Faculty of Arts and Philosophy
Academic period 2013-2014
THE VIETNAM WAR
WAS THE PRICE TOO HIGH FOR THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA?
VY THI BICH NGUYEN
Promoter: Prof. Dr. Ken Kennard
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the academic degree of
Master Program in American Studies
EXPRESION OF THANKS
First of all, my thesis would not have taken its shape without the great encouragement and
support of Professor Ken Kennard, my supervisor. Thus, my great appreciation is extended to
him, who spends a lot of time and care counseling and revising my work and gives me many
previous comments so that I could complete it on time.
Then, I would like to express my sincere gratitude towards all of the professors of the Master
Program of American Studies, who have brought me this invaluable opportunity to acquire
deeper knowledge of the fields in which I have long been interested. Their detailed and careful
guidance and responsibility provide me a warm and professional learning environment where I
could gain plenty of first-hand experience throughout the courses offered.
Last but not least, my thanks would also go to my family and my friends for their care and
assistance during the year. Without them, I could not have finished my master program in
Belgium and built up this intimate international friendship.
In brief, all of you are due for my deep gratitude.
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXPRESION OF THANKS ................................................................................... 2
1. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 4
2. INTERNAL PRICE .......................................................................................... 8
2.1 Money Cannot Buy Victory: An American War-Torn Economy ..................................... 8
2.2 The Invisible 17th Parallel Within American Society ...................................................... 13
2.3 The Other War in Washington ......................................................................................... 22
2.4 A Traumatized Nation – Impacts On American Psyche .................................................. 30
3. EXTERNAL PRICE ....................................................................................... 39
3.1 The Illusory Victory – The Illusory Prestige ................................................................... 39
3.2 American power: An End or a Change? .......................................................................... 44
4. CONCLUSION................................................................................................ 48
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................. 52
3
1. INTRODUCTION
In the memory of most Americans who were involved directly or indirectly in the Vietnam
War, Vietnam became much more than a country or a conflict;1 it became a metaphor for a
very unhappy chapter in American history. It reminded people of the very moment when the
United States lost its own values and beliefs. Moreover, Americans have not forgotten the
image of the last helicopter’s departure from Saigon on 30 April 1975, a glaring symbol of
American failure.2 Subsequently, the blame for the Vietnam disaster has been laid firmly at the
government’s door; yet, the costs for this defeat were not always understood. However, the
impacts of this war have remained all-pervasive. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter objected to
normalizing the relations with Vietnam, saying that the destruction had been mutual. His view
was later echoed by William S. Cohen, the incumbent Secretary of Defense, who paid a visit to
Vietnam to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the end of the conflict. Cohen pointedly
refused to apologize for the U.S. military action in Vietnam, explaining: “Both nations were
scarred by this. They, the Vietnamese, have their own scars from the war. We certainly have
ours.”3 Their common perception presents us with the unpalatable truth that the war was
equally destructive for the United States as it was for Vietnam. In other words, for Americans,
the effects of the war have reverberated throughout the nation over time and are now
considered as the price that the United States clearly continues to pay for its gross misconduct
in Vietnam decades ago.
More often, the war’s damage has only been associated with a ravaged Vietnam, which
was known to the world as having paid an enormous price for their eventual victory. 4
Frightening scenes during the conflict were televised prominently and later depicted in various
American movies, books and photographs. Yet, that was only one side of the sad story about
the Vietnam War. The other painful part stayed within the U.S. Although the images of
America as an exhausted nation, badly devastated by the war were blurred and outnumbered by
those of Vietnam, the war indeed had wounded the nation in many ways, visibly and
1
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War.
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 342.
2
Ibid., 343.
3
Bob Buzzanco, 25 Years After End Of Vietnam War: Myths Keep Us From Coming To Terms With
Vietnam. Common Dreams, 17 Apr. 2000. Accessed June 11, 2014.
http://www.commondreams.org/views/041700-106.htm
4
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War.
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 340.
4
intangibly, internally and externally, immediately and lingeringly. Recollections of those
gloomy days in Vietnam could hardly lie dormant in the minds of whoever was involved and
inevitably scarred by the war. Nonetheless, not everyone has thoroughly understood what came
out of the war as the immediate and long-term consequences for the U.S.
Much has been debated on the reasons and legacies of this disaster. Accordingly, the
results of this fiasco have also been extensively written down in American historical record as a
very hard lesson. The Vietnam War was also a defining psychological moment as it exposed
U.S. vulnerability for the very first time. Americans became aware that power alone was not
enough to win the war. Money, manpower and even technology could not bring back victory
for the Americans. For this reason, the Vietnam failure assumed great importance in American
story. The question of how this war could turn the U.S. into a domestically war-wrecked nation
that was vulnerable to international affairs has continued to interest many historians, politicians
and observers. Internally, it shook the domestic stability and pushed the nation into a serious
economic and political downturn. Externally, the failure not only lowered American global
prestige, but it also marked the decline of American power as a leading nation, the end of the
American era. Though the United States still held on to its peak position of power after
Vietnam, it had been seriously wounded by Vietnam. The United States then became identified
with weakness. Consequently, this once most powerful nation began showing numerous signs
of war-weariness, exhaustion, divisiveness and insecurity. Therefore, it is worth considering
whether both internal and external repercussions were too heavy a price for the United States to
pay.
Hence, in this paper, the focus will be on both this internal and external price that the
United States has paid and continues to pay for their conduct in Vietnam. These effects not
only emerged immediately after the end of the war but had appeared as soon as the Vietnam
commitment commenced. In the first section, we will discuss the internal problems the U.S.
encountered because of the conflict. Economically, the changing policies that five successive
presidents pursued in Vietnam were mainly at the expense of the federal budget. Having
suffered a huge budget deficit owing to the excess of money wasted on the war, the domestic
economy became destabilized. In return, this financial policy was hurting profits, creating labor
unrest, and fueling inflation in the U.S.5 Ironically, the United States was pumping billions of
U.S. dollars into a country whose existence was merely in name, only to bring back home
economic chaos, drain its financial power, and cripple its own economy for many decades
5
Ibid., 261.
5
afterwards.6 Thus, in terms of the economy, American policy culminated in an exorbitant loss.
Besides, socially, the Vietnam War was probably the prime cause for American domestic
disorder. As the war escalated, shifts of perspective among people appeared and social disunity
ensued. Many backlashes and anti-war movements were initiated among students who mainly
opposed to the excessive conscriptions. These waves of protest somehow stimulated thoughtful
people to reconsider the “righteousness” of American involvement in this conflict.7 People
started to question the morality of the war.8 Additionally, for the first time the media presented
to the people the harsh and real truths behind the war.9 The public became better informed as to
a larger degree about what was going on at the war front, which often challenged the narrative
that was being released by the U.S. government. As a result, doubts were cast on the
justifiability and urgency of American military action in the name of national security.
Hence, this became the most divisive war in American history.10 Society imploded,
public confidence eroded, and the price of humanity exceeded the limit of tolerance.
Politically, fighting two wars simultaneously, one in Vietnam and the other inside Washington,
American leaders were unavoidably undergoing extreme tensions and frustration. Public
outrage and dissatisfaction with what their government was doing considerably added to the
already unbearable pressure among the Cabinet members and other high-ranking officials who
were responsible for the decision-making to steer the nation to victory. When news was
released about successive increases in troop number, yet without signs of progress, the
presumed light of victory at the end of the tunnel became ever dimmer and illusory. Towards
the end of the 1960s, as the United Stated fell deeper into the war, patience was lost and
mistrust widespread. Particularly, as U.S. Presidents were held responsible for the
disinformation of the war and later scornfully exposed as liars, this was a profound shock to
many Americans. This resulted ultimately in the unprecedented transfer of power from the
executive branch to the legislative branch. The imperial presidency was over. It signaled
change in the White House and henceforth foreign policy became intertwined with the Vietnam
6
Ibid., 339.
Ibid., 263.
8
What Effects Did the Vietnam War Have on American Society? StudyMode.com. April 2004. Accessed
June 06, 2014.
http://www.studymode.com/essays/What-Effects-Did-The-Vietnam-War-45611.html
9
Kroes, Rob. "Mediated History: The Vietnam War as a Media Event." If you've seen one, you've seen
the mall: Europeans and American mass culture. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996.),113.
10
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War.
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 342.
7
6
syndrome.11 Psychologically, scars of the war kept haunting and traumatizing Americans for
decades. For those who directly fought in Vietnam, the experiences and its obsession continued
to haunt them in their daily lives.12 For the young generations, this war was a valuable lesson
about American values and characteristics. Notably, the failure was so serious an attack on the
notion of power and exceptionalism that had underpinned American life throughout history.
In large part, the impacts of this war were on domestic affairs. However, since foreign
policy is an extension of domestic policy, whatever happened in domestic area inevitably
affected the U.S. involvement in foreign affairs. Therefore, the second section will concentrate
on how the war affected the United States in connection to its international front. After
Vietnam, it became clear that the U.S. failed to fulfill its mission of bringing peace to the
world, which shook its worldwide position and prestige. As depicted in the words of Defense
Secretary McNamara, the continuation of Vietnam policy was “the continuation of American
slide down the slippery slope”.13 Coincidentally, this statement also foreshadowed the slope of
international power that the United States had always been top-ranked. This miscalculation
drove the nation into a new postwar era in which the American global role became restricted as
U.S. power declined.
11
Max Boot, The Incurable Vietnam Syndrome. The Weekly Standard 15, No 5. October 19, 2009.
Accessed June 20, 2014.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/017/059wcvib.asp?pg=1
12
Clyde Haberman, Agent Orange’s Long Legacy, for Vietnam and Veterans. The New York Times. May
11, 2014. Accessed June 18, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/12/us/agent-oranges-long-legacyfor-vietnam-and-veterans.html
13
Robert S. McNamara, and Brian VanDeMark. In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam. ed.
(New York: Vintage Books, A division of Random House, Inc., 1995), 125.
7
2. INTERNAL PRICE
2.1 Money Cannot Buy Victory: An American War-Torn Economy
As for the exorbitant price the U.S. had to pay for its involvement in Vietnam, it did not have
to wait until the final stage of the war to see all the damaging repercussions of this war. In this
way, the destruction of the U.S. economy had already taken place even before the war came to
an official end. The entire war cost an estimated $140 billion,14 creating an exhausted and
vulnerable economy in the end. Yet, no matter how much money the U.S. spent on the war, it
was never able to buy victory at home as planned. One of the reasons was because funds were
allocated not only for the sustainability of the contemporary huge standing army at home but
also for the maintenance of the puppet government in South Vietnam. The large financial
resource was mobilized to mainly invest in a fictitious South Vietnam whose existence and
longevity was not based on nationhood but on American money. Interestingly, in 1960s,
American victory almost depended on the capacity of this ‘invented nation’ to fight against
North Vietnam. This explained why up to 78 percent of the Vietnam budget was set aside for
the military-building while only 2 percent went for welfares, health and education.15 Yet, this
was obviously a hopeless fight. In the 1940s and 1950s, the U.S. had already spent a great
amount of budget subsidizing the French in their Indochina War, for example $785 million in
1953 alone.16 Then in the 1960s, having mistakenly put money into the incompetent hands of
the South Vietnamese government, the United States could not escape the financial loss in the
end. This triggered serious economic woes to the U.S. during the conflict, including an
unbalanced economic production, the dwindling consumer’s confidence, and the huge budget
deficit. These factors partly accounted for the economic crisis and energy vulnerability in the
1970s.17
Contextually, considered as one of the prosperous decades in American history, the
early 1960s was passing through the phase of affluence and high growth that preceded another
14
Harvard Sitkoff, Post War Impact of Vietnam, Modern American Poetry, n.d. Accessed 9 June 2014.
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/postwar.htm
15
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War.
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 198.
16
Ibid., 198.
17
Rexy. How much did the Vietnam War cost? The Vietnam War.Info. January 22, 2014. Accessed June
16, 2014. http://thevietnamwar.info/how-much-vietnam-war-cost/
8
economic boom. Yet, the late 1960s witnessed a surprisingly rapid downturn in the economy,
coinciding with the years the Vietnam War escalation began in earnest.18 This suggested that
among many unavoidable factors causing a slowdown as the very nature of the economy cycle,
the Vietnam War did give a significant contribution to the decline of American economy. This
decline continued and finally culminated with the economic crisis in the 1970s and as a result
weakened American economic power in the world.19 This unsettled most Americans as it
contradicted to their post-war consensus that economic boom would return as in the 1950s and
early 1960s. Triumphant experiences in fighting many wars in history, especially in the two
world wars against more powerful enemies, had boosted Americans’ confidence that victory
was well within grasp and another boom was around the corner. Owing to this post-war
consensus, the majority of Americans probably did not view the U.S. involvement in another
war as a matter of major concern. Unfortunately, the Vietnam War turned out to be a complete
difference. The longer the United States spent time in Vietnam, the more severely its economy
was hurt by the war. Unlike Vietnam, whose economy almost inescapably collapsed because
the whole country turned into the battlefield shattered by American constant bombings, the
United States ironically hurt itself in the pursuit of global security. While being the first to
blame for paralyzing the Vietnamese economy, the U.S. was to blame again for its ailing
economy till many subsequent decades. There were many ways the economy was driven for the
benefit of the war.
