The Islamic Discourses on European Polity
Ari Varon
Muslims in Europe do not present a demographic threat to European society. However, as
Muslims living in Europe mobilize socially and politically changes in European policy, politics
and polity are an almost certainty. At the heart of the discussion is how Muslims in Europe seek
to integrate, or not, between Western and Islamic concepts of religion, the nation state and the
law. As Muslims in Europe gradually overcome social cleavages and ethnic differences they
often challenge the secular nature and religious neutrality of European polity1 re-invigorating a
historic clash between two hierarchical systems – secular and religious - regulating European
governance.2
The following paper outlines what Muslims living in Europe are saying about the status quo
definitions of European polity on three core principles of European polity: religion, the state and
relations to the law.
1. Do Muslims in Europe believe Islam is compatible with the European understanding of
secularism based in the historical Christian experience?
2. Does the state represent the source of rights within society or does Islam? Should
Muslims in Europe promote the interests of the state ahead of the Islamic nation in their
daily actions? Is there a middle ground in Islam between nationalism and Islamic
identity?
1
polity" Dictionary of the Social Sciences. Craig Calhoun, ed. Oxford University Press 2002. Oxford Reference
Online. Oxford University Press. Tel Aviv University. 22 October 2010
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t104.e1288>
2
Juergensmeyer, Mark. “The New Religious State.” Comparative Politics 27, no. 4 (1995): pg 381
3. Is Sharia’h law acceptable in Europe for Muslims instead or above the secular legal
system? Should Muslims be allowed to have an Islamic civil court similar to the Jewish
Beiti Di’n in Europe? If so under what conditions?
Not only are there multiple answers these questions, there exists an intense debate within
Europe’s Muslim communities as to the relevance and implications of each of the issues
presented. As I argue, only through understanding the different Muslim perspectives on these
fundamental normative values does it become possible to explore the trends and ramifications of
the political mobilization of Muslims living in Europe.
But what do we mean when we say Muslims living in Europe? It is crucial to clarify some
elementary information relating to the Muslim population of Europe. Approximately 21 million
citizens and residents (out of 500 million in the EU) are Muslims.3 The origins of Europe’s
Muslim population comes from over 30 countries of origin has reached with significant
generational connections ranging from new immigrants to fifth generation. Each European
country deals with a diverse Muslim population often stemming from its colonial past.4 Given
the great social diversity social unification and political mobilization of Muslims living in
Europe has been an arduous process with multiple inherent obstacles remaining.5
3
CSIS Report: Muslim Integration: Challenging Conventional Wisdom in Europe and the United States,
2007 – www.csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070920_muslimintegration.pdf last accessed 4.5.11
4
For example the Muslim population of the United Kingdom mainly originates from Pakistan and India, of
Germany from Turkey and of France from Morocco and Algeria.
5
Carolyn M. Warner and Manfred W. Wenner; "Religion and the Political Organization of Muslims in
Europe"Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Sep., 2006), pp. 457-479
Although the recent influx of Muslim immigration started as a temporary work force rebuilding
Europe after World War II, issues of political mobilization have become relevant over the last
two decades. Even a glimpse at the events of the past two years highlight the growing
consequences of political mobilization of Europe’s Muslim communities including: A Swiss
referendum against minarets on Mosques in Switzerland (November 2009), anti-burqa legislation
in France (July 2010 and April 2011), political controversy in England of a large mosque in
central London to accommodate worshipers for the 2012 Olympic games, socio-political events
affecting elections in Holland, Sweden and Belgium. As well as the recent declaration from three
EU leaders – Cameron, Sarkozy and Merkel – declaring the national policy of multiculturalism
has failed.6 In short, Muslims in Europe are in many ways seeking unity out of their diversity.7 In
the mean time, the list of ways Muslims living in Europe influence European society continues to
grow while the social issues at stake in Europe become more prevalent.
Another connection has recently become relevant due to the massive influx of Arab immigration
to Europe as a direct result of the geo-political changes happening throughout the Middle East
since January 2011, especially the inter-European issues it raises. While it is far too early to
determine the outcome of events on the Middle East let alone its influence on Europe, once thing
is clear, stability in the Middle East has been shaken. Issues of an Arab democracy have recently
grabbed the attention of Middle East countries, European policy makers, academics and
journalists. Part of the importance of understanding the Islamic Discourses on European polity, I
suggest, is to understand the varying ways Muslims living in Europe’s liberal democracy view
“Sarkozy declares multiculturalism "a failure” France 24, http://www.france24.com/en/20110210multiculturalism-failed-immigration-sarkozy-live-broadcast-tf1-france-public-questions last accessed 1.5.11
7
Riva Kastoryano; Negotiating identities: states and immigrants in France and Germany; Princeton University
Press, 2002. pg 175
6
democratic principles through different Islamic lenses before assuming the Middle East will
adapt to or adopt Western conventional principles of European polity. Understanding the Islamic
discourses in Europe should clarify the spectrum of realistic options the Muslim world might
consider feasible for an Islamic democracy. Perhaps the varying perspectives towards European
polity of Muslims living in Europe offer insight into some of the ways Muslims in the Middle
East might view the construct of liberal democracy as acceptable, or not, throughout the region.
