NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ:
A STUDY OF SALAFI PESANTRENS
IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA
Het Koesteren van de Salafi Manhaj:
Een studie naar Salafi Pesantrens in Hedendaags Indonesië
(met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)
PROEFSCHRIFT
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Utrecht
op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof. dr. G.J. van der Zwaan,
ingevolge het besluit van het college voor promoties in het openbaar
te verdedigen op
maandag 27 januari 2014 des ochtends te 10.30 uur
door
Din Wahid
geboren op 14 juli 1968
te Indramayu, Indonesië
Promotor:
Prof. dr. M.M. van Bruinessen
This thesis was researched and written with financial support
from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the Training
Indonesia’s Young Leaders framework
Acknowledgment
Many people and institutions have helped me in completing my study. Without
their support, this thesis would not have materialized. First, I would like to
express my gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Martin van Bruinessen, for his
critical comments and valuable suggestions from the initial to the final stage
of my study. My thankfulness also goes to Prof. Wim Stokhof, Dr. Nico Kaptein
and Marise van Amersfoort of the Training Indonesia’s Young Leaders (TYIL)
program in the Netherlands. The program has provided me with an academic
environment and has assisted me in logistic matters as well.
My thanks also go to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of
Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic
University (UIN) Jakarta and S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,
Nanyang Technological University for their generous support that enabled
me to study in the Netherlands and to carry out fieldwork in Indonesia and
Singapore. My study in the Netherlands would not have been possible without
the consent of the Rector of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta and the Ministry
of Religious Affairs. At UIN Jakarta, my appreciation goes to Prof. Komaruddin
Hidayat, Prof. Azyumardi Azra, Prof. Amsal Bachtiar, Jamhari and Hamid Nasuhi.
My indebtedness also goes to Prof. Dede Rosyada and Mastuki of the Directorate
of Islamic Higher Education of the Ministry of Religious Affairs for their support
in granting me a scholarship for the completion of my thesis.
I benefitted much from the regular discussions of the “Salafi researcher
group” held jointly by the defunct International Institute for the Study of Islam
iii
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
in the Modern World (ISIM) and Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
I am indebted to scholars and friends who were involved in these discussions:
Prof. Harald Motzki, Roel Meijer, Martijn de Koning, Joas Wagemakers, Carmen
Becker, and Zoltan Pall. I am also indebted to Michael Feener and Robin Bush
of the Asia Research Institute (ARI), National University of Singapore (NUS) for
granting me an affiliation with the institute during the final phase of writing my
thesis in Singapore.
Some Salafi ustadhs deserve mention here as well, since my study on the
Salafi pesantrens would not have been possible without their permission and
help enabling me to carry out research among them. They not only gave me
the opportunity to visit but also allowed me to stay in their pesantrens. Here, I
would like to express my sincere thanks to them: Abdul Hakim Abdat (Jakarta),
Yazid Jawas (Bogor), Khatib Muwahid (Ciamis) Thaharah (Cirebon), Muhammad
As-Sewed (Cirebon), Aunurrafiq Ghufran (Gresik), Mubarak Bamualim
(Surabaya), Abu Qatadah (Tasikmalaya), Abu Haidar (Bandung), Ja’far Umar
Thalib (Yogyakarta), Afifuddin (Gresik), Abdul Mu’thi (Yogyakarta), Ahmas Faiz
Asifuddin (Solo), Nafi Zainuddin (Salatiga), Qasim Saguni (Makassar) and Sarbini
(Bogor), Wildan (Batam) and Adil Harahap (Batam).
During my study in The Netherlands, I enjoyed the friendship and the
togetherness of my Indonesian colleagues. Special thanks go to the TYIL’s
“Laskar”: Hilman Latief, Yasrul Huda, Amiq, Kusmana, Sujadi, Nurkholis, Siti
Nurul Azkiyah, Salamah Agung and Yanwar Pribadi. Their friendship and
togetherness made me stronger during this long intellectual journey. There are
many Indonesian fellows whom I cannot mention all. Warm thanks go to Dyah
Aryani Perwitasari, Tri Rini Nuringtyas, Dinar Sari Wahyuni Cahyaningrum,
Sylvia Pratiwi, Purin Purnama, Henni Vanda, Jani Kurni, Alia Baidhowi, Bang
Suryadi Sunuri, Mbak Lies Mustafa, Pak S. Mintardjo, Alpha Amirrachman,
Chaider S. Bamualim, Umar Hadi, Ramon Mohandas, Zainal “van Patrol” and
Mini Muttaqin. They have helped me in many ways to make my life in the
Netherlands more cheerful.
My research center, Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM) UIN
Jakarta, has provided me with an intellectual environment and has supported
me to pursue my PhD program. Here, I would like to thank the PPIM and the
gang: Ali Munhanif, Jajat Burhanudin, Fuad Jabali, Ismatu Ropi, Dadi Darmadi,
Jajang Jahrani, Oman Fathurrahman, Didin Syafruddin, Arief Subhan, Saiful
Umam, Murodi, Dina Afrianty, Asep S. Jahar, Tasman, and Idris Taha. I should
also appreciate Dick van der Meij who has edited this thesis.
iv
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Finally, my special thanks go to my family. My father, the late H. Amir, and
my mother, Hj. Sawen, for their support during my study in their own ways.
My truthful thanks go to my wife, Khalimatu Sa’diyah, and our children, Nadia
Azmi Wahid and Adiel Azhari Wahid, for their love and patience: they have lived
without my presence for the long period of my study in the Netherlands. Their
reiterated question “Papa, kapan disertasinya selesai?” has encouraged me to
finish my study soon. To them, this dissertation is dedicated.
v
Note of Transliteration
Throughout the text, I have adopted the transliteration system in the
International Journal of Middle East Studies, but diacritics have been reduced for
simplification. The names of personalities, organizations, and foundations, as
well as the titles of books, journals and articles are rendered as locally spelled
and transliterated. For plural forms of Arabic words, I simply add an “s”, such
as fatwa becomes fatwas. There are some Arabic and Indonesian terms that are
used interchangeably, such as madrasa and madrasah, baraka and berkah. For the
translation of the Qur’anic verses, I adopt The Holy Qur’an: English Translation of
the Meanings and Commentary, revised and edited by the Presidency of Islamic
Research, Ifta, Call and Guidance, n.d.
vii
Contents
Acknowledgment___iii
Note of Transliteration___vii
Contents___ix
Introduction___1
Background___1
Previous Studies___6
The Focus of this Study___10
Method of collecting the data___12
Structure of the Book___14
Chapter One
Who is Salafi?___17
A. Defining Salafism: is Salafi the same as Wahhabi?___17
Who is Salafi?___17
Salafism and Wahhabism___21
B. The Basic Principles and Characteristics of the Salafi Manhaj___25
Tawhid___25
Following Sunna (Ittiba’ al-Sunna) and Opposing Bid’a___27
Al-Wala’ wa al-Bara’___30
Obedience to the ruler___32
ix
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
C. Which Salafism?: Contesting Salafi Claims___35
D. Salafism and Mainstream Islam in Indonesia___44
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)___45
Muhammadiyah___46
Persatuan Islam___48
Al-Irsyad___50
Concluding Remarks___53
Chapter Two
The Salafi Movement in Indonesia:
Development, Mobilization and Network___55
A. The Origins and Development of the Salafi Movement in Indonesia___56
B. Mobilization and Network___78
Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia (Dewan Da’wah), Jakarta___80
Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA)___86
The Religious Attaché of the Saudi Embassy, Jakarta___89
Al-Irsyad___90
Pondok Modern Darussalam, Gontor, Ponorogo, East Java___91
Lajna Khayriyya Mushtaraka, Jakarta___94
Economic Resources___96
Religious Teachings in Mosques___98
Dawra___101
Radio___102
Periodicals: Magazines, Bulletins and Pamphlets___105
C. Strengthening Transnational and Developing Regional Networks 106
Concluding Remarks108
Chapter Three
Salafi Leaders: The Emergence of New Religious Authorities___111
A. Defining Religious Authority___113
B. The Social and Political Role of Religious Leaders___123
C. Salafi Ustadhs: Challenging Religious Authority___129
D. The Social Background of Salafi Leaders___141
Abu Qatadah___142
Thaharah___145
Mubarak Bamualim___147
Concluding Remarks___150
x
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Chapter Four
Salafi Pesantren: Development and Community’s Responses ___151
A. Early Wahhabi-influenced Pesantrens___153
Madrasah Wathaniyyah Islamiyyah, Kebarongan, Banyumas,
Central Java___153
Pesantren Maskumambang, Dukun, Gresik, East Java___156
B. The Development of Contemporary Salafi Pesantrens___161
Pesantren al-Furqan, Srowo, Sidayu, Gresik, East Java___163
Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari, Banjarsari, Ciamis, West Java___167
Pesantren Assunnah Cirebon___171
C. Community Responses___177
Concluding Remarks___189
Chapter Five
Salafi Pesantren: Nurturing the Salafi Manhaj___191
A. Educational Programs___194
B. Curriculum: Between Middle Eastern Orientation and
National Demands___205
C. Kitabs Used and Basic Materials___214
Kitabs (books) Used___214
Basic Material and Texts___215
1. ‘aqida___215
2. Hadith___220
3. Fiqh___223
D. Internalizing the Salafi Manhaj in Daily Practice: the Students’ Lives___224
Rejecting Entertainment (Music, Radio and Television)___224
Isbal, Jalabiya, Lihya, and Niqab___226
Kunya Name___228
Having Meals___229
Students’ Lives___229
The Influence of Salafi Doctrines on the Students’ Behaviour___232
Concluding Remarks234
Chapter Six
Transforming Individuals and Society___235
A. Framing: Struggle against bid’a, opposing the West, and
back to ‘true’ Islam___236
xi
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
B. Being Salafi: Retreat from the ‘World’___244
C. Being Salafi: ‘Reborn’ Muslim___249
D. From radical to ‘moderate’: a life history___253
Abu Rizal, Tasikmalaya, West Java ___253
Main argument: Loyalty to the Government___257
Social and Political Context___258
E. Creating a Salafi enclave: Imagining and practicing the model of
the early Islamic community___261
The Salafi Enclave in Beji, Depok, Bogor, West Java___262
Concluding Remarks___269
Conclusion___271
Bibliography___277
List of Abbreviations___303
Glossary___307
Samenvatting___313
Quaestiones Infinitae___319
Curriculum Vitae___323
xii
Introduction
Background
My first encounter with the Salafi movement was in 2002 when I was doing
research on the Laskar Jihad, a paramilitary Salafi group that called on Muslims
to join its jihad (holy war) in the Moluccas. From 2002 to 2004, my colleagues
(Jajang Jahroni and the late Edi Kusnadiningrat) and I received a research grant
from the Indonesian Institute of Science (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia,
LIPI). At that time, we carried out a research project on the relationship between
religion and politics, focusing on three contemporary militant Muslim groups:
Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam and Ikhwanul Muslimin.1 In the course of this
research, I interviewed various Laskar Jihad activists at their headquarters in
Cempaka Putih Tengah, Central Jakarta. I also attended various events, including
the National Working Consultation (Musyawarah Kerja Nasional), held on May
13-17, 2002, at Asrama Haji Pondok Gede, East Jakarta. The meeting was attended
by national figures, including the then Vice President, Hamzah Haz.2 However,
at this time, I was still not aware of the existence of Salafi pesantrens.
1
2
The first year’s report of the project was published by Rajawali Pers. See Jamhari
and Jajang Jahroni (eds), Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia, Jakarta: Rajawali Pers,
2004.
See, Din Wahid, “Laskar Jihad”, in Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds), Gerakan Salafi
Radikal di Indonesia, Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2004, p. 109.
1
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Later in 2006, I was engaged in a small research project on “Pesantren
Traditions and Democratic Values”. The project was designed to identify
pesantren teachings, cultures and traditions that are supportive or obstructive
to democracy. One of the pesantrens I visited for this project was Pesantren
Imam Bukhari in Solo, Central Java. It was my first encounter with a Salafi
pesantren and I became interested in getting to know it better because it teaches
its students different Islamic books than those taught in other pesantrens. I had
learned about the Salafi movement and Salafis’ basic ideas on certain issues, such
as the Islamic state, democracy and gender equality, but I did not know Salafi
pesantrens. The encounter made me eager to learn more about the methods
the pesantrens use in transferring knowledge and in habituating their students
with the Salafi manhaj (method or path of the Salaf).
My interest in the Salafi pesantrens increased further when I read the
International Crisis Group (ICG) report titled “Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism
and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix”.3 This report reminded me that foreign scholars
distinguish between Salafism and terrorism, while many Indonesian scholars were
still unable to understand them proportionally and had problems to make a clear
distinction between the two. This confusion was caused by, among other things, the
fact that terrorists claimed to be adherents of Salafism. This report also surprised me
as it stated that there were no less than twenty-nine Salafi pesantrens at that time.
Moreover, the report provided me with a list of Salafi pesantrens and foundations,
their main teachers, addresses and contact numbers.4 Since then, I decided to do
research on Salafi pesantrens in order to provide scholarly readers with a better
understanding of Salafi pesantrens in particular and of Salafism in general.
ICG’s report demonstrates the rapid growth of Salafi pesantrens. Despite the
fact that the precise number of the Salafi pesantrens is unknown, I assume that
their number increases and probably has grown to 50 pesantrens. In the course
of my fieldwork for this study, I found various new Salafi pesantrens, which were
not listed in the ICG report. This number, indeed, is insignificant if we compare
it with the more than 47.000 pesantrens and madrasahs that belong to other
Muslims organizations such as the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the Muhammadiyah
and Persatuan Islam (Persis).5 In spite of this small number, Salafi pesantrens
3
4
5
International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism
Mostly Don’t Mix, ICG Asia Report No. 83, 13 September 2004.
ICG, Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism, pp. 36-47.
Azyumardi Azra, Dina Afrianty and Robert W. Hefner, “Pesantren and Madrasa: Muslim
Schools and National Ideals in Indonesia” in Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim
Zaman (eds), Schooling Islam, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 191.
2
WHO IS SALAFI?
have drawn relatively much attention and have been able to attract many
students. Salafis also are active is preaching Salafism through many means, such
as organizing regular religious lessons, publications and on-air da’wa. It is no
exaggeration to say that Salafism and Salafi pesantrens have coloured, to some
degree, Indonesian Islam.
Salafi pesantrens pay special attention to the doctrine of Salafism, mostly the
teachings of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. These doctrines can be traced back
to an earlier period, to the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and Ahmad ibn Hanbal. In
the contemporary period, Abdul Aziz Abdullah ibn Baz and Muhammad Nasir
al-Din al-Albani are among the most influential Salafi authors. Salafis texts,
such as the Kitab al-Tawhid and al-Usul al-Thalatha by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and al‘Aqida al-Wasitiyya by Ibn Taymiyya are among the main textbooks used in Salafi
pesantrens. All these works are very different from those studied in the salaf
(traditional) pesantrens as described by Martin van Bruinessen.6
Salafi pesantren should not be confused with salaf pesantrens that belong to
or are associated with the NU. We have also another type of pesantrens, modern
ones that belong to the Muhammadiyah, Persis, and independent foundations
such as Pondok Modern Gontor and its kind. To differentiate between the
last two types, salaf pesantrens usually employ non-classical methods of
learning, namely sorogan and bandongan. Sorogan is individual consultation in
which a student, usually an advanced one, comes to a kyai or a senior ustadh
to study certain books, while bandongan is collective lessons in which a group
of students sit in front a kyai or ustadh listening to his instruction. Another
characteristic of salaf pesantrens is their persistence in teaching classic books
of Islam called Kitab Kuning. Modern pesantrens use the classical method with a
specific curriculum and teaching materials. However, this contrast is no longer
applicable since salaf pesantrens have also adopted modern teaching methods
as they run Islamic schools with a curriculum that includes general sciences as
well as religious knowledge.
The emergence of the Salafi movement in this world’s largest Muslim country
has brought about tension and conflict in the community. In Mataram, Lombok
Island, for example, conflict between Salafis and traditional Muslims aroused
in April 2006 when traditional Muslims damaged a musalla (small prayer house)
that belonged to the Salafis. The conflict was triggered by the lectures of a Salafi
6
Martin van Bruinessen, “Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic Script Used in the Pesantren
Milieu”, BKI, 149, 1990, pp. 226-269.
3
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
ustadh charging traditional Muslims of practicing bid’a (religious innovation).7
Conflicts between Salafis and other Muslims also took place in other regions,
such as in Banjarsari, Ciamis, West Java, and Sidayu, Gresik, East Java. The most
striking phenomenon of the Salafi movement in Indonesia that received much
attention in scholarly works was the birth of Laskar Jihad. Under the leadership
of Ja’far Umar Thalib, this paramilitary group mobilized Muslim support and
called on them to carry out jihad in the Moluccas on the ground of defending
Muslims from Christian attack. These phenomena have changed the image of
Indonesian Islam from what Martin van Bruinessen termed the ‘smiling face of
Islam’ to ‘conservative Islam’.8
Salafi pesantrens are part of the contemporary Salafi movement that emerged
in the late 1980s. This movement calls on Muslims to purify their beliefs and
religious practices from bid’as through the return to the Qur’an and the hadith,
and the examples of the al-Salaf al-salih, the first three generations of Muslims.
Islam as prescribed in the Qur’an, the hadith and the practices of the Salaf is
held to be pristine or authentic Islam, unpolluted by local traditions. When
Muslims conquered other regions and Islam spread there, Muslims interacted
with local inhabitants. This interaction led to the mixing of Islamic doctrines
and practices with local traditions and cultures, so that Islam became impure
as it became contaminated by local beliefs. In order to purify Islamic doctrines,
Salafis urged Muslims to return to the Qur’an, the hadith and the examples of
the al-Salaf al-salih.
In fact, the “call” to pristine or authentic Islam is not novel. According to a
commonly accepted hadith, the Prophet is reported to have said that in every
century a Muslim reformer will appear who will reform Islamic doctrines. In
modern times, the Salafiya movement emerged in the late nineteenth century
in Egypt and called on Muslims to purify their beliefs and ritual practices.
The movement was started by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and was continued
by Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida. In addition to a return to the two
foundational sources of Islamic doctrines, they called on Muslims to exercise
7
8
Nuhrison M. Nuh, “Kasus Salafi versus non-Salafi di Kabupaten Lombok Barat
– NTB”, in Nuhrison M. Nuh and Ahmad Rosidi (eds), Kasus-Kasus Aliran/Faham
Keagamaan Aktual di Indonesia, Jakarta: Badan Litbang dan Diklat, Puslitbang
Kehidupan Keberagamaan, Departemen Agama RI, 2006, pp. 22-27.
Martin van Bruinessen, “What Happened to the Smiling Face of Indonesian Islam?
Muslim Intellectualism and the Conservative Turn in Post-Suharto Indonesia”,
Working Paper Series, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, 6
January 2011.
4
WHO IS SALAFI?
ijtihad, independent reasoning. They divided Islamic doctrines into ‘aqida (creed),
‘ibadat (rituals) and mu’amalat (social interactions). The first two elements of
Islam, they argued, remained static and unchanged, while the last one changed
in line with the changing circumstances and demands of the era. In order to
cope with the problems Muslims faced, these reformers urged them to exercise
ijtihad. In the Muslim world, this Salafiya movement is also called Islamic
modernism or Islamic reformism. The wave of this Islamic reformism or Islamic
modernism emerged in Indonesia with the birth of reformist organizations,
namely the Muhammadiyah, al-Irsyad and Persis. These organizations call upon
Muslims to purify their creeds and ritual practices from bid’a, takhayul and
khurafat (superstitions).
The contemporary Salafi movement in Indonesia is part of a worldwide Salafi
movement that receives full support of the Saudi Government. In order to halt
the increasing influence of Arab Socialism in Egypt in the nineteen sixties, and
the Iranian revolution in the late nineteen seventies, and to dam its influence
in the rest of the Muslim world, the Saudi Government has made various efforts
to export its variant of Islam. These attempts included granting scholarship
to young Muslims to study at Saudi universities, building mosques in Muslim
countries, publishing textbooks and distributing them freely, and supporting
Muslim organizations.
In Indonesia, the Saudi government has supported the Dewan Da’wah
Islamiyyah Indonesia (DDII, or Dewan Da’wa, Indonesian Islamic Da’wa Council),
an Islamic organization that pays great attention to Islamic propaganda in rural
areas of the archipelago. Through this council, the Saudi government has granted
scholarships to its comrades to pursue tertiary education at Saudi universities.
When returned home, these graduates initiated Salafi da’wa in Indonesia. More
importantly was the Saudi’s initiative to set up the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan
Islam dan Arab (LIPIA) in Jakarta, a branch the Jami’a Imam Ibn Su’ud in Riyadh.
Supported by LIPIA graduates, the Salafi da’wa became livelier.
However, the Dewan Da’wah was not the only Muslim organization that
paved the way for the advent of Salafism in Indonesia. The reformist Muslim
organizations mentioned above also contributed to the expansion of Salafism.
The shared spirit of the purification of Islam among these organizations and the
Salafis is the reason behind their collaboration. The Muhammadiyah in Sidayu,
Gresik, for instance, provides the ground for Salafis to emerge, while Pesantren
al-Irsyad in Tengaran, Salatiga has become one of the earliest Salafi pesantrens
in the country.
5
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Salafis are enthusiastic in preaching their da’wa, utilizing any possible means
to accelerate it, including organizing religious gathering in mosques and offices,
organizing Salafi dawras, and publishing books and periodicals. Financially
supported by their counterparts in Middle East, they have established Salafi
foundations, pesantrens, radio stations and even a satellite television channel.
Of all these activities, pesantrens have become central in the efforts to spread
Salafism. Through the various programs these pesantrens offer, Salafis teach
Salafism systematically. The pesantrens not only produce Salafi preachers, but
also try to influence the surrounding community.
Previous Studies
Much research has been carried out on Islamic educational institutions,
particularly on madrasahs and pesantrens, and on Salafism. The Islamic
educational system and its institutions have received much attention, especially
after the terrorist attack on World Trade Center in New York on September 11,
2001 and the Bali bombing in October 2002.9
A classic reference on pesantrens is no doubt Zamakhsyari Dhofier’s
work, Tradisi Pesantren.10 This book is the Indonesian published version of
his dissertation he submitted to the Australian National University (ANU).
Employing an anthropological approach to the subject, the author discusses
important aspects of pesantrens, such as their curriculum, methods of learning,
intellectual traditions, and the networks of the pesantrens and their leaders,
kyais. His inquiry into pesantrens and kyais’ networks is a valuable contribution
to the study of Islamic education in Indonesia. In his research, the author found
that the endogamous marriage system between families of great kyais has
become an essential factor in the establishment of the religious authority of a
kyai. In addition to deep knowledge of Islam, the endogamous marriage system
guarantees the strong authority of a junior kyai in establishing a new pesantren.
The Dutch scholar Karel A. Steenbrink’s work Pesantren Madrasah Sekolah11 is
important to understand the history and development of Islamic educational
9
See, for example, Alexander Evans, “Understanding Madrasahs: How Threatening
Are They?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 1, 2006, pp. 9-16; Peter Bergen and Swati
Pandey, “The Madrassa Scapegoat”, The Washington Quarterly, 29: 2, Spring 2006, pp.
117-125; and Justin Magouirk, “Connecting a Thousand Points of Hatred”, Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, 31, 2008, pp. 327-349.
10 Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1984.
11 Karel A. Steenbrink, Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986.
6
WHO IS SALAFI?
institutions. As reflected in the title of the book, this work provides us with
a gradual shift in the Islamic education system from Pesantren to Madrasah
and finally to Sekolah (public School). As traditional Islamic boarding schools,
pesantrens taught religious subjects only. However, the modernization of Islamic
education the government introduced in the mid-nineteen seventies forced
Muslim educators to adopt a new form of educational institution, the madrasah.
Unlike pesantrens, the madrasah curriculum covers both religious and secular
subjects. Furthermore, Muslims also have adopted the Sekolah system that more
train students in secular subjects. Taking into account this gradual shift in the
adoption of a secular educational system, Steenbrink predicts that in the future,
the segregation between these three forms of Islamic educational institutions
will become fluid and blurred. He puts this gradual move in a phrase that reads
“From Kyai Haji (K.H) to Drs.” The “Kyai Haji” is the traditional title given to a
knowledgeable person or religious scholar who leads a pesantren and who has
performed the pilgrimage, while, the title “Doctorandus” is the official title
given to a person who has finished tertiary education. This phrase describes the
gradual move of religious authority from traditional title to the legal one.
Martin van Bruinessen’s work, Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat: TradisiTradisi Islam di Indonesia,12 remains important in pesantren studies. In addition
to a discussion on pesantrens and its living traditions, the contribution of
this work lies in its discussion of the so-called ‘Kitab Kuning’, classic sources of
Islamic teachings that constitute the trademark of traditional pesantrens. Based
on extensive research in forty-six pesantrens throughout Indonesia, the author
identified the most popular books pesantrens use in all branches of Islamic
knowledge and Arabic, including Arabic and its tools (nahw, sarf, balagha, mantiq),
fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and usul al-fiqh, hadith and ‘ilm al-hadith, ‘aqida, tafsir,
akhlaq (ethics), tasawuf, and sirat al-nabi (history of the Prophet).
