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IMMIGRATION AFF- K VERSION 2.0
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CASE EXTENSIONS
Ext- welfare reform act sucks ................................ 17
ext- otherization of immigrants ............................. 18
ext- otherization of immigrants ............................. 19
ext- otherization of immigrants ............................. 20
ext- otherization of immigrants ............................. 21
ext- otherization of guest workers......................... 22
ext- unconditional hospitality = moral obligation
..................................................................................... 23
ext- unconditional hospitality = moral obligation
..................................................................................... 24
ext- unconditional hospitality = moral obligation
..................................................................................... 25
ext- unconditional hospitality = moral obligation
..................................................................................... 26
ext- embrace the other ............................................ 27
ext- healthcare for immigrants = moral obligation
..................................................................................... 28
ext- speech act key ................................................... 29
at: this debate not key .............................................. 30
ext- we meet (gov definition) ................................. 40
AT: CP'S
AT: states................................................................... 41
AT: DA'S
At: politics- framework ........................................... 42
at: politics- framework ............................................ 43
politics link turns ...................................................... 44
at: plan spends money ............................................. 45
at: plan spends money ............................................. 46
at: plan saves money ................................................ 47
AT: K'S
at: biopower k- perm card ...................................... 48
at: biopower K .......................................................... 49
at: biopower k ........................................................... 50
at: ontology k ............................................................ 51
at: compassion fatigue ............................................. 52
at: nietzsche ............................................................... 53
FRAMEWORK
apocalyptic focus bad .............................................. 31
predictions bad ......................................................... 32
ethics key to prevent war ........................................ 33
at: great power war................................................... 34
at: util good ............................................................... 35
at: moral obligation to save da lives ...................... 36
AT: T
at: t- remove barriers ............................................... 37
AT: t-social services ................................................. 39
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PLAN: THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD REMOVE MEDICAID REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS AND ELIGIBILITY RESTRICTIONS ON UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS AND
IMMIGRANTS WHO HAVE BEEN IN THE COUNTRY FOR LESS THAN FIVE YEARS.
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CONTENTION ONE: THE ALIEN
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS ARE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR MEDICAID COVERAGE.
KU 8 (LEIGHTON, PROFESSOR OF HEALTH POLICY AT THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH SERVICES,
HTTP://WWW.KAISERNETWORK.ORG/HEALTH_CAST/UPLOADED_FILES/031208_TTHD_TRANSCR
IPT1.PDF)
the undocumented are, generally speaking, not eligible for Medicaid at
all except for emergency coverage. Legal immigrants are not eligible for federal coverage if they’ve been
living here for less than five years.
LEIGHTON KU, M.P.H., PH.D.: Okay, sure. Marsha, as you mentioned at the beginning,
DENYING HEALTH CARE TO IMMIGRANTS AUTHORIZES XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE—THIS
PROVIDES AN OPENING TO CONTEST THE VIOLENT BOUNDARIES BETWEEN HOST AND
GUEST.
Dikeç 02 (Mustafa, Lecturer in Human Geography in the Geography Department at Royal Holloway,
University of London, Pera Peras Poros: Longing for Spaces of Hospitality,” Theory Culture Society 2002;
19; 227)
Faced with an increasing number of immigrants, refugees, asylum
seekers, undocumented immigrants and homeless people, isn’t it timely to ‘call out for another
international law
a humanitarian commitment that effectively operates beyond
the interests of Nation-States’
Isn’t it timely to engage and challenge
‘the seduction of
home’
as
spaces safe from the disturbance of the stranger’?
Isn’t it timely, in short, to reconsider the notion of hospitality, to reconsider
what it means to be host and guest
declaring
undocumented immigrant population ineligible for basic social services such as health care
was based on creating a safe home
It is perhaps timely to ask the question inversely: what will ‘we’ do for or to the immigrant/stranger?
, another border politics, another humanitarian politics, indeed
(Derrida, 1999b: 101)?
, the seduction of the ‘construction of “homes”
, as Honig suggests,
Isn’t it timely to consider the usurpation of
spaces of safety,
speaking the language of hospitality in order to construct safe homes?
, to be disturbed, as Levinas once hinted at, by ‘being at home with oneself’? What if being disturbed by ‘being at home with oneself’ turns into being disturbed by the stranger?
The incident that once seduced many Californians with an image of home safe from the stranger presents an example. California’s Proposition 187 was an initiative passed by 59 percent of California’s voters in November 1994,
the state’s
and education. The
argument for the ballot initiative
for ‘we, the Californians’: WE CAN STOP ILLEGAL ALIENS. If the citizens and taxpayers of our state wait for the politicians in Washington
and Sacramento to stop the incredible flow of ILLEGAL ALIENS, California will be in economic and social bankruptcy. We have to act and ACT NOW! On our ballot, Proposition 187 will be the first giant stride in ultimately ending the ILLEGAL ALIEN invasion. (cited
The result was upsetting: abuses against not only undocumented persons, but against the
Latino population in general
‘Hate [was] unleashed.’
‘residents’
even
felt free to demand green cards from people that they suspected to be ‘illegal aliens’
Their home
state, after all, was under attack. The effect
has been: . . . to recriminalize the alien population and
to heighten the costs of alien visibility. . . . In short
to render aliens
politically invisible
The political abuse of the image of home as a sheltered and safe place drew upon an ‘exclusionary,
territorializing, xenophobic, premodern and patriarchal cult of home’
It was an elaborate
fixing of boundaries
Boundaries
not only evoke the idea of
hospitality, but of hostility and racism as well
in Hinojosa and Schey, 1995: 18)
, many of them United States citizens and legal residents.
Some responsible
of California
(CHIRLA, 1995).
of Proposition 187
, the effect and likely goal of Proposition 187 are not to prevent illegal immigration but
, to quash their potential power as democratic actors, labor organizers, and community activists. (Honig, 1998: 5) California’s Proposition 187 was an attempt to build ‘safe homes’ for Californians, not for all of them of
course.
(Antonopoulos, 1994: 57).
, making California a safe home for its ‘legal’ residents based on the exclusionary politics of home.
, evidently,
.12 It is important to remember, however, that it is not only the situation of the guest but also the host that needs to be r econsidered since, in the
case of immigration, for example, it is ‘both receiving populations and immigrants [that] . . . risk mutual transformation, [that] . . . engage and attenuate their home-yearning for each other’s sakes and for the sake of their political life together’ (Honig, 1999: 203).
The point, therefore, is about openings
, about ‘keeping open the question of who “the people” (the demos) is’, since the question of democracy ‘always arises at the limit of the demos . . . wherein native,
There is a need to reconsider the
boundary, not only as a separator but as a connector as well, where hospitality comes into play pointing
beyond the boundaries.
subject, citizen, or people receives its designation as such from the way the human encounter with the stranger and the strange is assumed’ (Dillon, 1999: 120 and 96).
There is a need, perhaps, to reflect on what the title words, in Greek, of this text suggest: Pera – peras – poros: the other side/beyond – limit – passage; ‘beyond the limits that interdict passage’ (Baptist,
1999: 102). There is a need, more importantly, if a cosmopolitan approach is to be assumed, to think about hospitality ‘that would be more than cosmopolit ical, that would go beyond strictly cosmopolitical conditions’, that would go beyond the interests, authority, and
legislation of the state (Derrida, 1999a: 43). To conclude, there is no way, I would argue, to escape the advent of the stranger, to avoid questions and questionings that tremble, if not stir, the socio-political order that once appeared, perhaps, as a safe home. Nor is
there a way to avoid the production of others. What is more important, instead of reflecting on the ways by which no other would be produced, is to be able to resist processes that produce and reproduce others; processes that stabilize themselves, that close
spaces, and that derive their sustainability from the very process of othering itself. Again, what is more important, rather than reflecting on the ways by which to avoid the ‘disturbance’ of the stranger, is to be able to provide for the social, cultural, institutional, ethical
and political spaces where we could learn to engage with and learn from each other, while being able to constitute our subjectivi ties free from subordination, in democratic ways. The point, then, is to open spaces, spaces where recognition as well as contestation
the point is not merely to open spaces; more importantly, it is to keep them open.
Hospitality is aimed at such a concern.
and conflict can take place. Furthermore,
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THE WELFARE REFORM ACT STIGMATIZES IMMIGRANTS. IT PERPETUATES THE BELIEF THAT
NONCITIZENS ARE INFERIOR. CHALLENGING THIS ACT OF DISCRIMINATION IS VITAL TO
CONTEST ALL OTHER FORMS OF XENOPHOBIA AND PERSECUTION
HULL 97 (ELIZABETH, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR AT RUTGERS, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 471)
By passing the
Welfare Reform Act Congress not only deprived resident
aliens of many of the social service benefits to which they had been entitled, but also stigmatized
resident aliens as a class by intimating that many migrate to the United States largely to enjoy these
taxpayer-funded services
"), 1
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("
. 2 "Resident aliens," who are also referred to as "immigrants," are foreign nationals who have been admitted for permanent residence in the United States and wh o are [*472] usually eligible for
citizenship after living here for five years. 3 In passing the Welfare Reform Act, lawmakers also departed radically from past practice by authorizing individual states, at their discretion, to impose restrictions on their alien inhabitants over and above those mandated
by federal law. Can Congress do this - authorize individual states to discriminate against their resident aliens? Since the Supreme Court has affirmed, with scarcely an exception, every immigration-related policy endorsed by the federal government, the answer is
probably "yes." But such acquiescent behavior is compelled neither by the Constitution, nor by the imperatives of sovereignty. Such behavior, moreover, undermines two constitutional principles that have contributed to a workable and humane federal system.
According to the first principle, Congress is constitutionally vested with the power to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," 4 and therefore possesses exclusive power to regulate the "terms and conditions" of an alien's residence. 5 Pursuant to the second
in order to prevent the emergence of an institutionalized underclass in this country, any lawful
resident, citizen and noncitizen alike, is entitled to enjoy the equal protection of the laws.
Restrictions on aliens were often
upheld on the ground that aliens as a class were less trustworthy, less capable, and less virtuous than
citizens
principle,
6
To protect these two principles,
Congress should repeal the Welfare Reform Act. If Congress does not act, the Supreme Court should declare the Welfare Reform Act unconstitutional. <Card Continues>
. In a 1927 case, for example, the Supreme Court upheld as "reasonable" a law prohibiting aliens from owning and operating a billiard parlor because such parlors were potential sites for d epravity. 11 A Rhode Island court similarly sanctioned a
state law forbidding noncitizens from driving motorbuses because "aliens as a class are naturally less interested in the stat e, the safety of its citizens, and the public welfare ...." 12 <Card Continues> In a 1971 case, Graham v. Richardson, 23 the Supreme Court
invalidated state restrictions conditioning welfare payments on citizenship or lengthy residence. Although the Court explained that such restrictions c onflicted with national policy in an area constitutionally entrusted to the federal government, it based its holding
primarily on the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 Without fanfare or prior notice, the Court proclaimed that classifications based on alienage, like those based on race or national origin, were "inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny." 25 Applying strict
while a state may
validly seek to limit its expenditures, it may not do so by means of an invidious classification whose use
violates "a general policy" embodied in "the Fourteenth Amendment
that all persons
shall abide "in any state' on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens under nondiscriminatory
laws."
Legislative classifications that target suspect groups are "subject to close judicial scrutiny"
because members of such groups lack the ability to protect their interests through the electoral system.
As a voiceless minority, aliens are easy targets for legislators, who in response to majoritarian pressure
could victimize them with impunity
Consider the Welfare Reform Act
Congress answered the public's clamor for a balanced budget and welfare reform by slashing
social services, then targeted non-voting aliens for the bulk of the cuts, thereby insulating itself from
retaliation at the polls. The Court's solicitude is in response to the deficiencies inherent in any pluralist
political system dedicated to majority rule. Resident aliens suffer special disabilities in such a system
beyond that experienced by other minorities, who can at least form coalitions with groups that are
similarly marginal and thus wrest concessions from the majority. Aliens, however, cannot even vote
the political powerlessness characteristic of "discrete and insular
minorities" both elicits and is compounded by public hostility. Such hostility, in turn, is particularly durable
because people who bear such feelings are rarely capable of recognizing the interests they share in
common with those whom they caricature. Moreover, few members of the political majority, and even
fewer lawmakers, are themselves minorities or have the kind of close contact with minorities that could
serve to modify their stereotypic notions.
Because such "notions" are rarely challenged, they
account for the "attitudes of parochialism and fear of the foreigner" that,
have
"historically disabled" noncitizens
scrutiny, the Court concluded that the state's desire to preserve its limited public welfare funds was not sufficient justification for the use of a suspect class. 26 Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Court, noted that
and the laws adopted under its authority ...
lawfully in
this country
27
<Card Continues>
were it not for the constraints imposed by the Court.
, which for all its severity represents clever
political strategy:
, and thus
cannot participate in what John H. Ely calls "mutual defense pacts."
43
Mr. Ely observed that
45
[*478]
as Justice Blackmun observed,
. 46 For example, noncitizens should not teach in public school or own billiard halls because as a class they are less trustworthy and less committed to the public weal than are
citizens. Nor should they qualify for public assistance since, as those who drafted the 1996 Welfare Reform Law suggested, the availability of benefits encourages aliens to immigrate her e in the first place, and then, once here, to feed from the public trough. 47
Such notions account for the long history of unequal treatment that suspect groups have experienced.
Aliens have been discriminated against so routinely in the past that even now it is "habit, rather than
analysis, makes it seem acceptable and natural to distinguish between ... aliens and citizens ...." 48
race and alienage
are
often used as a proxy for the other
"facially
neutral" requirements have been time-honored devices with which to handicap aliens, the bulk of whom
have always been racial or ethnic minorities.
This, then, is
another reason why courts should scrutinize any policy that targets suspect classes - to ensure that rational thinking rather than mere reflex or bias prompted its enactment. Notwithstanding the Court's insistence that
distinct, one is in fact
. In 1976, for instance, the Court invalidated a Puerto Rican statute requiring that all civil engineers on the island be citizens.
49
Legislators had
employed a neutral-sounding citizen mandate to camouflage what was in fact racial discrimination, since, as its drafters conceded, the statute was intended to reduce the number of Spanish-speaking immigrants. 50 [*479] Similar
51
Certainly citizenship requirements are not always proxies for racial discrimination, but the linkage occurs with sufficient regularity that courts should
examine them with due care. <Card Continues> Equal protection jurisprudence, as applied to noncitizens, lacks any semblance of analytic coherence. No sooner did the Court declare in Graham v. Richardson 56 that resident aliens constitute a suspect class than it
began to [*480] equivocate. Aliens, it turns out, are suspect only some of the time. 57 Although the Court continues to nullify an occasional state statute that subjects aliens to disparate treatment, 58 the Court continues to sustain other state and virtually all federal
policies that are at least as discriminatory. <Card Continues>
Perhaps no law enacted this decade will have as widespread and painful
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an impact on American citizens and resident aliens as the new Welfare Reform Act This Act
deleted the safety-net that has provided minimal subsistence to the poorest
members of society
The Act rendered whole categories of noncitizens ineligible for public
assistance, including taxpayers and those who may have lived here for decades
Congress
should repeal those provisions in the Welfare Reform Act that disqualify resident aliens from social
services because, in addition to being mean-spirited and gratuitous, they are counterproductive. The Act
will foster an underclass of impoverished, marginal, and increasingly desperate people. Society as a
whole will suffer as it always does when communal bonds are strained, just as it will profit if these bonds
are made strong
. 111
, which
President Clinton signed into law on August 22, 1996,
since the New Deal.
also
. 112 <Card Continues>
. Justice Harry Blackmun, speaking for the Court in Nyquist v. Mauclet,
172
noted that a social good is created when the state sees fit to educate and otherwise help sustain all the members of its comm unity. By extending its
hand to resident aliens as well as citizens, he said, the state would be developing a full "reservoir of talent and future le adership." 173 <Card Continues> According to Congressman Frank Riggs, the Welfare Reform Act was intended "to put ... the needs of American
citizens first." 187 The Welfare Reform Act did indeed "put the needs of American citizens first." Although the Census Bureau shows only about five percent of immigrants receive welfare, 188 almost half the cuts envisioned in the new law come at their expense. 189
this is the objective served by the disputed provisions - to promote discrimination for its own
sake. This is a dishonorable motive, and further reason why Congress should repeal the Act.
Perhaps, then,
OUR SOCIETY’S XENOPHOBIC FEAR OF IMMIGRANTS STEMS FROM A DESIRE TO CONSTRUCT
IMAGINARY BOUNDARIES BETWEEN “US” AND “THEM”- THIS CONSTRUCTION IS AT THE ROOT
OF THE HOLOCAUST
COLE 6 (PHILLIP, READER IN APPLIED PHILOSOPHY AT MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY, THE MYTH OF
EVIL: DEMONIZING THE ENEMY, P. 206)
It is an impressive and moving experience, and one aspect that stayed with me was the practice of
marking those the immigration officials felt were unfit to be admitted to membership of the American
nation with a chalk cross on their clothing. According to one display, a young girl was the only member of
her family to be marked this way and feared being separated, until an older person told her to remove her
coat and reverse it, so concealing the mark. She entered America with the rest of her family. According to
the museum, only 2 per cent of potential immigrants were turned away, but this conceals a larger story
that connects with the Holocaust. In an earlier book about immigration I wrote: ‘Whether we mark them
with paint, wire, walls or only on maps, borders remain imagined constructs, and what is banal about
them is their arbitrariness’ (Cole 2000: x). What the Holocaust shows us is that in our desire to make real
the boundary we imagine between ourselves and others – with, in Primo Levi’s words, the ‘we’ inside and
the enemy outside, ‘separated by a sharply defined geographic frontier’ – we mark not only the border,
but also those we feel do not belong inside it, with yellow stars or chalk marks. As we eject asylum
seekers and refugees from our borders we can comfort ourselves with the thought that – if proper
procedures are followed – there must be somewhere safe for them to go. But if we rush to judgement,
compelled by irrational panic, we may find that we are not simply ejecting people from our territory, but
that we are expelling them from humanity itself. That was certainly the case for many of the Jewish
refugees who sought refuge in the United States from the oppression they faced in Europe before the
Second World War. What the Ellis Island ‘2 per cent’ figure fails to represent are all those who never
made it even that far. In his superb and important book The Mismeasure of Man, the late Stephen Jay
Gould notes the passing of the US Immigration Restriction Act of 1924, heavily influenced by the same
eugenicist theories of racial inferiority that inspired the Nazi leadership and its supporters. ‘The eugenicist
battled and won one of the greatest victories of scientific racism in American history’ (Gould 1997: 262).
The Act set quotas designed to restrict immigration from southern and eastern Europe, in favour of the
‘superior’ northern and western Europeans. These quotas slowed immigration to the United States from
southern and eastern Europe ‘to a trickle’ (Gould 1997: 263). Gould observes the connection with the
Holocaust: ‘Throughout the 1930s, Jewish refugees, anticipating the holocaust, sought to emigrate, but
were not admitted. The legal quotas and continuing eugenical propaganda, barred them even in years
when inflated quotas for western and northern European nations were not filled’ (Gould 1997: 263).
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between 1924 and 1939, perhaps up to six million southern, central and eastern Europeans were barred
from entering the United States by the quotas. Robert S. Wistrich also notes the connections. He says:
‘The Holocaust was a pan-European event’ (Wistrich 2002: 5), and observes that it could not have
happened if there had not been a consensus about the Jewish ‘problem’, especially strong in eastern
Europe, but ‘there was also a growing anti-Semitism in western Europe and America, tied to hardships
caused by the Great Depression, increased xenophobia, fear of immigration and the influence of fascist
ideas’ (Wistrich 2002:191). Second, it obstructed German offers of negotiation to remove Jews from
Europe. And third, although the network of transport and camps that made up the Holocaust were known
of and could be reached by the Allied air forces, there was never any attempt to disrupt its operation by
bombing campaigns. The latter two charges stem from the first, the political influence of anti-Semitism in
America, which, although it ‘crystallised into a coherent, organized political movement or seriously
infiltrated into the mainstream political parties, it was nonetheless pervasive enough in the 1930s and
1940s to affect American responses to the Holocaust’ (Wistrich 2002: 192-3). Wistrich gives the example
of Breckenridge Jr, Assistant Secretary of State in the administration , who was ‘a paranoid anti-Semite
who thought Hitler’s Mein Kampf “eloquent in opposition to Jewry and to Jews as exponents of
Communism and Chaos”’ (Wistrich 2002: 193). Because of people like Long, attempts to relieve and
rescue Jews were sabotaged to such an extent that an internal investigation published a report in January
1944 entitled ‘Report to the Secretary on the Acquiescence of this Government in the murder of the Jews’
(Wistrich 2002: 194).
FEDERAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS CHILL IMMIGRANT PARTICIPATION IN HEALTH CARE—
REPEALING THESE LAWS IS ESSENTIAL.
PARK 4 (SEAM, J.D. CANIDATE AT FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW IN MAY 2005,
“NOTE: SUBSTANTIAL BARRIERS IN ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT ACCESS TO PUBLICLY-FUNDED
HEALTH CARE: REASONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE”, SPRING, LEXIS)
The
most essential step
requires Congress to repeal Section 434 of the Welfare Reform
Act and Section 642 of the Immigration Reform Law. This step is of vital importance because these
sections have created an indirect roadblock for illegal immigrants accessing federally or state funded
health care because they are not shielded from having their immigration status reported to the INS by
health care officials. Repealing this legislation is the touchstone of providing illegal immigrants with
undeterred publicly funded health care because if these sections remain in existence, states will not have
the ability to provide illegal immigrants with security when they choose to access the available federally
funded care and nor will states be effectively granted the power to provide illegal immigrants with
preventive care.
first, and
of the recommendation process
Congress should not have a problem repealing these sections because the [*586] objectives behind this legislation are unjustifiable. n123 Legislation proposing the reporting of immigration status of illegal immigrants when
they attempt to access public, social services has a myriad of objectives. These objectives include: First, illegal immigrants would be deterred from accessing public services if they fear being reported to the INS and subsequently deported. Second, with more
information on persons believed to be in the United States illegally, the INS would be able to deport more persons. Third, as part of broader anti-immigration programs, the mandatory reporting schemes aim to deter the flow of illegal immigrants into the United
States and encourage those already here to return to their home countries. Currently, there are approximately 8 million illegal immigrants in the United States. n125 In 1995, the federal government deported 1,200 illegal immigrants. n126 Even if these objectives
were successful to the point where it increased the number of deportations by an overwhelming ten-fold to 12,000 deportations per year, this would still leave the majority of illegal immigrants in the United States. n127 If there is a significant increase in the number
of deportations, the number will be nullified by the illegal immigrants that are bound to enter into the United States in the meantime. n128 In essence, these objectives are meaningless towards decreasing the number of illegal immigrants through deportation. Even if
the INS is unlikely to apprehend and deport a number of illegal
immigrants that would make any sort of significant impact.
the INS received a substantial increase in the names of illegal immigrants, history reveals that
n129 Former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani addressed the shortcomings of this legislation that is supposedly
intended to help the problem with illegal immigrants. n130 In New York City, there are approximately 2,500 undocumented illegal immigrants in their prisons. n131 Furthermore, nearly 4,000 illegal immigrants go through the New York City jail [*587] system every
the INS already has a
significant source of illegal immigrants they could deport but have chosen not to. "The Federal
Government does not deport enough illegal aliens in any given year to put a dent in the illegal
population."
Instead of meeting the intended objective of deporting illegal immigrants, these sections only create
a situation where poor, uninsured, illegal immigrants must fear going to public health care facilities and
obtaining other essential social services. If this legislation is to be justified, deportation, not depriving
these people from basic social services, must be the legitimate interest that the federal government is
trying to accomplish. Creating indirect fear for illegal immigrants seeking much needed public health care
services causes problems that are not justified by the federal government's modest number of
deportations.
year. n132 Although the names of these illegal immigrants are handed over to the INS for deportation, the INS successfully deported merely 300 of these convicted felons. n133 Therefore,
n134 Should legislation be aimed at deporting desperate, innocent illegal immigrants seeking health care, when the INS alread y has more than enough names of felon illegal immigrants to deport with their current funding? n135 The
answer is no.
