Presentation Summary by Gordon Crawford
Leeds University, UK
On Facilitating Democratic Reforms: Learning from Democratic Principles
Dialogue on Canada’s Approach to Democratic Development
Ottawa, 15 February 2007
Introduction
Over the past 25 years, relations between the West and the rest of the world have been
dominated by the advocacy of two sets of reforms, economic and political, by western
governments and the international institutions they dominate. The 1980s and 90s were
the decades of economic liberalisation, with structural adjustment programmes in the
developing world and ‘shock therapy’ free market reforms (post-1989) in the postcommunist countries. With the end of the cold war, political reform was added to the
agenda in the 1990s, with the advocacy of political liberalisation and democratisation in
both developing and transition countries. After two decades of economic reform, two
main criticisms emerged: a) the imposition of economic liberalisation through
conditionality; and b) the imposition of a ‘one-size fits all model’ whatever the particular
country context. The response by the World Bank and IMF was the shift in late 1999
from structural adjustment programmes to poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs).
As is well-known, the PRSP process is based on five principles, though there is much
controversy regarding the extent to which these are implemented. Although an equally
focused critique of political reform efforts is yet to emerge, this presentation similarly
attempts to articulate a set of principles for guiding the efforts of external actors to
engage positively in ‘democracy building strategies’. These are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Country authorship
Democratic dialogue
Participation and Inclusion
Legitimacy
Commitment
1. Country authorship
The process of democratic reform must be locally-driven. This principle is based on the
fundamental point that democratisation is an endogenous process. It cannot be
imposed from outside. It is my view that the concept of ‘exporting democracy’ is an
oxymoron. Democracy can neither be exported nor imported. It has to be developed
from within. There can be a role for external actors, certainly, but one that facilitates and
supports country-driven processes.
The principle of country authorship is similar to the oft-heard notion of local ownership, a
concept that has gained much credence in development discourses in recent times. Yet
I have substituted authorship for ownership for two reasons. First, the idea of ownership
has become somewhat overused and devalued, amounting at times to little more than
consultation of local opinion in order to provide endorsement for an externally-designed
programme. Therefore, secondly, the term authorship is more robust, suggesting more
strongly that external democracy promotion programmes place themselves under local
guidance and control. I have argued this more fully in relation to programme evaluation
and my advocacy of a participatory approach to evaluation, one where lessons learnt
would be integrated into revised donor strategies that are guided more effectively by
domestic priorities (Crawford 2003).
The rationale for domestic authorship of donors’ country assistance strategies is that
local perspectives provide a better understanding of the distinctive problems of
democratic reform faced in a particular context. Essentially, external actors must listen
to local voices. These will be plural voices. There will be different and even
contradictory voices, but such processes of deliberation and debate are themselves
fundamental to what democracy is about.
2. Democratic Dialogue
The second principle, that of democratic dialogue, is a vital part of democratisation itself
as well as a method by which the first, country authorship, can be achieved. One
important role for external actors is to facilitate and support such processes of national
democratic dialogue. Such dialogue can bring together a wide range of key domestic
actors and organisations for deliberation and discussion on the process of
democratisation in a country, inclusive of a range of thematic topics, (such as the roles
of political parties, civil society, parliament and the judiciary in democratic governance).
Democratic dialogue can be particularly important at the time of democratic transition,
especially in relation to the establishment of a constituent assembly and deliberation on
a new constitution (for example, Nepal at present), but remains vital throughout periods
of consolidation. Such dialogue is especially pertinent in relation to post-conflict
democracy building and the peaceful management of differences and divisions. The
facilitation of national political dialogue has been a feature of the work of International
IDEA, in Indonesia for instance (International IDEA 2000), and IDEA’s democracy
assessment methodology (Beetham et al. 2002) is not only a tool for structuring such
dialogue, but also the outcome is a report on the state of democracy in the particular
country.
Therefore the facilitation of democratic dialogue can serves two purposes. First, it
stimulates public debate about ongoing democratic reform processes in the country
concerned, itself vital for ongoing democratisation. Second, one outcome is the
identification of a reform programme that can be used by external actors as the basis for
their support, thus providing a strategy that is country-driven.
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3. Participation and Inclusion
A further question involves asking who contributes to processes of democratic
dialogue? In principle, everyone should have the opportunity to contribute, in line with
the principle of political equality that is inherent in democracy. In practice this is not
feasible, but it is important nonetheless that processes aim to be as participatory and
inclusive as possible. There is clearly a need for the active engagement of those wellinformed and committed individuals and organisations who are involved in the range of
pro-democracy activities, both within and outside of government, (for instance, political
parties, civil society organisations, women’s organisations, the media, faith groups and
academics). Efforts are also essential to widen participation and to ensure the inclusion
of representatives from under-represented groups. Most significantly, this entails
attention to gender inequalities in political representation and to the promotion of the
political participation of women. Additionally, it is important to extend such process of
dialogue and deliberation beyond the capital city and beyond the typical Westernfunded, capital-city based advocacy NGOs.
