DEPARTAMENTO....: CONTABILIDADE, FINANÇAS E CONTROLE (CFC)
CURSO.......................: CMA/CDA
DISCIPLINA..............: CORPORATE FINANCE
PROFESSOR..............: WESLEY MENDES DA SILVA
Contato: wesley.silva@fgv.br
Semestre: 2o./2013
Versao: Mar/2013
PROGRAMA
OBJETIVOS DO CURSO
O objetivo do curso é discutir os fundamentos teóricos da Corporate Finance.
Quais são evolução teórica e aspectos empíricos para três principais decisões financeiras: Financiamento, Investimento e Governança Corporativa? O enfoque do curso será a abordagem de criação de valor aos acionistas em todas as dimensões da moderna teoria financeira.
CONTEÚDO

Corporate Finance under Perfect Capital Markets: Modigliani-Miller

Taxes and Capital Structure

Agency problems and capital structure

Adverse Selection and Capital Structure

Dividend Policy

Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)
 Financing Constraints e Ciclo de negócio
 Governança Corporativa

Security Design/The Structure of Corporate Liabilities

Near-Rational Investors and Corporate Finance
METODOLOGIA
O programa será desenvolvido através de aulas-expositivas baseadas em discussões dos artigos que serão indicados para cada tópico do programa. Não temos um livro texto para o curso.
CRITÉRIOS DE AVALIAÇÃO
Participação nas discussões ............................................................... 20%

Prova Parcial .................................................................................. . 40%
Exame Final .............................................................................. 40%
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