Firstly, the military overproduction, which was regulated for the purpose of sustaining
the war, played a major part in causing an unbalanced economy.20 Since the United States was
sinking deeper into the mire of Vietnam, the escalation policy led to both an increase in the
manpower, further requirements in the number of military weapons, and more demands for the
mass production of weaponry. A full-scale war economy would also mean a transition in the
industrial sectors. As Williams concluded, “a growing portion of the industrial capacity and
labor power of the economy had to be devoted to meeting the growing needs of the war.”21 The
18
Sam Williams, The U.S Economy in the Wake of the Economic Crisis of 1957-61, A Critique of Crisis
Theory. Wordpress. January 5, 2009. Accessed June 9, 2014
http://critiqueofcrisistheory.wordpress.com/the-five-industrial-cycles-since-1945/the-u-s-economy-in-thewake-of-the-economic-crisis-of-1957-61/
19
Vietnam War and American Economy. Historycentral.com. Accessed June 27, 2014.
http://www.historycentral.com/sixty/Economics/Vietnam.html
20
Ibid.
21
Sam Williams, The U.S Economy in the Wake of the Economic Crisis of 1957-61, A Critique of Crisis
Theory. Wordpress. January 5, 2009. Accessed June 9, 2014
http://critiqueofcrisistheory.wordpress.com/the-five-industrial-cycles-since-1945/the-u-s-economy-in-thewake-of-the-economic-crisis-of-1957-61/
9
economy was thus occupied with producing weapons instead of basic necessities for the
domestic market. Factories that used to produce consumer goods were now converted to
manufacturing war-related materials.22 A balance on both military and consumer’s domestic
demands at the same time would provide an uphill task that the economy could hardly sustain.
Since military power was a demonstration of American might in both wartime and peace time,
and was vital for the U.S to sustain the war, cutting down the military expenditure at the war’s
peak seemed defeatist. In this case, the United States seemed to have no better option than
running an economy that centered on war production. The increasing requirement of the war
efforts especially when the ground war was waged after 1964 added higher tension and burden
to the manufactures.23 Certainly, a focus on the urgent military demands would simultaneously
entail a sacrifice of domestic demand at the time. The quantity of consumer goods produced
annually had to be shortened to make room for the war-related production. Also, fighting in a
backward and impoverished country, American troops and military personnel had to live on
American goods for their basic necessities including food and medicines. These products were
prioritized to send for American men on the battlefield. In return, the outcome was a shortage
of goods to meet domestic demands that spurred a price rise in the market and the flow of
imported goods. People frustrated and consumer confidence shrank. In the long-run, a
reduction in the consumer-capacity was well within sight.
Secondly, the policy of increasing military and economic support that Kennedy and
Johnson adopted undoubtedly added to the already “high level of Cold War military
expenditures.”24 Military spending had very often occupied a significant part in the national
budget under many Presidents. During Eisenhower years, nuclear weapon became the focus of
American national security policy. His emphasis on this massive destruction weapon, though
actually did not lead to the drastic reduction in military spending, still cost cheaper than the
standing army. Thus, defense budget was cut by 27 percent during his tenure. 25 As every raw
material and manpower serving in the military field was at the expense of the domestic
22
Rexy. How much did the Vietnam War cost? The Vietnam War.Info, January 22, 2014. Accessed June
16, 2014. http://thevietnamwar.info/how-much-vietnam-war-cost/
23
McNamara, Robert S., and Brian VanDeMark. In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam. ed.
(New York: Vintage Books, A division of Random House, Inc., 1995), 127.
24
Sam Williams, The U.S Economy in the Wake of the Economic Crisis of 1957-61, A Critique of Crisis
Theory. Wordpress. January 5, 2009. Accessed June 9, 2014
http://critiqueofcrisistheory.wordpress.com/the-five-industrial-cycles-since-1945/the-u-s-economy-in-thewake-of-the-economic-crisis-of-1957-61/
25
Lawrence J.Korb, Laura Conley, and Alex Rothlan, A Historical Perspective on Defense Budgets.
Center For American Progress. July 6, 2011. Accessed June 28, 2014.
http://americanprogress.org/issues/budget/news/2011/07/06/10041/a-historical-perspective-on-defensebudgets/
10
economy, Eisenhower reassured the nation that he would not spend even one penny less or
more than necessary to maintain national security. But still, American military spending
remained high. Under Kennedy and Johnson presidencies, the postwar economic success in the
previous decades could not afford the period of war escalation, particularly when the two
Presidents devoted themselves to constructing a better American society. Both men spent great
time and effort on their cherished domestic programs of the New Frontier and the Great
Society, which required a considerable amount of federal budget.26 As John Whiteclay argued,
“Johnson’s decision to finance the major war and the Great Society simultaneously ravaged the
economy.”27 Meanwhile, the President’s reluctance to ask Congress for a tax increase in the
course of pursuing a balanced budget further worsened the federal debt.28 While basic expenses
on social and welfare must be maintained, a substantial amount of money spent on weaponry
made the large budget deficit apparent. Therefore, American economy underwent a steady
downturn until reaching crisis in the following decade.
However, as explained, the United States seemed to have ‘no choice’ but continue to
shoulder the financial burden that it had taken up in the beginning. In the late 1960s up to the
early 1970s, consecutive requests for more troops certainly involved increases in the federal
budget. By 1967, expenditures were already in excess of $2 billion per month.29 An additional
200,000 troops in that year certainly required further mobilization of reserves. This also meant
spending another $10 billion annually on the war.30 Upon the near collapse of the South
Vietnamese government in 1965, more U.S. troops were sent there to fill the vacuum.31 For this
reason, by January 1973, there were more than 540,000 troops in Vietnam compared to 81,000
in 1965.32 This accounted for a constant sharp rise in funding to keep the large standing army
in a remote country. Eventually, it was estimated that $111 billion military cost for war-related
26
The Great Society. Encyclopedia.com. Accessed June 28, 2014.
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/The_Great_Society.aspx
27
John Whiteclay Chambers. The Oxford Companion to American Military History, (Oxford University
Press, 2000), 766.
http://books.google.be/books/about/The_Oxford_Companion_to_American_Militar.html
28
Melvin Small, The Domestic Course of the War, Modern American Poetry, n.d. Accessed June 9, 2014.
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/domestic.htm
29
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War.
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 339.
30
Robert S. McNamara and Brian VanDeMark. In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam. ed.
(New York: Vintage Books, A division of Random House, Inc., 1995), 265.
31
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War.
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 340.
32
Ibid., 321.
11
operations and another $25 billion economic and military aid to Saigon regime.33 Where was
that additional amount taken from if not partly from the reduction of domestic expenses?
Actually, in dealing with the overheating of the economy, in 1965, Johnson’s economic
advisers had proposed an increase in taxation to help pay for the increasingly expensive war
abroad and the possibility of a double-digit inflation in the economy. Yet, fearing that this
taxation would politically affect his ambitious Great Society, the President delayed taking up
that advice until late 1968, which turned out too late.34 Until then, he could neither save the
prevailing unbalanced economy from a downturn that loomed ahead, nor realize his domestic
ambition. As Martin Luther King bitterly concluded, “The Great Society has been shot down
on the battlefields of Vietnam.”35 Owing to the massive spending on war, President Nixon
inherited from Johnson an economy surrounded by troubles and difficulties. Surprisingly,
during his tenure, although Congress refused an increase in financial aid to South Vietnam,
Nixon still committed another $13 billion budget to the Vietnam policy.36
Besides those direct and immediate impacts on the domestic economy, the United
States also went through the currency crisis and Oil Crisis in the early 1970s. The OPEC
nations unanimously increased oil price and imposed oil embargo against the United States
right at the time the American economy was getting more fragile.37 The oil shortage was soon
followed by a sharp rise in the food price. Domestic inflation was sparked off. Moreover, after
the Second World War, the Bretton Woods system established a relationship between dollar
and gold. When the U.S. had to pour billions of money into the system to feed their ‘invented
nation’ in Vietnam, huge money needed printing. This growing expansion on money supply led
to the devaluation of the dollar and consequently shook the previously established relationship.
In the early 1970s, changes in the international market suggested that the system would no
longer be sustainable.38 Under international pressure, the United States unilaterally abandoned
33
Rexy. How much did the Vietnam War cost? The Vietnam War.Info. January 22, 2014. Accessed June
16, 2014.
http://thevietnamwar.info/how-much-vietnam-war-cost/
34
Melvin Small, The Domestic Course of the War, Modern American Poetry, n.d. Accessed June 9, 2014.
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/domestic.htm
35
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War.
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 250.
36
W. Scott Thompson, The Lessons of Vietnam, (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), 6.
37
Terry Macalister, Background: What caused the 1970s Oil Price Shock?, The Guardian. March 3,
2011. Accessed June 29, 2014.
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/mar/03/1970s-oil-price-shock
38
Ibid.
12
this system in 1971.39 The loss of the U.S. Dollar’s value, together with the effect of the Yom
Kippur war in 1974 that resulted in the oil embargo, had indeed threatened American economic
security.40 These setbacks originated from the United States’ policies of war escalation and
Americanization. Without having to finance the war, there might have been no urgent need for
large money supply, no dollar crisis and probably no quick collapse of the system. Instead, that
war expenditure could be spared for domestic investment to secure the economy from
international pressure. Economic vulnerability somehow diminished American strength in the
international market.
Generally, devoting to a war economy turned out to be an unwise investment. It clearly
produced more losses than gains. Unfortunately, the American government and its economy
seemed stuck in the evidently complicated situation. The excessive capital wasted overseas
annually did not generate any real profit to the American economy. Instead, it widened the
already sizable budget deficit. The duration of the war was the key factor. The United States
heavily subsidized its infant regime in South Vietnam while being ironically incapable of
stabilizing its own domestic economy. Fighting a far-off war that inflicted huge economic
instability at home turned out a serious miscalculation which the United States might not have
fully anticipated and thus, could not avoid. How could the U.S. bring stability to other nations
while still struggling with its own affairs? How could the U.S. strengthen South Vietnam to
make it able to stand on its own feet while failing to stay firm domestically? Eventually, what it
got in return was not an economically independent government but an exhausted domestic
economy burdened with another financial dependency in South Vietnam.
2.2 The Invisible 17th Parallel Within American Society
Socially, the Vietnam War also had an immeasurable effect on the United States, which
apparently shattered American unity as never before.41 During the war, there was a creeping
conversion of American perception upon American role in Vietnam. Public support for the war
39
Nick Beams, When The Bretton Woods System Collapsed World Socialist Website. August 16, 2001.
Accessed June 29, 2014.
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2001/08/bw-a16.html
40
Ron Hera, The War at the end of the Dollar, Financial Sense, 4 Dec. 2012. Accessed June 9, 2014.
http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/ron-hera/the-war-at-the-end-of-the-dollar
41
SparkNotes Editors. SparkNote on The Vietnam War (1945–1975). SparkNotes.com. SparkNotes LLC.
2005. Accessed 29 May 2014.
http://www.sparknotes.com/history/american/vietnamwar/context.html
13
was under the sway of political leaders, remaining strong in the beginning, gradually declining
and later transforming into frustration, distrust and oppositions. Also, the huge price of
humanity in this war challenged the moral aspect and justifiability of American action,
especially when disinformation was exposed at the peak of the war, largely thanks to the
media.
During Truman and Eisenhower presidencies, under the dire threat of Communism, the
United States adopted the containment policy for the national security. The Korean War was
one of the first showdowns of this policy. In the 1950s and early 1960s, American people were
almost unanimously behind their Presidents over the Southeast Asian issue. American opinion
showed a particular unity with respect to the need to contain Communism.42 This resulted from
the fact that Americans were living through the communist fear for decades. Especially in the
1950s, McCarthyism left Americans so fearful that they soon decided to encourage their
government to put all effort to contain Communism and therefore, believed that defending
South Vietnam was in the national interest.43 They were convinced by their government that
the Vietnam War was to block the communist flow into South Vietnam from the North,44 and
that protecting South Vietnam from being conquered by the Communist forces equaled to
protecting the United States and the West from communist aggression. A breakaway from
government stance would be deemed as either disloyalty or pro-Communism.45 Moreover,
events of the Tonkin Resolution in 1964 was another perfect catalyst that bolstered support
from both the public and Congress. Johnson was granted full authority to do whatever he
assumed appropriate in the ensuing years to sustain and win the war. Americans gave their
government absolute confidence and responsibility to release people from their communist
fear.46 A Harris survey reported that 70% of American people approved the ground war,
assuming that the United States should take its stand against communist expansion in Asia.
Yet, containment was the only goal of the war that these interviewees knew. Indeed, in 1965,
most Americans had little knowledge of the war and how to win it.47 Thus, results of the survey
were not solid enough to justify American action but only showed a fact that their fear of
42
David Kaiser, American tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War, (Cambridge,
Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2000), 1.
43
UShistory.org. The Antiwar Movement. U.S. History Online Textbook .2014. Accessed June 13, 2014.
http://www.ushistory.org/us/55d.asp
44
David L. Anderson, and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 245.
45
Ibid., 245.
46
Ibid., 249.
47
Ibid., 249.