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THE DEMAND TO KNOW THE OTHER’S IDENTITY IMPLIES A CONDITIONAL WELCOMING THAT
SUSTAINS THE SOVEREIGN DIVISION BETWEEN CITIZEN AND ALIEN
Yegenoglu 03 (Meyda, Department of Sociology @ Middle East Technical University, “Liberal
Multiculturalism and the Ethics of Hospitality in the Age of Globalization,” Postmodern Culture 13.2, muse)
Welcoming the other in
the form of codified multiculturalist tolerance implies a conditional welcoming, as the hospitality offered
remains limited within law and jurisdiction
Far from laying the grounds for an interruption of sovereign identity of the self,
multiculturalist respect and tolerance implies the conditional welcoming of the guest within the prescribed
limits of the law and hence implies a reassertion of mastery over the national space as it enables the
subject to appropriate a place for itself
Drawing on Derrida's deconstructive reading of the contradictions inherent in conditional hospitality, we can suggest that multiculturalist tolerance of minorities within the host nation-state is not for nothing.
. But more importantly, this kind of tolerance does not result in a fundamental modification of the host subject's mode of inhabiting the territory that is deemed to
be solely within his/her possession.
--an empty and universal and therefore sovereign place--from which the other is welcomed. Thus the place from which multiculturalist tolerance welcomes the
particularity of the other, fortified by codifications such as affirmative action and other legal measures, is what precisely enables the disavowed and inverted self-referentiality of racist hospitality which by emptying the host's position from any positive content asserts
The inherent paradox of multiculturalism's conditional and lawful welcoming of the other as
guest can be productively understood as conforming to "the structure of exception" that Giorgio Agamben
discusses in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.
its superiority and sovereignty.
In discussing this, I want to refer to the German case where the paradox of the inclusion of minorities within the
limits of law can be illustrated. All of the laws that regulate the conditions of arrival, presence, and departure of "guest-workers" in Germany reveal that the overriding concern is that of recruitment of a short-term labor force. For this reason, residence permits are
conferred only as work permits. Laws explicitly anticipate that the workers will leave Germany when the needs of capital are fulfilled. The fact that the workers' presence is regarded as temporary makes clear that the new regulations are seen as an exception: a
parenthesis to be opened and eventually closed. The logic underlying these laws is that the acceptance/welcoming of foreign l abor is a conditional one, as the workers' presence, which is expected to be temporary, is deemed to be an exception to the general rule.
Tellingly, the term "migrant" is not typically used to name this group. As guests, these workers are accepted as an exception to the general rule of membership in the German polity. Their welcoming is not regulated within the framework of the general rule of law. In
accordance with the persistent and widespread sentiment that declares that "Germany is not a land of immigration," the conditional welcoming or the temporary hosting of foreign labor appears at first glance to be s et outside the purview of general law. Hence these
In offering hospitality that is conditional, the German national self
appropriates a place for himself/herself so as to be able to say welcome. This entails not only maintaining
the status of the German national self as master, but more importantly it institutes a welcoming in order
to nourish the sovereignty of the German subject that was already in place
what Agamben calls "inclusive exclusion."
Such a sovereign self maintains and nurtures itself
not by pushing particular others to its exteriority or outside the purview of general law. On the contrary, it
is their inclusive exclusion, which the conditional welcoming enables, that is indispensable for a
reassertion of a sovereign German national self
It is precisely at this point that we need to be vigilant
and to problematize this codification by asking what is being negated and foreclosed here. Does this
codification entail the opening of the space of politics or does it effectively signal the circumscription of
what Zizek calls "politics proper"
regulations are nothing but the name of an interim, an exception. <Card Continues>
. To understand the dynamic that is operating here, we can
establish a link between Derrida's understanding of "conditional hospitality" and
Though pushed outside, the provisional acceptance of the guest-workers
enables the regeneration and nourishment of the German national self, which needs to reconstitute its sovereignty each time anew.
. The empty and universal position of the sovereign claim enabled by the general rule of law is capable of instituting conditional hospitality as an
exception and this enables the means to codify respect and tolerance for the different and confer upon them rights in the form of law.
or what Antonio Negri calls "constituent power"? <Card Continues> To answer this question--to understand the dynamic by which the "right to have rights" or the "right to have
politics" of minorities and foreigners is regulated and hence limited through institutionalized multiculturalism and through the granting of a set of rights guaranteed by law--it is useful to turn to (and to revise) Antonio Negri's conception of constituent and constitutive
power as articulated in Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State. I have already suggested, following Zizek, that it is through liberal multiculturalist institutional and juridical regulations that the post-national global order renders its global universalizing
does the current global management of the conditional and
legal hosting of immigrants mean that any change in the law or any attempt to modify the law will by
definition play into the hands of the forces of globalization? Can the legal conditions of hospitality or laws
on immigration be improved?
tendency indiscernible and thereby forecloses the possibility for a right to have politics or democratic politics. But
The analysis that Negri offers regarding the relation between constitutive and constituent power seems to imply that any attempt to improve or change the law is a vain effort; that it's futile to
attempt to replace existing laws with better ones, for any politics that remains within the purview of law is doomed to fail as it implies suffocation of democratic politics through constitutional arrangements. After a brief discussion of the analysis Negri offers and its
limitations, I will discuss Derrida's deconstructive reading of the relation between law and justice on the one hand and conditional and unconditional hospitality on the other hand and suggest that the latter offers a radically different opening of politics. <Card
Pointing to a hiatus between the law and ethics of hospitality, Derrida underlines how the ethics of
hospitality cannot be treated as a decree nor can it be imposed by a command. The hiatus between the
law and ethics of hospitality also pertains to the fact that it is unthematizable
Ethics as such is an attentive intention, a welcome and
tending toward the other, an unconditional "yes" to the other. Hospitality as ethicity is infinite
it cannot be
circumscribed
Continues>
, implying that a particular law or politics of hospitality cannot be deduced
from Levinas's discourse of the ethics of hospitality, for it is irreducible to a theme, thematization, or some kind of formalization.
(it is either infinite,
unconditional or not at all) and cannot be limited in the sense that Kant talks about it;
regulated by a particular political or juridical practice of a nation and therefore cannot be
. <Card Continues>
Unconditional hospitality entails a reversal, since the owner of the home can perform hospitality on the condition that she is invited to her own home by the one whom she invites, by being welcomed, accepted by the one whom she welcomes or accepts, and shown
Unconditional hospitality or hospitality as ethics implies the interruption of a full
possession of a place called home
hospitality in her own home by the guest.
and when its inhabitant becomes a guest received in her home--that is, when the owner becomes a tenant in her place. The inexorable law of hospitality therefore involves a
situation in which the hote who receives (the host), the one who welcomes the invited or received hote (the guest), the welcoming hote who considers himself the owner of the place, is in truth a hote received in his own home. He receives the hospitality that he
offers in his own home; he receives it from his own home--which, in the end, does not belong to him. The hote as host is a guest. The dwelling opens itself to itself, to its "essence" without essence, as a "land of asylum or refuge." The one who welcomes is first
welcomed in his own home. The one who invites is invited by the one whom he invites. The one who receives is received, receiving hospitality in what he takes to be his own home, or indeed his own land . . . . (41-2) Hospitality in this sense precedes property, since
When
home is no longer a property but a place that welcomes its owner, the question of hospitality cannot be
reduced to a multiculturalist tolerance, for there is no longer a question of limiting, restricting, or regulating
tolerance for the other
In the hospitality without conditions,
the host should, in principle, receive even before knowing anything about the guest. A pure welcome
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home, in this unconditional welcoming, is not owned, or is owned only in a very singular sense. That is, only insofar it is already hospitable to its owner, when the master of the house is already a received hote or a guest in her own home.
. As Derrida puts it: That a people, as a people, "should accept those who come and settle among them--even though they are foreigners," would be the proof [gage] of a popular and public commitment
[engagement], a political res publica that cannot be reduced to a sort of "tolerance," unless this tolerance requires the affirmation of a "love" without measure. (Adieu 72)
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consists not only in not knowing anything or acting as if one knows nothing, but also in avoiding any
questions about the Other's identity
From the moment that I
formulate all of these questions, and posit these conditions . . . the ideal situation of non-knowledge
is broken
, their desire, their rules, their language, their capacity for work, for integration, for adaptation . . .
--non-savoir--
--rompue. ("A Discussion" 9)
Above I have delineated the characterizing features of what unconditional hospitality is. To be able to understand its relati on to conditional hospitality, I want to briefly review how Derrida understands the
relation between law and justice in "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority,'" as it has a parallel structure with conditional and unconditional hospitality. This will enable us to better comprehend the nature of the relation between conditional and
For Derrida, there lies an aporia within the drive for
justice because it has to respect universality on the one hand and absolute singularity on the other. One
faces difficulty in justice precisely because of the necessity to speak in terms of the universal principles
when one is deciding about particular cases. Since law includes these two conditions simultaneously, the
singularity has to be translated into universality
justice is the principle in the name of which law is
deconstructed; that is, it is possible to change and improve the law, the legal system. Law can be
criticized and therefore is deconstructible, but justice is not deconstructible
Derrida makes clear that justice and law are indissociable
because it is in the name of justice that one deconstructs the law
Like justice, unconditional hospitality
is also impossible. But this impossibility does not mean that one does not aspire to pure hospitality. Its
impossibility lies in the very structure of unconditional hospitality itself. In principle, it is offered to an
unlimited number of Others and to an unlimited extent, without asking any questions. The Other's
welcoming is not to be contingent upon the Other's identity or the questions asked.
Derrida is not trying to offer a
political program about how a pure hospitality might be implemented; rather, he is trying to expose the
presuppositions of conditional hospitality and the series of concepts that it is based upon--such as
one's
proper identity
unconditional hospitality and thus better understand how unconditional hospitality is not simply the name of a political program.
. The aporia resides in the principle of universality which cannot directly speak to the particular case: in the fact that it is not possible to be just for
everyone and for every single case. This is what Derrida means in saying that "justice is impossible." However,
. Thus despite the absolute radical heterogeneity between the two, the relation
between them is not one of opposition. Law is not opposed to justice, nor is justice opposed to law.
. The relation between them will remain endlessly open and irreducible. To tend to justice one has to
deconstruct and improve the law, but it is never just--and it is there, in the space between law and justice, that one negotiates between the universal and the particular.
The very notion of pure or unconditional hospitality
assumes that one must offer to any stranger the right of entry to a territory, home, or nation of which one is legitimately in possession.
proper residence,
With the concept of unconditional hospitality,
, and proper cultural identity. For Derrida, there is an essential link between society or culture and hospitality. In every society there is space allocated for those who are invited and this
enables the welcoming of the strangers who arrive. In other words, conditional hospitality is what enables one's being at home. There is no culture, no home, no nation or famil y without a door. It is the opening of this door that functions as a means of welcoming
strangers. When the stranger, the Other, is welcomed on the condition that he adjust to the chez soi, the hospitality that is offered is a conditional one, one of visitation: the stranger is welcome only as long as he respects the order and rules of the home, the nation
or culture, and learns to speak the language. In contrast (but not in opposition) to conditional hospitality is unconditional or pure hospitality: the pure welcoming of the unexpected guest or anyone who arrives or visits, the hospitality of invitation. Conditional
hospitality of invitation is distinguished from the unconditional hospitality of visitation by the fact that in the former, the master remains the master, the host remains the host at home, and the guest remains an invited guest. As an invited guest, one is expected not to
Derrida imagines the hospitality of visitation in order to distinguish it from the hospitality of
invitation where the stranger is not an invited guest, but one who arrives unexpectedly
If unconditional or pure hospitality is impossible, then what is the possibility of the politics of
hospitality? Like the relation between law and justice, where it is in the name of justice that one
deconstructs the law, it is in the name of unconditional hospitality that conditional hospitality can be
deconstructed. To tend to unconditional hospitality one has to deconstruct and improve the laws on
hospitality (such as immigration laws),
the law
is perfectible and there is progress to be performed on the law that will improve the conditions of
hospitality. The condition of the laws on immigration has to be improved without claiming that
unconditional law should become an official policy. The very desire for unconditional hospitality is
what regulates the improvement of the laws of hospitality.
alter the rule and order of the home.
, where the host opens the house without asking
any questions. <Card Continues>
but these laws will never guarantee unconditional hospitality as such. The relation between them will remain open and irreducible. As Derrida notes,
PROVIDING HEALTH SERVICES TO UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IS CRUCIAL TO AFFIRM
HEALTH AS A BASIC HUMAN RIGHT- WE MUST FIRST ACCEPT IMMIGRANTS AS HUMAN
BEINGS TO MAKE MEANINGFUL CHANGE
ORTEGA 9 (ADRIANNE, J.D. BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, M.P.H. BOSTON
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, 35 AM. J. L. AND MED. 185)
The human rights model provides a fundamental moral argument for the extension of health care services
to undocumented immigrants. The human rights model asserts that certain values are "expressed and
understood in terms of human rights -- the rights that all people hold simply by virtue of their humanity . . .
." 42 Under the human rights framework, if we regard health care as a basic human right and designate all
humans as equals under the law, we cannot deny essential health care services on the basis of
immigration status. 43 By accepting immigrants as human beings first, we accept that providing "basic
preventive medicine and health care is not a right based on citizenship, but a right as a human being." 44
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HEALTHCARE IS AN ESSENTIAL BUILDING BLOCK OF OUR SOCIETY. THE DENIAL OF
HEALTHCARE TO MILLIONS OF CITIZENS HAS TURNED THE AMERICAN DREAM INTO NOTHING
MORE THAN A PIPE DREAM.
PLACE 99 (MICHAEL D., PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE CATHOLIC
HEALTH ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, “HEALTH CARE AS AN ESSENTIAL BUILDING
BLOCK FOR A FREE SOCIETY: THE CONVERGENCE OF THE CATHOLIC AND SECULAR
AMERICAN IMPERATIVE”, 1999, PROJECT MUSE)
It is in this context of significant compatibility of values and of a national commitment to maintaining
building blocks necessary to preserve those values that I want to suggest that there exists, in addition to
illiteracy and intolerance, a third "I," illness, that presents as significant a challenge to independence,
fairness, and equality of opportunity as illiteracy and intolerance. Obviously, this is not a new challenge.
Whereas it used to be that little could be done to prevent personal illness, our nation recognized early on
the need to constrain its social impact. The creation of sanitary districts, tuberculosis sanitariums, water
purification plants, and vaccination requirements reflected a public response to the impact of illness on
the common good. With advancements in surgery, public hospitals were established so that the poor
would be treated with a modicum of fairness and equality. As the practice of medicine became even more
complex and costly, we provided hospitals with tax-exempt status, the ability to float bonds, and access to
government support for construction. We also supported access to health care for those who work by
encouraging the development of employer-provided health insurance during the Second World War.
Similarly, we worked to level the playing field and provide some basic fairness when we said the poor and
the aged would not be marginalized from our responses to the threat of illness. In effect, over the years,
in various ways, we have had a national response to illness. There has been a type of informal building
block. Why do I say informal? Obviously my answer is somewhat subjective. If we are truly candid with
ourselves, however, could we in all honesty say that our current response to the reality of illness reflects a
national consensus as to what is truly essential for the well-being of individuals and the health of
communities? Even as we acknowledge the effectiveness of these previous efforts to address the third "I"
of illness, today many would agree that our health care system, as it is presently constituted, is not an
adequate building block for a free society. Even those who have [End Page 255] insurance are at risk not
only for the possibility of independence-threatening ill health, but for the loss of their insurance coverage,
which is their principal protection against the worst effects of sickness. Instead of double indemnity, they
face double uncertainty. For those outside the system--the 43 million--the situation is worse still. Under
such circumstances, it seems that our commitment to the notions of independence, fairness, and equality
of opportunity is compromised. In sounding this note, it is not my intention to promote a climate of fear,
but rather to encourage a clear-eyed assessment of the impact of our health care system on fundamental
national values. Earlier, it was suggested that fear of the unknown was an important factor in the public's
response to previous efforts at systemic health care reform--a fear capitalized on by reform's opponents.
Today there should be another very real fear, namely, that one of our nation's building blocks, access to
health care, is in grave jeopardy. Our self-image as a society is one in which opportunity, especially for
our children, is limited only by the ability to dream. I wonder whether that national dream has become a
pipe dream. This came home to me quite poignantly when I visited Dominican Sisters Family Health
Services, whose mission is to render compassionate and skilled nursing and health-related services to
individuals and families in the South Bronx. These dedicated religious sisters, professional staff, and
volunteers are safety net providers in what has been designated as the nation's poorest congressional
district. I learned there that hospital admission rates in that community for children suffering from asthma
and pneumonia, which can be prevented by adequate primary care, are five to seven times the rates in
more affluent areas of New York City. This is but one example of how for children, especially the poor,
fairness and equality of opportunity do not seem to be present. One can make the case in other ways. For
example, in 1995 and 1996 about one-third of our nation's children were without health insurance
coverage for one or more months; almost half of these were uninsured for a year or more (Kuttner
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1999b). What does this mean for their health care? Compared with children who have insurance
coverage, uninsured children are less likely to receive preventive services, such as diagnostic, screening,
and immunization services; to be treated for injuries or for chronic conditions, like asthma and ear
infections; or to benefit from prescription drugs or eyeglasses. [End Page 256] Race and poverty play a
central role. In 1997, 24 percent of Americans whose incomes were less than $25,000 were uninsured,
compared with only 8 percent of those with annual incomes over $75,000. In that same year, only 12
percent of non-Hispanic whites were uninsured, while 21.5 percent of African-Americans, 34 percent of
Hispanics, and 20.7 percent of Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders were without health insurance
coverage (Kuttner 1999b). How should we as a nation respond to these challenges? Let me propose the
title of this article as the organizing principle of an appropriate response: "Health Care as an Essential
Building Block for a Free Society." In adopting this concept, our goal would be to "reposition" health care
from its status as an important, but ultimately optional, building block to one that is essential. In fact, the
impact of health care, or its absence, is felt at every stage of life, from the prenatal health of one's mother
to one's own death. A lack of access at any step of the way is a potential threat to independence and the
pursuit of opportunity. Consequently, the provision of health care should be accepted as the same kind of
essential building block that universal education and nondiscrimination are for the individual, and that
police and fire protection, roads, and running water are for society.
WE MUST EMBRACE AN ETHIC OF UNCONDITIONAL HOSPITALITY IN OPPOSITION TO
CALCULATIONS- WE KNOW THAT ACHIEVING TRUE HOSPITALITY IS IMPOSSIBLE, BUT THE
ASPIRATION ITSELF BRINGS US CLOSER TO THE OTHER. TRUE JUSTICE MUST
SIMULTANEOUSLY STAND OUTSIDE AND WITHIN THE LAW.
THE ROLE OF THE BALLOT IS IDEAL FORMATION – A PROMISE OF JUSTICE TO COME. THE
ETHICAL DEMAND STEMS FROM THIS PROMISE, NOT FROM ITS FULFILLMENT THROUGH
SIMULATED ENACTMENT OF A POLICY.
DOTY 6 (ROXANNE LYNN, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY TEMPE, ARIZONA, “FRONTERAS COMPASIVAS AND THE ETHICS
OF UNCONDITIONAL HOSPITALITY”, MILLENIUM- JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 2006;
35; 53, HTTP://MIL.SAGEPUB.COM/CGI/REPRINT/35/1/53)
unconditional hospitality is located in the now sizeable body of Derrida’s writings on justice and ethics and is inextricably
intertwined with his ideas on numerous other ‘undecidable quasi-concepts’ such as democracy, forgiveness, friendship and
cosmopolitanism.23 Derrida explicitly addressed issues of justice and ethics, beginning with The Other Heading, but they have arguably always been present in his
The concept of
project of deconstruction, hence the statement, ‘deconstruction is justice’. The concept of hospitality figures prominently in these discussions as illustrated in his claim that
Derrida finds an implosion or self-deconstruction at work in the very core of the concept of
hospitality, the same aporia he discovers in the concept of justice which he articulated in his now classic essay, ‘Force of Law’.25 In
this much-discussed essay, he examined the relationship between law and justice arguing that justice requires an experience of the impossible,
an experience of aporia. However, ‘experience’ is itself contradictory because experience is ‘something
that traverses and travels toward a destination for which it finds the appropriate passage. The experience
finds it way, its passage, it is possible.’26 But, aporia does not allow passage. It is a non-road. Still, there
is no justice without this experience of aporia, however impossible such an experience may be. ‘A will, a
desire, a demand for justice whose structure wouldn’t be an experience of aporia would have no chance
to be what it is, namely a call for justice.’27 Such an experience may be law, but law is not justice. ‘Law is the element of
calculation, and it is just that there be law, but justice is incalculable.’28 In contrast to law, justice requires
absolute risk, not certainty. One must avoid good conscience as subjective certainty because it ‘is
incompatible with the absolute risk that every promise, every engagement, and every responsible
decision – if there are such – must run’.29 To buttress a promise, an engagement, a decision by the certainty of being right, of being on the side of reason, the side
[continued—no break]
‘ethics is hospitality’.24
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These things might
seem to offer protection, a guarantee that responsibility has been carried out and Derrida does not
suggest we completely abandon them. Such certainties nevertheless remain heterogeneous to the experience
of the aporia inherent in responsibility’s call.30 So, the fulfilment of responsibility, whether to justice,
democracy, or hospitality, must always take the form of a promise, a promise that is always ‘to come’.