The contemporary development of Islamic educational institutions
in Indonesia has been studied in Mencetak Muslim Modern: Peta Pendidikan
Islam Indonesia,13 edited by Jajat Burhanudin and Dina Afrianty. In this book,
researchers from the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) of
Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN, State Islamic University) Syarif Hidayatullah in
12 Martin van Bruinessen, Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat: Tradisi-tradisi Islam di
Indonesia, Bandung: Mizan, 1995.
13 Jajat Burhanudin and Dina Afrianty (eds), Mencetak Muslim Modern: Peta Pendidikan
Islam Indonesia, Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada in collaboration with PPIM UIN
Jakarta, 2006.
7
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Jakarta discuss the various models of Islamic educational institutions in some
provinces in Indonesia including traditional and modern pesantrens, madrasahs
and integrated Islamic schools. The book examines the changes and continuity
within Islamic education in response to modern challenges.
Robert W. Hefner’s work Making Modern Muslims: The Politics of Islamic Education
in Southeast Asia14 has contributed to a better understanding of Islamic education.
The book discusses various types of Islamic educational institutions in Southeast
Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Cambodia),
and their attempts to reform in response to social, cultural and political changes.
The work also examines their curricula on contemporary issues, including
citizenship, pluralism and gender equity. To compare their findings with Islamic
education institutions in other countries, Hefner and his colleague, Muhammad
Qasim, have also edited Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim
Education,15 which includes Pakistan, India, Morocco, Turkey, Egypt, Mali, and
even in the West, Britain. In this work, the authors discuss the various types of
Islamic educational institutions in these countries and their responses to social
and political changes.
Recent studies on pesantrens and madrasahs are found in The Madrasa in Asia,
Political Activism and Transnational Linkages,16 edited by Farish A. Noor, Yoginder
Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen. This work gives us a better understanding
of the madrasahs, Islamic educational institutions that have been recently
alleged as being incubators of Muslim fundamentalist. Most articles included
in the book are based on papers presented at the international conference on
“The Madrasa in Asia: Transnational Linkages and Real and Alleged Political
Role” in 2004, organized by International Institute for the Study of Islam in
the Modern World (ISIM) in Leiden, the Netherlands in cooperation with the
Zentrum Moderner Orient (Center for Modern Oriental Studies) in Berlin. The
book discusses various types of madrasahs; traditional, modern and the Salafi,
in the different countries in Asia. Some elements of the madrasah, such as
the curriculum, methods of learning, institutional reforms, and networks are
discussed in the book. Madrasah networks have connected them to the wider
14 Robert W. Hefner (ed.), Making Modern Muslims: The Politics of Islamic Education in
Southeast Asia, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009.
15 Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim (eds). Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics
of Modern Muslim Education, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007.
16 Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen, The Madrasa in Asia,
Political Activism and Transnational Linkages, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University
Press, 2008.
8
WHO IS SALAFI?
world and enable them to communicate with their counterparts both in their
home countries and outside.
Like pesantrens and madrasahs, the contemporary Salafi movement has
received serious attention in scholarly works. The first extensive work of the
contemporary Salafi movement in Indonesia is no doubt Noorhaidi Hasan’s
Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia.
It portrays the origins, development, and fragmentation of Salafism and
Salafis’ engagement in the jihad in conflict areas in the Moluccas. Focusing on
the Laskar Jihad, the author discusses not only the drama of jihad itself, but
also the processes of mobilizing support, including getting fatwas from Salafi
sheikhs in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, Muslims’ support in the home country, and
warrior recruitment. The author has paid much attention to the key actors in
the jihad. He demonstrates that the jihad in the Moluccas was viable because of
the availability of the theological basis for the jihad (fatwas, religious opinions
from Muslim scholars) and Muslims’ support in the home country. One of the
interesting conclusions the author draws is that the Salafi doctrine on the
obedience to ruler was not strong enough; once the Salafis had opportunity to
exercise power, they abused it.
Roel Meijer has edited Global Salafism17 that provided us with a comprehensive
understanding of movement. The work is based on papers presented in the
three-day conference on Salafism held in 2007 collaboratively by Radboud
University, Nijmegen, and ISIM, Leiden, the Netherlands, in which many experts
on Salafism took part. The significance of this book lies in its discussion of all
aspects connected with the Salafi movement in the world, including its basic
principles and doctrines, the various types of Salafism (quietist, politico and
jihadist), and the various movements of Salafism that exist worldwide.
A more recent work on Salafism is Zoltan Pall’s Lebanese Salafis between the Gulf
and Europe.18 It discusses the emergence of the Salafi movement in Tripoli and
Northern Lebanon, and its fragmentation into “purist” and “haraki” (activist).
In his research, Pall discovered that the first group of Salafis is supported by the
Kuwait-based foundation, the Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath, while the “haraki” group
received generous funds from the Qatar-based Sheikh Eid Charity Foundation.
Both foundations also have operated to support Salafi movements elsewhere in
the Muslim world, including in Indonesia. More interesting is Pall’s criticism
17 Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism, London: Hurst and Company, 2009.
18 Zoltan Pall, Lebanese Salafis Between the Gulf and Europe, Amsterdam: Amsterdam
University Press, 2012
9
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
of Quintan Wiktorowicz’s typology of the Salafi movements that classifies
them into “purist”, “politico” and “jihadi”. After criticizing this typology, Pall
proposes a new classification that categorizes them into “purist” and “haraki”
with subdivisions of each.
While the above works on pesantrens discuss traditional and modern
pesantrens, studies on Salafism consider Salafism as a social and religious
movement. As a movement, as Hasan has shown, Salafism to a certain degree
discusses the political affairs. Most studies on Salafism, however, have ignored
Salafi educational institutions, Salafi pesantrens and madrasahs. A Salafi
pesantren is an institution that teaches Salafism systematically, prepares a
Salafi generation and produces Salafi preachers. It is the nest where Salafism is
nurtured, preserved, and practiced by its adherents in their daily life. Indeed,
Hasan’s article “The Salafi Madrasa in Indonesia”19 provides us with a general
overview on Salafi pesantrens in the country. However, due to spatial constraint
the author fails to discuss many aspects of the Salafi pesantren.
The Focus of this Study
This study is about Salafi pesantrens. I have visited 14 Salafi pesantren
but I focus especially on three pesantrens in Java, namely, al-Nur al-Atsari in
Banjarsari, Ciamis, West Java; Assunnah in Cirebon, West Java, and al-Furqan,
Sidayu, Gresik, East Java. As educational institutions, Salafi pesantrens
have developed an educational system that includes educational programs,
curriculum, textbooks and materials, as well as methods of learning. Questions
on these matters include: What are the programs pesantrens offer? What kind
of curriculum do the pesantrens develop? What are the books pesantrens use?
What kind of methods does the pesantren adopt in transferring knowledge?
In this study, I address all these matters. However, there is another important
question concerning the internalization of the Salafi manhaj in the daily life of
the students. The Salafi manhaj includes not only the way of thought in religious
matters, but also way of conduct in daily life. The students in pesantrens not
only study Salafism, but also put it into practice, such as by wearing a jalabiya,
keeping a long beard, avoiding isbal, and a specific etiquette in having meals. By
looking at the process of internalizing of the Salafi manhaj carefully, I analyse
the dynamics of the students’ life in pesantrens, the interaction between the
19 Noorhaidi Hasan, “The Salafi Madrasas of Indonesia”, in Farish A. Noor, Yoginder
Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen, The Madrasa in Asia, Political Activism and
Transnational Linkages, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008, pp. 247-274.
10
WHO IS SALAFI?
mudir (director), ustadhs (teachers) and santris (students), and the interaction
between individuals in the pesantrens and those outside. Unfortunately, during
my fieldwork, I was unable to access and interview santriwatis (female students)
and ustadhas (female teachers). Salafis strictly prohibit any contact between a
woman and non-mahram men (men whom a women may not marry). Because of
this constraint, a discussion of female Salafis is beyond this study.
As educational institutions, Salafi pesantrens are not passive and static, but
active and dynamic. They always respond to changing circumstances in order
to meet current needs. Salafi pesantrens, for example, must respond to the
government’s educational policies concerning materials to teach. Related to this
issue, in this study, I also analyse the responses of the pesantrens in order to cope
with these challenges. This response can be observed in their adjustment of the
programs they offered, and by the changes in the curriculum the pesantrens
adopt. On the other hand, I also observe the different community’s responses to
the emergence of Salafi pesantren in particular, and to the Salafi movement in
general.
It is important to realize that Salafi pesantrens are embedded in networks of
similar pesantrens, and thus are not isolated, but connected to their counterparts
both in Indonesia and abroad. The network of Salafi pesantrens is maintained
through collaborative actions, such as teacher exchanges. The Salafis also keep
in touch with their sheikhs in the Middle East by inviting them to teach in the
Salafi dawras in Indonesia. Other means of conserving this linkage is by sending
students to study with them and asking them various fatwas on cases happening
in the country. In addition to discussing the traditional network they have with
the Middle East, in this study, I also investigate new regional links in Southeast
Asia between Salafis in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.
Another important issue concerning the pesantrens is fundraising. The key
question in this matter is how Salafi pesantrens obtain their funds. Do they
receive financial support from international donors? My inquiry found that most
Salafi pesantrens receive financial support from international sources, both
from charity foundations and individuals. The Kuwaiti charitable foundation,
Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami, remains the main donor that grants large
sums of money to Salafi pesantrens and institutions. Smaller amounts of
money have been granted to Salafi institutions by the Qatari Sheikh Eid Charity
foundation. Moreover, Salafi pesantrens also have found individual donors. In
addition to international sources, Salafi pesantrens have mobilized their own
financial sources, such as though publications and tuition fees.
11
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
I also analyse the historical development of the Salafi movement in Indonesia.
Studying this aspect, I explore the dynamics of the movement in responding to
the social, religious and political settings of the country. In this context, we see,
for example, the creation of the Laskar Jihad by a group of Salafis to respond
to ethno-religious conflict in the Moluccas. Their different attitude towards
the government, as in the case of Laskar Jihad, has caused divisions among the
Salafis into so-called “purist”, “haraki” and “jihadi” groups. After all, studying
the Salafi movement in Indonesia cannot disregard the theological aspects of
Salafism. Thus, I also allocate a certain portion of this book to studying Salafism’s
theological debates and basic doctrines.
Method of collecting the data
This study employs an anthropological approach. To collect data, I spent
seventeen months doing fieldwork divided over two periods; the first was
conducted from mid-August 2008 to mid-April 2009, while the second was
carried out from mid-December 2009 to mid-September 2010. During the
first period, I visited fourteen Salafi pesantrens in Java. When visiting the
pesantrens, I stayed at the pesantrens and interviewed mudir and ustadhs, and
had informal talks with ustadhs (male students). My stay in the pesantrens gave
me the opportunity me to closely observe all santri activities in the pesantrens.
I participated in some of their activities, such as performing collective prayers
in the mosque, attending religious lectures in the morning after dawn prayer
or in the evening after sunset prayer, attending lessons in the classrooms, and
having meals together with ustadhs. My participation in these activities aimed
at observing exactly what happened during these activities: how teachers
delivered lectures; how they explained and elaborated on these the lesson; what
kind of questions students and other participants posed; how teachers reacted to
these questions; and what the ustadhs did during the lessons in the classrooms
and public lectures.
During my first fieldwork, I also visited Salafi and non-Salafi foundations
that supported the Salafi da’wa, such as the Lajna Khayriyya Mushtaraka and the
Dewan Da’wah, while I interviewed some prominent figures of the institutions. I
also attended Salafi public lectures held in various mosques in Jakarta, Cirebon,
Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Gresik. In such events, I observed the situation during
the lectures and had informal conversations with participants, asking them
about the reasons behind their interest in Salafism.
12
WHO IS SALAFI?
My findings from the first fieldwork brought me to focus on the
aforementioned pesantrens in the second fieldwork. In my view, these three
pesantrens are interesting because they have survived while encountering
serious challenges of the community, especially from local religious leaders.
Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari, for example, was attacked by villagers in 2002,
while Pesantren al-Furqan was dissolved by the sub-district authorities in 1994.
Having survived serious trouble, the pesantrens have grown and have developed
significantly and currently leave behind other traditional pesantrens in their
villages.
Different from the first fieldwork when I stayed in the pesantrens, during
the second fieldwork I did not stay in the pesantrens but resided in the house
of a villager. Nevertheless, I still visited the pesantrens, interviewed ustadhs,
making informal conversations with ustadhs and administrative staff members
in order to update my data. I applied this strategy in order to see objectively
the responses of the communities surrounding the pesantrens. Outside the
pesantrens, I interviewed the local leaders of Muslim organizations, such as
the Muhammadiyah, the NU, Persis, and Persatuan Umat Islam (PUI). I also had
informal talks with ordinary people, such as retailers in the traditional markets,
and observed how ordinary people reacted to the Salafis, examining whether or
not their responses different from their leaders.
During the second fieldwork, I also visited various Salafi pesantrens in
Makassar, South Sulawesi, and Batam, Riau Islands, in order to make comparisons
between Salafi pesantrens in Java and outside Java. In Makassar, I found the
Wahdah Islamiyyah, a Salafi group that adopted a form organization. Batam is
an important site to visit, since Salafis in this island have set up a strong network
with their counterparts in Singapore and Malaysia. The Hang radio station in
Batam Center plays an important role in this network since it reaches audiences
in Singapore and Johor Bharu, Malaysia. To confirm this network, I made a
short trip to Singapore. During this visit, I interviewed various Indonesian
young Salafis who studied at the Nanyang Technological University (NTU), and
I attended Salafi religious lessons in Kembangan delivered by Rasul Dahri, a
prominent Singaporean Salafi ustadh.
In addition to observation and interviews, there are also other primary
sources such as documents like CDs and DVDs that record Salafis’ lectures, leaflets
and booklets are the main references of the study. Salafi textbooks written by
Indonesian Salafi figures and Salafi periodicals are indeed important sources for
this study. In Salafi magazines, I found interesting articles representing Salafis’
13
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
opinion on contemporary issues, such as bank interest and working women. The
Internet was without doubt a vital source for this study. This is because all Salafi
groups, institutions and pesantrens, and even Salafi individuals have created
their own websites or blogs. Moreover, lectures on Salafism are now easily found
on YouTube. During this study, I also often listened to Salafi radio stations that
put on air various programs, such as public lectures, tartil (Qur’anic recitation),
and questions and answers on religious matters.
Research on Salafism is not always easy. During my study, I often faced suspicion
from Salafis asking about my intention why I was carrying out this study. My
affiliation with Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, which is regarded
by Salafis as a secular institution, and my study in the Netherlands, led them to
be careful in providing me with the information I needed. During the fieldwork,
I was forbidden to visit a Salafiya pesantren in Jember, East Java, because of my
study in the Netherlands. However, I am fortunate to be a Gontor alumnus . I found
many Gontor graduates who had become leading Salafi figures, such as Mubarak
Bamualim from Surabaya and Khatib Muwahhid from Ciamis. Bamualim introduced
me to Aunurrafiq Ghufran, the director of Pesantren al-Furqan in Gresik, and asked
him to welcome me in his pesantren. Meanwhile, Muwahhid, the leader of al-Nur
al-Atsari, let me visit his pesantren. Being myself a Gontor alumnus, I thus found its
network helpful in accessing Salafi pesantrens and institutions.
Structure of the Book
This book comprises of six chapters. Chapter One defines Salafism. It explains
the meaning of Salafism, Salafi, and the Salafis’ arguments concerning their claim
that the Salafi manhaj is the only true manhaj. After this definition, I continue
to elaborate on the basic principles of Salafism, followed by a discussion on the
fragmentation of Salafism. In the end, I provide a discussion on Salafism in the
context of mainstream Islam in Indonesia as represented by primary Muslim
groups, namely the Muhammadiyah, the NU, Persis, and al-Irsyad.
Chapter Two concerns the historical development of Salafism in Indonesia
and the resources mobilized by Salafis. In the discussion on the origins and
development of the Salafi movement, I employ various social movement theories,
namely Political Opportunity Structure (POS) and Resource Mobilization Theory
(RMT). Using these theories, I discuss the social and political setting of Indonesia
that enabled the Salafi movement to emerge. In the beginning, the Salafis
benefited from existing organizations such the Dewan Da’wah and al-Irsyad.
However, after gaining a sufficient number of followers, the Salafis started to
14
WHO IS SALAFI?
mobilize all possible means to support their da’wa, including organizing religious
gatherings, dawras, establishing Salafi institutions, publications, and others.
In the last part of this chapter, I pay attention to the transnational network of
Indonesian Salafis, both their traditional network to Middle Eastern countries,
and a newly established regional network in Southeast Asia.
In Chapter Three, I analyse the emergence of Salafi leaders as new religious
authorities who challenge established ones. I start this chapter with a discussion
on the theory of authority in general and religious authority in particular. Then I
continue to explain the social and political roles of Salafi ustadhs in the community.
To demonstrate the challenge Salafism poses to existing religious authority, I take
the case of mubahatha (discussion, dialogue) between Salafis and members of Persis
in the West Javanese region in Bandung, where each party elaborated and examined
the arguments of their belief in the fundamental sources of Islamic doctrines. I
conclude this chapter with analysing the social background of Salafi ustadhs.
Chapter Four analyses the development of Salafi pesantrens and the
community’s responses to them. My analysis starts with a discussion of early
Wahhabi-inspired pesantrens in Indonesia, followed by a description of the
history and the development of the three Salafi pesantrens that have become
the main subjects of this study. I also examine the dynamics of the community
in responding to the Salafi pesantrens, which varies from strong resistance to
acceptance. Muslims who are affiliated to reformist organizations such as the
Muhammadiyah and Persis activists tend to accept Salafism, while those who
are affiliated to the traditionalist NU tend to oppose it.
In Chapter Five, I discuss the ‘contents’ of the Salafi pesantrens. It analyses
various aspects related to the pesantrens, namely the programs they offer, their
curriculum, methods of learning, textbooks and the material students read, and
more importantly the ways pesantrens preserve and nurture the Salafi manhaj
and teach it to their students. In the pesantrens, the students not only study
Salafism, but also practice the Salafi manhaj in daily life. I conclude this chapter
with evaluating the influence of Salafi doctrines in the student’s life.
The last chapter deals with the changing attitudes of individuals after their
conversion to Salafism. There are three models of individuals’ behavioural
changes: “retreat” from the world, being a “reborn” Muslim, and the move
from having a radical attitude to a moderate stance towards the government.
However, the changes occur not only on the individual level, but also in the
community, especially when Salafis have created their own enclaves. An analysis
on these enclaves appears in the last part of this chapter.
15
Chapter One
Who is Salafi?
The term “Salafi” is much in vogue both among scholars of Islam and among a
wide range of Muslim activists who claim this name exclusively for themselves
(and thus deny its use to others). Traditionalist, reformist, but also liberal Muslims
have claimed to be followers of the al-Salaf al-salih, the ‘pious predecessors’.
Recently, scholars have begun to pay serious attention to the Salafi movement
worldwide. The main reason for this interest is the fact that although most
Salafis are quietist and non-political, some of them are jihadis. At present, Al
Qaeda is the best-known jihadi Salafi movement. Also in Indonesia there are a
number of small groups that adhere to a Salafi jihadi ideology. However, those
called Salafi in Indonesia adhere to the non-political tendency of Salafism. In
this chapter, I shall explore how one may describe Salafism and how this term
relates to other terms like Wahhabism. I shall discuss also the various claims
Indonesian Salafis make.
A. Defining Salafism: is Salafi the same as Wahhabi?
Who is Salafi?
The term “Salafi” derives from the verb, “salafa”, which means “to precede”,
and “salaf” means “predecessor”.1 A Salafi is a person who follows the manhaj
1
See, Ibn Mansur, Lisa al-‘Arab, Dar al-Malaria, Vol. 3, p. 2068; Yazid bin Abdul Qadir
Jawas, Muglia dengan Manhaj Salaf, Bogor: Pustaka At-Taqwa, 2008, p. 14.
17
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
(path) of the salaf, the first three generations of the Muslim community who are
perceived as exemplary Muslims following a famous hadith that says: “the best
of you are those of my own epoch (qarni), subsequently those who follow on,
then those who follow them....”2 Muslims usually refer to these three generations
when they speak of the al-Salaf al-salih: the Companions of the Prophet (sahaba),
their followers (tabi’un) and the followers of the followers (tabi’un al-tabi’in).
Muslims consider them the people who best understood Islamic doctrines
as they lived during or close to the time of the Prophet. The Prophet directly
guided the Companions and they witnessed the revelation and knew the context
in which it was revealed. According to the Salafis, Muslims are obliged to follow
the Salafi manhaj and adhere to Salafi views.
The term “manhaj” stems from the word “nahaja”, which means “to proceed”.3
It denotes the “method” and the “clear path”4 as the Qur’an [5:48] says: “We have
ordained a law and way of life for each of you”. Thus the “Salafi manhaj” is “the
straight and clear way of the application of religion in line with the Companions
of the Prophet”.5 The word “Salaf ” is often contrasted to the term “Khalaf ”
(which literally means “successor”) as seen in the expressions ‘ulama al-Salaf”
and ‘ulama al-Khalaf. While the former are associated with ‘ulamas who follow
the path of the first three generations of Muslims, the latter are identified as
contemporary Muslim scholars who follow the former.6
One reason for focusing on the earliest generations as models to be followed
is the awareness that in later times the umma had become divided into numerous
different groups. According to a widely accepted hadith, the Prophet predicted
that the umma would be divided into seventy-three sects of which only one will
be saved. All sects are destined for hell, except this single ‘saved group’ (al-firqa
al-najiya). Usually this sect is said to be the ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama’a, the ‘people
who follow the Prophet and belong to the Congregation’. Traditionalists have
consistently claimed this name for themselves but the Salafis also claim that
they are the true ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama’a. Another hadith relates who belong to
2
3
4
5
6
This translation is adopted from E. Chaumant, “Al-Salaf wa’l Khalaf ”, The
Encyclopaedia of Islam (EI), vol. VIII, Leiden: Brill, 1995, p. 900.
Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz,
1961, p. 1002.
Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-‘Arab, vol. 6, p. 4554. Abdul Hakim bin Amir Abdat, Lau Kaana
Khairan la Sabaquunaa Ilaihi, Jakarta: Pustaka Mu’awiyah bin Abi Sufyan, 2007, pp.
60-62.
Yazid Jawas, Mulia, p. 14.
E. Chaumant, “Al-Salaf wa’l Khalaf ”, p. 900.
18
WHO IS SALAFI?
the jama’a: “all the groups will go to hell except one, the group where I am and
my Companions are in it.”7 Yazid Jawas, a leading Indonesia Salafi, explains that
they were called the jama’a in the past, because they were united by their imam
on the true path, and did not want to leave the group.8
The Salafis have put forward several arguments derived from the Qur’an and
the hadith on the obligation to follow the Salafi manhaj. The first is Qur’an [2:67]: “Oh Allah! Guide us to the right way. The way of those whom You favoured;
not those who have earned Your wrath, or those who have lost the Way.” Quoting
Ibn Kathir in his Tafsir, the Salafis argue that the al-sirat al-mustaqim (right way)
has four connotations: the truth (al-haqq), Islamic religion (Islam), al-Qur’an and
the first two caliphs (Abu Bakr al-Siddiq and ‘Umar ibn Khattab). Their way of
reasoning is as follows: when a Muslim follows the Prophet and the examples of
Abu Bakr and ‘Umar this means that he or she accepts the truth, the religion of
Islam and the Qur’an. Thus, as Yazid Jawas, whom we shall encounter repeatedly
in this dissertation, puts it, the above verses contain the three fundamental
sources of Islamic doctrines: the Qur’an, the hadith and the examples of the
pious forerunners (al-Salaf al-salih).9 Yazid quotes another Qur’anic verse
[9:100] to support his argument. The verse reads: “As for the first pioneers who
embraced Islam, the muhajir (emigrants who followed the Prophet from Mecca
to Medina) and the ansar (supporters in Medina) and those who follow them in
good deeds, Allah is well pleased with them and they are pleased with Him. He
has prepared gardens beneath which rivers flow, wherein they shall live forever:
that is the mighty achievement.” The Salafis argue that Allah’s satisfaction with
the Companions implies that Muslims should follow their path.10
In addition to the Qur’an, the Salafis quote various hadiths to support their
claim on the obligation to follow the Salaf, like one that says: “O mankind! I have
left for you all, by which you will not deviate forever if you hold strongly the Book
of God and the sunna of His Prophet”.11 Another hadith reads: “It is an obligation
for you all to follow my sunna and the sunna of the rightly guided caliphs. O you
all, hold them strongly and bite it with molars, and keep away from innovations
(in religion), for each innovation is bid’a and all bid’a leads to hell”.12
7
8
Yazid Jawas, Mulia, p. 21.
Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, Syarah Aqidah Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah, Bogor: Pustaka
Imam Syafi’i, 2006. p. 37.
