Power, Interests, and Identity:
Theory and Practice in Japan-China Relations
Mary M. McCarthy
Drake University
ATTRIBUTION NOT ALLOWED WITHOUT WRITTEN PERMISSION BY THE AUTHOR
Introduction
In this paper I seek to explore what the explanations and predictions are of the four main
theoretical approaches in international relations for Japan-China relations. I investigate
current and future Japan-China relations through a realist power politics analysis, a
neoliberal institutionalist analysis, an economic liberal analysis, and a constructivist
identity analysis. I seek to discover whether these approaches provide insights into our
understanding of this important bilateral relationship and which of these approaches, or
what combination of them, are most useful in helping us to understand Japan-China
relations.
In particular, I explore the issues: Is it inevitable that a rising China will produce conflict
between the two neighbors? Is China’s growing participation in international institutions
increasing interactions and the creation of mutual interests between the two countries?
Will Japan-China economic relations promote cooperation across the economic, political,
and security realms? Or will issues of identity be forefront in determining the
relationship?
1
My findings are that a theoretical analysis of Japan-China relations, based on realist,
institutionalist, liberal, and constructivist schools of thought, shows us that current JapanChina relations can be explained best as a balance of power based on sentiments of
superiority and humiliation, which are expressed through nationalism. As for future
predictions, the analysis also suggests that, although economic interests will temper
government preferences for escalating crises, these crises may be exacerbated by
domestic publics who have internalized national identities that have been formed by these
ideas of superiority and humiliation.
The Case Study
Japan-China relations are one of the most important relationships in determining the
future economic prosperity and security of the Asia Pacific. In addition, the state of this
relationship, whether cooperative or conflictual, will have a serious impact on global
wealth and peace, as the countries represent two of the largest economic and military
powers in the world. Therefore, understanding this relationship should be of paramount
concern to anyone interested in the future of the region and the region’s impact on the
world. Furthermore, it is a relationship that has been viewed somewhat as a puzzle by
many Western scholars and policymakers. Japan-China relations have been characterized
by a series of fluctuations or contradictions in the postwar period, from suspicion to
friendship to animosity to mutual acceptance of interdependence. Still, what the future of
those relations are remains an open debate.
2
Why Theory Matters
This paper fundamentally addresses the general issue of whether the main research
programs in IR theory are useful in helping us to understand a specific case study. Many
theories of international relations have been used to try to explain or make predictions
about Chinese and/or Japanese behavior, and, occasionally, about Japan-China relations.1
I will look at this literature to discover what it has shown us or failed to show us about
Japan-China relations. I will also explore this literature in the context of the more general
theoretical work in the field, to further investigate what the main theoretical approaches
in IR may contribute to our understanding of this case of interest.
Furthermore, I find this to be an important exercise because, as Katzenstein and Okawara
have argued, “How we go about drawing connections depends largely on the implicitly
analytical lenses that we use to interpret Japanese [and Chinese] politics.”2 We enter any
analysis with certain assumptions and looking at research on Japan-China relations
through the broad theoretical lenses of the main research programs of IR theory help us to
recognize what those assumptions are, how useful they are, and how realistic they are.
This paper does not purport to be a comprehensive literature review of all applications of
IR theory to Japan, China, or bilateral relations. Instead, it will provide a broad overview
of that literature, highlighting what I judge to be representative pieces, for the purpose of
1
Despite the application of such theoretical arguments, Ikenberry and Mastanduno have considered the argument that
international relations theories that emerged in the context of the West may not be relevant to Asian “calculations and
behavior.” See Ikenberry, G. John and Michael Mastanduno, eds. International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific
New York: Columbia University Press, 2003: 1-2. I do not explicitly address that issue in this paper.
2 Katzenstein, Peter J. and Nobuo Okawara. “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism.”
International Security. Vol.26, No.3 (Winter 2001/02): 157.
3
illustrating what these various theoretical approaches have given to our understanding of
Japan-China relations and where the existing literature has left room for further
development and exploration.
Overview of Findings
The fact that during the early years of the 21st century Japan and China suffered the worst
political relations since the postwar normalization of those relations in 1972 is of no
surprise to realists. Japan and China are two of the largest military and economic powers
in the world and the greatest powers in Asia.3 China’s military expenditures, military
procurements, and military modernization have been rapidly expanding. In the
meantime, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have begun to be active in areas beyond
Japan’s borders, while debates are raging within Japan about whether the constitution
should be revised to eliminate Article 9, which gives up Japan’s sovereign right to engage
in warfare. Furthermore, history supports the idea of the two countries as adversaries.
The late 19th and 20th centuries saw warfare between the two in the form of the SinoJapanese War (1894-5) and the Pacific War (1937-1945). Therefore, the fact that these
two countries are rivals and should seek to balance each other or maximize relative power
is logical from an analysis based on power politics.
On the other hand, liberals dismiss the likelihood of such an escalation in tensions due to
the economic interests that both Japan and China have in a stable relationship. They are
3
In 2006, China had the second largest military expenditures in the world, second only to the U.S., while Japan had the
fifth largest, coming up behind the U.K. and Russia (Nau, Henry. Perspectives on International Relations: Power,
Institutions, and Ideas. Washington, DC: CQ Press (2006)).
In 2005, China gave 4.3% of GDP to military expenditures while Japan gave 1%.
(http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2067rank.html).
4
one of each other’s top trading partners and China is a major recipient of Japanese
foreign direct investment. Not only are the economic ties that bind them too important for
each country’s economic and political stability, but domestic economic actors would
forcefully oppose any actions that would hurt their profits.
In addition, although scholars argue that the traditional Chinese perspective of how the
world works is based on power politics, these analyses show that, over time, China has
been shifting away from a purely realist balance of power strategy and view of the world.
China has come to embrace much of the international liberal economic order and become
more acceptant of the possible benefits to itself of international institutions. Liberals see
both developments as positive.
On the other hand, as far as Japan-China relations are concerned, the evolution is less
promising. Over the past twenty years, we have witnessed increasing incidence of
adversarial behavior on the part of both Japan and China. While bilateral economic
relations have become increasingly important to both parties, there also seems to be a
willingness to use economic relations as a potential weapon, on the part of both parties.