Justice, hospitality, democracy are all experiences ‘of the impossible’, though this does not mean they
cannot occur.31 We do, in fact, sometimes experience justice, hospitality, and democracy, but such
experiences are of the impossible because the concepts themselves with which we name the
experiences are imbued with undecidability. We construct these concepts in the attempt to capture, to
translate what cannot be translated and the risk is ever present of reducing the experience to the
language-dependent concept and/or to a mechanized technique or programme. The insistence on undecidability is to
of conscience, the side of science, the side of truth is to transform the experience into a deployment of a programme or the application of a rule.
guard against such a reduction. Given this, one could never come up with a body of specific laws or rules pertaining to such concepts. One could never list with any certitude the
One could never define with any exactitude a set of objective
social scientific indicators that would attest to the presence of these impossible experiences, which might
nevertheless happen. Justice, hospitality can only be poetic in the sense that they, like so many other experiences, are
untranslatable through language. They push against the limits of language and perhaps of comprehension itself. Like a poem, we must
allow these things to ‘come close to a silence around which discourse is ordered and that a poem
sometimes discovers, but always pulls itself back from unveiling in the very movement of speech or
writing’.32 One cannot speak of experiences of aporia without raising the issue of borders, the border as
limit and threshold and the inherent undecidability of all borders. Derrida has spoken of, written about, and called attention to the
conditions under which experiences of these things might happen.
deconstructive logic at work on the many borders in our world, including, and perhaps most importantly, the concept of a border itself. His work carries particular relevance, as
he has suggested on numerous occasions, for ‘the places where questions of juridical, ethical, or political responsibility also concern geographical, national, ethnic, or linguistic
In such places one encounters a call for and the possibility/impossibility of hospitality.
borders’.33
The Southwestern
desert is just such a place where a demand, a plea for hospitality rises in the silence and reverberates across vast and seemingly empty spaces of a borderland both
uncrossable and too porous, permeable and indeterminate.34 And it is here that the poles of conditional and unconditional hospitality perpetually haunt one another. In Of
Derrida speaks specifically to the issue of hospitality.35 He points to the troubled and
troubling Latin origin of the word, hospitalitat, ‘which allows itself to be parasitized by his opposite,
“hostility,” the undesirable guest’.36 The question of conditionality presents itself in the very concept of hospitality and leads him to ask, ‘Do we
know what hospitality is?’ and ‘will we ever know?’37 This enigma suggests two manifestations of
hospitality: (1) conditional or hospitality of the invitation; and (2) unconditional or hospitality of the
visitation. We should not think of these two manifestations as oppositional. Rather, each is haunted by the other. Conditional
hospitality, hospitality of the invitation, welcomes the other to the extent that he/she learns and speaks the
language, adjusts to the order of the house, respects the orderer, in more common terms, assimilates. The
notion of conditional hospitality is clearly inspired by the limitations of Kantian cosmopolitanism which, while asserting a right to universal hospitality, places
limits upon what it can mean by fixing it within a moral and physical geography defined by a world of
sovereign, territorial states.38 In contrast, in a situation of unconditional hospitality the visitor is not an
invited guest, nor expected. The visitor arrives unexpectedly, uninvited and the pure host should open
his/her house without asking, ‘Who are you?’, ‘What are you coming for?’, ‘Do you have a passport, a
visa?’ This hospitality of visitation requires unconditional acceptance of whomever turns up ‘before any
determination, before any anticipation, before any identification, whether or not it has to do with a
foreigner, an immigrant, an uninvited guest, or an unexpected visitor, whether or not the new arrival is the
citizen of another country, a human, an animal, or divine creature, a living or dead thing, male or
female’.39 Like justice, unconditional hospitality is impossible as a rule. Still it may happen. [S]ometimes,
exceptionally, it may happen. I cannot regulate, control or determine these moments, but it may happen,
just as an act of forgiveness, some forgiveness may happen, pure forgiveness may happen. …
Unconditional hospitality can’t be an establishment, but it may happen as a miracle ... in an instant, not
lasting more than an instant, it may happen. This is the ... possible happening of something impossible
which makes us think what hospitality or forgiveness, or gift might be.40
Hospitality and ‘Hostipitality’,
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WE HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO UNCONDTIONALLY EMBRACE THE IMMIGRANT OTHER, WHICH
MEANS EMBRACING THE VULNERABILITY INHERENT IN THEIR DISADVANTAGES.
WE MUST TRANSCEND THE TRAP OF XENOPHOBIC POLITICS THAT SEEK TO LIMIT
IMMIGRATION IN ORDER TO OVERCOME OUR STIGMATIZATION OF IMMIGRANTS.
DERRIDA 1 (JACQUES, PROFESSOR OF HUMANITIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
IRVINE, “A DISCUSSION WITH JACQUES DERRIDA”, THEORY & EVENT, VOLUME 5, ISSUE 1, 2001,
PROJECT MUSE)
In the hospitality without conditions, the host should, in principle, receive even before knowing anything about
the guest. A pure welcome consists not only in not knowing anything or acting as if one knows nothing,
but also in avoiding any questions about the Other's identity, their desire, their rules, their language, their
capacity for work, for integration, for adaptation... From the moment that I formulate all of these questions, and posit these
conditions . . . the ideal situation of non-knowledge -- non-savoir -- is broken -- rompue. [13] So an unconditional hospitality would have
to be offered to an unlimited number of unknown Others, to an unlimited extent. And to Others to whom no
questions were posed. It fails as such if it's offered only under duress, or to fulfil a debt, or out of legal or moral obligation. In an
unconditional hospitality, the Other whom we welcome might -- Derrida has proposed -- 'might be an assassin,
might disrupt my home... might come to make revolution'. [14] And, it must be added, one must welcome that
possibility. Our welcome would not be contingent on interrogations about the Other's identity, leading Derrida to
ask, in Of Hospitality: Does one give hospitality to a subject? to an identifiable subject? to a subject identifiable
by name? to a legal subject? Or is hospitality rendered, is it given to the Other before they are identified,
even before they are (posited as or supposed to be) a subject? [15] Perhaps those formulations seem to call -- come, viens
-- to the absolutely Other to whom I might offer a pure hospitality. But Derrida is not offering a manifesto for how to offer this, for he argues that the
project would always have failed. Pure hospitality is, he writes, impossible. Impossibility is not what prevents
a pure hospitality one might dream for, it's included in the structure of what pure hospitality is. Among the
reasons for this, there is his comment cited above that 'from the moment that I formulate all of these questions, and posit these conditions . . . the ideal
Is it possible to turn to the Other at all without posing some
kind of question: even just the what? or the who? So, hospitality offered would always 'annul' itself. And
there's a sense in which, as Derrida writes in Fidélité à plus d'un: There is a certain original mourning: the Other does not
present itself, but absents itself even as it presents itself, the Other is one of the disappeared (c'est un
situation of non-knowledge -- non-savoir -- is broken -- rompue.'
disparu). When I see the Other appear, I am already weeping the Other's absence, to deplore-desire-apprehend their departure, here I am (me voilà)
I never greet the absolute, anonymous
Other whom an unconditional hospitality might have welcomed. Perhaps we need to ask not whether the
politician, or anyone, should think about a poetics of unlimited hospitality -- but how the politician, or
anyone, is already engaged, if implicitly, in this reflection. Perhaps some, or all of us, do live believing in the
possibility of unlimited hospitality. Though in fact, I'm not thinking of those whose intentions might be to say:
viens -- 'come'. I was thinking of those also who have wanted to say: ne viens pas, 'don't come'. Those
wanting to limit immigration programs often evoke unconditional hospitality as a threat: a flood of immigrants
might be admitted, temporary visitors might never go home, they might be assassins, they might
contribute to unrest, the nation's identity might be lost in the numbers. So if we're told, as we are, that we
must draw the limit, let's assume that acts of limited hospitality do live with, and do bear the trace of, the
possibility of unlimited hospitality, and apparently the belief in that possibility. In Of Hospitality, Derrida
associates instances of xenophobia with the fear that one's home will no longer be one's own domain,
one's inviolable private space. He writes: 'the perversion and pervertibility of this law (which is also a law of
hospitality) is that one can become virtually xenophobic in order to protect or claim to protect one's own
hospitality, the own home that makes possible one's own hospitality'.[17] And in Fidélité à plus d'un, the Manifeste de
l'hospitalité and in Monolingualism of the Other, Derrida resists the positing of national or cultural identity as that which is
already saying: farewell, farewell, you abandon me (adieu, adieu, tu m'abandonnes).[16]
proper to us, that which we can possess or speak for. In Cosmopolites de tous les pays, encore un effort!, contributing to the proposal for a network of
cities independently offering asylum to persecuted intellectuals amongst others, Derrida
proposes that such urgent 'practical
initiatives' should also open up 'an audacious call for a true innovation in the history of the right of asylum
or of the duty of hospitality'. [18] What kind of new notions of responsibility might be opened up by a new concept of the chez soi, and so a
new concept of hospitality?
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THE LAW IS PERFECTABLE. IT WORKS TOWARDS PERFECTION WITHOUT EVER ACHIEVING IT
AND THUS EXPRESSES A USEFUL, IF IMPOSSIBLE, IDEAL.
WE UNDERSTAND THAT EVERY COUNTRY WON’T OPEN THEIR DOORS UNCONDITIONALLY TO
THE OTHER, AND WE DON’T THINK THAT WE SHOULD UNDERGO A POLICY SIMULATION, BUT
WE SHOULD, THROUGH THIS SPEECH ACT, EMBODY THE IDEA OF PURE HOSPITALITY
DERRIDA 1 (JACQUES, PROFESSOR OF HUMANITIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
IRVINE, “A DISCUSSION WITH JACQUES DERRIDA”, THEORY & EVENT, VOLUME 5, ISSUE 1,
2001,PROJECT MUSE)
what room is left for a politics of hospitality in that case, for
perfectibility? If I want to improve the laws -- and this is a very concrete problem for everyone in the world today, and especially in Europe and in
France -- how can we improve the situation? For instance, France has been recently, and for decades, betraying laws on political asylum, practicing a
politics of immigration which is untrue to its own principle and so on and so forth. So we have to change the law, improve the law, and there
is an infinite progress to be performed, to be achieved in that respect . I love the process of perfectibility, because it is marked by
Now, to come back to one of your most difficult questions:
the context of the eighteenth century, the Aufklärung. It is often the case that people would like to oppose this period of deconstruction to the Enlightenment. No, I am for the
I think the law is perfectible and we can improve the law. We have to
improve the conditions of conditional hospitality, we can change, we should change the laws on
immigration, as far as possible, given a certain number of constraints. For instance, in France -- let me take this example to be
less speculative and theoretical -- some people, including me, have signed a petition saying that, in certain conditions,
we were ready to shelter in our houses people who were considered illegal immigrants in France. We say,
well, we are going to violate the law, to practice civil disobedience because we find the way that the
government today applies the law is outrageous, but we are not simply doing this irresponsibly. The
Minister of the Interior at the time said: these intellectuals are irresponsible, they are irresponsible
because they want simply to open the gates and let everyone into the country, and then you will see what
happens. No, we didn't say that. We were not advocating an unconditional hospitality. We said that there
is today a law, for instance embodied in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, there is a law which is higher than the French legal system,
than the way it is currently applied. And it's in the name of this law, of this legality, that we oppose the current
interpretation of the law by the French government. So it was not in the name of pure hospitality that we did
so, but in the name of a perfectible law. We wanted the law to be changed and in fact, to some extent, it has been
changed. It has been changed, but not enough. Of course we were not charged. I myself, for instance, could hide some such immigrants, and
they couldn't sue me. The government had to change, to some extent -- not enough, but to some extent -- its policy, its practice. So in that case we considered that
the law was perfectible, that we had to improve the law, without claiming that the unconditional hospitality
should become the official policy of the government. We are not dreamers, from that point of view, we know that
today no government, no nation state, will simply open the borders, and in good faith we know that we
don't do that ourselves. We would not simply leave the house with no doors, no keys and so on and so
forth. We protect ourselves, OK? Who could deny this in good faith? But we have the desire for this
perfectibility, and this desire is regulated by the infinite pole of pure hospitality. If we have a concept of
conditional hospitality, it's because we have also the idea of a pure hospitality, of unconditional hospitality.
Enlightenment, I'm for progress, I'm a 'progressist'.
The same goes for forgiveness. This resembles but is not identical with Kant's notion of a regulative idea: that is, there is an endless inadequation between the conditional and
it's here and now that we have to try to think and to
embody what unconditional hospitality should be. There is this intention and if we cannot conform to this injunction, and we cannot, obviously
the unconditional, and there is this regulative idea ... an inaccessible law. In fact,
we cannot, its impossible, it's impossible as a rule.... Let me try and make this more specific. It's impossible as a rule, I cannot regularly organise unconditional hospitality, and
I cannot have a good conscience because I know that I lock my door, and
that a number of people who would like to share my house, my apartment, my nation, my money, my land
and so on and so forth. I say not as a rule, but sometimes, exceptionally, it may happen. I cannot
regulate, control or determine these moments, but it may happen, just as an act of forgiveness, some
forgiveness may happen, pure forgiveness may happen. I cannot make a determinate, a determining judgement and say: 'this is pure
forgiveness', or 'this is pure hospitality', as an act of knowledge, there is no adequate act of determining judgement. That's why the realm of action, of
practical reason, is absolutely heterogenous to theory and theoretical judgements here, but it may happen
without even my knowing it, my being conscious of it, or my having rules for its establishment.
Unconditional hospitality can't be an establishment, but it may happen as a miracle ... in an instant, not lasting more than
an instant, it may happen. This is the ... possible happening of something impossible which makes us think what
hospitality, or forgiveness, or gift might be.
that's why, as a rule, I have a bad conscience,
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SHORT-TERM POLITICAL CALCULATIONS ARE AN EXCUSE TO IGNORE THE RIGHT TO
UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE- WE SHOULD EMBRACE HUMAN RIGHTS TO TRANSCEND THE
TRAP OF POLITICAL INACTION
RUDIGER 8 (ANJA, HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH PROGRAM DIRECTOR FOR A JOINT PROGRAM
RUN BY NESRI AND THE NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, “A HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENT
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES’ HEALTH PLANS”, AUGUST 2008,
HTTP://WWW.HEALTHLAW.ORG/LIBRARY/ATTACHMENT.13081)
The current state of the health care reform debate may explain the focus of Obama’s plan on improving,
but not systematically changing the existing health care marketplace. The aspirations of most current
reform proposals, including those put forward by many health care advocacy organizations, are curtailed
by fears of disrupting the existing system, despite its acknowledged malfunctioning. The political
imperative is to avoid so-called dislocation wherever possible, primarily in order to increase the chances
of achieving any reform at all, however minor. Yet this fear of dislocation may instead induce paralysis
and ignore the very real disruption that people already face when trying to obtain adequate health care.
With more and more people losing coverage, suffering from poor health, dying prematurely, or facing
health care related bankruptcy, dislocation has in fact become a constant in people’s lives. Ironically, at
this point in the presidential campaign, the only reform plan that would truly change the health care
system is Senator McCain’s – but in a way that would further ration care for many. Shifting risk from
employers and insurers to individuals would cause significant additional disruption to people’s access to
health care. To stem these forces of regression, reforms need to move beyond a piecemeal
reorganization of existing health insurance markets, and instead take meaningful steps toward a
progressive realization of the human right to health care. Just as the 1965 establishment of Medicare was
preceded by fear mongering about disruptive changes, reformers today face resistance when attempting
to push back the market’s encroachment on people’s basic rights. But just as advocates then succeeded
in carving out health rights and protections for everyone in old age, the bar needs to be raised until those
rights become universal and equitable. Next Steps: Everyone Included, Everyone Equal A key first step
must be to conceive any reform measure, however small, in a way that includes everyone. Structural
inequities that underlie the current system are most apparent from the disparities in both access to care
and health outcomes, and their elimination should be at the top of any reformer’s agenda. Yet, both
McCain’s and Obama’s plans perpetuate, or even exacerbate, inequities and exclusions, firstly by
maintaining distinct tiers of access to different levels of care, and secondly by excluding the health needs
of some groups, for example immigrants, rural and inner city residents, and women of reproductive age,
from the debate. Any rhetoric of “access for all” quickly disintegrates in the face of fragmented measures
designed to protect what some people already have.
POLITICAL SOLUTIONS ARE NOT ENOUGH TO END WIDESPREAD NATIONALIST AND ETHNIC
VIOLENCE—EMBRACE AN ETHICS OF HOSPITALITY BEYOND POLITICS
CARROLL 7 (DAVID, PROFESSOR OF FRENCH @ UC--IRVINE, MLN 122.4 (2007) 904-924, MUSE)
One does not have to be a cynic to wonder if in a world plagued with nationalist, ethnic, and religious
wars and other forms of violence in which civilians are sacrificed daily in the name of ethnic
ideals or
fictions
or the crass political struggle for power and domination
whether any form of politics is
up to the task of dealing effectively with such conflicts and bringing peace to the affected peoples and
regions
something more fundamental than politics would seem to be needed for politics to be
effective, for justice for the conflicting groups to be possible
it is
in terms of hospitality that the priority of politics is challenged.
an absolute
form of hospitality that is independent of and exists prior to any politics. Hospitality in the conventional
[continued—no break]
or religious
, on the one hand,
, on the other,
. Something else,
. "Politics after!" is the title of an essay included in Emmanuel Levinas's Beyond the Verse [L'Au-delà du verset] to
which Derrida refers in Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas in order to evoke the possibility of a concept of peace that, in Levinas's terms, "goes beyond purely political thought." 14 The Levinas essay, however, could also have been entitled "Hospitality First!" since
Not in terms of conventional hospitality but what Derrida characterizes as
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[continued—no break]
sense implies that we accept that the host
has the right to inhabit his home and thus to open up
his home and offer hospitality to others, to those who by being welcomed and received into his home
become his guests. And for the same reasons, that he has the right to protect his home and refuse
hospitality to those he does not wish to welcome into it. The host knows his home is really his because he
has a deed
in the same way he knows his country is his because
he was born in it or immigrated legally into it and now has a passport, a green card, an identity card, or a
visa to prove his legitimacy, some document that gives him the right to live in the land in which he lives as
a citizen or legal resident. To question the original
right of the master of the house
is
not to oppose the right or laws of hospitality in general but rather to propose a more radical notion of
hospitality that is not governed by any written laws
In the process, the distinction between host and
guest also breaks down
the radical notion of hospitality that implies an original loss of
sovereignty over the land one inhabits
is "chez lui," that he
, a lease, a document of some sort that attributes to him the right to occupy the home he occupies;
, "natural"
or of the legal inhabitant of his or her country
. For if the "master of the house" cannot claim to possess originally or naturally what he possesses only legally and politically, then
hospitality not only becomes more problematic and contradictory, but also potentially more open and generous, more absolute or unconditional.
. Or as Derrida puts it in his analysis of Levinas's "ethics of hospitality," "if the at home with oneself [chez-soi] of the dwelling is an 'at home with oneself as in a land of asylum or refuge,' this would mean
that the inhabitant dwells there as a refugee or an exile, a guest [hôte] and not a proprietor."15 For Levinas,
, the home one "owns" and occupies, has both a biblical and Kantian source; I would argue that for Derrida it could also be c onsidered to have an Algerian source and be
part of his experience of injustice and thus an important part of what remains of Algeria in his texts. If "hospitality prec edes property" (Adieu, 45 [85]), then in terms of what Derrida calls "this implacable law of hospitality" the relation of host and guest is not stable but
consists of a series of reversals of the two French meanings of the word hôte: The hôte who receives (the host), the one who welcomes the invited or received hôte (the guest), the welcoming hôte who considers himself owner of the place is in truth a hôte received
in his own home. He receives the hospitality that he offers in his own home; he receives it from his own home—which, in the end, does not belong to him. The hôte as host is a guest [. . .]. The one who welcomes is first welcomed in his own home [chez lui]. The one
What is original, what makes hospitality in
its most radical, implacable sense, therefore, possible is not possession but a "radical dispossession." In
this sense no one is really ever originally or completely master of his/her house or truly at home in his/her
home(land).
there exists an "ethics beyond the political"
the excess or priority of the ethical in no way necessitates a retreat from politics or a refusal to
become politically involved
when the persecution of all these hostages—the foreigner, the immigrant
the
exile, the refugee, those without a country or a State, the displaced person or population seems, on
every continent, to be exposed to an unprecedented cruelty"
the function of the
ethical is to provoke the political, to refuse to accept the unacceptable cruelty inflicted on others in the
interests of the State
What is unacceptable in terms of an ethics of hospitality are
"the crimes against hospitality endured by the guests [hôtes] and hostages of our time, incarcerated or
expelled day after day, from concentration to detention camp, from border to border, close to us or far
away from us"
The politics
rooted in the respect for the unnamed,
and thus always potentially threatening other, a politics whose ultimate horizon is unlimited or
absolute hospitality.
who invites is invited by the one whom he invites. The one who receives is received [L'invitant est invité par son invité. Celui qui reçoit est reçu]. (41–42 [79])
The law of hospitality is rooted in this original displacement or deferment of the "natural right" to possess and along with it the right to sovereignty—over either oneself or others. But what exactly are the political implications of
(Adieu, 61 [113], Derrida's emphasis)?16 In
asserting that there is or should be "an excess of the ethical over the political," or in Levinas's words, that
Derrida's terms,
, although there is always a risk it will be interpreted this way. Derrida characterizes the priority Levinas gives to the ethical over the political rather as "a provocation [. . .] at a moment of the history
of humanity and of the Nation-State
(with or without papers),
[. . .]—
(Adieu, 64, trans. modified [117–18]). In general,
, national security, religion, ethnicity, or anything else.
(71, trans. modified [132]).
implied by Derrida's reflections on Levinasian hospitality are
undocumented
THE ROLE OF THE BALLOT IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE PRIORITY OF THE ETHICAL OVER THE
POLITICAL—THAT IMMIGRANTS SHOULD BE TREATED HUMANELY AND THAT THIS TAKES
PRIORITY OVER PERSONAL AND NATIONAL INTERESTS.
CARROLL 7 (DAVID, PROFESSOR OF FRENCH @ UC--IRVINE, MLN 122.4 (2007) 904-924, MUSE)
To interpret Levinas in relation to or through the experience of colonial and racial injustice and thus in terms of what remains colonialist in the contemporary postcolonial world is to propose through Levinas, in and through his name and work, a "beyond" or a "before
Could
unlimited hospitality in some form or other, then, ever become the policy of the State? Could an ethics of
hospitality ever be translated into a politics of totally open borders and the welcoming and democratic
treatment of all immigrants and refugees? In other words, could politics ever become ethical, and is that
even the purpose of Derrida's elaborate analysis of hospitality: to lay the ground for such an application
and help make such a transposition or translation of the ethical into the political possible? The sensible,
"realistic" answer is of course no, at least not completely.
politics" that is related to the possibility of "an other politics" (79 [144]), a politics oriented toward the recognition and respect for others rather than aimed at the protection of the sovereignty and mastery of the individual or collective self.
Derrida explicitly acknowledges this when in Adieu he compares Kant's cosmopolitanism with Levinas's concept of
hospitality: "Never will a Nation-State as such, regardless of its form of government, and even if it is democratic, its majority on the right or the left, open itself up to an unconditional hospitality or a right of asylum without restriction. It would never be 'realist' to expect
The Nation-State will always want to 'control the flow of immigration'"
But simply to
accept this fact would also be to accept the limits and conditions of possibility of hospitality that are
determined by politics
cannot be content with such a critical response, no matter
[continued—no break]
or demand this of a Nation-State as such.
(90 [159]).
. Derrida and Levinas, at least in Derrida's reading of Levinas,
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[continued—no break]
how necessary
analysis of limits and possibilities might be. "Political realism" in the pursuit of justice is
never sufficient
it is never just.
one should never "leave politics 'to itself'"
or let politics determine the ethical demand of unconditional hospitality,
a Kantian
—perhaps it is even possible to say,
Derrida would seem to agree with Levinas that
because even if a nation were to attempt to pursue a politics of hospitality, to make
hospitality its primary political goal, and some certainly come closer to doing this at certain times than others, it could not avoid introducing "tyrannical violence" into the very space in which openness, receptivity, and above all non-violence should be the rule (97
To
acknowledge the priority of the ethical over the political is to make demands on the political from an extrapolitical space
that immigrants
not be excluded
but rather
welcomed, treated humanely, and their needs responded to
[170]). If "the law of justice," in Levinas's terms, "transcends the political and the juridical" (110 [190]), if its prescriptions are "beyond" and "before" those of politics, then no politics of absolute, uncompromising hospitality can ever be realized as such.
, demands that the right of refuge and asylum be recognized above all, and
and the homeless
or expelled
in terms of an "other law": "Our task here is simply—between Kant and Levinas—to sharpen a difference that
matters today more than ever with regard to this right of refuge and all the most urgent matters of our time, everywhere—in Israel, in Rwanda, in Europe, in America, in Asia, and in all the Churches of St. Bernard in the world—where millions of 'undocumented
The
priority of the ethical over the political places humanitarian concerns before both personal and national
interests; it does not negate the importance and necessity of politics and political action but is never
satisfied with what is politically possible, what politics determines "realistically" to be possible
immigrants' [sans papiers] and 'homeless' call out for an other international law, an other border politics, an other humanit arian politics, indeed a humanitarian commitment that effectively operates beyond the interests of Nation-States" (101 [175–76]).