4. Legitimacy
Democracy promotion by its nature entails the intervention by external actors in internal
political affairs. This raises questions concerning infringements of sovereignty, and thus
it is incumbent on democracy promoters to demonstrate that their activities are
undertaken in a legitimate manner. This is particularly relevant in the current context of
the ‘backlash against democracy promotion’ highlighted by Tom Carothers in his recent
article in Foreign Affairs. Carothers (2006: 56?) notes the recent trend by relatively
authoritarian governments to denounce Western democracy assistance as illegitimate
interference in their internal political affairs and to place restrictions on the foreign
funding of NGOs and political parties. This occurred initially in states of the former
Soviet Union (Russia, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan), but with the
backlash spreading to Africa (Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Eritrea) and Latin America
(Venezuela) (ibid.). One key explanation for this backlash is clearly the fear of some
(semi-)authoritarian rulers of being undermined by powerful external actors, the “fear of
orange” as Carothers (2006: p.56?) puts it. But illegitimate practices by self-styled
democracy promoters can contribute substantially to the distrust and unease about
democracy promotion that has emerged in different parts of the world. In particular, I
would assert that the Bush administration has done great damage to international
democracy promotion through associating it with regime change, most notably in Iraq. It
is thus imperative that democracy promotion be pursued in a legitimate manner. At a
minimum this entails consistency, a lack of double standards and an even-handed, nonpartisan approach. I will briefly look at each.
Consistency?
Regarding consistency, there are three possible dimensions, with Western governments
and international institutions having to ask themselves the following questions.
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First, is there consistency in the treatment of different countries and regions? In
previous work, I have highlighted the inconsistent way in which political conditionality
and aid sanctions were imposed (Crawford 2001). Sanctions were more likely in small,
aid dependent countries in sub-Saharan Africa, much less likely where the West had
significant economic and/or geo-strategic interests, for example, Indonesia under
Suharto or Egypt under Mubarak, despite their poor human rights records.
Second, is there consistency amongst international actors? Or is a clear and robust
stand against authoritarian practices by one actor being undermined by another? The
latter has unfortunately been the case even within the EU at times. The example of
Togo stands out, where one member state, France, effectively undermined EU policy,
aptly summed up as a case of ‘One Union, Two Policies’.
Third, is there consistency with other foreign policy activities? Or is democracy
promotion trumped by other foreign policy goals? There is always the suspicion that
democracy will be promoted where it concurs with other economic and security
interests, but downplayed where there are economic or security reasons for staying on
friendly terms with (semi-)authoritarian regimes (Carothers 2004: 7), with numerous
past examples – Indonesia under Suharto, Egypt under Mubarak, Algeria in the early
1990s, Nigeria under military rule in the 1980s and 1990s, Uzbekistan in the post-9/11
period (2001-05).
Double Standards?
It is crucial that donor countries themselves uphold human rights and democratic
principles and are not subject to the accusation of hypocrisy and double standards. In
this respect the current US administration has severely damaged its own credibility in
much of the rest of the world, purporting to promote democracy while violating human
rights in various ways (for example, Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, ‘extraordinary
rendition’, the violation of civil liberties in the US itself). As Carothers (2006) states,
“How can a country that tortures people abroad and abuses rights at home tell other
countries how to behave”.
Non-partisan?
A further aspect of legitimacy is to ensure the adoption of a strictly non-partisan and
impartial standpoint. This is especially important in relation to political party assistance.
In this area external actors must demonstrate a clear intent to support the consolidation
of a multiparty democracy, working with both government and opposition parties, rather
than providing partisan support to particular pro-Western or economically liberal parties.
This is vital at a time when the Bush administration’s policies have led to the equation of
democracy promotion with regime change in the eyes of many. The work of the
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy is perhaps an example of good practice
here.
5. Commitment
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The importance of commitment by external actors to significant, long-term support is
based on the recognition that democratisation is both a gradual and a reversible
process. There is absolutely no guaranteed or linear progression towards democratic
consolidation. The need for commitment also acknowledges that democracy assistance
is not simply a quick, technical and financial fix, such as electoral support every five or
so years, but entails a long-term perspective in which serious consideration is given to
complex processes of democratic reform. The importance of commitment is highlighted
by Tom Carothers’ concept of the ‘gray zone’. In his article on the ‘end of the transition
paradigm’, he notes that “of the nearly 100 countries considered as ‘transitional’ in
recent years, only a relatively small number – probably fewer than 20 – are clearly en
route to becoming successful, well-functioning democracies” (Carothers 2002: 9), with
the large majority having entered the ‘gray zone’ of neither dictatorial nor democratic.