This could lead to conflict rather than peace. There also appears to be a greater
reluctance within China to enter into institutional arrangements with Japan than with
certain other countries, such as those of Southeast Asia. These occurrences are not
promising evidence for those liberals who argue that international institutions and
economic interdependence will hamper conflict in this difficult case, where there is a
rising power and shifting distribution of capabilities.
5
In order to understand why China and Japan may be less constrained by economic and
institutional factors in their current relationships with each other than in their
relationships with other states, it is necessary to look beyond material interests and
consider ideational factors. If one looks deeper into Japan-China relations, one discovers
that it is not the pursuit of security that is driving these relations. Instead, the rationale
for policies that some view to be realist or realpolitik are based on the processes of
national identity formation in both Japan and China. These processes are fueled in part
by material changes – China’s economic rise and Japan’s economic malaise. They are
also strongly influenced by history. Most importantly, national identity formation has not
occurred in isolation in either Japan or China, but in comparisons with the other and with
considerations of each one’s role in the international system. Finally, national identity
formation processes in Japan and China have been influenced by instrumental
considerations at the state level – state legitimacy and regime stability in China and votes
getting in Japan. Therefore, we see national identity formation in both Japan and China
occurring as an interplay between the nation (the public) and the state.
Due to historical factors, material changes, and instrumental considerations, national
identity formation in Japan and China has led to more adversarial sentiments coming
from both the public and politicians. This is despite strengthening economic ties and
growing institutional linkages between the two countries. The question is whether such
bellicose words and actions could lead to serious, even armed, conflict between the two
countries. Although the leaders recognize the dangers of allowing escalation of
6
hostilities and have actively tried to defuse tensions over the past couple years, I purport
that foreign policy will continue to be strongly influenced by national identity.
IR Theory Applied to Japan-China Relations
Application of Realism to Japan-China Relations: Explanations and Predictions
Power Politics and the Balance of Power
Realism is founded on the concept of “power politics,” where interactions among states
are a continuous struggle for power. This power may be pursued with the goal of
security or the goal of power maximization. Morgenthau states that the power of a nation
is found in its military preparedness.4 Carr agrees that power is defined by a nation’s
war-winning capability.5
Many scholars assert that Chinese behavior tends to be based on a perception of the
international system as a realm of power politics. Deng argues that the Chinese
government and Chinese analysts believe that foreign policy is (and should be) driven by
power, not by values or ideologies.6 Johnston reinforces this view that Chinese officials
“do indeed accept that the nature of world politics is essentially zero-sum and that
competition is the primary feature of the system.”7 Christensen agrees that China’s
“analysts certainly think more like traditional balance-of-power theorists than do most
4
Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 6th edition. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1985 (1948).
Carr, Edward Hallett. The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations.
Second, slightly revised edition. (First published in 1939 (London: Macmillan).) New York: Harper & Row, 1946
(1939).
6 Deng, Yong “Conception of National Interests: Realpolitik, Liberal Dilemma, and the Possibility of Change” in Deng,
Yong and Fei-Ling Wang, eds. In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World. Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1999: 49.
Johnston, Alastair Iaian. “Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Period” in Ethan B. Kapstein
and Michael Mastanduno, eds. Unipolar Politics. (1999): 280.
5
7
contemporary Western leaders and policy analysts.”8 And, thus, Johnston puts forward
that China should be a good, or easy, test of realist theory.9
Balance of power is defined in various ways.10 For the purposes of this paper, I use the
term to refer to the practice by which states increase their own capabilities or form
alliances to prevent another state from dominating a region, or the entire system. Walt
argues that states risk their survival if they fail to balance against an emerging great
power.11
The realist argument is that Japan will need to remilitarize in response to China’s rise.
Japan will have to act to balance Chinese power in the region, in order to continue to
pursue its own interests. As Christensen describes, “predictions of balance of power
theories see Japanese buildup as likely or inevitable.”12 China will respond with
continuing military expansion, especially in the face of Japanese remilitarization. Even if
both countries are merely acting defensively, such buildups could lead to a security
dilemma, with the consequences being an arms race or even war. Katzenstein and
Okawara argue that, “In view of a large number of potential military flash points, the
security dilemma confronting Asian-Pacific states is serious.”13 Christensen further
asserts that “the chance for spirals of tension in [East Asia] seems great, particularly in
Christensen, Thomas. “Chinese Realpolitik” Foreign Affairs vol.75 no.5 (Sept/Oct 1996): 37.
Johnston (1999): 261.
10 Gulick, Edward V. Europe’s Classical Balance of Power. Cornell, 1955; Niou, Emerson M. S., Peter S. Ordeshook,
and Gregory F. Rose. The Balance of Power: Stability and Instability in International Systems. Cambridge, 1989;
Vasquez, John, and Colin Elman, eds. Realism and the Balance of Power: A New Debate. Prentice Hall, 2002.
11 Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. New York: Cornell University Press, 1987. Johnston (1999) argues that
Chinese behavior is better explained by power maximization than by balance-of-power theory.
12 Christensen (1996): 44.
13 Katzenstein and Okawara: 168.
8
9
8
the absence of a US military presence in the region.”14 He specifically points to changes
in the distribution of capabilities leading to uncertainty and mistrust, as well as
competition over sea lanes and energy supplies engendering conflict.15
However, are these accurate representations of Chinese and Japanese behavior? Are
China and Japan acting to balance each other so that neither can dominate East Asia?
Japan-China Perceptions
Whiting reveals how, prior to the late 1980s, China sought to achieve its national interests
and balance the Soviet Union through cooperation with Japan. He cites Deng Xiaoping
as explicitly calling for such cooperation and quotes a statement by Deputy Chief of Staff
Wu Xiuquan to Yasuhiro Nakasone in 1980:
I am all for Japan’s increasing its self-defense capabilities . . . Generally speaking,
Japan is one of the economic powers and it is entitled to become a big power
militarily, too . . . . It would not seriously affect the Japanese economy even if
defense spending were increased to 2 percent of the gross national product.16
In this way, China supported Japanese remilitarization as a bulwark against Soviet
expansionism.
Today things have changed. While Chinese perspectives of international affairs continue
to focus on power politics, its view of Japan has altered. Wang reports that the internal
Christensen, Thomas J. “China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia” in Ikenberry, G.
John and Michael Mastanduno, eds. International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific New York: Columbia
University Press, 2003: 25.
