SCUSA 63
Thinking Beyond Boundaries:
Contemporary Challenges to U.S. Foreign Policy
Challenges and Opportunities in Sino-American Relations
China’s explosion onto the world stage as a great power has been one of the most salient
developments of the past few decades. Some argue that the 21st Century will, in fact, be
“China’s Century.” In any case, the relationship between great powers, especially the United
States and China, will shape the contours of the international system for the foreseeable future.
China has risen from a century of humiliation and exploitation at the hands of imperial
powers and from decades of internal turmoil, repression, and failed economic policies. Mao
Zedong’s ruthless and autocratic rule from the PRC’s independence in 1949 to his death in 1976
left China hungry, poor, and backward. Since Deng Xiaoping’s economic opening reforms
began, however, China has evolved into a country with an advanced and globalized economy
that is second only to the US in size. With growth rates consistently above nine percent, the
world’s largest cash reserve, and a massive export sector, China has positioned itself as a force to
be reckoned with on the international stage.1
China’s precipitous rise has been accentuated, in part, by the United States’ stagnation.
While China emerges from the global recession relatively unscathed, the United States is
concerned with possible deflation, high levels of unemployment, a languid manufacturing sector,
and a trade deficit with China that has ballooned to $273 billion in 2010.2 While China extends
its spheres of influence into Africa and beyond, the US seeks haltingly to extricate itself from
draining foreign commitments. With a view to these facts, some argue that the United States has
entered an era of hegemonic decline.3
China’s meteoric rise coupled with the United States’ stagnation present multiple vexing
questions to U.S. policymakers as they reconsider U.S.-China relations. In regards to China
what are the limits to U.S. power?4 How much leverage, and in what areas, does the United
States have? Should U.S. foreign policy towards China be shaped by realpolitik or through
international institutions, norms, and ideas?
China: Status Quo or Revisionist Power?
The current debate on Sino-American relations centers around two competing views:
according to one view, China is the United States’ principal competitor; according to the other,
See Bijian Zheng, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great Power Status,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5 (Sep/Oct
2005): 18-24.
2
U.S. Census Bureau, “Trade in Goods with China,” http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html
(accessed Sep 15, 2011).
3
See Gilpin for a discussion on hegemonic decline. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1981).
4
Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 1-2. Power is
the capacity to affect change and the ability to influence others. True power is self-legitimizing, purposeful, and
strategic in securing national interests. Power grows when others recognize the capacity, latent or otherwise, a state
possesses. Power is the foundation of force, but an excessive employment of force can erode the power foundation.
1
2
China is the United States’ principal partner in solving increasingly complex problems that
require multilateral responses. Which of these views is correct depends in large part on China
rather than the United States. In the anarchic system characterized by uncertainty among states,
U.S. policymakers must craft foreign policy based on their assessment of China’s aspirations and
strategy. China may be content to follow a strategy by which they accept the West’s
international institutions, or it may reject the Western-dominated international system altogether.
China’s acceptance into the World Trade Organization, increased participation in regional
organizations, deployments to neighboring states to assist with humanitarian disasters, and its
participation in policing the waters off the Horn of Africa are examples of the former; China’s
call for a new international currency to replace the dollar is an example of the latter.5
Will China seek regional hegemony or will it reach some mutually-satisfactory powersharing arrangement with the United States? Defining China as a status-quo or revisionist power
is useful in that it may illuminate the prospects for conflict or cooperation in this relationship.6
This, in turn, will help us best prescribe appropriate policies to fit our economic, military, and
political strategies. If the U.S. and China are in a spiral environment, perhaps the United States
should pursue “positive-sum” policies that incentivize mutual trust, transparency, and economic
ties in order to minimize the likelihood of internecine conflict. On the other hand, if the U.S. and
China exist in a deterrence environment, maybe the U.S. should pursue a “zero-sum” strategy
which views any relative increase in Chinese power as a long-term threat to the national security
and economic interest of the U.S.7 A third alternative might envision a hedging strategy as a
combination of the two.
Another critical question policymakers must ask is: What drives China’s and other
Southeast Asian states’ balancing behavior? Will states balance when there is a shift in power or
threat? Moreover, will Southeast Asian states balance against the greatest power in the region
for security, or will they bandwagon with the greatest power in the region for profit?