14
Communism in the 1950s was so pervasive. This fear explained why “public support for the
war appeared firmer than ever, although they knew that the fighting would go on for several
years.”48
Another reason why Americans maintained strong approval for the war was because of
the disinformation intentionally released to them. People were ill-informed, uninformed or
even misinformed during the conflict. The political turmoil in South Vietnam did not augur
well for the American future in Vietnam. Social unrest provoked boiling resentment of the
populace on the American-controlled government. This concurrently illustrated that the
American military advisers and troops had failed to maintain order and stability for that
newborn government. Hence, the fundamental purpose for sending huge political and financial
support came to nothing. When news about the protests, the political social backlashes in South
Vietnam and its incompetent government reached home in details, American people were left
with the feelings that their men were not achieving the success or progress that had previously
been sold to the public. The image of the self-immolation of a Buddhist monk in 1963 to
protest Diem government foreshadowed a political mess that could hardly be tidied up by
military alone as American officials had wrongly assumed.49 Images of other following selfimmolations had profound effects on both Vietnamese and Americans. Indeed, this event of
1960 cleared the way for series of subsequent waves of movement within the U.S. At least
eight Americans set themselves ablaze to protest the war within five years from 1965-1970.50
Notably, people were once again stunned in 1965 when Norman Morrison set himself on fire to
“express his concern over the great loss of life and human suffering in Vietnam.”51 He died in
the hope that his cries would not go unheard.52 Actually, their deaths sounded urgent alarm
about the horrors of the war. Together with news released about U.S. political failure in South
Vietnam, Americans were sharply divided among themselves and started to stage protests. 53 As
48
McNamara, Robert S., and Brian VanDeMark, In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam, ed.
(New York: Vintage Books, A division of Random House, Inc., 1995), 208.
49
Ibid., 209.
50
Michelle Murray Yang, Still Burning: Self-Immolation as Photographic Protest. (Quaterly Journal of
Speech 1: 1-25. Accessed June 12, 2014), 4.
http://advocacyethicsanddesign.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/murray-yang-still-burning.pdf
51
Robert S. McNamara, and Brian VanDeMark, In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam, ed.
(New York: Vintage Books, A division of Random House, Inc., 1995), 216.
52
Michelle Murray Yang, Still Burning: Self-Immolation as Photographic Protest. (Quaterly Journal of
Speech 1: 1-25. Accessed June 12, 2014), 4.
http://advocacyethicsanddesign.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/murray-yang-still-burning.pdf
53
Rob Kroes, "Mediated History: The Vietnam War as a Media Event." If you've seen one, you've seen
the mall: Europeans and American mass culture, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996), 113.
15
a result, while trying to deal with increasingly violent and political backlashes in South
Vietnam, the federal government concurrently faced many protests mounting across the nation.
Particularly, in the aftermath of the 1965 bombing policy Operation Rolling Thunder to
blast Hanoi to the point of national disaster, signs of protests rapidly emerged, mainly on
university campuses. Peace movements arrived in Washington in 1965, calling on officials to
end, not to extend the war.54 Forms of protest were not limited to marching. Alongside the Free
Speech Movement, broad revolts were led by college and university students across the land to
voice their moral objection to the other part of society which supported the war, Johnson’s
escalation policy and the rising draft calls.55 The “Vietnam Day” held at Berkeley in October
1965 drew thousands of students who gathered to freely voice their opinion. There, they
sparked off debates on the moral basis of the war. These intellectual gatherings played as a
ground where information and intelligence of the war were spread and drew nationwide
attention.56 Unfortunately, they practically made no impact on the administration, while in
return being considered as rebels or pro-Communists.57
With public support remaining strong, Johnson quietly changed his policy to
Americanize the war, to clear the way for an easy and certain victory, without having to ask for
further Congressional approval.58 As the American role in South Vietnam enlarged, so did the
number of American troops. It entailed constant increases in conscriptions at home, which were
clearly unfair to the minorities who were ineligible for deferments.59 In the course of the civil
right movement, these drafts intensified the frustration of the minority group over the
government. Much to the African American disappointment, the unfair conscription was just
another racial discrimination that fueled the antiwar movement that was spreading around the
nation. The seed of this movement began to sprout rapidly into an unstoppable force,
pressuring American leaders about the Vietnam commitment.60 The scope of the movement
seemingly corresponded with escalation of U.S. troops in Vietnam. The first march to
54
David L. Anderson, and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War.
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 246.
55
John Hellmann, American myth and the legacy of Vietnam, (New York: Columbia University Press,
1986), 71.
56
Mark Barringer, The Anti-War Movement in the United States, Modern American Poetry. 1998.
Accessed June 13, 2014
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/antiwar.html
57
David L. Anderson, and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 247.
58
Ibid., 249.
59
Ibid., 251.
60
UShistory.org. The Antiwar Movement. U.S. History Online Textbook .2014. Accessed June 13, 2014.
http://www.ushistory.org/us/55d.asp
16
Washington in March 1965 came as a shock to the officials. It comprised up to 25,000 people,
mainly students, gathering at the White House to resist the bombing.61 This marked the
beginning of many upcoming backlashes against the government’s military actions.62 The
movement blossomed in 1967 with the march on the Pentagon, the largest protest in decades,
drawing up to 50,000 protestors coming from different groups. The event astounded the
public.63 In the middle of social chaos and disorder because of the war opposition, American
people were suddenly going into an awful shock at the Tet Offensive in 1968, which dispelled
the illusion of progress in Vietnam. For them, this event was no different from a psychological
defeat as they figured out that their U.S. forces were hopelessly no closer to victory than they
had claimed in the beginning. People were also getting a clearer vision of the dangerous and
complicated situation in Vietnam, where U.S. troops were stuck. Antiwar feelings quickly
invaded into American psyche.64 In November 1969, in the middle of domestic economic
downturn, another group of estimated 500,000 participants marched on Washington the second
time, mainly to oppose the escalating U.S. role and troops in Vietnam because the economic
cost was too high.65 Ironically, the government was forced to employ military to quell its own
youth.66 By the end of 1969, up to 80% of those asked admitted that they were tired of the
conflict.67 Dissatisfaction with government officials and opposition to the administration’s
policy in Vietnam became the focus of dissenters’ attention. At times, Robert McNamara,
Secretary of Defense, was targeted by the protestors as a “war machine”.68 While constantly
receiving cables reporting the worsening political and social situations in South Vietnam,
Washington was tense with excessive domestic pressures and chaos. Those movements
demonstrated the clash of ideas between the government and its people, especially the draftees
and the youth, which ultimately tore society apart. People’s dissatisfaction on the federal
government marked the fracture in the relation between the public and politicians, and shook
61
Mark Barringer, The Anti-War Movement in the United States. Modern American Poetry. 1998.
Accessed June 13, 2014
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/antiwar.html
62
W. Scott Thompson, The Lessons of Vietnam. (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), iii.
63
David L. Anderson, and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War.
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 253.
64
Ibid., 255.
65
Mark Barringer, The Anti-War Movement in the United States, Modern American Poetry. 1998.
Accessed June 13, 2014
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/antiwar.html
66
David L. Anderson, and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 260.
67
Ibid., 259.
68
Robert S. McNamara, and Brian VanDeMark, In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam, ed.
(New York: Vintage Books, A division of Random House, Inc., 1995), 253.
17
public confidence in their government. The Vietnam involvement had been sold to public as a
‘crusade’ for American and Western security against the communist threat. In fact, that
external threat was not as clear as the domestic threat of increasing financial and human losses
for the United States. The aim of stopping Communism appeared more vague and dubious. The
war had been sold to them as where the U.S. as a superpower would need little effort to defeat
a third world nation that was economically and politically feeble. The nation’s physical ability
including huge amounts of time, finance and numbers of lives were continuously spent on the
war without recording success. The war had been sold to them as an easily-won fight and thus,
victory was guaranteed. However, more than two decades passed by, victory remained beyond
reach. Meanwhile, the war was taking so many young lives, and American social unity was
teetering on the edge of collapse. Opinion shifts were recorded as most profound in history.69
Demands for withdrawal regardless of consequences started to mount up.70 With growing
dissents among the public, signs of uncertainty and concerns appeared within the Pentagon.
Though failing to halt or slow down American intervention in Vietnam, these antiwar
movements finally did contribute to drawing national and worldwide attention to American
escalation in Vietnam. They also disseminated more degree of truth about the Vietnam War
and expressed doubts about American possibility of a victory attained via military superiority.
Together with other social movements, these protests not only typified the racial division as the
nature of the country in the 1960s, but also deepened the domestic fracture in society. In sum,
when the U.S. approached the political conflict in Vietnam, it was simultaneously handling
another social conflict at home.71
Obviously, public opinion was largely affected by the amount and accuracy of the
information released. In the Vietnam War, the media, particularly the press, was partly held
responsible for the changing perspective of Americans towards many war-related issues.72
Initially, when Americans were unanimous about the war, Life Magazine proclaimed that the
Vietnam policy was wise and moral. And Time concluded that the conflict was The Right War
at The Right Time.73 The growing power of journalism at the time opened doors for many war
journalists to go directly to the faraway warfront and brought home more degree of truth. With
69
David L. Anderson, and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 256.
70
Protests against the Vietnam War. HistoryLearningSite.co.uk. 2008. Accessed June 11, 2014
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/protests_vietnam_war.htm
71
David L. Anderson, and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 265.
72
Ibid., 267.
73
Ibid., 247.
18
numerous articles and photographs about the conflict, the public had a clearer and more exact
view of what their boys were doing there and how their government was handling the war.
Besides, when several truths were gradually made known to the public by the media,
Americans realized a “mismatch” between the reality and the government’s announcement.
This was the first American war to be televised. People everywhere in the world could follow
every American action from home. Thus, they had been bombarded with images from the
war.74 In particular, exploding napalm, firefights, body bags, coffins, and other frightening
scenes streamed into American living rooms.75 Notably, people were shocked and haunted by
the two images televised in Vietnam. One was the film of villagers from young to old being
burned by napalm when American troops mistakenly attacked the village. The other was the
traumatic My Lai massacre in 1968 where five hundreds unarmed villagers were killed, mainly
women and children.76 While such facts demonstrated American strong military power, the
American government could not help facing criticism for its inhumane actions. The public and
international observers were thus left with outrage and the impression that Americans had
misplaced Vietnam and misused their power. Media brought clearer the American state of
uncertainty and confusion.77 Since an added truth was disclosed, public faith in their officials’
claim of a promising victory started to wane. Domestic consensus rapidly ruptured. Another
wave of shock swept over the whole nation on 13 June 1971 when The New York Times
published the first installment of the Pentagon Papers.78 People were once again ignited when
confidential details were released, which inevitably challenged the accountability of the U.S.
government.79 It was doubted whether their trustworthy government was telling the truth. This
shocking news brought dissent and frustration around the country and intensified pressure on
the administration to quickly get out of the Vietnam political dilemma. Public outcry sparked
by the media helped bring the war to a quick end80. The Wall Street Journal warned that
74
Rob Kroes, "Mediated History: The Vietnam War as a Media Event." If you've seen one, you've seen
the mall: Europeans and American mass culture, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996),113.
75
David L. Anderson, and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 251.
76
Ibid., 344.
77
Rob Kroes, "Mediated History: The Vietnam War as a Media Event." If you've seen one, you've seen
the mall: Europeans and American mass culture, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996), 136.
78
Mark Barringer, The Anti-War Movement in the United States, Modern American Poetry. 1998.
Accessed June 13, 2014
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/antiwar.html
79
History.com Staff. Vietnam War Protests. A+E Networks. 2010. Accessed June 13, 2014.
http://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/vietnam-war-protests
80
David L. Anderson, and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 283.
19
everyone had better be prepared for a bitter taste of a defeat. 81 By and large, since the Vietnam
War, another historical dimension of the media event has been added.82 The role of the media
was largely recognized and became growingly influential, particularly in the area of public
opinion. Its enormous power played a key role in swaying people’s perspective. The media did
give the American public a different vision of the war, the tragedy and its effects. It raised
social awareness as to what the war really meant by the U.S. and clearly marked an influence
on the American population as a whole.
Additionally, the war raised another concern about the price of humanity in terms of
people’s lives being destroyed. It revealed the immoral aspect of American policy that
demanded condemnation by the society. “The ultimate human cost of the Vietnam War was
staggering for both sides.”83 About three millions of Vietnamese died. At least that many were
wounded, while more than 58,000 American troops gave up their lives on the battlefield. 84
About 1,400 Americans died in 1965 alone, and the number mounted up to 5,000 in 1966 and
over 9,000 in 1967.85 That many more casualties inflicted was easily predictable. Although this
number compared to that of the two World Wars was relatively small, the image of American
boys returning home in body bags alarmed the critical condition of the remote war and
questioned the ethical and the practical aspects of the war. The public was upset at the fact that
young Americans were constantly and increasingly being killed on foreign soil by an enemy
who was exposed as not posing any direct threat to the U.S. The sacrifice of American boys
was seemingly above people’s limit of tolerance. The cost for this victory, if gained, was
simply too high to pay.86 Demands for winning the Communist transformed into demands for
ending the war as soon as possible.
The immorality of this war was additionally illustrated in the body count measurement
adopted by American officials as a proof of their progress in Vietnam. American success was
81
Ibid., 256.
Rob Kroes, "Mediated History: The Vietnam War as a Media Event." If you've seen one, you've seen
the mall: Europeans and American mass culture, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996), 134.