9 Yazid Jawas, Mulia, p. 55-57.
10 Yazid Jawas, Mulia, p. 15; Abdul Hakim Abdat, Lau Kaana, p. 122.
11 Yazid Jawas, Mulia, p. 95
12 Yazid Jawas, Mulia, p. 25.
19
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
On the basis of these textual arguments, the Salafis conclude that every
Muslim is obliged to follow the Salafi manhaj, the path of the pious predecessors.
For them, the Salafi manhaj is the third source of Islamic teachings after the
Qur’an and the hadith. Muslims’ return to the first two sources alone is not a
warranty that they will embrace true Islam because they still may go astray due
to a false understanding of these sources. It is this issue, the obligation to follow
the manhaj of the Salaf that constitutes the area of dispute between the Salafis
and reformist organizations like the Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam
(Persis). The debates to which the issue of the Salafi manhaj has given rise will
be reviewed in a later section of this chapter.
Salafis use various names to refer to themselves: ahl al-hadith (followers
of the Prophetic tradition), ahl al-athar (followers of the Prophetic tradition),
al-jama’a (congregation), ahl al-sunna wa al-jama’a (followers of sunna and
the congregation), jama’at al-muslimin (congregation of Muslims), al-firqa alnajiya (the saved group), al-ta’ifa al-mansura (the victorious group), ahl al-ittiba’
(followers) and al-ghuraba’(strangers). “Hadith” and “athar” mean almost the
same: the Prophetic tradition. Salafis are called ahl al-hadith or ahl al-athar
because they advocate a hadith-based interpretation of the Qur’an. In Islamic
history, the ahl al-hadith came up in the beginning of the second century of
the hijra. The term ahl al-hadith is often contrasted with ahl al-ra’y (followers
of rational judgment), which refers to those people who advocate a rational
interpretation of the Qur’an. Ahmad ibn Hanbal, the eponymous founder of
the Hanbali School of Islamic jurisprudence, is regarded as one of the strictest
advocates of the reliance on the hadith and of the rejection of the ra’y.13 The
ahl-i hadith came up in India and Pakistan in the late eighteenth century as a
movement calling on Muslims to return to refer to the Qur’an and the hadith
instead of referring to the four well-established schools of Islam.14 Al-Jama’a, as
stated above, means ‘Muslim community’. Al-Ta’ifa al-mansura (victorious group)
is close in meaning to al-firqa al-najiya (the saved group). As God will save the
Salafis from hell, they will be the only sect to enter paradise. The Salafis are
called the ahl al-ittiba’ (followers), since they usually use dalil (argument) and do
not engage in taqlid (blind imitation). The difference between ittiba’ and taqlid is
13 J. Schacht, “Ahl al-Hadith”, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. 1, Leiden:
Brill, 1986, pp. 258-259.
14 S.H. Inayatullah, “Ahl-i Hadith”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition, vol. 1, Leiden:
Brill, 1986 p. 259. See also, Stéphane Lacroix, “Between Revolution and Apoliticism:
Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism” in
Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism, London: Hurst and Company, 2009, pp. 61-62.
20
WHO IS SALAFI?
somewhat vague since ittiba’ may be considered a form of taqlid. However, the
former denotes that a person knows the source of the dalil, while the latter does
not. Salafis are labelled al-ghuraba’ because they are aliens to others. The term
corresponds to a hadith that says that Islam came as something alien and will
become alien again.15
Bernard Haykel summarizes the fundamental ideas of the Salafi da`wa as
follows: 1) the return to pristine Islam, as prescribed in the examples of the
al-Salaf al-salih; 2) an emphasis on certain highly specific doctrines concerning
tawhid (rububiyya, uluhiyya and al-asma’ wa al-sifat); 3) the struggle against shirk
(polytheism); 4) the claim that the Qur’an, the hadith and the consensus of the
Companions (ijma’ al-sahaba) are the only valid sources of Islamic law; 5) cleansing
the Muslim community from all religious innovations; and 6) advocating a
literal interpretation of the Qur’an and the hadith in order to guide Muslims
in their life.16 Added to these characteristics is the unconditional respect for
the Companions. Although the Salafis do not believe that the Companions were
infallible (ma’sum), they do prohibit Muslim from insulting them.17 Instead of
discussing the disputes among the Companions of the Prophet, such as the case
of the jamal fitna (camel war, the civil war between the Companions), Salafis opt
to avoid the discussion by arguing that it was subject to the Companions’ ijtihad.
Salafism and Wahhabism
Some scholars make no distinction between Salafism and Wahhabism
and simply consider the former a new manifestation of the latter. The name
“Salafi” has come to be preferred, they claim, because of the negative views
many Muslims have of Wahhabism.18 To many Muslims, the term Salafi seems to
sound less threatening than Wahhabism. The supporters of the Salafi movement
strongly reject the name Wahhabi because it points to Muhammad ibn `Abd alWahhab and thus suggests the veneration of a human being. The influence of
Wahhabism – in the restricted sense of the movement Muhammad ibn `Abd al15 Abdul Qadir Jawas, Syarah Aqidah, p. 39.
16 Bernard Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action”, in Roel Meijer (ed.),
Global Salafism, London: Hurst and Company, 2009, pp. 38-39.
17 Interview with Aunurrafiq Ghufran, director of Pesantren al-Furqan, Gresik, 26
December 2009.
18 Noorhaidi Hasan, “The Salafi Movement in Indonesia: Transnational Dynamics and
Local Development” in Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East,
vol. 27, No. 1, 2007, p. 8.
21
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Wahhab inspired that took control of Mecca in the late 18th and again in the early
20th century – on contemporary Salafism needs to be more critically explored.
Tracing its history is one way of gaining a proper understanding of Wahhabism.
Wahhabism is a movement that pays enormous attention to the purification of
Islam by cleansing it from all that is not supported by the Qur’an, the hadith
or the practice of the al-Salaf al-salih. Unlike other reformist movements that
came up in the twentieth century as reactions to Western colonialism, this
eighteenth century movement was a response to internal conditions within the
Muslim community itself.19 In this century, Muslims indulged in local traditions
that were alien to pristine Islam such as visiting the shrines of saints. At the
time, Muslims believed that a saint was endowed with the spiritual power to
mediate between them and God. Wahhabism calls on Muslims to purify their
creed and their religious practices from these local traditions that are alien to
Islam. Although reformist Muslims faced the same situation in the twentieth
century, the reform movement at the time was very much influenced by Western
colonialism. As a result, reformist figures addressed ideas and practices that had
been developed in the West such as women’s rights and bank interest. In Egypt,
pioneers of Islamic modernism such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad
Abduh and Rashid Rida clearly discussed these matters in their thoughts.20
Confronted with this situation, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab called on Muslims to renew
their tawhid by ridding their belief from local practices. He was forced to move
from one place to another due to threats from existing ‘ulama, before he finally
entered into an alliance with local tribal leaders. He allied with Uthman ibn Hamid
ibn Mu’ammar and they agreed to support each other in matters pertaining to
religion and politics. Gaining political impetus, in his da’wa, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab
started to resort to violent actions like demolishing tombs, cutting down trees
to avoid spirit veneration and such like.21 This collaboration ended when the
more powerful leader Sulayman ibn Muhammad challenged Ibn Mu’ammar and
put pressure on him to expel his ally. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab subsequently went to
Dir’iya where he gained support from its local leader, Muhammad ibn Su’ud. The
two men entered into a mutual oath of loyalty (bay’a) to support each other: the
latter would support the religious teaching of the former, while the former would
19 Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, from Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, London:
IB Tauris, 2004, pp. 7-8.
20 On these three reformist figures, see Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age
1798-1939, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
21 Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, pp. 21-22.
22
WHO IS SALAFI?
show his allegiance to the political power of the latter. In 1744, this coalition led to
the creation of the first Saudi State.22 This agreement continues into the modern
period as Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s heirs maintain their religious privilege in return
for their support to Ibn Su’ud’s heirs in their political positions.
Thus, what distinguishes Wahhabism from other Islamic movements is its
use of force and violent actions in its da’wa. Wahhabism elaborated on the
concepts of takfir (excommunication), hijra (migration) and jihad. Takfir means
labelling as kafir (unbelievers) those Muslims who fail to perform their daily
religious duties. According to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, any Muslim who invokes the
help of a dead person or makes vows to holy men violates his faith and commits
major idolatry (shirk akbar). Moreover, any Muslim who fails to consider these
practice idolatry is dubbed kafir as well. Such Muslims must either repent to
God or be killed.23 Later, after Sayyid Qutb, the doctrine was often applied to
Muslim rulers who failed to implement Islamic law but preferred to enact manmade laws. This resulted in political turbulence as it legalized rebellion against
the legitimate ruler. 24 Hijra means that Muslims should move from an “infidel”
community to a pious, Islamic one. Jihad in Islamic discourse is defined as the
“exertion of one’s power in Allah’s path, that is, the spread of belief in Allah and
making His word supreme over this world.”25 In spite of this extensive meaning
of jihad, fundamentalists prefer to limit its meaning to holy war or to the fight
against any social system that contradicts Islamic law. Jihad is closely linked to
the concept of al-amr bi al-ma’ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar (commanding right
and forbidding wrong).26 By elaborating these concepts, Wahhabism wants to
legitimize its political goals. In case a ruler is labelled takfir, Wahhabism urges
Muslims to either leave their country or wage war against him.
The Saudi ruler has adopted Wahhabism as a religious ideology. It provides
the religious bases of the state, its political reality and its laws. In Saudi Arabia,
the ruler often uses Wahhabism as a political tool in order to provide his policies
22 Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, p. 34; Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic
Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007: p. 46.
23 David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, London and New York: I.B.
Tauris, 2006, p. 24.
24 Ahmad Mousalli, “Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who Is the Enemy?”, A
Conflict Forum Monograph, Beirut, London and Washington: January 2009, pp. 6-7.
25 Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1955, p. 55.
26 Rudolph Peters, “Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History”,
PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, 1979, p. 119.
23
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
with a religious foundation.27 In the 1990s, for example, the official Saudi ‘ulama
issued a fatwa legitimizing the ruler’s invitation of the infidel US army forces and
their allies to protect the holy land from the Iraqi invasion.28 As a consequence,
Wahhabism has granted the Saudi ruler his citizen’s unconditional loyalty,
which subsequently has become one of Wahhabism’s central doctrines. Here we
see the doctrine changing from takfir to loyalty.
Salafism emerged earlier in the second century after the hijra. It appeared
in the ahl-i hadith movement that opposed the ahl al-ra’y. Salafism differs from
Wahhabism as the former uses acts of non-violence whereas the latter tends
to resort to violence as became evident in the early phase of the Wahhabi
movement. However, Salafism calls on Muslims at the grassroots level to purify
their creed and to cleanse their religious practices in the hope that the Islamic
community will materialize when all elements of the community have resorted
to the Salafi manhaj. In order to achieve this end, the Salafi apply the means of
tarbiya (education) and tasfiya (purification).29
Salafi teaching encompasses more than that of Wahhabism. Wahhabis mainly
refer to the works of their eponymous sheikh, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab
and of three earlier scholars, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Ahmad ibn Taymiyya, and
Muhammad ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya. It is clear that these works, particularly
those of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab on the Islamic creed (‘aqida), constitute Salafism’s
main teachings. This explains the great influence Wahhabism has over Salafism.
Even in Indonesia, some Salafi teachers have no objection to the use of the
label Wahhabism to designate their movement.30 Moreover, some Salafis have
written books in defence of Wahhabism’s founder.31 They contend that ibn Abd
al-Wahhab’s da’wa was Salafi as it called on Muslims to return to the Qur’an
and the hadith.32 However, Salafism expands its references to other scholars
who took the path of the al-Salaf al-salih, such as Abu Muhammad al-Hasan ibn
27 Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, p. 4.
28 Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, p. 36.
29 Zainal Abidin bin Syamsudin, Buku Putih Dakwah Salafiah, Jakarta: Pustaka Imam
Abu Hanifah, 2009, pp. 174-180.
30 Interview with Ja’far Sholeh, director of Pesantren Salafiyah, Depok, August, 2008.
31 At least two books clarifying this matter circulate in Indonesia: Muhammad ibn
Jamil Zainu, Mitos Wahhabi, Yogyakarta: al-Husan, 2010; and Abu Ubaidah Yusuf asSidawi, Meluruskan Sejarah Wahhabi, Gresik: Pustaka al-Furqan, 1427 H (2007). While
the first book is a translation from an Arabic work written by a prominent Salafi
scholar, the latter is written by an Indonesian Salafi teacher.
32 Yazid Jawas, Mulia, p. 425.
24
WHO IS SALAFI?
‘Ali ibn Khalaf al-Barbahari (the author of Sharh al-Sunna) and Muhammad ibn
Idris al-Shafi’i, the founder of the Shafi’ite school. The Salafis also list the most
authoritative hadith collections, Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim among their
references. They even study and teach al-Nawawi’s works Riyad al-Salihin and alArba’in al-Nawawi, which are commonly found in traditional pesantrens and are
used in majelis taklim (religious gatherings).
B. The Basic Principles and Characteristics of the Salafi Manhaj
Salafis have developed the basic doctrines of the Salafi manhaj. They give
priority to ‘aqida (creeds) over fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). For them, ‘aqida is
more essential than fiqh because the former will lead Muslims to the performance
of the correct rituals. Salafis believe that true ‘aqida will result in the glory of the
Muslims. The following passages will discuss some of Salafism’s basic principles
and characteristics which include tawhid, following the sunna, being opposed to
bid’a and al-wala’ wa al-bara’, and obedience to the ruler. While all Salafis agree
with the first three doctrines, some Salafi groups object to the use of the fourth
as a guide regulating Muslims’ attitude towards government.
Tawhid
Tawhid (monotheism) is central to the teaching of Islam. According to
Islam, all Semitic religions are based on this essential doctrine. The first call
that Muhammad made to the people during his da’wa in Mecca was to tawhid.
Tawhid means the Oneness of God or the belief in one God. Salafis have divided
the concept of tawhid into three aspects: tawhid rububiyya (Oneness of Lordship),
tawhid uluhiyya (Oneness of Godship), and tawhid al-asma’ wa sifat (Oneness of
Names and Attributes). For Salafis, belief in all three aspects is crucial and the
belief in one God alone is insufficient for Muslims. Later, the jihadist added a
fourth aspect of tawhid, tawhid mulkiyya or hakimiyya (Oneness of Governance).
Muslims traditionally do not make a distinction between these aspects. Rather,
they simply believe in one God as the manifestation of the shahada (Islamic
confession), that “there is no god but Allah”. They also believe in the ninetynine Names and twenty Attributes of God.
Tawhid rububiyya is the belief that God is the only Lord, the Creator of the
universe, and the One who provides a livelihood to all His creatures in the
universe.33 The Qur’anic verses, [23: 86-89], read:
33 Yazid Jawas, Syarah Aqidah, p. 146.
25
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
“Say: ‘who is the Lord (Rabb) of the seven heavens and the Lord of the
Mighty Throne?’ They will say: “(They belong) to Allah.” Say: “Will ye not
then fear?” Say: “Who is it in whose hand is the sovereignty of all things,
Who protects (all), but is not protected (of Any)? (Say) if you know.” They
will say: “(It belongs) to Allah.” Say: “Then how are ye deluded?”
These verses imply that all human beings hold this belief including
unbelievers; Salafis contend that this type of tawhid is insufficient for Muslims.34
Based on these and other similar verses, Salafis urge Muslims to embrace higher
levels of tawhid, specifically tawhid uluhiyya and tawhid al-asma’ wa al-sifat.
Tawhid uluhiyya is the belief that only God should be subject to human
worship. This type of tawhid marks a sharp distinction between Muslims and
unbelievers and polytheists. This pillar of tawhid is the manifestation of the
Islamic confession, la ilaha illa Allah. In contrast to the common translation of
this phrase into “there is no god but God”, Salafis interpret it as “there is no
god to be rightly worshipped but Allah.”35 This is in line with Qur’anic verse, 1:5,
“Thee do we worship and Thee do we seek aid.”
Tawhid al-asma’ wa al-sifat is the belief in the literal meaning of Allah’s
Names and Attributes. The Salafis contend that all the Attributes of Allah should
be accepted as they are without ta’til, tahrif or ta’wil, takyif, tashbih and tafwid.36
Thus, the Qur’anic verses describing God’s Attributes such as His Face, His Hand
and His Chair should be understood literally. Furthermore, unlike rationalist
Muslims, Salafis contend that Muslims are not allowed to interpret them as
“power”, for example. Salafis equate the Attribute to the Essence (Dhat) of Allah
and therefore questioning the Attributes of Allah means questioning the Essence
of Allah, something prohibited for Muslims.
34 Yazid Jawas, Syarah Aqidah, p. 151.
35 Yazid Jawas, Syarah Aqidah, p. 132. See also, Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay,
New York: Islamic Publications International, 2002, pp. 31-32.
36 Ta’til means to negate or deny some of God’s Attributes. Tahrif or ta’wil means to
change the literal meaning of God’s Attributes or to interpret them into other
more rational meanings. Takyif means to pose further questions about what the
God’ Attributes are. Tashbih is to compare the Attributes of God to those of living
creatures like human beings, thus equating God’s attributes to those of human
beings. Tafwid means not to decide the meaning of God’s Attributes as prescribed in
the Holy Book and accepted hadiths. See, Yazid Jawas, Syarah Aqidah, p. 132, note no.
218, 219, 220, and 221. See also, Muhammadi bin Jamil Zainu, al-Firqatun al-Najiyah:
Jalan Hidup Golongan Selamat, Yogyakarta: Media Hidayah, 2003, pp. 32-33.
26
WHO IS SALAFI?
Salafis understanding of God’s Names and Attributes is in part similar to that
of the Ash’arite, a traditionalist Islamic theology to which the majority of Muslims
in Indonesia adhere. The Salafis and the Ash’arite share similar beliefs: that God
has Names and Attributes and that they do not interpret when they encounter
anthropomorphic Attributes of God (bila kayfa). They, however, differ in defining
God’s Names and Attributes. While Salafis equate the Names and Attributes, the
Ash’arite distinguishes between them. As result, they disagree in the quantity of
God’s Names and Attributes. On the one hand, the Ash’arite believe that God has
ninety nine Names (al-asma’ al-husna) as mentioned in the Qur’an, and summarize
God’s Attributes to twenty, such as wujud (Existence), baqa’ (Eternal) and irada
(Powerful).37 However, Salafis believe that there are many more Attributes.
Meanwhile, tawhid mulkiyya or hakimiyya means that God is the only
Ruler of the universe. Human beings have no right to make new laws but are
only entitled to implement what has been prescribed in the Qur’an and by the
examples of the Prophet. The hakimiyya concept was developed by the Pakistani
thinker Abul A’la al-Maududi and later adopted by Egyptian activist Sayyid Qutb,
the ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the Salafi majority refutes
this dimension arguing that this element is already included in the first part of
tawhid, tawhid al-rububiyya.
Following Sunna (Ittiba’ al-Sunna) and Opposing Bid’a
Sunna literally means “way, method, and path” which accords with a
hadith that reads as follows: “Whoever creates a good path (tradition) in Islam
will receive a reward for doing so and reward from who follows this method.
Whoever creates a bad way, he will accept punishment from it and punishment
from who imitates this way.”38 Sunna here refers to the true religious way or
method of thought and practices in accordance with the ways of the Prophet and
his Companions.39 Furthermore, Salafis maintain that the sunna is identical to
37 In Indonesia, the Ash’arite theological doctrines are summarized, for example, in
a booklet called the Kitab Perukunan Melayu, which is commonly found among the
Muslim community. See, for example, Yayasan Sosial dan Penerangan Islam, Kitab
Perukunan Melayu Besar, Jakarta: M. A. Jaya, n.d. While the main contents relate to
fiqh, the book also includes the twenty Attributes of God.
38 Abd al-Salam bin Salim al-Suhaymi, Menjadi Salafy Sejati, Yogyakarta: Pustaka alHaura’, 1429 (2009), pp. 39-40.
39 Abdul Hakim bin Amir Abdat, Risalah Bid’ah, Jakarta: Pustaka Mu’awiyah bin Abi
Sufyan, 2004, p. 37. See also, Abd al-Salam bin Salim al-Suhaymi, Menjadi Salafy
Sejati, pp. 39-41.
27
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Islam. Al-Barbahari says: “Islam is sunna and sunna is Islam. Each cannot stand
firmly without the support of the other.”40 This phrase explains the significance
of the sunna. Abdul Hakim Abdat, a leading Salafi scholar in Indonesia, explains
that a Muslim cannot truly understand correctly and implement the Islamic
doctrines without referring to the sunna, the utterances and the practices of
the Prophet.41
The sunna is the opposite of bid’a (innovation). In line with its original meaning
as “a new creation that has no precedence”,42 the term bid’a is commonly defined
as “a new creation in religious matters.” Some Salafis define bid’a in a wider sense
as “a new innovation in religious matters seemingly equal to the shari’a in order
to excessively worship God.”43 This definition suggests that bid’a is seen as similar
to the shari’a, and many Muslims have posited religious arguments to support this.
However, Salafis believe that such definition is totally against the shari’a.
The starting point for the discussion of bid’a is the view that Islam is a complete
religion and, therefore, does not need additional ritual or thought. The totality of
Islam has been stated definitely in the Qur’an [5:3]: “Today I have perfected your
religion for you, completed my favour upon you and approved al-Islam as din (way
of life for you)”. This argument is supported by a Prophetic tradition that reads:
“any religious action without an earlier example of the Prophet is reputed.”44
Salafis classify bid’a into two categories: bid’a haqiqiyya (essential bid’a) and
bid’a idafiyya (additional bid’a). The first type refers to a bid’a that has no basis
at all in the Qur’an, the hadith, ijma’ (consensus), and the opinions of the ‘ulama.
An example of this type is a person who admits that he has received a revelation
from God after the Prophet Muhammad. The second type of bid’a is a bid’a that
appears to have a basis in religious argument, but, in fact, does not. The practice
of traditional Muslims of gathering every Thursday evening to read sura Yasin
falls into this category. While the shari’a prescribes the recitation of the Qur’an,
the recital of a specific Sura during a particular time has no basis in Islam.45
40 Abu Muhammad al-Hasan ibn Ali ibn Khalaf al-Barbahari, Sharh al-Sunna, Riyad:
Dar al-Sami’i, 2007, p. 59.
41 Abdul Hakim Abdat, Lau Kaana, p. 56.
42 Ali ibn Hasan ibn Abd al-Hamid al-Halabi al-Atsary, Mengupas Tuntas Akar Bid’a dalam
Timbangan Al-Qur’an dan Sunnah”, Bekasi: Pustaka Imam Adz-Dzahabi, 2009, p. 19.
43 Ali ibn Hasan al-Atsari, Mengupas Tuntas, p. 20.
44 Ali ibn Hasan al-Atsari, Mengupas Tuntas, p. 23. Also, Abdul Hakim Abdat, Risalah
Bid’ah, p. pp. 47-48.
45 Ali ibn Hasan al-Atsari, Mengupas Tuntas, pp. 135-136; also, Abdul Hakim Abdat,
Risalah Bid’ah, pp. 92-93.
28
WHO IS SALAFI?
In addition to the above classification, Salafis also divide bid’a into bid’a
i’tiqadiyya (creedal bid’a) and bid’a ‘amaliyya (bid’a of religious practice or ritual).
While the former relates to theological doctrine that does not correspond with
the belief of the Prophet and his Companions, the second concerns religious
practices that have no roots in early Islam as practiced by the al-Salaf al-salih.46
Both categories of bid’a are haram. Some bid’a may lead Muslims to polytheism
such as tawassul (intercession), asking for God’s mercy through a mediator,
particularly through dead pious Muslims.
Most bid’a fall into the bid’a idafiyya category. To fight against bid’a is harder
than to fight against sinful actions. Every Muslim believes that adultery and theft
are sins, and as a result it is easy to ask Muslims not to do these things. By contrast,
not every Muslim is aware of bid’a, and, in fact, many Muslims believe that their
religious practices are true and right and supported by religious arguments.47
Consequently, many Muslims are keen to defend their religious practices.
Salafis are very strict in their denouncement of bid’a. All religious thoughts
and practices that have no roots in the Qur’an, the hadith and the examples
of the Companions are categorized as bid’a. Their dedication to combatting
bid’a includes not only the fight against popular religious traditions such as the
commemoration of the Prophet’s birthday (mawlid al-nabiy) and tahlilan (Qur’anic
recitation combined with the chanting of other religious formulas) at the
commemoration of the death of a person on certain days, but also encompasses
the new tradition of enhancing Islamic symbols such as the Musabaqa Tilawat
al-Qur’an (MTQ, Qur’anic Recitation Competition).48
There are a number of reasons why bid’a is committed: ignorance of the
sources of Islamic law, following one’s own passion when interpreting Islamic law,
and using reason to define Islamic law.49 Ignorance often leads Muslims to taqlid
(blind imitation) and ta’assub madhhabiy (fanatically following a particular school
of thought).50 Taking these reasons into account, Salafis do not condemn every
person who commits bid’a as ahl al-bid’a (the people of bid’a). In their view, only
46 Abdul Hakim Abdat, Risalah Bid’ah, pp. 93-94.
47 Abdul Hakim bin Amir Abdat, Hukum Tahlilan, Jakarta: Pustaka Mu’awiyah bin Abi
Sufyan, 2009, pp. 11-12.
