Australia and the Asia-Pacific
R. James Ferguson © 2006
Lecture 6:
ASEAN Plus: Government-Led Regionalism and Uneven Development?
Topics: 1. The Birth of ASEAN: Avoiding External Interventions
2. Regionalism Founded on Economic Gains and Perceived Threats
3. The ASEAN Regional Forum: An Emerging Asia-Pacific
Community or Stalled Dialogue Process?
4. Current Challenges for the ARF
5. ASEAN Concord II: Will It Fly?
6. Participatory Regionalism and a More Inclusive ASEAN?
7. Bibliography and Further Resources
1. Introduction: Avoiding External Interventions
One of the main trends in world affairs over the last several decades has been a certain
shift towards regionalism. This regionalism may be based on military alliances (e.g.
NATO), but more often in the post-1975 period has been based on the priority of
economic and stability concerns. Groupings such as the EU, NAFTA (North
American Free Trade Agreement), APEC and ASEAN (Association of Southeast
Asian Nations) all have trade, tariff and economic cooperation agendas. In the current
period, with the direct recognition of the significance of economic power and
globalisation as drivers of international interactions, this emphasis on regionalism is a
logical response to the changing environment and can act as a partial buffer (Kiuk
2005, p109). A strengthened focus on transnational security concerns through 20012006 has added another strong motivation for regional cooperation in the early 21st
century. These trends have emerged gradually in Southeast Asia and the wider AsiaPacific, but have not yet created an inclusive strong regime but rather resulted in
several, looser, overlapping organisations with diverse functions. Somewhat deeper
integration in East Asia through 2003-2020 has been signalled as a real
possibility by changes in ASEAN and its wider dialogue processes (most recently
the East Asia Summit process). At the same time, sustained criticism has been made
of ASEAN and ASEAN related institutions on a range of grounds: its limited
institutional structures, its gradualist, government-led agenda, limited role for civil
society organisations in spite of pattern of informal diplomacy (Tan 2005), through to
its weakness in dealing with human rights and developmental issues (see further
below).
However, Supranationalism, that is, binding interstate relations which reduce the
sovereign decision-making powers of individual states has only strongly emerged in
the European Union over the last two decades, and has not been developed in the
Asia-Pacific region. In Southeast Asia, regionalism has not travelled down the path of
the ‘region state’, nor that of the unified bloc or closed alliance. Instead, each state has
retained a high degree of sovereignty, but cooperated closely during a period of
high economic growth and diplomatic initiative in the 1980s and early 1990s. This has
been done largely through the creation of a core association, ASEAN, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. ASEAN, founded in 1967, included
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Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, with Brunei joining in
1984, and then Vietnam in 1995. Through 1997 the organisation enlarged with the
addition of Myanmar (Burma), Laos and Cambodia, to become the ASEAN’s
Southeast Asian Ten, an important organisation abutting China in the north, South
Asia in the west, and Australia in the south, and straddling crucial trade lanes between
the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Yet ASEAN, in its early phase, was only moderately successful as a trade and tariff
organisation, and was not even particularly successful in its anti-communist and
regional stability quests. In the 1960s and 1970s this was largely due to the
intervention of great foreign powers which were involved in regional wars in
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. After the end of the second Vietnam War in 1975,
however, ASEAN found that it could once again be much more effective. It did so as
Southeast Asian nations found shared vital interests in pursuing economic reform and
economic growth, and in reducing or balancing the intervention of large external
powers such as the US, the USSR, and China.
ASEAN developed a consensual model of gradual agreement, dialogue and an
expansion of roles, focusing in the 1990s on the idea of open regionalism. This is not
done on the basis of any ‘pact alliance’ (ASEAN is neither a pact nor a formal
alliance), but within the principles of an ‘open multilateral trading system, nondiscriminatory liberalisation and open regionalism’ (Tarrant 1996a). Thus, ASEAN
did not seek common external barriers or tariffs, nor did it limit bilateral cooperation
with external states. Involvement in the ASEAN process does not lock out other
parallel processes, either within other organisations such as APEC, or in further
negotiations under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation and the agreements
of the recent Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM), nor later bilateral free trade agreements.
From late 2003, however, ASEAN has begun to frame a new phase of integration,
called ASEAN Concord II, that through 2003-2020 will shape the region based on an
ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Security Community, and ASEAN
Socio-Cultural Community, with target dates for deeper integration through 20122020 (see further below).
ASEAN has been fairly in managing its affairs within the heart of several other
international organisations, timetabling its initiatives and interests in a pattern of
proactive diplomacy. We might ask, then, whether there has been something
distinctive about the way ASEAN states have conducted their affairs and foreign
policy. There has been much discussion of a new ‘Asian way’, and of the impact of
cultural systems (e.g. Confucianism), on current international relations. This model,
though poorly quantified, has correlated with a generally more assertive phase of East
Asian international politics and international relations over the last two decades.
ASEAN has emphasised a distinctive ‘ASEAN way’ is operating diplomatically
and in terms of foreign affairs policies, based on voluntary cooperation and the
principle of non-interference (see further Dupont 1996). The ASEAN Way in spite
of criticism has survived into the 21st century with the following methods of decision
making: * the search for compromises acceptable to all (musyawarah),
* consensus principle (mufakat),
* private talks (empat mata),
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* extensive unofficial exploratory talks with all parties involved before initiatives are
formally launched (feeler technique),
* a sense of community spirit (gotong-royong),
* decent and modest behaviour (nobody leads principle), and
* the search for a general agreement, even if there is yet no common understanding
concerning the specifics of its realization (agreeing first, details later). (Heler 2005,
p128
At present, this ASEAN process has reached out to create a wider Asia-Pacific
dialogue, and has intensely engaged other regional states such as China, Japan, South
Korea, Australia, Russia, and more recently with India. Over the last decade this
process has been formalised through the ASEAN-Plus-Three dialogue engaging
East Asia and extended now via the East Asian Summit process, efforts at
building free trade areas in the region, as well as via the security dialogues of the
ASEAN Regional Forum (see further below).
2. Regionalism Founded on Economic Gains and Perceived Threats
ASEAN was first formed in 1967. At that time, three pressing problems prompted
the formation of the organisation: 1) There was the awareness of the threat of communism posed by North Vietnam, an
active Soviet presence in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, the power of the
People’s Republic of China, and by communist insurgences in Malaysia, Thailand,
and in the early 1960s the impact of the Communist Party in Indonesia. However,
ASEAN was not formally an anti-communist alliance, but rather grew out of
the need for regional stability.
2) Indonesia and Malaysia had through the early and md-1960s been engaged in
a major confrontation over legitimacy and territorial disputes, and the new
organisation helped bring these two countries together in a peaceful context.
3) The region needed peace in order to pursue economic objects of national
development, crucial for a relatively poor region.
Furthermore, the ASEAN organisation (unlike the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organisation, SEATO, which was a direct anti-communist alliance created in 1954 on
US initiatives, dissolved in 1977), sought to reduce the interference of foreign
great powers in so far as this was possible. Palmer and Reckford accurately describe
the conditions of ASEAN’s formation: So from the historical viewpoint and also because of fortuitous political changes, the
nations that formed ASEAN were at last intellectually and conceptually prepared to
cooperate with each other. Although each nation was anti-Communist, ASEAN was
not conceived to be merely another anti-communist construct. Rather, from the
beginning ASEAN was self-consciously inward-looking and “regional” and devoted to
individual and regional self-reliance and resilience (Palmer & Reckford 1987, p7)
It was in this context that the purpose of ASEAN in the Bangkok declaration of 8
August, 1967, was to ‘foster regional economic, social, and cultural cooperation and
“to promote regional peace and stability”’ (Palmer & Reckford 1987, p5). This
meeting was the culmination of a series of meetings between Thai, Malaysian and
3
Indonesian foreign ministers which had begun the year before. The 1967 Bangkok
meeting established the following purposes: 
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To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the
region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to
strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast
Asian nations;
To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the
rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the
principles of the United Nations Charter;
To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common
interest in the economic, social cultural, technical, scientific, and administrative fields;
To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in
the educational, professional, technical, and administrative spheres;
To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture and
industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of
international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and
communication facilities, and the raising of the living standards of their people;
To promote Southeast Asian studies;
To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional
organizations with similar aims and purposes and explore all avenues for even closer
cooperation among themselves. (Palmer & Reckford 1987, pp7-8)
The main institution to bring about this progress were annual meetings of Heads of
State and the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings, the creation of a standing committee in
the host country where meetings are held, and the creation of a national secretariat in
each member country (Palmer & Reckford 1987, pp8-9). This was followed by
regular foreign ministerial meetings, as well as by special Post-Ministerial meetings.