First we must understand that a multitude of Islamic perspectives on European polity exist in
Europe. Each Islamic perspective is comprehensive, religiously justified and socially relevant in
reflecting and influencing the actions of Muslims in Europe. More than a nuance, I argue that the
lack of understanding of the multiple Islamic perspectives represents the core source of
disenfranchisement of many Muslims in Europe and much of the misunderstanding of the
Muslim community by European governments as well as Europe’s population.
In order to answer the questions set out above while maintaining relevance for all of Europe; I
analyze contemporary European Muslim scholars as they reflect on European polity not just in a
single European community or state. By comparing trans-European Muslim thought, I seek to
analyze and compare trends and perspectives that overcome national differences thereby
maintaining relevance for comparing to European thought. This methodology is a reverse of the
structure common today analyzing Muslims living in Europe through Western perspectives.
Comparing and contrasting Muslim scholars in Europe reveals a nuanced debate determining the
varying relations between Muslims and their reflections on European polity. Each scholar
represents an independent, comprehensive and distinct Islamic discourse of contemporary
relevance and trans-European influence intended for all Muslims living in Europe, not just a
specific country. In short, each scholar dictates a manner and reflections towards European
polity. The European Muslim scholars Presented and compared in the paper are: Bassam Tibi –
religious pluralism, Tariq Ramadan – multiple identities, Amr Khaled – Islam as a Golden Path
and Yusuf Qaradawi – Islam centric polity.8 All four Islamic perspectives exist in Europe today,
the question remains which perspective will be prominent within European society? Perhaps a
more interesting question to discuss is can government policy and actions influence the course of
political mobilization of Muslims in Europe?
Understanding the confrontations of normative values wielded by the multiple Islamic discourses
is heightened when juxtaposed with Western philosophy, past and present, highlighting and
contrasting Western and Islamic thought on the source of identity. The Islamic discourses in
Europe are spread across the spectrum of the religious-secular identity in a similar fashion as
European polity does, albeit over centuries.
Yet to understand how the political mobilization of Muslims living in Europe affect policy and
social integration we must first understand the argument each discourse makes about
fundamental aspects of religion, the state and the law. The following represents a comparative
analysis of European Islamic discourses as they confront, contradict or adapt to the normative
values of European polity.
8
For more information on the scholars see Appendix I
Islamic Discourses on Secular Identity within European Polity
The Thirty Years War, ending in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia, broke the Catholic
monopoly on institutionalized religion. The Treaty’s results marked the end of religious
monopoly on daily activity in Europe to an age, which Charles Taylor notes, where God is no
longer unchallenged in determining a person’s source of identity; an age where people have
choices and options thought equal to or perhaps greater than adhering to religious observance
which is on the decline and separated from public life.9
In practice, religion still provides the source of identity for many Europeans today, although a
declining amount.10 In many senses, secular Europe still deals with the growing presence of
institutional religion in internal, political, transnational and external affairs.11 In reality, the
source of identity in the West is complex, although religious influence on political decisions is
the tabooed it is not irrelevant. Ultimately though the conflict between religious and secular
sources of identity in Europe is not solved with the declining practice of faith alone until there is
an absolute abolition of God in the private sphere as well. It is doubtful that European society
will ever reach the complete secularization, as described by Oliver Roy, of a total disappearance
of religion from all practical relevance.12
9
Charles Taylor; A Secular Age; Harvard University Press, 2007 pg 2
Madeley, John. “European Liberal Democracy and the Principle of State Religious Neutrality”;in Madeley/Enyedi
(eds.) Church and State in Contemporary Europe. The Chimera of Neutrality. Special Issue of West European
Politics vol. 26, No.1, (Jan. 2003a), pg 2.
11
Madeley, John. “European Liberal Democracy and the Principle of State Religious Neutrality”; pg 2.
12
Olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam; Columbia University Press 2007, pg 7-8.
10
Understanding the difference between religion and secular society becomes complex when
integrating Islam into the equation. Islam, as a non-Christian base religious value system shares
many conceptual aspects with European secular society, yet also provides significant
confrontations as well. As a foundational frame of reference Islam is a religion that measures
observance through the implementation of religious practice; Christianity is a religion that
demands belief with minimal demands on action.13 The difference is more than nuanced
permeating throughout the entire body of theological thought, religious observance and interfaith orientation. Liberal democratic society shows the two can co-exist contemporaneously, yet
seemingly only if the normative values of one of the two systems prevail hierarchically.14 Below,
the four Muslim scholars elaborate varying perspectives of integrating the European concept of
secularism within Islamic tradition.
