FINAL REPORT
Sunni Militancy in India:
An Analytical Atlas
Stanford IPS/MPP Practicum Project
for
Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism
Defense Intelligence Agency
March 18, 2011
Prepared by:
Katherine Hoffmann
Jiro Kodera
Peter LeFrancois
Charles Nicas
Jackson Reed
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................... i
1.
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
2.
METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................................................... 5
3.
BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................. 7
4.
TRENDS IN TERRORISM COMMITTED BY SUNNI GROUPS ............................................... 14
5.
PROFILES OF SUNNI MILITANT GROUPS IN INDIA ........................................................... 17
DEFINITIONS OF CATEGORIES AND TERMS.............................................................................................. 17
ALL-INDIA GROUPS ................................................................................................................................. 22
Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) ................................................................................... 23
Indian Mujahideen (IM) ................................................................................................................... 27
Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF) ................................................................................................ 29
NORTHEAST INDIAN GROUPS .................................................................................................................. 30
Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) ................................................................... 32
Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA) .................................................................... 35
People’s United Liberation Front (PULF) ....................................................................................... 36
Islamic Liberation Army of Assam (ILAA) ...................................................................................... 38
Muslim Security Council of Assam (MSCA) .................................................................................... 39
United Muslim Liberation Front of Assam (UMLFA) .................................................................... 40
Islamic United Reformation Protest of India (IURPI) ................................................................... 41
Muslim Volunteer Force (MVF) ....................................................................................................... 42
SOUTH INDIAN GROUPS .......................................................................................................................... 43
Jihad Committee ............................................................................................................................... 45
Al-Ummah ......................................................................................................................................... 45
Islamic Defense Force ....................................................................................................................... 46
Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS) ............................................................................................................... 49
KASHMIRI GROUPS.................................................................................................................................. 51
Jamiat-ul-Mujahedin (JuM) ............................................................................................................. 53
Dukhtaran-e-Millat (DeM) ............................................................................................................... 55
Banat-ul-Islam .................................................................................................................................. 57
Muslim Khawateen Markaz (MKM) ................................................................................................ 58
PAKISTANI GROUPS ................................................................................................................................. 60
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) ...................................................................................................................... 61
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) ................................................................................................................ 63
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) .................................................................................................................. 65
Islami Inqilabi Mahaz (IIM) ............................................................................................................. 67
Harkat ul-Mujahideen ...................................................................................................................... 68
6.
EXTERNAL ACTORS’ INFLUENCE ON SUNNI MILITANCY IN INDIA ................................ 70
PAKISTAN’S INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (ISI) ................................................................... 70
AL QAEDA ............................................................................................................................................... 71
GULF DONORS AND THE HAWALA SYSTEM .............................................................................................. 72
TABLIGHI JAMAAT ................................................................................................................................... 73
7.
SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS ................................................................................................. 74
8.
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 82
9.
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................................ i
MAJOR SECONDARY SOURCES.................................................................................................................... i
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................. ii
LIST OF FIGURES
1. List of Militant Groups ......................................................................................................... 3
2. Profile Components .............................................................................................................. 4
3. States of India....................................................................................................................... 7
4. Indian States with the largest percentage of Muslim residents, 2001................................ 8
5. Indian States with the largest Muslim populations, 2001 .................................................. 8
6. Incidents and Deaths with Known Sunni Perpetrators .....................................................14
7. Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir 1988-2010....................................................................16
8. Terrorism by Suspected Sunni Militant Groups 1988-2010 ...............................................16
9. Overview of Profiled Groups ...............................................................................................19
10. Terrorism Incidents and Deaths by All-India Groups ......................................................22
12. Terrorism Incidents and Deaths by Northeast Indian Groups.........................................31
14. Terrorism Incidents and Deaths by South Indian Groups ...............................................44
16. Terrorism Incidents and Deaths by Kashmiri Groups .....................................................52
18. Terrorism Incidents and Deaths by Pakistani Groups .....................................................60
20. Relations Between Militant Groups ..................................................................................74
21. Social Network Overview ..................................................................................................77
22. Front, Joined, Merged, Offshoot, Predecessor, and Same ................................................78
23. Funding, Guidance, Influence, and Support .....................................................................79
24. Degree Centrality ..............................................................................................................80
25. Betweenness ......................................................................................................................81
i|Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As the U.S.-led effort against Sunni militancy in South Asia enters its second decade, the
issue of Sunni militancy in India, the region’s largest country, remains under-examined. The
following report responds to this gap by exploring the nature and implications of Sunni
militancy in India. Compiled with guidance from the Joint Intelligence Task Force –
Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the report
aims to understand Sunni militancy in India by answering the following questions:



What are the major Sunni militant groups in India?
What are their ideologies, links with other actors, and capacities for violence?
What are the salient characteristics (e.g., political, economic, ethnic, religious) of the
populations that support these groups?
 What are the trends and causes of Sunni militancy in India and their implications?
We approach these questions in three complementary ways: a quantitative overview of
Sunni terrorism incidents and deaths for India as a whole; in-depth qualitative profiles of
individual militant groups; and a social network analysis of the connections between the
groups. We find that the most active and violent of these Sunni militant groups are
generally related to Pakistan or the long-running conflict between Pakistan and India in
Kashmir. However, entirely indigenous factors also play an important role.
In order to complete the profiles we developed the following definition for militant group. A
militant group is an organization that advocates, materially supports, enables or uses
unlawful violent action against persons or property so as to further a political, religious or
ideological agenda. This definition allows a wide range of groups to be evaluated, including
those that may not directly engage in violent acts or terrorism themselves. We identified
and researched 24 Sunni militant groups with operations in India.
B ACKGROUND
We begin by situating Sunni militancy within the broader social and political environment
in India, a large and diverse country with a complex history. India’s Muslim population is
estimated to be approximately 160 million, only 13 percent of the national total, but large
enough in absolute terms to be the third largest Muslim population in the world. India’s
Muslims are overwhelmingly Sunni, and they constitute an important part of the political
and cultural landscape. Understanding militancy in this community requires looking at not
only the militant groups themselves but also the national and regional dynamics affecting
the community’s interests.
One of these dynamics is the rise of Hindu nationalism in India, a decades-old movement
that has long viewed India’s Muslim population with suspicion. Hindu-Muslim strife
manifested itself most violently in the early 1990s after the destruction of the Babri Masjid
by Hindu extremists. Many of the Sunni militant groups included in this report cite
incidents of anti-Muslim violence as motivation for their own violent acts, and they often
function in opposition to India’s Hindu nationalist groups. Perceptions of Hindu nationalist
ii | P a g e
parties among Muslims throughout India and the history of violence between radical
nationalists and Muslims is a critical piece of the story of Sunni militancy in India.
Another critical dynamic is the long-standing territorial dispute between India and
Pakistan over the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir. The defining moment in
the rise of terrorism in Kashmir was the alleged manipulation of the results of India’s 1987
State Assembly elections. Pakistan then began covertly supporting Indian and Pakistani
terrorist groups in Kashmir and importing Pakistani mujahideen returning from the Soviet
conflict in Afghanistan. Violence in Jammu and Kashmir has dominated the terrorism
component of Sunni militancy in India ever since.
R ESEARCH AND A NALYSIS
Our nationwide assessment of Sunni terrorism in India does not show a clearly increasing
trend over the past few years. Rather, the data show two competing trends. On one hand,
Sunni terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir has been declining, in terms of both incidents and
deaths, since 2005. On the other hand, Sunni terrorism outside Jammu and Kashmir has
been marked by sporadic, highly lethal attacks in India’s major cities since the early 1990s.
The next section of the report includes profiles describing each group’s background,
demography, and capacity. The profiles are organized geographically because regional
context appears to be a critical factor in determining a group’s particular motivations.
Consistent with this schematic, the three groups without a clear regional delimiter are the
most focused on national changes. These groups are characterized as All-India groups. The
geographic categories for the other groups are Northeast India, South India, Kashmir and
Pakistan. The report also devotes a section to a discussion of external influences on Sunni
militancy in India, focusing most notably on Pakistan’s intelligence services, Al Qaeda and
donors from the Persian Gulf.
Using the qualitative information contained in the profiles, we conduct a social network
analysis of the Sunni militant groups active in India to explore the links between them. A
preliminary evaluation of the overarching network indicates a highly interconnected space.
While groups tend to affiliate with each other according to regional ties (with for example
the South Indian groups forming a small cluster of their own, connected to the rest of India
by a single group), some actors – such as Pakistan’s intelligence service – act as links across
multiple regions. In fact, according to almost every metric, our social network analysis
suggests Pakistani organizations are critical to understanding Sunni militancy in India.
C ONCLUSIONS
Our research shows that the vast majority of Sunni attacks in India take place in the
disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir. Outside Kashmir, attacks by Sunni groups in India
tend to be less frequent and more lethal. For example, three notable attacks, New Delhi in
October 2005 and Mumbai in July 2006 and November 2008, account for 50 percent of the
total deaths from Sunni attacks outside Kashmir since 2004. Sunni militant incidents in
India as a whole have been decreasing since 2008, with Kashmiri militancy starting to fall
even earlier in 2005.
iii | P a g e
The motivations of domestic Indian militant groups can be divided three broad categories:
territorial grievances, relevant in Kashmir and Northeast India; the threat of communal
violence, especially versus Hindu nationalist groups, relevant for All-India and South India
groups; and the appeal of Islamist ideology, relevant for all of the groups.
Among the domestic groups, the Indian Mujahideen and the Students Islamic Movement of
India have been most closely associated with terrorism, especially medium and highmortality attacks in India’s cities. However, these groups are closely linked with Pakistani
intelligence and Pakistan-based groups. The Pakistan-based groups are directly involved in
both the high-frequency attacks in Kashmir and the highly lethal attacks in Indian cities. As
a result, we view these groups as the primary instigators of Sunni terrorism in India.
Because almost all of the Pakistan-based groups had – or have – ties to elements within
Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment, we believe the adversarial relationship
between the governments of India and Pakistan to be a central factor fueling this violence.
The India-Pakistan conflict has served as a primary motivation for the Pakistani state to
support Sunni terrorism, and for Pakistani militants to launch attacks in India. It is not the
only motivation, and it complements and competes with others, including religious or
jihadist ideology. Nevertheless, at present our research shows a decisive Pakistani influence
on Sunni militancy in India, and this leads us to accord a central explanatory role to the
territorial dispute in Kashmir and the broader political-religious conflict between India and
Pakistan that predates their partition.
The non-terrorism component of Sunni militancy in India, on the other hand, continues to
be influenced by domestic Indian actors. The riots of 1992 and 1993, street protests in
Jammu and Kashmir and communal mobilization in South India are all a response to
domestic territorial or communal grievances and show limited Pakistani involvement. In
the future, the domestic grievances of Sunni Muslims in India, combined with the limited
but nevertheless potent appeal of jihadist ideologies, could lead the development of a selfsustaining, widespread, indigenous movement of Sunni militancy in India. For now,
however, Sunni militancy in India—and Sunni terrorism in particular—is closely linked to
neighboring Pakistan.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This report represents our completed efforts to construct an atlas of Sunni militant groups
in India for the Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The project also serves as the Practicum component of
the graduate programs in International and Public Policy at Stanford University.
During preliminary discussion, JITF-CT identified Sunni militancy in India as a topic about
which they lacked organizational knowledge. The goal of the project is to fill this knowledge
gap with a document that can serve as a primer for junior personnel and as a working
reference piece for senior analysts at DIA. To serve these functions, the document answers
six key questions posed by JITF-CT:




What are the major Sunni militant groups in India?
What are their ideologies?
What are their interactions with other actors?
What are the salient characteristics (e.g., political, economic, ethnic, tribal) of the
populations that support these groups?
 What is the group’s capacity for violent action?
 What trends are there in Sunni militancy in India and why is it important?
To answer these questions, we profiled 24 Sunni militant groups that operate in India.
Section 2 describes the methodology used to research the groups profiled. Section 3 is a
brief background on elements of the Indian policy environment relevant to the study of
Sunni militancy, including overviews of Muslim demographics, the Hindu nationalist
movement and communal violence in the country, and a brief history of the conflict in
Kashmir. A description of the general trends observed in Sunni militancy over time is found
in section 4. Section 5 contains a table highlighting the major details of each group and the
group profiles themselves. Section 6 provides a concise description of the role of external
influences on Sunni militancy in India. The social network analysis in section 7 depicts the
relationships that exist between the groups and other actors. The report concludes with
section 8 and our analysis of why Sunni militancy in India is important and its role in a
national, regional, and international context.
The definition we selected for militant group considered the connection between militancy
and terrorism, the use of violence, and the group’s goals. In conjunction with JITF-CT, we
developed the following project-specific definition: an organization that advocates,
materially supports, enables or uses unlawful violent action against persons or property so
as to further a political, religious or ideological agenda.
This definition of militancy allows a wide range of groups to be evaluated, including those
that may not directly engage in violent acts or terrorism themselves, but that, through
rhetorical or logistical support, create an environment in which it is easier for violent
groups to operate.
Guided by these criteria, we sought to identify every Sunni militant group with operations
in India, whether foreign or domestically based. JITF-CT reviewed the groups identified by
this process and divided them into high and low priority lists, based on whether JITF-CT
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already possessed substantial knowledge of a group in question (primarily an issue with
well known Pakistan-based groups such as Lashkar-e Taiba).1 We then followed our
research methodology to complete profiles on 22 of the 25 groups in the high-priority list.
The three high-priority groups not profiled were the Muslim Tiger Force, Revolutionary
Muslim Commandos, and the United Liberation Tigers of Assam. Available information on
these groups was insufficient for profile compilation. After a preliminary investigation, and
based on our earlier experiences with similarly undocumented groups, like the Islamic
United Reformation Protest of India, we decided to forgo profiling them altogether.
We also profiled two groups from the low-priority list. The first, Lashkar-e-Taiba, was so
integral to the environment of Sunni terrorism in India that we found it expedient to
compile a profile, despite JITF-CT’s expertise on the group. The second group, Muslim
Khawateen Markaz was included in both the original low and high priority lists and was
included for thouroughness. The high and low priority lists and the list of the groups
profiled can be seen in Figure 1 below. As mentioned above, several of the profiles are quite
short due to information unavailability. We have decided to include these profiles to
address as completely as possible our list of militant groups.
Based on the needs of JITF-CT we sought to compile certain information in each group
profile. The availability of information varied widely between groups, and as such, the
following profile components (detailed in Figure 2 below) served as a guide for our
research.
1
In other words, high priority status only reflects the fact that JITF-CT knows relatively little about the
groups so classified and nothing about their intrinsic importance.
3|Page
FIGURE 1. LIST OF MILITANT GROUPS
HIGH-PRIORITY (LESSER KNOWN) GROUPS
LOW-PRIORITY (BETTER KNOWN) GROUPS
 Al-Ummah
 All Parties Hurriyat Conference*
 Asif Reza Commando Force
 Banat-ul-Islam
 Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami*
 Hizbul Mujahideen*
 Dukhtaran-e-Millat
 Harakat-ul-Mujahideen
 Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front*
 Lashkar-e-Taiba



















 Muslim Khawateen Markaz3
Indian Mujahideen
Islami Inqilabi Mahaz
Islamic Defense Force
Islamic Liberation Army of Assam
Islamic Sevak Sangh
Islamic United Reformation Protest of India
Jaish-e-Mohammad
Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen
Jihad Committee
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
Muslim Security Council of Assam
Muslim Tiger Force*
Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam
Muslim Volunteer Force
People’s United Liberation Front
Revolutionary Muslim Commandos*
Students Islamic Movement of India
United Liberation Tigers of Assam2*
United Muslim Liberation Front of Assam
* Not profiled.
2
3
Note: Not a Sunni militant group.
Originally listed by JTIF as both high and low priority.
4|Page
FIGURE 2. PROFILE COMPONENTS
BACKGROUND
 Date formed and disbanded
 Front companies, aliases, or
political fronts
 Predecessors
 Founding story
 Goals
 Ideology
 Brief history
 Key events
 Leadership