15 Christensen (2003): 25-26.
16 Quoted in Whiting, Allen S. China Eyes Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989: 129-130
14
9
Chinese view is that Japan “is transforming from a potential threat to a real threat.”17
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, power has shifted.
The most powerful country in the world is clearly the United States. However, according
to Christensen, China has a “historically rooted and visceral distrust of Japan,” which
causes it to favor a continuation of the US military in Asia if it will reduce, or delay, the
potential for Japanese remilitarization.18 This is due to the brutal history of late 19th and
20th Century war and occupation of China by Japan. Therefore, Christensen argues that,
among Chinese analysts, “there is a basic consensus that Japanese power would be more
threatening than American power.”19 In other words, China is pursuing a strategy of
balance of threat.20
Japan too has altered its policy towards China. Since normalization of relations in the
1970s, Japan followed a policy of engagement with China. One of the pillars of this was
economic cooperation through Official Development Assistance (ODA) and trade. This
was reinforced by “panda diplomacy” and a positive view of China within Japan.
However, since the mid-1990s Japan has been more likely to take a hard-line against
China. One example is the freeze of grant aid after China’s underground nuclear tests in
Quoted in Wang, Fei-Ling “Self-Image and Strategic Intentions: National Confidence and Political Insecurity” in
Deng, Yong and Fei-Ling Wang, eds. In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World. Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1999: 33; From Yang Jianyong, “Guanyu woguo zhoubian anquan huanjing de fenxi yu sikao” (“An
Analysis and Reflection on the Neighboring Security Environment of Our nation”), Yatai cankao (Asia-Pacific
Reference) (an internal publication, Beijing), no.34 (August 19, 1996).
18 Christensen (1996): 41.
19 Christensen (1996): 44.
20 Walt (1987) explains how states may either balance or bandwagon depending on perceived threat. He says it is not
just about power, but threat. States ally against or with most threatening power. When faced with external threat,
states are more likely to balance than bandwagon.
17
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1995. Some have described this as Japan becoming a more “normal” state or a more
“realist” state.21
Chinese Capabilities and the Japanese Response
Wang describes a realist analysis of a rising China as follows: “A nation experiencing
significant power increase will necessarily make new demands, search for new policies,
and initiate new challenges…[This will lead to] a challenging attitude, an aggressive
involvement, even an imperialistic agenda.”22 Goldstein predicts that a Chinese hegemon
would be a coercive power that would be disruptive to the region.23
Since 1989, China has been increasing its military expenditures by double digits annually.
The official budget is represented in the chart below. While 95% of Chinese see such
indications of China’s growing military power as a positive, 93% of Japanese see China’s
growing military as a negative trend.24
See, for example, Green, Michael. Japan’s Reluctant Realism. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
Wang, Fei-Ling “Self-Image and Strategic Intentions: National Confidence and Political Insecurity” in Deng, Yong
and Fei-Ling Wang, eds. In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield,
1999: 26. Wang disagrees with these realist assumptions.
23 Goldstein, Avery. “An Emerging China’s Emerging Grand Strategy: A Neo-Bismarkian Turn?” in Ikenberry, G.
John and Michael Mastanduno, eds. International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2003.
); Kang argues that a Chinese hegemon would be a benign power. Kang, David. “Hierachy and Stability in Asian
International Relations” in Ikenberry, G. John and Michael Mastanduno, eds. International Relations Theory and the
Asia-Pacific. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.
24 “China’s Neighbors Worry About Its Growing Military Strength: Publics of Asian Powers Hold Negative Views of
One Another.” The Pew Global Attitudes Project, Pew Research Center. September 21, 2006.
http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/255.pdf. Accessed July 3, 2008. However, note that the exact wording of the question
required respondents to choose Chinese military growth as either “a good thing” or “a bad thing” (or “don’t know”).
21
22
11
Chinese Military Expenditures (official budget)
35
30
(billion US$)
25
20
Military Expenditures (official budget)
15
10
5
20
05
20
04
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
19
99
19
98
19
97
19
96
19
95
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
91
0
Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget.htm
**Figures for 1996 and 1997 missing.
Officially Japan has expressed concern over the amount and destination of China’s
military expenditures. Japan has consistently argued that there is insufficient disclosure
of where Chinese military funding is going. Although China began publishing a defense
white paper, the Japanese government has complained that many aspects of it are opaque.
There are a number of military expenditures that are not reflected in the official budget.
For example, the purchase of military equipment from foreign suppliers, such as
destroyers from Russia, is not reflected in the official budget numbers.25 Many outside
sources have tried to estimate China’s actual military expenditures. Depending on the
25
“China’s Defense Budget.” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget.htm. Accessed March 9, 2007.
12
source and the years, they have come up with figures two to three times larger than the
official budget.26
One specific concern within Japan is China’s intermediate-range ballistic missiles.27
Another cause of concern for Japan is China’s apparent development of a blue-water
navy. From spring 2000, increased activity of the Chinese naval fleet in Japanese coastal
waters, including in Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), invited Japanese
suspicion.28 This led to questions about China’s intentions in the waters outside of its
immediate vicinity.
Japanese Capabilities and China’s Response
Not only are China’s increasing military expenditures and capabilities, as well as lack of
transparency, issues for Japan, Japan’s increasing capabilities are of concern to China.
According to Kristof, “Neican Xuanpian, a Chinese publication for the country’s
leadership, has denounced Japan as the main obstacle to peace in the Pacific and has
called on China to keep it in check.”29
Although traditionally keeping its military expenditures to 1% of GNP, that has still
allowed Japan to become one of the world’s top spenders on its military. With its
See, for example, Charles Wolf. “Asian Economic Trends and Their Security Implications.” RAND, MR-1143OSD/A, 2000; “Proliferation: Threat and Response.” US Department of Defense (January 2001), “The Military
Balance, 2000-2001.” International Institute for Strategic Studies (2001); US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
papers (various dates); Also discussed in “China’s Defense Budget.”
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget.htm. Accessed March 9, 2007.
27 Self, Benjamin L. “The Dragon’s Shadow: The Rise of China and Japan’s New Nationalism.” The Henry L. Stimson
Center, November 2006. http://www.stimson.org/southeastasia/pdf/TheDragonShadow-Version-052107.pdf. Accessed
July 7, 2008: 9.
28 2001 White Paper on Defense, Ministry of Defense, Government of Japan.