83
SparkNotes Editors. SparkNote on The Vietnam War (1945–1975). SparkNotes.com. SparkNotes LLC.
2005. Accessed May 29, 2014.
http://www.sparknotes.com/history/american/vietnamwar/context.html
84
Bob Buzzanco, 25 Years After End Of Vietnam War: Myths Keep Us From Coming To Terms With
Vietnam, Common Dreams, 17 Apr. 2000. Accessed June 11, 2014.
http://www.commondreams.org/views/041700-106.htm
85
David L. Anderson, and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 251.
86
Mark Barringer, The Anti-War Movement in the United States, Modern American Poetry. 1998.
Accessed June 13, 2014
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/antiwar.html
82
20
evaluated via the number of Vietcong being killed. The military advisers believed that they
could weaken the Vietnamese force and destroy Hanoi’s will to fight by killing as many
Vietnamese as possible via constant bombings and ground wars. This immoral strategy of
inflicting more casualties on Vietcong than they could replace or sustain became an American
military strategy for many following years. The purpose was to transfer only one message, that
there was little chance and space for North Vietnam to win. Sadly, counting the number of
dead Vietnamese as a measure of American progress was so inhuman that it was actually
showing a bitter truth. American policy-makers was being stuck in their hopelessness and lost
in their miscalculation of the war.87 “Using body counts as a measurement to help figure out
what should be done in Vietnam to win”88 was a seriously misleading and immoral strategy
they were following. Clearly, those statistics could not show any progress in the American
strategy. Likewise, they should not be treated as signs of progress in the war. How could they
count the enemy’s loss of life as American triumph? How could the increasing number of
enemy’s death be transferred into the increasing percent of hope for the U.S.? Where did
morality lie when viewing casualties as trophies? In essence, the only significance these
numbers conveyed was probably how fierce the war was, how mistaken the leaders were, and
how much the price of humanity the U.S. paid for its misconduct.
In short, the antiwar movement was the opportunity for those politically, racially,
culturally frustrated with the government and the society to make their voices heard. In a sense,
the movement may just be the tip of the iceberg that implied a much more serious schism of the
domestic U.S. in the 1960s. This movement might have reinforced the civil right movement,
which was launched for racial justices, and the hippy movement that looked to restructure the
whole society at the time.89 The collapse of social stability split the country’s unity over
Vietnam and weakened American strength at the home front. Conversely, that internal erosion
perfectly nurtured the will and obduracy of North Vietnam.90 Without strong public support,
whether the U.S. could sustain this protracted war was now open to doubt. People expressed
concerns about whether the war was legal and that young American giving up their lives for a
87
John Hellmann, American myth and the legacy of Vietnam. (New York: Columbia University Press,
1986), 67.
88
McNamara, Robert S., and Brian VanDeMark, In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam, ed.
New York: Vintage Books, A division of Random House, Inc., 1995), 238.
89
Mark Barringer, The Anti-War Movement in the United States, Modern American Poetry. 1998. Web.
June 13, 2014
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/antiwar.html
90
W. Scott Thompson, The Lessons of Vietnam, (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), 6.
21
dubious threat was justifiable.91 In the end, the U.S. went to a far-off war, only to let its internal
ideological conflict unfold onto the world. Was the war really worth that degree of social
divisiveness and dramatic loss of life?
2.3 The Other War in Washington
Politically, the fierce war of words in Washington, the erosion of faith when presidents were
exposed as liars, and the political fear of another Vietnam that led to the unprecedented
transferring of domestic political power, were among the huge costs for the Vietnam War.
Unfortunately, they continued to weigh down the U.S. for decades.
Firstly, it might not be an overstatement to say that ever since the war plunged deeper
into a political crisis, especially from 1965, when the escalation began, until the humiliating
withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1973, Washington was entering another invisible war. Indeed, it
was constantly suffering a heavy atmosphere whenever the issue of Vietnam was picked up.
Political strategy was regularly being contested and caused bitter division among the Cabinet
members as to which way to best proceed the war and steer the country towards victory. The
situation in the White House was also fraught with difficulties, worries and high expectations.
Yet, no absolute consensus was ever reached. There were always at least two contrasting
perspectives to approach any issue over Vietnam. The seemingly only common ground in their
presumption was probably the haunting falling-domino theory that the U.S. was already
obsessed with long before the Vietnam War.92 This obsession seemed to confuse and make
them unable to work out the problem in Vietnam. President Eisenhower himself, though
viewing the Southeast Asia problem as of great importance to American security, yet without
any clear feasible solution to it. He had already felt stumped and thus, together with his
Secretary of State, Herter, expressed a sense of satisfaction when dumping the potentially
intractable problem of Vietnam into Kennedy’s lap.93 As Secretary of Defense McNamara
admitted, during his seven years in service, both Kennedy and Johnson were under increasing
strain due to Vietnam issue. The confusing advice Kennedy had already received from
91
David L. Anderson, and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 248.
92
Theodore H. Drapper, McNamara’s Peace, The New York Review of Books. May 11, 1995. Accessed
June 18, 2014.
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1995/may/11/mcnamaras-peace/
93
, Robert S. McNamara, and Brian VanDeMark, In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam. Ed,
(New York: Vintage Books, A division of Random House, Inc., 1995), 36.
22
Eisenhower about the complicated situation in Vietnam was underpinned by the notion that
maintaining the Indochina region as a priority in American foreign policy was crucial. Indeed,
without any thoughtful or reliable analysis of the issue, most of Kennedy and his group’s
debates failed to come to terms with the pros and cons of withdrawal.94 Did any of the five
Presidents from Truman to Nixon actually know how to tackle this perplexing and dangerous
problem? All had to listen to and count on their military advisers who ironically had little idea
of how to deal with the conflict except by trial and error. The lack of experts or specialists who
had knowledge and understanding about Communism and the issues surrounding Southeast
Asia was ironically a result of the McCarthyism in the 1950s, which had uprooted anyone
suspected for fear that Communism would infiltrate into American political arena.95 Thus, the
advisers seemed to be inexperienced in Vietnam and therefore, their shallow analysis was
explicable.
In mid-1963, President Kennedy had to face a dilemma of whether to carry out a coup
against Diem government or not.96 This resulted from a continuing dispute among the military
advisers in both Washington and Saigon, who were still disagreeing over what to do due to the
lack of precise information and investigation. His reluctance finally deprived him of the choice
of supporting either Diem or the coup. Ultimately, Diem had been suddenly assassinated before
Kennedy could come up with a solution. As a result, his team “was forced to make tough
decisions,” to put the future of South Vietnam into “the hands of someone whose identity and
intentions remained unknown.”97 Had Kennedy made the decision earlier on the coup, he could
have avoided such a “somber and shaken”98 reaction over Diem’s assassination. Had he had
more options and trustworthy advice to change the situation in time, he could not have plunged
into the political chaos in South Vietnam afterwards, and forcefully worked with Diem’s
incompetent successor and his unfit provisional government.
Under Johnson presidency, the atmosphere in the White House was going from bad to
worse. When the “slide down the tragic and slippery slope” continued, the U.S. was stuck in
limbo.99 Especially, after the big shock of the Tet Offensive, most of the discussions were
about how to pull out of Vietnam.100 On one hand, withdrawal was equal to unconditional
surrender, which was like a stab in the back of Johnson’s predecessors, who had put all effort
94
Ibid., 63.
Ibid., 64.
96
Ibid., 81.
97
Ibid., 81, 188.
98
Ibid., 84.
99
Ibid., 125.
100
Ibid., 126.
95
23
to demonstrate American power to the world by making Vietnam their absolute commitment.
On the other hand, continuation, while would be dangerous, costly in lives and unsatisfactory
to the American people,101 would lead to nowhere near victory, particularly at the time signs of
certainty of success were fading.102 Unfortunately, while the war in Vietnam was increasingly
hot, the internal war of contradictory ideas among the military adviser team was equally
searing. Even worse, “the Secretary of Defense seemed almost at war with himself”, Vandiver
commented.103 The war in Vietnam was without a front. Similarly, the battle lines in the war of
ideas inside Washington were rarely clearly drawn. When the two wars began, both Johnson,
his Secretary of Defense, and perhaps any of his advisers, were like stifling in the airless White
House. The accumulating stresses took a heavy toll on any policymakers. The President’s
stream of unanswerable questions and McNamara’s constant sleepless nights with the aid of
tranquillizers clearly evidenced the depths of despair and pressure they were tied with.104
Frustration, anxiety, and desperation poured into Washington when the situation in Vietnam
proved clearly intractable. Victory became negotiable and illusory. Particularly, tensions
mounted even to breaking point when the American government had to press the panic button
in response to the Tet Offensive in 1968. Clearly, once the nation got involved in the conflict,
those who had to steer the political boat had no choice but fully engaged in and devoted
themselves to it. Meetings were held, memos exchanged one after another, and thousands of
cables transmitted between Washington and Saigon; yet none could ease the tensions they were
facing and lead to any solution. As the Secretary of Defense admitted, “we remained in
constant turmoil over Vietnam.”105 The American government claimed its purpose of the
intervention was to help bring peace and political stability to South Vietnam. Ironically, while
peace for Vietnam was still far beyond reach, these two elements were already unattainable in
Washington. Political atmosphere among the Cabinet remained highly strained when political
advisers were far from “at peace with themselves”.106
Secondly, when documents related to the war were brought to light, American people
were deeply shocked as American Presidents were exposed as liars. “For Johnson and his
101
Ibid., 307.
Vandiver, Frank Everson, Shadows of Vietnam: Lyndon Johnson's wars, (College Station: Texas A &
M University Press. 1997), 213.
103
Ibid., 223.
104
Robert S. McNamara, and Brian VanDeMark, In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam. Ed,
(New York: Vintage Books, A division of Random House, Inc., 1995), 260.
105
Ibid., 188.
106
Ibid., 335.
102
24
advisers, the war would have to be fought without arousing public passion.”107 This premise
was perhaps the basis of most of his later decisions to provide only half-truth to the public.
Even in 1965, when Johnson had already made “the fateful choices that locked the United
States onto a path of massive military intervention”108 and when requests for additional troops
in Vietnam continuously arrived, he still decided to tell the country: “our policy in Vietnam is
the same as it was one year ago, and it is the same as it was ten years ago.”109 He then invoked
the Tonkin Resolution in 1964 and Congress’s approval to take any necessary action to justify
all subsequent steps he took without asking for Congress’ further support. And he firmly said:
“I do not think any more congressional involvement would be necessary.”110 At the time when
antiwar movement was on the rise and signs of a divided society demanding a withdrawal from
Vietnam became clearer, Johnson either had to change the Vietnam policy to end the war or to
change public opinion.111 The problem was he could not back away and admit defeat for he had
once declared: “I am not going to be the first president to lose a war.”112 For him, the war “had
become a matter of pride.”113 Thus, he had no choice but to rally the nation. Officials became
salesmen as Johnson secretly told his advisers: “Sell our product to the American people. Tell
them we are winning the war”.114 Alterman even pointed out that McNamara, Secretary of
Defense, was also a compulsive liar sometimes. He kept in mind the perspective that he had the
right to choose which information to give to the public and nothing more. 115 Why did Johnson
decide to exclude Congress and American public from his policy? Was there a lack of trust or
self-confidence? Was it because he did not think that Congress would accept such an escalation
which would obviously cost huge money and human power? He did not believe that Congress
and American people would go along with the war. Congress would have been inundated with
constant requests to afford the escalation. Or was it because he did not feel confident of the
current policy? He himself was even not certain if the escalation would guarantee a victory for
107
John Whiteclay Chambers, The Oxford Companion to American Military History, (Oxford University
Press, 2000), 763.
http://books.google.be/books/about/The_Oxford_Companion_to_American_Militar.html
108
Robert S. McNamara, and Brian VanDeMark, In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam, ed.
(New York: Vintage Books, A division of Random House, Inc., 1995), 169.
109
Eric ALterman, When Presidents Lie: A History of Official Deception and its Consequences, New
York: The Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 2004
http://books.google.be/books/about/When_Presidents_Lie.html?id=ndpYYUsv2u4C&redir_esc=y
110
Ibid.,
111
David L. Anderson, and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 254.
112
Ibid., 246.
113
Ibid., 255.
114
Ibid., 256.
115
Ibid., 256.
25
the United States. Possibly, American people would react to the truth about the current
situation of the battlefront with an urge for a full-scale war. This would threaten the
involvement of China as in the case of Korean War, and then lead to the U.S.’s open-ended
commitment, which Johnson and his administration were attempting to avoid. Without
Congressional consultation and public support for a larger war effort, Johnson continued to
lead the country deeper into the war. After the Tet Offensive in 1968, “the widespread public
disaffection”116 started to grow rapidly since Americans realized that what they knew of the
war was nowhere close to the truth, and that they had been deceived by their government.117
While the situation was getting worse and public pressure calling for a withdrawal from
Vietnam were growing at home, Johnson’s struggle to seek feasible advice continued to bring
back no satisfactory results. However, the United States was not yet ready to give up in
Vietnam. Much to people’s surprise, in such a quagmire, Johnson decided to give up the home
front by deciding to withdraw from the coming Presidential election. The President painfully
confessed, “We have too many difficult problems and we need leadership that won’t be
attacked at every turn. We probably need a fresh face.”118 This decision marked the end of his
presidency and buried his cherished Great Society. His presidency was ruined by the Vietnam
War and eventually defined as more a failure than a success. His personal withdrawal from
politics ended in public condemnation. This was vaguely replicated by world condemnation
when the U.S. finally withdrew from Vietnam seven years later.