48 In his book, Risalah Bid’ah, Abdul Hakim Abdat identifies more than 500 religious
practices and thoughts that are regarded as bid’a. It deals with religious, social and
political aspects.
49 Ali ibn Hasan ibn Abd al-Hamid al-Halabi al-Atsary, Mengupas Tuntas Akar Bid’a, pp.
38-42.
50 Abdul Hakim Abdat, Hukum Tahlilan, pp. 18-19.
29
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
those people who have sufficient knowledge of Islam but still commit bid’a and
even encourage fellow Muslims to do the same, are considered ahl al-bid’a. Salafis
believe that these people deserve special treatment: they should be subjected
to isolation (al-hajr) and banned from having contact with fellow Muslims.
Furthermore, Muslims should not greet them or even smile at them when they
meet them.51 Moreover, Muslims should not heed their calls and not attend their
debates and discussions since doing so may awaken doubts about Islam. The aim
of these sanctions is to make the people of bid’a return to true Islam.
Al-Wala’ wa al-Bara’
Closely related to the concept of tawhid is the concept of al-wala’ wa al-bara’
which means “alliance and disassociation”. While al-wala’ etymologically means “to
love, help, follow and approach something”, the term al-bara’ means “to distance,
cleanse, escape from, and hate.”52 Thus the concept of al-wala’ wa al-bara’ bears
the meaning of love and hate for sake of Allah. It implies that true Muslims should
love and help their fellow Muslims, defend the interest of Islam (al-wala’) while at
the same time criticize and condemn infidels and un-Islamic ways of living while
making every effort to protect themselves from infidel corruption (al-bara’).53
As Joas Wagemakers has shown, the concept of al-wala’ wa al-bara’ has
existed since pre-Islamic Arab times when Arab ethnic groups were in conflict
forcing them to enter into alliances among themselves. The advent of Islam
did not wipe out the concept; rather, it kept it alive. The Kharijites made use
of al-wala’ wa al-bara’ for the first time following the conflict between ‘Ali and
Mu’awiyah. The Kharijites made a clear-cut boundary between its in-group and
the others. After Sunni scholars had regarded it as religious innovation (bid’a)
for centuries, Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) reconstituted the idea. Although he did
not use the concept al-wala’ wa al-bara’, he made a clear distinction between
true Muslims and non-Muslims. He was aware of the influence of non-Muslim
cultures on Muslims and warned them not to deviate from the true path. Muslims
were cautioned to distinguish themselves from non-Muslims including in their
way of dress.54 From that moment on, Sunni scholars adopted the concept and it
51 Abdul Hakim Abdat, Risalah Bid’ah, p. 277.
52 Yazid Jawas, Prinsip Dasar Islam, pp. 221-222.
53 Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New
Order Indonesia, New York: Cornell University, 2006, p. 138.
54 Joas Wagemakers, “The Transformation of a Radical Concept: al-Wala’ wa-l-bara’ in
the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, in Roel Meijer, Global Salafism, pp. 82-
30
WHO IS SALAFI?
has since been developed by contemporary radical thinkers such as Juhayman
al-‘Utaybi, the leader of a radical group that rebelled against their king and
who occupied the Grand mosque of Mecca in 1979,55 Yusuf al-‘Uyairi and Abu
Muhammad al-Maqdisi.56 Unlike mainstream official ‘ulama who supported the
Saudi rulers, al-‘Utaybi, for example, extended the meaning of the concept of alwala’ wa al-bara’ to include hijra and qital. Moreover, the Palestinian-Jordanian
thinker, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi extended the concept to include the notion
of takfir (labelling other Muslims as kafir). He uses the concept of takfir to
denote those Muslim rulers who refuse to apply the laws of God.57 Meanwhile, al‘Uyairi makes the adoption of the concept of al-wala’ wa al-bara’ a precondition
for exercising revolutionary jihad.58
The concept derives from Qur’anic verses, like 3:28:
“Let not the believers take for friends or helpers unbelievers rather
than believers; if any does that shall have no relation left with Allah,
except by way of precaution, that ye may guard yourselves from them.
But Allah cautions you (to fear) Himself, for the final goal is to Allah”.
Another Qur’anic verse, 60:4, says:
“There is for you an excellent example (to follow) in Ibrahim (Abraham)
and those with him, when they said to their people: ‘We are clear of
you and whatever ye worship besides Allah: we have rejected you and
there has arisen between us and you enmity and hatred forever unless
ye believe in Allah and him alone.’ But not when Abraham said to his
father: “I will pray for forgiveness for thee, though I have no power (to
get) aught on thy behalf from Allah.” (They prayed): “Our Lord! In Thee
86; Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad, p. 140.
55 On the rebel movement of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, see for example, Thomas
Hegghammer and Stéphane Lacroix, “Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The
Story of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi Revisited”, in International Journal of Middle East Studies,
39, 2007, pp. 109-113.
56 On al-Maqdisi’s view of al-wala’ wa al-bara’, see a comprehensive account on his
thought by Joas Wagemakers, “A Quietist Jihadi-Salafi: The Ideology and Influence
of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi”, PhD thesis, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, 2010,
especially chapters 6 and 7, pp. 151- 192.
57 Joas Wagemakers, “The Transformation of a Radical Concept, pp. 92-93; Joas
Wagemakers, “A Purist Jihadi-Salafi: The Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi”,
in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 36 (2), 2009, p. 289.
58 Roel Meijer, “Yusuf al-‘Uyairi and the Making of a Revolutionary Salafi Praxis”, Die
Welt des Islams, 47, 2007, p. 445.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
do we trust and to Thee do we turn in repentance. To Thee is (our) final
return.”
Based on these verses, Salafis contend that the doctrine of al-wala’ wa albara’ is indispensable to religion. It forms part of the tawhid as a manifestation
of the Islamic confession, “la ilaha illa Allah”. They believe that the concept
should be practiced daily in faith, utterance, and action.59 This includes, among
other things, not helping non-Muslims, not attending non-Muslim religious
festivals, not greeting non-Muslims, not imitating the habits and customs of
the unbelievers, not being loyal to unbelievers, and leaving infidel countries.60
However, enmity and hatred towards unbelievers should not lead Muslims to
behave in a hostile way towards them. Muslims, for example, are allowed to
make a peaceful agreement with non-Muslims, and to do business with them.61
The Salafis implement the doctrine of al-wala’ wa al-bara’ in a strict manner:
it is applied not only towards non-Muslim but also to other Muslims. Salafis
limit their interaction with other Muslims. For instance, during a Friday sermon
delivered at Pesantren Al-Nur al-Atsari, a khatib (preacher) advised the jama’a
to abandon their friends, groups and organizations that adhere to a different
manhaj.62 They have to adopt this attitude in order to firmly observe the Salafi
manhaj. Association with others may instil doubt in the hearts of Salafis. Thus,
some Salafis do not even greet their fellow Muslims.
Obedience to the ruler
Although not agreed to by all Salafis, the doctrine of the people’s obedience to
the ruler is a pivotal Salafi doctrine in relation to Muslims’ attitudes towards the
government. The idea of submission to the government is almost absolute and can
only be ignored for very fundamental reasons of faith. There is, no doubt, a small
group of Salafis who object to this doctrine and who support the takfir idea as
discussed above. This objection, however, does not detract from the significance of the
dominant Salafi doctrine concerning allegiance to the ruler. Madawi al-Rasheed has
noted that in Saudi Arabia, the doctrine of obedience to the ruler dates back to 1929
after the ikhwan’s rebellion against the then Saudi ruler, Abd al-Aziz ibn Su’ud. Ibn
59 Yazid Jawas, Prinsip Dasar Islam, pp. 223.
60 Yazid Jawas, Prinsip Dasar Islam, pp. 220-238; Yazid Jawas, Sharh Aqidah, pp. 502-509;
Muhammad Saeed al-Qahtani, al-Wala’ Wa’l-Bara’ According to the ‘Aqeedah of the Salaf,
part 3, London: al-Firdous Ltd., 2000, pp. 18-19.
61 Yazid Jawas, Sharh Aqidah, pp. 513-514.
62 Friday sermon by Abu Fauzan at Pesantren Al-Nur al-Atsari, December 12, 2008.
32
WHO IS SALAFI?
Su’ud defeated his own rebellious comrades in the battle of al-Sibla and repelled them
to the neighbouring Gulf States, which were under British rule. Soon after quelling the
rebellion, Saudi clerics developed the doctrine of obedience to the ruler in the home
country. Any attempt to oppose him was deemed khuruj ‘ala al-hakim, rebellion against
the ruler.63 This doctrine of loyalty is supported by many dalils from the Qur’an, the
Prophetic tradition and the examples of the pious predecessors, the al-Salaf al-salih.
In Salafi doctrine, Qur’anic verse 4: 59 contains the main argument for the
submission to the government. This verse states that Muslims should obey God,
the Messenger and their rulers (waliy al-amr). Both government and ‘ulama are
included in the category of ‘ruler’.64 Another Qur’anic injunction, verse 4: 83,
tells us that Muslims should always refer back to the Prophet and the ruler.
Unlike the submission to God and His messenger, which are absolute, obedience
to the ruler is conditional in so far as a ruler’s command does not contradict the
commands of God. Should the ruler command his people to commit sinful acts,
however, Muslims are told they are not allowed to execute his order.65
In addition to the above reference, there are a number of Prophetic sayings that
command Muslims to obey a ruler and not to rebel against him even in cases where
he is a tyrant, repressive or acts like the devil.66 The Prophet relates submission to
the ruler to submission to himself: loyalty to the ruler equates devotion to the
Prophet.67 The Prophet also tells that a Muslim who dies being disloyal to the
government dies in a state of jahiliyya (as if in the age of ignorance), as according
to Ibn Taymiyya, rebellion against the ruler is a jahiliyya tradition. However, Salafis
follow the example of the pious predecessors and quote the story of Ahmad ibn
Hanbal who, despite being tortured by his ruler, remained loyal to him.68
63 Madawi Al-Rasheed, “The Minaret and The Palace: Obedience at Home and Rebellion Abroad”,
in Madawi al-Rasheed, Kingdom without Borders, London: Hurst and Company, 2008, p. 203.
64 In spite of the minor difference in interpreting the term “waliyy al-amr minkum”
(ruler from you), the Salafis agree that the term includes the ruler and the ‘ulama.
See, “Kewajiban Mentaati Penguasa dalam Perkara yang Baik (Tafsir Surat An-Nisa’
59)”, in Salafy, Vol. 5, No. 7, 2005, pp. 44-46.
65 Abu Abd al-Rahman Fauzi al-Atsari, Meredam Amarah terhadap Pemerintah,
Pekalongan: Pustaka Sumayya, 2005 p. 49.
66 A famous hadith from Hudhaifa ibn Yaman says that a Muslim should listen to and
obey his ruler even if the ruler intimidates him and appropriates his wealth. The
hadith is narrated in the two foremost reliable hadiths books of Sahih al-Bukhari and
Sahih Muslim. See, Abd al-Rahman Fauzi al-Atsari, Meredam Amarah, p. 56.
67 Abd al-Rahman Fauzi al-Atsari, Meredam Amarah. p. 53. See also, Yazid bin Abdul
Qadir Jawas, Syarah ‘Aqidah, p. 573.
68 Abd al-Rahman Fauzi al-Atsari, Meredam Amarah, p. 68.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
With reference to the sources mentioned above, Salafis contend that Muslims
are not allowed to rebel against a ruler as long as he allows Muslims to perform
their religious duties, such as performing the five prayers, fasting during
Ramadan, and paying alms. There are only two conditions that permit Muslims
to rebel: if a ruler demonstrates his kufr (unbelief in God) and if he does not
perform his prayers.69 However, it is a complicated matter to decide whether or
not a ruler is a kafir (unbeliever). This status cannot be indicated by his sayings
alone because his sayings and his acts may not constitute the essence of his
belief. Furthermore, a ruler’s tyrannical and evil acts cannot make him a kafir.
It is the duty of hadith ‘ulamas to decide whether or not a ruler may remain
Muslim; ordinary people cannot accuse a ruler of being kafir.70
Salafis believe that fighting a Muslim ruler will result in more damage
than the ruler himself ever could do.71 This appears to contradict the principle
of commanding right and forbidding evil but Salafis argue that evil cannot
be eliminated though committing other evil acts. Moreover, when applying
the principle the potential gains and damages should be measured. In fact,
Salafis have developed various guidelines for its implementation: first, if the
application of commanding right and forbidding wrong outweighs the damage
its application would cause, then it is demanded by religion. Second, and by
contrast, if the application of the principle creates more damage than benefit, it
is considered unlawful. Third, if the benefit is equal to the damage, the application
of the principle is neither demanded nor prohibited so it is permissible. These
guidelines are in line with the more general principle in Islam of “avoiding
damage is preferable to acquiring benefit.”72
The Salafis have set up practical guidelines for the relationship between the
ruler and the ruled: Muslims must honour the ruler, not criticize him publicly
and not speak about his weaknesses. In addition, rather than advising a ruler
in the public space, Muslims are required to advise him covertly. Muslims are
obliged to display their support for their ruler by performing their religious
69 See, “Akhlak Kaum Muslimin Menghadapi Penguasa yang Dhalim,” in Salafy, Vol. 5,
No., 7, 2008, p. 60.
70 Ja’far Umar Thalib, “Sikap Politik Ahlus Sunnah”, in tabloid Laskar Jihad, 20, June
2002, p. 5. Also, interview with Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin, the director of pesantren
Imam Bukhari, Solo, February 21, 2009.
71 Yazid Jawas, Syarah ‘Aqidah, p 573.
72 Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, Amar Ma’ruf Nahi Munkar Menurut Ahlus Sunnah wal
Jama’ah, Bogor: Pustaka At-Taqwa, 2009, pp. 214-225.
34
WHO IS SALAFI?
duties such as paying alms (zakat), performing the pilgrimage and waging jihad.73
It should be noted that for Salafis, jihad is only valid if instructed by a legitimate
imam. Muslims should also abide by the government’s decision concerning the
arrival of Ramadan and the dates of the festivals of Id al-Fitr and Id al-Adha.74
As it happens, these important Islamic events have been the cause of recurrent
disagreement among Indonesian Muslims. For many years, Muslims have used
different methods to decide when the beginning of Ramadan should be. Similarly,
different Muslims have celebrated Id al-Fitr on different days. In order to avoid
this kind of disagreement, Salafis opt to follow the Indonesian government’s
decision when Id al-Fitr should be celebrated, and they follow the decision of
the Saudi government when the festival of Id al-Adha should be held. In the last
case, they argue that the celebration of Id al-Adha relates to the ritual enacted
during the pilgrimage which is performed in Saudi Arabia and thus the Saudi
Government should decide when the ritual should be held. Id al-Adha occurs on
the 10th of Dhulhijja, the last month of the Islamic calendar when large numbers
of Muslims from all over the world perform the pilgrimage. The pilgrims gather
in ‘Arafa to perform the wuquf, one of the hajj rituals on the 9th of Dhulhijjah or
one day before the celebration of Id al-Adha. As the wuquf is held in Saudi Arabia,
the Saudi government has the authority to decide on its date.75
To participate in demonstrations is perceived as bid’a. It contradicts the
general principle that evil cannot be countered by another evil. Usually,
demonstrations involve both women and men and this mixing of the sexes is not
allowed. Moreover, large crowds may be seen as a possible catalyst and provoke
other followers to act violently and to rebel against the legitimate ruler. For
Salafis, participants in demonstrations find it difficult to control their statements
and acts, which may humiliate the government and result in damage.76
C. Which Salafism?: Contesting Salafi Claims
The term “Salafi” has become contested. On the one hand, Salafis are viewed
as a safe and victorious group; holders of the Prophet’s assurance that they will be
the only group to enter paradise. As such, every group of Muslims is likely to claim
73 Madawi Al-Rasheed, “The Minaret and The Palace”, 205.
74 Abu Abd al-Rahman Fauzi al-Atsari, Meredam Amarah, pp. 232-246.
75 Interview with Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin, Solo, February 21, 2009. Interview with
Mubarak Bamualim, Surabaya, December 23, 2008.
76 Sheikh Su’ayyid ibn Hulaiyyil al-Umar, “Demonstrasi,…Solusi atau Polusi?”, in AdzDzakirah, Vol. 5, No. 5, 22 Rabi al-Thani 1428, pp, 10-15.
35
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
that it follows the ahl al-sunna wa al-jama’a or the Salaf, the pious predecessors.
Indeed, the Salaf generations are perceived as the communities to emulate.
However, who the Salaf are and how they should be followed is contested. In fact,
Salafis are far from monolithic; they are fragmented into a number of factions,
each of which claiming to be the true and the most consistent one. The paragraphs
below will discuss the various claims Islamist movements make.
It was Quintan Wiktorowicz, an American political scientist, who first made a
classification of Salafi movements into three factions: purist, politico and jihadi.77
All these groups share common values and have the same basic ideas such as
observing strict monotheism and returning to the fundamental sources of Islamic
teaching, the Qur’an and the hadith. The groups also emphasize the need to follow
the example of the al-Salaf al-salih. The difference between the groups lies in the
strategy they adopt for promoting Salafi tenets. The purists opt for disseminating
the teaching through peaceful means, such as da’wa for the purification of the
Muslim creed (tasfiya) and through education (tarbiya). The purist argument
is based on the experiences of the Prophet during his stay in Mecca, when the
Muslim community was still fragile. The purists believe that all political action
will result in chaos, which, in turn, will harm Muslims. They consider opposition
to the ruler unlawful and political parties are conceived as bid’a. Association
with non-believers is restricted, and the adoption of Western precepts such as
democracy is rejected. In sum, the purists focus their da’wa on purifying Muslim
creeds, thought and behaviour from all elements that corrupt Islam. Bin Baz from
Saudi Arabia is the most well-known representative of this faction.78
Unlike the purists, who appear to disengage themselves from politics and
who emphasize unconditional submission to their ruler, the second faction
– the politicos – are familiar with the political situation in the Muslim world.
They received their political training from the Muslim Brotherhood, who
fled Egypt in the 1960s and who were welcomed by the Saudi ruler to teach
in Saudi universities. The politicos became acquainted with political affairs
through their interaction with scholars of the Muslim Brotherhood. Armed with
political rhetoric, they began to criticize the purists – who always supported the
government – within their own circles. However, their dissatisfaction emerged
in public when ‘ulamas issued the fatwa that legitimized the Saudi ruler’s
policy of inviting the infidel American troops into the country. The politicos
77 Q. Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement”, in Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 29:3, 2006, p. 217.
78 Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy”, pp. 217-218.
36
WHO IS SALAFI?
believe that the American presence would result in more control over Saudi
soil. For this reason, they criticized the purists for their ignorance of the fatwa’s
political consequences. Thus, by engaging in political debates, the politicos
want to expand their role to cover politics next to religion. They want to apply
Salafi precepts in a modern context. Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Awda are
prominent figures of this faction.79 Their critique, however, does not extend to a
discussion of the notion of takfir.
It is to the jihadists, the third group of Salafis, to discuss the idea of takfir. As
mentioned earlier, the Egyptian scholar Sayyid Qutb developed the concept of
takfir. The jihadists espouse views and actions that are more radical than those
of the politicos and they legitimate the use of violence in order to achieve their
goal – the Islamic state. While the politicos criticize the purists for their support
for their ruler and their ignorance of political issues, the jihadists go further,
stating that any Muslim ruler who does not enact Islamic law is a kafir, and,
therefore, subject to jihad.80 Osama bin Laden epitomized this type of jihadist.
Various scholars have criticized this typology. Thomas Hegghammer, for
example, remarked that the typology is inconsistent – as it mixes means and
objections-- and incomplete – as it does not include other important groups
of radical Muslims.81 He identifies five rationales behind Islamic activism and
divides Islamic movements into “state-oriented”, “nation-oriented”, “ummaoriented”, “morality-oriented” and “sectarian-oriented”. The “state-oriented”
type strives for changes in the social and political structures of the state. The
“nation-oriented” model struggles to establish authority of specific territories
in non-Muslim lands. The “umma-oriented” style supports the unity of all
Muslim countries and their protection from non-Muslim threats. The “moralityoriented” group aims at changing Muslims’ attitude in accordance with
scripturalist interpretations while the “sectarian-oriented” want to protect the
group from competing sects. Hegghammer claims that these motives are behind
the most important intentions of Islamist acts.82 This classification no doubt
provides a wider scope to Islamic fundamentalism.
More recent is Zoltan Pall’s critique. In his view, Wiktorowicz’s classification
79 Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy”, pp. 221-222.
80 Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy”, p. 230.
81 Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics
in the Study of Militant Islamism” in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism, London:
Hurst and Company, 2009, p. 254.
82 Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi-Salafis”, p. 258.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
is too rigid, its distinction between the factions too sharp, and that it ignores
the theological discourse that motivates these groups.83 Pall contends that
theological doctrine plays an important role in determining their actions. He
proposes a mixed category based on theology and preference. He classifies
Salafis into two main factions: “purist” and “haraki” (activist). The purists are
those who are unconditionally loyal to their ruler, while the “harakis” are those
who object to absolute submission to a ruler. The “haraki” believe in the allinclusiveness of Islam: that Islamic doctrine not only deals with rituals, but
also concerns politics. Within the purist group, Pall furthermore distinguishes
“rejectionist purist” who totally repudiate engagement with political practices
and only focus on da’wa activities, and “politically oriented purist” who view that
to a certain degree involvement in politics is possible. Meanwhile, the “haraki”
range from “politico” to “jihadi”. The “politico” support political engagement in
order to change the community, while the “jihadi” advocate the use of violence
in removing the government. The distinction between “politically-oriented
purist” and the “politico” is that the former want to change daily life so that
it accords with religious doctrines; the latter aim to change more, including
international relations.
Although Pall still uses Wiktorowicz’s terms (“purist”, “politico” and
“jihadi”), he provides a clearer classification. However, this classification cannot
be used to analyse Salafi movements in Indonesia. I agree with his suggestion to
include theological motives in classifying the movement, but I disagree slightly
with him when he includes the jihadi among the category of “haraki”. I would
suggest that the jihadi group be distinguished from the “haraki”, because they
resort to verbal opposition to the government and reject the use of violence. The
“jihadi” go further by using violent actions against legitimate rulers.
The majority of Salafis in Indonesia are categorized as purists. Noorhaidi
Hasan has made the most widely accepted classification of Indonesia’s Salafism.
He distinguishes Salafism into “Yemeni” and “haraki” or “Sururi”.84 The
“Yemenis” are the followers of the great Yemeni Salafi sheikh, the late Muqbil
bin Hadi al-Wadi’i. Prominent figures of this faction include graduates of Darul
Hadith, a Salafi institution founded by Sheikh Muqbil in Dammaj, Yemen. Ja’far
Umar Thalib, the former commander of the Laskar Jihad, was the leader of
this faction. Currently, leading figures of this group are Muhammad al-Sewed
83 Zoltan Pall, Lebanese Salafis Between the Gulf and Europe, Amsterdam: Amsterdam
University Press, 2012, p. 24.
84 Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad, pp. 80-83.
38
WHO IS SALAFI?
from Cirebon, West Java and Luqman Ba’abduh from Jember, East Java. The
second group includes the followers of Muhammad Surur ibn Nayef Zainal
Abidin who criticized the official Saudi Arabian ‘ulama for legitimizing the
Saudi government’s decision to invite American troops and their allies into the
country in order to protect the holy land from Saddam Hussein. Thalib used the
terms “haraki” or “Sururi” to label his critics. Prominent figures of this faction
include Abu Nida from Yogyakarta, Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin from Solo, Abdul Qadir
Yazid Jawas from Bogor and Abdul Hakim Abdat from Yogyakarta. I will return
to this matter in more detail in Chapter Two on the origin and development of
Salafi movements in Indonesia.
Noorhaidi Hasan’s classification is no longer adequate in order to describe
current Salafi movements in Indonesia. On the one hand, the so-called “Yemenis”
are not merely “Yemeni” for they not only follow the late Sheikh Muqbil, but
also emulate Sheikh Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali from Saudi Arabia. On the other
hand, the so-called “haraki” or “Sururi” are not really “haraki” or “Sururi” in the
sense that they do not criticize the government and do not engage in political
movements. Moreover, the above category falls short because it does not include
other variants of Salafism, such as the jihadist. I would therefore propose a new
classification that meets current streams and comprises all variants of Salafism.
I employ the categories used by Pall and Wiktorowicz.
I propose to classify Salafism in Indonesia into three categories: “purist”,
“haraki” and “jihadist”. All share similar ideas on the first three Salafi doctrines
outlined above: tawhid, ittiba’ al-sunna and evading bid’a, and al-wala’ wa al-bara’. On
the doctrine of tawhid, all groups agree to the first three dimensions of tawhid, (alrububiyya, al-uluhiyya and al-asma’ wa al-sifat), but they differ on the fourth element,
tawhid al-mulkiyya. While the purists maintain that tawhid al-mulkiyya is included
in the tawhid al-rububiyya, the haraki and jihadist go further by emphasizing the
tawhid al-mulkiyya aspect. This dispute had led to diverse attitudes towards the
government and about obedience to the ruler which constitutes the fourth basic
doctrine of Salafism. While the purists maintain unconditional obedience to the
ruler, the harakis and jihadis criticize state authority.
