February 4, 2016
Canada’s leverage to foreign
money: How scary?

Since the global financial crisis, Canada has basked in the glow
of foreign investor interest. But with the country’s outlook having
clouded over and bouts of foreign selling popping up, it’s worth
asking: is the foreign love affair with Canada over?
Highlights:






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In addition to keeping the C$ under pressure, a sizeable
current account deficit has forced Canada to import massive
amounts of foreign capital. There’s no end in sight; we
estimate $130 billion of net foreign capital will be needed to
offset the cumulative current account shortfall in 2016 and
2017. Foreign direct investment could pick up, but net
portfolio inflows are likely to remain a major avenue for
financing this current account deficit;
A weak economy and looming stimulus will see the federal
government’s net financing requirements move decisively
higher, while net borrowing needs for provinces and
corporates (in aggregate) remain elevated;
Foreign demand could wane. Canada’s list of relative
advantages has been pared down to size. Meanwhile,
foreign government policy decisions and pronounced oil
price weakness have led to FX reserve/asset liquidation;
All else equal, supply-demand fundamentals would be
consistent with rising GoC yields, underperformance vs US
Treasuries, tighter Canadian swap spreads and wide(r)
credit spreads (vs cash and ASW);
Bond market liquidity remains constrained in Canada, owing
to regulatory/tax changes and other developments, implying
greater volatility for a given international flow;
If not a full-blown systemic risk, Canada’s leverage to
foreign portfolio investors is a notable vulnerability for the
country’s capital markets and debt issuers;
Canada is by no means alone; a number of advanced
economies have relatively greater exposure to nonresidents. Moreover, foreign investor exposure varies
considerably across the credit spectrum (and term
structure). Non-residents control more than 40% of
publically traded Canadas, more than double the pre-crisis
share. The foreign ownership share of provincials is sitting
at a record low, but non-residents still own a lot of provincial
bonds and related flows have notably influenced valuations;
Wild cards remain. The nature/size of Canada’s stimulus
response is a work-in-progress. The federal budget will
provide important guidance here, although further BoC
easing (including via unconventional means) can’t be ruled
out. Provincial budgets will reveal the desire/ability to
combat erosion in oil-levered jurisdictions, give guidance on
borrowing needs and allow for resolution of credit rating
risks. Monetary policy decisions in the US, Europe and Asia
will influence the global risk appetite, while geopolitical
developments will likewise hold sway.
Where’s the exposure?
An unprecedented amount of foreign money has poured
into Canada since the global financial crisis, leaving the
1
country with a record liability to non-residents . Where has this
foreign money gone? While holdings of the currency and
deposits have moved higher, the bulk of that foreign buying has
been steered into portfolio securities, where the book value of
foreign holdings has expanded by $820 billion since the end of
2007 (a 150% increase). Foreign money has been put to work
in stocks and money market paper, but more than anything
it’s been channeled into Canadian bonds (Chart 1).
Chart 1: Foreigners move into Canada
Non-resident holdings of Canadian portfolio securities (book value)
1600
C$bln
Bonds
1400
Money market
Equities
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
2000
2005
2010
2015
Source: NBF, StatCan
1
Canada’s net international investment position has been improving,
meaning the value of the assets Canadians hold abroad has grown
faster than liabilities to non-residents. But foreign currency assets are
largely owned by the household sector, while the growing mountain of
liabilities to foreign investors has been racked up by sectors that have no
net financial wealth (namely governments and corporations).
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ON TOPIC
Foreign investors have increased the value of their Canadian
bond holdings faster than Canada’s own private sector investors.
They were still binging as of 2015, with non-residents taking
down a net $82 billion of Canadian bonds through November.
Chart 2: What bonds do foreigners own?
