DEPARTAMENTO

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DEPARTAMENTO....: CONTABILIDADE, FINANÇAS E CONTROLE (CFC)

CURSO.......................: CMA/CDA

DISCIPLINA..............: CORPORATE FINANCE

PROFESSOR..............: WESLEY MENDES DA SILVA

Contato: [email protected]

Semestre: 2o./2013

Versao: Mar/2013

PROGRAMA

OBJETIVOS DO CURSO

O objetivo do curso é discutir os fundamentos teóricos da Corporate Finance.

Quais são evolução teórica e aspectos empíricos para três principais decisões financeiras: Financiamento, Investimento e Governança Corporativa? O enfoque do curso será a abordagem de criação de valor aos acionistas em todas as dimensões da moderna teoria financeira.

CONTEÚDO

Corporate Finance under Perfect Capital Markets: Modigliani-Miller

Taxes and Capital Structure

Agency problems and capital structure

Adverse Selection and Capital Structure

Dividend Policy

Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)

Financing Constraints e Ciclo de negócio

Governança Corporativa

Security Design/The Structure of Corporate Liabilities

Near-Rational Investors and Corporate Finance

METODOLOGIA

O programa será desenvolvido através de aulas-expositivas baseadas em discussões dos artigos que serão indicados para cada tópico do programa. Não temos um livro texto para o curso.

CRITÉRIOS DE AVALIAÇÃO

Participação nas discussões ............................................................... 20%

Prova Parcial .................................................................................. . 40%

Exame Final .............................................................................. 40%

BIBLIOGRAFIA

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(CW chapters 15 and 16 respectively, provides some background reading, as well as a

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