. <Card Continues> Derrida's
texts on hospitality repeatedly return to the question of how to move from the ethical to the political, without definitively or conclusively answering, but advocating political strategies for dealing with the inadequacy of any answer and the li mited nature of any strategy,:
"In giving a right [. . .] to hospitality, how can one give place [donner lieu] to a determined, limitable, and delimitable—in a word, to a calculable—right or law? How can one give place to a concrete politics and ethics? [. . .] A politics, an ethics, a law that thus respond
to the new injunctions of unprecedented historical situations, that effectively correspond to them, by changing the laws, by determining citizenship, democracy, international law, etc. otherwise? Thus truly intervening in the condition of hospitality in the name of the
The ultimate inaccessibility of unconditional hospitality is thus evoked
to dramatize the continuing, urgent necessity for new forms of political intervention, whose goal would be
the creation of more hospitable, just laws for those subjected to "the new injunctions of unprecedented
historical situations."
unconditional, even if this pure unconditionality appears inaccessible" (147, 149 [131]).
PUBLIC DEBATE IS A CRUCIAL FORUM TO CONTEST RACIST POLITICAL DISCOURSE—
FAILURE TO DO SO SHAPES PUBLIC OPINION IN A WAY THAT AUTHORIZES XENOPHOBIC
VIOLENCE AND PARALYZES RIGHTS MOVEMENTS
HEAD 5 (MICHAEL, CHAIR OF EUROPEAN COMMISSION AGAINST RACISM AND INTOLERANCE,
HTTP://WWW.COE.INT/T/DGHL/MONITORING/ECRI/ACTIVITIES/14PUBLIC_PRESENTATION_PARIS_2005/PRESENTATION2005_PARIS_PROCEEDINGS_EN.PDF)
to combat racism
xenophobia and intolerance
we have to be able to identify these phenomena in the varying forms they assume over time and in
different contexts. These contexts include public debate and, within it, political discourse. If we want to
be effective in proposing viable solutions against the exploitation of racism in politics, we need to be able
to detect it: not only when politicians make little secret of the prejudice that inspire their statements or
policies; but also when the racist and discriminatory nature of
policies lies somewhere beneath the
surface
There is not just concern about the possible consequences on social
cohesion of protracted and basically unchallenged racist or xenophobic political discourse
but there
is also concern about what has already resulted from it. It is a vicious circle of cause and effect. Political
discourse inspired by racial or cultural prejudice and xenophobia has deeply shaped public
opinion
and this has had in turn two effects: first, it has favoured the adoption of measures which
have impacted disproportionately on certain minority groups; second, it has affected the human rights of
people belonging to these groups
The findings of Jean-Yves Camus’ research confirm just how timely and useful the preparation of this study was. ECRI’s mission is
, antisemitism,
.
But to do this
statements and
and becomes apparent mainly as a result of time and repetition. This study provides us with further knowledge to enable us to do precisely this. ECRI’s concern with the exploitation of racism, antisemitism and xenophobia in political discourse
has been a feature of our work for many years now. We have two main concerns.
in Europe,
in Europe today,
. Only a few weeks ago, ECRI published its third report on Austria. This addresses precisely the link between a certain type of political discourse, the decline in the general public’s
support for asylum seekers and the adoption and the continuation of policies concerning this group of persons, for instance in the areas of social assistance and use of detention, the conformity of which with human rights has been widely questioned.
Racist or xenophobic political discourse, particularly where it has been fuelled by the media, has also
already favoured a situation where discriminatory or even violent behaviour directed against
certain minority groups is seen as more acceptable.
Another of the immediate practical effects of this sort of
political discourse is that it generates a form of political paralysis. This deters measures which would
be to the advantage of minority groups.
In a report on the United Kingdom published in 2000, ECRI specifically addressed this issue, particularly with respect to
asylum-seekers. ECRI will be addressing the issue again in its report on the UK which is to be published in June.
is turn
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EXT- WELFARE REFORM ACT SUCKS
CURRENT U.S. IMMIGRATION HEALTH LAWS LIKE THE WELFARE REFORM ACT EXCLUDE A
WHOLE POPULATION FROM OUR SOCIETY AND RESULT IN THE TRAGIC DEATHS OF
IMMIGRANTS
KRETSEDEMAS 8 (PHILIP, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
MASSACHUSETTS, BOSTON, “IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE COMPLICATION OF
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY: UNDERSTANDING LOCAL ENFORCEMENT AS AN EXERCISE IN
NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT”, AMERICAN QUARTERLY, VOLUME 60, NUMBER 3, SEPTEMBER
2008, PROJECT MUSE)
It is important not to lose sight of the role that these anti-immigrant anxieties have played in shaping local
enforcement laws. But I have also tried to show that these laws are not necessarily what they appear to
be. On the face of it, local enforcement laws appear to serve an immigration control agenda, but the
expansion of these laws was also facilitated by executive officials who support the expansion of
immigrant labor markets. In some respects, the willingness of the executive office to cater to restrictionist
sentiments is the most incidental feature of the role it played in helping to expand local enforcement laws.
More significant is the way that executive decisions were used to intervene in prior legal precedent in light
of immediate political contingencies, and as I have argued, these priorities resonate much more strongly
with a form of governmentality guiding the process of economic globalization. [End Page 567]
This is one reason immigration scholars and advocates need to come to terms with the likelihood that
neoliberal priorities will become the driving force behind future local enforcement (and immigration
enforcement more generally). Under these priorities, local enforcement becomes a strategy for weeding
out “undesirable” noncitizens from an expanding noncitizen workforce rather than being a long-term
strategy for the mass deportation of unauthorized migrants. For example, the National Crime Information
Center (NCIC) database allows local police to increase their apprehension of noncitizens with criminal
records, but it has no bearing for the vast majority of noncitizens (and unauthorized migrants) who do not
have a violation on record with the Department of Justice. Restrictions on immigrant use of social services
have also given rise to a variety of local screening practices that encourage welfare caseworkers and in
some cases educators and health-care workers to check the legal status of their clients. The 1996
Welfare Reform laws introduced a number of these restrictions, which were intended to reduce “welfare
dependency” and increase the workforce attachment of immigrants. In fall 2007, the tragic death of a U.S.
citizen child, Edgar Casterno, redirected public attention to immigrant fears of these sorts of screening
practices. Edgar died because his undocumented parents were fearful about taking the infant to a local
hospital that they thought would ask questions about their legal status.59 Edgar’s tragic death occurred
shortly before Oklahoma was about to adopt a statewide local enforcement law. Defenders of the law
pointed out that the infant’s death had nothing to do with the law, since it had not yet been enacted. But
Edgar’s death also drew attention to the fact that, even in the absence of “illegal immigrant” laws, there
are screening practices that can have a significant impact on the way that noncitizens structure their lives.
The screening practices that Edgar’s parents were trying to avoid were not informed by the territorial
paradigm of national sovereignty that I referenced at the beginning of this essay. So long as Edgar’s
undocumented parents avoided the use of all publicly funded services, it is unlikely that these sorts of
screening practices would ever have revealed their legal status. But the cost of this aversion—as Edgar’s
death tragically illustrates—is living a life under the shadow of the law, devoid of even the barest safety
net protections, such as access to emergency room care. These sorts of risks are indicative of the forms
of graduated sovereignty that have been intensified by the past two decades of immigration policy, in
which U.S. residents who live and work alongside each other are being held subject to very different
legal-juridical criteria and enforcement practices. [End Page 568]
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EXT- OTHERIZATION OF IMMIGRANTS
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS ARRIVE IN A SOCIETY OF RACIAL STEREOTYPING AND
EXPLOITATION- THIS EXCLUDES THEM FROM RECEIVING THE BASIC BENEFITS OF OUR
COMMUNITY
SADOWSKI-SMITH 8 (CLAUDIA, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH AT ARIZONA STATE
UNIVERSITY, “UNSKILLED LABOR MIGRATION AND THE ILLEGALITY SPIRAL: CHINESE,
EUROPEAN, AND MEXICAN INDOCUMENTADOS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1882-2007”, AMERICAN
QUARTERLY, VOLUME 60, NUMBER 3, SEPTEMBER 2008, PROJECT MUSE)
While contemporary immigrants arrive into a postindustrial economy, marked by legal quota preferences and post-civil
rights notions of race and ethnicity, much historical continuity exits in the transformation of non-elite immigrants into
undocumented populations. The notion of the illegality spiral, which links conditions under which immigrants
arrive and are inserted into the U.S. economy with variously racialized discourses of illegality, can be helpful to
highlight such structural similarities in non-elite movement to the United States. While the racialization of individual immigrant groups has changed over
time—from an equation of culture with race to “national origins” quota to segregationist practices, and, most recently, to post–civil rights realities—the
association of non-elite immigration with illegality seems to have remained constant. Recognition of this linkage
needs to inform any theory and practice of struggles for contemporary immigrant rights. Today’s undocumented immigrants
continue to be racialized differently through insertion into U.S.-specific notions of race and ethnicity. Irish
immigrants are usually not subject to ethnic discrimination and enjoy advantages because of their English
language skills. Irish construction workers occupy relatively privileged positions in the informal economy, and many Irish have even succeeded in
penetrating the formal sector by using their connections [End Page 798] in construction unions. In addition, Irish undocumented workers
in the hospitality industries occupy the highest paid positions as waiters/waitresses and bartenders, while
undocumented Latino immigrants tend to hold kitchen and janitorial jobs.68 Despite linguistic and cultural differences,
Polish and other Eastern European immigrants are also not treated as ethnic others in a context where
distinctions among Europeans no longer matter and their histories of illegality have been all but forgotten.
And Chinese populations are generally associated with the model minority myth, which overlooks nonelite
Asian immigrants, including Chinese undocumented immigrants who come surreptitiously on
unauthorized assisted passage systems that leave them with large amounts of “transportation” debt.
Viewed as the perpetual “illegal foreigners,” Mexican nationals, in contrast, now constitute the main target of
immigration debates, punitive regulation, and increased enforcement. Despite different forms of
racialization, however, all indocumentados bear the brunt of the ongoing restructuring of the U.S.
economy and the erosion of the welfare state that brought modest prosperity and security to an earlier
immigrant working class and its children. Contemporary undocumented immigrants work in
disproportionate numbers in unregulated low-wage labor markets, where they are generally remunerated
below minimum wage, do not receive benefits, or are employed by subcontractors who further exploit
them. Even higher levels of education, improved language skills, or longer stays in the United States usually do not translate into higher wages for
undocumented populations, so that their upward mobility is severely restricted.69 Undocumented immigrants are also
increasingly criminalized within punitive local, regional, and national legislation that further exacerbates vulnerability
to exploitation. Since the 1990s, undocumented immigrants have had to face enhanced Mexico-U.S.
border militarization, such as the implementation of highly visible enforcement operations, the
replacement of fences with wall-like structures, the institution of new technologies of control, and the
beefing-up of Border Patrol personnel along the Mexico-U.S. border. The Canada-U.S. border has also been enforced by
the tripling of the number of U.S. border agents, the installation of new surveillance and satellite tracking systems, and the erection of some fences.
These changes along land borders and other official ports of U.S. entry have turned large numbers of those who would otherwise be temporary
Especially
the militarization of popular Mexico-U.S. border crossing points has led immigrants to move to remote and
arid stretches [End Page 799] of the national boundary, which has increased the number of border crossing
deaths.71 In addition, legislative changes since 9/11 have enabled the more stringent enforcement of
immigration law, such as widespread immigrant raids and deportations, which often result in the
separation of families when U.S.-born children are left behind.
sojourners into more permanent undocumented migrants, who do not even dare take short trips home to see relatives or friends.70
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EXT- OTHERIZATION OF IMMIGRANTS
SOCIETY DEHUMANIZES IMMIGRANTS, CONJURING RACIALLY CHARGED IMAGES OF POOR
LATINO IMMIGRANTS, PREVENTING US FROM VIEWING IMMIGRANTS WITH COMPASSION
SHORT 7 (DANIELLE, AFSC COLORADO HUMAN RIGHTS DIRECTOR, “SEEING THAT OF GOD IN
OUR IMMIGRANT NEIGHBORS: IMMIGRATION AND FRIENDS’ TESTIMONIES”, 9-26-07,
HTTP://WWW.AFSC.ORG/HT/A/GETDOCUMENTACTION/I/18226.PDF)
In our society, it has become acceptable to dehumanize immigrants, and those who appear to be
immigrants. In recent years, we have seen an increase in expression of hatred against people of color,
both immigrants and citizens. The term “illegal alien” allows us to lose sight of our common
humanity. That term is also racially coded language that generally conjures up images of Mexican and
other Latino/a immigrants. While groups that oppose legalization often say that they are not antiimmigrant, just “anti-illegal immigrant,” the examples they offer of the supposed dangers undocumented
immigrants pose to our society are overwhelmingly of immigrants of color. This covert racism is reinforced
by the links many of their leaders have to white supremacist groups, as well as public statements referring
to the inferiority of certain racial and cultural groups. As Friends, we should look carefully at how this
issue is framed and examine our own reactions to the debate. IMYM’s Draft Faith and Practice offers the
advice that we should question our hidden prejudices and learn to value our differences. Are we looking
for that of God? Do we love our neighbor as ourselves? Is it possible that unconscious prejudices are
keeping us from viewing immigrants with compassion?
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EXT- OTHERIZATION OF IMMIGRANTS
IMMIGRANTS FACE THE PARADOX OF BEING WELCOMED AS GUESTS WHILE BEING FEARED
AS INVADERS OF OUR COUNTRY
DIKEC 2 (MUSTAFA, LECTURER IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY IN THE GEOGRAPHY DEPARTMENT AT
ROYAL HOLLOWAY, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, “PERA PERAS POROS: LONGINGS FOR SPACES
OF HOSPITALITY”, THEORY CULTURE SOCIETY 2002; 19; 227,
HTTP://TCS.SAGEPUB.COM/CGI/REPRINT/19/1-2/227.PDF)
Arguing for a ‘politically engaged, democratic cosmopolitanism’, Honig rereads the biblical book of Ruth,
engaging with Ozick’s and Kristeva’s readings where Ruth appears as a model immigrant (though for
different reasons). Honig sees Ruth, like Ozick and Kristeva, ‘as a generative, potentially very powerful
source of new ethics and dispositions’ (Honig, 1999: 186). She questions, however, the ways in which
Ruth appears as a model immigrant in the interpretations of Ozick and Kristeva, where Ruth represents
a ‘reinvigoration by way of conversion or assimilation’, in the former, and a stranger who ‘unsettles the
order she joins’, in the latter. These two interpretations, Honig argues: . . . combine two of the dominant
and enduring responses we have to immigrants. Immigrants are either valued for what ‘they’ bring to ‘us’
– diversity, energy, talents, industry, and innovative cuisines, plus a renewed appreciation of our own
regime, whose virtues draw immigrants to join us – or they are feared for what they will do to us –
consume our welfare benefits, dilute our common heritage, fragment our politics, and undermine our
democratic or cosmopolitan culture. Both responses judge the immigrant in terms of what she will do for
or to us as a nation. (Honig, 1999: 188)10 It is perhaps timely to ask the question inversely: what will ‘we’
do for or to the immigrant/stranger? Faced with an increasing number of immigrants, refugees, asylum
seekers, undocumented immigrants and homeless people, isn’t it timely to ‘call out for another
international law, another border politics, another humanitarian politics, indeed a humanitarian
commitment that effectively operates beyond the interests of Nation-States’ (Derrida, 1999b: 101)? Isn’t it
timely to engage and challenge, as Honig suggests, ‘the seduction of home’, the seduction of the
‘construction of “homes” as spaces of safety, spaces safe from the disturbance of the stranger’? Isn’t it
timely to consider the usurpation of speaking the language of hospitality in order to construct safe
homes? Isn’t it timely, in short, to reconsider the notion of hospitality, to reconsider what it means to be
host and guest, to be disturbed, as Levinas once hinted at, by ‘being at home with oneself’? What if being
disturbed by ‘being at home with oneself’ turns into being disturbed by the stranger? The incident that
once seduced many Californians with an image of home safe from the stranger presents an example.
California’s Proposition 187 was an initiative passed by 59 percent of California’s voters in November
1994, declaring the state’s undocumented immigrant population ineligible for basic social services such
as health care and education. The argument for the ballot initiative was based on creating a safe home
for ‘we, the Californians’: WE CAN STOP ILLEGAL ALIENS. If the citizens and taxpayers of our state wait
for the politicians in Washington and Sacramento to stop the incredible flow of ILLEGAL ALIENS,
California will be in economic and social bankruptcy. We have to act and ACT NOW! On our ballot,
Proposition 187 will be the first giant stride in ultimately ending the ILLEGAL ALIEN invasion.
(cited in Hinojosa and Schey, 1995: 18) The result was upsetting: abuses against not only undocumented
persons, but against the Latino population in general, many of them United States citizens and legal
residents. ‘Hate [was] unleashed.’11 Some responsible ‘residents’ of California even felt free to demand
green cards from people that they suspected to be ‘illegal aliens’ (CHIRLA, 1995). Their home state, after
all, was under attack. The effect of Proposition 187 has been: . . . to recriminalize the alien population and
to heighten the costs of alien visibility. . . . In short, the effect and likely goal of Proposition 187 are not to
prevent illegal immigration but to render aliens politically invisible, to quash their potential power as
democratic actors, labor organizers, and community activists. (Honig, 1998: 5) California’s Proposition
187 was an attempt to build ‘safe homes’ for Californians, not for all of them of course. The political abuse
of the image of home as a sheltered and safe place drew upon an ‘exclusionary, territorializing,
xenophobic, premodern and patriarchal cult of home’ (Antonopoulos, 1994: 57). It was an elaborate fixing
of boundaries, making California a safe home for its ‘legal’ residents based on the exclusionary politics of
home. Boundaries, evidently, not only evoke the idea of hospitality, but of hostility and racism as well.12
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EXT- OTHERIZATION OF IMMIGRANTS
THE MYTH OF THE AMERICAN DREAM IS DISTORTED THROUGH THE PLIGHT OF THE ILLEGAL
IMMIGRANT- THEIR WORK PRODUCES ONLY HUMILIATION AND SUFFERING, RATHER THAN A
REWARD- OUR SOCIETY PREYS ON THE IMMIGRANTS’ VULNERABILITIES TO OTHERIZE THEM
IN THE COMMUNITY
APOSTOLIDIS 8 (PAUL, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AT WHITMAN COLLEGE, “POLITICS
AND CONNOLLY’S ETHICS: IMMIGRANT NARRATIVES, RACISM, AND IDENTITY’S CONTINGENCY”,
THEORY & EVENT, VOLUME 11, ISSUE 3, 2008, PROJECT MUSE)
In key respects, these comments resoundingly validate the mythology of “America” as a “nation of
immigrants,” constructed as each generation of newcomers renounces its own immediate wellbeing for
the sake of their children, enduring the hardships of cultural and geographical dislocation as well as the
austerities of low-wage labor and working class life. Chávez confirms a core ideological effect of this
cultural dramaturgy that Bonnie Honig identifies: the legitimation of private property and the reinforcement
of liberal individualism through the economic self-reliance and class mobility that successful immigrants
epitomize (Honig 2001, 74). Yet the penumbra of pain that surrounds Chávez’s final phrase in the
quotation above prevents her story from unequivocally reproducing this nationalist mythology. Instead,
when Chávez narrates her bouts of recurrent bodily injury and routine personal humiliation at work, as
well as her earlier struggles crossing the border, she tells a counter-history of normality regarding the
genealogical constitution of the subject of the American Dream. She recounts, for example, days of
severe dehydration, hunger, exhaustion, and disorientation while attempting to cross the border – and
sheer terror, as she waded through muddy ocean waters at night and then nearly suffocated in the bottom
of a van hurtling down a California highway, her body pressed against burning-hot metal and crushed
under the weight of the fifty or so people piled on top of her. Later, as an employee at Tyson, Chávez met
with medical indifference and cruel humiliation when she sought treatment for an infection in her hands
that resulted from using the company’s wet, dirty gloves: They asked me some questions but about
unrelated things.... They asked if my mother had had abortions. And if I had had abortions. I don’t know
why they asked me those questions... I think it was to intimidate me. And later they asked me how many
times a day I washed my private parts; if I cleaned the yard; how many children I had, and if they were
still living at home. Things that had nothing to do with the matter. And what kind of soap I used when I
bathed or when I washed my private parts. What body creams I used. Whether I was a sleepwalker,
whether I was putting my hands on the walls without noticing it.14 Far from disciplining Chávez in the
ways I specified in the preceding section, much less rehabilitating her body, this ugly encounter was
simply an attempt to browbeat her into going back to work. Chávez, moreover, described a distressing
catalogue of additional health problems due to the working conditions at Tyson, and still more frustrating
conflicts with supervisors and medical personnel who refused to treat these ailments seriously.
Additionally, she told us of her rage and embarrassment during a phase when her supervisor would not
let her and her co-workers take bathroom breaks, forcing them to urinate in their clothing.15 The normal
route to realizing the American Dream is supposed to involve prevailing over adversity by conforming to
the positive sides of these well-known binaries: hard work/laziness, family care/selfish individualism,
delayed gratification/hedonism. Few US-Americans assume, however, that the suffering and sacrifice
connoted by the first terms in these pairs should entail the torments that Chávez has confronted over the
years. The shocking disillusionment that the story effects regarding the American Dream, in turn, not only
disturbs comforting dualisms that facilitate the stressful incorporation of “otherness” into the national body
by splitting the foreign others into “good” immigrants who follow the rules and “bad” ones who deserve the
punishments they get. It also exposes to contestation the teleotranscendental assumption that makes this
whole problematic celebration of “immigrant America” necessary in the first place: the unexamined
conviction that nationally defined human collectivities are indispensable, natural, and conducive to justice
and happiness.
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EXT- OTHERIZATION OF GUEST WORKERS
GUEST WORKERS OCCUPY A BORDERLINE IDENTITY OF BOTH A STRANGER AND A GUEST,
SATIATING OUR LABOR DEMAND BUT BEING DENIED OUR RIGHTS
DIKEC 2 (MUSTAFA, LECTURER IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY IN THE GEOGRAPHY DEPARTMENT AT
ROYAL HOLLOWAY, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, “PERA PERAS POROS: LONGINGS FOR SPACES
OF HOSPITALITY”, THEORY CULTURE SOCIETY 2002; 19; 227,
HTTP://TCS.SAGEPUB.COM/CGI/REPRINT/19/1-2/227.PDF)
Guest workers are those workers coming from other countries to their host countries where there is a
need for labor in the local economy. As Walzer outlines, the stay of these guests is conditioned by many
regulations: they are admitted as guests and not as immigrants looking for a new home and new
citizenship; the ‘civil liberties of speech, assembly, association – otherwise strongly defended – are
commonly denied to them, sometimes explicitly by state officials, sometimes implicitly by the threat of
dismissal and deportation’; and their right to stay is strictly bound to employment, which forces most of
them to leave in time of recession (Walzer, 1983: 56–7). The state, in the lives of guest workers, appears
as ‘a pervasive and frightening power’ and ‘never asks for their opinion’ (1983: 59). Although these guests
come to their host countries, where they are ruled as subjects, knowing what to expect, and in a sense
agree to be ruled, ‘this kind of consent’, Walzer argues, ‘while it is sufficient to legitimize market
transactions, is not sufficient for democratic politics’ (1983: 58). Besides, the presence of consent is no
guarantee that guest workers (or anyone, for that matter) are not oppressed by consent ‘[f]or the absence
of consent suggests that overt injuries need to be addressed while its presence suggests that there may
be subterranean injuries in need of attention’ (Connolly, 1995: 102, emphasis added). As participants in
economy and law, guest workers should also have the opportunity to participate in politics, going beyond
simply being exploited workers under a deceptive language of hospitality since ‘[n]o democratic state can
tolerate the establishment of a fixed status between citizen and foreigner’ (Connolly, 1995: 61). The
oppression of guest workers, however, is sustained by very elaborate and rigid boundaries establishing
two broad categories of identity, those of the host and the guest. Although the two identities mutually
depend on each other to construct themselves, one-sided domination casts a dark shadow on the
relationship between them, caused by the rigidity of boundaries. One would, perhaps, recall the epigraph
that opens this section: ‘Democracies should be judged not only by how they treat their members but by
how they treat their strangers’ (Benhabib, 1998: 108).6 It is timely, perhaps, to engage with the difficult
but important questions of the host and guest, and of the stranger and the other.