Disillusioned by Johnson’s administration, Americans transferred their faith to his
successor, Richard Nixon, who had promised a “secret plan” to end the war with honor.
Although at the time Nixon had no idea and even no intent to keep his words, those assuring
words, which were largely expected, helped him complete his journey to the White House.
Like many of his predecessors, Nixon had no knowledge of Vietnam and shared the same
feeling that victory depended on “the will to win and the courage to use power.”119
Surprisingly, despite running on the platform of opposing the war, Nixon was believed to have
prolonged the war for his presidential purpose. In particular, released tapes showed that Nixon
played a part in pulling the South Vietnamese government back from the Paris Peace Talks by
116
John Whiteclay Chambers, The Oxford Companion to American Military History, (Oxford University
Press, 2000), 763.
http://books.google.be/books/about/The_Oxford_Companion_to_American_Militar.html
117
Ibid., 763.
118
Frank Everson Vandiver, Shadows of Vietnam: Lyndon Johnson's wars, (College Station: Texas A &
M University Press. 1997), 221.
119
David L. Anderson, and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War.
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 257.
26
promising that they would get a better deal when Nixon got elected.120 Certainly, no President
wanted to be the first to lose a war. And Nixon fully understood that his Vietnamization could
hardly guarantee victory. Thus, his de-escalation policy remained on paper while he quietly
escalated the bombing campaign. Public patiently granted the President more time to wind
down the war.121 Unquestionably, the release of Pentagon Papers in 1971122 about the
government fighting the war in secret, and the subsequent Watergate Scandal, revealing the
misconduct of the Nixon administration,123 only further fueled public outrage. This event was
the last straw taking Nixon down from power. When it turned out that the war had been
dragged out for another five years with additional loss of another 22,000 lives and huge money,
public reaction was filled with anger and bewilderment. Among the public now sat the
shocking feeling that the people had once again been betrayed by their own President. No
matter what the administration did or said, once public confidence had been lost, it could never
be fully regained. Never before had the President’s credibility been questioned as it was since
Vietnam.
Thirdly, the whole nation had been living through different types of political fear for
decades; the Vietnam War had truly instilled another terrible persistent fear into American
psyche. As President Franklin D. Roosevelt once said, “the only thing to fear is fear itself”, 124
the American people now might fully understand the fearful nature of the fear. Undoubtedly,
the Red Scare and the McCarthyism in the 1950s alarmed the nation about the fear of
Communism.125 This communist fear invaded into the public and especially into all
government agencies. It was this fear, which Americans could not afford to live with, that
Colin Schultz, Nixon Prolonged Vietnam War for Political Gain – And Johnson knew about it, Newly
Unclassified Tapes Suggest, Smithsonian.com, March 18, 2013. Accessed June 19, 2014
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/nixon-prolonged-vietnam-war-for-political-gainandjohnson-knew-about-it-newly-unclassified-tapes-suggest-3595441/
121
David L. Anderson, and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 257.
122
Marc Fisher, As years go by, Watergate drifts toward myth, The Washington Post. June 14, 2012,
Accessed June 19, 2014.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/latest headlines/2010/08/25/gJQAKVYcdV_story.html
123
Naylor, Bryan, Best Known for Water Gate Committee, Longtime Sen. Howard Bakers Dies, NPR.org.
June 26, 2014. Accessed June 27, 2014.
http://www.npr.org/2014/06/26/325909260/best-known-for-watergate-committee-longtime-sen-howardbaker-dies
124
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address, March 4, 1933, as published in Samuel Rosenman, ed, The
Public Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Volume Two: The Year of Crisis, 1933 (New York: Random
House, 1938), 11–16.
http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5057/
125
McCathyism/The “Red Scare”. Dwight D. Eishenhower Presidential Library, Museum, and Boyhood
Home. Accessed June 26, 2014.
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/mccarthyism.html
120
27
largely affected and urged the country into Cold War, whose climax was on Vietnam
battlefront. Indeed, the decision to fight in South Vietnam certainly reflected contemporary
conventional wisdom.126 Interestingly, since the war dragged on and the nation fell deeper into
the conflict, the fear of Communism and the falling domino principle turned into the fear of
failure and of being trapped further into that political mess in Vietnam. This fear rapidly
overwhelmed Washington. The President and his Cabinet were now struggling with the fear of
losing the war and of losing face as international eyes were watching over the American
performance. This fear was among the basic premises leading to escalation. Probably, it was
this strong fear of failure that somehow drove the Presidents to take whatever risk they
assumed necessary to win the war, even by lying to the American public. In this regard, fear
turned out to be the United States’ Achilles heel in war. Had it not been for this fear,
Americans could have accepted withdrawal more easily when there was still chance even as
early as in 1963 as argued by McNamara.127 Had it not been for this fear, Americans might
have escaped the Vietnam nightmare. Had it not been for this seemingly well-founded fear,
American leaders would not have been blindly and hastily taken on such a remote war, only to
discover later that it was so wrong. This fear prevented Americans from breaking out of the
mindset that had been filled with the communist threat. Ultimately, when the war culminated in
success for North Vietnam, the fear of being defeated was transformed into American
tremendous shock. In a war, the winner was always right. And Americans were shocked
because for the first time they realized their powerful country was wrong. The U.S. was not as
infallible as they supposed. They were also shocked for being defeated by a “forth-rate”
power128 was too unpalatable a truth to believe. Wryly enough, after this fiasco, Americans
were once again going through another fear named “Vietnam syndrome”, a new political
phrase coined by President Richard Nixon.129 It was actually the fear of another Vietnam; the
fear of getting bogged down in a similar quagmire that made the United States reluctant and
cautious to demonstrate its power to the world.130 More importantly, this fear carried a long126
David Kaiser, American tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War.
(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2000), 1.
127
Robert S.McNamara and Brian VanDeMark, In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam, ed.
(New York: Vintage Books, A division of Random House, Inc., 1995), 321.
128
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 341.
129
George C.Herring, The “Vietnam Syndrome” and American Foreign Policy, VQR- A National Journal
of Literature and Discussion, Vol 57, No 4. December 12, 2003. Accessed June 20, 2014.
http://www.vqronline.org/essay/vietnam-syndrome-and-american-foreign-policy
130
Harvard Sitkoff, Post War Impact of Vietnam, Modern American Poetry, n.d. Accessed. June 9, 2014.
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/postwar.htm
28
term effect to any future President. His role as a U.S. Commander in Chief was partly
restricted. Indeed, a U.S. President was almost handicapped whenever it came to using military
power in the international front. The authority was automatically transferred to and
concentrated on the hands of Congress. The War Powers Resolution was one obvious example,
which required the President to consult with Congress for every single international
intervention.131 Curbs on presidential power were then unavoidable. The power of the White
House would never be regained to the fullest again. Since Congress and American public were
repeatedly misled into the conflict when Presidents were granted with wide discretion,132
mutual trust was broken and virtually absent within the United States henceforth. Put simply,
every time the United States was about to set foot on an international arena, the President had
to gain Congressional approval, sway public opinion, and set their minds at rest with the
promise that there would be “no more Vietnams.”133 A great effort was surely needed to restore
American trust after Vietnam.
In brief, the Vietnam War became an irretrievable disaster after five Presidents
successively made the same commitment to deal with it and failed. The government was
unconsciously engaged in the invisible war of words within Washington when conducting a
far-off war. These two parallel conflicts, which the administrators were fighting simultaneously
throughout years of excessive pressure and fear of failure, actually exhausted their heart, mind
and patience. Predictably, they lost all three. A national consensus, which was truly
fundamental when a country went to war, was seriously lacking within the U.S. How can the
U.S. win the war when the society was disunited, the government divided and ideas split
amongst the architects of the war? Failing to reach any feasible political solution to the
conflict, administrators were lost amongst themselves. They lost the war inside Washington.
Subsequently, Americans lost faith in their government and Presidents. With the morass of lies
and deceit, particularly of the Johnson and Nixon, American faith was almost broken. Their
distrust, as emphasized by Gary Hart, helped create the legacy of skepticism between the
governors and the governed in the United States that endures today.134 In the aftermath of the
Stephen Griffin, War Powers Resolution: America’s Most Misunderstood Law, Huff Post Politics.
November 13, 2013. Accessed June 27, 2014.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-griffin/war-powers-resolution-ame_b_4268839.html
132
Ibid.
133
The Vietnam War and its Impacts - Political Lessons. Encyclopedia of the New American Nation.
Accessed June 14, 2014.
http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/The-Vietnam-War-and-Its-Impact-Political-lessons.html
134
Gary Hart, ‘When Presidents Lie’: The Post-Truth Presidency, The New York Times, October 10,
2004. Accessed June 19, 2014.
131
29
war sat a huge incredibility gap, which explained why President Gerald Ford had to assure the
nation in his address: “Our long national nightmare is over. Our great Republic is a government
of laws, not of men. Here the people rule.”135 These words, Alterman argued, were only to
mark the beginning of the nation’s slide into the age of “the post-truth presidency”, the posttruth era.136 Moreover, ever since the U.S. took on this conflict, every single President seemed
to glue himself to as their major concerns in foreign policy. Consequently, while presented to
us as a misstep in American foreign policy, the Vietnam War also signified the historic change
in the United States presidency. Henceforth, presidential reliability was seriously called into
question. The previous discretion was then transferred to Congressional hands. As history is
full of surprises, the Vietnam failure evidently adds another to that series of the unexpected,
clearly in the American political life.
2.4 A Traumatized Nation – Impacts On American Psyche
Besides all the visible and measureable costs of the Vietnam War, the intangible damage on the
nation’s psyche, and on Vietnam veterans in particular, is probably too difficult and too huge to
quantify.
Initially, American failure came as a rude shock and probably the first and most
stinging attack on the United States. It caused the whole country to confront the values and
beliefs on which American character was formed.137 It challenged the notions of American
exceptionalism and invincibility that were well-entrenched in American history and built up
American nature.138 American history was seemingly associated with wars. Initiated from the
war of independence that marked the birth of the nation, along history, the United States often
found itself involved in wars of all kinds, from domestic to international ones, regardless of
whether it was for the national security or the world’s safety. Before Vietnam, it had been true
that any U.S. involvement in any war always brought home resounding victories and added one
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/10/books/review/10HARTL.html?_r=0
135
Marc Fisher, As years go by, Watergate drifts toward myth, The Washington Post. June 14, 2012,
Accessed June 19, 2014.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/latest headlines/2010/08/25/gJQAKVYcdV_story.html
136
Eric ALterman, When Presidents Lie: A History of Official Deception and its Consequences, New
York: The Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 2004
http://books.google.be/books/about/When_Presidents_Lie.html?id=ndpYYUsv2u4C&redir_esc=y
137
David L. Anderson, and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 345.
138
Ibid., 344.
30
after another to its “spectacular and unparalleled record of success.”139 Indeed, the United
States’ successive victories from its birth were among the solid evidences to tout Americans
about the country’s exceptionalism belief.
Throughout more than two centuries, that victorious feeling had seated deeply in
American mindset, reinforced American self-confidence and constructed American ego. In
return, this exceptional understanding was also the underlying power that accounted for
American natural inclination to reach out toward others and intervene into international affairs.
The notion of exceptionalism denoted and implied a hidden comparison in the American
relationship with other nations. Viewing itself exceptional meant others were not. Being
exceptional meant the United States placed itself at an exalted position and devalued the rest.
Being exceptional meant the United States was too wise to be wrong. And, being exceptional
somehow meant the United States allowed itself to make exceptions. Invading Vietnam
without having to declare war140 was one exception. Being defeated but withdrawing from
Vietnam without having to take any responsibility for the political mess it had left behind and
the rapid collapse of South Vietnam,141 an infant regime conceived and born by the United
States, was the other. Exceptions had certain benefits. If the United States had declared war on
Vietnam, it might not have saved face by the “peace with honor” as claimed by President
Nixon,142 even though in the language of a war, there seemed no place for honor on the loser’s
side. Simply, how could one lose the war in honor? And sometimes, the price for that
exception was even heavier. If the war had been officially declared, strong Congressional
approval and public support were obviously not absent or short-lived in the U.S. If the whole
country had been in accord on Vietnam, the gap between the government and the public would
not have been considerably unbridgeable, a certain amount of consensus could have been
reached, the return of U.S. troops probably sympathized, and the Vietnam defeat viewed and
accepted as the failure of the nation as a whole. Thus, the government and the soldiers would
not have been the ones to blame. In this sense, being exceptional equally meant the country had
to pay a higher price for its every misstep. After all, exceptionalism is a double-edged sword
that while represented American strength to the world, internally it could hurt the U.S. if
139
Ibid., 344.
Ibid., 249.
141
John Whiteclay Chambers, The Oxford Companion to American Military History, (Oxford University
Press, 2000), 763.
http://books.google.be/books/about/The_Oxford_Companion_to_American_Militar.html
142
Ibid., 763
140
31
success was not ensured. With the Vietnam miscalculation, the United States began to
understand this truth.