This evolved into a comprehensive dialogue across sectors: The highest decision-making organ of ASEAN is the Meeting of the ASEAN Heads of
State and Government. The ASEAN Summit is convened every year. The ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting (Foreign Ministers) is held on an annual basis. Ministerial
meetings on several other sectors are also held: agriculture and forestry, economics,
energy, environment, finance, information, investment, labour, law, regional haze,
rural development and poverty alleviation, science and technology, social welfare,
transnational crime, transportation, tourism, youth, the AIA Council and, the AFTA
Council. Supporting these ministerial bodies are 29 committees of senior officials and
122 technical working groups. (ASEAN 2005)
From 1976 special Summits also helped drive the process forward, often followed
by a wider dialogue process (later on this became the ASEAN-Plus-Three then the
East Asian Summit). Special Dialogue relationships were set up with other
countries, focusing on trading partners, as ‘external relations’, including ‘Australia,
Japan, New Zealand . . . in 1976; the United States (US) in 1977; the European Union
(EU) in 1980; Canada in 1981 and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1991’ (ASEAN
Secretariat 1996a). These would form the basis of later, more comprehensive
dialogues in the ASEAN Regional Forum (see below).
The second ASEAN meeting in Jakarta (August 1968) identified five priority areas
for cooperation: ‘food production, communication, civil aviation, shipping, and
tourism’, with permanent committees being set up in 1969 for ‘trade and tourism;
industry, energy, and minerals; food, agriculture, and forestry; transportation and
communication; finance and banking; science and technology; mass media and socio-
4
cultural activities’ (Palmer & Reckford 1987, p9). This mood of cooperation was
also increased by good personal relations between many of the ministers and
politicians involved, including Thanat Khoman, Adam Malik, and Tun Abdul Razak
(Palmer & Reckford 1987, p10).
However, at the regional level there were considerable areas of overlap in the
separate national economies, both in agriculture and manufacturing, and most
exports went outside of the region, to Europe, the US, and north-east Asia.
Furthermore, there were considerable gaps in fiscal and economic development,
e.g. between Singapore and Indonesia in the 1970s and even in the 1980s. Thus, in the
1980s only 18% of trade was intra-ASEAN, and ‘with the exception of Singapore, all
the members export the same raw materials, largely agricultural, produced in tropical
or semitropical climates’ (McIntosh 1987, p31). Through the 1990s some greater
complementarity began to emerge, e.g. Singapore and Malaysia emerging as major
service centres regionally, while greater flows of trade developed with North-east
Asia and particularly China.
Efforts to create an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA, announced in the Singapore
Summit of 1992) were designed to make the entire region more competitive globally.
The aim was for ASEAN states to gradually reduce their tariffs, from 1993, down to
5% by the year 2007 (later revised to earlier dates). The benefit of this is that the
regional timetable will be ahead of the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
group) voluntary deadlines of 2010 for developed nations, 2020 for developing
countries. The AFTA agreement, then, was designed to help cushion the blow of
wider drops in tariffs, and also allow the AFTA nations to work these agendas into the
wider, global agreements of the World Trade Organisation agreements (WTO). This
timetable was brought forward to allow an agreement for 0-5% tariffs by 2003. By
the year 2010, it is expected that an ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) would also
have been established, along with the further development of the AFAS (ASEAN
Framework Agreement on Services).
Singapore: Ancient and Modern in the Heart of ASEAN
 R. James Ferguson 1998
5
As ASEAN expanded (geographically and in terms of processes), serious debates
emerged about its direction and functioning. In the July 1998 meeting of ASEAN
in Manila, the problems of governance in Myanmar and Cambodia caused a review of
the principle of non-interference, a central doctrine of the organisation. Surin
Pitsuwan, then Thailand’s foreign minister, suggested that the concept of strict noninterference might be altered into a concept of ‘flexible engagement’, a view also
supported by the Philippines. This led to fierce debate and opposition by most other
countries, and even the watered-down version, ‘enhanced interaction’ was difficult
for the organisation to fully adopt (Economist 1998). However, it is clear that some
countries in the region recognise that the ten nations have to pull together
economically, and that some commitment to a minimum code of shared behaviour
would not only enhance regional political stability, but also raise the prestige of the
organisation globally. These issue has remained problematic, with fears of a two
tiered pattern emerging in two areas: poor and richer states, along with more
democratic (even if troubled) states such as Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia
verses more authoritarian and closed regimes, e.g. Vietnam and Myanmar.
Other countries could be considered in the future as possibly moving closer to
ASEAN, even if not gaining actual membership. One of these is India, which is
now a full dialogue partner with ASEAN, has its own ASEAN +1 meetings with the
organisation, and took part in the East Asian Summit in late 2005. Nonetheless, the
sheer size of India and the complicated politics of South Asia place real limits on how
far India can be accommodated. India over the last decade has been moving from its
non-aligned, import-replacement economy to taking a more active role in world
affairs and world trade. India during the 1990s promoted a ‘look east’ policy to
engage with Southeast Asia (see further Yahya 2003). Through 2001, India moved to
improve its economic and diplomatic ties with Myanmar, as well as to deepen
cooperation with the region as a whole through the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation
(MGC) accords for regional cooperation across mainland Southeast Asia and South
Asia. By November 2002 India was seeking to develop a free trade area with ASEAN
over a ten period, thereby balancing Chinese influence (see below). Likewise, as a
member of the ASEAN Regional Forum, and from 2003 a signatory to the Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation, India now has a strong dialogue with ASEAN. Through
2005-2007 proposals for an India-ASEAN FTA are being hammered out, with some
105 products having tariffs cut as early 2007 (Xinhua 2004).
Interaction within an East Asian core of the Asia-Pacific group remains one of
the main dynamics of the region. In late 1999, there was an important meeting of
the ASEAN-Plus-Three group, i.e. ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea, once
again keeping alive an active East Asian dialogue process. From 2000 this group tried
to moderate tensions in the South China Sea, and developed a loose code of conduct
for operations in the contested area, which PRC signed in 2002. From 2001, talks
progressed on the FTA between ASEAN and China (the ACFTA), operating
somewhat faster than a hoped for parallel East Asian free trade area that might
embrace all of the ASEAN-Plus-Three, and a more selective opening of trade with
Japan. Over a ten year period, the plan has been to open up trade, economic and
diplomatic cooperation between ASEAN and PRC: In other words, by the end of 2009 an ASEAN-China FTA will have been established,
within which, according to the agreement, tariffs will be substantially lowered to 0-5
6
per cent on all commodities (with the exception of a few special commodities), and all
non-tariff barriers will be removed. At the same time, service trade and investment will
also be liberalized and trade and investment facilitation measures created within the
FTA. To show its "sincerity and goodwill", China has offered to unilaterally open its
market to some ASEAN members five years ahead of the opening of their markets to
China.
In addition to the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers and the facilitation of
trade and investment, the ASEAN-China FTA will also serve as a framework for
overall economic cooperation between ASEAN and China. The whole idea is to
establish a comprehensive and close relationship between ASEAN and China
involving an FTA, and cooperation in finance, regional development, technological
assistance, macroeconomic cooperation, and other issues of common concern. The
decision to form an ASEAN-China FTA is obviously a significant move by ASEAN and
China in response to the intensifying economic regionalism elsewhere and the impact
of the Asian financial crisis . . . . The move by ASEAN and China toward an FTA also
reflects the adjustment of their respective political and economic policies in the
direction of East Asian integration (Cai 2003).
Trade between China and ASEAN has reached US$39.5 billion by 2000, with steady
high rates of growth through the 1990s, with the future FTA possibly boosting trade
by 48-55% approximately, as well as ensuring Chinese access to natural resources
(Kuik 2005, p110). In 2004 ASEAN-PRC trade reached US$105.8 billion, only
somewhat less than the 2003 trade flows with the US of $120 billion (Kuik 2005,
p118). Likewise, there were some early freeing up of agricultural exports from
Southeast Asia into China through 2004-2006, with 600 agricultural products having
tariffs removed as part of the 'early harvest' agreements of the ASEAN-China FTA
(People's Daily Online 2006).