Bassam Tibi completely separates religion from politics while emboldening the importance of
religion in the private life.15 Tibi emphasizes that even ‘laicite’ – the strict French concept of
secularism – does not represent the total abolishment of religion from public life.16 Secularism
and its confines could contribute to the needed depoliticization of religion allowing Islam to
adapt to the cultural underpinnings within Western culture.17 In accordance with Western Theory
Tibi’s discourse fits within a hierarchical divide allowing reform and secular Islam to exist and
Galston, William; “ Jews, Muslims & the Prospects for Pluralism Daedalus, Vol. 132, No. 3, On Secularism &
Religion (Summer, 2003), pp. 73-74
14
March, Andrew; Islam and Liberal citizenship: the search for overlapping identity; Oxford University Press pg 28
& Oliver Roy; “Secularism confronts Islam” Columbia University Press, 2007, Noah Feldman The Rise and Fall of
the Islamic State; Princeton University Press, 2008
13
15
Bassam Tibi; Islam's predicament with modernity: religious reform and cultural change, Taylor & Francis, 2009 pg
181
16
Bassam Tibi, Political Islam, world politics and Europe : democratic peace and Euro-Islam versus global jihad
(London ;;New York: Routledge, 2008) pg 88
17
Bassam Tibi; Islam's predicament with modernity: religious reform and cultural change, pg 207
thrive within Western society. Moreover, emphasizing the revival of ‘rational’ and ‘reason
based’ thought into Islamic culture allows the adaption of Islam to the European conceived
modernity including an Islamic concept of secularism.18 For Tibi, the basis of secular Islam is
cultural flexibility that respects cultural interpretations of Islamic sources.
From the opposite side of the discursive spectrum, Yusuf Qaradawi adamantly argues secularism
is unacceptable in Islam. In elaborate detail Qaradawi defines secularism as the most cunning
form of invasion forged against Islam.19 Qaradawi’s unmistakable rhetorical attack on secular
thought describes secularism as the abandonment of Shari’ah equivalent to the complete
abandonment of Islam, Apostasy.20 Qaradawi not only opposes a secular concept in Islam, he
seeks to eradicate what he views as the defects of contemporary Western civilization, or in other
words the lack of Islamic values based in divine legislation.21 Islam, Islamic sources and
religious observance represent everything worthwhile in life with no exception distinguishing
between areas of influence for religion.22
Thus, Tibi and Qaradawi set the boarders of a discursive spectrum where a conceptual European
Islamic debate thrives; on the one hand defining the guidelines for secular Islam while on the
other hand eliminating any such concept as secular Islam. Between the two scholars exists a
18
Bassam Tibi, Political Islam, world politics and Europe : democratic peace and Euro-Islam versus global jihad
pg 29
19
Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, “Major and Minor” IslamOnline.net April 13, 2006
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&pagename=Zone-EnglishLiving_Shariah%2FLSELayout&cid=1178724001992
20
Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, “Major and Minor”
21
Yusuf Al-Qaradawi “The Humanity’s need to the Cultural Role of Our Muslim Nation” IslamOnline.net June 13,
2002 http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&pagename=Zone-EnglishLiving_Shariah%2FLSELayout&cid=1158658490126
22
Yusuf Al-Qaradawi; “Islam and Politics“ IslamOnline.net July 10, 2004
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-EnglishAsk_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503544700
conceptual Middle Ground, tolerant yet not fully accepting of secularism within Islamic thought
and practice.
Tariq Ramdan’s perspective towards secularism reflects different cultural attitudes towards
religion than common in the West.23 Secularism in Islam is seen as imported from the West and
not the necessary outcome of Islamic political philosophical development.24 Ramadan
understands that Islam maintains closeness to religious practice that does not exist in
Christianity: perhaps many Muslims in Europe are not fully observant of religious obligations
but very few do not believe in the importance of Islamic practice.25 By combining two sources of
civilizational identity – Western and Islamic – Ramadan integrates Islamic principles into the
European culture of secularism in defining a distinct societal and political outlook for Muslims in
Europe.
Khaled on the other hand eliminates any distinction between religion in the public and private
sphere;26 Indicative of his clear preference of Islamic over Western concept of civilization,
Khaled’s emphasis lies clearly on Islamic religious lifestyle.27 For Khaled, increasing religious
practice in a secular surrounding attracts Muslims living in Europe who are looking to bridge the
religious observance gap between secular liberalism and Orthodox observance of Islam. 28
“Interview with Tariq Ramadan” May 22, 2009, last accessed April 28, 2011,
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=20197
24
“Interview with Tariq Ramadan” May 22, 2009
25
Tariq Ramadan; Islam the West and Challenges to Modernity, Islamic Foundation 2001, pg 221
23
Amr Khaled; “Episode 2: Introduction Part 2, Life Makers” http://www.amrkhaled.net/articles/articles63.html last
accessed June 16, 2009
27
Amr Khaled; “An Evening of Reflection” http://www.amrkhaled.net/articles/articles541.html last accessed June
15, 2009
28
Amr Khaled. (2010). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved March 07, 2010, from Encyclopedia Britannica
Online: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1240840/Amr-Khaled last accessed June 16, 2009
26
European Muslim perspectives on secularism cover a full spectrum of perspectives on the
relations between religion and state: the privatization of Islam allowing for the cultural
adaptation within secular European polity (Tibi) to the absoluteness of religion creating an
Islamic polity abolishing the concept of secular Islam (Qaradawi). Both scholars establish clear
guidelines for societal action in regards to religious observance within a secular state. Tibi
perceives that Muslims in Europe can adopt a publically secular approach to practicing Islam
while reforming Islamic identity to contemporary modernity; Qaradawi on the other hand is
convinced that secular Islam is an impossibility bordering the line with Apostasy.
