on
that feeling.
If they intersect – the majority can
do anything.
Madison argues that impulse and
opportunity coincide in a direct
democracy where people can meet
in person, make quick decisions
and implement them immediately.
Think about the Salem Witch Trials
or lynchings.
“If the impulse and the
opportunity be suffered to
coincide, we well know that
neither moral nor religious motives
can be relied on as an adequate
control.”
Passion will translate immediately
into legislation, and will be
implemented immediately.
This is why democracies are
dangerous. They can be subject to
the preferences of violent,
passionate majorities.
Pure democracies can admit of no
cure for the mischiefs of faction
since there is no barrier between
the individual and the law.
A republic – an indirect democracy
- can provide the solution to this
problem. A country can be both
based on individual liberty and
sovereignty and be resistant to
tyranny of the majority and
instability.
There are two ways republics can
cure the violence of faction.
First – because representatives,
not the people, will make
decisions. They will less likely to be
motivated by pure passion –
though this is not always the case –
as he admits.
“Enlightened statesmen will not
always be at the helm.”
The representative system will
slow the process down so that
passionate feelings will not
immediately influence policy.
The fact that the public can only
directly impact the government in
periodic elections minimizes the
opportunity for passionate
majorities to dominate
policymaking.
They can only have that influence
at the appointed time.
Second – because a representative
government is more likely to
contain multiple interests, making
it less likely that a single
permanent majority can be
formed. The majority is likely to be
split.
The existence of multiple interests
makes it less likely that one, or a
small handful of interests will allow
for the formation of a majority –
especially one that can be
sustained.
A large country will contain many
interests.
The House of Representatives, for
example, contains 435 members
elected from 435 distinct districts
around the country.
The various points of view held
across the country will be heard in
the House.
Madison argues that the smaller
the republic, the more dangerous it
can be because there will be a
smaller number of interests
contained within it. This makes the
formation of a majority more likely.
“Extend the sphere, and you take in a
greater variety of parties and interests; you
make it less probable that a majority of the
whole will have a common motive to
invade the rights of other citizens; or if
such a common motive exists, it will be
more difficult for all who feel it to discover
their own strength, and to act in unison
with each other.”
Local governments are more likely
to be tyrannical than state
governments and state
governments are more likely to be
tyrannical than the national
governments.
Note: Since the Texas Constitution
is far more democratic in its design
and smaller in scale than the U.S.,
it may be more prone to tyranny of
the majority.
Madison’s point was that states
were becoming tyrannical. The
ability of the minority – land
owners – to preserve their rights –
property – was being jeopardized.
He noted in the states at that time:
“A rage for paper money, for an
abolition of debts, [and] for an
equal division of property.” A
national government could
suppress those tendencies.
Madison's Ironic Conclusion: A
Republican Solution to a
Republican Problem.
The answer to the problem of
factions – interest groups – is to
make more of them.
Everyone is a minority, no one
group can dominate.
A minority cannot tyrannize the
majority in a democracy.
Certain institutions can preserve
the benefits of a minority.
The Senate – six year terms
The Courts – appointed to the
office, not subject to popular
pressure
Certain procedures allow a
minority to stop legislation from
either being passed or
implemented.
Filibusters
Judicial Review
The Anti-Federalists disagreed with
Madison’s assessment and wrote a
response:
Anti-Federalist #10
On the preservation of parties,
public liberty depends
A Farmer
The Antifederalist Maryland Farmer, wary of the
emergence of a high-toned social class, urges
ordinary Americans to "preserve your jealousy &
[for] on the preservation of parties, public liberty
depends. Whenever men are unanimous on
great public questions, whenever there is but
one party, freedom ceases and despotism
commences. The object of a free and wise
people should be so to balance parties, that
from the weakness of all you may be governed
by the moderation of the combined judgments
of the whole, not tyrannized ever by the blind
passions of a few individuals.“ – source.
Here’s an obvious criticism of
Madison’s point:
What about slavery?
What about the right of women?
What about the rights of native
tribes?
Madison’s arguments seems to
only apply to those who already
have the right to participate.
But it can also be made to apply to
other groups once they attain
suffrage.
It may be argued that the
eradication of slavery and the
eventual suffrage of women was
made possible by the explosion of
organized groups in America.
An additional contemporary criticism:
Madison seems to believe that the
natural development of groups will
allow these groups to check each
other.
But is Madison painting an adequate
picture of the dynamics of group
formation?
This raises important questions
about how interests organize and
become influential, and equally
important questions about why
others cannot.
Madison seems to believe that any
new interest will lead to the
formation of a group around it.
In some sense this is true.
But not all interests in society are
equally able to organize. Interests
that can provide tangible material
benefits to small cohesive
members can organize more
effectively than those that cannot.
For examples: The wealthy can
form more effectively than the
poor.
They have the resources, knowhow
and connections.
It is difficult to form interest groups
because not everyone wants to
work to make sure they are
effective.
Some people free ride off the work
of others.
If you’ve ever tried to organize a
group of people you know this.
We will discuss the mechanics of
this more fully in the section on
Interest Groups.