Supposedly, the North Vietnamese with their historic remarkable victory might have
taught Americans to reconsider the exceptionalism concept. Actually, perhaps it was not the
Vietnamese but Americans themselves, via their own failure in Vietnam, started to question
this belief. It was not and could hardly ever be the intent of the Vietnamese to attack American
exceptionalism, a notion that never seemed to bother them in any way. Why not the
Vietnamese? It was simply because most Vietnamese did not truly understand how much the
notion of exceptionalism really mattered in this war. They were not fully aware of or really
cared about the difference between the French, the Chinese, the Japanese and the Americans,
an exceptional people coming from an exceptional nation, except for the only common purpose
of occupying and colonizing Vietnam in one way or another. Thus, in the Vietnamese eyes,
American act was merely just another external invasion, regardless of American allegations
that they were helping to construct a stronger South Vietnam. How could they trust the United
States’ words that the huge American military and financial support for South Vietnam was for
free? In the Vietnamese interpretation, the imperial invader, like the French, was no different
from a war-hunger. Obviously, the xenophobic feelings inherited and cultivated throughout a
history of constant wars largely fueled their nationalism, patriotism and made them hostile to
the U.S. presence.143 All they knew was the firmness that they would fight against whoever
invaded their country, no matter how powerful the enemy was. Losing Vietnam to American
hands was similar to losing Vietnamese identity and nationality, for which they were fighting.
Likewise, they would rather fight, even till the last Vietnamese, for the country’s freedom and
self-determination than concede the Americans. That was their strong will and the only
message the Vietnamese wanted to deliver. Then why did Americans feel that their
exceptionalism was being attacked? Was it because after subsequent unsuccessful military
objectives, they eventually realized that invoking the exceptional nature to justify the direct
confrontation with North Vietnam after 1965 was no longer convincing? The language of
exceptionalism was once used by President Johnson to justify this conflict.144 Conversely,
many protestors meanwhile invoked this notion to oppose the act of intervention, stating that it
143
L. Anderson, David and Ernst, John, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam
War, (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 194.
144
Exceptionalism – Vietnam and the end of American Exceptionalism. Encyclopedia of the New
American Nation. Accessed June 17, 2014
http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Exceptionalism-Vietnam-and-the-end-of-americanexceptionalism.html
32
was “inconsistent with the values and principles upon which the nation was founded.”
Opposition was thus to reaffirm and preserve this understanding. Years after the war was over,
the reason why they were in Vietnam still left in confusion. That was why this defeat brought
about so many disputes over Americans’ attitudes to their exceptionalism. The Vietnam
experience in return raised doubts about this deeply-held belief. It also disclosed the truth that
the U.S. actually was just as other nations, having its own strength and weakness. More
importantly, the U.S. was definitely not infallible.145 In the end, thanks to this debacle,
Americans came to realize that exceptionalism, which they had been long proud of, was
bitterly identical to a myth. Psychologically, the more the U.S. believed in itself and its
capacity, the more vulnerable and responsive it was to the wound named Vietnam. Assuming
itself as an exceptional nation, the U.S. concurrently did not allow itself to make mistakes. And
thus, the mistake like Vietnam was something unimaginable, if not intolerable. The ideas of
American benevolence and infallibility had been guiding the country’s use of force throughout
history. It was in pursuit of noble goals that the United States got involved in Vietnam, pouring
immense military and financial support merely to foster the feeble puppet government or South
Vietnam.146 Yet, the use of force in this case only brought home disgrace and questioned the
great national dignity.
Besides the attack on the national psychology in general, there was another similarly
damaging attack on human psychology in particular. Irrefutably, a majority of Vietnam
veterans, whose souls were once distorted by horrors in the war, now continued to be
traumatized by its unpleasant memories and suffered much emotional disturbance in their lives.
This group was probably among the most severely injured, both physically and psychologically
by this war, not only in the wartime but also in peacetime. For them, the war even went beyond
the common perspective of a fight between the United States and North Vietnam. It became
their personal war in the fierce confrontation with the elusive and hostile enemy during the
fighting. The war then turned into their daily struggle with that disturbing past when they
returned. That chapter of national history perhaps became a part or the rest of their personal
history.147 In the war, the alien environment of the battlefield was the soldiers’ primary root of
fear. The huge rice paddies, deep swamps, and impenetrable jungles that were all well-travelled
to the North Vietnamese, were among the major disadvantages to American troops fighting on
145
Ibid.,
L. Anderson, David and Ernst, John, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam
War, (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 343.
147
Hellmann, John, American myth and the legacy of Vietnam, (New York: Columbia University Press,
1986), 102.
146
33
a ground war. They were enduring a miserable condition while not many were familiar with the
harsh tropical climate.148 The harsh living condition in an agrarian and wild country was
another source of suffering. “It was as if the sun and the land itself were in league with the
Vietcong, wearing us down, driving us mad, killing us”, a lieutenant bitterly shared.149
Emotionally, the troops were also troubled by their own bewilderment due to the cultural gap
that made them fail to understand their enemy. Sometimes, they even questioned among
themselves about their purpose of being there. As one veteran recalled the emotionless
response of the peasants witnessing their homes being destroyed, “their apparent indifference
made me feel indifferent. They did nothing and I hated them for that.”150 Particularly, the
guerilla war often filled them with dread of being attacked all of a sudden. Worse still, it was
difficult to tell friend from foe, to precisely identify their South Vietnamese associates from
North Vietnamese enemies.151 The fierceness of the war left them with the feeling that they
were surrounded by a deadly force for the whole time.152 Unfortunately, the end of the war did
not signal the end of their affliction. Thus, it could not guarantee these troops a truly escape
from the war and a brighter prospect back home. The twenty-five-year war was over, and its
lasting impact remained heavy. Physically, besides all the serious amputations or permanent
disability, appalling damage caused by the Orange Agent stayed equally irreparable for later
generations. It was the American program of defoliation, in which U.S. aircrafts were deployed
to spray more than 19 million gallons of powerful mixtures of herbicides over 4.5 million acres
of land,153 in order to fight an invisible enemy who immediately vanished into the dense
jungles after carrying out sudden attacks. Sadly, effects of that human catastrophe on both
Vietnamese and U.S. troops persisted for decades, causing cancers, disorders, and congenital
maladies on younger generations.154 Therefore, for these soldiers and their families, the wound
148
McNamara, Robert S., and Brian VanDeMark, In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam, ed.
(New York: Vintage Books, A division of Random House, Inc., 1995), 242.
149
L. Anderson, David and Ernst, John, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam
War, (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 337.
150
Ibid., 338.
151
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 338.
152
Bill Hunt, interview by Michelle Marberry, How Vietnam Vets Were Treated Upon Arriving Back In
The United States, The Vietnam Conflict: An Academic Information Portal for Education and Research.
Accessed June 16, 2014.
http://www.deanza.edu/faculty/swensson/interview_hunt_cominghome.html
153
History.com Staff. Orange Agent. A+E Networks. 2011. Accessed June 18, 2014.
http://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/agent-orange
154
Clyde Haberman, Agent Orange’s Long Legacy, for Vietnam and Veterans, The New York Times.
May 11, 2014. Accessed June 18, 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/12/us/agent-oranges-long-legacy-for-vietnam-and-veterans.html
34
might never be healed. It more or less reshaped, if not distorted their future. After several years
fighting in Vietnam, these veterans did not simply return home carrying scars on their bodies
but turning back to their normal lives with abnormalities.
Apart from about 300,000 physically wounded, another 58,000 died, and more than
2,000 missed in actions, the number of whom bore psychological scars were probably
uncountable.155 Psychologically, they once again endured years of mental torment by the
traumatic memories and seemed not ever able to forget that sad part of life. For those who had
given up lives in Vietnam or at home because of Vietnam, their deaths were possibly paid more
attention to by American public and aroused big waves of protest in return. Their mounting
sacrifices were like catalysts causing additional tensions and undue pressure within the United
States and around the world. For those who survived the war, in a sense, getting through the
conflict and returning home was not a fortune compared to dying for the country on the
battlefields. Had they died in the war and carried home in body bags, there could have been a
different story. Had they died in the war, their names might have been respectfully written
down as war heroes on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall years later. Had they died in the
war, their sacrifice and valor might have rested in American memories and recorded in history
forever. And had they died in the war, at least, their Vietnam wound would not have been that
lingeringly haunting.
Furthermore, there was another equally deep wound inflicted on these veterans, not by
the war itself but by their beloved country; the wound caused by American negligence. Unlike
veterans of the two World Wars who came home to well-deserved victory celebrations with
national self-congratulations, and were greeted as heroes in great honor,156 the Vietnam
veterans returned to the fraught silence and intense humiliation of the whole nation as if they
were bringing back a crying shame on the nation. If the United States considers its commitment
in Vietnam as to protect the country from the Communist threat, naturally, should U.S. troops
sent to Vietnam be viewed as heroes fighting for the U.S. national security? And if so, should
the U.S. pay tribute to their time, energy and even lives spent for the country’s security?
Strikingly, their return soon went unnoticed and sank. They were likely to be shunned, if not
denigrated by Americans when coming back home, alive.157 Even worse, some were alienated
155
Harvard Sitkoff, Post War Impact of Vietnam, Modern American Poetry, n.d. Accessed 9 June 2014.
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/postwar.htm
156
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War.
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 15.
157
Harvard Sitkoff, Post War Impact of Vietnam, Modern American Poetry, n.d. Accessed June 9, 2014.
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/postwar.htm
35
by their own family members who reacted to their return apathetically. Everyone chose not to
ever mention the war. Little assistance was provided and no new public policy adopted for
these veterans as well as their relatives158 as if there were, the Vietnam ache would be once
again touched, reopened and started to throb. They wanted to stay quiet to the past as though
they were attempting to let everything fall into oblivion.
By treating the soldiers with such indifference, the United States might be seeking a
sense of relief or a try to ease the sense of guilt for the failure. As the American public was
sharply split over the ‘righteousness’ of the war,159 how to treat these veterans remained a
confusing and disputable issue. Consequently, people tended to respond to these soldiers with
alienation and some condemnation. Why did Americans seem to blame these soldiers for the
wrong action in Vietnam? Clearly, though it might not be entirely accurate, this was the first
war the United States had ever lost, a totally new experience for the whole nation, a somewhat
embarrassment that the whole nation was attempting to forget. 160 Previous strong public
opposition seemed to pave the way for their current disappointment. The entire country now
threw their anger and frustration at those who had been forcefully drawn to the war. As a result,
the veterans were largely ignored, if not condemned, and “treated badly as an act of national
bad faith” and awful shock.161 As shared by Bill Hunt, a former U.S. military advisor,
Americans were raised to believe that winning wars was something within reach and
inevitable. They were so accustomed to success that they had come to take it for granted. And
failure came hard.162 When the United States lost the war, it was assumed that their soldiers
had not fought bravely enough to save the country. Later, when it turned out that the soldiers
were not to blame, public perspective was shifted to the government. As Isaacs argued,
American public only turned against the war when the military failed to win it in the end and
when the government failed to achieve what they kept promising, though having been given
plenty of time to justify the human and economic sacrifices with a victory.163 Consequently,
158
Ku Bia, Vietnam War Veterans, The Vietnam War. Accessed June 16, 2014.
http://thevietnamwar.info/vietnam-war-veterans/
159
Ibid.
160
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 342.
161
Adam Garfinkle, Wartime Lies, Arnold Isaacs challenges many of the myths surrounding Vietnam,
The New York Times. November 2, 1997. Accessed June 17, 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/11/02/reviews/971102.02garfint.html
162
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 345.
163
Adam Garfinkle, Wartime Lies, Arnold Isaacs challenges many of the myths surrounding Vietnam,
The New York Times. November 2, 1997. Accessed June 17, 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/11/02/reviews/971102.02garfint.html
36
having lost patience with their government, people now assumed that soldiers were not
victimizers but rather victims of a bad government that performed poorly in the war.164
Yet, calling these soldiers victims, who previously “allowed themselves to fall under
the charms and spells of political witch doctors,” as John Hellmann mockingly described, 165 in
a sense was still inappropriate. If they were victims of this war, then who were the three
millions Vietnamese families and soldiers who had no choice but fighting and dying for their
country’s independence? Were they not victims of American aggression and misassumption
about the conflict? In this context, it might be more appropriate to consider the Vietnam
veterans as both victims and victimizers. For the Vietnamese people and any observer who
looked at the U.S. intervention as an act of invasion, these troops would obviously be viewed
as victimizers, who had inflicted on Vietnam massive destruction and death. On the contrary,
through the lens of Americans who opposed their government action and therefore,
sympathized with these soldiers, veterans were also victims. They were deprived of freedom by
their democratic country, forced into conscription and then made to suffer these lasting damage
in lives. In sum, no matter how they were called and perceived, afflictions were hardly
relieved. The fact that more Vietnam veterans committed suicide after the war than had died in
it suggested this truth.166 Post traumatic stress disorders, such as felony conviction, incidence
of nightmares, and inability to be emotionally close to other people, etc. had become common
problems for Vietnam veterans.167 Thus, American refusal to recognize and share their
invisible and unspeakable burden was another sharp cut into their already tormented soul. Even
if the Vietnam War was condemned as a bad and immoral war,168 it should not be these war
heroes to blame. The war was wrong, but not the soldiers who had responded to the nation’s
call and fought bravely and loyally under the instruction of their generals. To abandon the
veterans immediately after their return could not help Americans more quickly forget the war
but only sharpened the wounds that were still sore. Instead, there should have been great efforts
164
Bill Hunt, interview by Michelle Marberry, How Vietnam Vets Were Treated Upon Arriving Back In
The United States, The Vietnam Conflict: An Academic Information Portal for Education and Research.