In general terms, these policies are an extension of PRC's policy from the early
1990s of 'good-neighbourliness' (mulin zhengce) whereby it wanted to end its
relative isolation after 1989, reduce regional threat perceptions, and gain greater
regional influence (Kuik 2005, p103). This was run through the ASEAN-Plus-Three,
the ARF, and also from 1995 by the regular ASEAN-China dialogue process, which
involves meeting of senior officials on political and security issues (Kuik 2005,
pp104-109). In general terms, after initial suspicions faded that ARF's multilateral
dialogue might be used as a tool for US policy, and might force concessions in the
South China Sea, PRC has been willing to use multilateral dialogue with ASEAN
as a core part of its foreign policy, perhaps hoping to influence the shaping of future
norms in the East Asian region (Kuik 2005). This may give PRC greater regional
influence: More importantly for China, the ACFTA is expected to create considerable political
advantages. As rightly observed by Sheng Lijun, this is the first time China has found
common interest to engage all ASEAN states constructively and exclusively to talk
about cooperation, rather than quarrelling over issues like the Spratly dispute. The
FTA negotiations would mean that Beijing could engage ASEAN capitals
constructively for at least ten years under one friendly framework. The ACFTA thus
can be viewed as "political confidence-building" for both sides (Sheng 2003, p. 16).
Over time, this is likely to expand Chinese influence in the region. The political
benefits of the ACFTA will be explored further below. Here, it is suffice to say that
these goals would help Beijing to transform its political ties with the ASEAN states,
and to reshape the regional order in Asia-Pacific. (Kuik 2005, p110)
ASEAN also sought to revamp its goals and internal cooperation. This enhanced
agenda was announced at the Sixth ASEAN Summit, Hanoi, in December 1998. The
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Hanoi Declaration made explicit mention of the economic crisis and aimed to use
this in part as a pretext for intensifying the established ASEAN agenda. The Hanoi
meeting approved a ‘regional surveillance framework’ which would allow countries
to monitor each other’s economic policies and provide early warning for crises
before they had gained impetus, or had become transnational problems. Though the
non-interference doctrine has been retained, this was accompanied by an acceptance
of the new concept of enhanced interaction, allowing for some wider frankness in
dealing with trans-boundary problems and in discussing reform issues, e.g. 2005-2006
dialogue over air-pollution ('the Haze', see lecture 3) was discussed in the 2005
ASEAN Summit with Indonesia seeking to become more accountable on this issue
(Bernama 2006).
Key concepts and ideas that have shaped ASEAN include: 
Open Regionalism and ‘Soft Governance’. 'Soft' regionalism often infers a loose,
informal integration centred on consensus as in the ASEAN system (Acharya 1999, p15),
but in the wider Asia-Pacific setting it may allow strong external influence by economic
powers, e.g. Japanese or Chinese economic networks (Katzenstein 1997, p22). 'Soft'
governance, however, can be viewed as the application of 'soft' power (Katzenstein
1997, p43) within a regional or multilateral setting. This is the basis considerable progress
of ASEAN and the ARF thorugh the 1990s, and the renewed efforts by ASEAN and
APEC to adapt to global challenges through 1998-2006.

The promotion of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in the wider
region. This was one of the main motives behind negotiations between 1966-1970 which
emerged in the ZOPFAN agreement, adopted in Kuala Lumpur on November 27, 1971.
This was aimed at a long term regional solution, which would of course require the
agreement of the great powers on the basis of self-interest. This move was generally
coherent with the membership of Malaysia (since 1969) and Indonesia in the NonAligned Movement (Palmer & Reckford 1987, pp12-3). Though ZOPFAN could not be
really established while war raged in Vietnam and Cambodia, and while nuclear tensions
existed between the US and the Soviets in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, it did at least
establish the principle within ASEAN that 'noninterference and nonaggression' were the
basis of relations' (Palmer & Reckford 1987, p13). After this there was an effort to
develop the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone concept (SEANFZ),
signed by ASEAN members through December 1997, seeking to limit great power
intervention and the use of the region as a zone of confrontations and proxy wars.
Neither concept could be fully developed until after the end the Vietnam War and the
end of the Cold War.
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Regional cooperation was based from 1976 in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
(TAC) (see Appendix I to Jawhar 1992, pp309-315). Principles of the TAC are: a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial
integrity and national identity of all nations;
b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external
interference, subversion or coercion;
c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;
e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force;
f. Effective cooperation among themselves. (in Heller 2005, p127)
All states wishing to join ASEAN had to sign the TAC, while through 2003 major
dialogue partners India and China also signed onto the TAC, followed by South Korea
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and Russia in 2004 (ARF 2005), while the TAC became the de facto basis for admission
to the East Asian Summit Process from 2005 onward.
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These ideas of preventive diplomacy were also further developed with respect to the
Spratly Islands and the South China in the ASEAN Declaration on the South China
Sea (Ball & Kerr 1996, p29). Intense debate with China through 1997-2002 did
eventually to a loosely phrased code of conduct for avoiding conflict over territorial
disputes in the South China Sea. In general, PRC has viewed the benefits of dialogue
with ASEAN, the ARF, and the ASEAN-Plus-Three as providing greater benefits that
allow sovereignty conflicts over the South China Sea to be side-stepped in favour of
collective development.

ASEAN sought to extend its influence through various ‘Circles of Engagement’
including the ASEAN core, the ASEAN ten, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEANPlus-Three, and ASEM (Asia-Europe Meetings) process. However, some circles were
harder to manage than others, e.g. ASEAN has not been a cohesive group within the
APEC process, and the ASEAN reforms has come under some sustained criticism
through 1999-2006 (see below).

ASEAN was based on the Non-Interference Principle whereby sovereignty and
internal affairs were to be respected by all members (see further Hund 2002). However,
ongoing transboundary issues (environmental, illegal workers, refugees) and
transnational problems (organised crime, regional resource pressures, international
terrorism) have made this hard to sustain in an absolute form. Though the principle of
non-interference among ASEAN members has been retained, this has been
accompanied by the acceptance of the new concept of 'enhanced interaction', allowing
for some wider frankness in dealing with trans-boundary problems and in discussing
reform issues (Henderson 1999, p12, p52). In some ways, this is a linear continuance of
the principle of non-interference, but is also a more open acceptance of the reality of
'quiet diplomacy' which operates behind the scenes in Southeast Asia to influence
neighbours on sensitive issues (Ramcharan 2000). Other areas of intensified cooperation
include efforts to monitor regional air pollution, with problems being seriously
operationalised within ASEAN in 1998 and using some ADB funding, utilising in part
the 1995 ASEAN Co-operation Plan on Transboundary Pollution and the 1997 Regional
Haze Action Plan (Rosenberg 1999). However, limits to this frankness remain. This
could be seen in 2003, when it seemed through mid-year that the organisation might
have put strong leverage on Myanmar’s regime (the SPDC, State Peace and
Development Council) for real reform in the area of human rights. However, by
October 2003 the much weaker version of the ‘road map’ proposed by Myanmar was
accepted by ASEAN, in spite of U.S. and EU criticisms of the ineffectuality of this
watered-down approach (Strategic Comments 2003), though Indonesia has signalled
through 2005-2006 that it may wish to re-address the issue of democratic reform within
Myanmar in future.

ASEAN-Plus-Three (APT) has extended the influence of a core East Asian Group in
relation to the future of ASEAN, and the dialogue in groups such as the ARF and
APEC. Based on earlier meetings from 1997, it was formalised from 2000. From late
1999, there was also an important meeting of the ASEAN plus three group to set up the
the ASEAN Plus Three Framework, i.e. ASEAN plus China, Japan and South
Korea, once again keeping alive an active East Asian dialogue process. Through 2000
this group has tried to moderate tensions in the South China Sea, and began a possible
code of conduct for operations in the contested area. In May 2000, a meeting of the
'ASEAN Plus Three' economic ministers in Myanmar outlined a comprehensive range of
areas of cooperation, including cooperation in groupings such as the WTO, APEC,
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ASEM, and representation of ASEAN concerns to the G8.1 This was followed by the
July 2000 round of formal meetings between ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea, as
well discussions on regional financing arrangements and swap agreements to increase
East Asian financial stability.2 The ASEAN-plus-three meeting did signal a confident
move toward deepened East Asian cooperation (Tang 2000a). Through 2000-2005 there
has been continued financial cooperation via ASEAN-Plus-Three dialogue, as well as
the long-term prospect of a free trade area eventually embracing all of East Asia. China
has also offered to open its marked to ASEAN states earlier than required to other
WTO members, has provided some aid for ASEAN's infrastructure needs, and has
supported Chinese firms wishing to invest in the region (Kuik 2005, p113). This
grouping remains a strong dialogue process within ASEAN summits and meetings
through 2000-2006.
Future tests, however, remain to challenge the viability of the ASEAN process.
These include:  Whether ASEAN can moderate the worst abuses of the government in
Myanmar, as well as effectively reduce drug flows out of the 'golden quadrangle'
discussed further in week 7).
 Whether ASEAN governments can better organise responses to regional
environmental disasters, such as the regular bushfire and haze problems, or to
natural disasters such as tsunamis and earthquakes. This ongoing problem has had
a major negative impact on tourism, agriculture and health.