In between those two conceptual boundaries lie a conceptual Middle Ground; pushing for greater
religious influence in Europe’s source of identity (Ramadan) and promoting greater religious
tolerance without dissolving or integrating into secular society (Khaled). The differences
between the two middle discourses are significant in allocating a hierarchy to Western and
Islamic principles, even if the differences between them are less stark than the perspectives of
Tibi and Qaradawi. Implications of the spectrum evolve not only in attitude towards European
polity, but reflect validity, respect and the overall legitimacy of liberal democracy as a identity in
the lives of Muslims living in Europe.
Complications of integrating between Western and Islamic perceptions of religious identity
derive from the varying concepts of God and the means of observing religious practice. The
separation of religion and state is not natural within Islamic doctrine thus need be the result of a
modern reformation intentionally introduced and developed over time.29 The core difficulty of
integrating between Islam into Western secular society seems to be that the conceptual starting
point for religious identities differs from secular both in its contents and characteristics. People
must choose for themselves how they integrate the two sources of identity. As contemporary
European polity is based on a strict separation of religion and state, public religious identity is de
facto source of potential, but not necessary, source of confrontation for Muslims living in
Europe.
Islamic Discourses on the State as Determining the source of Rights
The social, political and national interactions of European society take place within the state
centric framework of European polity. The legitimacy of government, on all levels: Municipal,
National and Supra-national, depends on the procedural norms and institutional structure legally
binding between them.30 The multi-level governmental construct forms a hierarchical system in
which the confines of European polity exist. Thus, in many ways the European Union is the new
space for determining identities.31
As Earnst Renan elaborates, the principle of a nation is the outcome of historical development,
not an a priori sense of unification. 32 In this context of supranational institutional formation,
29
Bernard Lewis; The Political Language of Islam; University of Chicago Press, 1991 pg 2
30
Jürgen Habermas, Ciaran Cronin; The Divided West; Cambridge [u.a.] : Polity, 2006.
31
Kastoryano, Negotiating identities, pg 14
Earnst Renan; “What is a nation” Lecture, 1863a
http://www.cooper.edu/humanities/classes/coreclasses/hss3/e_renan.html (1 von 9) [29.10.2001 17:42:33]
32
Europe is if anything in the midst of a phase determining the re-nationalization of political life.33
Although the EU is defining its institutional role the nation-state remains at the center of any
trans-national entity representing the primary mobilizing factor for identity while constituting the
only governmental framework defining and providing rights.34 Muslim scholars in Europe differ
as to the desired role of the state, either as the determining the source of rights within society or
as the framework in which society can determine their own social action.35 The Islamic
discourses present vastly different perspectives as to the relationship between the state and
society.
The underlying values Bassam Tibi promotes are a principled agreement of ideals that in the
West, society can govern through self determination: rights, law and civic obligations are based
on the provisions of the nation state.36 Tibi interprets the Qur’an as speaking of differences
between the public life of the Ummah within the construct of the state.37 From a pluralistic
perspective, classical Islam differentiates between the concept of ‘duties’ and ‘obligations’
without formulating a concept of ‘rights’ thereby removing any potential obstacle for Muslims
adhering to the Western state as a source of rights while abiding to Islamic principles.38 The
distinction Tibi highlights is that for most non Western cultures, including some Muslims living
Charles Kupchan, “Europe and American in the Middle East” Council on Foreign Relations Vol. 106, No. 698,
March 2007
33
34
Riva Kastoryano, Negotiating identities, 165
Taylor, Andrew; “Hollowing out or filling in? Taskforces and the management of cross -cutting issues in British
government ”; British Journal of Political and International relations. Vol. 2, No. 1 April 2000.
36
Bassam Tibi; Conflict and war in the Middle East: from interstate war to new security; Edition
2, reprint,
revised Palgrave Macmillan, 1998 pg 228-9
37
Bassam Tibi; Islam's predicament with modernity : religious reform and cultural change. London; New York:
Routledge, 2009. Pg 293
35
38
Bassam Tibi; Islam's predicament with modernity : religious reform and cultural change. pg 123
in the West, the framework of identity is based in local community and driven by their ethnic and
cultural surroundings while the modern state is deemed meaningless.39 For Tibi, European Islam
represents the adjustment of Islam to the political culture of European civil society amidst
demarcation of culture and politics. Seeing no contradictory to Islamic values, Tibi builds his
discursive presentation around the adaptation of Islamic reformation within Europe’s state
centered framework of governance.
Tariq Ramadan integrates two sets of identities, Islamic and Western, in defining the role of the
state. Ramadan recognizes the act of citizenship within a state framework obligates people with
“responsibilities” and entitles them to “rights;”40 but does not elaborate on the role of the state as
a provider of rights. People in the West, Muslims included, should define loyalty to their
principles; supporting ones country and its policies when it is right, opposed when it is wrong;
supporting the Ummah when it is right; opposed to the Ummah when it is wrong; loyalty to the
state is based on blending the civilizational desires need be critical not blind.41 The institutional
paradigm Ramadan presents respects the laws of the countries in which Muslims in Europe
live.42 Loyal citizens can and should implement their rights through a critique of the underlying
principles of governance if and when they do not represent the ideals deemed appropriate for
society.43
39
Bassam Tibi; The challenge of fundamentalism: political Islam and the new world disorder; Volume 9 of
Comparative Studies in Religion and Society, Edition revised, reprint University of California Press, 2002 pg 21.