Foreign holdings of Canadian bonds by sector (Nov-2015)
600
C$bln
All currencies
C$ only
500
400
Dive into the domestic bond market and you’ll find that foreign
exposure is most notably sovereign in nature—directly via
Canadas and also through explicitly guaranteed CMBs. Nonresidents now hold just over 40% of the publically available
GoC bond stock—more than double their pre-crisis share
(Chart 3). The bulk of foreign GoC holdings are concentrated
down the curve (Chart 4), and in the past, have been a
contributing factor behind repo market tightness. CMBs are
issued exclusively in Canadian dollars. Having consistently
placed a non-trivial share of CMBs outside the country, the debt
of this major federal Crown remains relatively exposed to foreign
2
investor attitudes .
Chart 4: Foreigners more active down curve
300
Non-resident share of domestic bond trading by sector & term
200
35
100
%
Gov't of Canada
30
176
0
163
Gov't of Canada
146
107
Fed'l crowns
189
77
Provi/muni
525
66
Private corp
Provincial
Corporate
25
20
Source: NBF, StatCan
15
With a book value topping $1 trillion (CAD equivalent), nonresidents control roughly one third of Canada’s entire bond
stock. To be fair, a host of advanced countries possess greater
relative exposure to non-residents. Moreover, foreign ownership
varies considerably by sector. You might be surprised to learn
non-residents own more Canadian corporate bonds than they do
Canadas,
Canada
Mortgage
Bonds
(CMBs)
and
provincial/municipal bonds combined (Chart 2). This veritable
mountain of corporate debt held by non-residents reflects the
fact our banks and non-financial issuers routinely access
international markets—a trend still in evidence early in 2016. As
such, almost 90% of the Canadian corporate bonds held by
non-residents are denominated in foreign currencies.
Chart 3: Foreigners major holders of GoCs
Foreign share of publically held GoC bonds
50
%
45
40
35
10
5
0
29
20
14
10
6
10
7
0-3
3-10
>10
0-10
>10
0-10
>10
Source: NBF, Bank of Canada | Note: Based on first three quarters of 2015
At 25%, the share of the total provincial debt stock held by
non-residents sits at a record low. That has a lot to do with
3
issuance patterns and the broader evolution of the debt stock .
In terms of C$ provis, the foreign ownership share looks fairly
innocuous at 12% (Chart 5). But one shouldn’t assume
international investors are a non-factor here.
4
Given the more rapid growth in the C$ provincial market , a
declining foreign ownership share masks a sizeable amount
of domestic provincial debt controlled by internationals. As
of November, the book value of C$ provincial bonds (direct and
guaranteed) held by non-residents stood at roughly $70 billion.
When foreign investor flows swing from net accumulation to
active divestment of provincials, as they did in August-
30
25
2
20
15
10
1991
1995
Source: NBF, StatCan
1999
2003
2007
2011
2015
On average, international accounts have accounted for roughly 30% of
primary distribution of CMBs in the past decade.
3
Provincial governments tapped international markets during the crisis
and early stages of recovery, but much of this paper has matured (or
shortly will mature). Absent a commensurate supply of new foreign
paper, the non-resident share of total provincial debt has slid lower, a
development which might be termed “passive” divestment.
4
On average, the stock of C$ provincial debt has grown by ~$30 billion a
year since the end of 2007, bringing the cumulative increase in
outstandings to $250 billion (an increase of >75%).
2
ON TOPIC
September 2015, spreads can de-couple from fundamentals5.
Rounding things out, the roughly $65 billion of C$ corporate
bonds held by foreign investors amounts to a bit more than 10%
of the outstanding float.
Chart 5: Non-res share of provi market down
Foreign share of provincial bonds: Total & domestic
50
% of outstandings
Total (all ccys)
45
Our merchandise trade balance and resulting current account
took a serious hit in 2015. And with oil prices still scraping
bottom, don’t go looking for a near-term improvement. We’d see
Canada running a current account deficit of 3-3.5% of GDP
this year and next, necessitating an additional net capital
7
inflow of $130 billion through 2017 . FDI flows could swing
around, with foreign takeovers of now discounted Canadian firms
likely to heat up. Still, we’d see net portfolio inflows remaining a
major avenue for financing Canada’s current account deficit.