 Whether better financial and economic management can avoid future major
currency and banking problems in the region, though some process has begun on
this through cooperation with PRC and Japan from 2000, and via ASEAN
Concord II from 2003 (see below).
 Whether patterns of more transparent and accountable government can
emerge regionally and remain stable.
 Whether the organisation can slowly move toward preventive diplomacy
procedures that solve serious disputes and avoid external interventions, e.g.
territorial and resource conflicts in the South China Sea (there has only been
moderate progress on this), and can avoid UN mandated interventions such as that
for East Timor (hoped for in the ASEAN Security Community from 2012, see
below).
 Whether the organisation can reduce the activities of terrorist networks and
extremist organisations within the region, thereby reducing external pressures and
fears, e.g. on Indonesia and the Philippines.
 Whether ASEAN can improve human rights and 'human security' in the
context of further democratisation and a stronger civil society, i.e. whether human
lives in these developing states are really improved or not. To do this ASEAN and
its government would need to seriously engage civil society groups and
demand a minimum conduct for government conduct, something that may clash
with the non-interference principle. This process has made only moderate steps
with affiliated regional NGOs and the regular ASEAN Civil Society Conference
(ACSC), which are to held 'annually on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit and
1
"The First Meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers and the Ministers of People's Republic of
China, Japan, and Republic of Korea", 2 May, 2000, Yangon, Myanmar, Joint Press Statement,
ASEANWeb access at http://www.aseansec.org/economic/asecjk01.htm.
2
Joint Communique of the Thirty Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Bangkok, Thailand, 24-25 July
2000, Sections 34 & 44.
10
that its report be presented to the Leaders' (ASEAN 2005). How, one NGO
Conference (Regional Conference on Civil Society Engagement in the ASEAN) in
October 2005 noted that: ASEAN is a community of people. However, ASEAN continues to be plagued by the
perception that it is an elite association of governments. Since its establishment in
1967 and up to now, ASEAN is an institution that is detached from the people of the
region. As we reaffirm our commitment for peace, stability and prosperity in the South
East Asian region articulated in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration that created the
ASEAN, we acknowledge our responsibility and lay our equal stake with our
governments in making ASEAN work with and for our people.
The vision and practice of an ASEAN community by 2020 founded on the three pillars
of security, economic and socio-cultural development has remained unknown among
the peoples of this region. There is a need to build an ASEAN community on a fully
transparent, accountable, and pro-people manner involving all sectors of our diverse
societies, including civil society, and seriously institutionalizing mechanisms for CSO
involvement in ASEAN decision-making and stake-claiming processes.
Ours is a region of 558 million people many of whom remain poor. . . .The extremes
of inequality between and within countries in the region have widened according to
the 2005 UN report, the ‘World Social Situation: The Inequality Predicament.’ In
varying degrees, our countries are suffering the social and environmental impacts of
rapid growth and trade liberalization. (RCCSE-ASEAN 2005)
3. The ASEAN Regional Forum: An Emerging Asia-Pacific Community
or Stalled Dialogue Process?
ASEAN achieved some of its goals via the creation of a second forum for a wider
Asia-Pacific membership. The immediate background to the creation of the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) were certain ideas discussed as early as 1990 in the ASEAN
Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), while the idea of a
wider regional security was broached with mixed success in the ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting (AMM) in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991 (Emmers 2001, pp277-278). These
issues were taken up more forcefully in 1992 at the fourth ASEAN heads of
government meeting, responding to new international realities including a rising
China, the end of the Soviet Union, and fears of a U.S. pull back from deployment
into the Asia-Pacific region (Leifer 1996, p8). The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
was designed in July 1993 to foster regional dialogue and to eventually allow
preventive diplomacy in the region, a real possibility once the Cold War had ended.
In part responding to earlier Japanese and Australian initiatives (see Leifer 1996,
p23), ASEAN leaders, mobilised through strong Singaporean support, saw a
multilateral forum as one way of increasing their influence in the wider region
(Emmers 2001, p279). With the Cold War winding down, there was a sense of new
uncertainty, fear of possible power vacuums, and a feeling of vulnerability among
smaller states (Naidu 2000, p1957). At the very least, the ARF was one way that
ASEAN hoped to secure a better dialogue among U.S., China and Japan that would
allow the smaller states to 'contribute to regional stability' (Leifer 1996, p20). With
initial support from Singapore, Australia and the U.S., the external dialogues of
ASEAN were expanded into a wider dialogue process (Leifer 1996, p21).
While something as ambitious as a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia
(a CSCA, modelled on the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which
became the OSCE) could not be sustained (in spite of some Australian and Canadian
11
support for the idea, Naidu 2000, p1960; Leifer 1996, p22), ASEAN hoped that it
could be the core of wider, cooperative dialogue process. On 25 July 1994 the first
ARF meeting occurred in Bangkok. ASEAN was also responding to increasing
external pressures for some kind of forum where regional tensions could be at least
aired and discussed, and a sense that it was important for ASEAN core to steer these
dialogues as far as possible. Likewise, the growing comprehensive power of China,
the relative economic dominance of Northeast Asian economies, and the potential of
changing U.S. military priorities were part of the context in which the ARF was
created (see Emmers 2001).
One key concern was to create a genuinely multilateral, but non-intrusive
organisation (for the principles of non-interference within the ASEAN core, see
above and Hund 2002). The hope was to move beyond the web of bilateral relations,
particularly among great regional powers such as the U.S., PRC and Japan, as well as
to create dialogue that went beyond that of the U.S. leadership of its allies in the
region, i.e. the San Francisco system (Naidu 2000, p1960). Multilateralism in this
sense involved more than just having several members within an organization – it
suggests the need to arrive at shared values and processes that support the interests
and needs of members. So long as this did not involve a high degree of rule-based
interaction, this approach was largely consistent with the ASEAN way of 'informality,
personalised rather than institutional relations, and distrust of definite and legally
binding commitments' (Hund 2002, p99). This form of organisation continued the
principles of 'equal participation and representation' that are part of ASEAN
diplomatic thinking (Hund 2002, p112). In theory, no state has a greater say than
another, and in theory no hegemon (dominant leader) or sub-set of allies should
dominate the organisation.
The Forum was seen in Southeast Asia as enhancing the influence of small and
middle powers, and a way of alternately engaging and constraining great powers.
In this context, ARF was viewed as a real achievement by ASEAN and favoured at
first by middle powers such as Australia and Canada (Leifer 1996, p32), while
Japan also favoured multilateralism as a way of enhancing its 'political role' without
generating threat perceptions (Naidu 2000, p1963). Japan, in particular, needed
non-threatening ways to enhance its diplomatic influence and ensure a stable AsiaPacific in which it could continue to thrive as an economic superpower. The ARF was
one forum through which this could be achieved. It must be noted that, in spite on
constitutional limits on Japan's military operations, Japan had an effective,
technologically advanced self-defence force, focused first against Soviet threats, and
from the mid-1990s against possible North Korean threats and the growing challenge
of PRC's capability (see lecture 4). Combined with a strong alliance with the U.S.
(deepened from 1996), and the possibility in the future of a deployed Theatre Missile
Defence (TMD) system, this meant that Japan was not seen as a harmless state within
the Northeast Asian system of states. Though not a 'normal nation', in the sense that
its security remained linked to the U.S., Japan still hoped to reduce regional
turbulence and improve its ability to project its foreign policy within a multilateral
setting. Likewise, regional players such as China were concerned that any serious
drawback of U.S. forces could force Japan towards a stronger military role. The ARF
was one way to moderate these tensions.
12
Australia, especially under the former Labour government, had edged towards a
strong engagement of the Asian region both economically and diplomatically. It was
concerned to ensure political stability, market access, and to enhance its role as an
'advanced' middle power. On this basis, Australia had a strong dialogue with
ASEAN itself, as well as making sustained efforts to continue strong relations with
most ASEAN members, e.g. even though relations with Malaysia remained at times
fragile, and deepening cooperation with Indonesia led to internal political controversy.
On this basis, there was also a pattern of deepened military cooperation with regional
neighbours, including Indonesia, through the mid-1990s, aimed at supporting regional
stability and edging towards a cooperative security environment (problematic through
1998-2006, see lecture 3).
In this setting, the ARF was seen at first as a great success, and a way of
supporting both foreign policy and defence objectives for many regional states.
This led to some rather triumphal claims of Australian leadership in the media that
could not be sustained Some return to an emphasis on bilateral relations emerged after
1997 with the Howard government. Current official rhetoric on ARF is now more
moderate: Australia regards the ARF as 'valuable in promoting stable relationships
between the major powers, and as a complement to the various bilateral alliances and
dialogues which underpin the region's security architecture' (DFAT 2002). This view
was states explicitly in the 1997 Australian Foreign Policy White Paper: In the
National Interest: The Government does not regard regional approaches to security as a replacement
for strong bilateral security arrangements. Nor does it view cooperative regional
approaches as inconsistent with bilateral alliances. The two are mutually supportive:
both contribute to regional peace and stability.