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EXT- UNCONDITIONAL HOSPITALITY = MORAL OBLIGATION
EVEN IF HOSPITALITY IS A PARADOX AND A STRANGER COULD BECOME A POTENTIAL
THREAT, WE HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO EMBRACE THAT POSSIBILITY WITH THE COMING OF
THE OTHER AND TO WELCOME THEM UNCONDITIONALLY. WE MUST TRANSCEND THE TRAP
OF XENOPHOBIC POLITICS THAT SEEK TO LIMIT IMMIGRATION IN ORDER TO OVERCOME OUR
STIGMATIZATION OF IMMIGRANTS.
DERRIDA 1 (JACQUES, PROFESSOR OF HUMANITIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
IRVINE, “A DISCUSSION WITH JACQUES DERRIDA”, THEORY & EVENT, VOLUME 5, ISSUE 1, 2001,
PROJECT MUSE)
In the hospitality without conditions, the host should, in principle, receive even before knowing anything about
the guest. A pure welcome consists not only in not knowing anything or acting as if one knows nothing,
but also in avoiding any questions about the Other's identity, their desire, their rules, their language, their
capacity for work, for integration, for adaptation... From the moment that I formulate all of these questions, and posit these
conditions . . . the ideal situation of non-knowledge -- non-savoir -- is broken -- rompue. [13] So an unconditional hospitality would have
to be offered to an unlimited number of unknown Others, to an unlimited extent. And to Others to whom no
questions were posed. It fails as such if it's offered only under duress, or to fulfil a debt, or out of legal or moral obligation. In an
unconditional hospitality, the Other whom we welcome might -- Derrida has proposed -- 'might be an assassin,
might disrupt my home... might come to make revolution'. [14] And, it must be added, one must welcome that
possibility. Our welcome would not be contingent on interrogations about the Other's identity, leading Derrida to
ask, in Of Hospitality: Does one give hospitality to a subject? to an identifiable subject? to a subject identifiable
by name? to a legal subject? Or is hospitality rendered, is it given to the Other before they are identified,
even before they are (posited as or supposed to be) a subject? [15] Perhaps those formulations seem to call -- come, viens
-- to the absolutely Other to whom I might offer a pure hospitality. But Derrida is not offering a manifesto for how to offer this, for he argues that the
project would always have failed. Pure hospitality is, he writes, impossible. Impossibility is not what prevents
a pure hospitality one might dream for, it's included in the structure of what pure hospitality is. Among the
reasons for this, there is his comment cited above that 'from the moment that I formulate all of these questions, and posit these conditions . . . the ideal
Is it possible to turn to the Other at all without posing some
kind of question: even just the what? or the who? So, hospitality offered would always 'annul' itself. And
there's a sense in which, as Derrida writes in Fidélité à plus d'un: There is a certain original mourning: the Other does not
present itself, but absents itself even as it presents itself, the Other is one of the disappeared (c'est un
situation of non-knowledge -- non-savoir -- is broken -- rompue.'
disparu). When I see the Other appear, I am already weeping the Other's absence, to deplore-desire-apprehend their departure, here I am (me voilà)
I never greet the absolute, anonymous
Other whom an unconditional hospitality might have welcomed. Perhaps we need to ask not whether the
politician, or anyone, should think about a poetics of unlimited hospitality -- but how the politician, or
anyone, is already engaged, if implicitly, in this reflection. Perhaps some, or all of us, do live believing in the
possibility of unlimited hospitality. Though in fact, I'm not thinking of those whose intentions might be to say:
viens -- 'come'. I was thinking of those also who have wanted to say: ne viens pas, 'don't come'. Those
wanting to limit immigration programs often evoke unconditional hospitality as a threat: a flood of immigrants
might be admitted, temporary visitors might never go home, they might be assassins, they might
contribute to unrest, the nation's identity might be lost in the numbers. So if we're told, as we are, that we
must draw the limit, let's assume that acts of limited hospitality do live with, and do bear the trace of, the
possibility of unlimited hospitality, and apparently the belief in that possibility. In Of Hospitality, Derrida
associates instances of xenophobia with the fear that one's home will no longer be one's own domain,
one's inviolable private space. He writes: 'the perversion and pervertibility of this law (which is also a law of
hospitality) is that one can become virtually xenophobic in order to protect or claim to protect one's own
hospitality, the own home that makes possible one's own hospitality'.[17] And in Fidélité à plus d'un, the Manifeste de
l'hospitalité and in Monolingualism of the Other, Derrida resists the positing of national or cultural identity as that which is
already saying: farewell, farewell, you abandon me (adieu, adieu, tu m'abandonnes).[16]
proper to us, that which we can possess or speak for. In Cosmopolites de tous les pays, encore un effort!, contributing to the proposal for a network of
cities independently offering asylum to persecuted intellectuals amongst others, Derrida
proposes that such urgent 'practical
initiatives' should also open up 'an audacious call for a true innovation in the history of the right of asylum
or of the duty of hospitality'. [18] What kind of new notions of responsibility might be opened up by a new concept of the chez soi, and so a
new concept of hospitality?
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ABSOLUTE HOSPITALITY IS A MORAL OBLIGATION
WESTMORELAND 8 (MARK W., ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY NEUMANN COLLEGE,
“INTERRPUPTIONS: DERRIDA AND HOSPITALITY”, KRITIKE VOLUME TWO NUMBER ONE (JUNE
2008) 1-10, HTTP://WWW.KRITIKE.ORG/JOURNAL/ISSUE_3/WESTMORELAND_JUNE2008.PDF)
Absolute hospitality’s very being unconditional means that there can be no debt or exchange involved. If
hospitality is demonstrated to another solely out of duty or by law, then it is not absolute hospitality. Such
hospitable acts remain conditional. Commenting on Kierkegaard, Derrida states that if duty is obeyed
“only in terms of duty, I am not fulfilling my relation to God.” 16 This duty to God, according to
Kierkegaard, is the ultimate duty. Nor is it partially and simply concerned with “the right of a stranger” as
Kant suggests. According to Kant, hospitality is limited to the rights of the visitor “not to be treated with
hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory,” not the rights of the resident, which must be
established by and between political sovereignties. 17 Furthermore, the laws of hospitality are bound up
with the state as sovereign, as that which determines laws and duty. 18 Absolute hospitality, however,
involves that which is beyond duty and right. It is “law without law,” and here is the distinction between
“an unconditional law or an absolute desire for hospitality [and] a law, a politics, a conditional ethics”. 19
The guest must be free of any subordination or debt.
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EVEN IF TOTAL UNCONDITIONAL HOSPITALITY IS IMPOSSIBLE, WE HAVE A MORAL
OBLIGATION TO OPEN OUR DOORS TO STRANGERS REGARLDESS OF THEIR IDENTITIES
YEGENOGLU 3 (MEYDA, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR IN THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AT THE
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY, ANKARA, TURKEY, “LIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM AND
THE ETHICS OF HOSPITALITY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION”, POSTMODERN CULTURE, 2003,
PROJECT MUSE)
Like justice, unconditional hospitality is also impossible. But this impossibility does not mean that one
does not aspire to pure hospitality. Its impossibility lies in the very structure of unconditional hospitality
itself. In principle, it is offered to an unlimited number of Others and to an unlimited extent, without asking
any questions. The Other's welcoming is not to be contingent upon the Other's identity or the questions
asked. The very notion of pure or unconditional hospitality assumes that one must offer to any stranger
the right of entry to a territory, home, or nation of which one is legitimately in possession. With the
concept of unconditional hospitality, Derrida is not trying to offer a political program about how a pure
hospitality might be implemented; rather, he is trying to expose the presuppositions of conditional
hospitality and the series of concepts that it is based upon--such as one's proper residence, proper
identity, and proper cultural identity. For Derrida, there is an essential link between society or culture and
hospitality. In every society there is space allocated for those who are invited and this enables the
welcoming of the strangers who arrive. In other words, conditional hospitality is what enables one's being
at home. There is no culture, no home, no nation or family without a door. It is the opening of this door
that functions as a means of welcoming strangers. When the stranger, the Other, is welcomed on the
condition that he adjust to the chez soi, the hospitality that is offered is a conditional one, one of visitation:
the stranger is welcome only as long as he respects the order and rules of the home, the nation or
culture, and learns to speak the language. In contrast (but not in opposition) to conditional hospitality is
unconditional or pure hospitality: the pure welcoming of the unexpected guest or anyone who arrives or
visits, the hospitality of invitation. Conditional hospitality of invitation is distinguished from the
unconditional hospitality of visitation by the fact that in the former, the master remains the master, the
host remains the host at home, and the guest remains an invited guest. As an invited guest, one is
expected not to alter the rule and order of the home. Derrida imagines the hospitality of visitation in order
to distinguish it from the hospitality of invitation where the stranger is not an invited guest, but one who
arrives unexpectedly, where the host opens the house without asking any questions.
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EXT- UNCONDITIONAL HOSPITALITY = MORAL OBLIGATION
OUR MORAL AND ETHICAL REASONS TO UNCONDITIONALLY ASSIST PEOPLE ARE NOT AN
“ADVANTAGE” WHICH SHOULD BE WEIGHED AGAINST THE RISKS OF THE PLAN. IT IS A
CONSEQUENCE OF THE INFINITE AND OBLIGATION WE HAVE TO ALL OTHERS AND A
PRETEXT TO LIFE ITSELF - AN UNAVOIDABLE RESPONSIBILITY THAT IS ALONE FILLS LIFE
WITH LOVE AND COMPASSION
BRODY 95, PROFESSOR @ UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX
D.H., “EMMANUAL LEVINAS: THE LOGIC OF ETHICAL AMBIGUITY IN OTHERWISE THAN BEING
AND BEYOND”, RESEARCH IN PHENOMENOLOGY, 25
the structure of the psyche is the uniquness of “me” as other, an identity “behind” identification,
beyond the refractive operations of consciousness, beyond an Kantian arguments for a transcendental structure determining experience, and
In Levinas
equally beyond any empirical induction. As responsibility, subjectivity “is structured as the one-for-the-other. It signifies outside of all finality and every system.”
Responsibility is in the imperative, not the denominative; it cannot be subject to any declension of
thought. In other words, it refuses access by an logos organizing the hermeneutic possibilities of discourse. Before the passing of information is
the Other who bears the message in an offering without reserve, utterly divested of all form, plasticity, or
theme. The signifyingness of subjectivity is an in-formation, or a breathing of alterity into the giving of informration. Above me in a height which is forever a heightening, a
distance of metaphysical space whatever his spatial contiguity to me, his otherness yet “reverberates” within themes. This could be
what Levinas means by attesting that the one-for-the-other of signification “indeed shows itself in the said,
but does so only after the event, betrayed, foreign to the said of being, it shows itself in it as a
contradiction.” The one-for-the-other has always already taken place even as it shows itself in the said of being. I have already given before I can give. Levinas writes
of the sense of signifyingness as a type of matrix of every thematizable relation, working in a way which “guides discourse beyond being.” The ethical is an
inspiration, or pneuma, of being. Without proposing that ethics is in any way the condition for the
possibility of being itself, Levinas does seem to be saying that it alters the significance of ontological significance,
displaces essence from its very esse, injects being with ethical value, for “the psyche is not grafted on to
a substance, but alters the substantiality of this substance.” Going further, he remarks that ethics if the foundation of theory.
Beyond commitment, it is the Goodness that justifies all commitment. Beyond compassion, it is the source
of all compassion, and in “God and Philosophy,” the infinite signifies “the condition – or the
unconditionality – of thought.” Further still, and in the same essay, “Love is only possible through the idea of the infinite.”
If ethics is not the condition for the existence of being, it certainly seems to condition the meaning that
being can have for itself. The ethical “plot” with being functions rather as though it were a species of
Socratic midwifery, calling into question accepted views and pregnant with the sense of alterity, without
ever finally giving birth to a completed materiality. And one cannot refuse the gestation of otherness. As an
unavoidable obligation, “signification as proximity is thus the latent birth of the subject.” The subject is “born in the beginninglessness of
anarchy and in the endlessness of obligation.” Not an “ethical aspect of being,” the ethical is rather heard as the
inaudible voice which “undoes” essence, perforating its differential resounding within itself as a
persecuting summons to responsibility. Levinas employs the term “hostage” to indicate the indeclinable
assignation by the other/Other. One is, as it were, held in thrall and transfixed alive like a butterfly pinned
struggling in its showcase. But the neighbor is at once a visible, definable category of being and
simultaneously, anachronously, a unique undergoing of suffering in bondage to the psyche that compels
him to responsibility. Responsibility for others. And his alterity calls me into question; I am responsible for
him and even his response to me, and even though I can know nothing about him insofar as he is other.
The relationship which is not a relationship gets more and more curious. Although the alterity of the saying other is not mine, and I cannot possess it nor even think it , has it
not already claimed me, beckoned to the otherness of infinity defining me as responsible subjectivity? As the
other calls me into question, I have already been called into question by the other-ness which interrupts my ego, that self
which found and re-finds itself within the schema of reminiscence where Denken is Andenken. Responsibility is an inordinate traumatism excessively overflowing the reach of
my thought. Not as a surplus which would be governed by a correspondent lack, nor a contained within a container which it overruns, but as a nearness separated from my
ability to find any resources with which to align it as contact. Because my being is transpierced by alterity, I mean despite what I might mean or intend; proximity has a meaning
My absolute exposure to you is, according to Levinas, pure
saying. I give (myself) to you. I am here an an extradition from myself in a “saying saying saying itself.”
However this pure saying demands the esse of my being in a double-configuration, both to demand of it
and to demand my existence in order to demand of it. To distinguish an intersection in this way implies a
dialectic between being and ethics; a space within which one can analyze the movement of a transfusion,
whereas for Levinas it is more of a fission, an unrecollectible elision in any movement of being.
despite the doxic thesis of being and despite concepts. Me voici.
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EXT- EMBRACE THE OTHER
WE MUST STEP OUTSIDE OF OURSELVES TO EXPERIENCE THE PLIGHT OF THE OTHERFAILING TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THOSE OTHER THAN OURSELVES IS AT THE ROOT OF
THE HOLOCAUST- THIS EMBRACE OF THE OTHER SHOULD BE COMPLETELY FREE OF
CALCULATIONS OR RATIONALITY
DERRIDA 1 (JACQUES, PROFESSOR OF HUMANITIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
IRVINE, “A DISCUSSION WITH JACQUES DERRIDA”, THEORY & EVENT, VOLUME 5, ISSUE 1,
2001,PROJECT MUSE)
I wanted to say just one word about the example you gave when you say -- I'm just re-reading your text -'In an Australian context this could have a particular resonance, as when John Howard disclaimed as not
properly his the history of colonial violence in Australia, as if one would be responsible only from the
starting point of that kind of property demarcation.' In that case, to go back to the question of inheritance
and heritage, of course one can imagine why someone would say 'well, colonial violence occurred before
I was born and I don't want to carry the burden of this responsibility'. There have been a lot of such claims
in Germany with the young generation saying 'I had nothing to do with Nazism, why should I feel guilty for
that?' Well, the fact is that we are responsible for some things we have not done individually ourselves.
We inherit a language, conditions of life, a culture which is, which carries the memory of what has been
done, and the responsibility, so then we are responsible for things we have not done ourselves, and that
is part of the concept of heritage. We are responsible for something Other than us. This shouldn't be
constructed as a very old conception of collective responsibility, but we cannot simply say: 'well, I, I wash
my hands, I was not here'. If I go on drawing some benefit from this violence and I live in a culture, in a
land, in a society which is grounded on this original violence, then I am responsible for it. I cannot
disclaim this history of colonial violence, neither in Australia nor anywhere else. That's the difficulty of the
concept of responsibility -- I'm going to end with this, missing a number of points that you made, as has
been constantly the case today. What does it mean to be responsible? Usually one associates the
concept of responsibility with the concept of freedom, decision, action: I'm responsible for what I freely
decide, and I actively make or do, but again -- to go back for the last time to this aporia of the
possible/impossible -- if I am responsible only for what I decide, and if I decide only what I can decide,
what I am -- I, ego -- am able, have the ability to decide, the possibility to decide, then it is not a decision.
If the decision follows my ability to decide, if I decide what I can decide, I say: well, I can do that, I do that,
I am able to do that, I do that, this is not a decision. If I do what I can do, it is not a decision. So that is a
terrible paradox, that is what blows up, explodes these traditional concepts. The decision, in order to be a
decision, however mad it may sound, or crazy it may sound, a decision, my decision should not be mine,
it should be, as impossible, the decision of the Other, my decision should be the Other's decision in me,
or through me, and I have to take responsibility for the decision which is not mine. When I say 'it's not
mine' I mean that which exceeds my own being, my own possibility, my own potentiality. If you describe
an individual as a set of possibilities, a set of capacities, a set of predicates -- I am this or that, I am the
one whom you can describe as being this or that, that is an assemblage of attributes or predicates -- and
if the decision is simply the consequence or what follows from this set of possibilities, then it's not a
decision. A decision should be something more than what is simply possible ... what follows from the
predicate of possibilities, what defines my definition. If I decide, if my decision is my definition, if by my
definition of myself I make such or such a decision, it's not a decision. So, the only possible decision is
the impossible decision, the decision which is stronger than me, higher than me and coming from the
Other, from the order of the Other, that is heteronomy. The Other orders me to take this decision, which
nevertheless remains free. It's free and I'm not exonerated from responsibility because it is the Other's
decision. I realise how mad this language may sound, but perhaps that it because decision is madness. A
decision which is simply a wise decision... what is a wise decision? If I ... take the 'wise decision', it's ... I
can ask my computer to calculate the wise decision, OK? But a decision is never wise, it should not be
wise, it should remain incalculable, incalculable. [applause] ....
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EXT- HEALTHCARE FOR IMMIGRANTS = MORAL OBLIGATION
PROVIDING HEALTH CARE FOR IMMIGRANTS IS THE ONLY ETHICAL CHOICE
EVANS 95 (CASWELL A. EVANS, JR. IS PROJECT DIRECTOR AND EXECUTIVE EDITOR OF ORAL
HEALTH IN AMERICA: A REPORT OF THE US SURGEON GENERAL, “IMMIGRANTS AND HEALTH
CARE: MOUNTING PROBLEMS,” FEB 15 95, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE,
HTTP://WWW.ANNALS.ORG/CGI/CONTENT/FULL/122/4/309#FN)
One resounding feature of the health care system that many immigrants face is the lack of access to care
of adequate quality. This lack of access, coupled with wide exposure to unhealthy U.S. lifestyles that are
linked to costly chronic conditions [11], is a prescription for disaster, a prophecy already materializing in
Los Angeles. The extent to which the health of recent immigrants declines over time reflects their risk for
poverty, which, in turn, imposes ominous barriers to adequate health care. Improving access to health
care and, in particular, to preventive health care, will substantially improve the health status of all those
afflicted by poverty. But health care has costs. In a recent study [12] completed by Los Angeles County,
the net cost to the County for providing health care to immigrants was approximately $350 million per
year, with undocumented immigrants accounting for half of the costs. In short, immigrants used more
services than were paid for by their contributions in taxes and other revenues to the County. Just as
alarming was the discovery that the native-born population also uses more services than they generated
in taxes and other revenues, an excess of $200 million [12]. Thus, it appears that immigrants are simply
falling into a deficit pattern already prevalent among the poor of Los Angeles County. Given the types of
chronic health problems inherent in the United States, the future costs will grow to even more astounding
levels. In discussing the cost of providing health services to immigrants, however, it is important to
remember the cost of not providing services. Although this cost can be registered in dollars, it is better
reflected in the immeasurable value given to human life. It is an ethical question: Where we choose to
allocate our resources determines our destiny. I believe that we must choose to allocate our resources to
provide a healthy life for each resident of this country. One of the wisest uses of our resources is
increased investment in our public health systems, which better prepares us for promoting health and
preventing disease.
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EXT- SPEECH ACT KEY
ACADEMICS ARE IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO CHALLENGE RACIST DISCOURSE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION AGAINST RACISM AND INTOLERANCE 5
(HTTP://WWW.COE.INT/T/DGHL/MONITORING/ECRI/ACTIVITIES/14PUBLIC_PRESENTATION_PARIS_2005/PRESENTATION2005_PARIS_PROCEEDINGS_EN.PDF)
On the occasion of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on 21 March 2005, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) organised a high-level panel meeting on the use of racist, antisemitic and xenophobic
Deeply
concerned by the increasing use of racist, antisemitic and xenophobic elements in political discourse,
including by mainstream political parties, ECRI adopted
a Declaration condemning this alarming
trend
elections
have given rise to the use of racist, antisemitic and xenophobic rhetoric, or other discourse which has an
impact on racism and xenophobia in public opinion
Immigrants
are primary targets of politicians who exploit feelings of insecurity in an increasingly complex and
multicultural world.
elements in political discourse, with the participation of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Mr Terry Davis, the Chair of ECRI, Mr Michael Head and members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
on 17 March 2005
which has been observed in many member states of the Council of Europe. (The declaration appears in the appendix, p. 55). This trend, which is well documented in ECRI’s country monitoring work, was further substantiated by an independent study
commissioned by ECRI in order to investigate this dangerous phenomenon in more depth. This study, carried out by the political scientist Jean-Yves Camus, provides shocking evidence of numerous cases in which European or national
in many Council of Europe member states.
and refugees, especially those from Muslim
countries,
Most worryingly, the theory of a so-called “clash of civilisations” is gaining ground. At the same time, antisemitism also continues to be encouraged either openly or in a coded manner by certain political leaders and
parties. ECRI therefore suggests in its Declaration concrete legal and policy measures, including self-regulatory measures which can be taken by political parties or national parliaments, to be adopted in all Council of Europe m ember states. There is no doubt that
political leadership can play a crucial role in combating racism and influencing public opinion in a positive way. It is ther efore of the utmost importance that political parties be involved as much as possible in the fight against racism and intolerance as led by ECRI
meeting, which brought together
academics working on the issue
an important opportunity for bringing this issue to the
forefront of national and international debate.
and other national and international actors in this field. This high-level panel
centres and
parliamentarians, representatives of intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, research
, was therefore
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AT: THIS DEBATE NOT KEY
WE MUST HIGHLIGHT EVERY INSTANCE OF RACIST HATRED.
DAVIS 5 (TERRY, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
HTTP://WWW.COE.INT/T/DGHL/MONITORING/ECRI/ACTIVITIES/14PUBLIC_PRESENTATION_PARIS_2005/PRESENTATION2005_PARIS_PROCEEDINGS_EN.PDF)
Ladies and gentlemen, As we mark the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, let us remember the victims of the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa on 21 March 1960 – the massacre which prompted the United Nations to commemorate
Racism is a
violation of human rights, rooted in dislike for someone who is different, or contempt for someone who is
deemed inferior. When this
contempt becomes hatred, it can lead people to commit unspeakable
crimes as the horrors of the Second World War and the more recent wars in the Balkans and the South
Caucasus showed to the whole world
this Day on 21 March every year. Let us remember at the same time all the other victims of racism throughout the world, past, present and future victims of racist violence and racial discrimination in their everyday lives.
dislike or
. The Council of Europe was born out of the ashes of the Second World War, out of the desire encapsulated in two words: “Never again”. It was intended to build a new
Europe, based on the shared values and principles of pluralist democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, a Eur ope free of racism and racial discrimination. Today, the principles on which the Council of Europe was founded are still far from being
Racism and intolerance in all forms
strike at the heart of the idea of a democratic society based on respect for the equal dignity of all
human beings. We must be constantly mobilised against these evils and campaign against them
each and every day
permanently entrenched. We must continually defend them – and to do so, we must have a sound understanding of what threatens them.