International and Domestic Constraints
Both the United States and China operate under unique international and domestic
imperatives that cannot be ignored in assessing the prospects for their bilateral relationship. The
two-level game faced by leaders from both states constrains their freedom of action in important
ways. On the international level, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is
supremely concerned with the “twin goals of security and great power status” in the international
arena.8 On the first matter, China has benefitted from a relatively benign environment over the
last thirty years. China has settled many of its decades-old border disputes with Russia,
Vietnam, and others; it has quelled uprisings in Tibet and among other ethnic minorities, and it
has pursued bilateral and multilateral relationships as well as trade with each of the actors in the
See Johnston for a critique and analysis of the status-quo vs. revisionist literature. Alistair Johnston, “Is China a
Status Quo Power?” International Security 27, 4 (Spring 2003): 5-56.
6
See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1976) for a discussion of spiral model and deterrent models of interstate relations.
7
Thomas Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy
Toward East Asia” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer 2006): 81.
8
Ibid.
5
3
region.9 However, the Taiwan issue and China’s military modernization have caused angst
among regional powers and the United States. The second matter -- securing China’s status as a
great power – has caused more concern for Chinese leaders. After a century of humiliation and
its legacy of distrust of outside powers, the CCP is frequently unwilling to make concessions in
the international arena for fear of being exploited.
On the domestic side, the CCP faces a volatile public at home and must maintain a
delicate balance between the powerful forces of nationalism and economic growth. Nationalism
is a “potent force” that has been manipulated by the Chinese government to divert attention from
domestic grievances in the past, but it has also backfired on the party in unexpected ways.10
Examples include the May 4th movement, the Hundred Flowers Campaign, and the Tiananmen
Square massacre. Delivering stability to the Chinese people while gently nurturing the unifying
tendencies of nationalistic sentiment will be an ongoing challenge to the PRC’s leaders. While
controlling Chinese nationalism, the CCP must maintain stable and high economic growth. It
has succeeded admirably at this task over the past few decades; however, given the globalized
economy and China’s dependence on foreign consumption, the CCP may have difficulty
sustaining China’s economic growth over the decades to come.
The United States similarly faces a number of constraints internationally and
domestically. On the international plane, the Obama administration must carefully protect U.S.
influence through its security, economic, and diplomatic instruments while managing its
withdrawal from Iraq, its drawdown in Afghanistan, and limited international political capital.
Domestically, presidential and legislative elections are a year away, high unemployment
concerns overshadow foreign policy interests, and gridlock between the administration and
Congress makes policymaking of any kind a herculean task.
Aside from these constraints, specific points of friction in Sino-American relations
include the Taiwan issue and China’s military modernization. Since Chiang Kai Shek and the
Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) fled to Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War, the U.S.
and the CCP have been at odds over Taiwan’s status. While China views Taiwan as part of its
sovereign territory (and therefore not subject to international meddling), the United States has
established a series of precedents demonstrating American commitment to supporting the
democratic aspirations of the people of Taiwan. The CCP, however, views Taiwan’s eventual
reunification as critical to the party’s legitimacy and therefore is unwilling to harbor U.S.
involvement in what it sees as a domestic affair.
China’s rise has also been accompanied, not surprisingly, by increasing military might
and corresponding friction with the U.S. In the wake of international condemnation of the
Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 and the incredible technological superiority demonstrated
shortly afterwards by US forces during the First Gulf War, China set out to modernize its
military and reduce its dependence on other powers. Deng Xiaoping’s strategy guiding the
development of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) envisioned the security of China’s borders
9
Taylor Fravel, “Regime insecurity and international cooperation,” International Security 30, no. 2 (2005), 46.
Suisheng Zhao, “Nationalism’s Double Edge,” The Wilson Quarterly 29, no.4 (Autumn 2005): 77.
10
4
and the ability to use force to prevent Taiwan’s independence.11 Presidents Jiang and Hu have
continued to fuel the PLA with annual double-digit budget increases. China’s annual defense
budget for 2009 was $150 billion, an increase of 7.5% from the prior year. China colors its
military modernization as a defensive measure designed to protect its security, but its policies
have often put it at odds with the U.S. China disabled a U.S. intelligence plane in 2001, it
harassed U.S. naval ships off its coast, and has bristled at recent U.S. – South Korean joint naval
exercises.12 China is also developing sophisticated technology to be able to attack military
forces at great distances when they attempt to deploy or maneuver in the vicinity of Taiwan
(which China watchers call anti-access and area denial strategies).13 The test flight of the
China’s J-20 stealth aircraft in January 2011 and the sea trials of its first aircraft carrier in August
are merely the two most recent sources of friction between the two states. U.S. policymakers
express deep concern over China’s growing defense budget, lack of transparency, and its
assertive military posture. How should the U.S. assess Chinese aspirations in the near- and longterm, and how should it respond in the event of future military provocation?