29 Kristof, Nicholas D. “The Problem of Memory.” Foreign Affairs. Vol. 77, No. 6 (Nov/Dec 1998): 43.
26
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economic and technological prowess, it also possesses much latent power. For example,
some argue that, if it so chose, Japan is only months away from producing its own
nuclear weapons.30
From his own research, Christensen concludes that China believes “that Japan could
easily become a great military power (such as France or Great Britain) in the next twenty
five years.”31 This colors Chinese calculations and behavior. For example, Christensen
argues that “if Japan appears headed toward eventual deployment of ship-based theater
missile defenses, China might try to develop ballistic, cruise, and antiship missiles, and
perhaps antisatellite weapons faster and more extensively than it otherwise would to
acquire the ability to destroy or elude the capability of these defensive weapons.”32 He
claims that China might even abandon the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or try
to hasten reunification with Taiwan, in the face of such shifting capabilities with regard
to Japan.33
In addition, the US military presence in Japan is only reassuring if “it replaces – not
strengthens – Japanese military forces.”34 However, calls by the US for Japan to increase
its military role in the US-Japan Alliance or to co-develop new military technologies or
systems is worrying to China. China is particularly wary of the theater missile defense
See for example, Broad, William J. and David E. Sanger. “Restraints Fray and Risks Grow as Nuclear Club Gains
Members.” The New York Times. October 15, 2006. On the other hand, some dispute that Japan could develop a nuclear
weapon in the short term.
31 Christensen (2003): 29.
32 Ibid: 44.
33 Ibid.
34 Christensen (1996): 43.
30
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systems (TMD). Although a defensive weapon, such a system reduces China’s deterrent
capabilities and, thus, its perception of security.
Furthermore, China will not accept that Japanese policy could be due to a sincere
perception that China is a threat.35 This increases the likelihood that China will respond
to any changes in Japan’s military capabilities as a threat to its power. For these many
reasons, realists see reasons for concern in current Japan-China relations.
Application of Liberalism to Japan-China Relations: Explanations and Predictions
International institutions
On the surface, neoliberal institutionalist predictions do not posit any more promising
future for Japan-China relations than do realist predictions. As Goldstein asserts,
“Because international institutions are so weakly developed in East Asia, as opposed to
Europe, there are good reasons to doubt their effectiveness in constraining a rising
China’s assertiveness that the other [realist] theories deem likely.”36 Duffield agrees that,
“one cannot help but be struck by the relatively limited nature of the formal institutional
security architecture to be found in the Asia-Pacific region.”37 The lack of such
institutions in East Asia means that they cannot work to mitigate the effects of anarchy or
promote cooperation and stability in the region.
35
See, for instance, Christensen (1996): 44.
Goldstein (2003): 59.
37 Duffield, John S. “Asia-Pacific Security Institutions in Comparative Perspective” in ” in Ikenberry, G. John and
Michael Mastanduno, eds. International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific. New York: Columbia University Press,
2003: 244.
36
15
Mearsheimer defines institutions “as a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states
should cooperate and compete with each other.”38 Neoliberal institutionalists argue that
institutions mitigate the effects of anarchy. They accomplish this by increasing
transparency, decreasing transaction costs, increasing iteration, monitoring compliance,
providing information, and determining convergence of preferences.39 The consequence
is the enhanced likelihood of peace and stability. As an application of this theoretical
framework, Keohane argues that “avoiding military conflict in Europe after the end of the
Cold War depends greatly on whether the next decade is characterized by a continuous
pattern of institutionalized cooperation.”40
There are a number of reasons for the absence of the type of international institutional
arrangements in East Asia that we see in Europe.41 At present I will focus on one of
these: China has not been quick to embrace multilateral institutions. It has been argued
that China often views “international organizations or collective security arrangements
very suspiciously.”42 This is due to the fact that it sees such institutions as tools of the
US and/or Japan to pressure or contain China.43 Therefore, it has been unwilling to help
to establish such institutions and has often actively discouraged the creation of them. For
example, on the inception of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994,
[China] argued against trying to create a formal security regime in East Asia to
parallel the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Their fear
Mearsheimer, John. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security. Vol.19, no.3 (Winter
1994/95): 8.
39 See Oye, Kenneth A. “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies” in Kenneth A. Oye, ed.
Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
40 Keohane, Robert O. “The Diplomacy of Structural Change: Multilateral Institutions and State Strategies” in Helga
Haftendorn and Christian Tuschhoff, eds., America and Europe in an Era of Change. Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1993: 53.
41 See Duffield (2003) for a thorough exploration of why there are not more multilateral institutions in Asia.
42 Wang (1999): 33.
43 See, for instance, Wang (1999): 32; Christensen (1996): 38; Goldstein (2003): 72.
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seems to have been that in a more formal ARF, China might play Gulliver to
Southeast Asia’s Lilliputians, with the United States supplying the rope and stakes.
If ARF were to adopt specific norms of transparency and rules on force
deployment, it might enable the region to monitor and limit the growth of China’s
ability to project power.44
However, the reality has been that, over time, China has become more accepting of
ARF.45 Johnston argues that, in fact, there has been a significant positive change in
China’s perceptions of multilateral institutions since it began participating in ARF in
1994.46 Goldstein also sees a clear shift in behavior as well as perceptions, as multilateral
institutions are “now seen as offering an opportunity to counter some of the threats to
China.”47 One example he provides is the arms control regime. This evolution is often
attributed to the fact that China now sees how it can benefit from international
institutions.48
Still, Christensen argues that we do not see such shifts in Chinese perceptions of
multilateral institutions producing the emergence of institutions in Northeast Asia, in part,
because of Chinese mistrust of Japan.49 However, the Six Party Talks may be evidence
that balance of power or balance of threat calculations between Japan and China do not
negate the possibility of institutional arrangements for regional security. As Katzenstein
44
Christensen (1996): 39.
Ibid.
46 Johnston, Alastair Iain “Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations
Theory” in Ikenberry, G. John and Michael Mastanduno, eds. International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific New
York: Columbia University Press, 2003: 127.