– be it antisemitism, Islamophobia
or xenophobia –
not
only on one day in the year, but
. We in the Council of Europe have created the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, ECRI, to lead this campaign, and I have come here today to show my
active support for ECRI and its mission. This panel meeting is bringing together representatives of intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, parliamentarians and academics, as part of this campaign. The study by Jean-Yves Camus contains some
striking examples of the use of racist rhetoric during national and European elections. Since the report was written, there have been other examples, and there are worrying signs that we will see something similar in the United Kingdom, one of the founding
members of the Council of Europe, during the election which is widely expected in May. However, I should like to deliver two messages of confidence: The first is that of the continual and determined commitment of the Council of Europe to the fight against all forms
of racism. Our action is not limited only to pointing out what is wrong, far from it. W e also recommend various measures to remedy the situation, and propose targeted, concrete solutions. I expect that the Chair of ECRI will shortly give us some examples of these
solutions. The second message is that of my hope that the sense of responsibility of our politicians will lead them to resist the temptation to play with fire. But that in itself in not enough. At the end of the day, we cannot build a democracy without political parties. It is
political parties which can and should be our strongest allies in achieving a society free of racism. They should be in the forefront of our active campaign against racism, xenophobi a, antisemitism and islamophobia. Many European politicians have been involved in
this struggle throughout their political lives. Tana de Zulueta is one of them, and I look forward to her contribution as well. Thank you.
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APOCALYPTIC FOCUS BAD
A FOCUS ON SHORT TERM, LOW PROBABILITY RISKS NECESSITATES A SACRIFICE OF
JUSTICE- THE PLANS PUSH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IS A BETTER PATH TO PEACE
BASSIOUNI 3 (DISTINGUISHED RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF LAW, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW INSTITUTE, DEPAUL UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW; PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR HIGHER STUDIES IN CRIMINAL SCIENCES (SIRACUSA, ITALY);
PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PENAL LAW (PARIS, FRANCE)
CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, SPRING)
At the end of the Second World War, the world collectively pledged "never again." While the intention of
this global promise may have been sincere, its implementation has proved elusive. There have been
over 250 conflicts in the twentieth century alone, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 75 to 170
million persons. Both State and non-state actors routinely commit extra-judicial execution, torture, rape
and other violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. In most cases, political
considerations permit perpetrators of gross violations of human rights to operate with
impunity. Yet, alongside the sad truth of our consistently violent world stands the moral commitment of
the post-war pledge and the related vision of peace, justice and truth. The human rights arena is
defined by a constant tension between the attraction of realpolitik and the demand for
accountability. Realpolitik involves the pursuit of political settlements unencumbered by
moral and ethical limitations. As such, this approach often runs directly counter to the
interests of justice, particularly as understood from the perspective of victims of gross violations of
human rights. Impunity, at both the international and national levels, is commonly the outcome of
realpolitik which favors expedient political ends over the more complex task of
confronting responsibility. Accountability, in contrast, embodies the goals of both retributive
and restorative justice. This orientation views conflict resolution as premised upon
responsibility and requires sanctions for those responsible, the establishment of a clear record
of truth and efforts made to provide redress to victims. The pursuit of realpolitik may settle the
more immediate problems of a conflict, but, as history reveals, its achievements are
frequently at the expense of long-term peace, stability, and reconciliation. It is difficult to achieve
genuine peace without addressing victims' needs and without [*192] providing a wounded society with a
sense of closure. A more profound vision of peace requires accountability and often involves a
series of interconnected activities including: establishing the truth of what occurred, punishing those most
directly responsible for human suffering, and offering redress to victims. Peace is not merely the
absence of armed conflict; it is the restoration of justice, and the use of law to mediate and
resolve inter-social and inter-personal discord. The pursuit of justice and accountability fulfills
fundamental human needs and expresses key values necessary for the prevention and
deterrence of future conflicts. For this reason, sacrificing justice and accountability for the
immediacy of realpolitik represents a short-term vision of expediency over more
enduring human values.
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PREDICTIONS BAD
BE SKEPTIC ABOUT THE DISADVANTAGES – THEIR PREDICTIONS ARE EXAGGERATED AND
USED A POLITICAL TOOL – NOTICE WHO BENEFITS AND WHO SUFFERS FROM THE POLITICAL
RESULT
PERLSTEIN 1, CONTRIBUTOR TO THE NEW REPUBLIC
(RICK, “PUNDITS WHO PREDICT THE FUTURE ARE ALWAYS WRONG” THE NATION, APRIL 23,
HTTP://WWW.THENATION.COM/DOC/20010423/PERLSTEIN)
Prediction is structurally inseparable from the business of punditry: It creates the essential image of
indefatigable authority that is punditry's very architecture; it flows from that calcified image and it provides
the substance for the story that keeps getting told about the inevitability of American progress. Punditry is
what happens when the interests of ordinarily intelligent and extraordinarily ambitious men and women
coincide with a rarely mentioned flaw in the American character: our undying need to believe we inhabit a
nation of constancy and good feeling that is free of conflict, though we actually live in one of unceasing
disputation, resentment and clashes of interest. Consider a paradigmatic anthology, edited by the
consensus sociologist Daniel Bell in 1967, called Toward the Year 2000: Work in Progress. Among the
developments pronounced "likely in the next thirty-three years" are "control of weather or climate,"
"flexible penology without necessarily using prisons" and "human hibernation for relatively extensive
periods (months to years)." Now, there is no sin in making incorrect predictions. That's all that
conventional wisdom, which can only extrapolate future trends from present realities, knows how to do
(the present reality in Bell's case being the belief that man's ability to control his environment could not
but continue to expand). The sin, however, is that such predictions are always at the same time political-tools for seeding general consent about which kinds of actions are sensible and which are senseless;
where social emphasis can legitimately be placed and where it cannot; what is real and what is beyond
the pale of imagination.
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ETHICS KEY TO PREVENT WAR
IT’S IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR TO BE OVERCOME IN ISOLATION –
PLUS THEIR APPEAL TO ELITES IS A TERRIBLE STRATEGY. CONFRONTING THE UNDERLYING
ETHICS THAT MAKE WAR A POSSIBILITY IS THE BEST WAY TO AVOID THEIR IMPACT
MARTIN 84, RESEARCH ASSOCIATE DEPT. OF MATHEMATICS, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL
UNIVERSITY
(BRIAN. “EXTINCTION POLITICS” SCIENTISTS AGAINST NUCLEAR ARMS NEWSLETTER UPDATE,
NO. 16, MAY, P. 5-6, HTTP://WWW.UOW.EDU.AU/ARTS/STS/BMARTIN/PUBS/84SANA1.HTML)
A related factor linked with nuclear extinctionism is a belief that nuclear war is the most pressing issue
facing humans. I disagree, both morally and politically, with the stance that preventing nuclear war has
become the most important social issue for all humans. Surely, in the Third World, concern over the
actuality of massive suffering and millions of deaths resulting from poverty and exploitation can justifiably
take precedence over the possibility of a similar death toll from nuclear war. Nuclear war may be the
greatest threat to the collective lives of those in the rich, white Western societies but, for the poor,
nonwhite Third World peoples, other issues are more pressing. In political terms, to give precedence to
nuclear war as an issue is to assume that nuclear war can be overcome in isolation from changes in
major social institutions, including the state, capitalism, state socialism and patriarchy. If war is deeply
embedded in such structures - as I would argue[9] - then to try to prevent war without making common
cause with other social movements will not be successful politically. This means that the antiwar
movement needs to link its strategy and practice with other movements such as the feminist movement,
the workers' control movement and the environmental movement. A focus on nuclear extinction also
encourages a focus on appealing to elites as the means to stop nuclear war, since there seems no other
means for quickly overcoming the danger. For example, Carl Sagan, at the end of an article about nuclear
winter in a popular magazine, advocates writing letters to the presidents of the United States and of the
Soviet Union.[10] But if war has deep institutional roots, then appealing to elites has no chance of
success. This has been amply illustrated by the continual failure of disarmament negotiations and
appeals to elites over the past several decades. Just about everyone, including generals and prime
ministers, is opposed to nuclear war. The question is what to do about it. Many people have incorporated
doomsday ideas into their approaches. My argument here is that antiwar activists should become much
more critical of the assumptions underlying extinction politics.
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AT: GREAT POWER WAR
STRUCTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL SHIFTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM MAKE GREAT
POWER WAR IMPOSSIBLE
FETTWEIS 3 PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
[CHRISTOPHER J. “REVISITING MACKINDER AND ANGELL: THE OBSOLESCENCE OF GREAT
POWER GEOPOLITICS” COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, 22, P 109-129]
Mackinder can be forgiven for failing to anticipate the titanic changes in the fundamental nature of the international system much more readily than can his successors. Indeed, Mackinder and his contemporaries
the danger of major war has been
World War III is, in Michael Mandelbaum’s words, “somewhere between impossible and unlikely.”25 Geopolitical and
geo-strategic analysis has not yet come to terms with what may be the central, most significant trend of international politics: great power war, major war of the kind that
pit the strongest states against each other, is now obsolete. 26 John Mueller has been the most visible, but by no means the only, analyst arguing that
a century ago would hardly recognize the rules by which the world is run today—most significantly, unlike their era, ours is one in which
removed,
where
the chances of a World War III emerging in the next century are next to nil.27 Mueller and his contemporaries cite three major arguments supporting this revolutionary, and clearly controversial, claim. First, and
modern military technology has made major war too expensive to contemplate. As John Keegan has argued, it
is hard to see how nuclear war could be considered “an extension of politics by other means ”—at the very least,
nuclear weapons remove the possibility of victory from the calculations of the would-be aggressor.28 Their value
as leverage in diplomacy has not been dramatic, at least in the last few decades, because nuclear threats are not credible in the kind of disagreements
that arise between modern great powers. It is unlikely that a game of nuclear “chicken” would lead to the
outbreak of a major war. Others have argued that, while nuclear weapons surely make war an irrational exercise, the destructive power of modern
conventional weapons make today’s great powers shy away from direct conflict. 29 The world wars dramatically
reinforced Angell’s warnings, and today no one is eager to repeat those experiences, especially now that
the casualty levels among both soldiers and civilians would be even higher. Second, the shift from the
industrial to the information age that seems to be gradually occurring in many advanced societies has been accompanied by a new
definition of power, and a new system of incentives which all but remove the possibility that major war
could ever be a cost-efficient exercise. The rapid economic evolution that is sweeping much of the world, encapsulated in the “globalization” metaphor so fashionable in the media
and business communities, has been accompanied by an evolution in the way national wealth is accumulated.30 For millennia, territory was the main object of
war because it was directly related to national prestige and power. As early as 1986 Richard Rosecrance recognized that “two worlds of international relations” were emerging, divided over the question of the
utility of territorial conquest.31 The intervening years have served only to strengthen the argument that the major industrial powers, quite unlike their less-developed neighbors, seem to have
reached the revolutionary conclusion that territory is not directly related to their national wealth and
prestige. For these states, wealth and power are more likely to derive from an increase in economic,
rather than military, reach. National wealth and prestige, and therefore power, are no longer directly related to territorial control.32 The economic incentives for
war are therefore not as clear as they once may have been. Increasingly, it seems that the most powerful
states pursue prosperity rather than power. In Edward Luttwak’s terminology, geopolitics is slowly being
replaced by “geoeconomics,” where “the methods of commerce are displacing military methods—with
disposable capital in lieu of firepower, civilian innovation in lieu of military–technical advancement, and
market penetration in lieu of garrisons and bases.” 33 Just as advances in weaponry have increased the
cost of fighting, a socioeconomic evolution has reduced the rewards that a major war could possibly
bring. Angell’s major error was one that has been repeated over and over again in the social sciences ever since—he overestimated the “rationality” of humanity. Angell recognized earlier than most that the
most obviously,
industrialization of military technology and economic interdependence assured that the costs of a European war would certainly outweigh any potential benefits, but he was not able to convince his contemporaries
The idea of war was still appealing—the normative cost/benefit analysis still
tilted in the favor of fighting, and that proved to be the more important factor. Today, there is reason to
believe that this normative calculation may have changed. After the war, Angell noted that the only things that could have prevented the war were
who were not ready to give up the institution of war.
“surrendering of certain dominations, a recasting of patriotic ideals, a revolution of ideas.”34 The third and final argument of Angell’s successors is that today such a revolution of ideas has occurred, that a
normative evolution has caused a shift in the rules that govern state interaction. The revolutionary potential of ideas should not be underestimated. Beliefs, ideologies, and ideas are often, as Dahl notes, “a major
independent variable,” which we ignore at our peril.35 “Ideas,” added John Mueller, are very often forces themselves, not flotsam on the tide of broader social or economic patterns . . . it does not seem wise in
“moral progress” that
has “brought a change in attitudes about international war” among the great powers of the world,37
creating for the first time, “an almost universal sense that the deliberate launching of a war can no longer
be justified.”38 At times leaders of the past were compelled by the masses to defend the national honor, but today popular pressures push for peaceful
resolutions to disputes between industrialized states. This normative shift has rendered war between
great powers “subrationally unthinkable,” removed from the set of options for policy makers, just as
dueling is no longer a part of the set of options for the same classes for which it was once central to the concept of masculinity and honor. As
Mueller explained, Dueling, a form of violence famed and fabled for centuries, is avoided not merely because it has ceased to seem ‘necessary’, but because it has
sunk from thought as a viable, conscious possibility. You can’t fight a duel if the idea of doing so never occurs to you or your opponent.39
By extension, states cannot fight wars if doing so does not occur to them or to their opponent.
this area to ignore phenomena that cannot be easily measured, treated with crisp precision, or probed with deductive panache.36 The heart of this argument is the
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AT: UTIL GOOD
OUR ETHIC INJECTS COMPASSION INTO STRICTLY UTILLITARIAN MODES OF DECISION
MAKING. THIS IS NECESSARY FOR GLOBAL SURVIVAL
THURMAN 2 (6/2, PROFESSOR OF INDO-TIBETAN BUDDHIST STUDIES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
RELIGION AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
HTTP://72.14.203.104/SEARCH?Q=CACHE:X73ZOKZFVYKJ:WWW.ABC.NET.AU/RN/RELIG/SPIRIT/S
TORIES/S569519.HTM+TIBET+%22TOO+MUCH+UTILITARIANISM%22&HL=EN)
Robert Thurman: Well, religion is ludicrous, all religions are ludicrous from a certain point of view, from a materialistic point of view, right? I mean go to any – the
Communists for example destroyed 6,250 monasteries in Tibet by saying that ‘Putting all this gold in these statues of
these Buddhas and things, this is ludicrous, you need the gold, you need the money, you can invest it in a sock factory or something you
know.’ And in 1980 when the late Chinese leader went to Tibet and saw what a disaster the Chinese colonisation and
invasion had wrought there, he gave the Tibetans total tax exemption and totally let them do what they want, and to his
amazement instead of starting laundries, they rebuilt some of those monasteries that he had destroyed, that Mao had destroyed. So
people can say Yes, it’s ludicrous, you should only do utilitarian things. I mean the way Protestantism has been
doing utilitarian things for 350, 400 years, right? But what has it gotten us, these utilitarian things? A
couple of flush toilets, yes, but it genocided the native Americans, enslaved the African American, it is
threatening our environment with pollution, it is threatening our whole civilisation with militarism and with high
tech weapons, and heaven knows, genetically altered food. Heaven knows what even is in our own intestine at this moment. And so too much utilitarianism
seems to also put things out of balance, you see. So the idea that somehow the spiritual destiny of the human being, and the condition,
internal condition of the being of hope in the future, and a feeling of viability of life, that is just as crucial, the feeling of viability of life, that is
just as crucial as some toilets and some other things. So there should be a balance, shouldn’t there, between some sort of spiritual investment let’s say, and
actually a spiritual investment really finally should take priority because this is the great Buddhist insight, you know. If you have a bad
mind, it’s just filled with surging impulses that you have no control over. You can be in the most beautiful mansion, with the most beautiful automobile, with a beautiful, well
you won’t have beautiful relationships because you’ll be such a pain you’ll drive them all away, but maybe temporarily you’ll
have some relationships, and you will still be miserable yourself. You will have to be on Prozac, you’ll be on something because your mind will be discontented with whatever it
is. But if your mind is controlled, you live in a modest place, now you don’t have to be in a sewer, you can be in a modest place, you can be peaceful, you can be contented, you
can find something beautiful in a little pot of flowers outside your window, like a little old lady in Kyoto or something like that. Fine. Because the mind is balanced, the spirit is
satisfied, do you see? There’s a famous writing from a thousand years ago, it says, ‘If you don’t like stepping on sharp things when you walk around town, you have two
choices: cover the whole surface of the town with leather. That’s one choice. Or make yourself a pair of shoes, that’s the other choice. Which is more practical?
AND- WE’LL OWN THEM ON THE PUBLIC POLICY MAKER ARGUMENT- STAR THIS EVIDENCE
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY HEALTH 1
LAW & POLICY, WINTER, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 95, P. 117
The utilitarian principle justifies intentional, harmful acts against other humans to
achieve a hoped-for benefit to a greater number of people. It is the wrong approach to
public policy decisions. Its most notable proponents have been responsible for much of
the misery and strife of the last century. Experience has taught us time and again that public
servants, even when crafting policies that appear wholly beneficent, can cause great harm (the so-called
"law of unintended consequences"). Humans lack the wisdom and foresight to completely
understand the future ramifications of many actions. A father, for example, may believe that it is
an entirely good thing to help his daughter with homework every day because they are spending time
together and he is showing sincere interest in her life and schooling. By "helping" with homework,
however, his daughter may be denied the mental struggle of searching for solutions on her own. She may
not develop the mental skills to solve tough math problems, for example, or to quickly find key concepts in
reading selections. If even "good" actions can produce undesirable results, how much
worse is the case when evil is tolerated in the name of some conjectural, future
outcome?
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AT: MORAL OBLIGATION TO SAVE DA LIVES
THIS LOGIC ABSOLVES US OF OUR OBVIOUS AND INFINITE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INITIAL
OTHER – THIS “JUSTICE” IS ITSELF UNETHICAL AND VIOLENT
SIMMONS 99, BETHANY COLLEGE, DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
WILLIAM, “THE THIRD: LEVINAS’ THEORETICAL MOVE FROM AN-ARCHICAL ETHICS TO THE
REALM OF JUSTICE AND POLITICS” PHILOSOPHY SOCIAL CRITICISM, 25; 83
Before examining the relationship between ethics and politics, several implications of Levinas’ move from
the Other to the Third need to be addressed. First, does the ego still have an infinite responsibility for the
Other? In Otherwise than Being, Levinas defines justice as ‘the limit of responsibility and the birth of the
question’.42 However, in the same work, he also claims that ‘in no way is justice a degradation of
obsession, a degeneration of the for-the-other, a diminution, a limitation of anarchic responsibility’.43 How
can these conflicting statements be resolved? Either justice limits the responsibility for the Other or it
does not. The contradiction is resolved by considering, once again, Levinas’ theoretical emphasis on the
separation and oscillation between the saying and the said. Ethics is found in the an-archical realm of the
saying, while justice is a part of the totalizing realm of the said. Ethics and justice exist in both relation
and separation. Neither can be reduced to the other. Thus, justice cannot diminish the infinite
responsibility for the Other: the ego remains infinitely, asymmetrically and concretely responsible for the
Other. This responsibility always maintains its potency. However, the ego is also invariably transported by
the Third into the realm of the said. The ego must weigh its obligations. It is not possible to respond
infinitely to all Others. The original demand for an infinite responsibility remains, but it cannot be fulfilled.
Ethics must be universalized, but in attempting to do so, the ego has already reneged on its responsibility
for the Other. Thus, Levinas’ peculiar formulation; justice is un-ethical and violent. ‘Only justice can wipe it
[ethical responsibility] away by bringing this giving-oneself to my neighbor under measure, or moderating
it by thinking in relation to the third and the fourth, who are also my “others,” but justice is already the first
violence.’
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AT: T- REMOVE BARRIERS
1. WE MEET- REMOVING THE RESTRICTION KEEPING IMMIGRANTS FROM ACCESSING
MEDICAID INHERENTLY EXPANDS MEDICAID FOR IMMIGRANTS.
2. NO RESOLUTIONAL BASIS- RESOLUTION MANDATES EFFECTS- TITLE XX WHICH IS THE
MOST PREDICTABLE DEFINTION OF SOCIAL SERVICES IS FEDERAL BLOCK GRANTS FOR THE
STATES.
3. REMOVING RESTRICTIONS IS ONE OF THE ONLY NON-EFFECTS CASES- CHANGING A
RESTRICITON AUTOMATICALLY LEGALLY ON-FACE GIVES PEOPLE MORE SOCIAL SERVICES.
4. EFFECTS T IS GOOD- EVERY CASE ON THE TOPIC TAKES A NUMBER OF STEPS IN ORDER
TO BE TOPICAL.
5. REASONABILITY- AS LONG AS WE REASONABLY INCREASE A SOCIAL SERVICE, DON’T
VOTE ON T.
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AT: T—PEOPLE LIVING IN POVERTY
MEDICAID IS FOR PEOPLE LIVING IN POVERTY
USAA 08 (United Services Automobile Association, Fortune 500 Financial Services Company,
https://www.usaa.com/inet/ent_utils/McStaticPages?key=ret_securing_health_care)
Medicaid is a state-managed health insurance "safety net"
for people living in poverty
Some people confuse Medicare with Medicaid. While Medicare is a federal health insurance program for retirees,
, and shouldn't be considered a part of your financial plan.
MEDICAID IS MEANS TESTED USING FEDERAL POVERTY GUIDELINES
About.com Medical Review Board 04
(http://seniorhealth.about.com/od/findinglongtermcare/f/Medicaid_NH.htm)
Medicaid is a federal program
that provides health care for low income individuals
To qualify for Medicaid the potential recipient must meet a
means test - their income and assets must be under a certain level
states use a
percentage of the Federal Poverty guidelines as the measuring stick
(A) -
administered at the state level
. It also pays for
nursing home care for low income elderly and disabled Medicare recipients who require that type of care.
as determined by the individual state. Most
to determine eligibility for Medicaid.
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AT: T-SOCIAL SERVICES
1) CI: SOCIAL SERVICE MEANS FEDERAL POVERTY PROGRAMS—THIS IS THE ONLY OFFICIAL
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DEFINITION
Bush 02 (George, President, EO 13279 “Equal Protection of the Laws for Faith-Based and Community
Organizations,” http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/docs/legal/wh-20021212.pdf)
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 121(a) of title 40, United States Code, and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and in order to guide Federal agencies in formulating
and developing policies with implications for faith-based organizations and other community organizations, to ensure equal protection of the laws for faith-based and community organizations, to further the national effort to expand opportunities for, and strengthen
the capacity of, faith-based and other community organizations so that they may better meet social needs in America's communities, and to ensure the economical and efficient administration and completion of Government contracts, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Definitions. For purposes of this order: (a) "Federal financial assistance" means assistance that non-Federal entities receive or administer in the form of grants, contracts, loans, loan guarantees, property, cooperative agreements, food commodities, direct
"Social service program" means a program that is
administered by the Federal Government
that provides services
directed at reducing poverty, improving opportunities for low-income children, revitalizing lowincome communities, empowering low-income families and low-income individuals to become
self-sufficient, or otherwise helping people in need. Such programs include
appropriations, or other assistance, but does not include a tax credit, deduction, or exemption.
, or by a State or local government using Federal financial assistance, and
, but are not limited to, the following: (i) child care services,
protective services for children and adults, services for children and adults in foster care, adoption services, services related to the management and maintenance of the home, day care services for adults, and services to meet the special needs of children, older
individuals, and individuals with disabilities (including physical, mental, or emotional disabilities); (ii) transportation services; (iii) job training and related services, and employment services; (iv) information, referral, and counseling services; (v) the preparation and
delivery of meals and services related to soup kitchens or food banks; (vi)
health support services
; (vii) literacy and mentoring programs; (viii) services for the prevention and treatment of juvenile delinquency and subst ance
abuse, services for the prevention of crime and the provision of assistance to the victims and the families of criminal offenders, and services related to intervention in, and prevention of, domestic violence; and (ix) services related to the provision of assistance for
housing under Federal law.
