Chapter Four
Italy’s demographic decline: a policy response programme
In 1986 that part of our research on the future which focused on demographic trends in Italy
became an independent programme. This enabled the Foundation to take a highly active part in
social discussion of the topic and to take a leading part in making proposals. The seriousness of the
demographic decline was not immediately apparent. We ourselves did not realize the seriousness
and complexity of the problem for, when we produced the Futurama Atlas in 1984, even though we
recognized that there was demographic decline, we still talked in terms of a “larger Italy”.
The research we undertook in the years 1981-5 was essentially descriptive in nature. In the
Futurama Atlas we attempted a provisional cultural interpretation of what the consequences would
be of Italy’s demographic transition, and painted the scenarios which seemed likely in tones which
were not dramatic. We argued that even though there would be fewer Italians in the future, the fact
that they would live longer and that more women would join the labour force made it possible to
talk of a “larger Italy”.
The extent of demographic decline emerged, however, in the years which followed publication
of our Atlas, and as is well known, the situation continued to deteriorate. As a result of this
worsening, the Foundation started a new study in 1986, which was completed in 1988. The subject
of this study was the demographic transition in the main regions of the world. This research served
as the basis for two different and successive lines of thinking and policy-proposal in the Foundation
– the first with regard to policies aiming to halt or slow demographic decline, the second with
respect to the management of immigration coming from outside the European Union1.
The seriousness of the demographic decline was clear when we realized that very soon Italy
would have to cope with the depressive effects caused by profound alteration of the structure of the
population, with all the effects this change was likely to have on the health system and the pension
system, on education, work and the economy. In the long term, it was even true that some regional
populations with particularly low birth rates, were likely to decline to the point where their very
existence was in danger. For although Italy in general was experiencing a crisis in the birth rate, this
was especially true of Liguria, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany and Piedmont. The various regions of
Italy were travelling at different rates towards desertification.
How could we raise the problem of Italy’s demographic future in the country’s cultural debate?
Two cultural obstacles made raising the issue particularly important. The first of these was
constitute by the image of the world which was popularized by the Club of Rome – the idea that the
world’s population was already too high and ecological equilibrium at breaking-point, with
resources running out. This was a catastrophic-type vision which described an abstract, unreal
world, and which failed to distinguish between the situation in the various cultures, and allowed no
room for the action of individuals. It was a totalizing and totalitarian vision (nowadays we might
say a fundamentalist vision) and it is extraordinary that it managed to gain so much support even in
democratic and liberal circles.
We tried to bring the debate on Italy’s demographic future back to the concrete terms of the
Italian case, and the case of a European country – with all the needs and specificities which that
implied. We achieved this result with our research on the demographic future of the main areas of
1
See below, Part Four, chapter 2, section on “Immigration and cultural pluralism in Italy and Europe”
the world, published in a work entitled Abitare il pianeta2. This was a necessary operation because
the prevalent culture was very close to that contained in the Club of Rome’s vision, which saw the
human race as having a different destiny from that of other animal species (exotic species in
particular). So, as the saying goes, everyone was very willing to worry about the extinction of some
race of parrots, promptly declare a protected species, or about some remote Amazonian tribe, yet
few seemed worried about the same risk being run by Piedmontese or Tuscans. The ideology which
was associated with the Club of Rome constituted what was, in its effects, anti-birth propaganda.
And this propaganda was received essentially acritically. It had frightened more or less all cultures
– inexplicably, even culture close to the Catholic Church.
Abitare il pianeta stressed that any serious demographic policy could not be applied in an
undifferentiated manner at a world level, but needed to be calibrated case by case, in accordance
with the stage which individual populations had reached in the demographic transition. By
“demographic transition” is meant that process which will eventually, in successive periods, affect
all populations on the planet, taking them from a pre-transition equilibrium, involving high levels of
fertility and of mortality, to a post-transition equilibrium, in which births and deaths are rarer. In the
central stages of this transition, when death rates have already fallen but birth rates remain high,
there is rapid growth of the population.
Demographic transition started in the nineteenth century and will be complete by the mid
twenty-first century, at which point the world population will stabilize. The present writer has
always liked the idea that the Italians, in all their regional varieties, will be there to see this event. It
would be nice to avoid Italian regions becoming rather like Cappadocia in Asia Minor (now part of
Turkey) - i.e., areas where there is no link whatsoever between the population actually living there
at present and the population of the past which built the buildings, shaped the works of art, and so
on, which tourists and locals view as archaeology. If this kind of “Cappadocia model” actually does
take place, the marks left by the past will be enigmatic: the majority will not understand their
significance, and for the minority who do know how to interpret them, they signs of erudition –
almost certainly not signs with which they identify.
The second difficulty we encountered in our attempts to awaken concern over Italy’s
demographic future was the fact that the theme had been discredited by the interest taken in it by the
Fascist government. We had already encountered a similar problem with our programme
encouraging ties with Italian Americans (for Fascism had wanted to mobilize Italians abroad as a
source of nationalist support for the regime). In that case too, the fact that the (now distant) Fascist
government had taken an interest in the question created an important obstacle to establishing
cultural relations between Italians and Italian Americans.