47 Goldstein (2003): 73.
48 See for example, Johnston, Alastair Iain and Paul Evans “China’s Engagement with Multilateral Security
Institutions” in Ross, Robert S., ed. Engaging China. Florence, KY: Routledge , 1999. Kent goes beyond the
instrumentalist, interest-based approach, to argue that China’s increasing participation in international institutions has
actually changed norms within China. Ann Kent. Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global
Security. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007. Katzenstein and Okawara (2001/2) acknowledge the
possibility of interactions leading to shifts in norms and identities (163). In these ways, Kent, and Katzenstein and
Okawara recognize the possible contribution of constructivism to understanding Chinese and/or Japanese behavior.
49 Christensen (1996).
45
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and Okawara explain, “The 1990s also witnessed the gradual emergence of a variety of
Asian-Pacific multilateral security arrangements involving track-one (government to
government), track-two (semigovernmental think tanks), and track-three (private
institutions) dialogues.”50 Japan-China participation in such initiatives includes the
Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) and US-Japan-China trilateral security
dialogues. However, despite this positive trend, Katzenstein and Okawara do point out
that, “In the context of the working group discussions [in the Council for Security
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)], some Japanese participants interpret China’s
role as bordering on systematic obstructionism of the track-two process.”51 Therefore,
any optimism for the future of multilateral institutions in Northeast Asia and the impact
they will have on Japan-China relations must be cautious at best.
Economic Interdependence
Some argue that the theoretical school that most persuasively predicts a peacefully rising
China is economic liberalism.52 As Japan and China become increasingly economic
interdependent, their relations should be similarly peaceful. Economic liberals claim that
economic interdependence impedes conflict and promotes cooperation. There are varied
pathways by which it is argued that this is accomplished.
One argument is that economic linkages produce mutual interests and contribute to
enhanced communication between parties, which lead to the development of common
50
Katzenstein and Okawara (2001/2): 161.
Katzenstein and Okawara (2001/2): 175.
52 For instance, see Goldstein (2003); Goldstein, Avery. “Great Expectations: Interpreting China’s Arrival.”
International Security. Vol.22, no.3 (Winter 1997/98).
51
18
values and institutions that foster cooperation and hinder conflict.53 Another argument is
that free trade reduces the utility of military force in pursuing economic interests because
it eliminates the need for territorial expansion to acquire markets and resources. A
related argument is that trade can be used as an instrument of statecraft not only in the
pursuit of economic goals, but in the pursuit of a number of non-economic state goals.
The availability of an additional tool that is less costly than armed conflict reduces the
use of military force as a tool of the state.54 A further argument rests on the assumption
that conflict will lead to a cessation (or at least a reduction) in trade. The potential
costliness of this disruption deters states from acting belligerently. The more extensive
the economic ties (the higher the level of trade), the stronger the ability should be for
economic interdependence to hamper conflict.55 A final argument about how economic
interdependence may decrease conflict examines how it reduces uncertainty in a
relationship by introducing an important means by which states can effectively signal
preferences and resolve.56
Oneal and Russett discuss economic interdependence and the creation of a ‘security community.’ (Oneal, John R.
and Bruce M. Russett. “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985.”
International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997): 267-295.)
54 Stein discusses economic sanctions as a step between diplomacy and military force. (Stein, Arthur A. “Trade and
Conflict: Uncertainty, Strategic Signaling, and Interstate Disputes.” in Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, eds.
Economic Interdependence and International Conflict. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2003.)
55 Gasiorowski, Mark J. and Solomon W. Polacheck, “Conflict and Interdependence.” Journal of Conflict Resolution
26(1982), Nye, J.S. Peace in Parts. Boston: Little Brown, 1971, and Polachek, Solomon W. “Conflict and Trade.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 24.1 (1980):55-78 discuss how dependence decreases the likelihood of conflict by
increasing its cost. Nye and Polachek also discuss mutual dependence as creating incentives to increase cooperation.
Oneal and Russett (1997) and Oneal, John R. and Bruce M. Russett. “Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative
Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 36 (July 1999) argue that economically
important trade reduces the incidence of militarized disputes due to the potential costs of any disruption of trade, as
well as to shared values and interests.
56 Gartzke (2003) argues that an economically dependent state can clearly reveal how important an issue is to it by
threatening its own economic benefits. This reduces uncertainty in the relationship and decreases the likelihood of war.
(Gartzke, Erik. The Classical Liberals Were Just Lucky: A Few Thoughts about Interdependence and Peace.” in
Edward D. Mansfield and and Brian M. Pollins, eds. Economic Interdependence and International Conflict. Ann
Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2003.)
53
19
Today China is taking full advantage of the benefits of economic interdependence. Deng
argues that although “China once disparaged the postwar, embedded liberalism [of the]
world economy,”57 now it seeks “to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the
world system.”58 Goldstein further states that China utilized a balance of power strategy
until the mid-1990s, but since that time its objectives have evolved to “cultivating
international partners…with a level of international economic and diplomatic
engagement to maximize the benefits of interdependence.”59
Japan has also sought to benefit from China’s economic development and acceptance of
the liberal economic order by increasing trade with and foreign investment to China. In
1993 Japan became the top trading partner of China. China remained Japan’s second
largest trade partner after the US, until it gained the top slot in 2004.60 Japan has had a
trade deficit with China since 1989, but this deficit widened after 1994, as Japan began to
import more Chinese goods. This was particularly in the areas of clothing, eyewear,
bicycles, vegetables, and marine products.61 Still, 68% of Japanese think China’s
growing economic power is a good thing.62
The two graphs below illustrate trends in Japan-China bilateral trade. The second graph
reveals the increasing importance of Japanese imports from China in bilateral trade
relations.
57
Deng (1999): 54.
Ibid: 61.
59 Goldstein (2003): 61.
60 Interestingly, 2004 was the same year that Japan sunk to China’s third largest trading partner after the EU and the
US.
61 Mizuho Corporate Bank, internal documents.
62 Pew (2006).
58
20
Japan-China Bilateral Trade, 1988-2002
1200.00
(US$ billions)
1000.00
800.00
600.00
400.00
200.00
0.00
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Source: Direction of Trade, IMF
21
Japan-China Imports and Exports
1988-2004
100.00
90.00
80.00
Billions US$
70.00
60.00
50.00
40.00
30.00
20.00
10.00
0.00
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Japanese Imports From China
Japanese Exports To China
Source: Direction of Trade, IMF
However, economic interdependence does not necessarily breed peace. Economic
relations can be used as a weapon. China has shown itself willing to utilize this weapon
against Japan. Before China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), China
retaliated against Japanese safeguards against certain agricultural products by imposing
restrictions on imports of Japanese automobiles and electronics. Trade can be used as a
tool outside of the economic realm as well. On occasion, China has tried to use threats
against US-China economic relations to garner additional bargaining leverage.63
63
For the theory behind such uses of economic relations, see Hirschman, Albert O. National Power and the Structure
of Foreign Trade. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980.