Opportunities
While it is tempting to consider only the potential pitfalls that could stymie productive
and mutually beneficial Sino-U.S. relations, a number of opportunities beyond the boundaries of
traditional diplomacy exist. First, given the tremendous power that a combined effort by the
U.S. and China represents, there is enormous potential for this bilateral relationship to achieve
what no other bilateral relationship can. Because of their financial and trade interdependence,
moreover, both states have incentives to see that neither one falters. This bilateral relationship
represents over 1/3 of the world’s economic activity and almost a quarter of the world’s
population. Some have described the locus of power in this century as the “G2.”
Several open questions in the international community cannot be solved without the
unified efforts of both the U.S. and China. Chief among these is the maintenance of a
functioning and stable global economy. The U.S. and the China were key players in executing
coordinated stimulus packages to head off the economy’s crash in 2008-2009. Secondly, climate
change and environmental protection more broadly must be addressed by both states given that
both have contributed to the problem and both stand to suffer from the depletion of the global
commons. Third, the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council as the body charged
with providing for a stable international system has been in serious doubt as China and the U.S.
routinely block collective action within the international community. A renewed agenda
involving common priorities could breathe new life into an institution that many view as the
source of international law.
11
David C. Gompert, François Godement, Evan S. Medeiros, and James C. Mulvenon, China on the Move: A
Franco-American Analysis of Emerging Chinese Strategic Policies and Their Consequences for Transatlantic
Relations, RAND, 2005, 39.
12
See David Sanger and Elisabeth Rosenthal, “U.S. Plane in China After It Collides with Chinese Jet,” New York
Times, April 2, 2001; Thom Shanker and Mark Mazzetti, “China & U.S. Clash on Naval Fracas,” New York Times,
March 10, 2009; and Elisabeth Bumiller and Edward Wong, “China Warily Eyes U.S. –Korea Drills,” New York
Times, July 20, 2010.
13
Roger Cliff et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the
United States, RAND, 2007, xiii-xiv.
5
Policy Prescriptions
Given the uncertainty inherent in the international system, and in light of the domestic
and international challenges faced by leaders on both sides of the Pacific, what policies should
U.S. leaders support in their engagement with China? On the strategic level, what can China and
the U.S. hope to achieve in the areas of proliferation of nuclear weapons, climate change, energy
security, trade, institutions, alliances, and cyber security? Can the United States and China find
common ground on a myriad of complex issues? How can the United States best leverage its
influence in order to maintain its power in the region and the world?
In the realm of economics, the U.S. regularly recites a litany of Chinese sins. China
strategically depresses the value of its currency and thus gains an unfair comparative advantage
over U.S. companies, accuses the US; China looks the other way while U.S. goods are pirated,
leading US companies to lose billions of dollars each year; China attempts to steal U.S.
company secrets, barraging American companies with cyber attacks. But to what degree can
the U.S. use economic force to change these harmful economic practices? 14 The US might resort
to tariffs and other protectionist measures, but it is not necessarily wise to use these tools against
the chief holder of U.S. debt. U.S. policymakers worry that China may respond to U.S.
economic force by dumping U.S. bonds and treasury notes to devastate the US economy,
although in doing so China would depreciate one of its most valuable assets and compromise its
chief export market.15
Due to U.S. military arms and equipment sales to Taiwan, military relations between the
US and China have been spotty at best.16 What steps can the U.S. military take to thaw militaryto-military relations with China? Can the U.S. and China find an accommodation that avoids
conflict? How should the U.S. respond to an increasingly assertive Chinese military?
More broadly, how can U.S. policymakers, who tend to think in terms of presidential
terms, effectively engage with Chinese policymakers who think in terms of dynastic cycles? Are
there appropriate policies that balance between traditionally near-sighted U.S. policies and longterm Chinese foreign policy objectives? What alliances, nuclear posture, energy security, and
regional engagement strategies will be able to most effectively advance U.S. interests without
provoking an overreaction from China?
Conclusion
Managing the relationship with China is a critical task for U.S. policymakers. Americans
sometimes view China’s rise as a relative power loss in a zero-sum game, and yet this
relationship presents unprecedented potential for directing vast stores of political capital and
economic resources towards the achievement of real and lasting global change. While the
consequences of miscalculation and misperception loom large, the payoffs from a productive
partnership are immense. America’s unipolar moment may be over. But as the United States
recalibrates its position in the world, American policymakers can have an important impact by
creating strategies that go beyond the boundaries of traditional diplomacy.
14
Economic force comes in the form of both carrots and sticks; it has the ability to compel, coerce, and attract other
states.
15
Paul Krugman, “China, Japan, America,” New York Times, September 12, 2010.
16
Thom Shanker, “Pentagon Cites Concerns in China Military Growth,” New York Times, August 16, 2010.