40
Tariq Ramadan; What I believe, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, Location 120-1
Tariq Ramadan; “Europe and its Muslim: Building a Common Future 1/3 (Japan) July 12, 2007,
http://www.tariqramadan.com/spip.php?article1049
42
Tariq Ramadan; What I Believe; location 1497-99
41
Tariq Ramadan; “Manifesto for a new ‘WE’ An Appeal to the Western Muslims, and their Fellow Citizens,” July 7
2006, http://www.tariqramadan.com/spip.php?article743
43
On the other side of the Islamic discursive spectrum lies a different, almost challenging,
perspective viewing the role of the state as a provider of a social framework. For Khaled the role
of the state becomes secondary to Islam. The state is viewed as a framework in which Muslims
in Europe exist, not a framework to provide social rights.
Khaled clearly recites the state-society relations for Muslims as represented in four different
levels in a specific hierarchical order: Ummah, country, neighborhood and then family.44 As
Ummah is preferred before country, the community of Islam is deemed as the determinant of
rights and not the state. The source of rights, obligations and institutional sovereignty are all
ruled by Allah’s sovereignty. 45 Khaled thus challenges the self-determined structures of
governance as found in liberal democratic political documents as oblivious to other cultures and
peoples; societal action’s source is in the Qur’an and not the state.46 Khaled emphasizes the need
of Muslims living in the West to utilize their freedoms and rights to positively represent and
improve the image of Muslims in the eyes of their Western surroundings, including the state.47
Freedoms, different from the rights provided within Islam, allow Muslims to create a selfdefined Islamic community utilizing Islam and not the state in defining communal obligations.
For Qaradawi Islam represents the source of all aspects of life defining the boundaries of
governance and regulations of state identity including realms of social, political and economic
Amr Khaled “Step 2: Unity. We are One Community (Ummah)”
http://www.amrkhaled.net/articles/articles309.html last accessed June 14, 2009
45
Amr Khaled; “Step 5: Confidence in Allah,” http://www.amrkhaled.net/articles/articles334.html last accessed June
14, 2009
46
Amr Khaled; “A Call for Coexistence” Episode 1, http://www.amrkhaled.net/articles/articles2205.html last
accessed June 15, 2009
47
Amr Khaled, “Between Integration and Introversion,” http://www.amrkhaled.net/articles/articles542.html last
accessed June 14, 2009
44
existence through Islamic terms.48 The Ummah, Islamic nation, exists as a political and
conscious reality.49 The implications of such strict interpretations suggest the source of rights for
Muslims draws upon Islamic sources to define social obligations.50 Qaradawi openly states the
West should not force Muslims, even those living in the West, to accept a government system of
rules and regulations, namely self-determined liberal democracy, which Islam rejects.51
Contrary to the Western outlook, Qaradawi does place the nation as the source of rights, just the
Islamic nation (Ummah) and not the Western concept of the state.52
Qaradawi defines the normative principles of a nation according to an Islamic concept of
modernity. Thus the difference is not in defining the source of rights – both draw from the
concept of the nation – rather the different definition of the nation, Western geographically based
or Islamic religiously based. For Qaradawi, Western nationalism and nationality is a technical
phenomenon having little if any influence in determining rights, freedoms or identity for
Muslims in Europe.
In this context the scholars are split. Both Tibi and Ramadan create discursive narratives
adapting the European context of Muslims in Europe integrating within the state centric
European polity, yet substantial differences exist. While Tibi adapts and creates a value system
Yusuf Al-Qaradawi; “Islam and Politics” http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnlineEnglish-Ask_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503544700 last accessed June 15, 2009
49
“Egyptian cleric Al-Qaradawi discusses concept of Islamic nation – Al-Jazeera” BBC Monitoring Middle East –
Political, October 20, 2008.
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1257197227936&returnToKey=2
0_T7764680711&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.985178.1041386788
50
“Egyptian cleric Al-Qaradawi discusses concept of Islamic nation – Al-Jazeera” BBC Monitoring Middle East –
Political,
48
Yusuf Al-Qaradawi; “Why Muslim and Christian Scholars Come Together,”
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&pagename=Zone-EnglishLiving_Shariah%2FLSELayout&cid=1158658489623
52
Talal Asad, Formation of the Secular: Islam, Christianity and Modernity, Stanford University Press 2003 pg 195
51
in line with European nationalism, 53 Ramadan places social influence on the citizens within the
institutional construct. The internal confrontation between the two discourses represents a desire
to either have Muslims living in Europe adapt to European nationalism (Tibi) or influence
society according to the values and principles deemed internally just. (Ramadan).
Khaled and Qaradawi believe the role of the state is merely a framework in facilitating societal
action according to the guidelines each community chooses for itself. As both scholars put the
utmost influence on the religiously based Islamic nation (Ummah) there is little to no relevance
for the geographically based Westernized concept of the nation state.