Domestic bonds only
40
Chart 6: Financing a current account deficit
35
Cumulative current account balance & financial flows (since 2008:Q4)
30
500
25
400
20
15
300
10
5
0
1991
$bln
200
1995
1999
2003
2007
2011
2015
100
Source: NBF, StatCan
Simply put, Canada has strapped on a high degree of relative
and/or absolute exposure to foreign investors. Whether directly
or indirectly, public- and private-sector issuers leveraged nonresident interest in their paper to advance borrowing programs
and access markets at borrowing rates that would not have
otherwise been achievable. For example, the Bank of Canada
estimates that foreign inflows of $150 billion lowered 10-year
6
GoC yields by 100 bps during 2009-2012 .
A supply-demand perspective
An examination of supply and demand fundamentals helps one
understand how this exposure to foreign investors came to be
and what risks might possibly lay ahead.
SUPPLY CONSIDERATIONS
First things first; Canada must import massive amounts of
foreign capital to finance a hefty current account deficit.
We’ve run a current account deficit in this country for 28 straight
quarters, with no end in sight. Up till now, net foreign direct
investment and other net outflows have compounded the current
account shortfall, leaving Canada needing to import nearly $500
billion (net) of portfolio capital since 2008:Q4 to keep the balance
of payments balanced (Chart 6).
0
375
494
-50
-70
Current account
FDI
Portfolio capital
deficit
inflow/(outflow)
inflow
Other financial
inflow
-100
Source: NBF, StatCan | Note: Cumulative balances as of 2015:Q3
Meantime, government and corporate issuers have been
supplying the market with ample paper, at times deploying
issuance strategies designed to tap into international pools of
liquidity. At the risk of oversimplifying a highly uneven
government/corporate sector outlook, we’re not exactly on the
cusp of a drop-off in net funding needs.
Rather, a deteriorating economic outlook and looming fiscal
stimulus program suggests the Government of Canada’s net
financing requirements are about to step up smartly (Chart 7),
coming onto (if not surpassing) the still-sizeable slug of annual
net issuance coming out of the provi sector (where oil-levered
names increasingly have more to issue). We estimate that, all
else equal, Ottawa’s incremental net financing needs
(upwards of $25 billion/year in the coming two fiscal years)
8
could end up adding ~30 bps to 10-year Canada yields ,
although the nature and location of any additional federal supply
remains a key consideration.
7
5
We explored foreign investor flows in provincials in a recent paper:
https://www.nbc.ca/content/dam/bnc/en/rates-and-analysis/economicanalysis/government-credit-08jan2016.pdf
6
Foreign Flows and Their Effects on Government of Canada Yields:
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/san2015-1.pdf
Net foreign buying of Canadian bonds, short-term paper and/or equities
is by no means the sole avenue for financing a current account deficit.
Canada could, in theory, repatriate offshore investments. Net inflows
through the FDI and currency/deposit channels could also help do the
trick. Finally, it must be said that unreported flows oftentimes spawn
significant statistical discrepancies in balance of payments flows. These
data, particularly quarter-to-quarter tallies, tend to be a bit messy.
8
That finding is derived from our Fair Value Model for Canadian yields,
which is run by my Economics colleague Paul-André Pinsonnault.
3
ON TOPIC
In light of funding pressures in some provinces, international
issuance is likely to perk up. And by the looks of things,
Canadian banks remain eager to access funding in key foreign
markets. Ok, so there has been and will continue to be plenty of
bond supply (a non-trivial portion likely to be placed
internationally) and a sizeable hole in the current account to be
filled. You might say Canada’s message to foreign investors
remains the same: we need you! So what of demand?
9
reciting Canada’s relative advantages . Compared with the US,
Europe or other advanced countries/regions that at various times
looked a tad scary, Canada was, for a while, a beacon of light in
a stormy global sea.
