A Defense of Traditional Marriage by Tim Hsiao
The Argument
Marriage is an institution grounded in human nature that is primarily centered around
responsible procreation and child-rearing. It is for this reason that the state confers legal and
economic benefits upon married couples, for it recognizes that both procreation and childrearing are difficult tasks that require considerable amounts of time and labor. Since responsible
procreation and child-rearing are essential to the advancement of society, the state has a vested
interest in protecting a stable relationship under which this can take place.
The state therefore ought to give special recognition to heterosexual unions, for they function as
a precondition to society. Indeed, had there only been one gender, it seems unlikely that the
institution of marriage would have ever arisen to begin with. Relationships which do not have
procreation as their core do not deserve such recognition, for they are not foundational to
society. The recognition of homosexual unions as marriages would therefore be unjustly
denying the special social value of heterosexual unions. Moreover, since a healthy marriage
culture is necessary for the flourishing of a just society, the legal recognition of the natural
institution of marriage is a proper function of government. This counts against the libertarian
idea that marriage should be privatized.
Perhaps the most common argument against the traditional understanding of marriage is that it
would violate the rights of homosexual couples via some legal or moral principle, such as the
14th Amendment, due to the fact that it discriminates against such relationships. This is
mistaken. Mere discrimination is morally neutral – it is not immoral for a prospective employer
to discriminate against a lazy job candidate on the basis that he lacks the skills that are required
of him. Discrimination is only unjust when someone is denied something they have a right to on
the basis of criteria that are irrelevant to what is being denied. And in order to know what is
irrelevant, we must first know what is relevant. The same is true of rights. We must first know
what we are talking about before we can determine who has a right to it.
The main issue in the same-sex marriage debate is thus over the nature of marriage. Rights
derive their very content from the thing that they are grounded in, such that it is necessary to
first determine what the latter is before we talk about the former. It is question-begging to argue
for a revisionist conception of marriage on the basis that it recognizes the right of same-sex
couples to marry, for this presupposes that they have such a right to begin with. This, however,
is precisely what opponents of same-sex marriage deny.
So before we can claim that the traditional conception of marriage would discriminate against
homosexual couples, we must first settle the issue of what marriage is. If the nature of marriage
excludes same-sex couples to begin with, then no discrimination would be taking place, for they
are not being unjustly denied something they deserve because they do not deserve it to begin
with. It’s up to advocates of same-sex marriage to argue for their account of marriage instead of
just assuming it.
What About Sterile and Interracial Couples?
It may be objected that the traditional conception of marriage prevents sterile heterosexual
couples from marrying due to the fact that they are unable to procreate. But this objection fails
to understand the argument. The traditional conception of marriage is based on human nature as
being a type of relationship under which procreation is intrinsically possible, and this remains
true even if the possibility is never realized due to some defect.. A heterosexual union is always
oriented toward procreation, even if it doesn’t happen due to some defect. Indeed, we refer to
such couples as sterile precisely because they lack the ability to realize a capacity that is
grounded in the nature of their relationship. We recognize that there exists a privation of what
should be there. By contrast, homosexual relationships are such that procreation is impossible in
principle. Their inability to procreate is not merely accidental to the type of their relationship,
but essential. Thus, this objection confuses acts that are reproductive in type with acts that are
reproductive in effect.
Neither will comparing same-sex marriage to interracial marriage work, for the analogy falsely
assumes that there is no relevant difference between race and gender. While race is irrelevant to
procreative ability, gender certainly isn’t. A heterosexual interracial marriage is still a
procreative type union and thus falls under the traditional conception of marriage. This is
precisely why bans on interracial marriage were unjust. Gender, however, is a different story. A
homosexual union is intrinsically incapable of procreation and thus would be excluded from
counting as a marriage. Therefore, the state has a principled reason to exclude couples from
entering into marital relationships on the basis of their gender, but not race.
Love Is Not All You Need
It’s sometimes said that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry because marriage is about
love. But this is all too vague. The million-dollar question that needs to be asked is “What is
love?” Unless one defines what love is, there is a risk of begging the question. By love do we
mean merely an intense emotional feeling, or do we mean the state of satisfaction that flows
from living properly? While the latter is how love was traditionally viewed, its grounding in
human nature excludes same-sex marriage and thus cannot be an option for its proponents.
Hence one will have to opt with something like the former. But viewing love as an intense
emotional feeling is too broad, for the state would have no reason to exclude any types of
relationships as long as those involved “love” each other in this regard. Friendships, business
partnerships, incest, polygamy, self-marriage, group marriage, and virtually any sort of
arrangement (One can be creative!) would not be excluded under this view. But obviously this
is mistaken. Indeed, if one’s view logically implies the conclusion that the state is obligated to
legally recognize incest and polygamy, then that implication alone is a sufficient reason to reject
it. Such a conception of marriage renders inexplicable why the institution exists in the first
place and why the state is so interested in it.