The purists are those who advocate absolute compliance to the ruler and
concentrate their activities in da’wa and education. They use peaceful means
to achieve their goal, the Islamic community. Within this category, there are
three sub-groups, which I call “rejectionist”, “cooperationist”, and “tanzimi”.
Rejectionists are the so-called “Yemeni” group: they reject cooperation with
other groups deemed hizbiyya such as the Ihya’ al-Turath. In education, this group
39
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
rejects the national curriculum stipulated by the Ministry of National Education,
or by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, preferring that of the Yemeni Darul Hadith
institution and, hence, it does not participate in the national examination.
The group also refuses to attend forums or panel discussions when non-Salafi
figures are present. The “cooperationist” refers to the so-called “haraki” or
“Sururi”. Contrary to the first sub-group, the “cooperationists” are more openminded in terms of collaboration with other groups. It accepts the national
curriculum in education and participates in the national examination. The last
sub-group in this category is the “tanzimi”. It adopts the form of a structural
and hierarchical organization. Unlike “rejectionist” and “cooperationist”
who consider the structural organizational form bid’a, the “tanzimi” faction
believes that organization is needed in order to be able to cope with the current
challenges da’wa faces. It sees the form of a mass organization as an instrument
for the enhancement of Salafi da’wa. Included in this category are the Wahdah
Islamiyyah from Makassar, South Sulawesi, and the Harakah Sunniyah untuk
Masyarakat Islami or HASMI, which has its headquarters in Ciomas, Bogor,
West Java. Both the Wahdah and HASMI are structurally organized from central
boards to branches. Unlike other Salafi groups that use the term “Salafi”, the
Wahdah and HASMI prefer to use the term “ahl al-Sunna”.
The second type of Salafism is “haraki”. Unlike the “purists” who maintain
unconditional obedience to the ruler, the “harakis” object to total submission to
the government. The “harakis” believe that Islam is an all-encompassing world
view that covers all aspects of life, including rituals, social norms, economics, and
politics. Consequently, a ruler must implement Islamic norms and regulations
and thus he has to submit to and enact Islamic laws. Failure to implement Islamic
law results in criticism by the ruled. Pondok Pesantren Islam al-Mukmin, Ngruki,
Surakarta, Central Java (well known as Pesantren Ngruki) is considered to belong
to this category. The Center for Research and Development of the Ministry of
Religious Affairs labels Pesantren Ngruki as “haraki” Salafi. The centre argues that
the pesantren teaches Salafi concepts such as the adoption of strict monotheism,
following the sunna and opposing bid’a, supporting a literal interpretation
of Islamic law, and adhering to the ijtihad bi al-ma’thur, or ijtihad based only on
the Qur’an and accepted hadith. The term “haraki” is perceived as a da’wa and
educational movement.85 I agree with this label, but I disagree with the argument
85 Puslitbang Pendidikan Agama dan Keagamaan, Depag RI, Pondok Pesantren Islam
al-Mukmin Ngruki Solo (Studi tentang Pendidikan, Faham Keagamaan dan Jaringan),
Jakarta: Puslitbang Pendidikan Agama dan Keagamaan, Balitbang Agama dan Diklat
40
WHO IS SALAFI?
put forward by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. If Ngruki’s engagement in da’wa
and educational activities are the reasons for the use of this label, purist Salafis do
the same. My argument is that Pesantren Ngruki has criticized the government
and has thus stayed clear from total submission to the government.
Pesantren Ngruki has developed theological arguments for this stance.
Wahyuddin, Pesantren Ngruki’s director, criticizes the purists for their total
loyalty to the government. For him, submission to the government is prescribed
in Qur’an [4:59] but this must be read carefully and the content of the whole
verse has to be considered: ulil ‘amr minkum (“the ruler among you”). The term
“minkum” refers to believers. He, furthermore, maintains that a believer will
make laws according to the laws of God. If the government produces laws that
contradict God’s will, it does not meet the condition of “ulil ‘amr minkum”. As a
result, Muslims must not necessarily always obey the government. Thus, if a
Muslim has to choose between secular law and God’s law, Wahyuddin adds, he
has to make a preference for God’s law.86
In line with this argument, according to Wahyuddin, participation in
demonstrations can be considered part of al-amr bi al-ma’ruf wa al-nahy ‘an almunkar (commanding right and forbidding wrong) which is prescribed in the
Qur’an. A widely accepted hadith, he continues, states that when a Muslim sees
a reprehensible act, he must eliminate it. If he has the power to do so he has to
do it by hand, if he cannot he can do it through giving advice. If that is also not
an option he can pronounce the desire to do so in his heart. Thus, according to
him, participation in a demonstration is a manifestation of the Islamic doctrine
of al-amr bi al-ma’ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar. Criticism and demonstrations
do not necessarily indicate opposition against the government or being antigovernment, but they oppose un-Islamic policies. When the intention of
demonstrating and criticising is to tell the truth, they are considered jihad.
Wahyuddin quotes a hadith that says that the highest jihad is telling the truth
before a tyrannical ruler.87 Therefore, Pesantren Ngruki often backs its students
when they get involved in rallies.
Pesantren Ngruki also criticizes the purists’ tendency to emulate the Prophet
in all aspects including jibillat. Jibillat means “natural disposition”, “nature”, and
“temper.”88 This includes tradition, culture and personal interest. The purists,
Keagamaan Departemen Agama, 2004, pp. 92-94.
86 Interview with Wahyuddin, September 27, 2012.
87 Interview with Wahyuddin, September 27, 2012.
88 Hans Wehr, A Dictionary, p. 111.
41
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
for example, imitate the Salaf in ways of dress including style and colour. They
wear a white jalabiya, and do not wear fabrics with pictures on it. According
to Wahyuddin, dress falls into the category jibillat which is subject to personal
taste, and therefore Muslims have no obligation to imitate. Because of this,
Wahyuddin is of the opinion that Salafis do not distinguish between sunna and
jibillat.89 In tandem with this criticism, Pesantren Ngruki students do not wear
the jalabiya, but instead, they dress in the pesantren’s uniform.
The last category of Salafism is the “jihadists”. In contrast to the “haraki”
who criticize the government verbally and refrain from violent actions, the
“jihadist” group goes further by taking up arms against Muslim rulers. The Bali
bombing group, which is believed to be affiliated with al-Qaeda in Southeast
Asia, is one of the jihadist Salafi groups in Indonesia.90 The first Bali bombing,
on October 12, 2002, killed more than 200 people, mostly foreigners, and injured
scores of others. The action was supported by a fatwa issued by Bin Laden to kill
infidel Americans and their allies and to attack their facilities. The bombing was
an act of revenge for American control of the holy land and its attacks on the
Taliban in Afghanistan.91
The Bali bombers claimed to be Salafis – followers of the al-Salaf al-salih.92
Imam Samudra contends that the people should emulate the Salaf and should
follow the opinions of contemporary Salafi scholars. Samudra mentions great
Salafi thinkers such as Nasiruddin al-Albani, Bin Baz, Muqbil al-Wadi’i, Rabi’
al-Madkhali, Muhammad al-‘Uthaymin, Safar al-Hawali, Ayman al-Zawahiri,
Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden. In fact, Samudra is not a follower of
one specific Salafi current, rather, he cherry-picks those fatwas issued by Salafi
scholars that he agrees with. For example, he is in agreement with purist Salafi
thinkers such as Ibn Baz and al-‘Uthaymin from Saudi Arabia regarding women’s
dress; at the same time, he adopts the fatwas of Ayman al-Zahiri, Osama bin Laden
and Abdullah Azzam concerning jihad. For Samudra, all these people share the
same ideas about the basic teachings on tawhid, the fundamental doctrines of
Islam. However, they differ in furu’ (practical matters), which in Islam are believed
89 Interview with Wahyuddin, 27 September 2012.
90 One of the suicide bombers of the Bali bombings of 2002 was reported to have links
with the DI/NII movement. See Quinton Temby, “Imagining the Islamic State in
Indonesia”, Bachelor thesis, The Australian National University, 2007, p. 1.
91 Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, Senyum Terakhir Sang Mujahid, Jakarta: Ar-Rahma Media,
2009, p. 138. Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, Jakarta: Republika, 2007, p. 236.
92 See for example, Imam Samudra, Aku Melawan Teroris, Solo: al-Jazeera, 2004. p. 59;
Ali Gufran, Mimpi Suci di Balik Jeruji Besi, Jakarta: Ar-Rahma Media, 2009, pp. 53-59.
42
WHO IS SALAFI?
to be secondary.93 Unlike the purists who maintain total obedience to the ruler,
Samudra believes that Muslims should protest and rebel against a ruler when is
he is a tyrant. According to Samudra, total submission to the ruler, as outlined
by early generations of Muslim scholars, means submission to the Muslim ruler
of an Islamic state, such as Yazid ibn Mu’awiya. No matter how tyrannical Yazid
was, he still remained a Muslim because he implemented Islamic law. This
condition differs radically from the situation in Indonesia. Although governed
by Muslim rulers, Indonesia is not an Islamic state because it applies secular law.
Basing himself on the arguments of Ibn Taymiyya, Abdullah Azzam and others,
which say that any ruler who fails to apply Islamic law is a kafir (unbeliever),
Samudra concludes that all Indonesian rulers are kafir.94 He also refers to some
of the Prophet’s Companions who rebelled against their rulers, including ‘A’isha
(the Prophet’s wife) who fought against ‘Ali, the fourth caliph.95 After having
studied early Islamic history and having contextualized the hadiths concerning
obedience to the ruler, Samudra finally concludes that by the consensus of the
Companions, “a coup d’état against a fasiq and tyrannical ruler of an Islamic
state is forbidden, on the same grounds that it is also obligatory for Muslims to
rebel against a ruler who falls into kufran bawwahan (genuine disbelief).”96
The three architects (Imam Samudra, Amrozi and Mukhlas) of the Bali
bombings were sentenced to death and executed in 2008 while Ali Imron was
sentenced to life imprisonment. While most Muslims denounced the group’s
actions, other Muslims consider the men to be heroes and even martyrs.
Their funerals were attended by hundreds of Muslims. Hermawan, an Islamist
activist and the richest person in Cianjur, West Java, was happy to provide three
hectares of land for the martyrs’ burial.97 Abu Jibril, a leading figure of the
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian Council of Warriors), gives the
following arguments for their martyrdom: 1) the martyrs’ manhaj was clear:
the al-Salaf al-salih; 2) their principles in life were also clear; ‘ibada (to worship
God); 3) there were obvious concepts of struggle; iman-hijra-jihad (belief,
emigration and jihad); 4) there was a tangible target for the jihad – unbelievers;
5) there was an apparent desire of becoming a martyr; 6) their attitude was
93 Imam Samudra, Aku Melawan Teroris, p. 64.
94 Imam Samudra, Jika Masih Ada yang Mempertanyakan Jihadku, Surabaya: Kafilah
Syuhada, 2009, pp. 34-40.
95 Imam Samudra, Sekuntum Rosela Pelipur Lara: Catatan Renungan dari Penjara, Jakarta:
Ar-Rahma Media, 2009, pp. 47-66, 69-75.
96 Imam Samudra, Sekuntum Rosela, p. 65.
97 Interview with Hermawan, Cianjur, December 2008.
43
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
firm and tough in terms of their reconciliation with the consequences of the
jihad; and finally 7) there were signs of martyrdom after their execution.98
D. Salafism and Mainstream Islam in Indonesia
Many Muslims in Indonesia affiliate themselves to religious-based mass
organizations, such as the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the Muhammadiyah, Persatuan
Islam (Persis) and al-Irsyad. In spite of the absence of exact membership numbers,
national surveys conducted in 2001 and 2002 by the Center for the Study of Islam
and Society (PPIM) of State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta found the following
figures: 50.3% and 44.9% of the surveyed people were, respectively, members
or sympathizers of the NU; and 18.9% and 17.8% were, respectively, members
or sympathizers of the Muhammadiyah.99 With organizational structures in all
regions and organizational offshoots for different sexes, ages and roles, these
organizations reach entire society. They provide a variety of education at all
levels, from pre-school to higher institutions. While the NU, for example, runs
religious educational institutions in the form of pesantren (Islamic boarding
schools), the Muhammadiyah prefers to offer secular education with a religious
component, healthcare institutions, orphanages and so forth. Leaders and
activists of the organizations are active in teaching Islam to the community.
Given these facts, for Muslims, the organizations have become points of
reference in religious matters and they offer generally accepted Islam, which is
moderate, tolerant and peaceful. The following discussion will deal with these
Islamic mass organizations and their Salafi claims.
The discussion will be limited to four Muslim organizations: NU,
Muhammadiyah, Persis, and al-Irsyad. NU and Muhammadiyah are selected
because they are the largest Muslim organizations in the country. Persis is
essential because it is considered closest to Salafism, while al-Irsyad is included
due to the fact that Salafis have flourished through this organization.
98 Abu Muhammad Jibril, “Kata Pengantar”, in Imam Samudra, Sekuntum Rosela Pelipur
Lara: Catatan Renungan dari Penjara, Jakarta: Ar-Rahma Media, 2009, pp. 23-27. Abu
Jibril published the same preface in books written by the three architects of the
Bali bombings: Ali Gufran, Mimpi Suci di Balik Jeruji Besi, Jakarta: Ar-Rahma Media,
2009; and Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, Senyum Terakhir Sang Mujahid, Jakarta: Ar-Rahma
Media, 2009. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir also wrote forewords to these books.
99 Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds), Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia, Jakarta: Rajawali
Press, 2004, p. 230.
44
WHO IS SALAFI?
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
In response to the dynamics of modernist movements both at home and in
the Muslim world, the Nahdlatul Ulama was established in 1926 by traditional
‘ulamas, in order to preserve and maintain traditional Islam. In Indonesia,
traditional Islam was being challenged by the Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam,
and by the Wahhabi movement after its successful seizure of Mecca in the early
twentieth century.100 Since its establishment, the traditionalist NU has claimed
to be the guardian of the ahl al-sunna wa al-jama’a, abbreviated to Aswaja.
The Nahdlatul Ulama believes that the Aswaja School adopts moderate
methods (tawassut) in the doctrines of Islam: ‘aqida, law and ethics. Indeed,
Aswaja’s main characteristic is moderation; it has found a balance between
the use of textual argument and the application of logic, and between blind
imitation (taqlid) and ijtihad. It has thus adopted a moderate position between
the two extremes of the qadariya and jabariya schools of thought. While the
first school advocates the absolute free will behind human actions, the latter
supports the notion of predestination. Confronted with these two extreme
views, the NU follows the Ash’ariya school with its kasb theory. In kasb, a human
being is neither free nor predestined, but has a significant role to play in his or
her own actions.101
Unlike reformist Muslims who reject affiliation with any specific madhhab
(school of Islamic law) in fiqh, the NU definitely confirms its affiliation to the
four madhhabs: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali. For the NU, following a
madhhab means the adoption of a moderate position between taqlid and ijtihad.
As not every person is able to engage in ijtihad, the NU views adherence to a
specific madhhab as a way of circumventing taqlid entrapment. Although they
accept all four orthodox schools, only the Shafi’i school is taught in Salafiya
pesantrens and, furthermore, most of these pesantrens do not teach al-Shafi’i’s
essential work, al-Umm. 102
The NU also applies the Aswaja doctrine in its appraisal of local cultures. In
this regard, it applies three maxims in its legal reasoning: 1) al-muhafaza ‘ala
100 Martin van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru,
Yogyakarta; LKiS, 1994, pp. 28-34. See also, Andrée Feilard, NU vis-á-vis Negara:
Pencarian Isi, Bentuk dan Makna, Yogyakarta, LKis, 1999, pp. 7-12.
101 Tim PWNU Jawa Timur, Aswaja An-Nahdliyah: Ajaran Ahlussunnah wa al-Jamaah yang
Berlaku di Lingkungan Nahdlatul Ulama, Surabaya: Khalista, 2007, pp. 12-17.
102 Ahmad Zahro, Tradisi Intelektual NU: Lajnah Bahtsul Masa’il 1926-1999, Yogyakarta:
LKis, 2004, p. 32. Martin van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, Yogyakarta; LKiS, 1994, p. 25.
45
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
al-qadim al-salih wa al-akhdh bi al-jadid al-aslah (to maintain that which is old
and good, and to embrace that which is new and better); 2) al-‘ada muhakkama
(considering customs in the final conclusion of Islamic law); and 3) ma la yudrak
kulluh la yutrak kulluh (when goals are not fully reached, what has been achieved
is still valuable). It is from these points of view that the NU tries to view local
cultures objectively. It values the content of local cultures. When a tradition
contains something that is good and does not challenge Islamic values, it is
absolutely accepted. This is the application of the principle of al-‘ada muhakkama.
Similarly, when the NU is of the opinion that a tradition seems to contradict
Islamic values, but still contains good elements, it does not abolish the tradition;
rather, it takes into account its virtues and adjusts it to fit with Islamic values.
This is the application of the principle ma la yudrak kulluh la yutrak kulluh. The
tingkeban tradition (celebration of the seventh month of pregnancy) is a good
example of this. While reformist groups condemn this tradition as bid’a – as it
originates in Hindu customs – the NU views it in a different way. The tradition
may contradict Islamic belief, but it also contains righteousness, such as praying
to God, which is prescribed in Islam. This way of thinking follows that of the
Wali Songo (the Nine Saints) who succeeded in preaching Islam in Java.103 As a
rural-based organization, particularly in Java where Islamic syncretism spread,
NU leaders came forward as the guardians of local traditions who fought against
their opponents from reformist organizations such as the Muhammadiyah and
Persis. With this view in mind, kyais try to maintain these traditions.104
Muhammadiyah
Since its foundation, the Muhammadiyah (the second largest Muslim
organization in the archipelago) has called on Muslims to purify their Islamic
beliefs and rituals. Founded in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan, the Muhammadiyah was a
response to what people considered widespread syncretism, such as organizing
tahlilan for the dead which includes the recitation of parts of the holy Qur’an.
Traditional Muslims believe that by reciting parts of the Qur’an the deceased
will receive God’s reward.105
To do away with traditional practices, the Muhammadiyah calls on Muslims
to engage in tadjid, which is defined as “purification” and “modernization”.
103 Ahmad Zahro, Tradisi Intelektual NU, pp. 31-35.
104 Martin van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, p. 20-23.
105 Achmad Jainuri, “The Muhammadiyah Movement in Twentieth Century Indonesia:
A Socio-Religious Study”, Master Thesis, McGill University, 1992.
46
WHO IS SALAFI?
While the first denotes the “maintenance of the content of Islamic doctrines on
the basis of the Qur’an and true hadith”, the second means the “interpretation,
application and manifestation of Islamic teachings on the basis of the Qur’an
and the true sunna.”106 This, then, is the Muhammadiyah’s fundamental call: the
return to the Qur’an and the sunna as the bases of its tajdid.107 This implies that
it rejects the four madhhabs.108 Although theoretically, it is true to say that the
opinion of the madhhabs may be taken into consideration before Islamic laws can
be concluded, the examination of decisions taken by the Majlis Tarjih – the body
of the Muhammadiyah responsible for tajdid – proves the opposite. According
to the Muhammadiyah, it is the second meaning of tajdid, modernization,
that it resorts to in the practice of ijtihad.109 While the first meaning of tadjid,
purification, concurs with Salafi beliefs, the second meaning, modernization, is
the cause of disagreement between the two groups.
The Muhammadiyah classifies Islamic doctrines into creeds (‘aqida), rituals
(‘ibada) and social interactions (mu’amalat). While it takes the view that these
creeds and rituals have been fully prescribed in the Qur’an and the hadith, it
believes that the last category of Islamic doctrines, social interactions, must
be subject to ijtihad in order to make them meet the demands of the modern
world. The advancement of technology has created cases that are totally new
and which have no precedence in early Islam and therefore are in urgent need
of religious guidance. Taking on this challenge, the Muhammadiyah tries to
respond by interpreting the Qur’an and the hadith in the light of common good
(maslaha), which it believes is the ultimate goal of Islamic laws.110 Again, in the
106 Fathurrahman Jamil, Metode Ijtihad Majlis Tarjih Muhammadiyah, Jakarta: Logos,
1995, p. 58.
107 The Muhammadiyah emphasizes the slogan “back to the Qur’an and the sunna”
at any time, including in its Centennial Celebration that coincided with the
46th Conference of the Muhammadiyah that was held in Yogyakarta, July 3-8,
2010. See, Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, “Tanfidz Keputusan Muktamar
Satu Abad Muhammadiyah (Muktamar Muhammadiyah ke-46)” in Berita Resmi
Muhammadiyah, edisi khusus, 2010, p. 23. In a discussion with the Leiden Indonesian
Student Association in October 2011, Din Syamsuddin, the current Muhammadiyah
chairman, proclaimed that in the second century of the Muhammadiyah, the
movement proclaims the second wave of tajdid.
108 Asjmuni Abdurrahman, Manhaj Tarjih Muhammadiyah: Metodologi dan Aplikasi,
Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2002, p. 9. See also, Mitsuo Nakamura, Agama dan
Lingkungan Kultural Indonesia, Surakarta: Hapsara, 1983, p. 40.
109 Fathurrahman Jamil, Metode Ijtihad, p. 58.
110 Fathurrahman Jamil, Metode Ijtihad, pp. 60-61.
47
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Muhammadiyah’s view, this maslaha should not contravene Islamic laws. The
Muhammadiyah believes that reason should play a role in the identification of
this common good.
Like the Salafis, the Muhammadiyah confirms the limits of reason. Ijtihad
may be applied only in worldly matters. It also concurs with Salafism in the
fields of ‘aqida and ‘ibada. For example, it believes that God has Attributes similar
to those of human beings. However, according to the Muhammadiyah, Muslims
should not think about His Attributes or the relationship between His Essence
(Dhat) and His Attributes (Sifat), because they are unthinkable and beyond
the capacity of reason.111 Despite some Muhammadiyah activists’ attempts to
interpret some of God’s Attributes, such as God’s Hand as “His power”, the
official view of the organization is that no attempt at interpretation should
be made; the Attributes should be left as they are. While there are a number
of areas of agreement, there are also many cases where the Muhammadiyah
diverges from Salafis. One example is the case of images: Muhammadiyah
views images of living creatures as permissible, unless they lead to cults.112
Persatuan Islam
Muslims perceive the Persatuan Islam (Persis) as the most puritanical Islamic
organization in Indonesia in terms of the acceptance and application of sound
hadiths (al-ahadith al-sahiha). Given this reputation, it is no surprise that the
organization claims to be the follower of the ahl al-sunna wa al-jama’a. In his
foreword to the Persis’ book, Kumpulan Keputusan Sidang Dewan Hisbah, its former
chairman, Shiddiq Amien, quotes from the same hadiths as those often quoted
by Salafis, which relate to the ahl al-sunna wa al-jama’a as being the ‘victorious’
sect of Islam.113
Persis defines the ahl al-sunna wa al-jama’a as “a person or a group of persons
111 See, Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah Majlis Tarjih, Himpunan Putusan Tarjih, 3rd
edition, n.d, p. 12.
112 For this reason, the Majlis Tarjih Muhammadiyah was of the opinion that putting
Ahmad Dahlan’s picture on the wall is unlawful as it can lead to cult. However, this
fatwa was abrogated by a later fatwa, which stated that displaying his picture is
permissible. See, Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Himpunan, pp. 281, 313.
113 Shiddiq Amien, “Kata Sambutan Ketua Umum PP Persis”, in Dewan Hisbah Persis,
Kumpulan Keputusan Sidang Dewan Hisbah Persatuan Islam (Persis) tentang Aqidah dan
Ibadah, Bandung: Persis Pers, 2008, pp. v-vii.
48
WHO IS SALAFI?
who cling to the Qur’an and the sunna and reject polytheism and bid’a”.114 This
definition differs slightly from that of the Salafis who add the further criterion
that it is “in line with the Salafi manhaj”. Persis criticizes the Salafis for this
addition on the grounds that the Prophet did not mention it.115 Persis views
this new criterion as problematic because the Prophet’s Companions (the Salaf)
held different opinions on a specific case – that Umar ibn Khattab, the second
caliph, had a different opinion than his predecessor, Abu Bakr, regarding the
distribution of the fay’ (spoils of war). Because of this difference, Persis asks two
essential questions: who are the Salaf? And, whom should Muslims follow, Abu
Bakr or ‘Umar?116 Persis criticizes the Salafis for their exclusive claim to Salafism.