DEMOGRAPHY
CAPACITY
Geographic base of support
Demographic base of support
Relationship with community
Interaction with other actors
Legal status
 Size
 Resources
 Recruitment strategy and
base
 Means of mobilizing
support
 Capacity for carrying out
violent action
 Mode of operation
5|Page
2. METHODOLOGY
Conducting research into Indian militant groups is an often complex endeavor that presents
conflicting accounts of events from a variety of sources, whose veracity cannot always be
ascertained. In consideration of that, we examined as many sources as we could to
construct an accurate profile of the groups in question.
To construct the body of militant group profiles, selected groups (see section 5) were
divided using rough geographical criteria and assigned to individual researchers. The
decision to assign whole profiles, as opposed to profile components, to individual
researchers was made to minimize redundancy of effort, given that individual sources
oftentimes contain information relevant to multiple profile components of a single group.
The study of militancy in India is characterized by information scarcity. The clandestine and
unlawful nature of militant activity contributes to this situation, as do the information
security measures of the government agencies that investigate and combat militancy. For
our U.S.-based, English-speaking research team, the inability to access physical archives in
India or to translate vernacular sources was an additional barrier. The fact that our
research was possible, in spite of these difficulties, is due chiefly to the existence of India’s
English-language news media, whose reports constitute the sole primary source available
to the research team, and the basis of almost all secondary-source writing on Sunni
militancy in India. However, articles on Sunni militancy frequently quote casualty and
incident figures without citing sources and publications repeat the reporting of their
competitors so that independent corroboration of key claims is oftentimes impossible. We
have tried to highlight discrepancies and information gaps throughout the report, but
readers should keep in mind that the open-source study of militancy in India rests on a
great deal of uncertainty.
In addition to news articles, the report relies on a number of secondary sources. The most
important of these is the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), an online source of
information and analysis on terrorism and political conditions across South Asia
maintained by the Institute for Conflict Management, an Indian think tank. Although SATP
does not cite individual sources, and its profiles of militant groups are not always internally
consistent, its documents are sourced in part from media reports that do not appear in the
LexisNexis database, making them a valuable, if problematic reference.
Other secondary publications do not cite their sources at all and are included with the lack
of sourcing highlighted, with the assumption being that their anonymous source may be
providing information that is unavailable elsewhere. The Terrorist Organization Profiles
(TOPs), maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, are an example of one such source (see
Appendix for a descriptive table of major secondary sources).
In addition to the secondary sources, we used two databases to assess trends in terrorism
by Sunni militant groups in India, both regionally and nationally: the Worldwide Incidents
Tracking System (WITS), maintained by the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center and the
Global Terrorism Database (GTD), maintained by START. Each consist of terrorism incident
records that including the date, suspected perpetrators, victims and casualties of attacks, in
6|Page
addition to other variables. The GTD is based primarily on media reports, while WITS relies
on unspecified open sources. The databases each use different definitions of terrorism, and
their exact methodologies, while not entirely transparent, appear to differ as well. These
differences are substantial enough to generate significant discrepancies in incident and
casualty counts for the four years in which their coverage overlaps. As such, information
from each source is represented separately in the charts in sections 4 and 5 that utilize GTD
and WITS data.
Finally, a social network analysis was performed using the qualitative data collected and
used for the individual profiles. Social Network Analysis is a useful means of visualizing and
identifying key organizations and regional trends in terrorist activity in India. In fact, social
network analysis has already been applied to the study of terrorism in India by Aparna
Basu of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (IDHA) in New Delhi. Basu used the
co-occurrence of group names in the Terrorist Tracker database’s report of terrorist
incidents to identify the strength of ties between different organizations.4
Our social network analysis focused on the narrower topic of Sunni militancy in India. A
study of the links between different organizations and the betweenness and degree
centrality of the different groups addressed in the report has allowed us to identify the
most active and influential groups in the network. The findings of this analysis, as well as a
detailed discussion of the specific methodological challenges faced, are in section 7.
4
Aparna Basu. Social Network Analysis of Terrorist Organizations in India (New Delhi: Institute for Defense
Studies and Analysis, 2004).
7|Page
3. BACKGROUND
M USLIM P OPULATIONS IN I NDIA
In 2009, the Pew Research Center estimated that India was home to roughly 161 million
Muslims, or 10 percent of the world’s total Muslim population. According to these data,
India has more Muslim residents than all other countries except Indonesia and Pakistan.
Nonetheless, only about 13 percent of Indians are Muslim.5 As of 2001, Muslims lived in
every state and union territory of India, and constituted a religious minority in all but two
(see Figure 4 ).
FIGURE 3. STATES OF INDIA
Source: India State Basemap: A Georeferenced GIS Database for India, 2008.
5
Estimates from 2009 were taken from 2001 census data. Mapping the Global Muslim Population, Pew
Research Center, 2009, 28.
8|Page
The largest Muslim populations live in populous northern states, but substantial numbers
can be found across the south as well (see Figure 5).6
FIGURE 4. INDIAN STATES WITH THE
LARGEST PERCENTAGE OF MUSLIM
RESIDENTS, 2001
FIGURE 5. INDIAN STATES WITH THE
LARGEST MUSLIM POPULATIONS, 2001
MUSLIMS AS
STATE/UT
Lakshadweep
Jammu &
Kashmir
Assam
West Bengal
Kerala
Uttar Pradesh
Bihar
MUSLIM
RESIDENTS
SHARE OF
STATE/UT
POPULATION*
STATE/UT
MUSLIM
RESIDENTS
SHARE OF
INDIAN
MUSLIM
POPULATION*
57,903
96%
Uttar Pradesh
30,740,158
22%
6,793,240
67%
West Bengal
20,240,543
14%
8,240,611
20,240,543
7,863,842
30,740,158
13,722,048
31%
25%
25%
19%
17%
13,722,048
10,270,485
8,240,611
7,863,842
6,986,856
10%
7%
6%
6%
5%
Jharkhand
3,731,308
14%
6,793,240
5%
Karnataka
Uttaranchal
6,463,127
1,012,141
12%
12%
Bihar
Maharashtra
Assam
Kerala
Andhra Pradesh
Jammu &
Kashmir
Karnataka
Total
6,463,127
138,188,240
5%
100%
Source: Census of India data, 2001.
*Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.
In 2009, the Pew Center estimated India’s Muslim population to be between 85 and 90
percent Sunni. The remaining 10 to 15 percent of the population was predominantly Shia,
with less than .07 percent of Muslims not affiliated with either major sect.7 Since the
Census of India does not record Sunni or Shia affiliation, Pew developed these estimates by
relying on expert academic opinion to infer the likely sectarian affiliation of different ethnolinguistic groups across India;8 consequently, they should be taken as a rough guide only.
Thus far, we have been unable to determine the geographic distribution of Shia and Sunni
populations within India.9
H INDU N ATIONALISM AND C OMMUNAL V IOLENCE IN I NDIA
Many of the Sunni militant groups included in this report cite incidents of anti-Muslim
violence as motivation for their own violent acts and oftentimes function in opposition to
India’s Hindu nationalist groups. Given these connections, and to limit repetition in the
profiles, we provide below an overview of the Hindu nationalist movement and its
connection to major incidents of communal violence in India, followed by a brief
6
7
8
9
“Population by Religious Communities,” Census of India, accessed October 9, 2010.
Mapping the Global Muslim Population, 10.
Mapping the Global Muslim Population, 38.
Ibid., and “Religion and Survey (survey level),” World Religion Database, accessed October 10, 2010.
9|Page
description of the three most important Hindu nationalist parties: the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).
The Hindu nationalist movement now led by these organizations began gaining mass
appeal in the early 1980s, a time when socialism and secularism were losing popularity in
the country. Initially, it was the Congress party that mobilized Hindu identity for electoral
purposes, relying on violent anti-Sikh sentiment among Hindus in the wake of a Sikh
separatist insurgency in Punjab and the related murder of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by
her Sikh bodyguards, to sweep the 1984 elections.10 When compared with the three main
Hindu nationalist organizations, however, the Congress party was organizationally and
ideologically ill-placed to reap the benefits of deploying Hinduism politically, and the BJP
won enough seats in the 1989 elections to support the Janata Dal party in forming India’s
first non-Congress government.11
By the early 1990s, the communalist anger of Hindu nationalists had shifted from Sikhs to
Muslims. Controversy centered on the Babri Masjid, a 16th century mosque in the small
town of Ayodhya, in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh (see Figure 3). Hindu nationalists
maintained that the mosque, which was dedicated to Babur, the first Mughal emperor of
India, rested on the foundations of an ancient mandir (Hindu temple) marking the
birthplace of the Hindu god Ram. The controversy culminated in the destruction of the
mosque by a large crowd of Hindu pilgrims in December 1992. RSS, BJP and VHP leaders
were present during the rioting that destroyed the mosque, although they deny having
instigated its destruction. This incident was followed by Hindu-Muslim violence across
India, in which thousands died over subsequent months.12 This violence led the Home
Minsitry to temporarily ban the RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal (a third Hindu nationalist group),
along with the Muslim Jamaat-e-Islami Hind and Islamic Sevak Sangh, all of which were
accused of exacerbating communal tensions.13
The destruction of the Babri Masjid and ensuing violence continue to affect communal
politics in India, and the disputed Ayodhya site remains controversial. In the past decade,
the worst communal violence occurred in 2002, following a deadly fire on a train at Godhra
in Gujarat state. The train was carrying Hindu pilgrims from Ayodhya to Ahmedabad, the
capital of Gujarat.14 Some pilgrims on the train alleged that Muslim terrorists lit the fire.
The cause of the fire was subsequently disputed, with an investigative committee appointed
by the central government finding that the fire was accidental, and a Gujarat state
government-appointed panel finding that a conspiracy of local Muslims was responsible.15
However, the immediate consequences of the fire were anti-Muslim riots across BJPgoverned Gujarat, in which 1,000 to 2,000 Muslims were killed.16 The perception of Hindu
nationalist parties and groups among Muslims throughout India and the history of violence
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia (London: Routledge, 1998), 225.
Bose and Jalal, Modern South Asia, 227.
Bose and Jalal, Modern South Asia, 227-229.
Sanjoy Hazarika, “India Issues a Ban on Five Rival Groups,” New York Times. December 11, 1992.
LexisNexis.
“Timeline, India,” BBC News, updated October 6, 2010.
“Sabarmati Express Fire Was an Accident, Says UC Banerjee,” Hindustan Times, March 3, 2006; and
“Uproar in House Over Nanavati Report,” United News of India, September 29, 2008.
“Timeline, India,” BBC News.
10 | P a g e
between radical nationalists and Muslims is a critical piece of the story of Sunni militancy
in India. The following descriptions of the BJP, VHP, and RSS provide important context for
the group profiles and the rest of the report.
 BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY (THE INDIAN PEOPLE’S PARTY, OR BJP)
Along with the Indian National Congress, the BJP is one of two major national
political parties in India. It led the country’s government between March 1998 and
May 2004 under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.17 Then party-leader L.K.
Advani was instrumental in mobilizing mass support for the Babri Masjid demolition
(see overview above).
 VISHWA HINDU PARISHAD (THE WORLD HINDU COUNCIL, OR VHP)
The professed goals of the VHP are to work for the cohesion of Hindu society and
protect the religion from malign influences.18 The organization has a global
presence and advocates in favor of Hindu causes. In India, the VHP campaigns for the
construction of the Sri Ram Janmabhumi Mandir (temple) on the site of the
demolished Babri Masjid in Ayodhya.19
 RASHTRIYA SWAYAMSEVAK SANGH (THE NATIONAL VOLUNTEER ASSOCIATION, OR
RSS)
The RSS was founded in 1925 to work for India’s independence as a Hindu nation. It
maintains a national association that organizes Hindu youth and attempts to instill
mental and physical discipline in its members. The RSS is one of the oldest Hindu
nationalist groups in India and its former members have founded or led many allied
organizations, including the BJP and VHP. These latter two groups also look to RSS
leaders for legitimacy.20
H ISTORY OF THE K ASHMIR C ONFLICT
Violence in Jammu and Kashmir has dominated the terrorism component of Sunni
militancy in India for the past two decades. This violence is inextricably tied to the history
of India and Pakistan’s conflict over the disputed territory, which began shortly after
independence and is ongoing.
From the mid-nineteenth century through its disputed accession to independent India in
1947, Jammu and Kashmir was a “princely state”, meaning that its rulers enjoyed titular
autonomy from the British East India Company and Crown as long as they supported the
former’s interests in the territory. During this period, predominantly Muslim Jammu and
17
18
19
20
“Vajpayee Celebrates Narrow Victory,” Courier Mail (Australia), March 30, 1998, 14; “India Country
Profile,” BBC News, accessed October 6, 2010.
“Swagatam,” Vishwa Hindu Parishad, accessed November 18, 2010.
“Know About Shri Ram Janmabhumi Mandir,” Vishwa Hindu Parishad, accessed November 18, 2010.
“Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS),” Encyclopædia Brittanica Online, accessed November 18, 2010.
11 | P a g e
Kashmir was ruled by a dynasty of Hindu maharajas (kings), whose domestic reign relied
on severe repression of the majority population.21
Because of the territory’s autonomous status, the Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh,
had the opportunity to choose whether to accede to Pakistan or India at the time of
partition. The situation was complicated by the fact that the princely state’s population was
still majority Muslim and highly discriminated against.22 These demographic and political
factors suggest that a majority of the state’s population would have favored accession to
Pakistan; however, the situation was further complicated by the fact that Sheik Mohammad
Abdullah, the foremost leader of Kashmir’s anti-monarchy reform movement in the 1930s
and 1940s, favored the Indian National Congress over Pakistan’s Muslim League on the
larger question of independence from Britain and partition. The territory’s Muslim majority
was also concentrated in the Kashmir valley, while the sub-regions of Jammu and Ladakh
were and are majority Hindu and Buddhist, respectively.23
After a period of indecision, Singh ultimately decided on accession to India after thousands
of armed Pathans (Pashtuns) entered Kashmir from Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier
Province. Indian forces were airlifted into the state just before Pathan forces captured
Srinagar airport as there was no road from India to the Kashmir valley, and Abdullah
became premier of an Emergency Administration.
Nehru agreed in principle to a British stipulation that, because of the demographics, the
final question of Jammu and Kashmir’s status should be decided by plebiscite, once the
invaders were expelled;24 however, Indian and Pakistani leaders could not agree on the
terms of such a plebiscite, and went directly to war over the issue in 1948, with the
Pakistan retaining control over some territory in the eastern part of the contested state.
In 1953, Sheik Abdullah fell out of favor with the Congress government and was imprisoned
for twenty-two years. In 1975 he was released and his party, the National Conference went
on to win elections in 1977 and 1983, only to be removed from power again by another
Congress government. A subsequent agreement between the National Conference and New
Delhi led to the election of 1987, which was widely perceived as fraudulent. Outrage over
the election rigging initiated militancy in the state.25
W HY IS S UNNI M ILITANCY I MPORTANT ? T HE N ATIONAL C ONTEXT
Central to understanding any issue in India is the recognition of the fact that it is a large,
diverse, complicated country with an equally long and complex history. This is particularly
relevant when studying the Muslim population in India. The role of Sunni militancy in India
and its importance in the national context is manifested in two key components: 1) the
ways in which Sunni militancy affects the state’s view of its minority Muslim population;
21
22
23
24
25
Robert Huttenback, Kashmir and the British Raj 1847-1947 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 5-6.
Huttenback, 136-137, 161.
Huttenback, 151.
Huttenback, vii, 162-163.
Bose and Jalal, Modern South Asia, 226 and “Kashmir; A Rethink,” The Economist, 8 October 1994.
LexisNexis.
12 | P a g e
and 2) the extent to which the militant tactics of many Sunni militant groups can
undermine the liberalism of the Indian state.
The Indian state’s response to recent terrorist incidents can be understood through its
legislative actions. Both the Terrorist and Disruption Activities (Prevention) Act of 1985
(TADA) and the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002 (POTA) were measures passed in
reaction to major terrorist incidents, and both have since been repealed due to popular
dissent against their draconian nature. However, after the 2008 bombings and attacks in
Mumbai the 1967 Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) was amended to include
many of the provisions of POTA and TADA. The amendments include:







A vague definition of terrorism;
Expanded powers to ban organizations identified as terrorist;
The ability to prosecute suspected members of terrorist organizations on a
broad definition of membership, rather than on the basis of complicity in an
act of terrorism;
Provisions to grant security forces broad powers not authorized under the
Indian Criminal Code, giving the police the power to make arrests and
conduct searches and seizures based on “personal knowledge” of a
committed offense;
A provision for courts to double the maximum period of detention from 90 to
180 days without charge for terrorism suspects;
A provision requiring the denial of bail for anyone charged as a terrorist;
The automatic shift of the burden of proof to the accused to prove innocence
if the accused is found to be in possession of arms, explosives or other
specified items believed to be used in a committed offense or if fingerprints
or other definitive evidence suggesting involvement is found at the site or in
connection with anything used in the offense.26
The above amendments run counter to the Indian Criminal Code, general Indian law, and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. While the earlier repeal of both
TADA and POTA illustrates the extent of popular opposition to such explicit powers, the
amendments represent an attempt to reintegrate previously rejected provisions. The
amendments allow authorities to classify political opponents and opposition groups as
terrorist, limiting the right to assembly and the organizational capacity of groups,
particularly those associated with a minority position or population. There is also the
potential for prolonged pretrial detention, limitations on the right to a fair trial, and
wrongful prosecution. The amendments to UAPA clearly run counter to the liberal nature of
the Indian constitution and to the international treaties India is party to.
A 2011 Human Rights Watch report on the arbitrary detention and torture of terrorism
suspects in India depicts how the 2008 amendments to UAPA are representative of a larger
trend in India. Indian police are shown to have routinely taken action that extends beyond
the defined parameters of Indian law. For example, the report describes incidents of torture
and forced confessions in police custody, beatings in jail, the arrests of relatives to coerce
26
“The ‘Anti-Nationals’ Arbitrary Detention and Torture of Terrorism Suspects in India,” Human Rights
Watch, 2011.
13 | P a g e
surrenders or obtain information, extended stays in police custody beyond the proscribed
limit, mass arrests for questioning, and denial of access to lawyers and family members in
the aftermath of the 2008 bombings. The majority of these incidents were reported by
Muslims, targeted suspected members of Muslim militant groups, and focused on Muslim
communities.27 It is difficult to link the police response targeting Muslim communities and
the reports of police abuse to the actions of Sunni militant groups directly. However, it is not
difficult to surmise that the continued targeting of Muslim communities and an antiterrorism legal framework that facilitates that action will contribute to an increase in
tensions with India’s Muslim population, ultimately creating an environment where
militancy will remain and perhaps increase.
27
“The ‘Anti-Nationals’ Arbitrary Detention and Torture of Terrorism Suspects in India,” Human Rights
Watch, 2011.
14 | P a g e
4. TRENDS IN TERRORISM COMMITTED BY SUNNI GROUPS
The majority of Sunni militant groups profiled in this study have engaged in terrorism at
some point in their history. For many groups, terrorism appears to be the dominant form of
violent activity. Section 5 contains the profiles of the individual groups and details their
involvement in acts of terrorism. This section will discuss the more general trends we have
observed in the terrorism committed by Sunni militant groups.
We have used data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the Worldwide Incidents
Tracking System (WITS) to conduct our analysis. As discussed in the Methodology Section,
both GTD and WITS consist of terrorism incident records. GTD is based primarily on media
reports, while WITS relies on unspecified open sources. The databases each use different
definitions of terrorism, and their exact methodologies, while not entirely transparent,
appear to differ as well. GTD’s records only cover until 2008. The lack of GTD data for 1993
is due to the loss of the note-cards containing that data when the data was moved to a new
location. WITS did not begin compiling data until 2004. To gain a more complete picture of
Sunni terrorist incidents in India we used both databases. The differences between GTD
and WITS are substantial enough to generate significant discrepancies in incident and
casualty counts for the four years in which their coverage overlaps. As such, information
from each source is represented separately in the charts in this section.
Based on our analysis of the data, several characteristics of Sunni terrorism in India are
clear. First, Jammu and Kashmir dominates the phenomenon of Sunni militancy. When only
incidents with known perpetrators were considered, this state, which accounts for just
under one percent of India’s population,28 accounted for 78 percent of Sunni perpetrated
incidents listed in the GTD and 59 percent of deaths in such incidents. For WITS, 95 percent
of Sunni-perpetrated incidents occurred in Jammu and Kashmir, and 42 percent of victim
deaths in such incidents were attributable to the state (see Figure 6). The discrepancy
between the two datasets on Kashmir’s share of deaths in Sunni-perpetrated incidents may
be due to the fact that the WITS data covers a period when terrorism in Jammu in Kashmir
was declining and which included several highly lethal Sunni attacks in India’s large cities.
FIGURE 6. INCIDENTS AND DEATHS WITH KNOWN SUNNI PERPETRATORS
Percent of total Sunni-perpetrated incidents
that occurred in Jammu and Kashmir
Percent of total Sunni-perpetrated deaths
that occurred in Jammu and Kashmir
28
Census of India data, 2001.
GTD
WITS
78%
95%
59%
42%
15 | P a g e
Second, Sunni terrorism in India does not show a clearly increasing trend over the past few
years. Rather, the data shows two competing trends. On the one hand, Sunni terrorism in
Jammu and Kashmir has been declining, in terms of both incidents and deaths, since 2005
(see Figure 7). On the other hand, Sunni terrorism outside Jammu and Kashmir has been
marked by sporadic highly lethal attacks in India’s major cities since the early 1990s. Such
incidents are visible in the scatterplots (see Figure 8) as spikes in deaths in 1992, 2006 and
2008.
16 | P a g e
FIGURE 7. TERRORISM IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR 1988-2010
700
Inicidents and Deaths
600
GTD
Incidents
500
400
GTD
Deaths
300
WITS
Incidents
200
WITS
Deaths
100
0
1988
1993
1998
2003
2008
Year
Source: Global Terrorism Database and Worldwide Incident Tracking System
FIGURE 8. TERRORISM BY SUSPECTED SUNNI MILITANT GROUPS 1988-2010
900
800
GTD
Incidents
Incidents and Deaths
700
600
GTD
Deaths
500
WITS
Incidents
400
300
WITS
Deaths
200
100
0
1988
1993
1998
2003
Year
Source: Global Terrorism Database and Worldwide Incidents Tracking System
2008
17 | P a g e
5. PROFILES OF SUNNI MILITANT GROUPS IN INDIA
This section contains the Sunni militant group profiles organized geographically, because
regional context is an important factor in determining a group’s particular motivations and
organizational links. Within each region, the groups are ordered by importance. Table 3
summarizes the main profile components for each group, and the individual profiles follow.
Each profile starts with a paragraph in italics summarizing the team’s estimates of each
group’s: size, resources, mode of operation, capacity for violent action, means of mobilizing
support, recruitment strategy and recruitment base.
D EFINITIONS OF C ATEGORIES AND T ERMS
ALIASES – Alternate or front names for the group. Does not include instances of re-naming
or merging with other groups (see Predecessors and Successors).
IDEOLOGY/GOALS – The group’s ideology, terms include:
29

ISLAMIST
A generic term for groups which believe that social and political life should be
governed by some set of Islamic principles. Groups falling into this category may
be influenced by ostensibly competing schools of Islamism such as Maulana
Maududi’s modernism or Deobandi traditionalism.

MODERNIST
Groups that look to the Quran as the source of Islamic principles and minimize
the importance of Islamic Scholars and traditional Islamic thought, especially
those following the teachings of Maulana Sayyid Abu’l Al’a Maududi.

DEOBANDI
Groups that look to traditional Islamic scholarship to define Islamic principles.
Especially those associated with Pakistan’s Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam.29

FEMALE-FOCUSED
Refers to groups that are or were primarily concerned with the welfare, rights or
behavior of women.
Both the Deobandi groups profiled here and the JUiI in Pakistan form the politically active fringe of a
traditionalist Islamic reform movement that began among India’s Islamic scholars in the 19th century.
The movement focuses on close study of the hadith for revelation of religious truth, and its mainstream is
apolitical. During India’s independence movement a minority of Deobandi scholars became politically
engaged, supporting the Muslim League’s efforts to create Pakistan. Following partition and
independence, this minority faction became the JUiI, one of Pakistan’s smaller religious parties. Barbara
D. Metcalf, “’Traditionalist’ Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs,” Social Science Research
Council. After September 11th Archive, accessed February 21, 2011.
18 | P a g e

SEPARATIST
Indicates that the group desires some kind of increased autonomy for a region or
people, but not secession from India as such.

SECESSIONIST
Indicates that the group that seeks the secession of a particular territory from
the Republic of India.

SELF-DETERMINATION
Desires that the final status of Kashmir be determined by plebiscite, but does not
rhetorically favor a particular outcome.
ATTACKS – Has the group been blamed for specific acts of terrorism?
BANNED – Is the group banned by any State or Union Territory of India, the government of
Pakistan, or listed under one of the following instruments?