Chart 8: C$ small slice of large pie
Currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves: 2015:Q3
Chart 7: Federal deficits = extra borrowing
Federal government budget balance
5
JPY
4
GBP
5
$bln
CAD
1.9
USD
64
0
CHF
0
AUD
2
-5
-10
EUR
20
-15
-20
Other
3
-25
-30
Apr-15 budget
NBF eco outlook
Nov-15 update
NBF w/ election stimulus
-35
2016-17
2017-18
Source: NBF, Government of Canada
DEMAND DEVELOPMENTS
For starters, note that over the first five years of this post-crisis
recovery, official FX reserves were fairly soaring, nearly doubling
from spring 2009 to summer 2014. In many cases, that was a
by-product of foreign government policies designed to limit
currency appreciation, and likewise reflected outsized wealth
accumulation in oil-producing jurisdictions—an explosion of
petrodollars. If you sense a positive correlation between oil
prices and FX reserves/SWF assets you wouldn’t be wrong.
Given the sheer explosion in the pool of global FX reserves,
some money was bound to flow into the Canadian market, and
that’s exactly what’s happened. Despite comprising a fairly
modest share of reserves, a snick under 2% of allocated
reserves (Chart 8), we estimate that the domestic value of FX
reserves allocated to Canada has tripled to $300 billion since the
crisis. But it wasn’t just central banks and sovereign wealth funds
on the bid; traditional asset managers, banks, insurers, pension
funds and even so-called “fast money” got in on the action too.
After all, with US QE sucking up stateside bond supply, many
investors were forced to seek out substitute assets. And for a
number of years, it was easy to see the attraction of Canada.
Indeed, if you were inclined to listen, you would have heard
political and corporate leaders, economists and strategists
Source: NBF, IMF | Note: Based on allocated reserves of US$6.6tln
While the global outlook remains turbulent, some of Canada’s
earlier advantages have faded. The economy moved from an
advanced country leader to a relative laggard. Canada’s
sovereign retains its gold-plated rating, with federal fiscal
sustainability still viewed as a strategic advantage relative to a
raft of more fiscally challenged countries. But provincial budget
balances and/or debt burdens in some cases leave a bit to be
desired, dragging the average credit quality of the provincial
market lower. Canadian banks rest on a strong capital
foundation, but after binging on cheap credit, household debt
levels and housing price valuations have sparked anxiety.
Meanwhile, a fundamental re-assessment of BoC-Fed overnight
rate expectations has erased Canada’s sovereign yield
advantage vs the US—another trigger for currency depreciation.
Complicating matters, the global reserve backdrop is evolving
notably. Relative to an August 2014 peak, the decline in
worldwide reserves amounts to US$1 trillion (Chart 9). Chinese
reserves, for instance, have contracted from roughly US$4 trillion
to $3.3 trillion (down 17%). You’ll also find disproportionately
rapid asset drawdowns in a number of oil-levered countries.
9
The story used to go like this: Canada boasted superior economic
performance (a resilient labour market, a housing market deemed
impervious to US-style weakness, less punishing demographics), a more
fiscally sustainable government sector (including one of the few truly
gold-plated sovereigns), the “soundest” banks in the world (we’ve lost
track of many straight years Canada has worn this crown…ok, it’s eight),
tremendous natural resource wealth (including a gusher of jobs, profits,
government royalties when oil was riding high), a yield advantage (over
the US and a long-list of advanced sovereigns), a currency deemed to
have more upside than downside potential, a relatively stable
institutional framework/political backdrop, and on and on.
4
ON TOPIC
capital flight
fundamentals
disruptive.
Chart 9: FX reserves roll over
Global official foreign exchange reserves
13
US$tln
Aug-2014
12
Consider a simplified example: assuming no change in relative
allocations, each US$1 trillion decline in global official FX
reserves could be expected to produce roughly US$20 billion in
net selling of Canadian assets, or closer to C$30 billion based on
current exchange rates. In many cases, prices would need to
adjust in order find new homes for the paper coming out,
pressure one might expect to be felt directly in Canadas, CMBs
and provincials, and indirectly in the corporate market.
11
10
9
8
7
6
Mar-2009
5
4
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Source: NBF, Bloomberg
Table 1: The 5 Ws
Who, what, when, where, why of foreign buying of Canadian securities
Who
—
Who was
buying?
What
—
What assets
were they
buying?
When
—
When were
they
buying?
Where
—
Where in
the market
was the
buying?