The Government will be working in the ARF to develop norms of regional behaviour
aimed at avoiding conflict and settling disputes without resort to the threat or use of
force. The Government will also encourage the ARF to take a more central role in
discussing and managing issues that threaten stability or confidence. One way to
achieve this would be through establishing voluntary mechanisms upon which
regional states could draw to prevent differences from becoming disputes, and
disputes from leading to armed conflict. In the longer term, Australia would see value
in the ARF developing a conflict resolution capacity. (Commonwealth of Australia
1997, Chapter 3)
The ARF, however, was greeted with some initial caution by the U.S.
administration and China (Naidu 2000, p1958). The U.S. saw it as an adjunct to
existing bilateral security relations, though a U.S. Department of Defence publication
of 1998 noted that the 'ARF has developed into a useful vehicle for official regionwide discussion and exchange. The ARF’s attention to promoting greater mutual
understanding and transparency promises to build trust among Asia-Pacific nations
and others outside the region, and provide an important contribution to regional
security' (DefenseLINK 1998; see also Naidu 2000, Footnote 9). However, this was a
supplement, not 'an alternative', to the U.S. strategic engagement in the region
(Leifer 1996, p27). U.S. defence policies, furthermore, do not always seem
compatible with policies of regional engagement, are vulnerable to domestic politics
and special interest groups (Simon 1999), and with ready access to preponderance of
power and bilateral alliance strategies, are often critical of the perceived limits of
the ARF. Through 2001-2005, the ARF was reinvested with importance once it
13
could be used as a grouping to help in ‘the war on terror’, and having a real but
limited role in dialogue with North Korea (see below). However, the failure of
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to attend the ARF meeting in 2005, suggested
some reduction of its importance in U.S. terms (Dillon 2005).
China, though cautious, hoped that the organisation would help its stated aims of
pushing towards a multipolar state system in the Asia-Pacific area (Emmers 2001,
p275). It supported the ARF and ASEAN leadership of it as a way of heading off
increased U.S. preponderance of power regionally and globally (see for example
Xinhua 2002a). ASEAN leadership on this context was acceptable, though the issue of
sub-groupings with ASEAN remained of concern. Thus one contentious issue for the
ARF was whether bilateral alliances, e.g. the US-Japan defence treaties, were
constructive or destructive to regional stability (Kwang 1997). Although no consensus
was reached on this issue, China (the PRC) made it clear that it did not favour such
alliance systems, and that the ARF should not be considered ‘as a supplement to
such military alliances’ (Kwang 1997).
The ARF was based around a core of ASEAN nations and their seven dialogue
partners (Australia, the United States, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Canada and
the European Union), with 'invited participants' including China, Vietnam, Russia,
Laos and Papua New Guinea. The membership of the ARF later expanded to
include China, Russia, India, PNG, North Korea, and Mongolia, then adding
Pakistan and Timore Leste (by 2005), while Bangladesh is to formally join in
2006 leading to a membership of 26 states. The initial membership was thus a
rationalisation and then extension of the main dialogue partners that ASEAN
recognised as important economic, political or security interlocutors. The logic of the
new membership is interesting in that it shows an effort to expand the dialogue to
the main players in the South-East Asia and North-East Asia, and to a lesser
degree the South Asian region, thereby implicitly claiming a strong role in the
northern zone of the Asia-Pacific, e.g. the inclusion of North Korea in the ARF talks
from mid-2000.
The addition of India to the ARF developed after it became a full dialogue partner to
ASEAN in 1995. This was based in part on India's new 'look east' strategy, on its
concern over growing Chinese power (economically, in terms of influence in
Myanmar, and its naval power projection capabilities), and on new patterns of
interaction with Southeast Asia. India has moved to improve its economic and
diplomatic ties with Myanmar, as well as to deepen cooperation with the region
through the recent Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) accords (Baruah 2001a &
2001b). There was at first some concern that this would draw the ARF into the
complications of South Asian politics, leading to some questions from the U.S. on
India's membership, but this decision was fully endorsed by May 1996 (Leifer 1996,
pp48-49). Ralph Emmers has also suggested that power considerations, recognising
India's strategic importance and as a counter-balance to China, may have played a role
in its admittance, especially for Indonesia (Emmers 2001, p282). Through 2002-2006
there have also been calls for Pakistan and East Timor to join the ARF in the future.
Membership criteria for the ARF have been developed: -
14
These criteria include the commitment to key ARF goals and previous ARF decisions
and statements; relevance to the peace and security of the ARF "geographical
footprint" (North East and South East Asia and Oceania); gradual expansion; and
consultation and consensus by all ARF members on all future membership decisions.
(DFAT 2002)
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), after foundational work through 1990-1992,
was designed through 1993-1994 to foster regional dialogue and to eventually allow
preventive diplomacy in the region. The first meeting in 1994 discussed major issues
such as potential hotspots in North Korea, the Spratly Islands and Cambodia, and also
addressed the issues of weapons proliferation, especially weapons of mass destruction
and missile technology (Caballero-Anthony 2002, p536). The early meeting
emphasised an open dialogue process that 'was flexible enough to accommodate
diverse interests and divergent opinions' (Naudu 2002, p1960).
In the second ARF (August 1995) an evolutionary, three stage approach was
adopted for promoting regional stability, including 'Confidence-Building Measures'
(CBMs), the 'Development of Preventive Diplomacy', and most ambitiously, the
'Development of Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms' (Leifer 1996, p40; Ball & Kerr
1996, p29). This was based on its 1995 Concept Paper (see ASEAN 1995), largely
shaped in the Singaporean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which launched the first major
initiative towards Preventive Diplomacy (Naidu 2000, p1961; Leifer 1996, p39).
CBMs are well developed mechanisms and in the ARF context include: Implemented CBMs relate to a host of important issues, including security dialogues,
exchanges between national defense colleges, disaster relief, voluntary exchanges of
information on military exercises, and the circulation of papers to the Intersessional
Group on CBMs. Partially implemented CBMs relate to bilateral exchanges of security
perceptions, increased high-level defence exchanges, military exchanges, and
training; annual defense policy statements, the publication of white papers, and
exchanges of related views; participation in the U.N. Conventional Arms Register
(UNCAR); and the signing and ratification of global nonproliferation and disarmament
regimes. (Garofano 2002, pp515-516)
The ARF had hoped to move through the following, gradual, evolutionary steps,
based on consensus and not voting (Leifer 1996, p40), in order to promote regional
stability: Stage I. Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures
Stage II. Development of Preventive Diplomacy
Stage III. Development of Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms (Ball & Kerr 1996, p29)
Preventive diplomacy, following 'UN-speak', was formulated in Singapore through
1998 as "the use of diplomacy to prevent differences from becoming disputes,
disputes becoming conflicts, and conflicts becoming wars." (Garofano 2002, p517).
These ambitious aims would be delayed from 1997 as a series of crises hit ASEAN
and for a time slowed down the ARF agenda (these included the 1997-1998 financial
crisis, growing turbulence within Cambodia and Indonesia, and the UN intervention
in East Timor). Moreover, the ARF has not avoided entanglement with wider AsiaPacific agendas. Disappointment with the ARF's non-interventionist approach has
led to some sustained criticism from the United States, and to a lesser extent
Australia. Likewise, doubts have been raised about the ability of the ARF to forge
solutions for the South China Sea territorial disputes, or help with the entrenched
15
security problems of Northeast Asia. There is also some concern that even in the
CBM stage, some states are 'more interested in concealing weaknesses than in
promoting trust' (Garofano 2002, p516). Likewise, the move towards preventive
diplomacy also seems to clash with the principle of non-interference enshrined in
ASEAN diplomacy (only partially modified through the notion of 'enhanced
interaction', Caballero-Anthony 2002, p540), while China has been concerned that
preventive diplomacy would intervene in its claims in the South China Sea (Garofano
2002, p518).
However, by 2002 the ARF seemed back on track as a potentially important
forum, in part because of American recognition of the significant role it might play in
easing new tensions and cooperating on anti-terrorism measures. Through 2002-2006,
a number of initiatives have been sought to strengthen the security dialogue role of the
ARF (Australian 2002). New roles have begun to emerge for the organisation through
2002-2006. These new issues include human security, environmental issues, drugs,
and illegal migration, cooperation in maritime and anti-piracy activities, exchange
programs, and 'intelligence exchanges on border insurgencies', and anti-terrorism
agreements, with areas receiving follow up in the 2005 ARF meeting in late July 2005
in Vientiane, Laos (Garofano 2002, pp516-520; ARF 2005; see further below). The
13th ARF meeting will be held in Kuala Lumpur in late July 2006. However, it
remains to be seen how effective the organisation will be, and whether it remains
doubtful that the ARF can provide a strong leadership role.