India’s Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967
Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of the European Union
U.S. Department of State’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations
U.S. Department of State’s Terrorist Exclusion List
19 | P a g e
FIGURE 9. OVERVIEW OF PROFILED GROUPS
ALIASES
DATE
FOUNDED
PREDECESSORS
IDEOLOGY
ATTACKS
BANNED
IM
1977
Jamaat-e-Islami
Hind, Jamaat-eIslami
Islamic revivalist
Yes
Indian
Government
2001
INDIAN MUJAHIDEEN
(IM)
n/a
First
claimed
attack in
2005
SIMI, Asif Reza
Commando Force
Islamist
Yes
Indian
Government
2010
ASIF REZA COMMANDO
FORCE (ARCF)
n/a
2001
HUJI
Islamist
Yes
No
GROUP NAME
ALL-INDIA GROUPS
STUDENTS ISLAMIC
MOVEMENT OF INDIA
(SIMI)
NORTHEAST INDIAN GROUPS
MUSLIM UNITED
LIBERATION TIGERS OF
ASSAM (MULTA)
n/a
1996
n/a
Separatist
No
No
MUSLIM UNITED
LIBERATION FRONT OF
ASSAM (MULFA)
n/a
1994
n/a
Separatist
n/a
No
PEOPLE’S UNITED
LIBERATION FRONT
(PULF)
n/a
1993 or
1995
n/a
Separatist
Yes
No
ISLAMIC LIBERATION
ARMY OF ASSAM (ILAA)
n/a
1993
n/a
Separatist
n/a
No
MUSLIM SECURITY
COUNCIL OF ASSAM
(MSCA)
n/a
n/a
n/a
Separatist
n/a
No
UNITED MUSLIM
LIBERATION FRONT OF
ASSAM (UMLFA)
n/a
Earliest
reference
2000
n/a
Separatist
No
No
ISLAMIC UNITED
REFORMATION PROTEST
OF INDIA (IURPI)
n/a
Earliest
reference
2004
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
MUSLIM VOLUNTEER
FORCE (MVF)
n/a
Earliest
reference
1998
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
20 | P a g e
GROUP NAME
ALIASES
DATE
FOUNDED
PREDECESSORS
IDEOLOGY
ATTACKS
BANNED
SOUTH INDIAN GROUPS
JIHAD COMMITTEE (JC)
All India
Jihad
Committee
1986
n/a
Islamist,
separatist
Yes
Tamil Nadu
State 1998
AL-UMMAH (AU)
n/a
1993
n/a
Islamist,
separatist
Yes
Tamil Nadu
State 1998
ISLAMIC DEFENSE
FORCE (IDF)
n/a
1997
n/a
Islamist,
separatist
Yes
No
ISLAMIC SEVAK SANGH
(ISS)
n/a
1990
n/a
Islamist
Yes
Indian
Government
1992
HuM,
Ansar ul-Islam
Islamist,
Deobandi,
separatist, proPakistan
Yes
US TEL
KASHMIR BASED GROUPS
JAMIAT-ULMUJAHIDEEN (JUM)
n/a
19901991
DUKHTARAN-E-MILLAT
(DEM)
Suspected
front for
Lashkar-eJabbar
1987
Jamaat-e-Islami
Islamist,
female-focused,
secessionist
Yes
No
BANAT-UL-ISLAM
(BUI)
n/a
mid1990s
Hizbul Mujahideen,
Jamaat-e-Islami
n/a
n/a
No
MUSLIM KHAWATEEN
MARKAZ (MKM)
Sometimes
also: Jammu
and Kashmir
Muslim
Khawateen
Markaz
n/a
Selfdetermination
for Jammu and
Kashmir, human
rights
No
No
1989
21 | P a g e
GROUP NAME
ALIASES
DATE
FOUNDED
PREDECESSORS
IDEOLOGY
ATTACKS
BANNED
Markaz Dawa ulIrshad
Ahle Hadith,
pro-Pakistan,
Kashmiri
successionist
Pakistani
government,
Indian
government,
US FTO
Yes
US FTO
2001;
Pakistani
Government
2002
PAKISTAN BASED GROUPS
LASHKAR-E-TAIBA
(LET)
Jamat udDawa,
Falah-eInsaniyat,
Tehrik-eTahafuz
Qibla Awal
JAISH-E-MOHAMMAD
(JEM)
Tehrik alFurqan,
Jamaat-eFurqa
Late
1980s or
early
1990s
2000
HuM
Deobandi
Anti-Shia,
Deobandi
Yes
Pakistani
Government
2001; US
FTO 2003
LASHKAR-E-JHANGVI
(LEJ)
n/a
mid-1990s
Sipah-e-Sahaba
Pakistan
ISLAMI INQILABI MAHAZ
(IIM)
n/a
1990s
n/a
Islamist
No
No
HARAKAT-ULMUJAHIDEEN (HUM)
Al Faran
1985
Harkat ul-Jihad-iIslami, Harkat ulAnsar
Pro-Pakistan,
Kashmiri
Secessionist
Yes
Indian
Government,
US FTO
22 | P a g e
A LL -I NDIA G ROUPS
The three groups profiled below are included in this section because neither their bases
nor operations are limited to a particular region of India. The groups also share close
organizational links. The Asif Reza Commando Force essentially became part of Indian
Mujahideen, and many of Indian Mujahideen’s members appear to have been drawn from
the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). The groups’ national presence is probably
due in large part to the nationwide support base that SIMI built prior to being banned in
2001.
These groups are also explicitly Islamist, rhetorically embracing the desire to see India
governed by Quranic principles, but are also highly motivated by anti-Muslim communal
violence in the country. These are the groups also support Pakistan-based groups in
executing attacks in major Indian cities (see Figure 10).
FIGURE 10. TERRORISM INCIDENTS AND DEATHS BY ALL-INDIA GROUPS
Incidents and Deaths
250
GTD
Incidents
200
WITS
Incidents
150
100
GTD Deaths
50
WITS Deaths
0
Year
Source: Global Terrorism Database and Worldwide Incidents Tracking System
23 | P a g e
STUDENTS ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF INDIA (SIMI)
Founded:
1977 by Mohammad Ahmadullah Siddiqi
Predecessors:
Jamiat-e-Islami Hind, Jamaat-e-Islami
Successors:
Indian Mujahideen30
Ideology:
Islamic revivalist
Key Personalities:
Mohammed Islam, Safdar Nagori, Shahid Badar Falah
Aliases:
Indian Mujahideen31
Links:
Lashkar-e Taiba, Jaish-e Mohammed
Attacks:
Yes (logistical assistance for LeT, IM attacks)
Bans:
Indian Government, 2001
Estimates of SIMI’s current resources cannot be made with any confidence. Several
hundred to several thousand former members dispersed around the country probably
remain willing to engage in militancy, based on pre-ban strength and recent government
reports, but overall level of organization probably low, given ban. The current MO is
logistical assistance to other groups, but given connections with IM and Pakistan-based
groups, capacity for at least low-lethality terror attacks is likely. Given the now
longstanding ban, mobilization of support probably relies on informal connections between
trusted members of the group, possibly in disparate sub-networks around India. Mass
mobilization very unlikely. Any recruitment strategy probably relies similarly on informal
connections made by former members.
According to two un-sourced think-tank profiles, the Students Islamic Movement of India
(SIMI) was founded in 1977 at Aligarh University by Mohammad Ahmadullah Siddiqi.32
SIMI was initially affiliated with Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, the independent, reorganized Indian
remnant of Mawlana Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi’s Jamaat-e-Islami, but split from the parent
group within its first few years.33 Ideologically, SIMI appears to have been influenced by
Mawdudi’s version of Islamic revivalism, which maintains that Quranic principles should
organize social and political life and minimizes the importance of the Ulema (Islamic
Scholars).34
According to an interview with a former SIMI member, the group’s early activities consisted
largely of efforts to spread revivalist ideology among India’s young Muslims, but that the
organization’s focus changed to countering the rhetoric and activities of rising Hindu
30
31
32
33
34
Some sources maintain that Indian Mujahideen (IM) is a SIMI front, while others say that IM is SIMI’s
militant wing, a now separate splinter group, or a separate body founded in part by former SIMI members
(see IM profile).
See note 27.
“Students Islamic Movement of India,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, Animesh Roul, “Students Islamic
Movement of India: A Profile,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 7 (2006).
Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996) and Roul, “Students Islamic Movement of India.”
Nasr, Mawdudi, 49-52, and Roul, “Students Islamic Movement of India.”
24 | P a g e
nationalist groups in the late 1980s.35 The oldest article in the LexisNexis database is a
1984 Associated Press report covering, in part, SIMI’s third all-India conference, where
revivalist rhetoric was reportedly mixed with anger over violence against the country’s
minorities. The conference was reportedly attended by 20,000 delegates, while the
organization claimed a total registered membership of 17,000 and a further 80,000
sympathizers and donors.36
The second-oldest article on SIMI in LexisNexis is a 1998 report on the Srikrishna
Commission, which investigated the Babri Masjid demolition and its aftermath and
concluded (five years after the fact) that SIMI’s efforts to counter Hindu nationalist
propaganda increased the level of communal violence in Mumbai following the demolition;
however, SIMI was not one of the five religious groups (both Muslim and Hindu) subjected
to a temporary Home Ministry ban during the 1992 violence.37
The exact nature of SIMI’s activities between 1992 and 1998 are not clear, but, based on
articles from 1999 and 2000, SIMI does appear to have become more militant, possibly
forging links with Pakistan-based militant groups. One news article from 1999 (during the
beginning of the Kargil conflict) lists SIMI as having rhetorically embraced violence as a
legitimate means for spreading Islam.38 According to a March 2000 article, SIMI made
efforts that month to impose a conservative dress code on Muslim women in the northern
city of Kanpur, through unspecified means.39 In March 2001, SIMI activists in Kanpur were
part of a riot that killed a district official. The impetus for the violence was an alleged Quran
burning by Hindu nationalists in Delhi.40 SIMI also began to rhetorically identify itself with
Al-Qaeda during this period. As early as October 2000, Safdar Nagori made public
statements questioning the labeling of Osama bin Laden as a terrorist, and following the
9/11 attacks, SIMI activists allegedly distributed bin Laden posters at several Indian
universities.41
SIMI’s first alleged connection to terrorism in the English-language media came in August
of 2000, when SIMI activists were linked to Independence Day terrorism in Uttar Pradesh,
though the exact nature of the link is unclear. Uttar Pradesh police blamed SIMI members
for planning bombings in Kanpur, Lucknow, Agra, and on several trains.42 Ten days earlier,
Agra city police had blamed one of the train bombings, which killed 10 people on a pair of
Kashmir-trained Indian militants with links to Hizbul Mujahideen and unspecified
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
“Seeds of Extremism is in Communal Riots: Sayeed Khan,” TwoCircles.net, accessed February 16, 2011.
“Mrs. Gandhi Says U.S. Base Poses Threat to Region,” The Associated Press, October 28, 1984. LexisNexis.
“Srikrishna Panel Nails Naik Govt, Hindutva Parties,” The Statesman, August 6, 1998. Lexis Nexis (ACC:
B0IIBKRAFKWR) and Sanjoy Hazarika, “India Issues a Ban on Five Rival Groups,” The New York Times,
December 11, 1992.
“India- RS Meet Will Only Help Enemy- CM,” The Hindu, June 23, 1999. LexisNexis.
Rahul Bedi, “Girls Beaten For Defying Dress Codes, The New Zealand Herald, March 22, 2000.
LexisNexis.
Indranil Singh, “10 Die in India Security Clashes,” Associated Press Online, March 17, 2001 and “ADM
Among 6 Killed in Kanpur,” The Statesman, March 16, 2001. LexisNexis.
“SIMI Terms Jammu and Kashmir a ‘Vexed’ Issue,” The Press Trust of India, October 12, 2000 and “Govt
Bans SIMI, Sets Off Violent Protests in Lucknow, 3 Dead,” The Press Trust of India, September 27, 2001.
LexisNexis.
“SIMI Planned Bomb Blasts in UP: Police,” The Press Trust of India, September 14, 2000.
25 | P a g e
connections to SIMI.43 A third report listed the two arrestees as being actual SIMI
members.44 This apparent uncertainty over the group’s links to the attacks may explain
why the group was not banned, either in Uttar Pradesh, or by the BJP-controlled central
government, despite calls to do so by several organizations.45 Politicians’ fears of alienating
Uttar Pradesh’s large Muslim population may also have played a role.46
The Global Terrorism Database first lists SIMI as a suspected perpetrator of terrorism in a
non-lethal August 2001 Independence Day attack that wounded two people.47 On
September 27 of that year, SIMI was banned under India’s Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act of 1967 for engaging in anti-national activities, presumably including the two alleged
terror attacks and other forms of militancy.48 Following the ban, SIMI activists’ alleged
involvement in terrorism increased dramatically; the GTD records contain 11 such
incidents between the ban and 2008 (the last year covered in the GTD’s records for India).
Five of the incidents resulted in fatalities, of which there were 87 total. Lashkar-e-Taiba is
also listed as a perpetrator in all of the lethal incidents. Indian Mujahideen is also listed as a
suspected perpetrator in three lethal incidents and four non-lethal. In the worst incident
specified, the August 2003 Gateway of India bombings in Mumbai, LeT operatives are
recorded as having actually detonated the explosives. The GTD was also unable to confirm
that SIMI has ever claimed responsibility for an incident of terrorism.49 The Worldwide
Incidents Tracking System (WITS), which covers 2004-2010, includes an additional four
incidents in which SIMI is listed as a potential perpetrator. In one, the 2006 Mumbai train
bombings, SIMI’s claim of responsibility is considered spurious (LeT is widely believed
responsible), in two others, accounting for a total of three fatalities, SIMI’s involvement is
speculative, and in the final incident, which killed 31, SIMI is listed as having assisted the
primary perpetrator, LeT.50
These incident reports suggest a strong link to Lashkar-e Taiba. The South Asia Terrorism
Portal, which does not specify sources, corroborates this connection and alleges others,
with Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami, and the group’s branches in Bangladesh and Nepal, Hizbul
Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammed, HuJI-Bangladesh, and the ISI. The nature of the links is not
specified. SATP also believes that SIMI receives funding from the Riyadh-based World
Assembly of Muslim Youth and Kuwait-based International Islamic Federation of Students’
Organizations.51
Despite the 2001 ban SIMI has apparently retained at least some minimal level of
organization. SIMI leader Safdar Nagori was only arrested in 2008 and India’s Ministry of
Home Affairs was concerned about the group’s reorganization efforts as recently as March
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
“Two Former AMU Students Arrested in Connection with Blasts,” The Press Trust of India, September 5,
2000.
“UP Govt Considering Imposing Ban on SIMI,” The Press Trust of India, September 9, 2000.
“VHP Demands Ban on SIMI, Jamaat,” The Press Trust of India, October 3, 2000 and “UP BJP for Ban on
SIMI,” The Press Trust of India, September 22, 2000.
Aman Sharma, “SIMI Banned Till ‘12 Though UP Stays Mum,” Mail Today, August 4, 2010.
Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed November 18, 2010.
“SIMI Banned, Hundreds Nabbed,” The Press Trust of India, September 27, 2010, and Utkarsh Anand.
“Delhi HC Tribunal Upholds Ban on SIMI,” Indian Express, August 4, 2010
Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed November 18, 2010.
WITS, (ICN: 200693218, 200693769, 200808439, 200910944) accessed March 6, 2011.
“SIMI,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, accessed November 18, 2010.
26 | P a g e
2, 2011.52 Multiple media and police sources indicate that SIMI members were
instrumental in the founding of Indian Mujahideen, sometime before 2008, and other
reports maintain that SIMI has provided IM with logistical support in many of its terror
attacks.53 SIMI itself is not listed as a terrorist group by the European Union or U.S.
Department of State.54
While SIMI’s ability to mobilize large numbers of supporters was once significant, the
central government ban appears to have severely reduced its organizational capacity.
Nevertheless, SIMI’s current and former membership will remain a recruiting pool for other
Sunni militant groups in India and a base of support for Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups
that seek to operate there.
52
53
54
“Top SIMI Leaders held in Indore,” Hindustan Times, March 27, 2008 and “After MHA Alert, States Hunt for
80 SIMI Men,” Indian Express, March 2, 2011. LexisNexis.
Utkarsh, “Delhi HC tribunal upholds ban on SIMI.”
“Terrorist Designation Lists,” U.S. Department of State, accessed November 18, 2010; and “Council Decision
2010/386/CFSP,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010.
27 | P a g e
INDIAN MUJAHIDEEN (IM)
Founded:
Approximately 2005
Predecessors:
SIMI, Asif Reza Commando Force
Successors:
n/a
Ideology:
Islamist
Key Personalities:
Amir Reza Khan, Riyaz Shahbandri, Abdul Subhan Qureshi
Aliases:
n/a
Links:
ISI, Lashkar-e Taiba
Attacks:
Yes (bombings, approximately 180 killed)
Bans:
Indian Government 2010
IM’s size is probably in the hundreds, including members drawn from other groups. Its resource
pool is potentially quite large given LeT connection. IM’s MO includes: terrorism, low and
medium lethality bombings against civilian, including Western, targets. The capacity to carry out
high-lethality attacks is likely, given past actions. IM mobilizes support from the SIMI network
and Pakistan and Bangladesh-based groups. The recruitment strategy is unknown but
recruitment base includes former SIMI members, possibly Bengali-speaking.
Indian Mujahideen’s (IM) exact origins are obscure. The organization first came into the
public view when it claimed responsibility for a series of bomb blasts in September 2008;55
however, the organization has subsequently been blamed for earlier attacks, starting with a
February 2005 Varanasi that injured eight.56 Most Indian police agencies, newspapers, and
think tanks now believe that IM is intimately connected with SIMI, though the exact
relationship is disputed. The SATP considers IM to be a SIMI front group, while others say
that IM is SIMI’s militant wing, a now separate splinter group, or a separate body founded
in part by former SIMI members.57
According to an unattributed report in The Economic Times, the pressure of the 2001
Central Government ban exacerbated tensions between radical and moderate SIMI factions,
creating an internal crisis which came to a head following the post-Godhra riots in
Gujarat.58 According to this narrative, the radical wing of SIMI was led by Safdar Nagori,
who oversaw the ISI and LeT-supported founding of IM by Amir Reza Khan, Riyaz
Shahbandri and Abdul Subhan Qureshi. The connection with Amir Reza Khan led Delhi antiterror police to suspect, as of September 2008, that the IM was a renamed Asif Reza
55
56
57
58
Phil Hazlewood, “India Blast Was ‘Terrorist Attack’: Police,” Agence France Presse, September 30, 2008.
LexisNexis.
“IM Declared a Terror Outfit,” The Statesman, June 4, 2010.
“E-mail Threatening Delhi Attacks Traced to Mumbai’s Borivali Area,” Asian News International, September
21, 2010; and “Students Islamic Movement of India, (SIMI),” South Asia Terrorism Portal, accessed
November 18, 2010.
“Indian Mujahideen Declared Terror Unit,” The Economic Times, June 5, 2010.
28 | P a g e
Commando Force, which had reportedly ceased operations after the 2002 arrest of Aftab
Ansari, one of its senior leaders.59
Direct information on IM’s ideology is not available in open sources, but the Economic
Times report indicates that many of its initial members were Kashmiri students studying at
Deobandi madrassas in South Gujarat.60 Assuming that IM’s connection with SIMI is real,
the group’s leaders are likely to have been influenced by the thought of modernist Islamic
revivalist Mawlana Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi as well. The fact Deobandism is a movement
of the Ulema should place it in conflict with Mawdudi’s anti-clericalism (see SIMI profile),
suggesting that IM ascribes to a more generic form of Islamism that accommodates these
two competing ideologies.
IM emails sent to TV stations minutes before the September 2008 bombings in Delhi
indicated that the attacks were revenge for the Babri Masjid demolition.61 Similar email
messages sent before the 2007 bombings in Varanasi, Faizabad, and Lucknow cited the
post-Godhra anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat as motivation.62
As of June 2010, anonymous Home Ministry officials maintained that IM had been involved
in 10 bombings across India, killing several hundred people.63 The Global Terrorism
Database lists IM as a suspect in seven incidents of terrorism, all in 2008 (the last year of
data available under the GTD), accounting for only 24 fatalities.64 The Worldwide Incidents
Tracking System lists IM as a suspected perpetrator in only four incidents that year, but
those incidents killed 151 people. WITS also lists a division of IM as claiming joint
responsibility with a division of LeT for the September 2010 German Bakery attack in
Pune.65 This attack is significant because, like the 2008 Mumbai shootings, it targeted a
facility frequented by Westerners. Ilyas Kashmiri, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated Pakistan-based
militant leader purportedly implied his organization’s involvement in the attack in an email,
without directly claiming responsibility.66
According to newspaper reports, on June 4, 2010 the Indian Government banned IM as a
terrorist organization under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967.67 The group
is not listed as a terrorist group by the European Union or U.S. Department of State (FTO or
TEL).68 Anonymous Indian Home Ministry officials have stated that IM is under direct ISI
control.69
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
“Is Indian Mujahideen Actually the Asif Reza Commando Force?,” Indian Express, September 30, 2008.
“Indian Mujahideen Declared Terror Unit,” The Economic Times.
Rahul Bedi, “Police Raids Lead to Arrests in New Delhi Bombings,” The Irish Times, September 15, 2008.
“Gujarat Constant, Kashmir New in IM Mails,” Indian Express, September 22, 2010.
“IM Declared a Terror Outfit,” The Statesman.
Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed November 18, 2010.
WITS also lists IM as claiming responsibility for a 2008 series of bombings in Assam, but suggests the
claim is spurious. WITS, (ICN: 200715490, 200806036, 200808449, 200810255, 200810972, 201005732,
201014504), accessed March 8, 2011.
“Ilyas Kashmiri Warns Sportspersons Against Visiting India,” The Press Trust of India, February 16, 2010.
LexisNexis.
“IM Declared a Terror Outfit,” The Statesman.
“Terrorist Designation Lists,” U.S. Department of State, accessed November 18, 2010; and”Council Decision
2010/386/CFSP of 12 July 2010,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010.
“IM Declared a Terror Outfit,” The Statesman.
29 | P a g e
ASIF REZA COMMANDO FORCE (ARCF)
Founded:
2001
Predecessors:
HUJI
Successors:
Indian Mujahideen
Ideology:
Islamist
Key Personalities:
Amir Reza Khan, Aftab Ansari
Aliases:
n/a
Links:
HUJI
Attacks:
Yes (one only, shooting at American Center, Kolkata)
Bans:
No
ARCF is defunct and believed to be part of IM. The sole independent ARCF attack targeted
an U.S. Consular facility.
Created with the help of HUJI in 2001, the Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF) was a small
India-based Sunni militant group that was only active under the ARCF name in late 2001
and early 2002. The group had three primary figures: Aftab Ansari and two brothers, Asif
and Amir Reza Khan.70 In October 2001, while the group was still being formed, Asif Reza
Khan was killed by Indian security forces during a prison escape attempt, giving the group
its name.71
The ARCF’s only known activity was the January 2002 shooting of police officers at the
American Center (part of the U.S. Consulate) in Kolkata.72 Around the same time, Ansari
was arrested, leaving Amir to assume control.73 The group was never active again, however,
and Amir reportedly went on to co-found Indian Mujahideen.74 One of the alleged shooters
in the American Center incident was also later associated with Indian Mujahideen,
suggesting that whatever assets ARCF had following the 2002 incident were folded into
IM.75 Early reports of the American Center incident indicated HUJI involvement in the
incident.76 HUJI’s leadership denied involvement, but, given the links between HUJI and
ARCF’s leaders, the former may have been providing some logistical support.
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
Devesh K. Pandey, “Bangladesh Blasts Confirm a Suspicion,” The Hindu, August 24, 2005.
Pandey, “Bangladesh Blasts Confirm a Suspicion;” South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Asif Reza Commando
Force;” Vicky Nanjappa, “Gujurat-born Amir Could be the Next Hafiz Saeed,” Rediff, March 3, 2010.
Madhuparna Das. “Eight Years After Terror Attack, Kolkata American Center Loses Its Barricades,” Indian
Express, November 4, 2010 and Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.
Pandey, “Bangladesh Blasts Confirm a Suspicion.”
Chauhan, Neeraj. “Is Indian Mujahideen Actually the Asif Reza Commando Force?” Indian Express,
September 30, 2008.
“’02 US Centre Blast Accused is IM Founder: Police,” Hindustan Times, November 10, 2008.
“Shooting at American Center in Calcutta Leaves Four Dead, 20 Wounded,” The Associated Press, January
22, 2002. LexisNexis.
30 | P a g e
N ORTHEAST I NDIAN G ROUPS
Sunni militant groups in Northeast India have a common goal of greater independence for
Muslims in the region. Their tactics include armed attack, extortion, kidnapping,
manufacturing and smuggling of illegal weapons and explosives, and sale of illegal drugs.
However, the region’s level of violence is quite low (see Figure 12); only three people per
year were killed between 2005 and 2008, and no one has been killed since 2009. This small
number is surprising given that Northeast India is one of the country’s most violent
regions. Assam’s Home Ministry estimated that militants as a whole killed over 1,700
people in Assam alone between 2001 and July 2010.77
The Pakistani ISI has allegedly been supporting the region’s many small Sunni militant
groups with money and training and has also allegedly been attempting to organize them
under two umbrella organizations: the United Liberation Front of Seven Sisters (ULFSS),
which covers all seven states and union territories in the region, and the All Muslim United
Liberation Forum of Assam (AMULFA), which is subordinate to the former and includes
only Assam-based groups. However, neither of these coordinating bodies appears to have
any significant power. A number of media and government sources believe that the ISI also
supports several non-Sunni militant groups in the region, and that the relationship extends
to outright control in the case of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), one of the
larger and more deadly militant groups in the region.78 If this analysis is correct, the ISI
may be using the Northeast’s Sunni groups as revenue generating and supply bodies for
ULFA (see MULTA and MULFA profiles, below) and discouraging them from engaging in
terrorism.
77
78
“1549 Civilians, 205 Securitymen, 1,703 ultras killed during 2001-10,” Hindustan Times, July 12, 2010.
LexisNexis.
“Talking to ULFA,” The Statesman, July 10, 2005. LexisNexis (ACC A20050709108-BF62-GNW) and “ULFA
Has Links with ISI, Says Govt,” Indian Express, July 8, 2009.
31 | P a g e
FIGURE 12. TERRORISM INCIDENTS AND DEATHS BY NORTHEAST INDIAN GROUPS
Incidents and Deaths
5
4
GTD Incidents
3
WITS Incidents
2
GTD Deaths
WITS Deaths
1
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
0
Year
Source: Global Terrorism Database and Worldwide Incidents Tracking System79
79
WITS includes MULTA and PULF, GTD includes only PULF. All attacks from PULF, except one of MULTA.
32 | P a g e
MUSLIM UNITED LIBERATION TIGERS OF ASSAM (MULTA)
Founded:
1996
Predecessors:
n/a
Successors:
n/a
Ideology/Goals:
Greater Independence for Assamese Muslims
Key Personalities:
Abdur Rahman, Rustom Ali, Moon Chaudry, Nazrul Haque, Hussain
Mubarak
Aliases:
n/a
Links:
AMULFA, DGFI, HUJI-B, HuM, ISI, IURPI, JeI, NSCN-IM, SSP, ULFA,
ULFSS
Attacks:
No (Most MULTA cadres were arrested for illegal arms trade,
manufacture, and possession)80
Bans:
No
According to unsourced academic estimates, MULTA has approximately 1500 members.
MULTA’s resources are extortion, the manufacture and sale of illegal weapons, and the sale of
illegal drugs. Its MO includes: criminal enterprises, including weapons manufacture. The
capacity for low to medium-lethality armed attack is low given past criminal activities.81
MULTA’s means of mobilizing support and recruitment strategy are unknown and its recruitment
base is Northeast Indian Muslims.
Formed in 1996,82 the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) is the most
active of the roughly 15 Sunni militant groups in Northeast India.83 MULTA’s stated
objective is to fight for the “cause of Muslims” and to establish a “greater independent
Islamistan” for the Muslims of Assam, comprising the districts of Nagaon, Dhubri, Kamrup,
Karimganj, and Hailakandi.84 According to an anonymous security source, referenced by
80
81
82
83
84
For more details, see the chronology at the bottom of the “Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam
(MULTA)” in South Asia Terrorism Portal. The MULTA is reported to be responsible for kidnapping one
civilian and later killing him by unknown means in July, 2007. But this assassination has been the only
murder case so far which the MULTA allegedly committed.
MULTA has killed no one (or, possibly one person) over the past few years.
“Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA),” South Asia Terrorism Portal. In contrast, some
reports say that MULTA was formed in 1993, e.g. Jaideep Saikia, “Terror sans Frontiers: Islamic Militancy
in North East India,” ACDIS Occasional Paper series, (Champaign: Research of the Program in Arms
Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, 2003);
Renaud Egreteau, “Instability at the Gate: India’s Troubled Northeast and its External Connections,” CSH
Occasional Paper, No. 16 (2006), 83; and Ved Parakash, Terrorism in India’s North-East: a Gathering
Storm (Delhi: Singhal Print Media 2008), 179.
This number ranges from 11 to 22 depending on the source and which groups are considered active or
defunct.
“Muslim Terrorist Groups,” Assam Chronicle, March 15, 2010, and Parakash, Terrorism in India’s NorthEast, 179.
33 | P a g e
the SATP, as of July 25, 2010, the chairman of MULTA was Abdur Rahman, then residing in
Bangladesh.85
MULTA’s specific goals include:






Establishing a university for Islamic studies and a Muslim court in Assam;
Ensuring a 30-percent reservation for Muslims in government services and
educational institutions (this corresponds to Muslims’ share of the total state
population);86
Reserving seats in the Legislative Assembly for the Muslims of the Barak Valley
district;
Stopping the deletion of names of Muslims from the voters list;
Providing full protection to the lives and property of Muslims;
Ensuring the allotment of adequate funds for the maintenance of madrassas
and mosques.87
How MULTA plans to achieve these goals is not clear. According to a 2003 academic source,
MULTA finances its activities through extortion, the manufacture and sale of illegal
weapons, and the sale of illegal drugs.88 However, according to SATP, MULTA has no
activities beyond these fundraising efforts.89
Along these lines, despite MULTA’s widespread identification as a terrorist group, there are
essentially no accounts of MULTA committing acts of terrorism.90 WITS and SATP list
MULTA as having kidnapped and then killed a civilian in 2007; however, this was likely a
failed extortion attempt, whose primary purpose was revenue generation. The event is not
listed in the Global Terrorism Database, whose definition of terrorism excludes revenue
generation.91 The SATP also blames MULTA for the 2002 murder of the son of a local police
official, but leaves the event out of their list of incidents involving MULTA.92 The incident
does not appear in English-language news media or either of the databases.
In April 2000, then Chief Minister of Assam, Prafulla Kumar Mahanta, made a speech before
the State Assembly, where he presented undisclosed evidence that Pakistan’s ISI was
supporting and directing MULTA, along with other groups in the state .93 The SATP claims
that the ISI is providing training to MULTA and other groups in the Syleth district of
Bangladesh under the command of Rustom Ali, a former Pakistani Army officer.94
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
“MULTA,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
See Table 2, p. 2.
Saikia, “Terror sans Frontiers.”
Saikia, “Terror sans Frontiers,” Appendix One.
“MULTA,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
Ibid., and
The GTD’s definition of terrorism excludes criminal acts whose primary goal is raising revenue. Global
Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011, and WITS, (ICN: 200710513), accessed
February 19, 2011.
“MULTA,” SATP.
“India: Mahanta Presents Proof of ISI Mischief,” The Hindu, April 7, 2000.
“MULTA,” SATP.
34 | P a g e
Media reports indicate that MULTA is also linked to the Directorate General of Forces
Intelligence (DGFI), Bangladesh’s foreign intelligence agency.95 The report suggests that
MULTA is connected with terrorist groups, such as Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami- Bangladesh
(HUJI-B), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), the National Socialist Council
of Nagland-Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM), Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), and the Islamic United
Reformation Protest of India (IURPI).96 According to an Indian think-tank report, MULTA is
one of the main suppliers of weapons to the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA).97
According to one report from a U.S. academic research institute, MULTA had approximately
1,500 members as of 2003. Of these, 150 had reportedly been trained in Bangladesh and
Pakistan; however, the report does not specify the definition of membership, the nature of
the training, nor the source of the figures.98 The SATP lists MULTA’s strength as unknown,
but, according to one 2008 media report, 150 MULTA members were in Assam’s prisons as
of that date.99
According to anonymous security sources referenced by the SATP, as of July 25, 2010
MULTA was not very active.100 MULTA has not been banned by the Indian government and
is not on the FTO, TEL, or the EU list of terrorist organizations.101
Maloy Krishna Dhar, “Assam: The Bangla hand,” Rediff India Abroad, January 19, 2007.
“MULTA,” SATP.
97 Samir Kumar Das, “ULFA, Indo-Bangladesh Relations and Beyond,” Center for Security Analysis.
98 Saikia, “Terror sans Frontiers,” Appendix One.
99 “MULTA,” SATP, and “234 Ultras from Muslim Groups in Assam Jails,” Indian Express, April 2, 2008.
100 “MULTA,” SATP.
101 “Terrorist Designation Lists,” U.S. Department of State, and “Council Decision 2010/386/CFSP of 12 July
2010,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010.
95
96
35 | P a g e
MUSLIM UNITED LIBERATION FRONT OF ASSAM (MULFA)
Founded:
1994
Predecessors:
n/a
Successors:
n/a
Ideology/Goals:
Greater Independence for Assamese Muslims
Key Personalities:
Rustom Ali
Aliases:
n/a
Links:
AMULFA, DGFI, ISI, MULTA, ULFA, ULFSS
Attacks:
n/a
Bans:
No
MULFA is believed to be inactive.
Formed in 1994,102 the Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA) is one of the
approximately 15 Sunni militant groups operating in the state.103 Like MULTA, MULFA
demands the creation of a separate Muslim state, protection and preservation of Muslim
Personal Law and 30 percent reservation for Muslims in government services and
educational institutions.104
Like MULTA, MULFA is said to be part of the umbrella All-Muslim United Liberation Forum
of Assam (AMULFA- see regional overview) and the chief suppliers of arms for the United
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) through Bangladesh.105
MULFA is also connected with Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), which
reportedly trains its members. A newspaper report also indicates that MULFA receives
support from the Bangladeshi DGFI.106
The details of MULFA’s leadership, membership, strength, resources, and modus operandi
are unknown. MULFA is not listed in the Global Terrorism Database, and, according to
anonymous security sources referenced by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, as of July 25,
2010, MULFA was believed to be largely inactive.107 MULFA is not on the FTO, TEL, or EU
list of terrorist organizations.108
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
Parakash, Terrorism in India’s North-East, 180.
“MULTA,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
Parakash, Terrorism in India’s North-East, 180.
Samir Kumar Das, “ULFA, Indo-Bangladesh Relations and Beyond,” Center for Security Analysis.
Krishna Dhar. “Assam: The Bangla hand.”
Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011 and “MULTA,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
“Terrorist Designation Lists,” U.S. Department of State, and “Council Decision 2010/386/CFSP of 12 July
2010,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010.
36 | P a g e
PEOPLE’S UNITED LIBERATION FRONT (PULF)
Founded:
1993 or 1995
Predecessors:
n/a
Successors:
n/a
Ideology/Goals
Greater Independence for Muslims in Northeastern India
Key Personalities:
Home Secretary Raffisuddin (Former the Islamic National Front (INF)
chairman); Deputy Finance Secretary Mustaffa; Publicity Secretary
Seikh Sahid Ahmed; Assistant Publicity Secretary A.E. Quresh
Aliases:
n/a
Links:
ISI, MULTA, MULFA, NSCN-IM, LeT
Attacks:
Yes (12 killed since 2004)109
Bans:
No
PULF’s size isless than 150. Its resources are gained from extortion, ransom for kidnappings,
and smuggling of arms and explosives. PULF’s MO includes: low-lethality armed attack. The
capacity for medium-lethality armed attack is likely given past attacks. Means of mobilizing
support and recruitment strategy are not known. PULF’s recruitment base is Muslims in Manipur
and Assam.
Accounts differ as to the year (1993 or 1995) and details of the founding of the People’s
United Liberation Front (PULF).110 Nevertheless, it is the second most active Sunni militant
group in Northeast India, following MULTA.111 PULF merged with another Islamist outfit
operating in Manipur, the Islamic National Front (INF), on May 30, 2007, increasing PULF’s
tactical capabilities and strength by about 50 cadres.112 However, according to the South
Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) PULF has suffered from factionalism since the beginning of
that year. At least one group led by “Azad” is involved in narcotics trafficking outside the
control of PULF’s top leadership.”113 PULF’s membership is mainly drawn from the Muslim
community in Manipur and Assam.114
109
110
111
112
113
114
Author’s calculation based on the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS).
“People’s United Liberation Front” profile in South Asia Terrorism Portal states that PULF was founded in
1993 after a communal clash between the dominant Meiteis and the Pangals (Muslims in Manipur state)
over monetary transaction leading to approximately 150 deaths. In contrast, the Terrorist Organization
Profiles (TOPs) in the National Consortium for Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)
states that the PULF was formed in 1995, allegedly with arms and training supplied by the Naga
separatist National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM).
M. Amarjeet Singh points out that the most active among Sunni militant groups in Northeastern India are
the MULTA and the PULF. Considering MULTA’s large number of cadres and level of violence, the author
judged the PULF as the second most active Sunni militant group.
“Peole’s United Liberation Front,” South Asia Terrorism Portal. The INF was established in the 1980s and
its cadres were reportedly trained by the Kuki National Front (KNF) in the Churachandpur district.
Azad’s identity is not specified. “People’s United Liberation Front,” SATP.
The Times of India, “Excl: ISI-Manipur separatist group link exposed.”
37 | P a g e
PULF’s goal is to establish an independent Islamic state in Northeastern India for the sake
of the interest of the Pangals (Muslims in Manipur state), many of whom are migrants from
Bangladesh.115 PULF also envisions a society based on Islamic values. For this purpose,
PULF has banned the consumption of alcohol among Manipuri Muslims since 2004,
punished several people for peddling drugs, and asked Manipuri Muslims to wear
traditional Islamic attire.116
According to unspecified official sources referenced by the SATP, PULF is linked with
Pakistan’s ISI as well as other Sunni militant groups operating in India’s Northeast.117 Local
newspaper accounts corroborate the link; however, it is unclear if these reports are
independent of SATP’s official sources.118
Although PULF maintained close links with the NSCN-IM for arms and training in its
formative years, the extent of its linkages with the outfit at present is not known.119
In 2006, Delhi Police interrogation of several Manipuri LeT activists allegedly revealed a
link between an LeT module based in Bangladesh and PULF.120
PULF’s membership is reported to be less than 150.121 Armed attacks, extortion, ransom
for kidnappings, and smuggling of arms and explosives are PULF’s most common tactics.122
The primary targets of PULF are individuals representing the Indian government, Indian
security forces, and non-Muslim civilians in the area.123 The group is listed as a suspected
perpetrator in four incidents of terrorism in the Global Terrorism Database, resulting in 1
injury and no fatalities. All incidents occurred in Manipur, in 2008.124 According to WITS,
PULF is suspected of 35 incidents of terrorism, between 2005 and 2009, accounting for 14
fatalities.125
Although PULF possessed only rusty and locally-made weapons in its formative years, with
the help of NSCN-IM the PULF is reported to possess an unspecified number of AK-series
rifles, stun guns, and carbines.126
PULF's major area of operation is in Manipur, especially in the Imphal Valley and the hill
districts of Chandel, Thoubal (Lilong is its stronghold) and Churchandpur, though it has
also been active in the adjoining districts of Assam, Nagaland and Meghalaya.127 A local
newspaper reported that PULF has bases in the Barak Valley, Lakhimpur, Nagoan, and
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
Pathak Das, “Militancy in Manipur” and “PULF,” TOPs.
Singh, “The Emerging Islamic Militancy in North-East India.”
“People’s United Liberation Front” South Asia Terrorism Portal. In addition, a police report on December
24, 2006 says that the “PULF had tied up with the MULTA and MULFA, and extended its operation to
Barak Valley.” (“MULTA” South Asia Terrorism Portal.)
The Times of India, “Excl: ISI-Manipur separatist group link exposed.”
“People’s United Liberation Front,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
Singh, “The Attack on Migrants in Manipur.”
“People’s United Liberation Front,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
“PULF,” TOPs, and “People’s United Liberation Front,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
“PULF,” TOPs.
Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.
WITS, (Various ICN’s).
“People’s United Liberation Front,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
Singh, “The Emerging Islamic Militancy in North-East India.”
38 | P a g e
Barpeta in Assam, but as of December 2010, SATP considered PULF inactive in Assam but
active in Manipur.128 PULF is not on the FTO, TEL, or EU list of terrorist organizations.129
ISLAMIC LIBERATION ARMY OF ASSAM (ILAA)
Founded:
1993
Predecessors:
n/a
Successors:
n/a
Ideology/Goals
Greater Independence for Assamese Muslims
Key Personalities:
Arif Muhammad
Aliases:
n/a
Links:
n/a
Attacks:
n/a
Bans:
No
ILAA is believed to be inactive.
Formed in 1993, The Islamic Liberation Army of Assam (ILAA) is one of the lesser-known
Sunni militant groups in the state, and the South Asia Terrorism Portal considers it
inactive.130 Several English-language newspaper articles list the ILAA as one of the many
militant groups in Northeast India; however, details of the organization’s philosophy,
leadership, membership, strength, or resources are not known. ILAA is not on the FTO, TEL,
or EU lists of terrorist organizations, nor is it listed in the Global Terrorism Database.131
101 “Terrorist/Insurgent
129
130
131
Groups of Assam” and “Terrorist / Insurgent Groups of Manipur,” South Asia
Terrorism Portal.
“Terrorist Designation Lists,” U.S. Department of State, and “Council Decision 2010/386/CFSP of 12 July
2010,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010.
“Terrorist/Insurgent Groups of Assam,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011 and “Terrorist Designation Lists,” U.S.
Department of State, and “Council Decision 2010/386/CFSP of 12 July 2010,” Official Journal of the
European Union, July 13, 2010.
39 | P a g e
MUSLIM SECURITY COUNCIL OF ASSAM (MSCA)
Founded:
n/a
Predecessors:
n/a
Successors:
n/a
Ideology/Goals
Greater Independence for Assamese Muslims
Key Personalities:
n/a
Aliases:
n/a
Links:
n/a
Attacks:
n/a
Bans:
No
MSCA is believed to be inactive.
The Muslim Security Council of Assam (MSCA) is one of the lesser-known Sunni militant
groups in the state, and the South Asia Terrorism Portal considers it inactive.132 MSCA
appears to have sought greater independence for Muslims in the state.133 The date of
formation and the details of MSCA’s philosophy, goals, leadership, membership, strength,
resources, and modus operandi are unknown. MSCA is not on the FTO, TEL, or EU list of
terrorist organizations,134 and is not listed in the Global Terrorism Database.135
132
133
134
135
“Terrorist/Insurgent Groups of Assam,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
Nava Thakuria, “ISI in Northeast India,” Assam Times, December 30, 2007; and “ISI Spreads a Net in
Northeast India,” American Chronicle, January 29, 2008.
“Terrorist Designation Lists,” U.S. Department of State, and “Council Decision 2010/386/CFSP of 12 July
2010,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010.
Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.
40 | P a g e
UNITED MUSLIM LIBERATION FRONT OF ASSAM (UMLFA)
Founded:
Earliest reference 2000
Predecessors:
n/a
Successors:
n/a
Ideology/Goals
Greater Independence for Assamese Muslims
Key Personalities:
n/a
Aliases:
n/a
Links:
DGFI, ISI
Attacks:
n/a
Bans:
No
UMLFA is believed to be inactive.
The United Muslim Liberation Front of Assam (UMLFA) is one of the lesser-known Sunni
militant groups in the state, and the South Asia Terrorism Portal considers it inactive.136
Newspaper reports indicate that UMLFA received support from the Pakistani ISI and the
Bangladeshi DGFI.137 The details of UMLFA’s philosophy, goals, leadership, membership,
strength, resources, and modus operandi are unknown. UMLFA is not on the FTO, TEL, or
EU list of terrorist organizations,138 and is not listed in the Global Terrorism Database.139
136
137
138
139
“Terrorist/Insurgent Groups of Assam,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
M.V. Kamath, “Kohima to Kashmir: On the Terrorist Trail,” The Organiser, October 14, 2001; and Krishna
Dhar. “Assam: The Bangla hand.”
“Terrorist Designation Lists,” U.S. Department of State, and “Council Decision 2010/386/CFSP of 12 July
2010,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010.
Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.
41 | P a g e
ISLAMIC UNITED REFORMATION PROTEST OF INDIA (IURPI)
Founded:
Earliest reference 2004
Predecessors:
n/a
Successors:
n/a
Ideology/Goals:
n/a
Key Personalities:
n/a
Aliases:
n/a
IURPI is believed to be inactive.
The Islamic United Reformation Protest of India (IURPI) is one of the lesser-known Sunni
militant groups in Assam, and the South Asia Terrorism Portal considers it inactive.140 At
least one English-language Indian newspaper article mentions the organization in passing,
and two scholarly articles list it as one of roughly 15 Islamic militant groups in Northeast
India.141 According to available media reports and the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs
website (which was last updated in 2008) the IURPI is not banned under the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967, nor is it listed as a terrorist group by the EU or U.S.
Department of State.142 The group is also not listed as a perpetrator in the Global Terrorism
Database.143
“Terrorist/Insurgent Groups of Assam,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
“Another Conference Another Warning,” Indian Express, October 12, 2004; and Jaideep Saikia, “The ISI
Reaches East: Anatomy of a Conspiracy,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25: 3 (2002): 185-197; and Subir
Bhaumik, “Ethnicity, Ideology and Religion: Separatist Movements in India’s Northeast,” Religious Radicalism
and Security in South Asia (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), accessed November 29,
2010.
142 “Banned Organisations,” Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India , updated May 5, 2008; and “Terrorist
Designation Lists,” U.S. Department of State, and “Council Decision 2010/386/CFSP of 12 July 2010,” Official
Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010.
143 Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.
140
141
42 | P a g e
MUSLIM VOLUNTEER FORCE (MVF)
Founded:
Earliest reference 1998
Predecessors:
n/a
Successors:
n/a
Ideology/Goals:
n/a
Key Personalities:
n/a
Aliases:
n/a
MVF is believed to be inactive.
Publicly available information on the Muslim Volunteer Force (MVF) is extremely scarce
and the South Asia Terrorism Portal considers it inactive.144 India’s English-language media
made passing reference to the organization as early as December 1998,145 and a number of
subsequent newspaper articles list the MVF as one of the roughly 15 Muslim militant
organizations operating in Northeast India; however, no founding date is given for the
organization. According to several articles, the MVF’s operations are, or were, concentrated
in the Barpeta district of western Assam.146 As of April 2000, the state government of
Assam listed the MVF as one of eleven Muslim militant organizations through which
Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Directorate might foment unrest in Northeast India.147
According to available media reports and the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs website
(which was last updated in 2008) the MVF is not banned under the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act of 1967, nor is it listed as a terrorist group by the EU or U.S. Department of
State, nor is it listed in the Global Terrorism Database.148
“Terrorist/Insurgent Groups of Assam,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
“Ministry’s Paper Blames Poor Governance for N-E Militancy,” Hindustan Times, December 30, 1998.
146 “Assam’s Dark Day Reflects Siege Within,” The Statesman, October 31, 2008.
147 “India: Mahanta Presents Proof of ISI Mischief,” The Hindu, April 7, 2000.
148 “Banned Organisations,” Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India , updated: May 5, 2008, and “Terrorist
Designation Lists,” U.S. Department of State, “Council Decision 2010/386/CFSP of 12 July 2010,” Official
Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010, and Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17,
2011.
144
145
43 | P a g e
S OUTH I NDIAN G ROUPS
The major Sunni militant groups in the South Indian states of Tamil Nadu and Kerala
developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Their creation was a response to the growing
influence of Hindu nationalism and the increased presence of the RSS in the region.
Extremist, Islamist rhetoric and minor communal incidents of violence characterized the
early stages of Sunni resistance. The destruction of the Ayodhya mosque in 1992 galvanized
the increasingly radicalized minority. The Kerala based group, Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS),
played a leading role in the violence in the aftermath of the mosque’s destruction, resulting
in a ban by the Indian government and its dissolution.
Rallying around the mosque’s destruction, the leading militant groups in Tamil Nadu, alUmma and the Jihad Committee, increased their violent activity by inciting communal
violence and targeting the RSS and government offices they deemed complicit to RSS goals.
The violence peaked with the 1998 serial bombings in the Tamil Nadu city of Coimbatore
that resulted in over 70 deaths and over 200 injuries (see Figure 14). Al-Umma and the
Jihad Committee, credited with the bombings, were subsequently banned by the Tamil
Nadu state government. Investigations linked the former leader of the ISS, Abdul Nasser
Madani, to the bombings resulting in his arrest and a nine year incarceration before his
acquittal. The state response targeted the two groups and effectively broke apart their
leadership structure and capacity.
The state response to Sunni militancy in Southern India led to the dismantling of the major
militant groups in the region, and no major attacks have occurred since the 1998 bombings
and no new militant groups have established themselves. However, the underlying causes
that fueled al-Umma, the Jihad Committee, and the ISS remain present in both Kerala and
Tamil Nadu as seen in reports that link former ISS members to a 2008 bombing in
Bangalore, militant groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the claim that Kerala is becoming a
training ground for militants that support the violence in Kashmir. As long as the situation
in Kashmir remains unresolved and the communal strife between Muslims and Hindus
continues, there will remain a disaffected population within the Muslim community in
Southern India that will advocate a militant response both locally and nationally.
The three Tamil Nadu-based groups Jihad Committee, Al Ummah, and Islamic Defense Force
have been covered in one profile because their extremely close organizational and
operational linkages would have made separate profiles highly repetitive.
44 | P a g e
FIGURE 14. TERRORISM INCIDENTS AND DEATHS BY SOUTH INDIAN GROUPS
80
Incidents and Deaths
70
60
50
40
GTD Incidents
30
GTD Deaths
20
10
0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Year
Source: Global Terrorism Database. Worldwide Incidents Tracking System contained no such incidents 149
149
The deaths and incidents represented in the charts are not explicitly linked to either al-Umma or the Jihad
Committee in the GTD but are linked to Islamic militants
45 | P a g e
JIHAD COMMITTEE
Founded:
1986
Predecessors:
n/a
Successors:
n/a
Ideology/Goals:
Islamist, separatist,
Key Personalities:
Ahmed Ali (alias Palani Baba), Imam Ali, Hyder Ali
Aliases:
All India Jihad Committee
Links:
al-Ummah
Attacks:
Yes (bombings)
Bans:
Tamil Nadu State, 1998
AL-UMMAH
Founded:
1993
Predecessors:
n/a
Successors:
n/a
Ideology/Goals:
Islamist, separatist
Key Personalities:
Syed Ahmad (S.A.) Basha
Aliases:
n/a
Links:
Jihad Committee, Islamic Defense Force
Attacks:
Yes (bombings)
Bans:
Tamil Nadu State, 1998
46 | P a g e
ISLAMIC DEFENSE FORCE
Founded:
1997
Predecessors:
n/a
Successors:
n/a
Ideology/Goals:
Islamist, separatist
Key Personalities:
Mohammed (Erwadi) Kasim
Aliases:
n/a
Links:
al-Umma
Attacks:
Yes (bombings)
Bans:
n/a
Jihad Committee, Al-Ummah, and Islamic Defense Force believed defunct.
The Jihad Committee, Al-Ummah, and the Islamic Defense Force represent a contingent of
Islamic militant groups based in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu. While the three
groups have different leadership and varying levels of involvement in the sectarian violence
that developed in Tamil Nadu from the late 1980s through the 1990s, similar causes led to
their formation and adoption of militancy.
Prior to the 1980s, little to no sectarian violence and no noteworthy presence of Islamist
organizations existed in Tamil Nadu.150 The rise of Sunni militant groups in Tamil Nadu
coincided with the spread of Hindu nationalism. The conversion of Dalits (the lowest
members of the Hindu caste system) to Islam throughout the state in the early 1980s led to
increases in Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) activity and presence there.151
Throughout the 1980s, local and national Hindu leaders mobilized anti-Muslim sentiment
within Tamil Nadu152 in response to expanding sectarian tensions.
The Jihad Committee is believed to have been formed in 1986,153 and al-Ummah (though
not officially founded until 1993) can trace its origins to the early 1980s.154 Less is known
about the founding of the Islamic Defense Force, which appeared in 1997.155 The increase
in the occurrence and severity of violent acts perpetrated by Islamist groups in Tamil Nadu
is largely attributed to the destruction of the Babri Masjid (mosque) at Ayodhya.156
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
P.G. Rajamohan, “Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism,” South Asia Terrorism Portal:
Faultlines, 16 (2004).
Rupal Oza, “The Geography of Hindu Right-Wing Violence in India,” in Violent Geographies: Fear, Terror,
and Political Violence, eds. Derek Gregory and Allen Pred (New York: Routledge, 2007), 162.
P.G. Rajamohan, “Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism.”
“Jihad Committee Profile,” Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPS), START.
P.G. Rajamohan, “Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism.”
“Islamic Defense Force Profile,” TOPS.
P.G. Rajamohan, “Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism,” and “Masjid Demolition Caused
Backlash in Tamil Nadu,” The Hindu, May 12, 1998.
47 | P a g e
The leadership of al-Ummah, the Jihad Committee, and the Islamic Defense Force is
associated with different individuals. However, the sectarian violence that erupted in Tamil
Nadu in the 1990s is often sourced to all three organizations conjointly, illustrating the
close ties between them.
All three groups were motivated by a desire to protect Muslims and their interests from
Hindu forces that they perceive as predatory.157 Pursuit of their goals revolves around
attacks against Hindu nationalists and the state structures and institutions that are believed
to work towards Hindu nationalist ends.158
Leadership of the individual groups has been identified as follows:



al-Ummah: Syed Ahmad (S.A.) Basha, founder.159
Jihad Committee: Ahmed Ali (alias, Palani Baba), founder160 Imam Ali and Hyder
Ali, prominent members.161
Islamic Defense Force: Mohammed (Erwadi) Kasim, founder.162
The first major act of violence after the Babri Masjid destruction was the bombing of the
RSS office in Chennai. The bombing was reputedly carried out by al-Ummah under the
leadership of S.A. Basha,163 but it has also been attributed to the Jihad Committee, with
Imam Ali identified as critical to the planning and bomb making.164 The RSS office bombing
was followed by frequent acts of violence throughout the 1990s. During this time, alUmmah rose to prominence as the leading Islamist group in Tamil Nadu.165 Multiple violent
acts were attributed to al-Ummah during this time period, though none are listed in the
Global Terrorism Databse.166 The most prominent were:



An explosion at the Hindu-Munnani (Hindu extremist organization) office in
Chennai, April 1995.
A parcel bomb in Nagore, July 1995.
A petrol bomb attack on the office of the DIG of Prisons in the Central Jail in
Chennai, April 1996.
The most intense period of sectarian violence in Tamil Nadu lasted from late 1997, to
February 1998. The escalation began in November 1997, when a group of Muslim youths
killed a policeman in the city of Coimbatore. This event was followed by clashes between
Hindu and Muslim rioters. According to media sources, the Coimbatore police responded in
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
“Jihad Committee Profile,” TOPS.
“Jihad Committee Profile,” TOPS.
T.S. Subramanian, “Behind the Coimbatore Tragedy,” Frontline, March 7-20, 1998.
“Four Acquitted in RSS Blast,” The Statesman, June 22, 2007.
Ibid.
“Train Bomb Blast Chargesheet Filed,” The Hindu, July 24, 1998.
“The Rise and Fall of a Fundamentalist,” Indian Express, August 3, 2007.
“Four Acquitted in RSS Blast,” The Statesman, June 22, 2007; and Sayantan Chakravarty, “ISI: Terror’s
Hidden Face,” India Today, November 5, 2002.
P.G. Rajamohan, “Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism.”
Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.
48 | P a g e
openly an anti-Muslim manner, further exacerbating the violence.167 An Indian civil and
human rights organization report alleged that Hindu militants and a section of the
Coimbatore police made a coordinated attack on Muslim businesses causing the death of 18
people.168
The Islamic Defense Force is a minor group that emerged during this period of escalating
sectarian violence to carry out one terrorist attack. In December 1997, on the fifth
anniversary of the destruction of the Babri Masjid, a series of train bombings occurred
across Tamil Nadu. Pamphlets discovered by police after the fact named the Islamic Defense
Force in conjunction with one of the blasts. After investigation, police concluded that the
Islamic Defense Force was formed in conjunction with al-Ummah to carry out the train
bombings.169 The Islamic Defense Force has not been linked to any other incidents and was
a minor group, if indeed it ever existed separately from al-Ummah.170
The violence peaked on February 14, 1998 a series of 13 to 19 separate bombings
(according to various accounts) occurred in Coimbatore. Investigations and arrests linked
al-Ummah and the Jihad Committee to the bombings, which resulted in around 70 deaths
and over 200 injured.171 In response to the bombings, both al-Ummah and the Jihad
Committee were banned by the state of Tamil Nadu.172 The lethality of the bombs led to an
aggressive response by the Tamil Nadu Police and the creation of a special investigation
team to combat religious fundamentalists. Al-Ummah, the Jihad Committee, and the Islamic
Defense Force were all successfully suppressed by this police body.173
According to media sources, all three groups have been largely inactive since the 1998
Coimbatore bombings, with most of their leadership either dead or in prison.174 As such,
Sunni militancy in Tamil Nadu appears to have been contained; nevertheless, a major
national or South-Indian anti-Muslim incident could lead to a resurgence of such activity in
the region in the future.175
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
“Coimbatore in Focus,” The Hindu, February 24, 1998.
People’s Union for Civil Liberties report, referenced in T.S. Subramanian, “Behind the Coimbatore
Tragedy.”
“Al-Uma Behind Train Blasts?” The Hindu, December 12, 1997.
“Islamic Defense Force Profile,” TOPS.
K.P.S. Gil and Ajai Sahni, “Extremist Islamist Terror and Subversion in South Asia,” in Muhammad’s
Monsters: A Comprehensive Guide to Radical Islam for Western Audiences , ed. David Bukay (Green
Forest, AR: Galfour, 2004), 176 and T.S. Subramanian, “Behind the Coimbatore Tragedy.”
“Fresh Blasts Rock Coimbatore, Toll Rises to 87,” The Statesman, February 15, 1998.
Tamil Nadu Police Department, “Policy Note 2006-07, Demand no. 22, Ch. 9: Special Units in Tamil Nadu
Police.”
“Four Acquitted in RSS Blast,” The Statesmen, June 22, 2007; and “Al-Umma a Feared Outfit of the 1990s,”
Indo-Asian News Service, August 1, 2007.
P.G. Rajamohan, “Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism,” and “Jihad Committee Profile,” TOPS.
49 | P a g e
ISLAMIC SEVAK SANGH (ISS)
Founded:
1990
Predecessors:
n/a
Successors:
People’s Democratic Party (PDP)
Ideology:
Islamist
Key Personalities:
Abdul Nasser Madani
Aliases:
n/a
Links:
SIMI, National Democratic Front, Lashkar-e Taiba
Attacks:
No (primary activity: mass-mobilizations)
Bans:
Indian Government, 1992
ISS is believed to be defunct, but former members may serve as a recruiting and support
network for SIMI, IM (by extension) and LeT.
Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS) was founded in 1990 by Abdul Nasser Madani in the state of
Kerala.176 The ISS was formed to counter the growing RSS influence in the region.177 Led by
Madani’s extremist rhetoric of, the ISS developed into a militant pan-Islamic group.178 The
ISS was banned in 1992 by the Ministry of Home Affairs for its role in the violence in the
aftermath of the Ayodhya mosque destruction.179 Following the ban, Madani dissolved the
ISS and established the People’s Democratic Party (PDP).
Since its inception, Madani has claimed that the PDP does not support militancy or violence
and he has attempted to gain political legitimacy by building ties with the leading political
coalition in Kerala. PDP’s political success and Madani’s claim to be a reformed radical have
both been affected by accusations of ongoing involvement in terrorism.180
Madani was arrested in 1998 for his alleged involvement in the Coimbatore bombings (see
Tamil Nadu group profiles above) and held in a Coimbatore jail until his acquittal in 2007.
He was subsequently implicated in a series of LeT-perpetrated bombings in Bangalore in
July 2008, though he was not arrested until August 2010.181
176
177
178
179
180
181
“Bus hijacked, torched in Kerala in bid to free Islamic extremist,” Indian Express, September 11, 2005.
Sanjoy Hazarika, “India Issues a Ban on Five Rival Groups,” New York Times, December 11, 1992.
“Bus hijacked, torched in Kerala in bid to free Islamic extremist,” Indian Express, September 11, 2005
Hazarika, “India Issues a Ban.”
Shaju Philip, “Terror ties come back to haunt Madhani,” Indian Express, December 20, 2009.
“Kerala cannot shirk responsibility in Bangalore blasts,” Indo-Asian News Service, December 7, 2009 and
“Former Madhani follower is now terror accused,” Indian Express, December 1, 2009, and TA Johnson,
“Based on Nasir’s statements, cops to probe Madani LeT links,” Indian Express, August 18, 2010.
50 | P a g e
The ISS, despite its formal dissolution and Madani’s claim to political legitimacy and nonviolence, has left a network of former members with links to SIMI and Lashkar-e-Taiba182
and a radicalized group of militants linked to attacks throughout India.
182
“Madani has confessed hand in Bangalore IPL venue blasts: Minister,” Times of India, August 25, 2010 and
A. Vinod Kumar, “Kerala’s Emergence as a Terror Hub: Repeated Warnings Ignored,” Institute for Defense
Studies and Analyses Comment, November 11, 2008.
51 | P a g e
K ASHMIRI G ROUPS
The defining moment in the rise of terrorism in Kashmir was the alleged manipulation of
the results of India’s 1987 State Assembly elections, which gave rise to a domestic
secessionist insurgency and an allied political movement. Pakistan soon became involved,
covertly supporting Indian and Pakistani terrorist groups and the importation of Pakistani
Mujahideen returning from the Soviet conflict in Afghanistan. The peak of political
organization in Kashmir occurred during the 1990s, when a number of new groups formed
and articulated secessionist aims.
Kashmir is one of the most violent regions of India, plagued by frequent, low-level terrorist
attacks and periodic outbursts of political violence. The types of actions perpetrated vary
by group and range from grenade attacks and suicide bombings to acid attacks and the
defacement of property, with Pakistan-based groups generally mobilizing heavier
weaponry and causing higher casualties per incident.
Kashmiri groups tend to espouse one or more of the following goals: increased autonomy
or self-determination for Kashmir, a reunion with Pakistan-administered Kashmir and
accession to the Pakistani state, and/or membership in the global Islamic community and a
transnational Islamic state. Some groups encourage accession to Pakistan as an
intermediate goal to attaining the latter objective.
By the mid-1990s, militancy in Kashmir came to be dominated by well-equipped Pakistanbased organizations that have used Kashmir as a rallying point for broader domestic and
transnational ambitions and espouse extremist religious rhetoric.183 Sunni militant
organizations are essentially divided into well-organized and smaller homegrown
independence movements that focus more on the human side of the conflict, including
several women’s movements working to support the families of martyrs and advocating the
“rights” of female Kashmiri Muslims, which are often articulated to include freedom from
the abuses of Indian occupation. Many of the more moderate groups have been coordinated
under the political banner of the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference, and demonstrations by
domestic groups against Indian rule over Kashmir continue.
Pakistani support for Kashmiri separatists has led to the escalation of tensions between
India and Pakistan and the occasional exchange of fire across their common border.
Nevertheless, this support has waned somewhat in recent years, either because Pakistanbased groups have turned to domestic activities or Pakistan’s government is reining in its
proxies.184 In 2008, the conflict death toll was at its lowest point since 1989 (see Figure
16), leading some analysts to argue that the conflict had begun to take on a fundamentally
more peaceful tone.185
183
184
185
Peter Chalk. “Pakistan’s Role in the Kashmir Insurgency,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Rand Corporation,
September 1, 2001 and “Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front,” SATP, accessed March 8, 2011.
Jamal Afridi. “Kashmir Militant Extremists,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 9, 2009.
Yaroslav Trofimov. “A New Tack in Kashmir: Peaceful Protest Gains in Separatist Fight,” The Wall Street
Journal, December 15, 2008.
52 | P a g e
FIGURE 16. TERRORISM INCIDENTS AND DEATHS BY KASHMIRI GROUPS
Incidents and Deaths
60
50
40
GTD Incidents
WITS Incidents
30
GTD Deaths
20
WITS Deaths
10
0
Year
Source: Global Terrorism Database and Worldwide Incidents Tracking System 186
186
GTD includes attacks with DeM-front Lashkar-e-Jabbar's involvement suspected. All attacks from JuM,
except one of DeM in WITS.
53 | P a g e
JAMIAT-UL-MUJAHEDIN (JUM)
Founded:
1990-1991 by Hilal Ahmed Mir (alias Nasir ul-Islam)
Predecessors:
HuM, Ansar ul-Islam (“Helpers of Islam”)
Successors:
n/a
Ideology/Goals:
Islamist, Deobandi, secessionist, pro-Pakistan
Key Personalities:
Hilal Ahmed Mir, Ghulam Rasool Shah (alias General
Abdullah/Mohammad Ramzan Sofi), Sheikh Abdul Basit, Mohammed
Salah
Aliases:
n/a
Links:
DeM, LeT
Attacks:
Yes (suicide bombings, armed attacks)
Bans:
Terrorist Exclusion List
JuM’s size is probably between tens and several hundred and it resources are unknown. JUM’s
MO includes: low-lethality explosive and armed attacks. The capacity to execute mediumlethality attacks is likely based on JUM’s history. JUM’s support and recruitment base is
increasingly in Pakistan.
Jamiat-ul-Mujahedin is believed to be a descendant of Ansar ul-Islam, a group formed in the
1980s by Hilal Ahmed Mir. Ansar ul-Islam was a militant Islamic group that strove to turn
the largely secular Kashmiri separatist movement into a religious one. Ansar ul-Islam was
succeeded by Hizb-ul-Mujahideen in 1989, but after a split in the group Mir’s supporters
went on to form JuM. Mir was succeeded by Ghulam Rasool Shah (alias General
Abdullah/Mohammad Ramzan Sofi).187 Other prominent leaders include Chief Sheikh
Abdul Basit and Mohammed Salah.
JuM is one of the most hard-line Kashmiri militant organizations. It does not support
negotiations over Kashmir and it actively tries to obstruct the political process. As a result,
JuM frequently clashes with groups like the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference over their more
moderate positions on a political solution to the Kashmir problem.188 Nevertheless, JuM’s
inflexibility and its unwavering hostility towards India seem to appeal to extremist
elements of the pro-Pakistan movement in Kashmir.189 There is evidence of cooperation
between JuM and LeT.190
Tactically, JuM favors high-profile, though not necessarily high-lethality, suicide attacks. For
example, at the beginning of this year two operatives launched a midday attack in central
187
188
189
190
Charlotte Fleishman, “In the Spotlight: Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JuM),” Center for Defense Information, April
4, 2005, “Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, and Arif Jamal, “A Guide to Militant Groups
in Kashmir,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 5 (February 4, 2010)
“Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
“Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen Claims Responsibility for Lal Chowk Attack,” Daily News and Analysis, January 6,
2010; and Fleishman, “In the Spotlight.”
Arif Jamal, “A Guide to Militant Groups in Kashmir,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 5 (February 4, 2010).
54 | P a g e
Srinagar, throwing grenades and firing indiscriminately at civilians before occupying the
Punjab Hotel.191 The siege lasted for 23 hours before the militants were killed by security
forces; the death toll also included one civilian and one policeman.192 In another incident in
1997, JuM detonated a bomb in a rickshaw approaching the Jammu and Kashmir Chief
Minister’s house, wounding ten and killing four.193
Nevertheless, in recent years JuM’s authority has been waning. The group’s cavalier attitude
towards civilian deaths has led to a decline in its local popularity,194 and a wave of arrests
in 2003 targeted several of the group’s key members.195 The organization has been forced
to rely increasingly on Pakistani recruits,196 a marked change from its initial Kashmiri-only
policy.197 While some sources claim that JuM’s membership numbers in the hundreds,
others estimate that it is far smaller.198
JuM is listed as a suspected perpetrator by the Global Terrorism Database in 17 incidents of
terrorism between 1996 and 2006, resulting in 92 deaths. Four of the attacks used firearms
exclusively, while the rest involved explosives of some kind. All incidents occurred in Jammu
and Kashmir, and all but three listed other groups as suspects, including Jaish-e-Mohamad,
Lashkar-e-Taiba, Al-Mansoorian, and Tehreek-e-Jihad-e-Islami and Harkat ul Jihad eIslami.199
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
“Srinagar Gunbattle: JUM Claims Responsibility, 100 Evacuated,” The Times of India, January 6, 2010.
“Lal Chowk Siege Ends After 23 Hours, 4 Killed,” Kashmir Press Service, January 7, 2010.
Fleishman, “In the Spotlight.”
Fleishman, “In the Spotlight.”
Anupama Airy, “J-K Police Claim to Have Neutralized Jamiat-el-Mujahideen,” Express India, February 8,
2003.
“Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
“Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
Jamal, “A Guide to Militant Groups in Kashmir;” “Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.
55 | P a g e
DUKHTARAN-E-MILLAT (DEM)
Founded:
1987 by Asiya Andrabi
Predecessors:
Jamaat-e-Islami
Successors:
n/a
Ideology/Goals:
Islamist, feminist, pro-Pakistan, secessionist
Key Personalities:
Asiya Andrabi
Aliases:
Lashkar-E-Jabbar (hypothesized)200
Links:
APHC, HuM, JuM, LeJ, ISI, RAW
Attacks:
Yes (unofficially accused of logistically supporting one bomb attack)
Bans:
n/a
DeM’s size is probably in the hundreds. Its resources unknown and its MO includes: vandalism,
assault/battery, logistical support for other groups. The capacity for low and medium lethality
terror attacks is likely given DeM’s connections to Pakistan-based terror groups. Its means of
mobilizing support, recruitment strategy and recruitment base are unknown.
Dukhtaran-e-Millat (DeM), or Daughters of the Community, is a Kashmir-based women’s
group founded in the late 1980s, by activist Asiya Andrabi.201 The initial mandate of the
group was the use of Islam to promote women’s rights.202 However, over time the group has
radicalized and adopted a broader political agenda, which includes support for jihadist
campaigns to gain Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan.203 Long-term goals include
the Islamization of Pakistan and the formation of a global Muslim state.204
DeM’s membership is estimated at around 350 women.205 The organization has not been
directly involved in acts of political terrorism,206 and Andrabi claims that women cannot
execute military operations.207 However, she supports the use of violence against the Indian
state and its security forces,208 and the group is believed to be linked to the bomb that
killed Agence France Presse reporter Mushtaq Ali in 1995.209 DeM has been suspected of
providing logistical support such as money laundering and arms transport to a wide range
of other militant groups (listed below).210
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
This information could not be confirmed.
“Dukhtaran-e-Millat Profile,” Terrorist Organizations Profiles (TOPS), START.
M. Mazharul Haque, “Asiya Andrabi: Warrior in Veil,” The Milli Gazette.
Haque, “Asiya Andrabi.”
Haque, “Asiya Andrabi,” and Andrew Whitehead, “Daughter of Faith Who Will Fight the Holy War Forever,”
The Guardian, April 23, 2001.
“Dukhtaran-e-Millat,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
“Dukhtaran-e-Millat,” SATP.
Haque, “Asiya Andrabi.”
Whitehead, “Daughter of Faith.”
“Dukhtaran-e-Millat Profile,” TOPS, START.
“Dukhtaran-e-Millat,” SATP.
56 | P a g e
The first notable actions of DeM included protests against Indian military violence in
Jammu and Kashmir and the defacement of movie posters with graphic images of
women.211 Other activities have included arson attacks on liquor stores212 and attempts to
enforce wearing of the hijab by women in Srinigar, which at the extreme have involved
splashing paint213 and acid214 on the faces of uncovered women and teenagers. DeM is not
listed as a perpetrator for any incidents in the Global Terrorism Database; however, DeM
appears in the notes field for one incident.215
A key spokesperson and driver of the group, Andrabi has spent much of the past two
decades in and out of prison under India’s Public Safety Act.216 She has close ties to the AllParties Hurriyat Conference and Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen, of which her husband Muhammad
Quasim (alias Aashiq Husain Faktoo) was once a leader.217 Furthermore, it is suspected that
DeM is the actual force behind the Lashkar-e-Jabbar women’s terrorist group, which has
been involved in acid attacks on uncovered women and attempts to compel Kashmiris to
wear clothing that identifies their religious affiliations.218 Other suspected connections
include the ISI, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, the World Kashmiri Freedom Movement, and even the
Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of the Indian Prime Minister’s Office, India’s external
intelligence agency.219
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
Haque, “Asiya Andrabi.”
Altaf Hussain, “Kashmir Women Fight ‘Obscenity,’” BBC News, August 31, 2005.
Hussain “Kashmir Women Fight ‘Obscenity.’”
Haque “Asiya Andrabi.”
Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.
Arif Shafi Wani, “Aasiya Andrabi, Aide Arrested,” Greater Kashmir, August 29, 2010.
Wani, “Aasiya Andrabi, Aide Arrested.”
“Dukhtaran-e-Millat,” SATP, and “India,” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices, March 4, 2002.
“Dukhtaran-e-Millat,” SATP, and Bhaduri, “Inshallah, Kashmir Will Become Part of Pakistan,” Hindu Vivek
Kendra: A Resource Center for the Promotion of Hindutva.
57 | P a g e
BANAT-UL-ISLAM
Founded:
mid-1990s
Predecessors:
Hizbul Mujahideen, Jamaat-e-Islami
Successors:
n/a
Ideology:
n/a
Key Personalities:
Fatima Shafi, Umi Arifa
Aliases:
n/a
Links:
HuM, JeM
Attacks:
n/a
Bans:
n/a
Banat-ul-Islam has very limited available information.
Little information is publicly available about Banat-ul-Islam. Conflicting media reports
maintain that it is the women’s wing of either the Hizbul Mujahideen or Jamaat-e-Islami
Jammu and Kashmir.220 (In Arabic, Banat-ul-Islam translates as Girls of Islam; thus, both of
these organizations may have women’s wings with that title.) Its leaders include Fatima
Shafi221 and Umi Arifa, while its activities include providing support for the families of
martyrs.222
According to the Asia times, during the 1990s the group encouraged women not to
participate directly in attacks because of their reproductive role, but rather to volunteer
their sons for the cause.223 Banat -ul-Islam is not listed in the Global Terrorism Database.224
220
221
222
223
224
“Spawning Militancy: The Rise of Hizbul,” Indian Express, May 22, 2003; and Sudha Ramachandran,
“Helping Women Balance Family Life, Jihad,” Asia Times, September 15, 2004.
Ved Prakash, Terrorism in Northern India: Jammu and Kashmir and the Punjab (Gyan Publishing House,
2008).
“Spawning Militancy: The Rise of Hizbul,” Indian Express, May 22, 2003.
Sudha Ramachandran. “Helping Women Balance Family Life, Jihad,” Asia Times Online, September 15,
2004.
Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.
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MUSLIM KHAWATEEN MARKAZ (MKM)225
Founded:
1989 by Yasmeen Raja
Predecessors:
n/a
Successors:
n/a
Ideology:
Self-determination for Jammu and Kashmir, human rights
Key Personalities:
Yasmeen Raja, Zamrooda Habib (sometimes also Anjum Zamruda
Habib), Ayesha Shah
Aliases:
Sometimes also: Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Khawateen Markaz
Links:
HuM, JeM
Attacks:
n/a
Bans:
n/a
MKM has very limited available information.
Muslim Khawateen Markaz (Muslim Women’s Center, known also as the Jammu and
Kashmir Muslim Khawateen Markaz) is a women’s political group based in Jammu and
Kashmir. Its primary activities include protests advocating human rights for the women of
Jammu and Kashmir.226
Although MKM has a website, little information about its ideology or activities is publicly
available. The group’s declared goals include “the self-determination and betterment of the
women of Jammu and Kashmir.”227 MKM is not listed in the Global Terrorism Database.228
Notable figures include chairpersons Zamrooda Habib and Yasmeen Raja, as well as former
acting chairperson Ayesha Shah.229 Raja is the daughter of Ghulam Nabi Bhat, a Kashmiri
activist who served with the Civil Secretariat of Jammu and Kashmir and several local
political movements.230 Habib, has published a book/booklet entitled Our Widows, which
asserts that 15,000-40,000 women have been widowed by the conflict in Kashmir.231
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
MKM does not appear to fit our definition of militancy, as they appear non-violent. We did not fully realize
this fact until after the profile had been included in several drafts of the report. For the sake of continuity
and the interesting role that the group plays in Jammu and Kashmir, we have left the profile in the final
report.
“Kashmiris to Take Martyrs’ Mission to its Logical End: Yasmeen Raja,” Kashmir Media Service, Jammu
Kashmir People’s League, accessed February 7, 2011.
Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Khawateen Markaz, “About Us,” accessed February 7, 2011.
Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.
“Interference in Religious Affairs by Authorities Condemned,” Kashmir Media Service, accessed February
7, 2011.
Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Khawateen Markaz, “About Us,” accessed February 7, 2011.
Zamrooda Habib’s Muslim Khawateen Markaz Women’s Concern, “Chastity of 90,000 Women Outraged in
10 years; 40,000 widows in Kashmir: MKM,” accessed February 7, 2011.
59 | P a g e
The group is a member of the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference and has strong ties to the
organization, with Habib and Raja both having served in the APHC leadership.232 In 2003
the Pakistani Charge d’Affaires was embroiled in controversy when he was charged with
funneling Rs. 370,000 (approximately US$ 8,000) to the APHC with the help of Zamrooda
Habib.233
Given that there are currently two different websites for the group, MKM may exist in two
factions, one led by Yasmeen Raja, and the other by Zamrooda Habib, though the small
amount of information on the group makes this difficult to determine.
232
233
Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Khawateen Markaz, “About Us,” accessed February 7, 2011.
Praveen Swami, “APHC: The Nexus with Terror,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, accessed February 7, 2011;
and Mahendra P. Lama, “Terrorism and Insurgency in India: Economic Costs and Consequences,” ICSSR
Journal of Abstracts and Reviews, Political Science, 33:1&2 (2007).
60 | P a g e
PAKISTANI G ROUPS
Though not based in India, Sunni groups from Pakistan play a central role in militancy there.
As our research shows, many of the most active Indian groups receive support from
Pakistani counterparts such as LeT. Pakistani groups such as LeT, JeM, and HuM are directly
responsible for many of the attacks in Indian-controlled Kashmir, and these groups have
also launched attacks in India's major cities, both on their own and in collaboration with
Indian groups, especially IM and SIMI. These groups account for a large number of India’s
fatalities due to terrorism (See Figure 18). Pakistani groups may be motivated by the
conflict between India and Pakistan, centered on the dispute in Kashmir, as well as Islamist
ideology that calls for the establishment of an Islamic state in India as part of a subcontinental caliphate. Within India, the Pakistani groups' activities are generally confined to
the realm of terrorism; they do not take direct part in the more political elements of
militancy, except to the extent that they support Indian-based groups that do.
FIGURE 18. TERRORISM INCIDENTS AND DEATHS BY PAKISTANI GROUPS
400
Incidents and Deaths
350
300
250
GTD Incidents
200
WITS Incidents
150
GTD Deaths
100
WITS Deaths
50
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
0
Year
Source: Global Terrorism Database and Worldwide Incidents Tracking System 234
234
GTD -- Includes JeM and LeT (and HuM, which only had 3). IIM not in database, and the two LeJ attacks in
India were actually misattributed -- it was Lashkar-e-Jabber, not LeJ. WITS -- Includes JeM, HuM, LeT, IIM
and LeJ (although there were no India attacks from the last two in WITS).
61 | P a g e
LASHKAR-E-TAIBA (LET)
Founded:
Late 1980s to early 1990s
Predecessors:
Markaz Dawa-ul-Irshad
Successors:
n/a
Ideology:
Ahle Hadith, pro-Pakistan, Kashmiri secessionist
Key Personalities:
Hafez Saeed
Aliases:
Jamaat ud-Dawa, Falah-e-Insaniyat, Tehrik-e-Tahafuz Qibla Awal
Links:
ISI, JeM, LeJ, SIMI, IM
Attacks:
Yes (bombings, armed attacks, over 200 killed)
Bans:
Pakistani Government, Indian Government, US List of Foreign
Terrorist Organizations
LeT’s size cannot be estimated with confidence. Its resources are likely high given state support
from ISI and support from private charities. LeT’s MO in India includes medium and highlethality terror attacks. The capacity to execute high-lethality terror attacks is confirmed. LeT’s
recruitment and primary support base is in Pakistan and its support base in India includes SIMI,
IM and regional militant groups.
LeT is a Pakistan-based international terrorist organization that has actively funded and
supported a number of Indian terrorist groups. The organization began in the 1980s with a
focus on Jammu and Kashmir. At a time when many Kashmiri political movements made
secular demands for autonomy or self-determination, LeT put forward a religious argument
in favor of Kashmir’s accession to a broader pan-Islamic state and advocated the
Islamicization of India.235
LeT recruits through an extensive network of madrassas and religious centers located
throughout Pakistan.236 The group has a broad base of financial support, including its own
charity, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which has raised money for LeT under the pretense of providing
relief for the 2005 Pakistan earthquake.237 Other sources of support include Pakistani
expats in the US, the UK, and the Middle East; local Kashmiri and Pakistani businessmen;
gulf donors such as Saudi Arabia; and the Pakistani ISI.238
LeT is also connected to larger transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the
Taliban,239 and has been associated with activities in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Iraq in its
235
236
237
238
239
South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Lashkar-e-Toiba, ‘Army of the Pure,’” accessed February 7, 2011.
Bajoria. “Background: Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) (a.k.a. Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Lashkar e-Toiba,
Lashkar-i-Taiba).” Council on Foreign Relations. January 14, 2010.
Bajoria. “Background: Lashkar-e-Taiba."
Bajoria. “Background: Lashkar-e-Taiba."
For example, Al-Qaeda operative Abu Zubayda was caught at an LeT safe house. See Bajoria. “Background:
Lashkar-e-Taiba."
62 | P a g e
effort to create a pan-Islamic state.240 Consequently, LeT has been banned by the US, the
UN, the UK, India, and Pakistan.241
In India, LeT provides support for a range of groups, is believed to have perpetrated attacks
alongside LeJ and JeM,242 and works closely with IIM. In fact, some scholars hypothesize
that the two groups have joined.243 LeT was involved in the founding of IM and has coperpetrated attacks with the group244 and also cooperates with SIMI, with SIMI providing
logistics and support and LeT responsible for actually executing the attacks.245 Finally,
there is evidence of LeT involvement with attacks claimed by JuM, suggesting that these
groups may also be linked.246
The failure or unwillingness of the Pakistani government to curtail LeT’s activities in India
has been a major source of tension between the two governments.247 Currently, the South
Asia Terrorism Portal estimates that LeT has conducted attacks in Bangalore, Gujarat,
Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai, New Delhi, and Varanasi, and that with the help of the ISI is
involved with Islamic extremism and/or terrorist activity in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat,
Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and
West Bengal.248 LeT has been connected to the 2001 parliamentary attacks in New Delhi,
the 2003 Gateway of India bombing in Mumbai, and the 2005 New Delhi bombings.249 The
Global Terrorism Database lists LeT as a perpetrator in 14 attacks (if the 2008 Mumbai
shootings are considered one event) accounting for 193 fatalities.250 In addition to its high
death toll, the Mumbai attack was significant because it specifically targeted hotels
frequented by Western tourists as well as a Jewish residential facility hosting several
Israelis.251
While LeT has a wide range of connections to local groups in Jammu and Kashmir and
beyond, it is important to consider the global scope of the organization and the contrast
between LeT and the more homegrown style of terrorism practiced by many Indian outfits.
As some scholars have noted, LeT has proven fairly successful in building partnerships with
local organizations and in importing its own trained militants from Pakistan-administered
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
Bajoria. “Background: Lashkar-e-Taiba."
Bajoria. “Background: Lashkar-e-Taiba."
Sometimes, JuM and LeT together are known as The Save Kashmir Movement, while JeM, LeJ, and LeT
together are known as Lashkar-e-Omar or al-Qanoon; see Globalsecurity.org, “Military: Lashkar-eTayyiba.”
Arif Jamal, “A Guide to Militant Groups in Kashmir,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 5 (February 4, 2010);
South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Lashkar-e-Toiba, ‘Army of the Pure,’” accessed February 7, 2011.
“Is Indian Mujahideen Actually the Asif Reza Commando Force?,” Indian Express, September 30, 2008.
C. Christine Fair, “Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Attack
Upon Several Targets in the Indian Mega-City of Mumbai,” Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on
Homeland Security, 11 March 2009, Rand Corportation, p. 10.
Arif Jamal, “A Guide to Militant Groups in Kashmir,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 5 (February 4, 2010).
Bajoria. “Background: Lashkar-e-Taiba."
South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Lashkar-e-Toiba, ‘Army of the Pure,’” accessed February 7, 2011.
Bajoria. “Background: Lashkar-e-Taiba" and Sanjoy Majumder, “Who Is Behind the Delhi Bombings?” BBC
News, October 31, 2005; “Islamic Militants May Be Behind Indian Bombings,” CBC News, October 30,
2005; and “Group Says It Staged Indian Blasts,” Associated Press, October 31, 2005.
Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.
“Mumbai Still Under Siege, 200 Still Trapped in Oberoi,” The Press Trust of India, November 27, 2008.
63 | P a g e
Kashmir and other parts of Pakistan to execute its activities;252 however, its role in building
the capacity of local Indian organizations and recruiting Indians to join the global jihad is
less prominent.
JAISH-E-MOHAMMAD (JEM)
Founded:
2000
Predecessors:
HuM
Successors:
Khaddam ul-Islam
Ideology:
Deobandi
Key Personalities:
Masood Azhar
Aliases:
Tehrik al-Furqan, Jamaat-e-Furqa
Links:
ISI, Al Qaeda, Afghan & Pakistan Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Sipah-eSahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
Attacks:
Yes (Bombings, armed attacks, approximately 60 killed)
Bans:
US List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 2001; Pakistani
Government, 2002
JeM’s size cannot be estimated with confidence. Its resources are likely high given its ISI links.
JeM’s MO includes: low-lethality terror attacks with heavily guarded targets like the Indian
Parliament as well. The capacity for at least medium-lethality attacks is likely given JeM’s
history. Its recruitment and support base is in Pakistan.
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) is one of the most violent Deobandi groups in South Asia and has
carried out many deadly attacks in Kashmir, India and Pakistan. JeM is believed to receive
support from the ISI.253 JeM is also believed to have links with a number of other groups,
including Al Qaeda,254 the Afghan255 and Pakistani Taliban,256 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),257
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan258 and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.259
JeM was created by Masood Azhar in January 2000.260 Azhar, a former leader of another
Pakistani militant group, Harkat ul-Mujahideen (HuM), had recently been released from an
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
Arif Jamal, “A Guide to Militant Groups in Kashmir,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 5 (February 4, 2010).
Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2007), 65; and Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan
Connection (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 29.
Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 64, 66.
Ibid., 66.
Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 4 (April 2009), 1.
Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 107.
Zahab and Roy, Islamist Networks, 30; and Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban,” 1.
Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban,” 1.
Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 65-66; and Zahab and Roy, Islamist Networks, 28-29 (these citations apply to
the entire paragraph).
64 | P a g e
Indian prison. Azhar had been in custody since 1994, when he was arrested in Kashmir in
connection with HuM attacks on Indian forces there. In December 1999, HuM operatives
hijacked an Indian Airlines flight and held its occupants hostage in Afghanistan; in exchange
for the hostages’ safety, the hijackers demanded the release of a host of jailed militants,
including Azhar. A few weeks after his release, Azhar announced that he was leaving HuM to
form a new group, JeM.
Since its formation, JeM has carried out a number of high-profile attacks, including the
December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament building in conjunction with LeT261 and
the January 2002 murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl.262 JeM is listed as a
suspected perpetrator by the Global Terrorism Database in 19 incidents of terrorism in
India, resulting in a total of 60 fatalities. The incidents occurred between 2003 and 2007,
and all but two occurred in Jammu and Kashmir.263 WITS lists JeM as a perpetrator in 40
incidents of terrorism in India between 2004 and 2009, accounting for 57 deaths. All but
one of the incidents took place in Jammu and Kashmir.264
JeM was added to the U.S. list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations in 2001 and was banned by
the Pakistani government in 2002. As JeM came under increasing scrutiny, it reportedly
changed its name to Tehrik al-Furqan265 (also reported as Jamaat-e-Furqa266). In 2003, the
group reportedly split into two factions: Khaddam ul-Islam headed by Azhar and another
headed by the JeM chief in Karachi, Abdullah Shah Mazhar.267
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 107.
Zahab and Roy, Islamist Networks, 59.
Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.
WITS, (various ICNs).
Zahab and Roy, Islamist Networks, 30.
Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 67.
Zahab and Roy, Islamist Networks, 31-32.
65 | P a g e
LASHKAR-E-JHANGVI (LEJ)
Founded:
mid-1990s
Predecessors:
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
Successors:
n/a
Ideology:
Anti-Shia, Deobandi
Key Personalities:
Riaz Basra (deceased), Akram Lahori
Aliases:
n/a
Links:
Al Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
Attacks:
Yes (low-lethality and infrequent in India)
Bans:
Pakistani Government, 2001 ; US List of Foreign Terrorist
Organizations 2003
LeJ’s size or resources cannot be estimated with confidence. LeJ is almost entirely Pakistan
focused with an MO of low lethality attacks on Muslim minorities. The Capacity for at least
medium-lethality attacks is likely. LeJ’s recruitment and support base is Pakistan’s Deobandi
adherents.
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) is an anti-Shia Deobandi jihadi group in Pakistan with ties to Al
Qaeda.268 Since it was founded in the early to mid-1990s, LeJ has launched dozens of
attacks against non-Sunni minorities in Pakistan and, in recent years, has increasingly
targeted the Pakistani state. LeJ founder Riaz Basra, who was killed by Pakistani police in
2003, developed ties to Al Qaeda while training alongside its members in Talibancontrolled Afghanistan in the late 1990s.269 In the years since 9/11, LeJ has strengthened
these ties and has become increasingly enmeshed in a broader militant network led by the
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.270
LeJ is an offshoot of the anti-Shia sectarian group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), which
was founded in the 1980s with support from the Pakistani government of Zia ul-Haq.271 LeJ
also received state support in its early years.272 These groups were used by the Pakistani
268
269
270
271
272
Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Central Asia (New York: Viking Penguin, 2008), 227.
Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 94-96.
Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban,” 1; and Jane Perlez, “Pakistan Attacks Show Tighter Militant Links,”
The New York Times, October 15, 2009.
Describing the split with LeJ, Chairman of the SSP’s Supreme Council Zia ul-Haq Qasmi said: “We parted
ways because Lashkar-e-Jhangvi’s way of pursuing its policies were different from the SSP’s. The Lashkar
does not like our moderate policies” (Mariam Abou Zahab, “The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts
in Pakistan,” in Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (New York: Zed Books
Ltd, 2002), 127, n. 15).
S.V.R. Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in
Society and Politics,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2000), 157.
66 | P a g e
state to counter the rising influence of Iran’s revolutionary Shiism.273 In the late 1990s,
however, the Pakistani government of Nawaz Sharif began cracking down on some
homegrown militant groups, including SSP and LeJ. In response, the groups began directly
targeting police and military installations. LeJ was officially banned by the Pakistani
government in 2001 but continues to operate from strongholds in Karachi, central Punjab,
and North Waziristan.274
LeJ was placed on the U.S. list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations in January 2003. 275 The
U.S. alleges that LeJ was responsible for the March 1995 attack on U.S. consulate officials in
Karachi, which killed two people. That attack was said to be in response to a U.S. request
that Pakistan extradite Ramzi Yousuf, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing.276
LeJ is listed as a suspected perpetrator by the Global Terrorism Database in two incidents of
terrorism in India, which resulted in two injuries and no fatalities. Both incidents occurred
in Jammu and Kashmir. For reference, LeJ is listed in 17 incidents in Pakistan.277
273
274
275
276
277
C. Christine Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other Organizations,”
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 27 (2004), 492; and Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism:
Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2005), 205.
Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban,” 3.
Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 96.
Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 96.
Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.
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ISLAMI INQILABI MAHAZ (IIM)
Founded:
1990s
Predecessors:
n/a
Successors:
LeT
Ideology:
Islamist
Key Personalities:
Zulfikar Ali Shah
Aliases:
n/a
Links:
n/a
Attacks:
Yes (Responsibility disputed)
Bans:
No
IIM’s size and resources are unknown. It’s MO is terrorism. The capacity for independent
violence is unknown given the probability of LeT involvement in IIM-attributed terror attacks.
IIM’s recruitment and support base is in Pakistan.
Islami Inqilabi Mahaz (IIM) is a Sunni militant group with long-standing ties to LeT. The
group was founded by Pakistani veterans of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, who set up
base in Lahore, Pakistan, in the early 1990s.278 In 1992 or 1993, the group shifted its
activities to the Poonch district, near the Line of Control in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir,
where it carried out joint operations with LeT.279
IIM leader Zulfikar Ali Shah, a Pakistani from Hyderabad, was arrested by Indian authorities
in February 1993.280 In 1999, Shah was among 36 militants whose release was demanded
by the hijackers of an Indian airlines flight.281 Although some jailed militants were released
to end the hijacking, Shah’s name was dropped from the list late in negotiations, and he
currently remains in custody.282 It is not clear why he was dropped from the list.
IIM has claimed responsibility for at least two high-profile attacks, although the veracity of
either claim has not been determined. The first of these was the fatal shooting of four
American employees of a U.S. petroleum company in Karachi in November 1997. 283 A
previously unknown group also claimed responsibility for the attack.284 Both groups said it
was in retaliation for the U.S. conviction of Mir Aimal Kansi, who shot and killed two CIA
employees outside the agency’s headquarters in 1993.285 IIM also claimed responsibility
for series of bombings in New Delhi on the eve of Diwali celebrations in 2005, an attack that
killed approximately 60 people and wounded more than 200. This is the group’s only listing
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997, “Asia Overview,” April 1998.
“Inqilabi Just Another Name for LeT,” Times of India, October 30, 2005.
Praveen Swami, “Terror Links,” Frontline, Volume 17, Issue 01 (January 8-21, 2000).
Swami, “Terror Links.”
Saikat Datta, “Delhi Blasts: Cinder Ash,” Outlook India, November 14, 2005.
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997.
“In Wake of Karachi Killing, Americans Keep Low Profile,” New York Times, November 14, 1997.
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997.
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in the GTD.286 Ajai Sahni, the director of SATP, argues that IIM has merged with LeT and
that IIM’s claim on the 2005 Delhi bombings was an attempt to obscure LeT’s
involvement.287
HARKAT UL-MUJAHIDEEN
Founded:
1985
Predecessors:
Harkat ul-Jihad-i-Islami, Harkat ul-Ansar
Successors:
Harkat ul-Ansar
Ideology:
pro-Pakistan, Kashmiri secessionist
Key Personalities:
Sajjad Afghani, Nasrullah Mansur Langrayal, Maulana Masood Azhar
Aliases:
Al Faran
Links:
ISI
Attacks:
Yes (Bombings, armed attacks, approximately 50 killed)
Bans:
Indian Government, US List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Harkat ul-Mujahideen’s size and resources cannot be estimated. Its MO in India is low-lethality
terrorism. The capacity for violence is unknown given the possibility that JeM has drawn
resources away. HuM’s recruitment and support base is in Pakistan.
According to un-sourced newspaper and South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) reports,
Harkat ul-Mujahideen was founded in Afghanistan in 1985 to fight against the Soviet
occupation. The organization subsequently shifted operations to Jammu and Kashmir.288
The SATP maintains that Harkat ul-Mujahideen was a splinter of another jihadist group, the
Harkat ul-Jihad i-Islami, and was renamed the Harkat ul-Ansar (HuA) in 1993 by Pakistan’s
Inter Services Intelligence Directorate. HuA reverted to Harkat ul-Mujahideen in 1997
following the group’s listing as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department.289
According to India’s Ministry of Home Affairs, Harkat ul-Mujahideen is banned under the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, where Harkat-ul-Ansar and “Harkat-ul-Jehad-e Islami”
appear to be listed as aliases.290
According to media reports and the SATP, the group’s three key early leaders were Sajjad
Afghan, Nasrullah Mansur Langrayal, Maulana Masood Azhar. All three were arrested by
286
287
288
289
290
Sanjoy Majumder, “Who Is Behind the Delhi Bombings?” BBC News, October 31, 2005; “Islamic Militants
May Be Behind Indian Bombings,” CBC News, October 30, 2005; and “Group Says It Staged Indian Blasts,”
Associated Press, October 31, 2005 and Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.
Ajai Sahni, “Shadow Over the Festival of Lights,” South Asia Intelligence Review, October 31, 2005.
“Hostages ‘Will Die if Rescue is Attempted’,” The Guardian, 19 August 1995 and “Harkat-ul-Mujahideen,”
South Asia Terrorism Portal.
“Harkat-ul-Mujahideen,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.
“Home Ministry Clarifies On Banned Organisations,” Hindustan Times, December 14, 2004. LexisNexis.
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Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir in the early 1990s. Azhar was released following the
hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight, and went on to found Jaish e-Mohammad,291 while
Afghani is dead292 and Langrayal reportedly remains in prison.293
As of November 2010, Harkat ul Mujahideen was listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization
by the U.S. Department of State, but not by the European Union.294
According to the Global Terrorism Database, Harkat ul Ansar and “Harakat ul-Mujahidin”
committed a total of 17 terror attacks in India prior to 2008, killing 50 people, including
militants. The group’s preferred tactic appears to be bombing; however, they have carried
out shootings and kidnappings as well. Hizbul Mujahideen, Harkatul Jihad e-Islami, the
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front, and the Lashkar e-Jhangvi are listed as suspected
perpetrators in at least one of the listed incidents.295 The South Asia Terrorism Portal
reports that Harkat ul-Mujahideen’s capacity was much reduced after the founding of Jaish
e- Mohammad, but Harkat militants have been reported killed in encounters with police as
recently as July 2010.296
291
292
293
294
295
296
“Jaish: Small But Not to be Ignored,” The Statesman, 8 October 2001. LexisNexis.
“Sajjad Afghani Died in Prison Riot,” The Statesman, 28 December 1999. LexisNexis.
“How a Former Pakistani Commando Became a Terrorist,” Rediff News, 20 September 2009, accessed
2/2/2011
“Terrorist Designation Lists”, U.S. Department of State, accessed November 18, 2010, and “Council
Decision 2010/386/CFSP,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010.
Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed 2/2/2011.
“Top Militant Killed in Sopore,” The Pioneer, 22 July 2010. LexisNexis and “Harkat-ul-Mujahideen,”
South Asia Terrorism Portal..
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6. EXTERNAL ACTORS’ INFLUENCE ON SUNNI MILITANCY IN
INDIA
Sunni militancy in India is influenced by outside actors in significant ways. To varying
degrees, these non-Indian organizations provide financial support, inspiration, and
guidance to India’s Sunni militant groups. We begin by looking at Pakistan’s intelligence
service, which has a long history of providing material and financial support for militant
groups that advance its policy objectives. Then we examine several other influences,
including Al Qaeda, whose role is largely limited to ideological inspiration; individual
donors from across the region, who offer financial support via the hawala banking system;
and Tablighi Jamaat, a secretive missionary organization, whose influence is harder to
discern.
PAKISTAN ’ S I NTER -S ERVICES I NTELLIGENCE A GENCY (ISI)
The Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) is Pakistan’s foreign intelligence service.
As an inter-services directorate of the military, the ISI draws personnel from the Army,
Navy and Air Force. The ISI, and the military more broadly, play an important role in
determining Pakistan’s foreign policy.297 Pakistan’s primary foreign policy concern for all
of its independent history has been conflict with India, with which Pakistan has fought four
wars, in: 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999. Except for the secession of East Pakistan in 1971,
these conflicts have centered on Kashmir.
The ISI’s involvement in militancy in Kashmir began in 1988 or 1989, when popular
outrage over the fraudulent elections of 1987 led to the outbreak of organized violence
against Indian authorities. According to American journalists and think tanks, the ISI, with
the consent of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, used resources from the waning anti-Soviet
war in Afghanistan to support Kashmiri insurgents with weapons, supplies and training.
When the number of native Kashmiri militants proved insufficient, the ISI began equipping
and infiltrating Afghan, Pakistani and Arab fighters into Kashmir to harass Indian forces.298
While most sources agree on the origins of the ISI’s involvement in Jammu and Kashmir,
the organization’s support for Sunni militancy elsewhere in India is sometimes disputed.
According to Indian media, think tank and government sources, every Sunni militant group
profiled in this report as well as many non-Sunni militant organizations receives assistance
from the ISI. In these accounts, the ISI seeks to promote indiscriminate violence in India by
supporting as many Indian militant groups as possible.299
297
298
299
“Inter-Services Intelligence,” The New York Times, updated February 10, 2011, and Stephen Cohen, The
Idea of Pakistan, 100.
Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin, 2004), 221, 292, and Mark Roberts, “Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence Directorate.”
“India: Mahanta Presents Proof of ISI Mischief,” The Hindu, April 7, 2000. LexisNexis.
71 | P a g e
A second major issue relates to ISI support for the Pakistan-based groups such as Jaish eMohammad and Lashkar e-Taiba that have carried out highly lethal attacks in India in the
past decade, including the 2001 Parliament incident, the 2006 Mumbai train bombings, and
the 2008 Mumbai shootings. While these organizations’ roots as ISI proxies are rarely
disputed, it is unclear if these highly lethal urban attacks are directly supported by the ISI,
either at the top, or by rogue lower-level officers, or if the groups themselves are operating
independently.
Despite these uncertainties, Pakistan continues to be an important source of manpower,
supplies and funding for terrorist attacks in India, especially the most lethal such incidents.
A L QAEDA
Al Qaeda is not known to have directly provided material or financial support to Indiabased militant groups, but Pakistan-based LeT has a long-standing relationship with Al
Qaeda and Osamabin Laden. LeT’s precursor organization was founded in the 1980s with
the help of Abdullah Azzam, bin Laden’s mentor,300 and bin Laden himself reportedly
donated money to help LeT build its headquarters in Muridke, Pakistan.301 Bonds between
the groups grew stronger in 1998, when LeT joined Al Qaeda’s World Islamic Front.302
Lacking direct ties to Sunni Indian groups, Al Qaeda and bin Laden nevertheless offer
inspiration.303 Al Qaeda’s inspiration is particularly apparent with LeT-allied groups such
as SIMI. In the past, SIMI leaders have expressed their support for Al Qaeda and propagated
its message. SIMI official Safdar Nagori admitted to disseminating bin Laden’s speeches via
audio cassette;304 while others have admitted to hanging posters of bin Laden in Gujarat.305
Some evidence suggests Al Qaeda is increasingly interested in targeting India. After the
February 2010 attack in Pune, India, Al Qaeda operational commander and 313 Brigade
leader Illyas Kashmiri claimed responsibility for the attack and vowed to continue
launching them “across India until the Indian Army leaves Kashmir and gives Kashmiris
their right to self-determination.”306 “The entire Muslim community is one body and we
will take revenge for all injustices and tyranny,” Kashmiri said, citing the 1993 demolition of
the Babri Mosque and deaths of Muslims in Gujarat.307 In 2010, Defense Secretary Bob
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
C. Christine Fair, “Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Attack Upon
Several Targets in the Indian Mega-City of Mumbai,” Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on
Homeland Security, 11 March 2009, Rand Corporation, p. 6.
Ryan Clarke, “Lashkar-i-Taiba: Roots, Logistics, Partnerships, and the Fallacy of Subservient Proxies,”
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 22, Issue 3 (July 2010): p. 395.
Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection (London: Hurst
& Company, 2004), p. 60.
Animesh Roul, “Hybrid, Homegrown and Transnational: The Indian Mujahideen and the Islamist Terror
Matrix,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8, Issue 3, January 21, 2010.
Animesh Roul, “Students Islamic Movement of India: A Profile,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism
Monitor, Vol.4, Issue 7, April 6, 2006.
South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI),” Terrorist Groups in India.
Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda Chief Delivers a Warning,” Asia Times Online, February 13, 2010.
Ibid.
72 | P a g e
Gates warned that an Al Qaeda-led syndicate of South Asian terrorist groups was intent on
destabilizing the region and might go so far as to provoke war between India and
Pakistan.308
G ULF D ONORS AND THE H AWALA S YSTEM
Indian officials widely view the private citizens and organizations of wealthy Persian Gulf
countries as sources of financial support for Muslim militancy in India, especially in
Kashmir.309 Indian Government sources also allege that funds sent from Saudi Arabia to
Kashmir are often routed through the Saudi Arabia-based Muslim World League (Rabita alAlam al Islami) and Pakistan-based World Muslim Congress (Motamar al-Alam al-Islami),
two large, reputable Islamic associations whose involvement with militancy is contested.
The aforementioned sources maintain that these organizations make donations to Kashmiri
groups for promotion of the Islamic faith, but that these funds are diverted to militant
groups without the donor’s knowledge.310
Individuals who financially support militancy in India need not rely on large intermediary
organizations, however. Much of the attention that has been paid to the external financing
of Sunni militancy in India centers around the informal hawala (also known as hundi in
South Asia) money transfer system, which relies on trusted networks of hawaladars
(hundiwalas) to effect remittances with almost no paperwork and very little cross border
currency movement. The system is predominantly used to transfer legally-earned funds;
however, its informal nature and minimal paper trail also make it an attractive method for
financing illicit activities, including militancy, and make it very difficult to amass evidence
against the sources of illicit funds.
Indian press reports have linked hawala financing to a variety of Sunni militant groups,
including the Dawood Ibrahim organization, Hizbul Mujahideen, Dukhtaran-e-Millat, and
Jaish-e-Mohammad. Indian officials sometimes refer to hawala as a source of funding for
secessionist activity in Kashmir generally. According to a 2002 Indian newspaper article,
India’s central government has investigated a number of expatriate Kashmiri groups as
suspected funding sources including the Kashmir-American Council (US), Kashmir Study
Group (Canada), Friends of Jammu and Kashmir (UK), and the World Kashmir Freedom
Movement (UK).311
As an example of the difficulty that authorities oftentimes have in interdicting the flow of
funds, in 2002, Jammu and Kashmir Police made arrests in a hawala militancy-financing
case involving the alleged transfer of $300,000 from Ayub Thakur, head of the World
Kashmir Freedom Movement in London, to Asiya Andrabi, head of the militant group
Dukhtaran-e-Millat and Sayyid Ali Shah Geelani, separatist leader and former chairman of
the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference. Geelani was held for allegedly forwarding the money to
308
309
310
311
Yochi J. Dreazen, “Gates Warns of Militants in South Asia,” The Wall Street Journal, January 21, 2010.
B. Raman, “The Saudi Connection, Outlook India, March 2, 2010.
“J&K Hawala Cloud Over Charity for A [sic – rest of headline missing from database],” The Statesman, July
29, 2002.
“J&K Hawala Cloud,” The Statesman.
73 | P a g e
Hizbul Mujahideen, a banned group;312 however, Geelani apparently never stood trial in the
case, possibly because of a lack of police evidence on the latter claim.313 Dukhtaran-e-Millat
is not a banned group in India, and as such the transfer of funds to Andrabi was apparently
not illegal.
TABLIGHI JAMAAT
Tablighi Jamaat, the Pakistan-based international association of lay Muslim proselytizers,
does not appear to be involved in funding Sunni militancy in India, consistent with the
group’s public refusal to engage in political activity; however, investigators in the United
States and France allege that Tablighi’s activities facilitate contact between young European
Muslims and international jihadist groups.314 Some members of the organization have been
known to hold membership in militant groups such as JeM and LeT, but there is no evidence
that the organization as a whole has decided to support these groups or others with
operations in India.315
312
313
314
315
Scott Baldauf, “The War on Terror’s Money,” Christian Science Monitor, July 22, 2002.
“Kashmir Leader Geelani Released from Jail on Health Grounds,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
February 8, 2003.
Craig Smith, “French Islamic Group Offers Rich Soil for Militancy,” The International Herald Tribune, April
29, 2005.
Nicolas Howenstein, “Islamist Networks: The Case of Tablighi Jamaat,” United States Institute of Peace,
October 2006.
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7. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS
To conclude our analysis of Sunni militancy in India, we have performed a social network
analysis of the relationships between Sunni militant groups and other relevant actors. Using
the qualitative information contained in the group profiles, we have populated a matrix of