Why
—
Why were
they
buying?
or linked to deteriorating current account
in key oil-producing jurisdictions, can be
Net foreign buying has come from a variety of accounts and from most corners of the globe. The
official sector (central banks, SWFs) has been notably active in Canada, with some increasing
their allocation to C$ assets. Asset managers, pension/insurance companies and banks have
also increased their exposure to Canada (in a variety of currencies). Regionally, US-based
investors have accounted for two-thirds of the cumulative net buying of Canadian bonds since
2008. UK-based accounts have accounted for just over 20% of the net buying during the same
time period, but were the most active in 2015. There’s been net selling of Canadian bonds out of
continental Europe since 2008. Non-OECD countries, including China, have bought a net
$31bln of Canadian bonds since 2008, but have turned into net sellers of late.
Non-residents have accumulated a variety of financial assets since the crisis. Refer to Table 1
on page 6. Non-resident assets include currency/deposits, loans and accounts receivable, but
portfolio securities (stocks, short-term paper and bonds) have accounted for much of the net
buying since the crisis. While there has been net buying of Canadian money-market paper and
equities since 2008, foreign investors have put more of their money to work in Canadian bonds
issued in a variety of currencies. Indeed, bonds have accounted for roughly 75% of net foreign
buying of Canadian securities since 2008.
Non-residents have been net buyers of Canadian bonds (all currencies) each and every year
since 2001, but the scale of those purchases started to shoot higher in 2008. Net bond buying
has averaged roughly $70bln a year since then, hitting a record $106bln in 2010. With one
month of data still to come, note that 2015 produced another sizeable round of foreign
purchases of Canadian bonds ($82bln through Nov-15). For a time, Canadian money-market
paper saw large net foreign buying, particularly in 2008 and again in 2011-12. But there’s been
net foreign divestment of Canadian short-term paper over the past three years (on balance).
From a currency perspective, C$ bonds have accounted for one half of the net buying since
2008. But significant international issuance by the public and private sectors has resulted in a
net increase in non-resident holdings of Canadian bonds denominated in foreign currencies. Net
purchases of US$-denominated bonds moderated in 2015 as retirements piled up, with net
buying of other foreign currency denominated paper (notably euros) jumped. In the C$ bond
market, foreign holdings of the sovereign (GoC) have increased most notably ($130bln since the
end of 2007). But non-residents have also upped their C$ holdings of federal crowns ($50bln),
private corporations ($47bln) and provincial/municipal bonds ($43bln). Non-residents now own
>40% of publically available Canadas, and ~12% of domestic provincials.
Financing Canada’s current account deficit has required net foreign capital inflows. That’s still
the case, with NBF forecasting a two-year shortfall of $130bln during 2016-17. Net bond
issuance was in many cases skewed to parts of the yield curve and markets where international
investors were most active. For a time, Canada enjoyed a number of relative advantages,
appearing relatively more stable during the crisis and early years of recovery vis-à-vis the US
and Europe. Rapid growth in FX reserves/SWF balances also created a bid. Moreover, QE in
other parts of the world (notably the US) drove investors to seek alternative bond supply.
Source: NBF, incorporating info from StatCan and other sources
On the bright side, a still-deep pool of reserves provides armour
to deflect speculative attacks, reducing risks of a global currency
crisis. And to be fair, not all foreign investors are created equal;
a number of central banks, for instance, appear to have made a
long-term commitment to Canada and may be less inclined to
run for the hills. In fact, we have observed net buying from a
number of key “official” sector accounts of late, particularly in the
GoC market. Moreover, Canada is hardly alone in learning
that large-scale global reserve/asset liquidation, whether as
a consequence of defending a currency setting in the face of
Reduced bond market liquidity (which could be linked to a
changing regulatory environment) is another fly in the
ointment. The regulatory driven re-pricing of the repo
market has compromised liquidity avenues via hedge
funds/foreign fast money, eroding a key bond market shock
absorber. Meanwhile, changes in the provincial bond
issuance process, including the use of carve outs by some,
may have contributed to increased investor concentration
risk; in other words, it may be easier for investors (domestic or
foreign) to get large positions on than it is to divest in size. Also
noteworthy, proposed federal tax changes to synthetic equity
arrangements—the so-called equity TRS issue—could
reduce the domestic appetite for shorter-dated C$ bonds.