Accessed June 16, 2014.
http://www.deanza.edu/faculty/swensson/interview_hunt_cominghome.html
165
John Hellmann, American myth and the legacy of Vietnam, (New York: Columbia University Press,
1986), 115.
166
Harvard Sitkoff, Post War Impact of Vietnam. Modern American Poetry, n.d. Accessed 9 June 2014.
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/postwar.htm
167
Curry G. David, and Josefina J.Card. Lives after Vietnam: The Personal Impact of Military Service.
American Journal of Sociology 90, No 4 (1985): 949-951. Accessed June 16, 2014.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2779544?seq=2
168
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 15.
37
of the government and American public in trying to heal these tangible and intangible wounds.
Injuries may be healed, and pain may alleviate. Yet, scars would be left forever.
As history cannot be changed, memories can hardly fade away no matter how much
time went by. People all want to leave the war behind, but the fact remains that time and space
could not guarantee to release their minds from such an unnerving experience. Even till the day
these present veterans have all rested in peace, the infliction of the Vietnam pain will remain
pervasive. Put simply, while turning Vietnam into a physically war-crippled nation,
psychologically, the whole United States was living through the shadow of the war. The notion
of exceptionalism continued to be shaken as it provoked numerous debates. Though more than
four decades has gone and Americans have woken up from the nightmare of Vietnam, its
memories continue to loom large in American minds, leaving them a vague sense of unease
whenever people touched the issue.169
169
Harvard Sitkoff, Post War Impact of Vietnam, Modern American Poetry, n.d. Accessed June 9, 2014.
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/vietnam/postwar.htm
38
3. EXTERNAL PRICE
3.1 The Illusory Victory – The Illusory Prestige
History of the United States as a world leader was often associated with stories of its powerful
influence over other nation states. Understandably, the country’s outstanding historical record
has been dominated by American foreign affairs. And since domestic and foreign policies were
closely intertwined, whatever happened to the former would inevitably trigger the reframe of
the later. This explained why the Vietnam War, regarded as a dark spot of American history of
intervention, was also believed to have inflicted indirect but far-reaching consequences on the
U.S. international front. The tenacious persistence of this external price made it continuing
intolerable.
Arguably, the first external impact of the Vietnam failure was the shaking of American
worldwide prestige. As soon as news of the Vietnam involvement was widely disseminated,
the American worldwide image was accordingly at stake. How could such an unofficial war in
a remote area be a major cause for concern and damage to the U.S.? Why did the United States
continue to stay in a fight that was clearly by mid-1968 unwinnable? To answer this, it is
necessary to understand the American perspective on Vietnam, recognizing how vital victory
was to the U.S. and its reputation.
Naturally, war often breaks out when the two-sided conversation stops working, when
the ‘collision’ could not be solved by diplomacy, or when the gap of misunderstanding is too
large to be bridged by mutual reconciliation. Strangely enough, none of these reasons were
applicable to the outbreak of the Vietnam War. In fact, there was no official declaration of
war.170 Originally, the U.S. did not go to war with Vietnam because of any direct conflict
between the two. An impoverished faraway Vietnam certainly could not and would not pose
any danger to the United States at any time, let alone at the moment the U.S. was at the height
of its power. Some revisionist historians such as Gabriel Kolko, contended that if it had not
been for the American drive for hegemony and world order, the United States might have
eluded an overestimation of the communist threat and the containment policy.171 When this
drive was obstructed and challenged by the communist aggression, and the U.S. came under
170
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 249.
171
Ibid., 18
39
attack from communist advances, military response was adopted virtually anywhere on the
globe, specifically in Southeast Asia.172 Following the lines of this policy, most Joint Chiefs of
Staff agreed the military intervention in this area. 173 Vietnam unavoidably became the focus of
American concern at the climax of the ideological conflict. Without the communist threat, the
U.S. had little legitimate excuse to fight in Vietnam. In this context, the Vietnam War was
actually an extension of Cold War and accordingly, victory bore great significance to the U.S.
Winning this war carried immense prestige and helped the U.S. deliver three vital messages
correspondingly to the world, Communism and the French.
Firstly, “Americans have perceived themselves as having a world destiny that
intertwined with the fate of Asia”.174 In this connection, the future of Asia was the key to the
world’s security. And it was only the United States that allegedly had enough power and
capacity to ensure this security. Thus, acting as a world protector, the U.S. decided to reach out
to Asia, to make it “safer for democracy”175 for the benefit of the world. The purpose of the
Vietnam War was to protect the western world and the U.S. itself from the communist
expansion, which was represented by the Soviet Union’s increasing domination over the Third
World. Victory would act not only as an illustration of American power but also a confirmation
of its international role and prestige. Moreover, the United States would use this victory as a
warning to any third-world nation that was about to fall into Communism; there would be a
price to pay if against the United States. Hence, in the eyes of the world, this conflict was
somehow a display of power and a test of U.S. firmness and capacity to achieve its objective.
Since the U.S. volunteered to carry this world mission on its shoulder when coming to
Vietnam, the success or failure of this intervention was equal to that of the mission. American
reputation as a world saviour would either be reinforced or redefined. This just added pressure
on the U.S. to be victorious.
Secondly, in the larger scene of Cold War between the Communist and the Capitalist,
whose representatives were the Soviet Union and the United States respectively, the conflict
reflected an indirect confrontation between the two world powers. If Asia fell into communist
hands, it would certainly be led by the Soviet Union, who would extend influence over the
whole region and predictably organize these newborn communist countries against the United
172
David Kaiser, American tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War.
(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2000), 2.
173
Ibid., 3.
174
John Hellmann, American myth and the legacy of Vietnam, (New York: Columbia University Press,
1986), 4.
175
Ibid., 6.
40
States and the western world. Winning in Vietnam in a sense meant the U.S. was well able to
contain Soviet Union domination. American victory would partially thwart the Communist
ambition of expansion and reaffirm American determination to afford Cold War anywhere.
Thirdly, there was also an implicit message sent to the French, an American close ally,
who represented the highly civilized Europe. Despite American huge support in the name of
containment policy, which was up to 80 percent of French warfare from 1950 to 1954, the
French fate in Vietnam still culminated with failure.176 Succeeding where the French colonial
had been defeated in humiliation, not once but twice, would be a third-time embarrassment for
the French. The United States intervened in Vietnam with high hopes of easily achieving this
purpose, with the feeling that victory was within grasp. Victory would be the solid evidence to
show the French how exceptional the Americans were and that they far exceeded their
European ancestry. Success would strengthen American belief that with their messianic
mission, Americans were far more remarkable and civilized than their European allies.177
All above sublime objectives implied the truth that it was first for the United States’
own benefit that the country went to war. The U.S. would not and could not guarantee the
world’s security unless being able to ensure its own at home first. If the United States failed to
contain Communism, it might be true that the democratic world’s future would be more prone
to harm. Yet it was even more certain that the American future would first be threatened. This
danger appeared to weigh heavier. The question was: Why did the Communist expansion
become so threatening in the eyes of Americans that they had no other choice but contain?
American ego probably played one part in this perspective. For so long the United States was
shaped by the ambition to top the world in all aspects.178 This ambition and its realization built
up an American arrogance that largely sat in the mindset of almost every American. So
arrogant was the U.S. that it could not allow itself to be outranked by anyone, as well as be
threatened. Regarding itself as “a shining city upon the hill”179, the United States seemed to rest
assured with the presumption that it was a model for other countries to follow. If the Soviet
Union became so influential, it would someday play down American international role. The
opponent’s advance meant the U.S.’s recession. With the communist domination, the United
176
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 337.
177
John Hellmann, American myth and the legacy of Vietnam, (New York: Columbia University Press,
1986), 52.
178
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 15.
179
The Puritan vision for America that continues to this day. Finley, Gavin. John Winthrop and “A City
Upon A Hill. Accessed June 24, 2014. http://endtimepilgrim.org/puritans02.htm
41
States would forcibly dwarf itself to make room for the newly emerged powers. In this respect,
it was not yet certain that the security of the world or of the United States was in jeopardy; yet,
the American world image and role were now under direct attack. It was for the preservation of
its global credibility that the United States found this intervention justifiable.180
History might play the other part. The triumph of Mao Tse-tung in 1949 had caused a
trauma to the United States. China had appeared as an important part of American thinking, a
next frontier of the U.S. in Asia. Notably, since the day the U.S. lost China to communist
hands, Chinese expansion became a clear-cut demonstration of the regional threat to American
influence over Asia. Actually, Washington remained convinced that its principal enemy in
Southeast Asia was not North Vietnam but the People’s Republic of China. Therefore, the
defense of South Vietnam was rather to stem Chinese ambition across the region. This was
American interpretation, which underpinned its wider policy in Asia.181 The fact that China
went communist added to the existing apprehension that the communist expansion had reached
a point that must be contained. Indeed, in the Chinese long-term ambition, American influence
in Asia would be greatly diminished, if not eliminated altogether.182 Moreover, the fact that the
United States had to concede the Soviet Union and draw up an artificial border in the Korean
War183 did not bode well for American future in this region. This concession conveyed the
impression of American impotence in Asia against the communist force.184 The international
threat of Communism, joined by the regional one, turned into a doubled worry for Americans
and their imperial control of Southeast Asia. The United States probably had a clearer sense of
how formidable its rival was and thus, it no longer felt secure with its position at the time. In
this regard, it was apparently not a perfect coincidence of the three historic events: the Chinese
expansion, Korean War and the Vietnam involvement. Without China and Korea going
communist, the United States would not go to war with Vietnam at once. Since Asia possessed
a strategic position in American foreign policy, the United States could not let its political
arena in Asia be swayed by the communist. In the larger picture, Americans were being forced
to take drastic action to avoid defeat in South Vietnam for the sake of American security and
180
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 14.
181
R.B.Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, (New York: St Martin’s Press. 1991), 186.
182
Ibid., 187
183
Stanley Sandler, The Korean War: An Encyclopedia, (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 2013
Accessed June 24, 2014). 351.
http://books.google.be/books?Korean+war+-+An+Encyclopedia&hl
184
C.Herring, George, America and Vietnam: The Unending War, Foreign Affairs. December 1, 1991.
Accessed June 20, 2014. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/47440/george-c-herring/america-andvietnam-the-unending-war.
42
position.185 Understandably, the conclusion that Communism was so threatening appeared
logical. Accordingly, the containment policy sounded more justifiable than ever. At this
juncture, it was not so important whether Communism was truly as dangerous as the United
States had assumed. The more important issue was that the United States had to contain
Communism by using the Vietnam conflict to defeat the Soviet Union, its Cold-War enemy,
and the Chinese, its regional enemy. In other words, the fight against North Vietnam was
American aim to kill two birds with one stone. The United States was concurrently well aware
that this remote war could not be won in the conventional sense. It was fearful that “winning
might provoke a larger war”, a head-on confrontation with either the Soviet or the aggressive
Chinese, and even a nuclear war, which should and must be avoided. In sum, a traditional
victory seemed inappropriate, “unnecessary and possibly counterproductive”.186
As a result, for the Americans, winning the war did not simply mean having defeated
North Vietnam but having successfully achieved its three-layer-objective. It was immediately
obvious that being a winner would powerfully reinforce American self-confidence and ego.
Conveying such significance, victory became so crucial that the United States could not bear
losing. Sadly, big declarations often fall short. As the war dragged on, victory remained
strangely elusive while American patience was pushing towards a breaking point. It always
seemed true that the higher the expectation was, the deeper the disappointment would be.
Likewise, the Vietnam failure greatly stunned the world and weighed even more heavily
against the U.S. and its sphere of influence. The defeat in Vietnam did not simply mean the
United States lost the war to North Vietnam, whose sustainability was largely thanks to the
considerable financial and military support from both China and Russia.187 It also meant the
U.S. lost the war to the Communist. Inevitably, it lost its own worldwide image, its
international prestige and influence. In the American conception and even through the lens of
other smaller powers, it was incredible that this powerful nation could be beaten in any war and
by anyone. And the Vietnam experience surprisingly challenged the popular narratives about
the powerful and the powerless. Winning the war, Vietnam also concurrently delivered a vital
message to the world. The power of nationalism could defeat even the most powerful enemy.
The American ignorance of this element, together with its arrogance, was largely accountable
R.B.Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, (New York: St Martin’s Press. 1991), 186.
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 338.
187
Bob Seals, Chinese Support for North Vietnam during the Vietnam War: The Decisive Edge,
MilitaryHistoryOnline.com, 2008. Accessed July 7, 2014
http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/chinesesupport.aspx
185
186
43
for its failure.188 The astounding victory of the Vietnamese played as a catalyst for other civil
strife elsewhere around the world to spark off. After that failure, the domino theory, which had
been haunting Americans for so long, did not come into practice on the spot. Nor was it
obvious yet that the Communist were about to organize all Asian nations against the United
States as judged and feared by American political leaders.189 It was quite clear that the loss of
South Vietnam to North Vietnam and the reunion of the this country did not threaten American
security immediately as Americans had scared themselves. Instead, with that loss, the United
States had to endure a much more devastating consequence, the attack on its international
reputation. Wryly enough, this had nothing to do with Communism. It was not the communist
power that lowered American prestige. Rather, it was American misinterpretation of the
communist threat that the nation suffered this self-inflicted damage. Perhaps, the United States
now better understood that it had mistakenly overestimated the communist threat in Vietnam.