For Persis, any person or group can claim to be Salafi as the term does not refer
to any specific group.117
This being so, Persis shares many views with the Salafis. It maintains that the
Islamic creed is final and unchangeable and, therefore, any new thoughts and
ideas on this matter are bid’a. In terms of the Islamic creed (‘aqida), Muslims
must accept the literal interpretation of the texts and must not assume that
these texts are allegories and thus to seek rational meanings in them, especially
in matters of the supernatural. Consequently, Muslims are not to contest the
texts on the ‘aqida as they are beyond the capacity of reason.118 Similarly,
Persis accepts the doctrine of God’s Names and His Attributes as God Himself
describes them, and on the basis of the Prophet’s explanation, without change,
reduction, comparison and ta’wil.119 Moreover, Persis has similar views with the
114 Dewan Hisbah, Kumpulan Keputusan Sidang, p. 19.
115 The Regional Branch Office of Persis in West Java organized a dialogue with
Salafis in March 27, 2007. The forum was attended by two Salafi teachers, Abdul
Hakim Abdat from Jakarta, and Abu Qatadah of the pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah in
Tasikmalaya. Abu Qatadah had attended the Persis pesantren in Bangil for seven
years and taught at the pesantren before he eventually went to Yemen to study
with Sheikh Muqbil. During the dialogue, the leaders of Persis raised a critical
question to Salafis’ insistence on the obligation of Muslim to follow the path of
Salaf (Salafi manhaj). Abdat repeats his answers to the criticism in a VCD distributed
by a Salafi institution: Abdul Hakim bin Amir Abdat, Mereka Bertanya tentang Salafi,
VCD, Jakarta: Yayasan Imam Bukhari.
116 Interview with Maman Abdurrahman, member of Persis’ central board, Bandung,
February 10, 2010.
117 Aceng Zakaria, “Makna Ahlussunnah wal Jama’ah”, in Dewan Hisbah Persis,
Kumpulan Keputusan, p. 21.
118 Dewan Hisbah Persis, Kumpulan Keputusan, p. 28.
119 Dewan Hisbah Persis, Kumpulan Keputusan, p. 29.
49
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Salafis on the ruqya, an alternative medical treatment, which asks for God’s
protection with His Words. As this therapy was conducted by the Prophet and
his Companions, Persis concludes that ruqya is permissible in Islam. According
to Persis, ruqya is different from magic or the use of amulets; the latter is a sort
of shirk (polytheism) even though it utilizes Qur’anic verses.120 Like Salafis,
Persis denounces ritual traditions, such as the celebration of mawlid, which have
no precedence in the early generations of Islam. It classifies them as bid’a.121
On takfir, like Salafis, Persis maintains that Muslims are not allowed to charge
other Muslims with being kafir (unbeliever) unless they do not believe in the
Qur’an and the Prophet and worship other gods, such as idols. That said, Persis
differs from Salafis on some specific cases. For example, Persis argues that
adhering to a different opinion of the Islamic creed does not necessarily lead to
unbelief.122 And on the question of images, while most Salafis are of the opinion
that reproducing images of living creatures is unlawful, Persis confirms its
permissibility, unless the pictures lead to a cult or become idols.123
Al-Irsyad
The Jam’iyya al-Islah wa al-Irsyad al-Islamiyya, abbreviated to al-Irsyad, was
established in 1914 by Sudanese born Ahmad al-Surkati. In 1911, he was invited
by the Arab organization, Jami’at al-Khayr, to teach at its school, and he joined the
association. However, for some reasons he left the Jami’at al-Khayr and found a
new organization, al-Irsyad.124 The new organization aimed at the enhancement
of education among the Arab population. Consequently, the organization can
only develop in regions where there is a significant Arab population.125 Al-Irsyad
deals with the purification of religious beliefs, such as cleansing daily rituals
from bid’a, and encourages Muslim to exercise ijtihad and oppose taqlid.126
120
121
122
123
124
Dewan Hisbah Persis, Kumpulan Keputusan, p. 86.
A. Hassan, et al., Soal-Jawab, vol. 2, Bandung: Diponegoro, 1977, p. 795.
A. Hassan, et al., Soal-Jawab, vol. 1, pp. 392-393.
A. Hassan, et al., Soal-Jawab, Vol. 1, p. 356.
Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942, Kuala Lumpur:
Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 61-62.
125 Husein Haikal, “Pembaruan Islam Syaikh Ahmad Surkati dan Gerakan al-Irsyad”, in
Ulumul Qur’an, No. 2, Vol. IV, 1993.
126 M. Mukhsin Jamil, et al., Nalar Islam Nusantara: Studi Islam ala Muhammadiyah, alIrsyad, Persis dan NU, Cirebon: Fahmina Institute, 2008, p. 115. See also, Pimpinan
Pusat al-Irsyad al-Islamiyyah, Keputusan-Keputusan Muktamar ke-36 Al-Irsyad alIslamiyyah, Jakarta: PP al-Irsyad, 1996, p. 17.
50
WHO IS SALAFI?
Surkati was very much influenced by the thought of Muhammad ibn Abd alWahhab, which is reflected in Surkati’s ideas regarding the religious practices of
Muslims in Indonesia, as represented in his work, al-Masa’il al-Thalath.127 In this
book, the author addresses widespread issues among the Muslim community:
1) taqlid and ijtihad; 2) sunna and bid’a; and 3) ziarah, tawassul (intercession)
and shafa’a.128 He condemns taqlid and encourages ijtihad. In his inquiries, he
found that the founders of the four madhhabs encourage adherents to examine
their religious arguments. This means, for Surkati, that the gate of ijtihad is still
open.129 On the second issue, the sunna and bid’a, Surkati maintains that Muslims
can develop new methods of preaching Islam such as via the establishment of
educational institutions, orphanages, hospitals and others. This effort can be
classified as sunna hasana (good sunna).130 According to Surkati, this initiative
should not be confused with new thoughts and practices in religious matters
or bid’a, which is unacceptable in Islam.131 Muslims are not allowed to add new
elements to religious doctrines. Surkati views that ziarah (shrine visitation) is
not only permissible but recommended (sunna) as long as this action is free
from prohibited deeds such as crying, asking the dead person’s help, and reciting
the holy Qur’an directed to the dead. According to Surkati, all those deeds are
bid’a.132 On the matter of tawassul, Surkati maintains that it is permissible when
applied to living persons (or asking help from a person to pray) and previous
good deeds.133 However, tawassul to the deceased, as practiced by many Muslims,
is totally forbidden and is considered shirk.
That Salafis have flourished through this organization is a worthy of notice
here. As will be discussed later in Chapter Two, Pesantren al-Irsyad, Tengaran,
Salatiga, Central Java inspired the spread of early Salafi pesantrens. Prominent
Salafi figures such as Ja’far Umar Thalib and Yusuf Baisa taught at this pesantren.
Moreover, Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam (STAI, Islamic College) Ali bin Abi Thalib
has started its initiatives at the al-Irsyad educational institution in Surabaya,
East Java. Concerning this phenomenon, I would argue that, in addition to similar
notions of Islamic purification, another factor is the Arab ethnic background.
Some leading Salafi figures, such as Thalib, Muhammad as-Sewed, Abdul Hakim
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
M. Mukhsin Jamil, et al., Nalar Islam Nusantara, pp. 141-142.
Ahmad Surkati al-Anshari, Tiga Persoalan, Jakarta: PP al-Irsyad al-Islamiyyah, 1988.
Ahmad Surkati al-Anshari, Tiga Persoalan, p. 39.
Ahmad Surkati al-Anshari, Tiga Persoalan, p. 51.
Ahmad Surkati al-Anshari, Tiga Persoalan, p. 56.
Ahmad Surkati al-Anshari, Tiga Persoalan, p. 63.
Ahmad Surkati al-Anshari, Tiga Persoalan, pp. 73-74.
51
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Abdat, Yazid Jawas, and Abdurrahman al-Tamimi, are from Arab ancestry.
This brief discussion of the organizations makes it clear that the common
interest of these reformist organizations and the Salafis is the call for the
purification of the creed and the cleansing of rituals. They share a similar
slogan; the return to the fundamental sources of Islam, i.e. the Qur’an and
the hadith. The dispute lies in Salafis’ insistence that Muslims should follow
the pious predecessors, the al-Salaf al-salih. While Salafis tend to absolutely
emulate the examples of the Salaf in their daily life, the reformist groups try
to grasp the spirit of the Salaf, and contextualize it in the modern era. The
obligation of following the Salaf as demanded by Salafis also becomes a point
of disagreement between them. The reformist groups, such as Persis, contend
that the Prophet orders Muslims to firmly hold on to only the Qur’an and the
hadith. On the contrary, Salafis argue that following the Qur’an and the hadith
in insufficient, since Muslims could go astray from the true belief. History, the
Salafis argue, tells how Islamic groups, such as the Kharijite and the Mu’tazilite,
made use of the texts of the Qur’an and the hadith to support their movements
and thoughts, while they were, in fact, deviant from the true manhaj.
Salafis also refute the use of reason as promoted by the reformist groups.
They contend that the use of reason will have results in two directions: the
refutation of the revelation and allegoric interpretation. The first is evident in
some Muslim groups that reject various illogical hadiths that contradict reason,
while the second is proven in the opinions of rationalist groups of Muslims, such
as the Mu’tazilite.134 According to the Salafis, religious teachings are not subject
to reason. Revelation, and not reason, is at the basis of religion. Revelation
emerges in two main sources: the Qur’an and the hadith. When the text seems
to contradict reason, Salafis argue, Muslims should follow the text, since the
capacity of reason is limited. This does not mean, as Salafis argue, that Islam has
no respect for reason but Islam gives reason its proper place. Islam prerequisites
sound reason in the application of religious duties.135 An insane man is not
responsible for his actions. The argument of the text (nass) is superior to logic,
and therefore some religious teachings are illogical.
Moreover, Salafis criticize the reformist groups for their exclusiveness in
religious doctrines. These groups, they argue, emphasize that their following
has to refer to their official fatwas, such as those of the Majelis Tarjih for the
Muhammadiyah and those of the Dewan Hisbah for Persis. The adherents who
134 Abdul Hakim Abdat, Hukum Tahlilan, p. 20.
135 Abdul Hakim Abdat, Risalah Bid’ ah, pp. 146-149.
52
WHO IS SALAFI?
deviate from the official fatwas will be excluded from the group. Thus, the Salafis
view these organizations as having become new Islamic schools that divide
Muslims into factions.136 This means that taking the form of an organization is
hizby (partisan) bringing about Muslims to divisions. While the Salafis view that
organization as hizby and bid’a, they never label Muslim organizations like the
Muhammadiyah, NU and Persis as hizby and bid’a as they did to other Salafi
counterparts, the Wahdah Islamiyyah and HASMI. They may be reluctant to
label these organizations as hizby and bid’a based on a careful calculation of the
possibility of a counter attack launched against them. The fact that the NU, the
Muhammadiyah and Persis are the largest and most influential organizations
in the country drives the Salafis to carefully estimate the risk. Once the Salafis
label these organizations hizby and bid’a, they may guess, they may encounter
serious challenges that might determine their future.
Salafis are, no doubt, more critical of traditionalist organizations, NU and the
like, than of modernist groups. NU’s taking side with traditional practices has
become the major focus of the Salafi attack against it. This criticism has raised
controversies and opposition to Salafis, which, in some cases, involved violent
actions in some villages. I will discuss this opposition later in Chapter Four.
Concluding Remarks
Salafism is a purification movement that calls Muslims to renew their religious
creed and practices. Salafis call upon Muslim to return to the two fundamental
sources of Islam, the Qur’an and the hadith with an understanding of the Salaf.
Salafis contend that Muslims are obliged to follow the Salaf manhaj. The Salaf
manhaj has become the third source of Islam, after the Qur’an and the hadith.
It is at this point that Salafis differ from other modernist groups in Indonesia,
the Muhammadiyah and Persis. They share a similar spirit in “the return to the
Qur’an and the hadith”, but they differ in the method of applying this concept.
Salafis criticize traditionalist NU for its support for rituals and religious practices
that have no roots in the Qur’an, the hadith and or the practices of the Salaf.
The question Persis raised “which Salaf should Muslims follow when Salaf
differ” is important to analyse different groups of Salafi adherents. They are
136 Interview with Rasyid, teacher of Pesantren Al-Nur al-Atsari, Ciamis, January 22,
2010. Rasyid was a Persis cadre. He attended Persis pesantrens in Tasikmalaya for
several years and was sent by Persis to al-Azhar, Cairo. He converted to Salafi after
he returned home.
53
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
fragmented into three mainstream groups, “purist”, “haraki” and “jihadist”.
Within the purist we find “rejectionist”, “cooperationist” and “tanzimi”. What
causes this fraction is the methodology they use in the application of Salafi
doctrines, and the way they interpret the practices of the Salaf. While these
groups share similar doctrines, they differ in the strategy they adopt in their
da’wa. “Tanzimi” groups, such as Wahdah and HASMI, for example, view no
theological constraints in the adoption of the form of an organization while
other purist counterparts, the “rejectionist” and “cooperationist”, consider this
form bid’a. This is also applicable in analysing another Salafi group, the “haraki”
as represented by Pesantren Ngruki. Advocating its belief, Pesantren Ngruki
finds strong arguments in the practice of the Salaf when it criticizes the ruler. A
similar approach can be applied to assess the jihadist faction of the Salafis when
they recount the case of the civil war between ‘Aisha and ‘Ali, the camel war
mentioned above. The jihadist group finds theological and historical arguments
for its rebellious attitude in this event.
54
Chapter Two
The Salafi Movement in Indonesia:
Development, Mobilization and Network
“In the 1990s, we had only a few centres of Salafi teaching in Jakarta.
Now, we have so many centres, mosques, and offices that offer Salafi
da’wa. Every day the Salafi teachers are busy in delivering their da’wa.”1
The above statement is taken from an interview with Abu Qatadah, director
of Pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah in Tasikmalaya, West Java, describing the rapid
development of the Salafi movement in Indonesia. Abu Qatadah is correct. He
himself travels a lot, visiting various cities in Java to deliver lectures on the Salafi
manhaj and almost every weekend he preaches about the Salafi manhaj in many
places in Jakarta. At present, it is easy to find Salafi teachings in the capital city
of Indonesia and in the areas surrounding Jakarta like Bogor, Depok, Tangerang
and Bekasi in West Java. Hundreds of followers attend Salafi religious teaching
sessions and practice the Salafi manhaj with great enthusiasm. The followers
move from one mosque to another, attending similar teaching sessions under
different teachers. They have different backgrounds and include professionals,
businessmen, university students, laymen, and unemployed people.
On the other hand, there is an anxiety among the members and leaders of
other Islamic mass organizations, particularly the Muhammadiyah, Persatuan
Islam (Persis) and al-Irsyad. Their apprehension is caused not only by Salafi
penetration among their followers, but also by Salafi co-optation of their assets,
1
Interview with Abu Qatadah, director of Pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah, Tasikmalaya,
February 10, 2009.
55
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
such as mosques and pesantrens. Some new Salafi leaders were previously
members of these organizations and yet they do not hesitate to criticize their
former organizations or their teachers. This chapter discusses the development
of the Salafi movement in the country. I will also discuss the ways the Salafi
movement grows: how Salafis make use of existing organizations; how they
mobilize their resources after having gathered significant numbers of adherents;
and how they develop their network.
A. The Origins and Development of the Salafi Movement in Indonesia
Many studies have been devoted to the development of contemporary Salafi
movements in Indonesia.2 The most extensive research has been carried out by
Noorhaidi Hasan.3 To avoid redundancy, I will here highlight only some important
points concerning this matter. As Hasan’s study ends at the disbandment of
the Laskar Jihad, in this section I will emphasize the events after Laskar Jihad’s
dissolution, when Ja’far Abu Thalib, its commander in-chief was abandoned by
his disciples.
The puritan movement that glorifies the past of Islam by living according to
the examples of the al-Salaf al-salih, as advocated by the contemporary Salafi
movement in Indonesia is by no means new. In the early eighteenth century,
pre-independent Indonesia saw the emergence of the Padri movement in West
Sumatra.4 This movement called for Muslims to purify their beliefs from local
customs. The movement led to civil war for years and resulted in the Dutch
invasion of the region. In the early twentieth century, some reformist movements
surfaced: the Muhammadiyah in 1912, al-Irsyad in 1914, and Persatuan Islam
2
3
4
See for example, Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, (eds), Gerakan Salafi Radikal, (Jakarta:
Rajawali Pers & PPIM UIN Jakarta, 2004); Sukidi Mulyadi, “Violence under the
Banner of Religion: The Case of Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus”, Studia Islamika,
Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003, pp. 75 - 109; Muhammad Sirozi, “The Intellectual Roots of
Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia”, in The Muslim World, Vol. 95, January 2005, pp.
81-120; Saiful Umam, “Radical Muslims in Indonesia: The Case of Ja’far Umar Thalib
and the Laskar Jihad”, Explorations in Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring
2006, pp.1-26.
Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New
Order Indonesia, New York: Cornell University, 2006.
On the Padri movement, see for example, Jeffrey Hadler, “A Historigraphy of
Violence and the Secular State in Indonesia: Tuanku Imam Bondjol and the Uses
of History”, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 67, No. 3 (August), 2008, pp. 971-1010;
Christine Dobbin, “Economic Change in Minangkabau as a Factor of the Rise of the
Padri Movement, 1784-1830,” Indonesia, No. 23 (April), 1977, pp. 1-38.
56
THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
(Persis) in 1923. All these movements advocated a similar spirit, the return to
the Qur’an and the hadith (al-ruju’ ila al-qur’an wa al-hadith), and opened the gate
of ijtihad (independent reasoning). On the other hand, in order to maintain and
protect local traditions from modernist Muslims’ attacks, traditional Muslim
leaders formed Nahdlatul ‘Ulama in 1926.5
The emergence of the contemporary Salafi movement in the late 1980s
was closely linked to the development of the religio-political ambition of the
Saudi Government. Since its creation in the mid-eighteenth century and its
reconstruction in the early twentieth century, the Saudi state has adopted
Wahhabism as the state’s model of Islam. The Saudi Government has enjoyed
Wahhabi support for social and political stability in the country as its ‘ulama
have always issued fatwas legitimizing government policies. However, within
the Muslim world, since the 1970s the Saudi Government encountered serious
challenges from Jamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt with his Arab Socialism that came
up in 1960s, and from the Shi’ism of the Iranian revolution in 1980s.
Supported by the oil boom in the 1970s, the Saudi Government attempted
to export its Wahhabi Islam to other places in the Muslim world in order to
halt the influence of its rivals: Nasser’s Arab socialism and Shi’ism. The efforts
had started before by the creation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC) in 1957, followed by the establishment of the Rabitat al-‘Alam al-Islami
(RAI, the Muslim World League) few years later. While the first organization
was aimed at formulating foreign policy for Muslim countries, the latter was
intended to disseminate Saudi’s variant of Islam. Through the Rabitat, the Saudi
Government poured large amounts of money into the Muslim world for various
purposes such as building mosques, providing scholarships and supporting
preachers. It was within this effort that the Saudi Government offered
scholarships to Indonesian students to study at Saudi universities. In Indonesia,
these scholarships were channelled through Saudi-linked institutions, such as
the Dewan Da’wah Islamiyyah Indonesia (DDII, or Dewan Da’wah, Indonesian
Council for Islamic Propaganda) and the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan
Arab (LIPIA, Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic). As will be described
later, the pioneering Salafis in Indonesia were awarded scholarships by these
institutions.
In Indonesia, contemporary Salafis found fertile soil for their movement.
Following the 1974 university students riot, well known as the Malari
5
On the modernist movements, see for example, Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim
Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973.
57
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
(Malapetaka Limabelas Januari, 15th of January Disaster) case, four years later,
in 1978 the government promulgated a new rule concerning student activities
on campus. This rule, called Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi
Kampus (NKK/BKK, Normalization of Campus Activities/Campus Coordinating
Body), restricted the political engagement of students.6 Responding to this
new regulation, in the early 1980s some students turned to religious activities,
particularly to discussions of Islamic doctrines. Having started in the Salman
mosque of the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), enthusiasm to study Islam
soon became widespread in other campuses as well such as the Bogor Institute
of Agriculture (IPB), Bogor, West Java, the University of Indonesia (UI) in Jakarta,
Gadjah Mada University (UGM) in Yogyakarta, and Hasanuddin University
(Unhas) in Makassar, South Sulawesi. The activists developed the so-called usra
in their recruitment and study model.7
The Dewan Da’wah merits mention in this regard. Banned by the government
from engagement in any political activities, Dewan Da’wah figures, particularly
Mohammad Natsir, took this opportunity to disseminate its ideas through the
campuses. As A.M. Lutfi, Natsir’s former secretary explained, the campus was
the only place free from government control.8 The Dewan Da’wah encouraged
Muslim intellectuals, notably Imaduddin Abdul Rahim, Ahmad Sadili and
Nukman, to hold Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (LMD, Training for Preachers) at the
ITB, inviting student activists from other campuses. LMD was a special training
program for preachers in which students were trained in an all-encompassing
Islam (Islam kaffa) in which Islam is perceived not only as a doctrine of worship
but also of all other aspects of human life including economics and politics.9
These activists later developed similar programs on their own campuses.
In the 1980s, Muslims witnessed the swing of the political pendulum of
the New Order regime. In the first half of the decade, Soeharto proposed
6
7
8
9
Hasan, Laskar Jihad, p. 44.
Usually an usra consists of 5 to 15 participants under the leadership of a naqib.
Indonesian activists learned to use the method from their counterparts in Malaysia,
where they had encountered government repression. See, Abdul Syukur, “Gerakan
Usroh di Indonesia, Kasus Peristiwa Lampung 1989”, Master Thesis, Universitas
Indonesia Jakarta, 2001, pp. 41-44. The Ikhwanul Muslimin movement in Egypt was
the first to adopt this method in order to avoid the ruler’s repressive measures on
the organization. Literally, the term ‘usra’ literally means ‘family’.
Interview with AM. Lutfi, Jakarta, September 12, 2008.
Ali Said Damanik, Fenonema Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di
Indonesia, Bandung: Teraju, 2002, pp. 68-69.
58
THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
the Pancasila as the sole foundation of all organizations, including mass
organizations and political parties. Muslim figures were profoundly opposed to
this idea, which culminated in the bloody Tanjung Priok (North Jakarta) tragedy
in September 1984 in which hundreds of lives were lost and injury caused to
many others.10 However, the regime’s repressive measures continued until all
Muslim organizations had no choice but to accept the regime’s order. The two
largest Muslim organizations, the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah,
for example, accepted the Pancasila as their foundation in 1984 and 1985,
respectively. The reluctant youth organizations were banned. For example, the
Masyumi-affiliated student union, Pelajar Islam Indonesia (PII, Islamic Student
Union), was dissolved in 1988.11 Having secured its ideology, the government
moved to accommodate Muslims’ interests. This tendency became apparent
in the promulgation of the Religious Court Law in 1989, the launch of the first
Islamic Bank in Indonesia, the Bank Mu’amalat Indonesia, and the establishment
of the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI, Association of Indonesian
Muslim Intellectuals) in 1990.12 Soeharto himself performed the pilgrimage to
Mecca in 1991. Despite the fact that many scholars have viewed this as a ploy to
gain Muslim support since support from the army had decreased, many Muslim
leaders welcomed this new political change and some of them supported
Soeharto’s candidacy for the next term of his presidency.
It was within this socio-political setting that the Salafi movement started
to emerge. The movement began in the late 1980s when enthusiasm for
studying Islam had grown among university students. As Hasan has shown, this
enthusiasm provided fertile soil for the emergence of Islamic global movements
such as the Ikhwanul Muslimin and Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia.13 Later, in 1998
Indonesian Ikhwanul Muslim activists formed the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera
(Justice and Prosperous Party).
10 See also Chapter six on this incident.
11 See Martin van Bruinessen, “Islamic State or State Islam? Fifty Years of IslamState Relations in Indonesia”, in Ingrid Wessel (ed.), Indonesien am Ende des 20.
Jahrhundrets, Hamburg: Abera Verlag, 1996, pp. 19-34, available online at: http://
www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/Bruinessen_State_
Islam_or_Islamic_State.pdf
12 On ICMI, see for example, Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam, Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2000, chapter six, pp. 128-166; Nasrullah Ali-Fauzi
(ed.), ICMI Antara Status Quo dan Demokrasi, Bandung: Mizan, 1995; A. Makmur Dakka
and Dhurorudin Mashad, ICMI: Dinamika Politik Islam Indonesia, Jakarta: Pustaka
Cidesindo, 1997.
13 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, p. 45.
59
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
The Salafis targeted university students in Yogyakarta. It was Abu Nida
(Chamsaha Shofwan) who initiated da’wa among the university students. He
was a cadre of the Dewan Da’wah and served as a preacher in rural areas in West
Kalimantan. Through the Dewan Da’wah, he got a scholarship to study at the
Jami’a Imam ibn Su’ud University in Riyadh. When he returned home, the Dewan
Da’wah assigned him to teach at Pesantren Ngruki in Solo, where he taught for two
years, from 1984-1986. He started to preach Salafism in Yogyakarta and made use
of the networks of existing groups such as the Jama’ah Salahuddin (Salahuddin
Community),14 a religious unit associated with the Gadjah Mada University, and
the so-called tarbiyah movement. In these groups, he gave lectures on Salafism
among the students. Together with the Ikhwanis, such as Dewan Da’wah activist
Abu Ridlo, he managed dawras and halaqas (learning circles), championing the
combined Salafi-Ikhwani slogan “‘Aqidah Salafi, Manhaj Ikhwani” (“Salafi creed,
Ikhwani method”) to spread Salafi doctrines.15 He also expanded his da’wa to
Solo, about sixty kilometres from Yogyakarta. In all of these occasions, Abu Nida
found that students were very keen to attend his lectures.