In the case of demographic policy, attitudes were similar. Parochialism led Italians to mistakenly
believe that worrying about the country’s demographic future was right-wing, and thus unseemly.
In Italian culture at the time it was the opinion of the vast majority (one even had an impression of
unanimity) that the state should remain absolutely neutral on the question of the country’s birthrate. And neutrality was intended in terms of “refraining from intervention”, and disinterest in the
question. It was assumed (an assumption we later showed to be mistaken) that existing, spontaneous
living conditions in Italy provided couples with the real possibility to choose between having and
not having children. The concept of equal opportunity had long been applied to the condition of
women, but nobody had yet applied the concept of equal opportunity as a criterion for population
policy.
2
Marcello Pacini, Aristide Zolberg, Antonio Golini et al., Abitare il pianeta, vol. I, Il Mondo Arabo, l'Italia e
l'Europa; Thomas J. Espenshade, S. Philip Morgan, Guido Ortona et al., Abitare il pianeta, vol. II, USA, URSS e aree
asiatica e australe, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1989. See also Giovanni Agnelli Foundation,
1976-1990: quinze ans d'activité, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1990, pp. 192-93.
At the conference in which we presented our research 3 , I argued that policies encouraging
population growth were politically neutral, for they had had both right- and left-wingers among
their supporters, and argued that it was necessary to make Italy’s demographic future a theme of
political debate, in the same way as the quality of life, condition of women, or the reform of the
Constitution, in order to encourage collective realization of the serious consequences of
demographic decline. The Foundation wished to issue an invitation to debate pro-birth policy which
would slow the rapid decline in the Italian population. It was, in fact, already obvious that
increasing the number of Italians was not a feasible objective, even given the most optimistic
hypotheses of upturn in fertility. But it was desirable that the process of aging of the population,
which was now inevitable, should proceed as slowly as possible – partly to give the social and
economic system the time to adapt.
By 1991 we could say that the first objective we had set ourselves – making Italy’s demographic
future a theme of public debate – had been achieved. By that year, in fact, even though there was
still insufficient awareness of the problem, the issue had become part of political and cultural
debate. This was objectively positive, and represented progress over the situation of just a few years
previously, when misinformation and disinterest prevailed. The second step was to define with
clarity what population policy meant, in what sort of ambit it should intervene, and what kind of
measures it should employ.
As we clarified our concepts we came to the conclusion that population policy was not the same
as simply policy encouraging births, nor did it necessarily even imply the latter 4. The difference is a
precise and clear one: birth policy involves specific initiatives to encourage an increase in the birthrate, whereas population policy is a series of measures designed to ensure that a couple who have
chosen to have children is not penalized with respect to a couple who have chosen to not have
children. In other words, population policy has the form of an “equal opportunity” policy – a
commitment to eliminating obstacles, and all forms of discrimination, facing those who wish to
exercise their right to procreate.
If, therefore, pro-birth policy may in some cases be part of a wider population policy, it is
equally true that it is possible for population policy to exist which contains no birth policy in the
strict sense. As I put it in 1990 at the conference on “Populations, society and demographic policy
in Europe”, “In our view it is legitimate and necessary for Italy to have a coherent, well-organized
population policy”5. I argued, furthermore, that particularly urgent situations could justify pro-birth
policies – which meant, as will become clear, a policy of equal opportunities at the national level,
and policy of more direct incentives for births left to the discretion of individual regions.
I stated that numerous factors “penalize not just a general, abstract social function – reproduction
- but also a very great number of Italian citizens discriminated against by sex and age”. This led to
the conclusion “that our country, too, should adopt a population policy. Or rather, Italy should adopt
a general orientation in favour of a population policy, because alongside measures aiming to
directly encourage procreation, there should be a general orientation to avoiding penalization
present in the country’s framework of laws and administrative provisions as a whole. Work,
housing, taxation, social insurance and social security are all areas where the law intervenes and
where measures which penalize women and families can be easily identified. It is in these areas that
we should act, to make sure that we have a population policy which really provides conditions
whereby the choice to have a child or not is a free one. A general orientation towards eliminating
3
“Transizione demografica, migrazioni internazionali e dinamiche culturali”, Turin, Giovanni Agnelli Foundation,
17-18 October 1988. See Marcello Pacini, Aristide Zolberg, Antonio Golini et al., Abitare il pianeta, vol. I and vol. II,
op. cit.
4
See Marcello Pacini, “Le politiche per la popolazione: idee per un dibattito italiano” in Antonio Golini, Alain
Monnier, Olivia Ekert-Jaffé et al., Famiglia, figli e società in Europa. Crisi della natalità e politiche per la
popolazione, Turin, Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1991, p. xvii.
5
Ibid., pp.xv-xvi.
measures which penalize procreative activity should be an important thread of long-term policy – a
sophisticated response by government to a new social and cultural situation.
A policy for population does not, therefore, have as its main objective to favour couples who
wish to have children, but to avoid making them disadvantaged. The question of whether or not
specifically pro-birth measures – for example, encouraging couples to have a third child – are
desirable is a distinct one (even though closely connected to other aspects of population policy)” 6.