After all, financing a current account deficit gets more
problematic when domestic portfolio investors abandon their
10
home market and seek opportunities outside the country .
Overall, reduced liquidity could prove particularly problematic
should foreign investor repositioning take the form of active
secondary market selling. However, it must be said that foreign
divestment could be conducted more “passively”, for instance, by
simply failing to re-invest coupons/maturities.
Finding the new market clearing level
So where are we left? The current account deficit isn’t going
away, government fiscal metrics (on balance) are deteriorating,
total public sector funding needs are rising (in some cases
sharply), while corporate issuance is still elevated. Call it
incremental supply, if not an outright supply shock. Meanwhile,
underlying demand risks faltering, partly in response to Canadaspecific concerns, but also courtesy of policies being pursued by
foreign governments. More supply and less demand results in
lower prices for affected assets, including the Canadian
dollar, rates and credit.
All else equal then, the confluence of forces outlined above
would be consistent with higher underlying bond yields in
Canada (despite a near-zero overnight rate), a widening of
10
Nov-2015 produced record net buying of foreign portfolio securities by
Canadian investors. This capital outflow helped spark currency
weakness, which likely carried over into December and early January.
5
ON TOPIC
Canada-US yields (i.e., less negative spreads), narrower or even
negative swap spreads, and wide(r) credit spreads (even for
issuers like Ontario that possess a relatively more constructive
economic/fiscal/financing outlook).
In sum, you might consider Canada’s leverage to foreign capital
as something of a wildcard for the country’s debt issuers, a
notable driver of relative valuations and a potential source of
market volatility, given the evolving regulatory climate and
generally constrained market liquidity. The irony is that Canada
is likely to become even more exposed to foreign investors
in the years ahead, even if underlying demand for our
assets isn’t what it used to be.
Canada isn’t exactly surrendering its financial autonomy to asset
managers in New York, London, Tokyo or other foreign money
centres. But don’t be surprised if foreign investor attitudes and
policy developments in faraway corners of the world exert
disproportionate influence on Canadian markets in the year(s)
ahead. As we’ve previously warned, these foreign flows can
trump domestic fundamentals and look to add incremental
volatility to a liquidity constrained market.
Warren Lovely
Managing Director,
Head of Public Sector Research and Strategy
warren.lovely@nbc.ca
6
ON TOPIC
Table 1: What type of Canadian financial assets do non-residents hold?
National balance sheet accounts: Non-resident holdings of Canadian financial assets (book value)
2015:Q3
Yr/Yr change
Chg vs 2007:Q3
Book value
C$bln
C$bln
%
C$bln
%
Total financial assets
2,898
+437
14
+1,496
95
121
Currency & deposits
230
+84
42
+149
1,106
+165
16
+707
151
Canadian short-term paper
89
+8
-8
+67
193
Government of Canada
28
-4
-24
+17
123
Other
61
+13
5
+49
257
1,016
+156
18
+640