4. Current Challenges for the ARF
A range of current issues, however, remain to challenge the ARF as a useful forum.
These include: 1.
Are bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific Region truly are complementary to the
multilateralism of the ARF (Naidu 2000, p1960)? The U.S. went along with the ARF on the
basis of it being a complementary, if weaker, approach to regional security than its existing
alliances. PRC, in particular, has been concerned that alliances within the region could
undermine the ARF as a viable institution. Through 2002-2006 bilateral relations were
strengthened across the region by both the U.S. and Australia, alongside strong bilateral
Free Trade Agreements that drove trade debates, e.g. between Australia, Singapore, the
US, and in future perhaps PRC and Japan.
2. In terms of international relations theory, this goes back to the debate between realists (the
role of state power and national interests) verses institutionalists (and constructivists)
who argue that the new global system is based on complex interdependence and the need for
new, cooperative multilateral organisations that can build trust and a sense of community
(Garofano 2002, p503; Naidu 2000, p1962). Put simply, can a stable balance of power be
achieved in the Asia-Pacific, and is this necessary before effective regional security
organisations can develop? As noted by G.V.U. Naidu: "Although multilateral institutions are as yet new to the Asia Pacific and it is too early
to make a critical evaluation, nevertheless, the limitations of an institutional approach
to address regional problems have become obvious with regard to three most
pressing issues that the region has confronted in the recent past: the Korean
Peninsula, the South China Sea and the financial crisis that hit the region in mid1997. Hence the basic question is: Can multilateralism provide an alternative
proposition to the balance of power as a guarantor for peace and stability?" (Naidu
2000, p1962)
16
Likewise, the ARF was not able to effectively intervene in the East Timor crisis, and does
not seem to be a major player in the current round in efforts to head off North Korean
nuclear militarisation, though ASEAN and the ARF were urged to play some role by U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, James Kelly, in 2003 (Unidjaja
2003). In 2002, Powell did manage to have a brief discussion with the North Korean foreign
minister Paek Num Sun on sensitive issues (a brief naval clash with South Korea) during the
ARF meeting (Xinhua 2002b), but through 2005-2006 the ARF has not been a major player
in talks on these issues. At the same time, we should also note that balance of power can be
hard to sustain in the long term (e.g. with a modernising PRC), and can easily be subverted
by spoiler or engagement strategies initiated by relatively weak powers (e.g. North Korea in
relation to the U.S., Pakistan in relation to Indian dominance in South Asia). Realists, for
example, seem to suggest an inevitable clash of U.S. and PRC interests as they try to shape
regional dynamics (Garofano 2002, p512). Likewise, ASEAN had some success in diplomatic
moderation of violence within Cambodia, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation seemed
to be a very useful tool for avoiding conflict within Southeast Asia (Leifer 1996, p16) and has
since been signed by both India and PRC. What is less certain is whether these approaches
could be expanded out into the wider Asia-Pacific region.
3. Whether ASEAN can continue to maintain leadership within the ARF, especially
through its continued Chairmanship of the organisation (as asserted in the Hanoi Declaration,
32 and the Hanoi Plan of Action, 8.1). The ARF was intimately linked to ASEAN through
these mechanisms as its regional forum, based on the ASEAN Core. Likewise, the annual
ARF meetings occur along with the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings and the ASEANPMCs (Naidu 2000, p1964), once again closely linking them as follow-ons from the ASEAN
agenda. From its conception, the ARF was to be held in the country which was the chair of
ASEAN's Standing Committee, with its foreign minister the main official involved in the
ARF (Leifer 1996, p47). There is a real danger, here, of course, that the ASEAN focus will
not be strong enough to draw in the regional great powers to do real work that should be the
focus of the forum.
4. Whether the ARF can effectively engage preventive diplomacy procedures to avoid
serious future conflicts. It must be stressed, however, that this is a different stage to formal
conflict resolution. It can be argued that: "The undeclared aim of the ARF is to defuse and
control regional tensions by creating and sustaining a network of dialogues within the overarching framework of its annual meetings, while the nexus of economic incentive works on
governments irrevocably committed to market-based economic development' (Leifer 1996,
p55). In this sense, ASEAN, the ARF and APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
process) provide a general environment which makes conflict less profitable and less likely
regionally. Thus, regional competitors find dialogue via the ARF as useful contact point.
5. Whether the ARF is a suitable forum for Northeast Asian security dialogue. Through
the mid-1990s, South Korea was at times frustrated by the ASEAN process as not being
responsive enough to the need for a special Northeast Asian dialogue (Leifer 1996, p41). In
spite of the current membership of North Korea, and hopes from the U.S. that the ARF
become more active, it remains to be seen whether the Forum can moderate the ongoing
crisis.
6. Whether the ARF can build cooperative regional approaches to combat terrorist
networks and extremist organisations within the region. The U.S. in particular, has pushed
for ASEAN and the ARF to play this role in the region, stimulating new interest in the
organisation through 2002 (Wain 2002). Cooperation among ASEAN and the U.S., and
among Australia, Malaysia and Indonesia has begun this process, based initially on
intelligence sharing (Australian 2002), as well as efforts to control terrorist funding and
money-laundering networks. The aim here is to intercept key flows and nodes in these
loose networks, ‘crashing’ their ability to fund and plan operations, and to isolate players into
17
smaller, bounded groups that can be detected and arrested at the local level. Likewise,
through 2005 ASEAN made agreements with Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and
Pakistan (Joint Declarations for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism) to support these
initiatives (ARF 2005).
7. The ARF may need to deepen its internal structure if it is be move into serious
preventive diplomacy roles (Garofano 2002, p515). At present it is based on annual
meetings organised through foreign ministries and diplomatic staff, with at first only limited
presence of defence officials, and with no secretariat of its own (see Heller 2005, p125; Leifer
1996, p44). This has begun to be addressed through some ARF inter-sessional activities,
e.g. the Workshop on Defence/Military Official's Cooperation within the ARF, run in the
Republic of Korea in August 2002, and six sessions of the ARF Meeting of the Heads of
Defence Colleges/Institutions (through to September 2002). Inter-sessional activities and
Senior Official Meetings remain somewhat limited, and without Secretariat support aside
from that provided by ASEAN itself. Two early processes supported the ARF between its
annual meetings: the Inter-Sessional Support Group (ISG) on Confidence Building
Measures, and the Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) to 'deal with cooperative activities,
including peacekeeping and search-and-rescue coordination', as well as combating
international crime and terrorism, and disaster relief concepts (Heffer 2005, p127; Leifer
1996, p43). In these inter-sessional activities, an ASEAN country can share its chair with a
co-chair, non-ASEAN member (Leifer 1996, p43). Thus, for example, in 1998-1999 Thailand
and the USA worked on Confidence Building Measures, while Russia and Vietnam worked
on Disaster Relief These sessions address issues such as CBMs, Peacekeeping issues, Search
and Rescue, and Disaster relief, but this does not constitute a continuous and flexible
response to regional crises, though some 'social capital' has accrued through these
regular processes (Caballero-Anthony 2002, p536). This includes an ARF Register of
Experts and Eminent Persons than can be turned to on a voluntary basis (CaballeroAnthony 2002, p537). The ARF also produces an Annual Security Outlook, ASO, which
has provided some regional transparency over the last decade (ARF 2005; Heller 2005,
p132; Caballero-Anthony, p537). The ARF is also involved in a number of Track II
(informal) conferences, e.g. the Conference on Comprehensive Security and Cooperation
in the Asia Pacific in April 1999, as well as a number of expert seminars, e.g. the September
1998 seminar on the Production of Defence Policy Documents (run by Malaysia and
Australia). Thus the ARF Calendar for 2005-2007 includes a wide range of issues: CyberTerrorism, Missile Defence, Preventive Diplomacy, Cooperative Maritime Security,
workshop on control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Disaster Relief, Weapons of Mass
Destruction, Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, Disease control, Peacekeeping etc
(ARF 2006). However, even if the ARF does move into a conflict resolution phase, it will
need to be able to act quickly to deal with new crises as they emerge, e.g. witness the
rapidly changing politics of the Korean Peninsula (Garofano 2002, p520). Likewise, there
may be a need to enhance the role of ARF Chairman to allow it to deepen coordination
across the year between main meetings (Caballero-Anthony 2002, p537; Tay 1997, p263). At
the same time this run into the representation problem: at present, no individual state or
subgroup is held to be 'representative' of the larger organisation, though for an interim
period certain members can be tasked with a research or coordination role.