22
This danger does not only exist in terms of Chinese behavior towards Japan. Japanese
politicians have hurt Chinese goodwill through their utilization of the economic card. For
example, in 2001, calls for cuts in Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China
became a common political response to discord with China. Whether the issue was
illegal immigration from China, Chinese retaliation against Japanese safeguards on
agricultural products, Chinese pressure on the Japanese prime minister to stop visiting the
Yasukuni shrine, or human rights, Japanese politicians called for suspension of the type
of economic cooperation that had been a pillar of Japan-China economic relations and
Japan-China relations, in general, since the 1970s.
Therefore, although economic relations are strong and both China and Japan are
nurturing an interdependent relationship, threats of economic coercion or manipulation
have come to play a potentially dangerous role in the relationship. This can lead to
increased perceptions of threat and significant tension with the potential to escalate.
Application of Constructivism to Japan-China Relations:
Explanations and Predictions
Identity and Nationalism
Johnston attempts to explain Chinese foreign policy with a constructivist inspired realism,
which he refers to as “identity realism.”64
He argues that, although China is pursuing
power, the core impetus is not material interests but ideational interests. Johnston asserts
that the “critical driver of [China’s] long-term goals is not security per se but status.”65
64
65
Johnston (1999).
Ibid: 282.
23
He emphasizes the ideas of “’national self respect’ (minzin zizun)” and “’international
position’ (guaji diwei)” that have been integral to China’s foreign policymaking.66
Although identity realism, as explored by Johnston, who relies heavily on China-US
examples, is not fully applicable to Japan-China relations, it does provide insights into
the relationship and helps us to understand the role that constructivism can play in
helping us to understand this relationship.
National identity formation in Japan or China does not occur in isolation but in
interaction with each other and the world at large.67 National identity in both Japan and
China has historically and contemporarily been formed with consideration of one’s
position vis-à-vis the other, both bilaterally and internationally. National identity in each
country is historically rooted yet must also be placed in a contemporary context. As
Gries explains, “Chinese identity is not static, but evolves as Chinese interact with the
world.”68 Japanese identity is no different. Therefore, we must look at the historical
identity of each country, but also see how that identity may have evolved over time.
Then we must consider how the historical identity and the evolution of this identity
impact Japan-China relations today.
China traditionally considered itself superior to Japan,69 given its great power status and
role as a cultural exporter. Chinese national identity in the 19th century was connected to
its considering itself one of the great civilizations of the world. It saw Japan as an
66
Ibid: 283.
See Gries, Peter Hayes. China’s New Nationalism. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004; Johnston
(1999); Self (2006).
68 Gries (2004): 19.
69 Ibid: 92.
67
24
offshoot of that civilization, as a younger brother. Therefore, China was shocked by its
defeat at the hands of Japan in the late 19th century. As Gries describes, when China lost
to Japan in 1895 “China’s supremacy [was] abruptly challenged.”70 This was
compounded by Japanese adventurism on the Chinese continent through the 1940s and
until the defeat of Japan.
As Gries describes, these historical conflicts between Japan and China “continue to drive
Chinese views of Japan and – more to the point – of themselves.”71 China’s defeat by
Japan was part of its “century of humiliation.”72 On the other hand, China’s defeat of
Japan was instrumental to its resurrection as a nation. Therefore, “many Chinese are
incensed by the belief that Japanese refuse to admit having been defeated by China,
failing to confirm Chinese claims to victor status.”73 The feeling is that Japan
undermines China’s status as a great power by refusing to acknowledge it as such. It
does this by refusing to sufficiently apologize for the Pacific War and show its contrition
and its acknowledgement of defeat.
This acknowledgement is part of the process of emergence for China from its “century of
humiliation,” as it demands its “rightful” place in the world. The impression that it is due
such status has become strengthened with the unprecedented growth and development it
has been enjoying, as it takes on an ever increasing role in the global economy.
70
Ibid: 70.
Ibid: 69.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid: 74.
71
25
Therefore, Chinese identity today is defined in part by its being superior to Japan, in part
by its victimization at the hands of Japan (and the West), in part by its ultimate victory
over Japan, and in part by its recent ascendance as an economic powerhouse. Since its
national identity is based on notions of status and honor, it requires Japan to acknowledge
that status and not humiliate that honor in its bilateral relationship. In concrete ways this
plays out in China seeking to be more powerful than Japan, not for reasons of security but
for reasons of status and honor, as Johnston describes. In addition, this relative power
needs to be recognized by the international community in order to be serving its full
purpose.74 This suggests that it is unlikely that China would ever accept Japan as a
permanent member of the Security Council. This is because it is not simply about
concerns with regard to Japan’s historical revisionism or potential for remilitarization, but
China never allowing its status in the international system to become watered down by
Japan. If China’s identity is, in part, defined by Japan being inferior to it, then China is
unlikely to allow it to be granted the benefits of permanent membership, including veto
power and international reputation.
Chinese national identity, as described, further requires Japan to be continually
apologizing for its treatment of China during the Pacific War. As Gries explains,
“apologies are about power relations”75 and “kowtowing can only stop when the superior
is satisfied that status has been restored.”76 This means that any apology considered
sufficient would need to occur in a manner and at a time decided upon by China and not
by Japan.
74
Gries (2004); Johnston (1999).
Gries (2004): 89.
76 Ibid: 92.
75
26
Japan’s national identity has also been formed with regard to its historical relationship
with China and its position vis-a-vis China in the international system. With its military
triumph over China in the late 19th century, Japan began to see itself as usurping China’s
place as the leader of Asia. Despite its defeat in World War II, its rise to economic
superpower status by the 1980s resurrected Japan’s national identity as a great power.
According to Self, Japan “saw itself as economically stronger and more sophisticated
than China.”77 This was one impetus for its policy of economic cooperation with China
after normalization in the 1970s, as it sought to help a country from whom historically it
had absorbed great learning and culture to develop economically and socially.78 Japan
was able to be so generous in its attitude towards China in the two decades or so after
normalization because it had become a great power. It had developed economically and
socially and was able to compete with the West.