148
Government of Canada
165
+26
10
+123
275
Provincial & territorial gov't
166
+3
11
+78
87
7
+1
3
+3
69
678
+127
23
+436
151
Loans
599
+109
14
+290
82
Equity & investment fund shares
885
+74
10
+352
70
Other accounts receivable
78
+5
-1
-1
-9
Debt securities
Canadian bonds
Local gov't
Other
Source: NBF, Statistics Canada
Table 2: A closer look at domestic/foreign holdings of Canadian bonds
National balance sheet accounts: Holdings of Canadian bonds/debentures by sector (market value)
As at 2015:Q3
Change since 2007:Q3
Market value
C$bln
Share (%)
C$bln
Share (%)
Total
3,227
100
1,467
100
Domestic investors
2,171
67
798
54
Private sector
1,628
50
567
39
8
Banks
292
9
119
Insurers
341
11
90
6
Pension funds
497
15
219
15
M utual funds
269
8
131
9
Other
229
7
9
1
543
17
230
16
Public sector
M onetary authority/GoC
79
2
42
3
Provincial/local gov'ts
150
5
31
2
Gov't business enterprises
252
8
139
9
Social security funds
63
2
18
1
1,057
33
669
46
Non-residents
Source: NBF, Statistics Canada
7
ON TOPIC
Table 3: An historical perspective on net foreign buying/(selling) of Canadian securities
Net foreign investment in Canadian securities by year & category (C$billions)
All
Year
Money-
securities mkt paper
Bonds
By issuer type
Total
Fed govt
Fed GBEs Provi/muni
By currency
Corp
C$
By country
US$
Other
Equity &
US
Other
inv't funds
35.2
2000
15.6
0.8
-20.5
-19.1
-1.0
-10.0
1.2
-10.7
-3.7
-6.1
-8.1
-12.4
2001
39.2
-7.4
42.5
-5.6
2.0
-1.2
49.5
-5.0
42.4
5.0
42.9
-0.5
4.1
2002
20.7
1.8
20.4
5.3
11.3
-2.1
6.9
15.1
6.2
-0.9
23.6
-3.2
-1.5
2003
19.6
-1.6
7.7
-19.2
12.3
-1.7
16.4
-5.5
7.7
5.6
2.9
4.8
13.5
2004
56.2
0.5
20.0
-3.4
10.9
-0.4
13.2
11.9
13.1
-4.9
20.2
-0.1
35.7
2005
13.6
0.5
3.9
-1.2
5.3
5.1
0.6
0.5
-3.9
7.3
-8.3
12.2
9.1
2006
31.2
3.7
16.7
0.6
10.4
1.1
5.6
12.0
2.3
2.4
10.9
5.8
10.8
2007
-26.7
-1.1
16.5
-8.4
11.2
-6.0
14.3
5.4
8.2
2.8
3.2
13.3
-42.0
2008
39.2
11.1
25.3
1.4
8.1
2.6
18.0
9.9
10.1
5.3
14.5
10.8
2.7
2009
112.7
0.7
85.8
42.2
11.9
15.4
32.0
40.5
39.4
5.9
63.9
21.9
26.2
2010
127.7
3.2
106.3
61.4
6.2
20.3
38.7
66.8
39.1
0.3
78.3
28.0
18.2
2011
121.6
32.0
68.4
28.6
6.8
13.9
33.3
44.2
28.5
-4.2
58.3
10.1
21.1
2012
98.9
13.3
84.6
48.5
1.9
14.5
33.3
50.2
42.3
-7.8
66.4
18.2
1.0
2013
51.4
-2.5
35.0
-8.2
4.5
-2.9
38.5
5.1
22.9
7.0
25.8
9.2
18.9
2014
75.4
-2.8
52.9
2.6
11.8
8.5
38.7
13.0
7.4
32.5
13.5
39.5
25.2
2015*
96.6
3.3
81.8
24.5
16.2
-8.8
40.9
44.1
7.8
30.0
28.3
53.5
11.4
Source: NBF, Statistics Canada | Notes: Figures for 2015 cover Jan-Nov; "Provi/muni" includes provincial GBEs; "Corp" refers to private corporations only (i.e., excludes GBEs)
8
ON TOPIC
ECONOMICS AND STRATEGY
Montreal Office
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416-869-8598
Stéfane Marion
Marc Pinsonneault
Warren Lovely
Chief Economist & Strategist
Senior Economist
MD, Public Sector Research and Strategy
stefane.marion@nbc.ca
marc.pinsonneault@nbc.ca
warren.lovely@nbc.ca
Paul-André Pinsonnault
Matthieu Arseneau
Senior Fixed Income Economist
Senior Economist
paulandre.pinsonnault@nbc.ca
matthieu.arseneau@nbc.ca
Krishen Rangasamy
Angelo Katsoras
Senior Economist
Geopolitical Associate Analyst
krishen.rangasamy@nbc.ca
angelo.katsoras@nbc.ca
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