2) SOCIAL SERVICES INCLUDE MEDICAID.
Pew Charitable Trusts 04 (http://www.pewtrusts.org/news_room_detail.aspx?id=18310)
"There's good reason why Medicaid might be a potential funding source for faith-based service providers-its funding is large and growing." said Richard P. Nathan, Director of the Rockefeller Institute of
Government, which is overseeing the Roundtable project. "As the nation's largest social service program,
Medicaid accounted for $260 billion in federal, state and local spending in 2003."
3) PREFER OUR INTERPRETATION:
A) DEFINITIONAL PRECISION: WE HAVE THE ONLY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DEFINITION AND
THE ONLY EVIDENCE THAT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSES WHETHER MEDICAID IS T—
DEFINITIONAL QUALITY IS NECESSARY TO CREATE PREDICTABILE LIMITS THAT SHAPE THE
RESEARCH BURDEN FOR BOTH SIDES AND TO GENERATE MORE USEFUL EDUCATION.
B) OVERLIMITS: THE TOPIC IS ALREADY LIMITED BY “PERSON LIVING IN POVERTY”—THERE
ARE A FINITE NUMBER OF MEANS TESTED PROGRAMS, THE STATES CP MAKES EVEN FEWER
OF THESE AFFS VIABLE. A LARGER INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL SERVICES IS NECESSARY
TO ALLOW THE AFF TO COMPETE.
4) AT WORST WE’RE EXTRATOPICAL WHICH ISN’T A VOTING ISSUE
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EXT- WE MEET (GOV DEFINITION)
THIS EXECUTIVE ORDER DOES ENCOMPASS MEDICAID.
THE ROCKEFELLER INSTITUTE 4
(HTTP://WWW.ROCKINST.ORG/HEALTH_CARE/MEDICAID_FAITH_BASED_ORGANIZATIONS.ASPX
)
Medicaid and Faith Organizations: Participation and Potential Bush Administration proposals to allow
participation by faith-based organizations in federally funded social service programs have touched off
considerable controversy. To understand the role of faith-affiliated organizations in health care in general
and Medicaid in particular, we examined the role of faith-based or affiliated programs and facilities in
several aspects of the Medicaid program in ten states. We examined the role of faith in five areas:
hospitals, nursing homes and other long-term care, mental health, substance abuse, and Medicaid/CHIP
outreach and marketing.
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AT: STATES
LOCAL EFFORTS AT HEALTHCARE ARE UNSUSTAINABLE IN THE LONG-TERM- ONLY
FEDERALLY FUNDED MEDICAID SOLVES
HIROTA, ET AL 6 (SHERRY, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF ASIAN HEALTH SERVICES IN
OAKLAND, “INCLUSION OF IMMIGRANT FAMILIES IN U.S. HEALTH COVERAGE EXPANSIONS”,
MEHARRY MEDICAL COLLEGE, JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE FOR THE POOR AND
UNDERSERVED 17.1 SUPPLEMENT (2006) 81-94, PROJECT MUSE)
The Bush administration has made some investments in local communities by expanding community
health centers in low-income and medically underserved areas. The cost-effectiveness of community
health centers and their ability to provide optimal health care to low-income and racially diverse
populations is well-documented.31, 32, 33 However, broader reform may be in order, as community
health centers are still unable to meet the demands of the growing number of uninsured. Furthermore,
community health centers do not have the capacity to provide the full range of necessary medical
services, such as specialty care (e.g., radiology, dermatology, ophthalmology) and hospital services. Most
of the uninsured therefore, are still likely to seek care at emergency departments at the late stages of
illness or not seek care at all. The administration has also expressed a desire to scale down Medicaid,
and stimulate the private purchase of health plans and medical services through the use of individual
health savings accounts and new tax credits.34, 35 Tax credits may encourage some to purchase
coverage, but tax credits will do little to mitigate the financial impact of health coverage premiums and
other out-of-pocket medical costs for very low-income families.36 Furthermore, individuals with illness
face the risk of insurance companies denying them coverage altogether. Therefore, those who lose
Medicaid coverage under the proposed reforms are likely to remain uninsured. Creating a stable federal
tax base to finance health coverage may be the first step in securing health coverage for all residents.
The rapidly growing federal deficit, $427 billion in fiscal year 2005, is currently the greatest obstacle to
achieving universal health coverage, but is not insurmountable, particularly in view of the fact that in the
period of one year, federal, state, and local governments already spend $34.6 billion in medical care for
the uninsured in the U.S.37, 38
STATES WILL PROVIDE THE MINIMAL FUNDING NECESSARY TO ENACT THE COUNTERPLAN—
WILL CUT PROGRAMS AND DENY SERVICES TO UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS.
WOOD 9 (DANIEL, STAFF WRITER OF THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
HTTP://WWW.CSMONITOR.COM/2009/0324/P01S01-USEC.HTML)
Jose Cedillo, an illegal immigrant from Mexico, says he has nowhere to turn. A day laborer since 1986, Mr. Cedillo has received notice from a Los Angeles County hospital that he must start paying out of pocket for the treatment he will need. "I have no choice
The recession – and a big state deficit – is
leading some California counties to cut back on nonemergency health services to illegal immigrants. In
others, cutbacks in services for the uninsured are hitting illegal immigrants especially hard. The
problem is socking California because it is home to the lion's share of US immigrants, both legal and
illegal
"There simply isn't enough revenue to support the network of services which heretofore has
been expected,"
In many states, budget cuts mean reduced
funding for the uninsured, many of whom are immigrants and low-income families
About 64 percent of illegal immigrants nationwide – 7.2 million – are
uninsured
"The states and local governments tend to bear the brunt of
illegal immigration,"
Now, with revenues falling well short of predictions, services
to undocumented immigrants are getting the ax
because I have no insurance and can't work while I'm taking these treatments," he says, sitting in the tiny apartment he shares with his wife, a janitor.
. The latter are often eligible for healthcare provided to the poor. But health departments across the country are facing budget pressures that are leading to slashed services – and that could reignite the debate over providing medical care to illegal
immigrants.
says Robert Pestronk, executive director of National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO).
. In Arizona, a $13 million cut from the state budget
eliminated funds partly used to reimburse hospitals for caring for the uninsured.
, according to the Washington-based, Center for Immigration Studies (CIS).
says Steve Camarota, statistician and demographer for CIS.
in an effort to preserve other programs, from infrastructure to schools to the environment. The cutbacks could potentially r efire the debate over
providing social services such as healthcare for illegal immigrants. In 2007, several state legislatures introduced bills that sought to limit social service benefits including healthcare to illegal immigrants. An LA Times/Bloomberg survey in December 2007 found that
one in three Americans wanted to deny social services, including public schooling and emergency-room healthcare, to illegal immigrants. In California, two counties are pulling back on health services for illegal immigran ts. Sacramento County closed two health
clinics that serve the poor and ended services with various mental health contractors in early February, saving nearly $6 million in an effort to close a $55 million general fund shortfall. In Contra Costa County, a proposed plan would screen out illegal immigrants –
except for children and pregnant women – from nonemergency healthcare services that are provided to low-income residents who cannot get insurance. The county is looking at cutting services to an estimated 5,500 illegal immigrants they serve annually, to tally a
savings of $6 million. "
The pressure is
purely
economic
," says Dorothy Sansoe, senior deputy county administrator for Contra Costa County. Her county has already cut $90 million fr om its general purpose budget and has to
cut another $56 million by July 1.
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AT: POLITICS- FRAMEWORK
PUNDIT CLASSES HAVE DEVELOPED THAT UTILIZE PREDICTIONS TO ADVANCE IDEOLOGY
RATHER THAN ADVANCE PUBLIC POLICY – BE ESPECIALLY WARY OF POLITICAL
PREDICTIONS
MENAND 5, PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LITERATURE AT HARVARD
(LOUIS, “EVERYONE’S AN EXPERT,” NEW YORKER
HTTP://WWW.NEWYORKER.COM/CRITICS/BOOKS/ARTICLES/051205CRBO_BOOKS1)
Tetlock also has an unscientific point to make, which is that “we as a society would be better off if
participants in policy debates stated their beliefs in testable forms”—that is, as probabilities—“monitored
their forecasting performance, and honored their reputational bets.” He thinks that we’re suffering from
our primitive attraction to deterministic, overconfident hedgehogs. It’s true that the only thing the
electronic media like better than a hedgehog is two hedgehogs who don’t agree. Tetlock notes, sadly, a
point that Richard Posner has made about these kinds of public intellectuals, which is that most of them
are dealing in “solidarity” goods, not “credence” goods. Their analyses and predictions are tailored to
make their ideological brethren feel good—more white swans for the white-swan camp. A prediction, in
this context, is just an exclamation point added to an analysis. Liberals want to hear that whatever
conservatives are up to is bound to go badly; when the argument gets more nuanced, they change the
channel. On radio and television and the editorial page, the line between expertise and advocacy is very
blurry, and pundits behave exactly the way Tetlock says they will. Bush Administration loyalists say that
their predictions about postwar Iraq were correct, just a little off on timing; pro-invasion liberals who are
now trying to dissociate themselves from an adventure gone bad insist that though they may have
sounded a false alarm, they erred “in the right direction”—not really a mistake at all. The same blurring
characterizes professional forecasters as well. The predictions on cable news commentary shows do not
have life-and-death side effects, but the predictions of people in the C.I.A. and the Pentagon plainly do.
It’s possible that the psychologists have something to teach those people, and, no doubt, psychologists
are consulted. Still, the suggestion that we can improve expert judgment by applying the lessons of
cognitive science and probability theory belongs to the abiding modern American faith in expertise. As a
professional, Tetlock is, after all, an expert, and he would like to believe in expertise. So he is distressed
that political forecasters turn out to be as unreliable as the psychological literature predicted, but
heartened to think that there might be a way of raising the standard. The hope for a little more
accountability is hard to dissent from. It would be nice if there were fewer partisans on television
disguised as “analysts” and “experts” (and who would not want to see more foxes?). But the best lesson
of Tetlock’s book may be the one that he seems most reluctant to draw: Think for yourself.
42
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AT: POLITICS- FRAMEWORK
A RESUSCITATION OF ETHICS IS NECESSARY TO CHANGE THE NATURE OF POLITICS. THEY
ARE NOT HOPELESS, BUT RATHER NECESSARY IN ORDER TO UNIVERSALIZE ETHICS INTO
LAW
SIMMONS 99, BETHANY COLLEGE, DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
WILLIAM, “THE THIRD: LEVINAS’ THEORETICAL MOVE FROM AN-ARCHICAL ETHICS TO THE
REALM OF JUSTICE AND POLITICS” PHILOSOPHY SOCIAL CRITICISM, 25; 83
Levinas’ critique of the foundations of political thought changes the very nature of politics. A politics based
on the battle between autonomous selves, like Hobbes’, is a negative politics whose primary purpose is to
constrain individual desires. Levinas, on the other hand, insists that politics must have a positive role.
Politics must serve ethics. The occidental ethic always proceeds from the fact that the other is a limitation
for me. Hobbes says you can come directly to philosophy from this mutual hatred. Thus we could attain a
better society without love for the other, in which the other is taken into account. That would be a politics
that could lead to ethics. I believe, on the contrary, that politics must be controlled by ethics: the other
concerns me.32 Although Levinas is suspicious of the Western political tradition, his thought is not
apolitical as some have charged. His philosophy begins and ends with politics. For example, Peperzak
argues that ‘the point of orientation and the background of all other questions’ in Totality and Infinity is
‘the question of how the violence that seems inherent to all politics (and thus also to history) can be
overcome by true peace’.33 Politics is also a necessary step that Levinas’ ethical thought must take. Just
as the an-archical saying requires the ontological said, an-archical ethics requires politics. The mutually
interdependent relationship between the saying and the said serves as the paradigm for the relationship
between ethics and politics. Ethics, which is a manifestation of the saying, has been traditionally
subordinated by politics, a manifestation of the said. A resuscitation of the ethical is needed to check the
political. However, the political should not be abandoned. Ethics requires the political to be universalized
into laws and institutions.
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POLITICS LINK TURNS
THE MOST POWERFUL LOBBIES SUPPORT GRANTING SOCIAL SERVICES TO IMMIGRANTS—
GUARANTEES POLITICAL SUPPORT.
SHEEHAN 9 (JAMES, RHODE ISLAND STATE SENATOR,
HTTP://WWW.PROJO.COM/OPINION/CONTRIBUTORS/CONTENT/CT_IMMIGRATE3_06-0309_G7EF2UJ_V8.4496F89.HTML)
A very powerful and well-funded special interest that works hard to combat the enforcement of U.S.
immigration laws is American business, as represented by state and local chambers of commerce and, by
extension
some in the Republican Party
, perhaps,
. These associations battle enforcement of laws such as E-verify, an effective tool requiring employers to verify the legal status of new hires, because they
allege that the E-verify system is a burden to businesses. In fact, the E-verify system is cheap, relatively easy to implement, and very accurate. In truth, these groups fight enforcement of E-verify because they must hew to the wishes of numerous chapter members
who undoubtedly employ illegal immigrants at below-market wages. In general, this unlawful practice also undermines years of hard-fought labor laws in the workplace. Moreover, hiring illegal immigrants also denies low-skilled citizens and legal residents an
even some union leaders now
oppose the enforcement of America’s immigration laws
Legal or not workers are welcomed by unions because they help to revitalize waning
union ranks with fresh dues-paying members
illegal workers give union leaders
additional clout in negotiations
Politically speaking, powerful members of the Democratic Party have a vested interest in illegal
immigration, too, because they believe that illegal immigrants who benefit from longstanding
Democratic mainstays — social-welfare programs — will vote to support the Democratic Party if
they become lawful citizens of this nation.
each of the aforementioned special interests derives some personal benefit
from illegal immigration
opportunity to work at entry-level jobs, and provides businesses that exploit illegal workers an unfair advantage over their competitors who do not exploit illegals. Ironically,
. Illegal immigrants who are able to obtain false papers are readily hired in various sectors of the economy, such as the
hospitality industry or construction.
, these
. Of course, there is strength in numbers, and
. Interestingly, union leaders arguably can still offer management their services at a relative discount since many of their non-citizen members are probably willing to work for less than
citizen workers.
Of course, some claim that illegal immigrants already are voting in large numbers in this country because of weak election laws that often do not require
positive identification to register to vote or to cast a vote. While
, the burden is shouldered squarely by a majority of lawful citizens. While illegal immigrants pay some taxes, research shows that they do not pay enough to offset the dollars paid out through federal and
state government programs that support them. Illegal immigrants receive government-subsidized health care, social services and education that probably can be measured in the billions of dollars annually. Worse yet, illegal immigrants who violate the law are
crowded into our nation’s prisons, costing countless millions more. Our nation is in financial crisis and many states, inclu ding Rhode Island, are facing formidable deficits. The U.S. and Rhode Island can no longer afford a de-facto policy of open borders, especially
it is the confluence of special interests
elected representatives will continue to kowtow to the special
interests that personally benefit from illegal immigration. After all, many politicians also personally
benefit from illegal immigration by way of special-interest contributions and/or voter support at election
time.
when Rhode Island may be forced to cut aid to cities and towns, education, state worker pensions and health-care benefits to lawful citizens. Still,
that prevents proper
enforcement of immigration laws. Until a majority of citizens take a stand on this issue, some
BEING TOUGH ON IMMIGRANTS IS LESS AND LESS POLITICALLY FEASIBLE—LATINOS ARE
BECOMING AN INCREASINGLY POWERFUL CONSTITUENCY.
DEMOCRACY NOW! 7 (NATIONAL NEWS PROGRAM BROADCAST ON NPR AND PBS,
HTTP://I1.DEMOCRACYNOW.ORG/2007/11/2/LATINO_SUPPORT_FOR_GOP_DROPS_AMIDST)
At 15% of the population, Latinos
form the largest non-white community in the United States, and Latino voters are an increasingly
important constituency
“fighting to see who is more anti-immigration.”
The 2008 presidential election is a year from this Sunday. Although immigration is not yet a major campaign issue, it is one that presidential hopefuls cannot afford to ignore.
. And Latino support for the Republic Party is steadily dropping. Lionel Sosa, a longtime Republican supporter and Hispanic marketing consultant, announced Tuesday that he will no longer back the
Republicans and is instead supporting New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson. Sosa said Republican presidential hopefuls are
Sosa’s defection
comes on the heels of the abrupt resignation of Senator Mel Martinez of Florida as the chairman of the Republican National Committee. Martinez also cited frustration wi th his party’s anti-immigrant tenor. Countrywide, Latino support for the Republicans has been
slipping since 2004, when over 40% of Latinos voted for George W. Bush. By 2006, this had dropped to less than 30%. Pollster John Zogby said last year that the Republican campaign against illegal immigration
is “a key factor in
Hispanic disillusionment.”
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AT: PLAN SPENDS MONEY
DENYING IMMIGRANTS PREVENTIVE CARE WILL COST MORE WHEN THEIR PROBLEMS
COMPLICATE INTO COSTLY EMERGENCIES THAT HEALTH PROVIDERS ARE REQUIRED TO
TREAT.
PARK 4 (SEAM, J.D. CANDIDATE AT FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW, 18 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 567)
The Welfare Reform Act denies illegal immigrants access to preventive care,
but provides that public health care facilities are required to treat emergency conditions for all people,
regardless of their immigration status or their ability to pay. The current legislation, therefore, takes a
back-end approach to providing illegal immigrants health care access by providing emergency services.
However, this approach is critically flawed because it is more expensive to provide emergency care than it
is to take a front-end approach by providing preventive care
emergency treatment can
cost nearly "four to ten times as much" as providing preventive care. The cost discrepancy exists because
it costs less for health facilities to treat symptoms and conditions before they "degenerate into
emergencies that necessitate more elaborate procedures and care," which could include much more
expensive services such as intensive care and hospitalization.
Economic inefficiency is another problem with the current legislation.
83
. 85 Dissenters of taking a front-end approach dispute that providing emergency care would be more costly than
providing preventive care and claim that preventive care drains local resources that would be better used serving the documented population.
86
However, these dissenters fail to realize that
89
Doctors and other health care officials have expressed similar concerns.
90
One doctor commented, "It's
been our view that from a good public health policy perspective, we would provide preventive care so as to avoid the higher c ost of emergency cost and hospitalization, which we would be forced to provide." 91 Adding to the economic inefficiency of the Welfare
Reform Act is the Immigration Reform Law, which does not allow states to provide security against potential deportation if illegal immigrants decide to access the av ailable emergency care. Illegal immigrants must, therefore, fear the possibility of having their
immigration status reported to the INS and risk subsequent deportation if they choose to access available emergency care. Thus, illegal immigrants are unlikely to access treatment for emergency [*582] services until they are "supersick" 92 because they risk having
their immigration status reported to the INS. This risk arguably places illegal immigrants in a dilemma where their condition might already qualify as an emergency condition, but because of the significant risk involved in seeking the available treatment, they may
The same
legislation is also economically inefficient when considering the cost discrepancy between treating an
outbreak of infectious diseases against providing illegal immigrants with preventive treatment, which
lessens the likelihood of the infection and subsequent spread of communicable diseases
undesirably choose to wait until their conditions worsen and degenerate into an even more complicated situation. At which time, conditions may require much more complicated and expensive procedures or treatment.
. 93 As discussed earlier, the illegal
immigrant population, because of their often poor, and less than ideal living situation, is at a much greater risk for the infection and transmission of infectious diseases. 94 The same problem with the back-end approach, comprised of strictly providing emergency
services, applies in the context of infectious diseases because it is less costly to "prevent infectious diseases . . . early-on than to wait until the acute stage and risk exposure to the general community." 95 Experts have expressed similar concerns. Professor Linda
Bosniak stated that, "people afraid to go to the doctor will simply create the conditions for a public health catastrophe and will end up costing the state more money later on." 96
PREVENTIVE CARE SAVES MONEY
ORTEGA 9 (ADRIANNE, J.D. BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, M.P.H. BOSTON
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, 35 AM. J. L. AND MED. 185)
Contrary to the argument that providing health care to immigrants constitutes a drain on the economy, an
economic analysis supports an argument favoring extending coverage to undocumented immigrants. 33
First, the federal government benefits from the unclaimed federal payroll taxes of undocumented
immigrant workers using false social security numbers. 34 From 2000 to 2005, undocumented immigrants
furnished an estimated seven billion dollars in unclaimed Social Security tax revenue and another 1.5
billion dollars in unclaimed Medicaid taxes to the federal government. 35 Additionally, immigrants stimulate
the American economy through the "investment and consumption of resources." 36 Finally, the federal
government exacerbates health care costs by waiting to treat immigrants until care is at its most
expensive point while denying less expensive routine medical care. 37 In most cases, providing
immigrants with preventive care would be cheaper than [*189] waiting for more expensive life-saving
care in the emergency room. 38 The federal government, however, aggravates this problem by requiring
that hospitals treat undocumented immigrants in an emergency but providing no federal funding beyond
emergency care. 39
45
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AT: PLAN SPENDS MONEY
DELAYING CARE UNTIL IMMIGRANTS NEED AN EMERGENCY ROOM INCREASES COSTS
GERENCHER 7 (KRISTEN, REPORTER FOR MARKETWATCH, “WHERE IMMIGRATION AND
HEALTH CARE COLLIDE,”
HTTP://WWW.NIPCWEB.COM/WHERE_IMMIGRATION_HEALTH_CARE_COLLIDE.PDF)
Under federal law, undocumented immigrants aren't eligible for Medicaid
Legal
immigrants have to wait five years after entering the country before they become eligible for those
programs
or the State Children's Health Insurance Program.
. States can opt to change those regulations, but it means they have to fund the programs without federal matching dollars, K ing said, noting that 22 states cover children and pregnant women who have legal status. About 44% of
documented immigrants were uninsured in 2005, more than three times the rate among the native-born, the study found. Although federally funded community and migrant health centers served more than 675,000 migrant and seasonal farm workers in 2004, many
Federal law requires emergency rooms to accept and stabilize anyone who seeks
emergency medical care
"Especially along the Mexico-U.S. border you can see [immigrants are] actually not going
to emergency rooms as much as the public commonly thinks," King said. "But when they do go they're
sicker, and that's the issue. That does increase the costs, but it's not because they're going more
often. They're putting off health services until it's absolutely necessary."
noncitizens lack preventive-care services.
. But areas such as Cleveland and Little Rock, Ark., that have smaller immigrant populations see higher ER use than do Miami, Phoenix and Orange County, Calif., which have much larger numbers of
noncitizens, according to the study.