6
Recommended Readings
Christensen, Thomas. “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S.
Policy Toward East Asia.” International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 81-126.
Christensen, Thomas. “Power and Resolve in U.S. China Policy.” International Security
26, No. 2 (Fall 2001): 155-165.
Friedberg, Aaron. “The Future of U.S. – China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International
Security 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005): 7-45.
Ikenberry, John. “The Rise of China & the Future of the West.” Foreign Affairs 87, No. 1
(Jan/Feb 2008): 23-37.
Mahbubani, Kishore. “Understanding China.” Foreign Affairs 84, No. 5 (Sep/Oct 2005):
49-60.
Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China, 2010.” Annual Report to Congress 2010.
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf
Shambaugh, David. “Containment or Engagement of China?” International Security 21,
No. 2 (Fall 1996): 180-209
Zhao, Suisheng. “Nationalism’s Double Edge.” The Wilson Quarterly 29, No.4 (Autumn
2005): 76-82.
Zweig, David and Bi Jainhai. “China’s Global Hunt for Energy.” Foreign Affairs 84, No.
5 (Sep/Oct 2005): 25-38.
Additional Readings
Economic Policy
Hughes, Neil. “A Trade War with China?” Foreign Affairs 84, No. 4 (July/Aug 2005): 94-106.
Krugman, Paul. “China, Japan, America.” New York Times (12 September 2010).
Miller, Ken. “Coping with China’s Financial Power.” Foreign Affairs 89, No. 4 (July/Aug
2010): 96-109.
7
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 2009 Report to Congress. November
2009.
http://www.uscc.gov
Energy Policy
Bradsher, Keith. “China Leading Global Race to Make Clean Energy.” New York Times (30
January 2010).
Broad, William. “China Explores a Frontier 2 Miles Deep.” New York Times (11 September
2010).
Political Policy
Applebaum, Anne. “China’s Quiet Power Grab.” Washington Post (28 September 2010).
Christensen, Thomas J. “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict.”
The Washington Quarterly (Autumn 2002): 7-20.
http://www.twq.com/02autumn/christensen.pdf.
Christensen, Thomas J. “A Strong and Moderate Taiwan,” speech to US-Taiwan business
Council, September 11, 2007.
http://www.ait.org.tw/en/officialtext-ot0715.html
Fishman, Ted C. China Inc.: How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America and the
World. New York: Scribner, 2005.
Jacobs, Andrew. “China Warns U.S. to Stay Out of Islands Dispute.” New York Times (26 July
2010).
Johnston, Alastair. “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27, No. 4 (Spring
2003): 5-56.
Pehrson, Christopher J. “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power across
the Asian Littoral.” From the Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
Russ, Robert and Zhu Feng, eds. China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of
International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007.
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Shambaugh, David. “Facing Reality in China Policy.” Foreign Affairs 80, No. 1 (Jan/Feb
2001): 50-64.
Swaine, Michael D. “China’s Assertive Behavior - Part One: On ‘Core Interests,’” China
Leadership Monitor, no. 34 (Feb 2011): 1-11.
Wang, Jisi. “China’s Search for Stability with America.” Foreign Affairs 84, No. 5 (Sep/Oct
2005): 39-48.
Military Policy
Bumiller, Elisabeth and Edward Wong. “China Warily Eyes U.S. –Korea Drills.” New York
Times (20 July 2010).
Burles, Mark, and Abram Shulsky. “Patterns in China’s Use of Force: Evidence from History
and Doctrinal Writings.” RAND, 2000.
Fravel, M. Taylor. “China’s Search for Military Power.” The Washington Quarterly 31 (Summer
2008): 125-129, 135-139
Medeiros, Evan, et al. Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in
East Asia to China’s Rise. RAND, 2008.
Robinson, Peter and Gopal Ratnam. “Pentagon Losing Control of Bombs to China’s Monopoly.”
Bloomberg Businessweek (29 September 2010).
Ross, Robert. “China’s Naval Nationalism.” International Security 34, No. 2 (Fall 2009): 46-81.
Wong, Edward. “Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power.” New York Times (23 April
2010).
Strategic Thinking
Friedberg, Aaron L. “The Struggle for Mastery in Asia.” Commentary (November 2000): 17-26.
Goldstein, Avery. “An Emerging China’s Emerging Grand Strategy: A Neo-Bismarckian Turn?”
In G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the
Asia-Pacific. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003, 57-106.
Lai, David. “Learning From the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept,
Shi.” Strategic Studies Institute. May 2004.
McCormick, Barrett. The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds. Berkeley:
Berkley Press, 2008.