Later, when Abu Nida felt that he had gained a sufficient number of followers,
he independently managed his own religious circles such as at the Mardiyah and
Mujahidin mosques near the Faculty of Medicine and the Faculty of Engineering
at Gadjah Mada University. Now, he collaborated with his companions, Ahmas
Faiz Asifuddin and Aunurrafiq Ghufran who were cadres of the Dewan Da’wah and
alumni of the University of Imam Ibn Su’ud in Riyadh. Like Abu Nida, Asifuddin
was sent by the Dewan Da’wah to Pesantren Ngruki to teach and he taught there
for two years. At the same time, they organized Salafi halaqas and dawras in
Yogyakarta. In addition, the students were encouraged to study Arabic which,
for Salafis, had become part of religion and an obligation for Muslims to study.
They argued that understanding Islamic beliefs and doctrines is impossible
without understanding Arabic.16 Furthermore, to accelerate the Salafi da’wa, in
1992 they established the As-Sunnah foundation, by which they organized serial
workshops and dawras.17
14 On the Jama’ah Salahuddin, see Abdul Gaffar Karim, “Jamaah Shalahuddin: Islamic
Student Organisation in Indonesia’s New Order”, in Flinders Journal of History and
Politics, vol. 23 (2006), pp. 33-56.
15 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, pp. 52-53.
16 Aunur Rafiq bin Ghufran, Mukhtarat Qawa’id al-Lugha al-‘Arabiyya, Gresik: Pustaka
al-Furqan, 2010, p. iii.
17 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, pp. 53-54.
60
THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
The return to Indonesia of three new graduates in the early 1990s, Ja’far Umar
Thalib, Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawas and Yusuf Usman Baisa gave more impetus to
the Salafi da’wa Abu Nida had started. These young figures were LIPIA alumni
who had graduated from different Islamic institutions abroad. Thalib graduated
from the al-Maududi Institute in Pakistan; Yazid Jawas studied at Muhammad
Salih al-Uthaymin’s teaching centre in Najran; while Baisa completed his study
at the Jami’a Imam ibn Su’ud University in Riyadh. The director of LIPIA assigned
them to teach at Pesantren al-Irsyad in Tengaran, Salatiga, Central Java. The then
LIPIA director, Abd al-Aziz Abd Allah al-Amr, contributed to the development of
the pesantren. During the planning of its establishment, al-Amr recommended
Umar Abdat, the founder of the pesantren, to meet a high official of the Saudi
Arabian Ministry of Education, from which Abdat gained the Ministry’s financial
support. When al-Amr became aware that the pesantren developed into teaching
non-Salafi doctrines and to operate along non-Salafi lines, he sent his affiliates
to teach at the pesantren in order to keep the pesantren on the right track of the
Salafi manhaj.18 Although their presence at the pesantren drew opposition from
teachers, these Salafi figures successfully changed the pesantren’s orientation
to Salafism. It soon became the centre of Salafi da’wa and attracted many
prominent Salafi figures who attended dawras in the pesantren.
However, friction emerged among these figures. The conflict was triggered
by the Thalib’s replacement by Baisa as the director of the pesantren. As
Hasan has shown, this substitution was in response to protest by parents who
witnessed their sons’ behaviour change towards militancy. The parents vented
their anxiety to al-Irsyad’s official branch in Semarang and they demanded the
official to control this current. Responding to this demand, al-Irsyad decided
to replace Thalib with Baisa upon which Thalib left the pesantren and went to
Yemen to pursue further study with Sheikh Muqbil Hadi al-Wadi’i. However, due
to illness, Thalib spent only three months in Yemen. He also travelled to Saudi
Arabia and met various Salafi sheikhs, such as Rabi ibn Hadi al-Madkhali. Upon
his return, he cooperated with Abu Nida to preach Salafism under the umbrella
of the As-Sunnah foundation. Again, friction between them surfaced, and Thalib
established his own pesantren, Ihya al-Sunna, in Degolan, Kaliurang, Yogyakarta
in 1994.19
The conflict between Thalib and Baisa persisted. It even worsened because
of the visit of ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq from Ihya’ al-Turath to Pesantren
18 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, p. 74.
19 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, pp. 76-77.
61
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
al-Irsyad in Tengaran, in 1996. Abd al-Khaliq was a prominent Salafi figure at
the Ihya al-Turath, a Salafi charitable institution in Kuwait. Unlike purists who
prohibit Muslim engagement in political practices, ‘Abd al-Khaliq maintained
that Muslim involvement in politics is acceptable. For him, in Islam, politics
and human enhancement are more important than mere ritual. Islam is an
all-encompassing system of how to live in which politics has its part.20 He also
supported the fourth pillar of tawhid, tawhid al-hukm, or hakimiyya (oneness of
governance). This means that only God governs the world. Muslims have no right
to produce new laws, but are obliged to implement God’s laws as prescribed
by His Book and the hadith.21 In his lecture in the pesantren, ‘Abd al-Khaliq
defended the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and criticized its opponents.
Because of this, Thalib accused ‘Abd al-Khaliq and his followers, including Abu
Nida and Baisa, of being Sururi, a term made after Muhammad ibn Surur al-Nayef
Zainal ‘Abidin. Ibn Surur was a Syrian Salafi who had adopted the ideas of the
Muslim Brotherhood. In 1965 due to political pressure he moved to Saudi Arabia
and lived there until 1973 when he was expelled and he migrated to Kuwait.
From Kuwait, he headed for London in 1983 where he lived between London and
Birmingham until 2004. Since 2004/2005 he has lived permanently in Amman,
Jordan.22 He criticized the Saudi ruler for his invitation of the infidel US army to
protect Saudi soil from Saddam Husein’s invasion.
As Hasan has shown, this accusation incited the anger of Muhammad Sharif
Fu’ad Haza, an Egyptian teacher sent by the Ihya al-Turath to teach at Pesantren
al-Irsyad, Tengaran. He challenged Thalib to enact a mubahala which is a kind
of prayer in which all conflicting parties meet and ask God for His verdict by
casting His curse on lying participants. For Fu’ad Haza, the mubahala was aimed
at muting Thalib’s criticism against his rivals. 23 This event exacerbated the
conflict between the Salafis and they became irreconcilable, mainly between
Ja’far Umar Thalib on one hand, and Abu Nida and Baisa on the other.
It was from Pesantren al-Irsyad in Tengaran that other Salafi pesantrens
started to spread across the country. They emerged in several cities in Java and in
20 Zoltan Pall, Lebanese Salafis between the Gulf and Europe, Amsterdam: Amsterdam
University Press, 2012, pp. 87-89.
21 Zoltan Pall, Lebanese Salafis, p. 91.
22 Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007, pp. 73-74; see also, Stéphane Lacroix, “Muhammad Surur Zayn al‘Abidin”, in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism, London: Hurst and Company, 2009, pp.
435-436.
23 asan, Laskar Jihad, pp. 81-82.
62
THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
some of the outer islands. Thus, in West Java we find, for example, the following
pesantrens: Minhaj al-Sunnah in Bogor, Ihya’ al-Sunnah in Tasikmalaya, Al-Nur
al-Atsari in Ciamis, Al-Sunnah and Dhiya’ al-Sunnah in Cirebon; in Yogyakarta we
find pesantrens Ihya al-Sunnah, Anshar al-Sunnah, Bin Baz, and Jamilurrahman;
in Central Java, we find al-Irsyad in Tengaran, Imam Bukhari in Solo; in East Java,
we find STAI Ali ibn Abi Thalib in Surabaya and al-Furqan in Gresik. In the outer
islands we also find Pesantren Anshar al-Sunnah and SDIT (Sekolah Dasar Islam
Terpadu/Integrated Islamic Elementary School) Fajar Ilahi in Batam, Riau Islands,
Sumatra; in South Sulawesi we find Anshar al-Sunnah and Wahdah Islamiyyah
in Makassar; Pesantren Abu Hurairah in West Nusa Tenggara, Lombok.
Through the creation of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlusunnah wal Jama’ah
(FKAWJ, Communication Forum for the Followers of the Sunna and the Jama’a)
in 1999, followed the next year by its paramilitary wing, Laskar Jihad, Thalib
gained his momentum to enter the national political arena. The launch of Laskar
Jihad was in response to a continuous conflict between Christians and Muslims
in Ambon that killed hundreds of Muslims. The conflict began when Muslims
were attacked by Christians on the day of the ‘Id al-Fitr celebration on January
19, 1999. The conflict soon spread over the entire island. An official report stated
that three days of conflict had brought about serious damage: it killed 22 and
injured 147 people, and burned 107 houses, 7 houses of worship, 2 traditional
markets, 33 shops, 12 stalls, 22 cars, 25 motorcycles, and 216 becaks (pedicaps).24
Many parties, individuals and groups urged the central government to put in
every effort to end the conflict. The central government, however, seemed to
have no intention of taking serious steps to end the clash. After waiting of a
year, Thalib launched Laskar Jihad, calling Muslims to take part in a jihad in
the Moluccas in order to defend Muslims from Christian attacks. Many Muslims
enthusiastically responded to this call and many registered themselves to
take part in the jihad. In the following months, Thalib occupied himself with
mobilizing support from Muslims, most importantly financial back up, and the
recruitment of the fighters.
After mobilization, recruitment and training, during April and May 2000,
Laskar Jihad dispatched about seven thousand fighters. They were welcomed by
local Muslims and military personnel who sided with them. They served different
tasks: they included combatants, health practitioners, and religious teachers.
The presence of the Laskar Jihad in fact awakened the spirit of struggle among
24 Mohammad Shoelhi, Laskar Jihad: Kambing Hitam Konflik Maluku, (Jakarta: Puzam,
2002), h. 12.
63
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
the native Muslims to take revenge on their Christian rivals. Together with local
Muslim fighters, Laskar Jihad re-occupied Muslim areas. More interesting was
Thalib’s determination to implement shari’a law, including rajm (stoning to
death). He applied the rajm to a warrior who had committed adultery. It was
reported that a member of Laskar Jihad, Abdullah, raped a thirteen year-old
local girl on March 23, 2001. After careful investigation made by Laskar Jihad and
the confession of the rapist, on March 27, 2001 Thalib pronounced the stoning
sentence upon his warrior.25 Thalib was subsequently praised by many Muslim
leaders for his consistency in the implementation of the shari’a.
Thalib’s call for jihad was supported by fatwas from various Salafi sheikhs
in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, including Sheikh Muqbil Hadi al-Wadi’i and Sheikh
Rabi al-Madkhali.26 Before commencing the jihad, Thalib also tried to persuade
President Abdurrahman Wahid to lead the jihad, but he refused. Wahid,
furthermore, asked the military forces to make every effort to halt the Laskar
Jihad’s arrival in the conflict areas. The jihad was sharply criticized by Thalib’s
opponents. Faiz Asifuddin, for example, criticized it as invalid as it deviated
from the true Salafi doctrine, arguing that the Salafi manhaj’s most fundamental
doctrine is obedience to the ruler. According to him, a valid jihad must be made
public by the legitimate ruler, and in the Indonesia context that was President
Wahid. When the president refused to call Muslims to engage in jihad, Muslims
must obey him.27 Thus, the jihad case no doubt sharpened the conflict between
Thalib and his opponents.
The change of the national political scene affected the Laskar Jihad. In August
2000, the central government declared the territory a civilian emergency zone
and decided to send combined armed forces to the island. The task of this army
was clear: to wipe out all civilian militia involved in the conflict. During the
operation, the forces arrested armed militia groups and members of the armed
forces who sided with the conflicting parties. Naturally, this action created
tension between Laskar Jihad and the military forces which reached its peak in
the bloody tragedy in Kebun Cengkeh in June 2001 when the military attacked
the Laskar’s health centre. The attack killed dozens of fighters while many
others were injured.
25 Soelhi, Laskar Jihad, pp. 72-77.
26 Ja’far Umar Thalib, “Menepis Rekayasa Fatwa Seputar Jihad di Maluku”, Salafy, No.
34, 2000, pp. 8-9.
27 Interview with Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin, director of pesantren Imam Bukhari, Solo,
February 21, 2009.
64
THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
The event received enormous attention of different groups of Muslims
many of whom demanded an exhaustive investigation into the tragedy and the
replacement of the Commander of the combined armed forces. The tragedy
caused the inner Laskar Jihad circle to become dissatisfied with Thalib, their
commander in-chief. Some senior ustadhs vented their anxiety, since they
viewed that the Laskar Jihad had moved too far from its original mission which
was jihad against the Christians and instead waged jihad against the national
military.
During the presidency of Megawati Soekarnoputri who had succeeded Wahid,
new attempts to end the conflict were undertaken. These included the Malino
Agreement negotiations held on February 13, 2002 in Malino, South Sulawesi,
chaired by Jusuf Kalla, the then Coordinating Minister of People Prosperity, and
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the then Coordinating Minister for Politics and
Security, where delegations of Muslims and Christians negotiated and agreed
to end the conflict. The agreement implied that Laskar Jihad had to withdraw
from the island. This agreement, however, left Thalib with a narrow space to
manoeuvre in which he refused to leave the conflict area. In order to prolong
his commando, he issued a declaration of war and accused the government and
the military forces of being US agents. Thalib was subsequently detained by the
police on May 4, 2002.
The dissatisfaction of senior Salafi ustadhs with Thalib and Ayip Syafruddin,
the chairperson of FKAWJ, continued to grow. According to them, Thalib had
deviated from the spirit of Laskar Jihad. The case of Kebun Cengkeh and the war
declaration were evidence of that as these had shown how the Laskar Jihad had
moved from fighting against non-Muslims to confronting the army.28 Thalib was
also charged with having exceeded his mandate by dispatching the Laskar Jihad
to Ngawi, East Java, to deal with gambling activities there. This action resulted
in a conflict both between local villagers and Laskar Jihad and Laskar Jihad with
activists of political parties.29 Moreover, Laskar Jihad had also become active in
other islands, from Aceh to Papua. The emergence of Laskar Jihad in these two
conflict provinces started the rumour of the existence of possible coordination
between Thalib and high-ranking military officers.
Senior ustadhs demanded an explanation from Thalib, but he refused to
28 Interview with Ahmad Halim, former activist of Laskar Jihad, Yogyakarta, January
19, 2009.
29 http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2001/12/26/LU/mbm.20011226.
LU86755.id.html, accessed on April 13, 2011.
65
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
answer. They concluded that the Laskar Jihad had deviated from the true manhaj,
and consequently, it must be dissolved. To support this step, they sent a letter
to Sheikh Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali describing the current jihad situation. AlMadkhali was one of the senior Salafi sheikhs who had issued the fatwa on the
obligation of engaging in jihad in the Moluccas. Furthermore, they also sent
Usamah Faisal Mahri and Luqman Ba’aduh as their envoys to meet al-Madkhali
in order to clarify the case. During the meeting, al-Madkhali criticized Thalib
and concluded that under Thalib’s leadership, the jihad of the Laskar Jihad had
deviated from the true manhaj. Responding to this meeting, senior ustadhs of
the FKAWJ board organized a special meeting on 3-7 October 2002 in which they
decided to disband the Laskar Jihad. Thalib rejected the decision, but was unable
to sustain his leadership as all Laskar Jihad branches had accepted the decision.
Finally, on October 16, 2002, a few days after the Bali bombing, Thalib emerged
in a press conference declaring the disbandment of the Laskar Jihad.30 Most of
his closest comrades subsequently abandoned him, including the Laskar’s vice
commander, Muhammad Umar al-Sewed who acknowledged that the Laskar
Jihad had made some serious mistakes which all ran against Salafi principles.
They included: 1. the adoption of a commandment system and the use of bay’a
(taking an oath as symbol of loyalty); 2. organizing demonstrations; 3. seeking
political support from all parties including the people of ahl bid’a; 4. committing
sinful acts such as ikhtilat (free social intercourse between men and women) and
making photographs; 5. engaging in acts of violence; and, 6. fighting against the
military and the government.31
Having been abandoned by his former pupils, Thalib tried to find new
allies outside Salafis circles. He, for example, appeared with Arifin Ilham32 on
the program Dzikir Bersama (to chant collectively God’s Names) broadcast live
by a private television channel. On another occasion, together with Muchdi’s
advocates, he appeared at a press conference defending Muchdi, a former
official of Indonesia’s Intelligence Body, from the accusation that he had
killed the human rights activist, Munir. Thalib was criticized for these actions.
Responding to the first case, Thalib admitted that initially he was of the opinion
that the Dzikir Bersama was bid’a. However, after further examination of various
30 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, pp. 211-213.
31 Muhammad Umar As-Sewed, “Rujuk kepada Kebenaran adalah Ciri Ahlus-Sunnah”
in Sheikh Abu Abdirrahman Fauzi al-Atsari, Meredam Amarah terhadap Pemerintah,
Pekalongan: Pustaka Sumayyah, 2006, pp. x-xii.
32 Arifin Ilham is a rising star preacher who frequently organizes the Dzikir Bersama
that attracts many followers, mostly women.
66
THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
hadiths that supported the program, he claimed that he found it sahih (sound,
and hence, accepted) and therefore it is not bid’a. In terms of the second case,
Thalib replied that he had a very good relationship with Muchdi. He recalled
that Muchdi had once saved his father’s life. In the 1980s, when the issue of
wearing the jilbab was heatedly debated across the country, Thalib’s father was
among the supporters of wearing the jilbab. He was accused by security officials
of being a Darul Islam follower and detained. It was Muchdi, the then sub-district
army chief in Malang, East Java, who released him. Thalib’s defence of Muchdi
was therefore recompense. Thalib believed that Muchdi was being mistreated
and was innocent of the allegations put forward against him.33
The abandonment of Thalib by his followers meant a lot to the Salafis. It
proved that Salafis do not fall under the spell of the fanaticism of their leader;
if a leader strays from the true manhaj, he will be abandoned. It also showed
the emergence of newly arrived, more knowledgeable Salafi figures. Compared
to Thalib, who studied for few months only with the founder of Salafism and
the most influential Salafi teacher in Yemen, Sheikh Muqbil34, new figures, such
as Luqman Ba’abduh, spent more time studying with the same sheikh. They
used to be Thalib’s students whom he himself had sent to Yemen. When the
now knowledgeable ex-students returned to Indonesia, the Salafis were keen to
learn from them.35
Thalib tried to recapture his influence. In his magazine, Salafy, which appeared
irregularly after Laskar Jihad’s dissolution, he wrote an article entitled “Saya
Merindukan Ukhuwwah Imaniyyah Islamiyyah” [I pine for the Faithful and Islamic
Brotherhood] in which he reflected on and evaluated his career in the Salafi
da’wa.36 In this article, the author highlighted some essential Salafi da’wa issues.
First, he reflected on his emphasis on teaching the true ‘aqida and he paid little
attention to ethics. As a consequence, he recognized that Salafi da’wa seemed
to be exclusive: the behaviour of his pupils towards other Muslims was rigid,
strict and intolerant. His second reflection was his taqlid of the opinions of the
Yemeni and Saudi Arabian Salafi sheikhs without further examination of their
33 Interview with Ja’far Umar Thalib, Yogyakarta, June 12, 2010.
34 On a brief biography of Sheikh Muqbil, see, Laurent Bonnefoy, “Muqbil ibn Hadi alWadi’i, Founder of Salafism in Yemen”, in Roel Meijer, Global Salafism, London: Hurst
and Company, 2009, pp. 431-432.
35 Interview with Abu Abdillah, a senior teacher in Pesantren Dhiya’ussunnah,
Cirebon.
36 Ja’far Umar Thalib, “Saya Merindukan Ukhuwwah Imaniyah Islamiyah”, in Salafy,
Vol. 5, No. 5, 2006, pp. 3-23.
67
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
arguments. Third, he emphasized the importance of proper conduct (al-akhlaq
al-karima) in da’wa activities. Fourth, he stated the significance of Muslim unity
and of the Islamic brotherhood. The fifth issue was the application of various
da’wa methods using wisdom, advice and argumentation. Thalib acknowledged
that his inadequacy in teaching these aspects had resulted in dissension and
friction among the Salafis.37
Two years later, the article was followed by his declaration of repentance. The
declaration was made in Medina, Saudi Arabia in 2008 when he performed the
‘umra, often called the small pilgrimage. It is said that Thalib was unable to perform
the ‘umra until 2008 because of security reasons. From late 2002 to 2007, Thalib
did not communicate with prominent Salafi sheikhs in Yemen and Saudi Arabia,
including Sheikh Rabi al-Madkhali. However, during this period, the sheikh was
well informed about Thalib’s actions and opinions, including his participation in
the Majelis Dzikir of Arifin Ilham, a rising star preacher who organizes collective
dhikr. It was also reported that he had been making some efforts to recapture his
leadership position among the Salafis. Because of these reports, the sheikh accused
Thalib of having abandoned the true Salafi manhaj, and, thus he excluded him
from the Salafis. When Thalib finally had the opportunity to perform the ‘umra
he tried to meet various Salafi sheikhs, particularly Rabi al-Madkhali. In Mecca,
Thalib met al-Madkhali, and found that the sheikh was angry. The sheikh advised
him as follows: to repent and then return to the true Salafi manhaj, but just as
a member of the Salafis and not as their leader, and not to engage in political
practices. When Thalib questioned the reasons behind his exclusion from being
Salafi, the sheikh gave three reasons: Thalib’s denial of his mistakes committed
during his leadership of the Laskar Jihad; Thalib’s disconnection with the “ulama;
and Thalib’s improper accusation to other Salafis.38
Based on al-Madkhali’s clarification, Thalib made a declaration of repentance
before a number of Indonesian Salafi students of the Islamic University of Medina
at the residence of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab al-‘Aqil in Medina.
Prior to the declaration, there was a discussion session between Thalib and the
students on Thalib’s involvement in the Majelis Dzikir based on sound hadiths.
However, the issue then moved to his attendance in discussion sessions with
non-Salafi. Since these discussions were organized and attended by non-Salafis,
37 Ja’far Umar Thalib, “Saya Merindukan Ukhuwwah”, pp. 14-23.
38 http://salafiyunpad.wordpress.com/2008/08/21/walhamdulillah-pernyataanresmi-tentang-ruju-nya-ust-jafar-umar-thalib-hafizhohullah/, accessed on March
9, 2011.
68
THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
harakis and hizbys, his attendance could lead to the opinion that Salafis agree
with their non-Salafi ideas and thoughts. Taking this into consideration, Thalib
declared that he would no longer attend the program, and at the same time he
resigned from the shari’a board of the Majlis al-Dzikra led by Arifin Ilham.39
Following the discussions in Medina, when he later returned home, Thalib
reissued his declaration of repentance:
In order to comply with Sheikh Rabi’ ibn Hadi al-Madkhali’s advice,
in this writing I accomplish my declaration of repentance to God of
my action of labelling the Salafis in Indonesia as ahl al-fitna wa alkhiyana (meaning artisans of libel and treason). Herewith I declare
that I was guilty of such labelling, and thus revoke my statement. I
humbly apologize as much as possible to all Salafis for all of my mistakes
and oppression of their honour.40
In spite of this clear declaration, doubt among his former followers
persisted. They believed that Thalib’s repentance was a trick aimed to recapture
his leadership role among the Salafis. Moreover, they wanted to see if his
repentance was real. However, some of his former comrades, such as Dzul Akmal
from Riau, Sumatra, reconciled with their former teacher. It was reported that
many Salafis sent short messages to their colleagues to welcome Thalib’s return.
The spreading of these messages roused anxiety among prominent figures and
made them consolidate their following. On February 2010, for example, under
the guidance of the Yemeni Sheikh Abdullah ibn Umar ibn Burayk Mar’i on the
occasion of the annual Salafi dawra, prominent Salafi teachers circulated advice
for Salafis how to deal with rumours of Thalib’s repentance. In their advice, the
teachers requested that the Salafis remain calm and not get in touch with Thalib
by any means until he proved his repentance in practice.41
In April 2010, Thalib, accompanied by Dzul Akmal, and with the assistance of
al-Madkhali’s closest students, namely Sheikh Ahmad al-Ghamidi from Jeddah,
39 http://salafiyunpad.wordpress.com/2008/08/21/walhamdulillah-pernyataanresmi-tentang-ruju-nya-ust-jafar-umar-thalib-hafizhohullah/, accessed on March
9, 2011.
40 http://salafiyunpad.wordpress.com/2008/08/21/walhamdulillah-pernyataanresmi-tentang-ruju-nya-ust-jafar-umar-thalib-hafizhohullah/, accessed on March
9, 2011.
41 This advice circulated among Salafis through the Internet and the pesantren
network. When I visited the pesantren al-Anshar in Sleman, Yogyakarta, in June
2010, for example, I found a circular in the pesantren’s mosque. See, http://www.
salafy.or.id/modules/artikel2/artikel.php?id=1619, accessed on March 9, 2011.