The division between the scholars clarifies a set of normative perspectives of the state creating
direct confrontations of Western political philosophy and some Islamic perspectives regarding
the role of the state and its institutions within society. The differences between the scholars
reflects the institutional structure dictating the source of rights in society – the state or Islam representing the principles each scholar views relevant for defining the relationship between the
state and society for Muslims living in Europe. For Muslims living in Europe to truly adapt Islam
to European polity, a fundamental first step is representing the central role of the state as
determining the source of rights in society, not just a framework of governance to support social
choice. While some Islamic discourses view the centrality of the state fundamental, others
replace the state with the centrality of Islam sparking a core confrontation with European polity.
53
Bassam Tibi, Islam between culture and politics (Houndmills Basingstoke Hampshire ;;New York: Palgrave,
2001) pg 206
Islamic Discourses on Shari’ah Law in Europe
A third component of European polity is the nature of the juridical system. Both European and
Islamic juridical systems create a paradigm defining law as the supreme value in shaping the
culture and defining values within society.54 The question remains, how to understand the many
interpretations of Shari’ah, as cultural source of identity or as a rigid legislative structure.
As Muslims living in Europe potentially draw their judicial framework from two vastly different
normative legal systems naturally perceived as contradictory in nature, a spectrum of options is
available. Cultural attitudes shape interpretation of law; for example Jürgen Habermas suggests
that Christian culture remains embedded within European law.55 It is the common interpretation
of shared secular principles driving the judicial system that unifies all legal interpretations
throughout Europe. Balancing between the secular and religious judicial extremes, the four
Muslim scholars vary on their definitions of Shari’ah and its implications influence the role of
the judicial system within European polity.
Yusuf Qaradawi co-founded the law of minorities - Fiqh Al-Qalayat 56 recognizing the inherent
difficulties of living an Islamic life in a non-Muslims country. Fiqh al Qalayat creates a parallel
legal system for Muslims living in Europe for all aspects of life57 incorporating easements in
54
Yedidia Stern; "State, Law and Halakha Part One: Civil Leadership as Halakhic Authority," Position Paper
Number 2, The Israel Democracy Institute, December 2001
55
Jurgen Habermas, Ciaran Cronin; The Divided West, Polity 2006
56
See The European Council for Fatwa and Research http://www.e-cfr.org/ar/, www.islamonline.net and
http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/islamonline.net
Yusuf Qaradawi; “Selling Girlie Magazines: Does that Make the Business Haram?” October 5 th 2002,
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-EnglishAsk_Scholar%2FFatwaE%2FFatwaEAskTheScholar&cid=1119503546034 “Shari`ah dictates the manners of
everyday
57
implementing religious obligations for Muslims.58 For the elaborate legal system of Fiqh al
Qalayat Islamic law is divine, because people lack sovereignty and secularism, is unacceptable.59
The source of the confrontation with the West is inherent within the reasoning of its creation; the
law of minorities provides an Islamic legal framework for Muslims living in Europe. In
promoting an external judicial regulatory system, Islamic Exceptionalism completes the
institutional segregation of Muslims living in Europe from their surroundings. No longer
interacting with the state on any official level, Muslims following this discourse turn to their
religious leadership for specific guidance on how to live one’s life. The concept of a law of
minorities based on shari’ah law dislocates the interactions, association and integration of
Muslims living in Europe with their surroundings. The message delivered by Qaradwi is that by
following Shari’ah law, Muslims living in Europe can in some way seek to reach the purity of
actions as dictated by the Prophet Muhammed and the Caliphs even as they live in non-Muslim
countries.60
Conversely, Bassam Tibi emphasizes the single Qur’anic mention of the world Shari’ah as
meaning morality and not law; Tibi holds that Islamic law was never codified therefore there is
no single common understanding of shari’ah as a basis for legal rule. 61 Within this context, Tibi
opens a debate as to the awareness between two types of Islam in Europe: Sharia based Islam or
Yusuf Qaradawi; “Shura and Democracy” February 4th, 2002,
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-EnglishAsk_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503543152
59
Yusuf Qaradawi; “How Islam Views Secularism” June 22, 2002.
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-English
Ask_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503545396
60
Yusuf Qaradawi; “Islam and Politics” July 10, 2004.
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-EnglishAsk_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503544700
61
Bassam Tibi, Islam's predicament with modernity: religious reform and cultural change pg. 102.
58
a European based Islam;62 the former creating rigid Islamist legal interpretations while the later
promoting cultural integration. The conflict of defining the confines of shari’ah opens a
significant aspect of Islam’s predicament with cultural modernity, the relations between law,
state and society.63 Similar to the complexities regarding a dual set of exceptionalism, obstacles
to inter-civilizational integration as the West and Islam both claim universal legitimacy with
regard to their respective judicial systems.64
The rigid definitions of shari’ah under political Islam negate the depoliticization of Islam viewed
as crucial in creating a cultural bridge between the juridical traditions of Islam and the West.65
Tibi holds that transforming shari’ah into rigid definitions of legal code threatens to turn Islamic
law into an ideological weapon of political Islam. 66 Tibi supports enforcing one legal system
equally for all, and not a shari’ah law for Islamic minorities, opposing shari’ah law as a
determining factor even solely in the realm of family law.67 According to the discourse,
ultimately, in secular society, the basis of law is a matter of societal legislation, not divine
provisions, enforceable equally to all.68
For Ramadan shari’ah, is not considered law or the basis for a political system rather Shari’ah
represents a value system.69 Ramadan describes Shari’ah as way towards faithfulness, to be
Bassam Tibi; “Europeans Have Stopped Defending Their Values,” Spiegel Online International, 10.2.2006.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,440340,00.html last accessed 1.5.2011.