This includes a large number of countries that may present the trappings of democracy,
such as holding regular elections, but suffer from such serious democratic deficits that
they are best described as semi-authoritarian (ibid.). The concept of waves of
democratisation has always involved the notion of a backwash where a number of
countries revert to (semi-)authoritarian rule of one sort or another. In the case of the
third wave of democratisation, now truly over in terms of new transitions, perhaps one
role for external actors is to try to minimise the backwash and to maintain the
democratic advancement of a larger proportion of countries than would otherwise be the
case. This would entail commitment in both quantitative and qualitative terms, that is a
preparedness for long-term support over a number of years and an attentiveness to the
complex and very different political realities in individual countries.
Yet, what is the record of Western governments and international institutions? Despite
all the policy statements and declarations, how serious are they about democracy
promotion? The record is at best mixed. On the one hand, there is no doubt that
international support for democracy has increased over the past decade and a half. The
World Bank stated in its World Development Report 2004 that democracy assistance
has increased ten-fold in the 1990s, from 0.5% of official development assistance in
1991 to 5% in 2000, with total expenditure of approximately US $3billion per year. It is
very likely that this figure has increased again in the first half of the current decade. On
the other hand, there is considerable evidence that the rhetoric about democracy
promotion is not matched by the reality of actual support.
Take the EU for instance. The EU provides over half of development assistance
globally, yet very little is spent on democracy assistance, especially in the European
Community’s own development programmes. I am on record as stating that the EU is
‘high on rhetoric and low on delivery’, with this statement backed up by my case-study
work on Ghana (Crawford 2005). But let me rely here on the work of Richard Youngs
and give three other examples. First, the budget for the European Initiative on
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) only represented about 1% of EC development
assistance (Youngs 2001: 31). Second, under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
(EMP), Richard Youngs (2001: 84) reports that from 1996-99, democracy assistance
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only amounted to 0.3% of all EU aid to the Mediterranean region, which includes North
Africa and the Middle East. Further, between 2001 and 2003, he states that funding to
the Middle East from EIDHR actually halved to €7m. (Youngs 2004: 10). My favourite
quote from Youngs is that, “In the year after 9/11, the EU gave over twenty times more
money for the preservation of historical sites in the Middle East than for democracy
building” (Youngs 2004: 10).
It is the case that democracy assistance requires less expenditure than other forms of
development assistance, such as budget support and infrastructural development. But it
can also be argued that 5% of the aid budget does not represent sufficient resources for
such a high profile aid objective and does not demonstrate the commitment required for
long-term engagement in complex processes of political reform.
Concluding remarks
While recognising that the precise strategy employed in individual countries will depend
on the particular country context, this contribution has outlined five principles as an
overall basis for undertaking international democracy promotion. The latter two
principles, legitimacy and commitment, call on the democracy promoters to make sure
that their approach is both genuine and serious, and not blighted either by association
with regime change or by a rhetoric-reality gap. The first three principles, country
authorship, democratic dialogue and participation and inclusion, pertain to the manner
in which democracy is promoted, suggesting that democracy cannot be exported and
that it is essential that external support for democratic reform is in accord with the very
principles and processes of democratisation itself.
References
Beetham, D., S. Bracking, I. Kearton and S. Weir (2002) International IDEA Handbook
on Democracy Assessment, Kluwer Law International, The Hague.
Carothers, T (2002), ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’ in Journal of Democracy
vol.13 no.1.
Carothers, T. (2004), Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C.
Carothers, T. (2006), ‘The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion’, in Foreign Affairs
vol.85 no.2.
Crawford, G. (2001), Foreign Aid and Political Reform: A Comparative Analysis of
Democracy Assistance and Political Conditionality, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Crawford, G. (2003), ‘Promoting democracy from without: learning from within’ in
Democratization, vol.10 no.2, pp.1-20.
Crawford, G. (2005), ‘The European Union and Democracy Promotion in Africa: The
Case of Ghana’ in European Journal of Development Research, vol.17 no.4.
International IDEA (2000), Democratization in Indonesia: An Assessment, International
IDEA, Stockholm.
World Bank (2004), World Development Report 2004, World Bank, Washington D.C.
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Youngs, R. (2001), The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy: Europe’s
Mediterranean and Asian Policies, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Youngs, R. (2004), ‘Europe’s Uncertain Pursuit of Middle East Reform’, Carnegie
Papers No.45, June 2004, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington
D.C.
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