With regard to pro-birth policies of this type, cultural resistance is still strong. “However [I argued
at the time], the idea that we might intervene actively to raise birth rates cannot be rejected out of
hand, especially in regions such as Tuscany, Emilia, Piedmont and Liguria, which have populations
in such rapid decline that the very survival of these populations, with their socio-cultural identies, is
at risk”. I went on to say that “an increase in the number of Italians is not the aim of a modern
population policy such as that we believe is necessary for our country. The real objective is to attain
- in a context of relative numerical stability - a balanced structure of the population, where there is a
harmonious relationship between young people, adults and the elderly (…) We are convinced that a
neo-industrial society like ours has all the cultural and economic means to make it possible to
choose consciously a demographic regime where there is balance in the long period between the
generations. However, cultural and economic resources are not enough on their own: legislative
tools are also required. The lack of such tools is what justifies the existence of a population policy. I
might repeat that having such a policy would bring us closer to our partners in Europe”7.
The fall in Italy’s birth-rate, 1971-2007
The research which the Foundation has carried out on future trends has (we might say)
accompanied the development of the population in Italy over the last two decades. Looking back at
the predictions we made, and comparing them against actually occurring trends, we can say that in
general our predictions hold up well and can be seen to have been precise.
One trend which was much more accentuated than we predicted, however, is the fall in the birth
rate. As the graph shows, the predictions we made in the Futurama Atlas (1983), and the lower
predictions made in Il futuro degli italiani (1990) (compiled by Piero Gastaldo, Stefano Molina,
Sandro Monteverdi, Carla Marchese and Daniela del Boca) – estimates which themselves led to
serious worry about the consequences of the decline in the birth rate – were in reality shown to be
too optimistic. They were overtaken by real trends, which yielded far fewer births than predicted.
6
7
Ibid., p.xxi-xxii.
Ibid., p.xxvi.
Our long involvement in demographic issues, which started in 1981, did not stop in 1991, and
certainly has not run its course today. Between 1991 and today, Italy’s demographic situation has
changed for the worse. By March 1999 the total fertility rate, that is to say the number of children
per woman of childbearing age was 1.17 – just over half the replacement rate (2.05 children per
woman), which is the rate which ensures that the numbers of births will just keep the population at
the level it is, maintaining the size of the population stable in the long term. It seems that the Italian
people has definitely opted for suicide. However, the increased seriousness of the question does not
change the key points of our position, which can be summarized as follows:
- the criteria and objectives underlying demographic policy vary in time and space; each
country should have its own demographic policy, which will change in accordance with its position
in the processes of demographic transition, and its culture. It is to be hoped that all policies will
respect the life and freedoms of persons;
- the demographic future should be made into a major theme of political debate, a theme as
important as the national debt or pensions. One of the ways in which a society shows its cultural
adequacy is by the way it reacts to the problems regarding its future;
- the framework of legislation which exists today penalizes couples who want children: this is
a real attack on rights and it is surprising that, in a democratic country, this situation is not only
accepted, but is not even discussed or questioned by the political parties. The only explanation for
this state of affairs which comes to mind (but it is perhaps too optimistic a conclusion) is that Italy
has gone through a particularly turbulent period over the last few years, and one where the
conditions of the country’s public finances have limited what was possible;
- finally, since demographic indexes are one of the many indicators of regional differences,
those regions where the population crisis is most acute ought to have the legal and financial
capacity to activate genuine pro-birth policies. The problem of the future existence of Piedmontese,
Tuscans, Emilians or Romagnolians is first of all an issue for the citizens and tax-payers of these
regions. It is to be hoped that the federalist reform of the state we hope will take place will facilitate
solution of the population crisis.
Unfortunately, it has been impossible to propose a debate along these lines. The priorities of
politicians do not just depend on the seriousness of a problem, but also on its urgency. An issue like
demographic decline, which has a very long time-scale, is seen as being less pressing than the
emergencies of the country’s immediate economic or financial situation, meeting the criteria
demanded by the Maastricht agreement, or struggling to reduce unemployment. The greater
predictability of the problems connected to the structural decline of the Italian population has
evidently not been sufficient to bring about prompt preventive action or the adoption of corrective
measures.
But since the problem has only been put off to another day, it will inevitably re-present itself in a
form which will be all the more serious the longer we wait. I therefore believe that equal
opportunity population policy, and incentives for births at the regional level, are two issues which
will be present in the cultural debate in the next few years. When Italy has restored balance to its
budget and reformed its framework of government and administration, and when the effects of the
change in the age-structure of the population begin to make themselves felt, it will be possible to
propose a policy strategy: a) to enlarge the area of equal opportunities for citizens; b) to introduce
more rational and far-sighted management of the consequences of Italy’s demographic transition; c)
to counter and correct the effects of demographic decline.
These are the policy conclusions of an ambitious programme which started in 1981 and
gradually became a permanent focus of interest, which the Foundation will need to cultivate in the
years to come.