DENYING PRENATAL CARE TO IMMIGRANT MOTHERS DRASTICALLY INCREASES HEALTH
COSTS FOR THE CHILD—WHO WILL BE A U.S. CITIZEN
PARK 4 (SEAM, J.D. CANDIDATE AT FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW, 18 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 567)
The legislation is also problematic towards prenatal care, a type of preventive care. 110 Women are at a
heightened risk during pregnancy because their bodies as well as the fetus' are very vulnerable. 111 If
illegal alien pregnant mothers must fear deportation when attempting to receive publicly [*584] funded
prenatal care, and have no other source for health care, this could jeopardize their health and the health
of their children, who will be born as United States citizens. 112 In the long run, if these children are born
with health complications because their mothers were deterred from acquiring prenatal care, the United
States will incur significant financial burdens to treat their illnesses because of their citizenship status.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals commented: The New York State Department of Health believes
that the costs of furnishing prenatal care for more than 13,000 annual births to undocumented pregnant
women in New York would be almost completely recouped by the savings from the decrease in initial
postnatal hospitalizations alone, without even considering the vast savings from not having to treat these
children's health problems that would have resulted from denial of prenatal care. 113
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DENYING HEALTH CARE TO IMMIGRANTS DOES NOT SAVE MONEY
KU 8 (LEIGHTON, PROFESSOR OF HEALTH POLICY AT THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH SERVICES,
HTTP://WWW.KAISERNETWORK.ORG/HEALTH_CAST/UPLOADED_FILES/031208_TTHD_TRANSCR
IPT1.PDF)
LEIGHTON KU, M.P.H., PH.D.: Let me just add I mean one of the things can be unfortunate is that
because of some of these fears, I mean ultimately if you’re really, really sick, at some point you will need
to seek care. There’s no avoiding it. What happens is when there are concerns that gee, this might
somehow cause problems for my legal status, what this means is that you’ll postpone that care for a
longer time period. What in many cases this also means is medically you could have gone and sought
care when it was a more trivial problem, it was a problem that could be resolved relatively simply, and
instead the problem becomes more complicated. So in many cases the states when they do these things
are to a certain extent shooting themselves or shooting their health care providers in the foot because
instead it means that they’re going to see some care postponed, but when the care comes in, it’s a real
whopper that they’re having to bear. And in those cases they may think that they are saving some
money. On the other hand, it’s not particularly clear that they really are.
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THE PERM SOLVES- ONLY COMBINING ACTION WITH THOUGHT PREVENTS TYRANNIES
PAPASTEPHANOU 5 (MARIANNA, PHILOSOPHY PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CYPRUS,
“CAN SUBJECTIVITY BE SALVAGED?”, COMMON KNOWLEDGE 11.1 (2005) 136-159, PROJECT
MUSE)
Among the most decisive factors, in my view, for conclusions of this sort is how, after the full
establishment of the sciences and technology as premier products of civilization, reason is now
conceived. In the context of positivism, reason supposedly becomes value-neutral, since value is ousted
to a sphere of experience that is drastically separated from that of knowledge. This value-neutrality may
lead in either of two directions. The self-referential subject, as a concept, may reach its apogee, or else
the empirical subject may be seen as more or less determined by the logic of stimulus and response. In
the latter case, political or emancipatory interests will be reduced to matters of decision and volition,
which in positivistic terms means that politics is relegated to the sphere of nonrational personal choice.54
Arbitrariness and a lack of serious criteria lurk behind reductions of this sort and carry along many
negative implications for ethics and politics, one of them being the imposition of new tyrannies or the
uncritical perpetuation of old ones. Jacques Derrida has warned against such moves: "one step further
toward a sort of original an-archy risks producing or reproducing the hierarchy." "'Thought'," Derrida
continues, "requires both the principle of reason and what is beyond the principle of reason, both the
arkhe and an-archy. Between the two, the difference of a breath or an accent, only the enactment of
this 'thought' can decide."55
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UNCONDITIONAL HOSPITALITY SOLVES ALL OF THE BAD ASPECTS OF BIOPOWER- THE
SOVEREIGN ISN’T A POWER TO TAKE CONTROL OF US, BUT WE EMBRACE THE IDEA THAT
THE OTHER IS THE SOVEREIGN OVER US- THIS FOSTERS AN ETHIC OF COMPASSION
DAMAI 5 (PUSPA, ENGLISH PROFESSOR AT TRIBHUVAN UNIVERSITY, NEPAL, “MESSIANIC-CITY:
RUINS, REFUGE AND HOSPITALITY IN DERRIDA”, DISCOURSE 27.2&3 (2005) 68-94, PROJECT
MUSE)
Derrida's project of the
city of refuge fails to theorize the other of sovereignty, for it is already conditioned by the sovereignty of
the other. By the other of sovereignty I do not mean, as if following a path paved by Foucault in Society Must Be
Defended, that "we have to bypass or get around the problem of sovereignty" (27). Bypassing sovereignty
would be impossible, as Derrida cautions in Rouges, because evading it would threaten "the classical
principles of freedom and self-determination" (158). Derrida indeed handles the question of sovereignty
with more subtlety than does Foucault with the latter's impatient bypassing. Against the classical conceptualization of
All of these constraints that condition Derrida's unconditional hospitality eventually bear on the question of sovereignty, and I claim that
sovereignty as expressed so volubly and indivisibly, for instance, in the Leviathan, where Hobbes argues that whether sovereignty resides in one as in monarchy, or in many as
in autocracy, or in all as in democracy, sovereignty requires that they must have it entirely (123), or in Bodin's On Sovereignty where sovereignty is defined as an absolute and
), Derrida maintains that sovereignty
should remain at once indivisible yet to be shared. Nevertheless, the question persists as to the nature of this sharing (partage), for it is
also the unconditional gift of sovereignty that constitutes the law of the unconditional in Derrida; and the
whole deconstruction of the classical notion of sovereignty seems merely to reverse the order of the
sovereign. Instead of claiming the sovereignty of the self, or ipseity, Derrida seems to revert it to the
sovereignty of the other. The circular wheel of sovereignty that receives a measured pounding in the first chapter
of Rouges—where Derrida adroitly exposes the circularity of sovereignty as "a rounding off" by the self, or as a
turn (tours) around the self (12)—only comes full circle in order to reaffirm the unicity of the heart of the city.
perpetual power of the prince that cannot be transferred in any other ways than as an unconditional gift (8
Derrida's project of the city in general and, in particular, that of the city of refuge, which he sketches out in his address to the International Parliament of Writers in Strasbourg in
1996 (later [End Page 71] published in On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness), is a pertinent site for pursuing this reversal because these projects seem—against his express
wish not to put forward any plan or proposition, and to strictly maintain "the essential poverty of [his] work" ("Hospitality" 74)—to chart out an ambitious plan for a network of
cities of asylum for victims of state persecution. The Cities of Asylum network, established under the auspices of the International Parliament of Writers, of which Derrida was a
founding member and vice president, is not a utopic vision. As we are informed by Christian Salmon in the first issue of the Parliament's Journal, Autodafe, the Parliament
convened in haste after the assassination of Tahar Djaout in Algeria in 1993, and Salman Rushdie and Wole Soyinka were its first two presidents. And from the moment of its
creation, it has been involved in setting up a network of Asylum Cities that offer refuge to writers and artists threatened by fundamentalist and totalitarian regimes. "Five years
after its creation," Salmon continues, "there are thirty cities in this network" including Barcelona, Frankfurt, Salzburg, and Venice (13). In his address to the Parliament,
Derrida characterizes the cities of refuge as "free and autonomous cities," but their autonomy does not
correspond to the classical notion of autonomy as indivisible sovereignty; instead it invokes "an original
[inédit] concept of hospitality" (5) which proposes the "Law of an unconditional hospitality, offered a priori
to every other" (On Cosmopolitanism 22). In other words, the autonomy of a city of refuge would initiate an implosion of
classical sovereignty and an emergence of a new concept of shared sovereignty. Derrida proposes the implosion and
emergence at a number of levels, of which perhaps the most consequential is the destabilization of the topological and political unity of the polis, which he splits into two: the
City and the State. While the traditional theory of sovereignty, that of Carl Schmitt, for instance, seeks to keep the unity of the polis intact by safeguarding what Schmitt's
Derrida, on the contrary, seeks to dissociate the City from the State in
order to bring the former out of the shadow of the monopolistic sovereignty of the latter, and to endow the
city with more autonomy and sovereignty. Another event of this shared sovereignty occurs in Derrida's
interrogation of the classical notion of the sovereign being who decides on the exception, as formulated by Carl
Schmitt in Political Theology (5). Against the secularized theological and ontological legacy of sovereignty of which Schmitt is only one of the heirs, Derrida
maintains that a decision, if such a thing is possible, cannot and should not be made by me; rather it is
always the other [End Page 72] who decides, leaving me, the subject, in the wake to bear responsibility
for his decision ("Hospitality" 67). In other words, the event of decision embodies a shared—or, to use Derrida's favorite term,
spectral—sovereignty which is divided between the other and myself, and in which the other, who
overwhelms me, is not a presence but an apparition. Thus, by conceptualizing the city as a threshold
between two forms of the polis, or between the norm and the decision, Derrida conjures a site in which
sovereignty implies a decision that exceeds the economy of one's ipseity or an experience of the haunting of the other
beyond the exchanges of intersubjectivity. On the basis of his concept of the shared sovereignty of the city, Derrida succeeds in
envisioning a new cosmopolitics beyond the sovereignty of nation-states and even beyond the discourse
of world-government or its analogies in the form of world-cities or globalicities, to which even the most
serious discussions on cosmopolitanism are confined. Even though Saskia Sassen, one of the most cited exponents of global cities, thinks
Political Theology calls the State's "monopoly to decide" (13),
that global cities are command points in the organization of a world economy (4), her project nonetheless does not seek to dissociate cities from the neocolonial politics of the
wealthy nations. It is important to remember, as Spivak reminds us, "why Kabul—behind it Gaza, Karachi, Ulan Bator and bien d'autres encore—cannot emerge as global cities"
(74).
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KRITIKS OF BIOPOLITICS’ REFUSAL TO ADDRESS QUESTIONS OF DEATH BLOCK THEIR
EFFECTIVENESS, MASK MASSIVE VIOLENCE, AND PRECLUDE AND ETHICS OF RESPECT FOR
THE OTHER—THEIR NOTION OF A BIOPOLITICAL WORLD ORDER IS A FANTASY
VALVERDE 99 [MARIANA, “DERRIDA'S JUSTICE AND FOUCAULT'S FREEDOM: ETHICS, HISTORY,
AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS,” 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 655, L/N]
From a Derridean perspective, the problem with Foucault's ethics is not his theorization of freedom,
since as we have shown, Foucault grew increasingly distant from libertarianism and more attentive to
the dialectic of freedom and power, in reflections that are by no means incompatible with Derrida's
concerns. But, however sophisticated the analysis of freedom provided by Foucault, freedom
nevertheless remains virtually the only term in his ethical reflections. From a Derridean perspective, a key
limitation of Foucault's thoughts on ethics is that - like Marx, and perhaps because of Marx - Foucaultian
ethics underestimates the continuing role of death and memory work in constituting ethical practice.
Though concerned at times to analyze executions, murders, and genocides, Foucault rarely speaks about
death, possibly because death has by and large been appropriated by ethical philosophy and religion. By
contrast, as is well known, Foucault's work from Discipline and Punish onward is centrally concerned with
life as a conduit of modern governmental projects. In his analysis of biopower, Foucault shows that,
contrary to Nietzsche's predictions about the increasing influence of life-denying slave moralities, modern
societies have come to be governed increasingly through projects that do not perhaps affirm life in the
Nietzschean manner, but certainly seek to maximize it, aligning our own desire to be alive and healthy
with governmental projects of all sorts, from population policies to the enlightened hedonism of
contemporary sexual regimes. In an important but seldom cited article, Judith Butler has analyzed the
shortcomings of the influential notion of biopower (as developed primarily in The History of Sexuality,
vol. 1) in ways that parallel Derrida's critique of Marx's unilateral emphasis on life against death:
Foucault's historical account can perhaps be read as only a wishful construction: death is effectively
expelled from Western modernity, cast behind it as a historical possibility, surpassed or cast outside it as
a non- Western phenomenon. Can these exclusions hold? To what extent does his characterization of
later modernity require and institute an [*669] exclusion of the threat of death? It seems clear that
Foucault must tell a phantasmatic history in order to keep modernity and productive power free of death
and full of sex. (Butler 1993, 85) Butler argues that AIDS and current instances of ethnic cleansing, of
wars and famines taking place in Europe as well as outside it, demand that Foucaultian work pay more
attention to the persistence of the rather ancient forms of power associated with death. Linking Butler's
critique to the earlier discussion of the disavowal of death, it could be argued that Foucault's tendency to
ignore the continuing power of death is part of a more general ethical stance toward the past, toward the
dead, and toward memory itself that is directly or indirectly de rived from Nietzsche. Nietzsche had argued
that the dead ancestors and founding fathers of Western culture should be neither revered nor critiqued.
We should simply laugh at them, recognizing that although we may be sufficiently burdened by our past
that the creation of brand-new identities is impossible, it is nevertheless within our power to exorcise the
past through the laughter of parody, thus "revitalizing the buffoonery of history" (Foucault 1977, 161).
Nietzsche's work, Foucault writes in a passage that is diametrically opposed to the stance toward memory
developed by Benjamin and Derrida, implies "a use of history that severs its connection to memory, its
metaphysical and anthropological model, and constructs a counter-memory - a transformation of history
into a totally different form of time" (Foucault 1977, 160).
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BEING-FOR-THE-OTHER IS A QUESTION THAT PRECEDES BEING-FOR-THE-SELF. IN
RECOGNITION OF HUMAN SAMENESS, AND IN THE FACE OF THE SUFFERING OF THE OTHER,
THE MOST PRIMORDIAL AND IMPORTANT OBLIGATION WE HAVE IS TO THEM, NOT OUR SELF
SIMMONS 99, BETHANY COLLEGE, DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
WILLIAM, “THE THIRD: LEVINAS’ THEORETICAL MOVE FROM AN-ARCHICAL ETHICS TO THE
REALM OF JUSTICE AND POLITICS” PHILOSOPHY SOCIAL CRITICISM, 25; 83
How is it possible to break the stranglehold of ontology? How can transcendence be rediscovered in the
Western tradition? How can Levinas claim that ethics and not ontology deserves to be labeled ‘first
philosophy’? According to Levinas, the face-to-face relationship with the other person, the Other, is
beyond the grasp of ontology. The face cannot be totalized because it expresses infinitude. In other
words, the ego can never totally know the Other. In fact, the Other exists prior to the subject and
ontology: the Other comes from the immemorial past. How can Levinas reject the Cartesian hypothesis
and claim that the relationship with the Other is primary? How can the relationship with the Other precede
my being? How can the Other be an-archical? In Totality and Infinity, Levinas develops his an-archical
ethics by reviving the Platonic distinction between need and eros or desire.6 A need is a privation which
can be sated, but a desire cannot be satisfied. The ego satisfies its needs, and remains within itself, by
appropriating the world. ‘Need opens upon a world that is for-me; it returns to the self. . . . It is an
assimilation of the world in view of coincidence with oneself, or happiness.’ 7 As the desired is
approached, on the other hand, the hunger increases. It pulls the ego away from its self-sufficiency. Thus,
needs belong to the realm of the Same, while desires pull the ego away from the Same and toward the
beyond. Nonetheless, desires also originate in an ego who longs for the unattainable. Therefore, desire
has a dual structure of transcendence and interiority. This dual structure includes an absolutely Other, the
desired, which cannot be consumed and an ego who is preserved in this relationship with the
transcendent. Thus, there is both a relationship and a separation. According to Levinas, this structure of
desire is triggered by the approach of the Other. The ego strives to com-prehend, literally, to grasp the
Other, but is unable. The Other expresses an infinitude which cannot be reduced to ontological
categories. The ego is pulled out of itself toward the transcendent. This inability to com-prehend the Other
calls the ego and its self-sufficiency into question. Have I, merely by existing, already usurped the place
of another? Am I somehow responsible for the death of the Other? The face calls the ego to respond
before any unique knowledge about the Other. The approach of the human Other breaks the ego away
from a concern for its own existence; with the appearance of the Other, Dasein is no longer a creature
concerned with its own being. What I want to emphasize is that the human breaks with pure being, which
is always a persistence in being. This is my principal thesis. . . . The being of animals is a struggle for life.
A struggle for life without ethics. It is a question of might. Heidegger says at the beginning of Being and
Time that Dasein is a being who in his being is concerned for this beirng itself. That’s Darwin’s idea: the
living being struggles for life. The aim of being is being itself. However, with the appearance of the human
– and this is my entire philosophy – there is something more important than my life, and that is the life of
the other.8 The face as pure expression calls the ego to respond, to do something to justify its existence.
However, Levinas’ theory of responsibility does not call for the annihilation of the ego. Levinasian
responsibility maintains the dual structure of desire; that is, it questions the privileged place of the Same,
but it keeps the ego intact, albeit in a subordinate position. Without a responsible self, responsibility would
lose its meaning. Levinas furnishes a new way to think about responsibility: the ego does not choose to
answer the Other’s demand; to be human, it must respond to the Other. Responsibility is so extreme that
it is the very definition of subjectivity, the ego is subject to the Other. ‘The I is not simply conscious of this
necessity to respond . . . rather the I is, by its very position, responsibility through and through.’9 This
primordial, an-archical responsibility is concrete, infinite, and asymmetrical.
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OUR ADVOCACY EMPHASIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF SAYING, NOT THE SAID – ASSIGNING THE
EGO TO THE OTHER IN RECOGNITION OF OBLIGATION SOLVES THEIR CRITICISM. PLUS, OUR
EVIDENCE IS MUCH MORE CONTEXTUAL THAN THEIRS
SIMMONS 99, BETHANY COLLEGE, DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
WILLIAM, “THE THIRD: LEVINAS’ THEORETICAL MOVE FROM AN-ARCHICAL ETHICS TO THE
REALM OF JUSTICE AND POLITICS” PHILOSOPHY SOCIAL CRITICISM, 25; 83
The distinction between the saying and the said is best understood in juxtaposition to traditional theories
of expression. In the traditional view, language originates with the speaker. The speaker intends to speak,
formulates thoughts into words, then expresses them. The ego is preeminent. Levinas, on the other hand,
emphasizes the role of the addressee. The focus is thus shifted from the ego to the Other. ‘The activity of
speaking robs the subject of its central position; it is the depositing of a subject without refuge. The
speaking subject is no longer by and for itself; it is for the other.’17 The traditional view of expression
emphasizes the content of the communication, the said. In the realm of the said, the speaker assigns
meanings to objects and ideas. It is a process of identification, a kerygmatics, a designating, a process of
labeling ‘a this as that’.18 This is the realm of totality and autonomy, ‘a tradition in which intelligibility
derives from the assembling of terms united in a system for a locutor that states an apophansis. . . . Here
the subject is origin, initiative, freedom, present.’19 The realm of the said overlooks the most important
aspect of communication, the Other. Prior to the speech act, the speaker must address the Other, and
before the address is the approach of the Other or proximity. Before any speech, before any intention to
speak, there is an ‘exposure of the ego to the other, the non-indifference to another’, which is not a simple
‘intention to address a message’.20 The saying includes not only the content of the speech, but the
process itself which includes the Thou who is addressed and the speaker as attendant to the spoken
word. The approach of the Other is non-thematizable, non-utterable, impossible because the saying is
diachronous to the said. The realm of the said is a synchronic time where all of reality can be thematized
and made present to the mind of the ego. This is the domain of Husserlian time, where time is a series of
instants which can be re-presented in the consciousness of the ego. This synchronic, totalizing world is
the world of Derrida’s violent language. The saying, on the other hand, ‘is the impossibility of the
dispersion of time to assemble itself in the present, the insurmountable diachrony of time, a beyond the
said’.21 The saying comes from a time before the time of Being, and is thus irreducible to ontology. It is
the past that was never present. While the said emphasizes the autonomous position of the ego, the
saying tears the ego from its lair. In the saying, the ego is more than just exposed to the Other, it is
assigned to the Other. Assignation supplants identification. ‘The one assigned has to open to the point of
separating itself from its own inwardness, adhering to esse; it must be dis-interestedness.’22 The saying
is a de-posing or de-situating of the ego. Thus, the saying is otherwise than Being.
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PITY IS A NATURAL AND BIOLOGICAL HUMAN EMOTION – THE ALTERNATIVE IS FUTILE. PLUS,
PITY IS THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND AN ETHIC TO THE OTHER – THE IMPACT IS THE CASE
NUYEN 2K (PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND
A.T., DECEMBER, “LEVINAS AND THE ETHICS OF PITY”, INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL
QUARTERLY, 40:4)
The answer is that and in the feeling of pity and it is not just the pain of the distressed Other to which I have to respond; it is also, and primarily and my own pain to which I have
pity is such that the pitier and the pitied are importent with respect to the cause of
the misfortune. Thus the desire to relieve the suffering will not be fulfilled: there is nothing that the Virgin Mary can do to
remove the cause of Christ's suffering and this impotence is constitutive of her pity. The unfulfilled desire on the part of the pitier results in
a suffering in the pitier himself or herself and in addition to the suffering of the pitied. It is like the pain of a baby caused
to respond. As pointed out above and
by the cry of pain of another baby. However, while neither baby can do anything to ease its own pain other than crying to motivate others to do it and the pitier can and his or her
. The feeling of pity has a motivational force because, in pitying and the pitier has his or
her own pain to deal with. Since the source of the pitier's pain is the pain of the pitied and the pitier is motivated to give “the bread out of one's own mouth and
the coat from one's own shoulders.” This is not to say that the concern for the Other and for Hecuba and for my brother
and is a selfish one and having to do only with relieving my own pain. This is not the experiential characteristic of pity and which is
the exact opposite. The concern is genuinely for the Other. The fact that the motivational force originates from within oneself does not render the
resulting actions egoistic. As Bishop Butler has pointed out and personal enjoyment does not undermine altruism. It is widely accepted in
modern moral philosophy that psychological egoism is not the same thing as ethical egoism and is perfectly
compatible with altruism. Even biologists accept the role of altruism in the competitive game of survival.
Finally, in Otherwise than Being and L? inas speaks of “identity gnawing away at itself--in a remorse” (OB 114). Identity is a metaphysical question. In
order to “accomplish” metaphysics and we need to address the motivational question and which is the
question of what does the gnawing and why one should respond ethically. We saw earlier that L? inas's answer and namely,
“conscience,” is inadequate. We have seen that the feeling of pity accomplishes his metaphysics of identity insofar as it is
a pain that both gnaws away inside the pitier and motivates the pitier to share bread with the famished
and to welcome the wretched. Furthermore, there is no escape from the pain of pity because and as pointed
out above and the desire to alleviate the pain cannot be satisfied and the responsibility sensed by the
pitier cannot be discharged. Given the fact of pain and suffering and given our vulnerability to and our
susceptibility to the distress of others and the pitiful is always out there and traumatizing us and holding
us hostage. It is out there as an “incessant murmur that strikes with absurdity” (OB 164), as that which puts us “under the traumatic effect of persecution,” and as that by
own pain is the motivation
virtue of which the “subject is a hostage” (OB 112). In Totality and Infinity L? inas claims that and given the primordial responsibility and we are already created moral. From the
The only subjective human condition that fulfills
this moral metaphysics is our biological susceptibility to and vulnerability to the feeling of pity. That we are
biologically disposed to the feeling of pity is thus miraculous. I have tried to show that it is the feeling of pity that fully
accomplishes L? inas's metaphysics of morals. In a passage that comes closest to what I have argued here and L? inas claims that it is
“through the condition of being hostage that there can be in the world pity, compassion, pardon and
proximity” (OB 117). My claim is that it is in fact through the condition of being hostage to pity that there
can be in the world morality as we know it. Those who still ask “Why should I be moral?” are those who
have not felt the force of pity. No doubt and there have been and will continue to be people born with an
immunity to it and as if there is a disconnection in the hardwiring and if it is a matter of hardwiring. The
more fortunate among them can count on and as an entry ticket into the moral community and either the
susceptibility to the force of practical reason (as Kant had envisaged) or the Humean (second-order)
sentiment of sympathy. Only the less fortunate among these will still ask: “Why should I be moral?” These
are the pitiless and lacking in sympathy and devoid of moral reason. In L? inasian terms and they are the
people full of their own being and the people whose enjoyment has not been interrupted and the people
blind to the revelation of infinity on the face of the Other. Toward them we must show an appropriate
moral stance developed from a good pity and a L? inasian readiness to embrace the Other with the words
“Here I am.
metaphysical point of view and the “miracle of creation lies in creating a moral being” (TI 89).
53