However, Japan began to face an identity crisis as the 1990s unfolded. As Self argues,
Japan’s economic struggles in the 1990s, “brought a profound reconsideration of what
Japan is, how the world works, and how Japan should relate to the world, including
China . . . The bursting of the economic bubble gave a sharp blow to Japan’s self
confidence and image of itself vis-à-vis China.”79 Suffering from economic recession,
Japan was at the same time challenged by a rising China. This challenge was more
ideational than material. A Japan that had begun to see itself as the superior to China was
77
Self (2006): 13.
Self (2006) emphasizes the role of war guilt and obligation in Japan’s decision to extend aid to China in the 1970s.
The decision was actually made based on a combination of factors, both material and ideational, including economic
and political factors.
79 Self (2006): 7-8.
78
27
seemingly beginning to lose its position of relative superiority. Relative power matters to
Japan not because of concerns over state survival, but because of issues of national
identity, as it defines itself in relation to the other.
In addition, the shifting distribution of capabilities created changing perceptions in the
international community as well. International observers began to focus increasingly on
China and decreasingly on Japan. As Self describes, “This concern about being replaced
in the hearts of the world by the Chinese has been a recurrent theme, echoed in the
postwar era by the Nixon Shocks in the 1970s and Japan Passing in the 1990s.”80
Therefore, the “China threat” in Japan seems less about material interests (material
threat) and more about status and honor, particularly in the international system. The
perceived “Japan passing” in the 1990s is an illustration of this. This means that when
we look at claims of “China threat” in Japan and dismiss them as not reflecting material
realities, we are not engaging with the real issues. Threat may not be in terms of material
interests but in terms of identity.
The People Speak Out
Such expressions of national identity have become common components of the public
discourse on and the public sentiment about the other country in both Japan and China.
National identity formation is not only at the level of the state, but at the level of the
public as well, as the public does constitute the nation.
80
Ibid: 30.
28
The China Daily has discussed the “open hostility” that the Chinese people feel toward
Japan81 and Gries has described “Japan bashing” as “ascendant and unquestioned” in
China.82 According to public opinion polls, only 21% of Chinese view Japanese
favorably, while 70% view it unfavorably. Revealing mutual animosity, 28% of Japanese
view China favorably, while a whopping 71% view it unfavorably. 66% of Chinese and
82% of Japanese view the other as nationalistic, while 65% of Chinese and 50% of
Japanese view the other as violent. Perhaps revealing that the tendency to see the other
as nationalistic is not far from reality, 75% of Chinese believe that their culture is
“superior to others;” 83% of Japanese feel this way about their own culture.83
Public opinion polls further support the argument that Japanese-Chinese views of each
other are ideational and not material based. Despite the fact that Japanese are not in favor
of China’s growing military power, only 33% of Chinese see the Japanese as an
adversary, while only 31% of Japanese see Chinese as an adversary. Also, as mentioned
earlier, the vast majority of Japanese do not see China’s growing economy as a threat.
This suggests that the unfavorable view of each other is not based on material
considerations (at least not predominantly), but on ideational considerations.
The Role of the State
Some assert that these negative public sentiments stem from a nationalism that is created
by the state, at least in the case of China. Gries argues that the “dominant Western
Shirk, Susan. “Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy in China.” Japanese Journal of Political Science. Vol.8,
No.1 (March 2007): 43-4.
82 Gries (2004): 85.
83 Pew (2006). Pew also notes that, in terms of Japanese favorable views of China, this is a declining trend. In 2002,
55% of Japanese viewed China favorably. The figures on cultural superiority are mentioned in the 2006 study, but
come from an earlier Pew study done in 2002.
81
29
interpretation” has been that “the Communist Party has constructed Chinese nationalism
as a tool to legitimize its rule.”84 Despite Gries’ criticism of this interpretation, there is
some validity to it. As Johnston discusses, “With the collapse of Marxist-Leninist
ideology as a force for social cohesion and political legitimacy, the regime has turned
with more urgency to a victimization discourse, and to a new amalgam of appeals to an
ancient, glorious Confucian past.”85
Shirk describes how “during the 1990s Communist Party leader President Jiang Zemin
cultivated anti-Japanese nationalism especially among youth by means of the Patriotic
Education campaign. Nationalism looked like a good way to foster popular identification
with the Party at a time when belief in socialism was waning.”86 And Johnston explains
that “it is clear the regime has thought fairly carefully about the politically instrumental
purpose of these nationalist discourses.”87
As was mentioned previously, Japan has been an integral part of Chinese nationalism and
national identity formation. As Gries explains, “For over half a century now, ‘defeating
the Japanese and saving the nation’ has been a dual legacy at the heart of Chinese
Communist claims to nationalist legitimacy.”88 Therefore, specifically due to Mao’s
historical connection between the Communist role in defeating Japan in the Pacific War
and the legitimacy of Communist rule in China, it is logical for the state to use those
same symbols.
84
Gries (2004): 18.
Johnston (1999): 292.
86 Shirk (2007): 45.
87 Johnston (1999): 293.
88 Gries (2004): 69.
85
30
However, there can be an overemphasis on the role of the state that distances us from a
true understanding of national identity formation. Johnston emphasizes identity as one’s
identifying “with the Chinese state.”89 This is as opposed to identification with the
Chinese nation. It also gives the role of agency in identity formation to the state. In fact,
Johnston argues that “this intensified identity discourse is primarily a function of a
regime of shaky legitimacy trying hard to convince its people that only the Communist
Party can lead China to its place of greatness in the face of external adversaries.”90
However, Johnston does acknowledge that the state would not be successful in this
endeavor “if there were not fertile ideational ground for such symbols.”91 This is an
important point to make, but it should be explored in further depth because here it is
important to distinguish among top-down, bottom-up, and mutually constituted (or dually
constituted) nationalism. This is one of the main things that Grier contributes to the
discussion. He argues that “the 1990s witnessed the emergence of a genuinely popular
nationalism in China,” but that is also true that such nationalism has been promoted for
the purpose of serving state needs.92
Although Johnston emphasizes the crisis of the state, Han Chinese took Tibetan unrest in
the spring of 2008 as a “crisis of legitimacy”93 against the nation, not just the state. The
Chinese nation (people) is emerging from a “crisis of legitimacy” and seeking its
“rightful” place on the world stage. The Chinese state is facing a “crisis of legitimacy”
89
Johnston (1999): 294.