8. Whether the ARF can build an effective system of cooperative security, or whether
different national interests will confound this aim. Cooperative security is an idea which
emerged in the late 1980s and began to shape Australian and Canadian thinking security
through the 1990s. Former Australian foreign affairs ministers Gareth Evans at the UN
General Assembly outlined cooperative security as: an approach which emphasizes reassurance rather than deterrence; it is inclusive
rather than exclusive; favours multilateralism over unilateralism or bilateralism; does
not rank military solutions over non-military ones; assumes that states are the
principal actors in the security system but accepts that non-state actors have an
18
important role to play: does not particularly emphasize the creation of formal security
institutions, but does not reject them either: and which, above all, stresses the value
of creating habits of dialogue. (in Evans 2001)
Within ASEAN itself, there has been some emerging signs of shared identity and decision
processes, but whether this has spilled over into national decision-making, and into the wider
ARF region is another matter. Commentators such as Alan Dupont have suggested that the
ARF may be a nascent or emerging security community (in Garofano 2002, p513).
9. Signs have emerged that the ARF has begun to extend its mandate into the
comprehensive and human security areas, including environmental issues, drugs, and illegal
migration (Garofano 2002, p520). Practically, this includes some cooperation in maritime and
anti-piracy activities, in exchange programs, and 'intelligence exchanges on border
insurgencies' (Garofano 2002, p516). The latest mandate has been an effort to move into a
regional approach against terrorism, in part responding to U.S. needs. This is logical
given the regional reach and cooperation of some terrorist groups, leading for example to the
ARF Workshop on Financial Measures Against Terrorism, hosted by Malaysia and the United
States in Honolulu in March 2002 (ASEAN 2002; see above).
10. Whether the ARF, in conjunction with ASEAN and the UN, could become involved not just
in conflict resolution, but could pro-actively become involved in 'peace operations' (see
for example one proposal, using the Partnership for Peace model, outlined in CaballeroAnthony 2002). In a developed form this might involve conflict management, peacekeeping
and peacebuilding operations (Caballero-Anthony 2002, p532), all controversial within the
ARF context. From late 2003 there was a plan for regional peacekeeping to be developed
as part of ASEAN Concord II (see below), but this proposal has been delayed due to
opposition to the idea through June 2004 from Singapore and Vietnam. Thus the ARF has
not been able to mobilise this option in relation to East Timor in 2006, nor to broach issues
such as the Indonesia, PNG, Australia problem of asylum seekers and ongoing tensions in
West Papua
In the scope of its considerations, its interests in promoting regional confidence, preemptive diplomacy (Acharya 1993, p74), and enhanced security dialogue, many of
the concerns of the ARF converge on the notion of comprehensive security
(Ravenhill 1998, pp259; Ball & Kerr 1996, pp76-77). However, there are several
factors which suggest that by itself this grouping will have troubles in entrenching
either regional governance or a genuinely operational comprehensive security at
the regional level (see further Ferguson 2001). The first of these is the relative lack of
an ongoing institutional presence and independent administrative structure. In spite of
some ongoing committees (e.g. an Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence
Building Measures, and an Inter-Sessional Meeting on Peacekeeping Operations,
Ravenhill 1998, pp263-264), the ARF is only fully mobilised in its main meetings.
Second, the very diversity of the organisation, including potential triangular
antagonists such as China, Japan and the U.S. (Johnstone 1999), make the ARF a
suitable locus for dialogue and clarification, but less effective in the creation of
regional plans of action. This problem has been deepened by the political usage of
selective humanitarian interventions (Ayoob 1999, p252), and by the role of alliance
politics between subsets of members thereby mitigating the likelihood of any genuine
move towards a security community (see Ravenhill 1998, pp266-267; for theoretical
considerations, see Ayoob 1999). A review of ARF procedures may be required,
including the option of smaller coalitions of actors being allowed to manoeuvre at a
sub-consensus level, to push ARF agendas forward (Garofano 1999, pp89-92).
19
However, the ARF has been partially successful in creating a regional regime that
reduces the likelihood of large scale, accidental conflict: The ARF fulfils the criteria of regime theory that have to be met to categorize an
institution as a regime (Krasner 1983, pp. 2ff). First, it consists of principles laid out in
the TAC, norms taken from the ASEAN Way, and procedural rules, which are derived
from these norms. Second, although the ARF does not incorporate formal sanctions it
has formulated sufficient principles, norms and rules to bring about a higher
predictability of members' future actions. Third, the CBMs within ARF result in
increased information that would not be available otherwise, increasing transparency
in the Asia-Pacific. Fourth, the ARF achieves all this with very modest transaction
costs compared to the bilateral consultation of the concerned members, the settingup of parallel negotiations of several governments or the gathering of information by
secret services if the ARF did not exist. In addition, the ARF functions as an important
channel of communication for governments in the region. All of these functions make
the ARF attractive to actors in the region--and as the appeal of the ARF grows, so
does the appeal of regional security cooperation. (Heller 2005, p135)
At present, then, we can see that the ARF has made some serious strides since the
early 1990s. However, it has yet to fulfil the mandate it has given itself. Even as it
edges towards something that looks like a security community, it has to get traction
serious challenges in Northeast Asia and move into regular patterns of preventive
diplomacy and dispute resolution. It has been suggested that some of these activities
might be fielded through the new East Asian Summit process (2005 onwards) but
this remains to be seen.
5. ASEAN Concord II: Will It Fly?
In this setting ASEAN also sought to deepen its own integration and regain some
momentum for ASEAN related processes. A new ASEAN Concord II (also called
Bali Concord II) was agreed to through October 2003. This lays out an ambitious path
towards creating an ASEAN Community founded on economic, security and sociocultural pillars. It also speaks of a ‘concert’ of Southeast Asian nations, thus
explicitly mobilising a term pregnant with overtones from a period in 19th century
diplomacy (The Concert of Europe, approx. 1815-1853) when major European
powers were able to chart a period of relative peace and international stability (Cotton
1998). Progress on ASEAN Concord II requires strong regional diplomacy and
management of economic and foreign policy convergence. Fortunately, this policy
area has begun to be filled out through initial agenda set in place through the 20032006 period, laying the foundations for progress towards the AEC (ASEAN
Economic Community) in particular (see further below). AEC hopes to create ‘a
single market and production base with free flow of goods, services, investments,
capital, and skilled labour’, though it remains to be seen whether this process would
also require a single currency and shared financial institutions (Hew & Soesastro
2003). Moreover, the long time period for implementation of Concord II as a
whole (down through 2012-2020), seems a realistic assessment of the challenges
implicit in building the three communities (contra Neuman 2003).
ASEAN Concord II is a daring, if loosely phrased, blueprint for the future of
Southeast Asia. The signing of the ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) was
designed to prepare the ground for the 'proposed' ASEAN Community based on the
three 'pillars' of an ASEAN Security Community, an ASEAN Economic
Community, and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (Borneo Bulletin 2003;
20
BBC 2003). Thus section three notes that ASEAN ‘shall urgently and effectively
address the challenge of translating ASEAN cultural diversities and different
economic levels into equitable development opportunity and prosperity, in an
environment of solidarity, regional resilience and harmony’ (ASEAN Concord II).
Section four states: ‘ASEAN shall nurture common values, such as habit of
consultation to discuss political issues and the willingness to share information on
matters of common concern, such as environmental degradation, maritime security
cooperation, the enhancement of defence cooperation among ASEAN countries,
develop a set of socio-political values and principles, and resolve to settle longstanding disputes through peaceful means’ (ASEAN Concord II). The document thus
clearly recognises the range of new and old ‘threats’ confronting the region, and an
urgent need to confront divergences in economic development.
Through 2003, key elements of the proposed Community policy began to be
debated among ASEAN-focused groups, including the High Level Task Force
(HLTF) on ASEAN Economic Integration (drawing on key research by think-tanks
such as ISEAS and ASEAN-ISIS) and among member states. Limited but real
progress was demonstrated in economic and security issues: 
Strong initiatives for the AEC with clear deadlines, some taking hold through 20032005. These included ‘fast-track integration of eleven priority sectors’, including
fisheries, electronics, health care and tourism (Neuman 2003); faster and simplified
customs procedures, elimination of trade barriers, acceleration of specific product
Mutual Recognition arrangements, harmonisation of regulations and standards; and
measures to reduce non-tariff barriers (Hew & Soesastro 2003, pp292-293).