63
Bassam Tibi, Islam's predicament with modernity: religious reform and cultural change pg. 27
62
64
Ibid, pg 110
65
Ibid, pg 183
66
Bassam Tibi, Islam between culture and politics pg 166
Ibid, pg 207
67
68
69
Ibid, pg 160
Tariq Ramadan; “Interview” 2.2.2005 http://www.tariqramadan.com/spip.php?article205 Last accessed 1.5.11
extracted by human rationality and presented in a global message right for all Muslims and all
mankind.70 Obeying shari’ah is a means of remaining faithful to ones beliefs and principles.71
For Ramadan the European legal system is a means of expressing religious freedom and
practice;72 specifically in upholding contractual agreements.73
Ramadan thus creates an Islam rooted in the European cultural surrounding in a similar fashion
as there is an Islam based in African or Asian cultural traditions.74 Creating an Islam adapted to
European culture strictly opposes the creation of a Shari’a law of minorities – fiqh Aqalliyyat –
as the discourse invokes universal values and not minority values based in a law for minorities in
Europe.75 To support the principled and not juridical definition of Shari’a, the discourse actively
promotes revisiting Islamic sources;76 adapting Islamic sources to the cultural environment
Muslims live adapts Islamic sources to culturally specific social existence.77 The European
endeavor of Ijtihad, adaptation of Islamic texts to social norms, is considered a great
responsibility for Muslims living in Europe.78
Khaled relates to shari’ah as superior to the Western concept of law. The discourse defines not
70
Tariq Ramadan; “Interview”
71
Ibid,
Tariq Ramadan; “Seeing and understanding religious symbols” 2.1.11
http://www.tariqramadan.com/spip.php?article907 last accessed 1.5.11
73
Tariq Ramdan; Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, pg 92
74
Ibid, pg 85
72
75
Tariq Ramadan; “Interview”
Tariq Ramdan; “What the West Can Learn from Islam” 14.2.07,
http://www.tariqramadan.com/spip.php?article963 last accessed 1.5.11
77
Tariq Ramadan; “Interview”
76
78
Tariq Ramdan; Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, pg 83
only the principles of Islam as correct for Muslims but also influencing the concept of Western
law.79 Shari’ah is defined as a specific means of interpreting Islamic texts, not as a direct
competition to the Western legal framework for Muslims living in Europe. As the discourse does
not create a separate institutional juridical framework of existence, it follows a less
confrontational aspects relating to the state-society relations specifically when defining a legal
framework for the actions of Muslims living in Europe.
Neither of the four scholars define Shari’ah in the same manner. Qaradawi creates a
comprehensive Islamic legal system for all Muslims in Europe defining all aspects of observance
based on Islamic sources. Both Tibi and Ramadan oppose the formation of Qaradawi’s law of
minorities both defining Shari’ah as a form of morality of value system not a strict legal system.
While Khaled combines the dissonance between the other three scholars while still remaining
independent. In summary, there is no discursive agreement to the definition, confines or meaning
of Shari’ah for Muslims living in Europe.
In order to clearly define secular society, the space that religion may occupy within society must
be clearly defined and constantly redefined by the nation-state’s system of law.80 Blending
within the secular construct the role of the legal system defines the secular state. The other side
of the spectrum, although held by only a minority of Muslims in Europe, suggests that the
Qur’an is the Islamic equivalent of a constitution representing the core foundations defining the
Amr Khaled; “A Call for Coexistence” Episode 21 http://www.amrkhaled.net/articles/articles2561.html#Scene_1
last accessed June 15, 2009
80
Talal Asad, Formation of the Secular. Pg 201
79
core characteristics of the state.81 Strictly enforced Islamic law recognizes its own
comprehensiveness while simultaneously not recognizing the existence of any polity other than
Islam.82 In order to truly integrate into secular European society, Muslims in Europe must also
understand and adopt the primacy of European law, undisputed in legal hierarchy. Islamic courts
and rulings can perhaps assist in determining social affairs only so long as they do not contradict,
or in fact seek to replace, the national juridical system.
Conclusion
Are Muslims living in Europe changing the normative values, demographics and diversity of
European society and politics? Certainly, but as part of a larger historical and contemporary
trend of European citizens - including of other religions - searching for a way to combine their
religious beliefs with their political opinions, not as a non-Christians seeking to overrun and
Islamize Europe. Yet, politicized religion - any religion - runs the double edged risk of
undermining the values of secular political regimes as well as alienating society from
institutionalized religion.