Ibid: 295.
91 Ibid.
92 Gries (1999): 20.
93 I am using the term “crisis of legitimacy” from Johnston (1999): 294.
90
31
both at home – with the declining role of Marxist ideology – and abroad – with the 1989
Tiananmen Square massacre and subsequent issues with regard to human rights. These
are separate crises. The first has been integral in national identity formation. The second
has forced the state to be responsive to nationalist sentiments and to utilize nationalism as
a tool.
Japan has found itself in a process of national identity formation as well. The Japanese
nation and state, both of which grew in self-esteem with the successes of the post-war
period, have been facing economic malaise and challenges from China as the leading
power in Asia. The Japanese state is facing a second crisis as well. This is a domestic
crisis. With increasing voter volatility, Japanese politicians have felt a growing need to
be responsive to the Japanese public. Japanese politicians have stated that the Japanese
public (voter) is calling for Japan to deal more assertively with China. Japanese
politicians have found that it serves their political interests to be more bellicose in their
rhetoric towards China and more assertive in their policy action plans.94 Self explains
that “Outright anti-China sentiment has become increasingly mainstream among Japanese
politicians. Japanese leaders are increasingly likely to back Taiwan, pay tribute at the
Yasukuni shrine, and call for a sterner approach toward China, including further cuts in
aid.”95
Japanese and Chinese politicians are both responding to and promoting those public
sentiments that are based on national identity. Even if anti-Japan sentiment with China is
94
95
Author’s interviews.
Self, Benjamin. “Japan and China: A Façade of Friendship.” The Washington Quarterly. (Winter 2002-2003): 80.
32
not created by elites, it is allowed by and promoted by those elites. Whether or not their
intention is responsiveness, they are also promoting these sentiments. Therefore, rather
than the state or the public solely driving it, nationalism and national identity formation
in both Japan and China are created through the interactions between the state and the
public, as Gries purports.96
National identity formation in Japan and China has a significant impact on Japan’s China
policy and China’s Japan policy. However, national identity, although a significant
factor, is only one of the factors that drive foreign policymaking. Policymakers must
weigh political, economic, and security considerations. If national identity is
undermining one’s political, economic, or security goals, then one must consider shifting
priorities. Therefore, it is important to note that once a certain national identity has
become internalized by the people, the state becomes further constrained in its foreign
policymaking. This is because the public will hold it accountable to behave in
accordance with that identity.
In fact, since the 1990s, the Japanese and Chinese publics have increasingly pressured
their respective governments to engage in bilateral relations in a manner that is in
accordance with the national identity. In this way, negative public opinion has had a
deleterious effect on Japan-China relations, compounding the impact of national identity.
As Shirk tells us, “By the end of the 1990s, public opinion became so negative towards
Japan that it was constraining Chinese diplomacy and becoming a possible domestic
Although Gries (2004)’s arguments in this regard are interesting and generally persuasive, he fails to adequately
engage with the role politics plays as a structural component in this interplay between state and society.
96
33
threat.”97 Similarly, in Japan we have witnessed the impact of public opinion on China
policy and a struggle by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to alter public opinion to
alleviate the political pressure they have felt on their policymaking towards China.98
The Utility of Theoretical Eclecticism99
Theory does have something to contribute to our understanding of Japan-China relations.
First, an exploration of the explanations and predictions of the theories of the various
research programs helps us to see the implicit assumptions with which we may enter into
any analysis of the relationship. This will allow us to argue for or against the validity of
such assumptions. Second, it allows us to see how such theoretical approaches may
interact to enhance our understanding of the case study.
Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara have argued for theoretical eclecticism in
understanding the Asia Pacific.100 They have stated that “Japan and Asia-Pacific’s
security policies are not shaped solely by power, interest, or identity but by their
combination.”101 My analysis supports this claim, as I have found that current JapanChina relations can be explained best as a balance of power based on sentiments of
superiority and humiliation, which are expressed through nationalism.
97
Shirk (2007): 45.
McCarthy, Mary. “The Use of ‘Carrots’ and ‘Sticks’ in Japanese Aid Policy Towards China 1989-2001: How
Electoral Politics Shapes Foreign Economic Policy.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University (2007).
99 The use of the term “eclecticism” here is influenced by Katzenstein and Okawara’s use of the same term.
100 Katzenstein, Peter J. and Nobuo Okawara. “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism.”
International Security. Vol.26, No.3 (Winter 2001/02): 153-185.
101 Katzenstein and Okawara:167.
98
34
The Future
In conclusion, Japan and China are facing a myriad of challenges. International relations
theories tend to predict rather difficult times ahead. Theories of balance of power and
balance of threat see a continuation of balancing behavior by both China and Japan.
Furthermore, although China is becoming more acceptant of participating in multilateral
institutions, there is little evidence that it is willing to help to establish or participate in
any formal security institutions in East Asia, of the type that exist in Europe. On the
other hand, less formal institutions, such as ARF, have been shown to have some positive
effect on both Chinese perceptions and behavior. In addition, China has shown some
willingness to cooperate with Japan with regard to their mutual interests on the Korean
peninsula. Given the experience of ARF and its related track II process, less formal,
track II dialogues on regional security and other issues have the potential to make a real
difference in Northeast Asia and there has been some progress on this front.
In addition, although Japan and China have both illustrated their willingness to attempt
economic coercion against the other, the economic interests between the two countries
are so important to the stability and prosperity of each, that it is likely that these interests
will work as a constraint on the escalation of tensions.
However, where the largest questions remain is where the core of Japan-China relations
is situated. Namely, national identity. Notions of honor, status, superiority, and
humiliation drive Japan-China relations and the relative power considerations that each
35
has towards the other. And, as national identity formation has turned the publics of Japan
and China increasingly hostile towards each other, national identity has become a
growing constraint on Japan’s China policy, as well as China’s Japan policy. This is
likely to continue at least into the near future. The consideration for state leaders is
whether policies determined by national identity are hurting material interests and, if so
(as is likely), what they can do to lessen the negative impact of conflicting national
identities or influence identity formation in a way which lessens mutual acrimony. They
are more likely to have success in the former than the latter, but, in either case, their
choices are limited.
36