links between groups and characterized these links according to the parameters listed
below (see Figure 20).
FIGURE 20. RELATIONS BETWEEN MILITANT GROUPS316
RELATIONSHIP
DESCRIPTION
ATTRIBUTION
Groups listed as co-perpetrators in at least one attack
FORMED
One group involved in the formation of the other
FRONT
One group a front for the other
FUNDING
One group funds the other
GUIDANCE
One group exerts concrete, directional influence over the actions of
another
INFLUENCE
One group has influenced the other ideologically
INTERMEDIARY
One group acts as an intermediary for the other (perhaps channeling
funds or supplies)
JOINED
One group has joined the other or an umbrella organization represented
by the other
LINKED
Groups linked in an unspecified fashion
MERGED
Groups have merged, or one group has been absorbed into another
OFFSHOOT
One group is an offshoot of the other
PREDECESSOR
One group is the predecessor of the other
SAME
Groups believed to be the same
SUPPORT
One group provides material or logistical support for the other
TRAINING
One group has trained members of the other or group members have
trained together
Using this dataset, we were able to use UCINET’s Netdraw application to visually analyze
the Sunni militant space in India; examples of the output produced are contained below
These links can be uni- or multidirectional and are not mutually exclusive; for example, an organization
may provide both guidance and training for another.
316
75 | P a g e
(see Figures 21 – 25).317 This process has yielded a number of insights to support and
enhance our descriptive findings.
First, as Figure 21 indicates, Sunni militancy in India operates in a highly interconnected
space. Sunni militant groups maintain large numbers of national and transnational ties with
a diverse range of actors. For example, a brief look at a Kashmiri group like Dukhtaran-eMillat (DeM) indicates that it has been linked to state institutions like India’s external
intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and Pakistan’s ISI; Pakistani
groups like HuM and JuM; political fronts like APHC; and its own extremist front
organization, Lashkar-e-Jabbar. A broad range of associations such as these is characteristic
of many of the larger Sunni militant groups.
Nevertheless, it is clear that many of the domestic groups in India remain regionally
oriented. The figures below were produced with the spring embedding function, which
positions groups according to how closely they are related to each other. As Figure 21
demonstrates, this strategy yields considerable clustering, with the South Indian groups in
neon green at the bottom right corner, the Northeast Indian groups in dark green at the top
right corner, and the Kashmiri groups in bright blue on the left. On the other hand, the
Pakistani groups and the all-India groups seem to have closer trans-regional ties, placing
them at the center of the network. This suggests a distinctly regional flavor to domestic
militancy in the South, the Northeast, and Kashmir, consistent with our qualitative findings.
Third, the militant landscape in India has seen considerable change over time. While the
available data is not specific or comprehensive enough to create meaningful inter-temporal
analysis, a brief look at the evolution of Sunni militant groups to date, as represented by
trends such as the emergence of fronts and offshoots and the joining and merging of
groups, indicates that the identity of these groups evolves frequently (see Figure 22).
Notable actors in this space include Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami, which has split to yield a
number of spinoffs, as well as the Pakistani groups HuM, JeM, LeT, and LeJ, which have a
broad range of fronts, offshoots, and successors, most likely as a result of the size of their
operations and their efforts to evade government bans.
Finally, the role of Pakistan and Pakistani groups in supporting Sunni militancy in India is
particularly evident in the connections between groups. As Figure 23 demonstrates,
Pakistan’s ISI has been implicated in supporting organizations ranging from PULF, MULTA,
MULFA, and AMULFA to LeJ, JeM, HuM, LeT, and IM. From Figure 24, which includes nodes
sized according to their degree centrality (i.e. the number of links they maintain with other
actors in the network), we see that the ISI has the most number of links of all of the groups
in the network. Pakistani groups such as HuM, JeM, and LeT have the second highest degree
centrality measures, followed by significant Indian domestic actors like SIMI, MULTA, and
DeM. As indicated by Figure 25, the ISI also ranks high in betweenness , or the ability to act
as a link between otherwise disconnected groups; it is followed by SIMI and less
significantly, HuM, JeM, and LeT.
317
Groups were arranged using the spring embedding function, with small manual changes made to increase
clarity and visibility of the network.
76 | P a g e
Ultimately, this analysis is far from authoritative. In particular, our need to rely on opensource news reports to compile the relationship database poses the threat of omission bias
due to the under-reporting of less “interesting” links and the lack of information on
clandestine groups. It is also limited by potential media bias, with Pakistan’s ISI possibly
overrepresented as a result of the Indian news media’s eagerness to find a Pakistani
operative behind every attack. Nevertheless, this social network analysis is consistent with
our intuitive and quantitative findings regarding the importance and lethality of all-Indian
groups and their Pakistani collaborators, and as such provides useful support for our
previous conclusions.
77 | P a g e
FIGURE 21. SOCIAL NETWORK OVERVIEW
REGION (NODE COLOR)
Bangladesh's DGFI
IURPI
ULFSS
India's RAW
UMLFA
Al-Faran
HuA
Pakistani state
MULFA
Lashkar-e-Jabbar
NSCN-IM
JKIF
DeM
ULFA
MULTA
SSP
HUJI
APHC
AMULFA
MKM
HuM
Pakistan's ISI
LeJ
World Kashmiri Freedom Movement
ARCF
JuM
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
HUJI-B
Al-Qaeda
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
IIM
Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh
IM
Jamaat-e-Furqa
al-Qanoon
Tehrik al-Furqan
Banat ul-Islam
Jamaat-e-Islami
SIMI
Jamaat-ud-Dawa
Lashkar-e-Omar
Khaddam ul-Islam
ISS
Jamaat-e-Islami (Hind)
Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir
RELATIONSHIP
Afghan Taliban
LeT
JeM
Ansar ul-Islam
Islamic National Front
PULF
National Democratic Front
Jihad Committee
International Islamic Federation of Student's Organizations (Kuwait)
Al-Ummah
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (Riyadh)
PDP
IDF
Sunni militant groups maintain large numbers of national and transnational ties with a diverse
range of actors. While South India, Northeast India, and All-India groups cluster by region, AllIndia groups and Pakistani groups appear to maintain broader ties.
• All-India
• Northeast India
• South India
• Kashmir
• Miscellaneous
Indian
• Pakistani
• Pakistan (official)
• International
─ Attribution
─ Formed
─ Front
─ Funding
─ Guidance
─ Influence
─ Intermediary
─ Joined
─ Linked
─ Merged
─ Offshoot
─ Predecessor
─ Same
─ Support
─ Training
PROFILE STATUS
(LABEL FONT)
Core profile
External actor
Not profiled
78 | P a g e
Jihad Committee
FIGURE 22. FRONT, JOINED, MERGED, OFFSHOOT, PREDECESSOR, AND SAME
onal Islamic Federation of Student's Organizations (Kuwait)
World
Kashmiri
Freedom
ssembly
of Muslim
YouthMovement
(Riyadh)
National Democratic Front
Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh
Ummah
stan's ISI
Jamaat-e-Islami
REGION (NODE COLOR)
Jamaat-e-Islami (Hind)
SIMI
Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir
LFA
PDP
ISS
IM
• All-India
• Northeast India
• South India
• Kashmir
• Miscellaneous
Indian
• Pakistani
• Pakistan (official)
• International
ARCF
Banat ul-Islam
esh's DGFI
M
RAW
JuM
HUJI
Taliban
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
MULTA
HuA
ni state
HuM
Khaddam ul-Islam
Al-Faran
AMULFA
Tehrik al-Furqan
ULFSS
JeM
Ansar ul-Islam
RELATIONSHIP
MULFA
Jamaat-e-Furqa
PULF
DeM
al-Qanoon
Lashkar-e-Omar
LeT
Lashkar-e-Jabbar
LeJ
IIM
Al-Qaeda
Islamic National Front
PROFILE STATUS
(LABEL FONT)
Jamaat-ud-Dawa
SSP
MKM
─ Front
─ Joined
─ Merged
─ Offshoot
─ Predecessor
─ Same
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
APHC
The militant landscape in India has seen considerable change over time. In particular, Jamaat-e-Islami and other
Pakistani groups like HuM, JeM, LeT, and LeJ have a broad range of fronts, offshoots, and successors.
Core profile
External actor
Not profiled
79 | P a g e
FIGURE 23. FUNDING, GUIDANCE, INFLUENCE, AND SUPPORT
Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh
ARCF
Banat ul-Islam
IIM
ISS
Jihad Committee
JuM
MKM
UJI-B
uA
Bangladesh's DGFI
Pakistani state
REGION (NODE COLOR)
ULFA
• All-India
• Northeast India
• South India
• Kashmir
• Miscellaneous
Indian
• Pakistani
• Pakistan (official)
• International
MULTA
LeJ
UMLFA
MULFA
NSCN-IM
Afghan Taliban
l-Faran
ational Democratic Front
DP
amaat-e-Islami Kashmir
DeM
PULF
amaat-e-Islami (Hind)
JeM
AMULFA
SSP
nsar ul-Islam
ashkar-e-Jabbar
Pakistan's ISI
HuM
World Kashmiri Freedom Movement
ehrik al-Furqan
RELATIONSHIP
IM
amaat-e-Furqa
LFSS
LeT
UJI
URPI
slamic National Front
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
IDF
ndia's RAW
haddam ul-Islam
Jamaat-e-Islami
ehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
KIF
amaat-ud-Dawa
─ Funding
─ Guidance
─ Influence
─ Support
APHC
Al-Qaeda
SIMI
Al-Ummah
PROFILE STATUS
(LABEL FONT)
ashkar-e-Omar
l-Qanoon
International Islamic Federation of Student's Organizations (Kuwait)
Core profile
External actor
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (Riyadh)
Pakistan’s ISI has been implicated in supporting many Sunni militant organizations in India, ranging from PULF, MULTA,
MULFA, and AMULFA to LeJ, JeM, HuM, LeT, and IM.
Not profiled
80 | P a g e
FIGURE 24. DEGREE CENTRALITY
REGION (NODE COLOR)
Bangladesh's DGFI
IURPI
ULFSS
India's RAW
UMLFA
Al-Faran
HuA
Pakistani state
MULFA
Lashkar-e-Jabbar
DeM
AMULFA
NSCN-IM
JKIF
MULTA
ULFA
SSP
HUJI
APHC
World Kashmiri Freedom Movement
Pakistan's ISI
HuM
MKM
LeJ
ARCF
JuM
JeM
Ansar ul-Islam
RELATIONSHIP
Afghan Taliban
IIM
LeT
Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh
IM
Jamaat-e-Furqa
al-Qanoon
Tehrik al-Furqan
Banat ul-Islam
SIMI
Jamaat-e-Islami
Jamaat-ud-Dawa
Lashkar-e-Omar
Khaddam ul-Islam
ISS
Jamaat-e-Islami (Hind)
Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
HUJI-B
Al-Qaeda
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
Islamic National Front
PULF
National Democratic Front
International Islamic Federation of Student's Organizations (Kuwait)
Jihad Committee
Al-Ummah
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (Riyadh)
• All-India
• Northeast India
• South India
• Kashmir
• Miscellaneous
Indian
• Pakistani
• Pakistan (official)
• International
PDP
IDF
─ Attribution
─ Formed
─ Front
─ Funding
─ Guidance
─ Influence
─ Intermediary
─ Joined
─ Linked
─ Merged
─ Offshoot
─ Predecessor
─ Same
─ Support
─ Training
PROFILE STATUS (LABEL
FONT)
The ISI has the highest measure of degree centrality, followed by Pakistani groups like HuM, JeM, and LeT and then significant
Indian domestic actors like SIMI, MULTA, ISS, and DeM.
Core profile
External actor
Not profiled
81 | P a g e
FIGURE 25. BETWEENNESS
REGION (NODE COLOR)
Bangladesh's DGFI
IURPI
ULFSS
India's RAW
UMLFA
Al-Faran
HuA
Pakistani state
MULFA
Lashkar-e-Jabbar
DeM
JKIF
NSCN-IM
MULTA
ULFA
SSP
HUJI
APHC
AMULFA
World Kashmiri Freedom Movement
Pakistan's ISI
HuM
MKM
LeJ
ARCF
JuM
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
HUJI-B
Al-Qaeda
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
IIM
Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh
Ansar ul-Islam
IM
Jamaat-e-Furqa
Tehrik al-Furqan
Banat ul-Islam
SIMI
Jamaat-e-Islami
al-Qanoon
Jamaat-ud-Dawa
Lashkar-e-Omar
Khaddam ul-Islam
ISS
Jamaat-e-Islami (Hind)
Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir
RELATIONSHIP
Afghan Taliban
LeT
JeM
Islamic National Front
PULF
National Democratic Front
International Islamic Federation of Student's Organizations (Kuwait)
Jihad Committee
Al-Ummah
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (Riyadh)
PDP
IDF
ISI also ranks high in betweenness, followed by SIMI, HuM, JeM, and LeT
• All-India
• Northeast India
• South India
• Kashmir
• Miscellaneous
Indian
• Pakistani
• Pakistan (official)
• International
─ Attribution
─ Formed
─ Front
─ Funding
─ Guidance
─ Influence
─ Intermediary
─ Joined
─ Linked
─ Merged
─ Offshoot
─ Predecessor
─ Same
─ Support
─ Training
PROFILE STATUS
(LABEL FONT)
Core profile
External actor
Not profiled
82 | P a g e
8. CONCLUSION
S UMMARY OF F INDINGS
In this report, we have studied Sunni militancy in India using three principal approaches: a
quantitative overview of Sunni terrorism incidents and deaths for India as a whole; indepth qualitative profiles of individual militant groups; and a social network analysis of the
connections between these groups.
Our research shows that the vast majority of Sunni terror attacks in India take place in the
disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir, which has been at the center of the conflict
between India and Pakistan for more than 60 years. Outside Kashmir, attacks by Sunni
groups in India tend to be less frequent and more lethal. For example, three attacks, New
Delhi in October 2005 and Mumbai in July 2006 and November 2008, account for 50
percent of the total deaths from Sunni attacks outside Kashmir since 2004. Sunni terrorism
incidents and fatalities in India as a whole have been decreasing since 2008, with Kashmiri
terrorism starting to fall even earlier, in 2005.
The motivations of domestic militant groups can be divided three broad categories.
Regional and territorial grievances are most relevant in Kashmir and Northeast India, while
the threat of communal violence, especially versus Hindu nationalist groups, motivates AllIndia and South-India groups. Islamist ideology is a driver for groups in all regions,
including Pakistan, though not to the same degree for each group. Among domestic groups,
IM and SIMI have been most closely associated with terrorism, especially medium and highmortality attacks in India’s major cities.
Less operationally robust than their Pakistani counterparts, Indian groups lack the ability
to perpetrate attacks beyond India’s borders and rely in many ways on support and
guidance from groups based in Pakistan. The Pakistani groups offer assistance and, in turn,
leverage Indian groups to spread their influence and launch attacks in India. These
Pakistan-based militant groups are directly involved in both the high-frequency attacks in
Kashmir and the medium and high lethality attacks in Indian cities. As a result, we view
these Pakistan-based groups as the primary instigators of Sunni terrorism in India.
Because almost all the Pakistan-based groups have had ties to elements within Pakistan's
military and intelligence establishment, we believe the adversarial relationship between
the governments of India and Pakistan to be a central factor fueling the terrorism
component of Sunni militant violence in India. The India-Pakistan conflict has served as a
primary motivation for the Pakistani state to support Sunni terrorism, and for Pakistani
militants to launch attacks in India. It is not the only motivation, and it complements and
competes with others, including religious or jihadist ideology. Nevertheless, at present our
research shows a decisive Pakistani influence on Sunni terrorism in India, and this leads us
to accord a central explanatory role to the territorial dispute in Kashmir and the broader
political-religious conflict between India and Pakistan that predates their partition.
The non-terrorism component of Sunni militancy in India, on the other hand, is dominated
by domestic Indian actors. The riots of 1992 and 1993, violent street protests in Jammu and
83 | P a g e
Kashmir and violent communal mobilization in South India are all militant responses to
domestic territorial or communal grievances and show limited Pakistani involvement.
In the future, the domestic grievances of Sunni Muslims in India will continue to fuel nonterrorist forms of militancy, and as long as India and Pakistan's conflict persists, there will
be Pakistani actors willing to carry out terrorism in India and Sunni militant groups in India
willing to assist them.
I MPLICATIONS FOR U.S. I NTERESTS
Two elements of the Sunni militancy environment in India directly implicate U.S. interests.
The first and most acute is the anti-Western thread that has emerged in some Sunni terror
attacks in India and in the rhetoric of some Indian Sunni groups. The second is the
connection between Pakistan-based elements of Sunni militancy in India and the broader
India-Pakistan conflict, which has serious implications for the U.S. effort in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
Anti-Americanism has surfaced several times in our study of Sunni militancy in India; first
with SIMI’s praise for Osama bin Laden in the late 1990s, followed by the Asif Reza
Commando Force’s fatal shooting outside Kolkata’s American Center in 2002, and
subsequently with the direct targeting of Westerners in the LeT-perpetrated 2008 Mumbai
attacks. Another incident, the 2010 German Bakery bombing in Pune, India, is especially
significant because, while most Indian media sources and WITS list IM as the perpetrator,
Al-Qaeda commander Ilyas Kashmiri also implied his organization’s involvement in the
incident. Kashmiri has expressed a desire to export Mumbai-style combined-arms attacks
to European cities, suggesting that the influence of global jihadism on militancy in India
could also work in the opposite direction.318 Taken together, these disparate incidents
suggest that the ethos of anti-Western global jihadism is creeping into the terrorism
component of Sunni militancy in India. As such, policymakers should prepare for the
possibility that a future outbreak of Sunni terrorism in India could target Western interests
to an even greater extent than in the past.
Secondly, Given Pakistan's geostrategic importance, Pakistan’s engagement with Sunni
militancy in India has direct implications for US national security interests. The US mission
to disrupt, defeat, and dismantle Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot easily
succeed without active support from the Pakistani military, and yet the military of Pakistan
continues to view India as its primary threat.319 Crises such as the 2001 mobilization of
forces along the India-Pakistan border, and the Sunni militant attacks that precipitated
them, increase tensions between India and Pakistan, consume the attention of Pakistani
forces and therefore inevitably distract from Pakistan’s willingness and ability to fully assist
U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the border region with Afghanistan. Sunni militancy in India
is a problem not just for India, but also for the U.S.
318
319
Tim Lister, “Ilyas Kashmiri: The Most Dangerous Man on Earth?”, CNN.com, November 10, 2010.
LexisNexis.
Steve Coll, "War By Other Means," The New Yorker, 24 May 2010, p. 51.
i|Page
9. APPENDICES
M AJOR S ECONDARY S OURCES
DATABASE/SOURCE
WITS
WORLDWIDE INCIDENTS
TRACKING SYSTEM
https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDisco
verWITS/index.do?N=0
GTD
GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE
as of May 2008,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
in Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism
PROPRIETOR
YEARS
U.S. National
Counterterrorism
Center
2004 –
present
University of
Maryland &
DHS
1970 –
2008
NO. OF
EVENTS/
RECORDS
TYPE OF INFORMATION
5,947
Date, location, number of
casualties, type of
event/weapon/ victim/
perpetrator /target/facility
Over
87,000
Date, location
(region/country), perpetrator,
casualties/fatalities, nature of
weapon, attack, and target
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/
TOPS
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION
PROFILES
as of March 1, 2008,
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/d
ata_collections/tops/
SATP
SOUTH ASIA TERRORISM PORTAL
http://www.satp.org/
University of
Maryland,
DHS, and
Memorial
Institute for
the
Prevention of
Terrorism
(MIPT)
Present
Institute for
Conflict
Management
New Delhi
Present
856
Bases of operation, date
formed, strength (# of
members), classifications
(nationalist/separatist/
religious), financial sources,
founding philosophy, current
goals, key leaders, related
groups, US and other
government designations
Data and analysis on terrorism
and political conditions across
South Asia
ii | P a g e
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