Plans for the creation of a stronger ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM)
whose decisions would be binding in trade disputes and which would be appealed to
more often as ASEAN integrates, in part drawing on the expertise of a legal unit to be
created within the ASEAN Secretariat (Hew & Soesastro 2003). This would indicate
a modest degree of supranational decision-making not present within the future
ASEAN.

From mid-2003 through March 2004, talks launched by Indonesia have broadened to
a wider ASEAN discussion on implementing aspects of the ASEAN Security
Community. Driven in part by renewed concerns over the necessity for foreign
intervention (whether in East Timor, deepened U.S. engagement against terrorist
groups in Philippines) or the danger of regional terrorism and related money
laundering and arms smuggling (Xinhua 2003). Indonesia also hoped that this agenda
might eventually establish an ASEAN peacekeeping force that can take up
‘neutral’ intervention, upon invitation, in potential hotspots such as Aceh and the
Southern Philippines, as well as improve control of regional piracy. It is hoped that a
practical plan for such operations can be developed through 2012: The proposal, which was offered by Indonesia recently, would be a major pillar of
an action plan for creating an ASEAN Security Community by 2020. The security
community is one of three components envisaged by the Declaration of ASEAN
Concord 2, popularly known as Bali Concord 2, signed by leaders of the 10member group last October. Under the declaration, the leaders are committed to
setting up an integrated ASEAN community by 2020 comprising the concepts of
an ASEAN Security Community, an ASEAN Economic Community and an
ASEAN Social and Cultural Community. According to a draft ASEAN Security
Community action plan, an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force with a standby
arrangement and its deployment mechanism will hopefully be established by
21
2012 to resolve member states' internal conflicts comprehensively and
peacefully. (Kyodo New 2004)
If followed through, such proposals would lead to the creation of a regional training
centre for peacekeeping training, an ASEAN centre to help combat terrorism, and
possibly a ‘ASEAN maritime surveillance’ centre (Xinhua 2003). Some initial work
has begun on a region-wide anti-piracy agenda through regular workshops and
technical working groups, as well as the establishment of a Maritime Transport
Working Group (MTWG), often hosted by Indonesia and other ASEAN states, with
ongoing support for the ASEAN Maritime Policy and Development Framework Plan
2002-2007 (Djalal 2002; Suryodipuro 2002). The proposal for an ASEAN regional
peacekeeping force was slowed down from June 2004, with countries such as
Singapore and Vietnam signaling that it was too soon for this to be developed (Kyodo
News 2004b). The idea has been dropped from the ‘draft plan of action’ for the
ASEAN Security Community and from definite timetabling, though not from
Indonesian aspirations for the future.
6. Participatory Regionalism and a More Inclusive ASEAN?
As has been noted by Amitav Acharya, though the outcomes for regional engagement
within ASEAN since 2001 have been somewhat mixed, there is a clear opportunity
for increased national democratisation, leading to a ‘participatory regionalism’
more inclusive than current forms of elite consensus: The key argument here is that while these consequences are mixed the displacement of
traditional patterns of regional elite socialisation has been offset by gains such as
advances in regional conflict management, transparency and rule-based interactions.
Moreover, these pave the way for a more ‘participatory regionalism' in Southeast Asia.
(Acharya 2003, p376)
Although tensions still exist between newly nascent democratic states and the older
regional order of dominant post-colonial political parties, in the long run democratic
regimes are likely to generate a more transparent and accountable regionalism
with greater political space for civil society and reform in sensitive areas such as
human rights (Acharya 2003, pp384-385; Connors 2003, p443). The partial but real
successes of Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia demonstrate that more political
space can be opened up for civil society and NGOs without undermining moderate
political elites. This will be even more important if ASEAN becomes the hub of a
wider regionalism embracing North-east Asian through 2006-2020 (alternative visions
of regional order will be looked at later in the subject).
Civil society, NGOs, and international agencies can help in some of Concord II
goals. There are tentative signs of more active regionally based patterns of civil
society activity, e.g. Alternative ASEAN (ALTSEAN), Forum Asia, Focus on the
Global South, Third World Network and Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional
Alliance (TERRA). (Acharya 2003, p384-385) Forum Asia in particular has been
keen to emphasise the security of ‘the people’ rather than states, and there has been
some initial linkage between ASEAN and regional civil society, e.g. through the 2000
ASEAN People’s Assembly, but these Track III processes remain weak (Acharya
2003, pp384-286). From the late 1990s there were over 50 NGOs operating at the
regional level and recognised as affiliated to ASEAN, ranging from banking groups
22
through to various student associations (ASEAN 2000). Interventionist international
NGOs (INGOs) are still regarded with suspicion, but also have become more active as
states open up to global information flows, though NGOs remain limited in
influence compared to Inter-government Organisations (IGOs) in Southeast Asia
(Hewison 2002, pp143-162; Schmidt 2002, p102) Some areas of regional civil
cooperation, e.g. through religious organizations, have also been limited by
heightened security concerns after September 11 (Acharya 2003, p388). ASEAN
Chairs now do accept reports and input from groupings such as the ASEAN Civil
Society Conference (ASEAN 2005), but the policy process, though accepting Track II
input, still tends to be 'top-down'.
The newest phase of activity has been the formation of the East Asian Summit
Process (EAS) in late 2005, build around the ASEAN-Plus-Three with the addition
of India, New Zealand and Australia. The declaration at the end of this Summit
followed the general principles outlined within ASEAN, and the ASEAN-Plus-Three,
but with strong Chinese and Malaysian support for a grouping without US
involvement (Cody 2005). Its final declaration included the following statements: * Fostering strategic dialogue and promoting cooperation in political and security
issues to ensure that our countries can live at peace with one another and with the
world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment;
* Promoting development, financial stability, energy security, economic integration
and growth, eradicating poverty and narrowing the development gap in East Asia,
through technology transfer and infrastructure development, capacity building, good
governance and humanitarian assistance and promoting financial links, trade and
investment expansion and liberalisation; and
* Promoting deeper cultural understanding, people-to-people contact and
enhanced cooperation in uplifting the lives and well-being of our peoples in order to
foster mutual trust and solidarity as well as promoting fields such as environmental
protection, prevention of infectious diseases and natural disaster mitigation. (ASEAN
2005b)
This very general statement perhaps masks some of the behind the scenes discord
at the meeting, including strong tensions between PRC and Japan, the feeling that US
interests are indirectly represented by Australia, and that in the long term new
members will need to added, resulting in some reduce of PRC interest in the Summit
(Cody 2005). The second meeting will be held in the Philippines in late 2006, with a
further commitment for regular meetings, though it is unclear what new role the
organisation will stake out in relation to existing organisations based on ASEAN
(Strategic Comments 2005).
.
Sustained, national-level, inter-governmental and civil commitment, plus more
deeply integrated ASEAN policies, will be needed to sustain ASEAN Concord II,
the ARF and the EAS in the 21st Century. There remains the possibility, however, that
these emerging communities will be too hard a challenge, and the process could stall
or be bypassed through 2006-2012. However, these institutions, and the drivers
behind them, are key players shaping the wider Indo-Pacific region in the current
decade.
7. Bibliography and Further Resources
Resources
23
A range of official documents and other data on ASEAN can be found on the
ASEAN Web at http://www.aseansec.org/
A wide range of links to materials concerning the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
are listed in a page maintained by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade at http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/
For the informal dialogue process initiated by Thailand from 2002, the Asian
Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), go to the April 2005 forum website at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/acd/
The Network of East Asian Think-Tanks (NEAT) supports a wide range of formal
and informal meetings, with a web page at
http://www.neat.org.cn/neatweb_en/index/index.php
The ARF's Annual Security Outlook (ASO) can be found at
http://www.aseansec.org/12009.htm
Further Reading
ACHARYA, Amitav Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the
Problem of Regional Order, London, Routledge, 2001
ACHARYA, Amitav Acharya, “Democratisation and the Prospects for Participatory
Regionalism in Southeast Asia”, Third World Quarterl,y 24, no. 2, 2003, pp375-390
CSIS & CSCAP Preventive Diplomacy: Charting a Course for the ASEAN Regional Forum,
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Pacific Forum, 2002 [Internet
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GAROFANO, John " Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security
community for Asia?", Asian Survey, 42 no 3, May-June 2002, p502-521
HELLER, Dominik "The Relevance of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for
Regional Security in the Asia Pacific", Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27 no. 1, April
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KUIK, Cheng-Chwee "Multilaterialism in China's ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution,
Characteristics, and Aspiration", Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27 no. 1, April 2005,
pp102-122 [Access via Infotrac Database]
Strategic Comments "The East Asia Summit: Towards a Community - or a Cul-de-Sac?", 11
no.
10,
December
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TAN, See Seng “Non-Official Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: ‘Civil Society’ or ‘Civil
Service’”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27 no.3, December 2005, pp370-388
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