A multitude of discourses and perspectives exists on Islamic religiosity in Europe. Non-Muslims
often forget and for the most do not understand the nuances between the multiple Islamic
discourses within Western society. Certainly some Muslim perspectives oppose integrating into
Western culture, however we cannot ignore the silent majority of Muslims in Europe that seek a
largely secular European lifestyle according to secular European normative values and
principles. Focusing on Qaradawi’s perspective ignores the adaptive nature of Tibi’s.
Ed Husain, “Egypt can bring in the Brotherhood,” Financial Times, February 1, 2011, last accessed February 1,
2011. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/047884de-2e56-11e0-8733-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Cof36r6U
82
Bernard Lewis: The Muslim Discovery of Europe; W.W. Norton, 2001
81
Highlighting Tibi’s ignores the confrontational aspects presented by Qaradawi. Focusing on
either end of the spectrum eliminates the discursive debate taking place in the Middle Ground by
Ramadan and Khaled. Only by understanding the nuances of all four scholars as they address
religion, the state and the relations with the law can we understand the full spectrum of Islamic
thought on European polity.
Recently European leaders declared multiculturalism as a failed policy; to replace it states are
now required to clearly define their own identity: what it means to be British, French, German
etc. The larger relations with the EU must also be solidified amongst a growing trend of
European nationalization. It is not only unfair but also unrealistic to expect Muslims living in
Europe to naturally adapt to European principles. It is perfectly acceptable to demand Muslims
adapt to European values, but a pre-requisite is understanding the varying cultural demands that
requirement makes; not as a precaution or limit to accepting Islamic practice in Europe, rather as
a strategic policy planning tool understanding the vast social diversity with the various Muslims
communities of Europe.
The diversity within the numerous Islamic discourses on European polity exemplifies the variety
of Islamic perspectives present within the large, growing and influential Muslim demographic of
European society. If Europe continues to shy away from the true issues of this debate, it risks
eroding the social cohesion that unites the Western society. Understanding the political
mobilization of Muslims in Europe through the different Islamic discourses on European polity
can break the mold of Western perceptions while enlightening the politically sensitive and
complex subject of European social change, of which the effects on European polity are as of yet
not fully known.
It is mistaken to interpret the diversity within the Islamic discourses as the way Islam is taking
over Europe. Rather, I believe it indicates that Europe and its Muslim population are waking up
to the long term implications of its growing Muslim population along with decades of failed
policy geared to integrate them into society. The growing number of social, economic and
political events experienced throughout Europe over the past two years is just the beginning of
long term social trends showing that European society is confronting difficult social issues head
on. It is not too late for Europe or its Muslim population to increase positive integration of
Muslims living in Europe into European society.
European citizen and residents of Islamic faith have every right and in fact should even be
promoted to strengthen their voice and mobilize politically. Why? Because the greater the
political mobilization of Muslims in Europe, the more that demographic group adapts to
European norms customs and political culture. Increased emphasis must be placed on long-term
policy and legislation geared to integrating Muslims living in Europe into the states culture in
order to reduce social tension in order to mitigate potential social “threats.”
Political stability will only be achieved after overcoming emotional reactions to sensational
misinformation about Muslims as taking over Europe. As Europe’s Muslim population mobilizes
politically and the political right organizes against it we can be certain of one thing – Europe is at
the early stages of a central debate to take place over the coming years and decades.
Appendix I
Bassam Tibi:
A Syrian born professor of political philosophy in Germany. Tibi promotes the de-politicization
of Islam, and religion in general, including the introduction of reforms to embrace secular
democracy, pluralism, civil society and individual human rights in order to avoid bolstering
religious fundamentalism. Tibi suggests deconstructing political Islam and then integrating
Islamic principals within European culture based on the Western concept of pluralism.83
Tariq Ramadan:
The Swiss born Grandson of Hassan Al –Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ramadan
promotes an independent Western Islam, anchored not in the traditions of Islamic countries but
in the cultural reality of the West. He sets out a vision representing a new Muslim identity
embracing the idea that Islam can be defined in alliance to and integrated with Western ideals
while maintaining Islamic principals at the core of Muslim identity in Europe.84
Amr Khaled:
An Egyptian tele-evangelist currently based in England. Citing the importance of Islam
representing a middle ground to bridge between Islamic and European identity, Khaled states
that Muslims in Europe should mingle or integrate in a positive way without dissolving the
importance Islamic principles in their daily lives.85
Yousif Qaradawi:
A Muslim religious scholar currently based in Qatar founded the religious guidelines for the
Islamic jurisprudence of Muslims living in Europe. Qaradawi is perceived as the spiritual leader
of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and is often considered one of the most influential scholars
in the Muslim world. Qaradawi states "those who do not live for Islam and its spread and do not
share the suffering and the hardship that best the Ummah are self - centered. Such people have
no right to tell those who believe in Islam and live by it that they are wrong and should
change."86
83
84
Bassam Tibi; Islam's predicament with modernity : religious reform and cultural change. London
Tariq Ramadan; Western Muslims and the future of Islam
Amr Khaled;” Between integration and introversion” http://www.amrkhaled.net/articles/articles542.html last
accessed June 15, 2009
86
Islamic awakening between rejection & extremism. [Indianapolis IN] ;[Herndon VA]: American Trust
Publications; International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1980.
85