In the Cold War scene, this Vietnam defeat was like a severe attack on American pride. The
silent retreat after suffering heavy losses of lives indeed brought home shame and dishonor on
American international prestige. The latter price was even higher and unendurable in
connection with American ego.
3.2 American power: an End or a Change?
There was little doubt that the United States was playing a leading role in the world affairs.
Every American international performance was the demonstration of American power, which
was often thought of as seemingly unlimited and unique. In the wake of Vietnam, the notion of
American power started to be questioned. That ignominious defeat gradually sapped the United
States from its domestic and international credibility. When people’s trust was shifted away,
the role was restricted, and the power would accordingly dwindle. That was why the Vietnam
War was believed to have marked the end of American era and signaled change of its
international role. This was deemed as the second external price for the United States.190
It was necessary first to understand what the American era was? Stephen emphasized
that it was the period when the world was largely driven by American power, when the United
188
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War.
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 18.
189
Robert S. McNamara, and Brian VanDeMark. In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam. ed.
(New York: Vintage Books, A division of Random House, Inc., 1995), 218.
190
W. Scott Thompson, The Lessons of Vietnam. (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), vi.
44
States could create and lead almost every part of the world, and establish a worldwide political,
economic and security order.191 With that definition, the American era was characterized by the
international recognition of American power and role as a world police. In return, the latter
evidenced the former. If the United States was able to perform its international role to the full,
the American era would be in its greatest. As the two notions were closely intertwined, if
demonstrations of the one were no longer solid and convincing, the other similarly became
shaky. More importantly, did the war really cause an end or merely a change to what the
United States had self-proclaimed, its American era? The answer probably lied on the current
judgment of the American power.
Admittedly, having defeated a world leader did not necessarily mean Vietnam was
stronger than the United States. Likewise, that the United States was defeated did not obviously
mean its position as a leading power had to be transferred to the new winner. As Anderson
argued, Vietnam did not defeat the United States as a nation. Thus, the United States remained
a world power that was predictably able to apply its full strength and authority over other
international conflicts.192 Certainly, the U.S. was still leading the world, and that position was
merely challenged but surely not to be shifted to any nation right after the defeat. Even the
Soviet Union was doubtfully qualified for that top, let alone Vietnam. However, whether the
maintenance of that position would secure the nation’s great era was called into question.
Apparently, North Vietnamese astounding victory partly shook American position, and
consequently endangered American power. That power had previously been displayed through
the U.S. military performance in Vietnam. Yet, power was not merely about how much
American military capacity was, but also about to what extent the U.S. could utilize this
strength to decide and define its own sphere of influence, its own interests, as well as its
control over others. American power was illustrated by the capacity to both handle its internal
affairs and dominate the world. Stepping into international affairs was a typical American
action and reaction, which had long been regarded as the expression of the Manifest Destiny,
an ideology on which the nation premised.193 This was also among the nation’s motivations to
get involved in Vietnam. Unfortunately, owing to the Vietnam defeat, the U.S. henceforth took
one step back from international front. It was also no longer allowed to take risks proving its
191
Stephen M.Watt, The End of The American Era, The National Interest, Nov-Dec 2011, Accessed June
23, 2014.
http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-end-the-american-era-6037
192
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War.
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 16.
193
Hellmann, John, American myth and the legacy of Vietnam, (New York: Columbia University Press,
1986), 6.
45
power to the world at the country’s expense. Congress disapproved a massive and prolonged
military intervention, arguing that it did not want to make the same mistake in Vietnam,
wasting more lives and money for any unclear threat. Was it truly because the U.S. did not
want to get into more troubles; or rather because it would be unable to stay out of troubles and
solve them if once again intervene? Was that act of recession for the benefit of American future
security; or rather because of the present insecurity of the country? Congressional explanation
appeared to be only half-truth. The other half was that any similar loss was unaffordable for an
already exhausted nation, and that with its current power, the U.S. might be incapable of
guaranteeing victory. Taking back the power once given to the Executives’ hands, Congress
probably better understood where American position was after Vietnam. This new step
meanwhile disclosed a sense of anxiety and a lack of confidence that primarily affected and
steered the American world of politics into many unprecedented changes. This largely
reframed American foreign policy.194 And since foreign policy was to perform American
international role, a change in the former would inevitably require an adaptation of the latter to
fit in with new conditions. Congressional reaction to the Vietnam failure seemed to present
another unpleasant truth: the U.S. was now losing the power it once gained. Also, the power of
the White House would never be the same again. In other words, in the changing times, though
still able to preserve its top position, the world savior could hardly remain the most powerful,
let alone save the world as it declared. Restriction on its sphere of influence entailed the limit
on its role. How could the United States show its power to the world if unable to exercise it?
This was another cost for this conflict that the United States was still paying.
In short, when American worldwide cachet was lost and the once most influential
country was now carrying little clout in its voice, the United States could no longer deserve the
prominence it had ever risen to. Similarly, when American authority was in decline, its
international role consequently needed redefining. These interconnected elements, which
constructed American power, probably accounted for changes in American international
relations and diplomacy. In the new “so-called” American century, “might it remain the
strongest global power but be unable to exercise the same influence it once had”?195 Might the
United States preserve its era but be unable to drive the world towards American attraction? If
George C.Herring, The “Vietnam Syndrome” and American Foreign Policy, VQR- A National Journal
of Literature and Discussion. Vol 57, No 4. December 12, 2003. Accessed June 20, 2014.
htp://www.vqronline.org/essay/vietnam-syndrome-and-american-foreign-policy
195
Stephen M.Watt, The End of The American Era, The National Interest, Nov-Dec 2011, Accessed June
23, 2014.
http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-end-the-american-era-6037
194
46
not, its heydays were probably over. Its era might be drawing nearer to a close. And Vietnam
was not the prime cause but rather a catalyst for that change in American power. Without the
“strategic surrender”196 in Vietnam, the United States would have still triumphantly enjoyed its
lasting empire. In this regard, the external price for this miscalculation was way too heavy.
196
Thompson, W. Scott, The Lessons of Vietnam, (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), v.
47
4. CONCLUSION
Generally, a war ends when either of the belligerents can no longer afford to sustain it.
Similarly, the Vietnam War ended with victory for North Vietnam because the powerful United
States became exhausted and therefore, had to give up this military political conflict first. This
exhaustion was not simply encapsulated physically but spiritually. The final victory of a war
often tells us who is right and who is wrong; who is strong and who is not. Likewise, the
victory of North Vietnam proved that the tough-minded Vietnamese were right and were
fighting for the right, for the reunion and self-determination of their country. Yet, in this case,
the winner was definitely not the stronger. It was true that American failure was partly
attributed to the country’s limited strength when it was not allowed to conduct an all-out war.
Thus, American military and financial resources were never mobilized to the fullest extent.197
However, it was largely the lack of fighting spirit and national unity that caused the United
States to walk away from the war. When signs of a promising victory became elusive, the
whole nation ran out of patience and as a result, the confidence that victory was well within
reach seriously shrank. As pretext for a war seemed always necessary, the price for a war was
inevitable. The Vietnam War was no exception. The horrors of the war were for everyone. The
twenty-five-year war ended with a humiliating failure for the U.S. while exposing an harsh
truth that many American politicians had misunderstood. In the fight between the power and
patriotism, the hi-tech weaponry and will, victory was scarcely on the former side. Vietnam
was a prime example of the importance of will power in warfare. Indeed, no matter how strong
the United States appeared, military superiority could not be the solution to the conflict but
only produce the reversed effects on Vietnam instead. Vietnamese were not discouraged but
keener and more determined to fight. Undoubtedly, the United States was militarily and
financially powerful; yet that power was definitely not the privilege for it to control everything
given that it was able to. Whenever that power became problematic, the resulting price was
exorbitantly high and clearly unbearable.
After twenty five years of involvement, the United States came out of this conflict,
carrying so many visible and invisible wounds. Some were left scars; some remained unhealed.
And the nation is still bearing the burden for its countrymen’s mistakes decades ago.198 This
burden is deemed as the price the U.S. has to pay for being involved in such a tragedy.
R.B.Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 2.
David Kaiser, American tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War,
(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2000), 497.
197
198
48
Actually, in the beginning, the United States had been fully aware of most of the possible and
dire consequences that might happen once failed to handle this fighting. As time elapsed and
the U.S. fell deeper into the Vietnam commitment, their anticipation proved excruciatingly
true. The Vietnam War remained a pivotal event in American history as its profound effects on
domestic America still persist today.199 Having poured huge money to feed a fictitious nation
in South Vietnam, which was at the brink of social collapse, the United States in return
suffered a serious drain on the economy that threatened its economic security in the coming
decades.200 This economic exhaustion forced the U.S. to change its approach to Cold War ever
since.201 Furthermore, society was split over the Vietnam dispute. The anti-war movement
gradually took shape. These domestic troubles became so clear that the feeling of warweariness started to pervade the whole nation.202 As the media intervened, news of atrocities,
notably the enormous price of humanity that both belligerents were suffering, was rapidly
broadcast. People started to question the U.S.’s claim of the justifiability of its action, the
progress of the war, as well as the moral purpose of this intervention that Washington had been
selling. Clearly, blood and money were not the only price that the United States was paying
during the war. The widespread public distrust of the government for having misled people into
an illegitimate war finally transformed into the lack of public confidence in the federal
government in the contemporary U.S.203 The gradual disintegration of social values and order
that the war had resulted in still continues today.204 Due to the Vietnam experience, there was
also a loss of confidence in the capacity of American politicians for leadership. Moreover, the
protest and disharmony in the society also weighed heavily on policy-makers.205 When the
United States entered the war, Washington simultaneously entered a period of constant tensions
and disagreement. Its members including the Presidents were likely to be caught between a
199
Ibid., 1.
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 198.
201
Rexy, What was the impacts of the Vietnam War, The Vietnam War.Info, June 8, 2013. Accessed
June 16, 2014.
http://thevietnamwar.info/vietnam-war-impact/
202
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 247.
203
Rexy, What was the impacts of the Vietnam War, The Vietnam War.Info, June 8, 2013. Accessed
June 16, 2014.
http://thevietnamwar.info/vietnam-war-impact/
204
David Kaiser, American tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War,
(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2000), 497.
205
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 342.
200
49
rock and a hard place. Sign of consensus and peace in Washington quickly disappeared. When
it became clear that American military was not in control of the situation in Vietnam, military
officers became doubters and critics.206 All were experiencing an exceedingly difficult
atmosphere, sinking deeper into the mire of Vietnam. Additionally, memories of the war kept
traumatizing the veterans for the rest of their lives. Meanwhile, the scars of this defeat scoured
into the national psyche. This conflict also challenged the notion of exceptionalism that had
become a deep-rooted belief of the American lives. In a sense, the United States was seemingly
not engaged in a fight against a small nation for fear of Communism but in a fight to redefine
American values and beliefs. Besides, although the external impacts of the war on American
international front seemed to be outweighed by the domestic upheaval, their persistence also
contributed chiefly to the severity of the devastation. Ironically, the world saviour cannot save
himself. Once Washington’s self-image was shattered, American worldwide prestige was
accordingly damaged. Eventually, losing the war, the United States was forced to reframe the
goals of its political life ever since.207 As for foreign policy, the war thoroughly changed the
way the United States approached its military action.208 International engagement was limited
as the American power was in decline. In this regard, coming out of Vietnam, the United States
was correspondingly entering a period of political downfall.
The American dream of victory could hardly be realized because the country was
fighting in a losing battle. The U.S. initially lost among the politicians, in the path to win the
hearts and minds of the American people. It also miscalculated in the premature birth of South
Vietnam. American defeat was clearly a tragedy that caused incalculable damage to the
nation’s standing in the world, while leaving a tender scar to the domestic U.S. The post-war
consensus was brought to an inevitable end.209 It took the U.S. many decades to recover
domestically, and even now, the whole country is still dealing with some of the fallout from
that period.210 Unfortunately, the United States eventually lost its overwhelming predominance
206
Ibid., 198.
David Kaiser, American tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War,
(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2000), 9.
208
Rexy, What was the impacts of the Vietnam War, The Vietnam War.Info, June 8, 2013. Accessed June
16, 2014.
http://thevietnamwar.info/vietnam-war-impact/
209
David Kaiser, American tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War,
(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2000), 9.
210
Max Boot, The Incurable Vietnam Syndrome, The Weekly Standard 15, No 5. October 19, 2009.
Accessed June 20, 2014.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/017/059wcvib.asp?pg=1
207
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in world affairs.211 Worse still, it might take a longer time for the Americans to successfully
push the traumatic images of the Vietnam War to the back of their minds. It was mainly
because echoes of the war are likely to grow even louder every time the United States is about
to demonstrate its military power to the world. Many historians regarded the Vietnam
experience as a war that never seemed to go away, and so did its impacts.212 In this context, the
price for this war was too high for the United States.
R.B.Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 2.
David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends, New Perspectives on the Vietnam War,
(Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 2007), 342.
211
212
51
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