69
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Sheikh Usama ibn Ataya al-‘Utaybi from Medina, and Sheikh Abu Ishaq alJaza’iri, Thalib was at last welcomed by al-Madkhali. Before meeting him, these
sheikhs had suggested that Thalib write a letter of repentance to al-Madkhali.
In his letter, Thalib explicitly mentioned that he did not want any leadership
role. Thalib also highlighted other issues. First, he himself was responsible
for all his mistakes and those of his followers during the time of the jihad.
Second, he admitted that his participation in heated debates with secularists
in the presence of women contradicted the Salafi manhaj. Third, his taking part
in the Majelis Dzikir of the Sufis opposed the manhaj. Fourth, his attendance
in the dawra in the presence of hizbys disagreed with the manhaj. Fifth, his
mislabelling of ‘ulama disputed the manhaj. Sixth, his attendance in debates in
the presence of non-Muslim figures such as Christians and Buddhists was not
in line with the manhaj. For all of these mistakes, he repented to God.42 After
having accepted this letter, al-Madkhali welcomed Thalib and advised him to
prove his repentance and maintain the unity of the Salafis in Indonesia.
Thalib is currently busy with da’wa and teaching activities. He has more
time to concentrate on his teaching activities in his pesantren, Ihya al-Sunnah,
in Degolan, Kaliurang, Yogyakarta. The number of his students decreases to a
dozen only. The majority of his students have moved to other pesantren, such
as al-Anshar in Ngaglik, Sleman, located about five kilometres from Ihya alSunnah. Unlike their counterparts who suffered from frictions, the so-called
“cooperationists” did not have this problem and remained united. They are
consistent in preaching the Salafi manhaj by establishing pesantrens, creating
Salafi foundations and launching radio channels.
Apart from the above two groups, there are two other Salafi groups called the
Wahdah Islamiyyah and the Harakah Sunniyah untuk Masyarakat Islamiyyah or
HASMI, which are not considered to be Salafi either by the “rejectionist” or the
“cooperationist” faction. They, however, share similar thoughts and ideas with
the two factions about the basic doctrines outlined above: tawhid, following
the sunna and opposing bid’a, al-wala’ wa al-bara’, and obedience to the
government. The difference between them is that the last two Salafi groups, the
Wahdah Islamiyyah and HASMI, have become mass organizations with official
structures from central board to local branches. It is because of the similarity
between them in the fundamental doctrines of Salafism that I call them Salafis.
The Wahdah was founded by young Muhammadiyah activists who were
disappointed by the organization’s acceptance of the Pancasila as the sole
42 http://alghuroba.org/front/node/r/184, accessed March 9, 2011.
70
THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
foundation (Asas Tunggal) of all organizations in 1985.43 The late Fathul Mu’in
Daeng Ma’gading, a Muhammadiyah local leader from Makassar merits mention
here. He was well-known for his radical opposition to government policies that
he viewed as being in contradiction to Islamic law. In August 1968, for example,
Daeng Ma’gading was arrested by the police for his participation in a movement
against a “lotto”, a sort of Chinese gambling in Makassar. This movement was
a protest against the government policy that legitimated gambling among
the Chinese in the region.44 Later, when president Soeharto insisted that all
organizations adopt the Pancasila as their ideological foundation, Daeng
Ma’gading opposed this policy. He trained Muhammadiyah young activists to
become preachers, mostly students from the secular Hasanuddin University in
Makassar at the Takmirul Masajid Mosque located at Jalan Banda, Makassar, the
centre of Muhammadiyah activities. Among his students were Zaitun Rasmin and
Qasim Sagidu, the current chairperson and secretary of the Wahdah Islamiyyah
in Makassar.45 When Mu’in died in 1985, these young activists founded the
Yayasan Fathul Mu’in (YFM) focusing on da’wa activities, such as delivering
Friday sermons, religious gatherings (majelis taklim), and mentoring university
students about Islamic studies.
In 1998, YFM changed its name into Yayasan Wahdah Islamiyyah (YWI) and
no longer made reference to Mu’in in order to avoid him becoming the focus
of a cult. Two years later, the Wahdah declared itself to have become a mass
organization with an official structure, a national board and branch offices, and
headquarters in Makassar.46 According to an official leaflet, at present the Wahdah
has set up 35 branches, mostly in South Sulawesi, and planned to establish 34
more throughout the country.47 Like other Islamic organizations in the country,
the Wahdah concentrates its activities on education, da’wa and social services.
The transformation from a foundation to a mass organization was aimed at
broadening its activities. However, as a result of this transformation, a number of
Salafis refused to recognize the Wahdah as still being Salafi. For example, when
asked during a Salafi teaching session in the Mubarok mosque about the position
of the Wahdah in Salafi da’wa, Abdul Hakim Abdat, a prominent Salafi teacher,
43 Syarifuddin Jurdi, Sejarah Wahdah Islamiyyah, Yogyakarta: Kreasi Wacana, 2007, p. 107.
44 Muhammad Saleh Tajuddin, Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Sulawesi Selatan: Studi atas
Gerakan Organisasi Wahdah Islamiyah, Makassar: Pukat, 2007, p. 16.
45 Interview with Qasim Saguni, Makassar, July 22, 2010.
46 Jurdi, Sejarah Wahdah Islamiyyah, p. 130.
47 DPP Wahdah Islamiyyah, Selayang Pandang Wahdah Islamiyyah, Makassar: DPP
Wahdah Islamiyyah, n.d., p. 3.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
stated firmly that the Wahdah is hizby. Another reason for the exclusion of the
Wahdah from the Salafi manhaj is that it calls on its members and sympathizers
to vote in the general elections –clearly a political act. Wahdah considers
participation in general elections as beneficial to Muslims, because they can
vote for Islamic parties and for Muslim candidates who struggle for the interests
of Islam. If Muslims do not participate in the elections, senior teacher Ikhwan
Abdul Jalil argues, Muslims would have no representative in legislative bodies.48
As an organization, the Wahdah is active in recruiting a following. Campusbased student organizations in Makassar such as the Hasanuddin University and
the Indonesian Muslim University (UMI) are claimed to be important venues for
recruitment. Besides, the Wahdah also uses another method called “Satu Kader
Satu” (SKS) in which obliges each member to recruit another member.49
The Wahdah has close ties with the Mua’assat Sheikh ‘Aid Al Thani al-Khayriyya
(Sheikh Eid Charity Association), a Salafi charity foundation established by the
Emir of Qatar in 1995. Some Wahdah buildings have been constructed using
financial support from this foundation. In addition, the ‘Aid foundation has also
helped various Salafi sheikhs to visit the Wahdah to deliver lectures on specific
dawras. In July 2010, for example, the Wahdah held a Salafi dawra on the Qur’an
in the presence of Mahmud ibn Ahmad ibn Salih al-Dausary, a Salafi sheikh from
the Islamic university of Medina. All the expenses of the sheikh during this visits
were borne by the ‘Aid foundation. During my visit, I learned that the Wahdah
had covered all pictures of living creatures.
Currently, the Wahdah offers integrated Islamic education from kindergarten
up to high levels. It adopts the national curriculum in secular sciences, combined
with its own curriculum in religious subjects. In 2010, there were more than 1300
students studying at the Wahdah’s educational institutions. In addition to this, the
Wahdah also runs a program called “Pondok Pesantren Salafiyah” for students who
want to study religion only. The program includes Tahfiz al-Qur’an or memorizing
the Qur’an. On a higher level, the Wahdah manages the Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Islam
dan Bahasa Arab (STIBA, College for the Study of Islam and Arabic), focusing on
the comparative study of Islamic Laws and the Arabic Language.
The Harakah Sunniyah untuk Masyarakat Islami or HASMI has its
headquarters in Ciomas, Bogor, West Java. Unlike other Salafi groups that use
48 Interview with Ikhwan Abdul Jalil, a senior teacher at Wahdah Islamiyyah, Makassar,
July 21, 2010.
49 Interview with Nur Salam Sirojuddin, a senior teacher at Wahdah Islamiyyah,
Makassar, July 24, 2010.
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THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
the term “Salafi”, HASMI prefers to use the term “ahl al-Sunna” as reflected in its
name “Harakah Sunniyah”. According to Sarbini, HASMI’s chairperson, HASMI
emerged in response to current Islamic movements dealing with the decline of
Muslims in Indonesia in a number religious, social, political and cultural aspects.
In his view, there are currently two kinds of Islamic movements. The first type
sees that Muslims in Indonesia only suffer from spiritual defects. As a result,
these movements try to purify Islamic doctrines, particularly tawhid. It believes
that adherence to the true and pure ‘aqida will lead to Muslims’ victory. The
second type sees that Muslims suffer from both spiritual and material defects. It
considers that the role of Muslims in politics has been marginalized. This model
moves in two diverse directions: political participation in parliament and jihad
against the government. HASMI agrees with the second view in understanding
the decline of Muslims, but it differs in its da’wa strategy: It opts to emerge as an
Islamic organization that organizes social and educational activities, and refutes
political participation in parliament and engaging in violent actions.50 HASMI
aims at the creation of an Islamic community, which is defined as “a community
which is collectively and individually covered and guided by Islamic norms.”51
The establishment of HASMI was initiated by the foundation of Pesantren
‘Alam al-Sunnah in Leuwiliang, Bogor, West Java, in 1996. Two figures merit
mention here: M. Sarbini and Abdul Malik. Sarbini went to Pesantren al-Nida’ alIslami in Bekasi, West Java, where he completed his elementary and secondary
schooling. He continued his studies at Syarif Hidayatullah State Institute for
Islamic Studies (IAIN) and got his bachelor’s degree in Islamic law in 1995.
Ten years later, in 2005, he gained his master’s degree in Islamic Economics
from the Ibnu Khaldun University (UIKA) in Bogor, West Java. He finished his
doctoral study on Islamic Education from the same university in 2012. When he
was a student at IAIN he became aware that he had to live according to Islamic
teachings more strictly like observing the daily prayers on time and such more.
It happened when one time he was sitting and talking with friends in a musalla
(a small prayer house) of the institute while the noon prayer were about to
start. Someone came up to him, perhaps a member of the Tablighi jema’at who
warned him to stop talking, and said, “This campus is an Islamic campus. Why
do you keep talking while we are about to pray?” According to Sarbini’s account,
this remark made him aware that he had to observe Islamic teachings more
50 Interview with Sarbini, chairperson of HASMI, Bogor, March 19, 2013. See also, DPP
HASMI, Sebuah Gerakan Kebangkitan, Bogor: Pustaka MIM, 2008, pp. 67-70.
51 DPP HASMI, Kebangkitan Sejati, Bogor: DPP HASMI, 2010. p. 21.
73
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
seriously. Then, he started to look for true Islam and became acquainted with
some LIPIA students who introduced him to Salafism. This friendship led him to
study Salafism intensively with Abdul Qadir Jawas in 1998-1999 at his residence
in the Cimanggu compound in Bogor, West Java. Later, in the early 2000s, Jawas
charged him of being hizby after Sarbini had established the HASMI.52
Abdul Malik, a senior HASMI teacher, went through senior high school in
Purwokerto, Central Java. He continued his studies at the Bandung Institute
of Education and Teaching (IKIP) from 1981-1983. During this period, he was
active in the Lembaga Pengembangan Pondok Pesantren Kilat (Institute for the
Development of the Lightning Pesantren, LP3K). This movement was a neo-NII
movement aspiring for the creation of the Islamic state of Indonesia. After the
Indonesian military’s capture of the leaders of the Darul Islam (DI)/Negara Islam
Indonesia (NII, Islamic State of Indonesia) in the 1960s, the movement perished.
However, the DI/NII ideology continues to live on and has been adopted by young
activists in new forms. These movements adopted several names such as usrah,
ashab al-kahfi, pesantren kilat, and ribat sari’. All of them remained underground
and their activists were united under the name Ikhwan al-Shahidin. In the late
1980s, these movements sent warriors to Afghanistan, and when they returned
home, they brought Salafi books with them. These Salafi books caused divisions
among Ikhwan al-Shahidin activists: some insisted in continuing their struggle
through existing movements while others turned to Salafism. Abdul Malik was
active in the pesantren kilat movement until the early 1990s.53
The Salafi da’wa these activists promulgated became more visible with the
visit of Abd al-Karim al-Katiri, an Indonesian of Arab descent from Yemen who
owns a big company in Saudi Arabia. In the early 1990s, he frequently visited
Indonesia and made contact with Indonesian activists. Assisted by Yazid alTamimi who worked with him in Saudi Arabia, he visited Indonesia to meet
Ikhwan al-Shahidin activists, including Abdul Malik, Ali Hijrah and Yazid alTamimi. In these meetings, they discussed the formulation of Salafi da’wa in
Indonesia. Following this meeting, Abdul Malik went to Saudi Arabia to work with
al-Katiri from 1992-1993. During this period, he often discussed the formulation
of Salafi da’wa in Indonesia. Before leaving for Indonesia, Abdul Malik paid a
short visit of three months to Yemen to witness Salafi da’wa there. In Indonesia,
he had intense discussions with his colleagues and with al-Katiri about possible
ways to accelerate Salafi da’wa. They finally established Pesantren ‘Alam al52 Interview with Sarbini, Bogor, March 19, 2013.
53 Interview with Abdul Malik, Bogor, March 19, 2013.
74
THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
Sunnah which received financial support from al-Katiri.54
Pesantren ‘Alam al-Sunnah ran one year training programs for preachers
(du’at) that taught Arabic and da’wa methodology. Included in the teaching
materials were books on Salafism, particularly those authored by Muhammad
ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. In 1999, HASMI activists founded Pesantren al-Akhwayn in
Cimanglid in Ciomas, Bogor, West Java, under the banner of Yayasan al-Huda.
The pesantren ran a two year program for preachers, and focused on Arabic,
tahfiz (memorization of the Qur’an), and da’wa methods. Al-Huda also managed
similar pesantrens such as al-Anshar in Bandung, West Java. Due to financial
constraints, however, only Pesantren al-Akhwayn continues to exist. At present,
Pesantren Al-Huda runs formal educational institutions from kindergarten
to higher education. With the support of Saudi donors, it builds hundreds of
mosques in Java, mostly in West Java. After the building of the mosques, it sends
its da’i to these mosques to preach Salafism among the community. Now, al-Huda
also operates a Salafi radio station, Fajri 99, 3 FM.55
With the diverse activities they do and the expansion of the area they
operate in, the activists needed a new “umbrella” to manage their activities.
They felt that the organizational form of a yayasan (foundation) was insufficient
to be able to organize their activities. Thus, in 2003, they changed into a
much wider mass organization and adopted the name HASMI. From then on,
the new name was brought under the attention of its members, and in 2005,
HASMI was officially registered at the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights.
HASMI actively recruits its member in many ways, such as through discussions
on the book entitled Shiratul Mustaqim published by the HASMI central board
which contains explanations on the true and straight path to paradise. As an
introduction to Salafism, the book discusses the basic Salafi doctrines, such as
sunna, ahl al-sunna, bid’a, and al-firqa al-najiya. After the discussion, the activists
offer membership to the participants.56 HASMI also employs another method
of recruitment by organizing Halaqah Bimbingan Islam (HBI, Islamic Guidance
Circle) sessions, where 3-5 potential members are invited to join the halaqah for
studying religion. Each halaqah is supervised by a murabbi (mentor). This method
is considered more effective than the first, since it reaches Muslim grassroots.57
54 Interview with Abdul Malik, Bogor, March 19, 2013.
55 Interview with Cepi Burhanuddin, murabbi of al-Huda, Parung, Bogor, March 15,
2013.
56 Lajnah Ilmiah HASMI, Shirotul Mustaqim, Meniti Jalan yang Lurus, Bogor: Pustaka
Sunni, 2012.
57 Interview with Supendi, member of Departemen Dakwah Umum, Dewan Dakwah
75
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
The transformation into a mass organization was not without risks. As
mentioned above, other Salafi groups (“rejectionist” and “cooperationist”) no
longer consider HASMI to be Salafi. They argue that a mass organization is bid’a
and hizby. HASMI, of course, refutes this charge. It contends that the form of a
mass organization is not prohibited but allowed and even recommended in Islam.
It points to a number of arguments from the Qur’an and the practices of the
Prophet. The Qur’an [61:4] says: “Truly Allah loves those who fight in His Cause
in battle array, as if they were a solid cemented structure”. This verse means
that God loves Muslims who practice collective rather than individual da’wa. For
HASMI, collective da’wa needs proper management and a proper organizational
format. Another Qur’anic verse [5:2] reads: “Help ye one another in righteousness
and piety, but help ye not one another in sin and rancour.” assistance can be given.
It concludes that to initiate religious establishments is an order of God. The aim of
creating an organization is to achieve a common goal.58
HASMI also refers to the practice of the Prophet and his Companions who
often gathered at Dar al-Arqam to discuss various matters. Before the Badr
War, the Prophet made a list of his warriors and their weapons, and he checked
their presence in order to check their availability in the jihad. Moreover, the
Prophet also often sent his preachers to targeted areas. These practices required
coordination and a certain strategy to achieve their goals. Thus, the form of
a mass organization is necessary. For HASMI, in the modern era the da’wa
movement urgently needs to adopt the format of a mass organization because
it needs to fight many challenges, such as the spread of liberal thought and
Christianization.59
Furthermore, HASMI criticizes its opponents’ inconsistency because despite
their criticism of the organizational format, they also adopt it. Those Salafis
who say they reject this form, in fact, adopt the organizational format but much
more simple ones by establishing pesantrens and foundations. If the form of
an organization were prohibited, Sarbini adds, all organizations in Saudi Arabia
such as the Lajna al-Da’ima and the Rabitat al-‘Alam al-Islami should be dissolved.60
Abdul Malik, a senior HASMI ustadh, refutes the view that organization will lead
to fanaticism and hizbyiyya. In practice, Salafis are hizby when they only attend
Hasmi, Bogor, March 19, 2013.
58 http://dpdhasmibogor-depok.blogspot.com/2011/05/harakah-bidah.html,
accessed March 18, 2013.
59 http://dpdhasmibogor-depok.blogspot.com/2011/05/harakah-bidah.html,
accessed March 18, 2013.
60 Interview with Sarbini, HASMI chairperson, Bogor, March 19, 2013.
76
THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
religious gatherings when presided over by a certain ustadh. They will keep far
from another Salafi as soon as they learn he does not belong to their group.61
Any discussion on Salafism in Indonesia is incomplete if it does not pay
attention to Pondok Pesantren Islam al-Mukmin, Ngruki in Surakarta, Central
Java (shortly well known as Pesantren Ngruki). Pesantren Ngruki was founded
in 1972 by a group of Muslim activists including: Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir, Abdullah Baraja, Yoyok Rosywadi, Abdul Qohar Daeng Matase and
Hasan Basri.62 The diverse backgrounds of the founders and senior teachers
determine the pesantren’s orientation that is to combine elements they consider
good from three educational institutions: Pondok Modern Gontor, al-Irsyad,
and Pesantren Persatuan Islam (Persis) Bangil. Gontor (represented by Ba’asyir,
Rosywandi, Wahyuddin and Farid Ma’ruf) provides open-minded intellectual
thinking; al-Irsyad (reflected by Sungkar and Baraja) supports the purification
of Islamic education and thought; and Persis Bangil (figured by Ahmad Husnan,
Muhammad Ilyas and Suwardi) contributes to adherence to the use of a strict
methodology in understanding Islamic law.63 More important is the support of
the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyyah Indonesia (DDII, Indonesian Council for Islamic
Propaganda) in which Sungkar was the head of its Surakarta office branch.
In spite of its adoption of modern thought in politics, the Dewan Dakwah
encourages a literal interpretation of Islam. Bearing this legacy, the institute has
developed into a modern pesantren with a strict interpretation of Islam. It aims
at the production of ‘ulama and a Muslim generation devoted to the belief in
Islam kaffah.64 Islam kaffah means that Islam is conceived as an all-encompassing
ideology covering religion and politics.
The Dewan Dakwah fully supported the foundation of the pesantren. It was
founded after Natsir’s speech in Surakarta in which he expressed his intention to
build pesantrens and hospitals in order to counter the rise of communism and the
Javanese spiritual movement.65 The Dewan Dakwah, for example, sent it teachers
61 Interview with Abdul Malik, a senior teacher at HASMI, Bogor, March 19, 2013.
62 Pondok Pesantren Islam al-Mukmin, Sekilas Profil, Ngruki: n,d., p. 15
63 Puslitbang Pendidikan Agama dan Keagamaan, Depag RI, Pondok Pesantren Islam
al-Mukmin Ngruki Solo (Studi tentang Pendidikan, Faham Keagamaan dan Jaringan),
Jakarta: Puslitbang Pendidikan Agama dan Keagamaan, Balitbang Agama dan Diklat
Keagamaan Departemen Agama, 2004, pp. 103-104.
64 Pondok Pesantren Islam al-Mukmin, Sekilas Profil, p. 17.
65 Interview with Wahyuddin, the director of pesantren Ngruki, 27 September 2012.
See also, Muhammad Wildan, “Mapping Radical Islam: A Study of The Proliferation
of Radical Islam in Solo, Central Java”, in Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), Contemporary
77
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
to the pesantren including Abu Nida, Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin, and Syafruddin who
were later to become leading personalities of the Salafi da’wa, to teach. However,
later they left the pesantren. Probably, Ngruki’s attitude towards the government
may have been the reason behind their departure. Pesantren Ngruki often
criticizes the government about the implementation of Islamic law.
Pesantren Ngruki has long been alleged to be the centre of the jihadist
movement in Indonesia.66 The involvement of its founders (Sungkar and
Ba’asyir) in the Darul Islam movement and the engagement of various alumni
in terrorist attacks are the reasons behind this accusation. In 1978, Sungkar and
Ba’asyir were arrested for their involvement in the Komando Jihad. In 1985,
they fled to Malaysia and in 1995 founded the Jama’ah Islamiyyah (JI) which
was believed to have links with al-Qaeda. Upon the New Order collapse, they
returned to Indonesia, but Sungkar died soon in November 1999. In 2000, Ba’asyir
furthermore founded the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian Council
for Warriors) that struggles for the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia,
in which he became its amir.67 He departed from MMI, and in 2008 established
a new organization called the Jama’ah Anshar Tauhid (JAT, Community for the
Helpers of Tawhid). Recently, Ba’asyir was sentenced to imprisonment, for his
support in JAT terrorist activities in Aceh. Moreover, some of its alumni were
engaged in terrorist attacks, such Asmar Latif Sani, the suicide bomber who
tried to blow up the Australian Embassy in Jakarta on 9 September 2004. Because
of these activities, pesantren Ngruki is still regarded as a jihadist centre.
B. Mobilization and Network
Classic theories on social movement have relied on the psychological
aspect of the actors. This approach posits that the driving force of people’s
participation in social movements is psychological. The psychological discontent
with the existing socio-political order and economic problems has deprived
and marginalized the people. This psychological anxiety in turn leads them to
Developments in Indonesian Islam, Singapore: ISEAS, 2013, pp. 195-201.
66 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the
‘Ngruki Network’ in Indonesia”, Indonesia Briefing, Jakarta/Brussels, August 8,
2002.
67 On biography of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, see, Irfan S. Awwas, Dakwah dan Jihad Abu
Bakar Ba’asyir, Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2003, pp. 29-85. On the Majelis Mujahidin
Indonesia, see Irfan S. Awwas, Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakan Syari’ah Islam,
Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2001.
78
THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
participate in social movements striving for better circumstances.68
This approach is insufficient to explain the absence of protests in places
where injustice exists. Injustice is present everywhere, so why do some people
participate in social movements while others do not? What factors are missed
by the non-participants? To answer these questions, scholars have developed a
new theory, known as the Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT). According to
this theory, beliefs (ideology) and psychology alone are insufficient to mobilize
participants.69 RMT states that the silent people lack the resources that would
enable them to mobilize and unite into action. In contrast with the classic
theory that stresses psychological aspects, RMT explains that resources can be
mobilized, referred to as mobilizing structures, in order to attract participants.70
Doug McAdam and colleagues have defined mobilizing structures as “those
collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which the people
mobilize and engage in collective action”.71 This includes middle-level groups,
organizations and social networks.
Formal organizations, like NGOs, religion-based organizations, student
organizations, professional organizations, political parties and labour
organizations provide a good repertoire for resource mobilization. To recruit
followers, some formal organizations have developed branches in many cities
and have semi-autonomous bodies for different sexes and ages. Informal
organizations, such as mosques are frequently used to mobilize the masses. In
addition to their function as centres of Islamic learning and preaching, some
activists use mosques as a place to engage in social activism. Hamas in Palestine
and students group activists in Indonesia have utilized mosques as their centres
for recruitment.72 The availability of funds and the time given by the followers
68 John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements:
A Partial Theory”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, No. 6, 1977, p. 1214.
69 Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim
Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan, New York: State University of New York Press,
2001, p. 7.
70 Bert Klandermans and Sidney Tarrow, “Mobilization into Social Movement:
Synthesizing European and American Approaches”, in Bert Klandermans, et al.,
From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research Across Cultures, London:
JAI Press Inc., 1988, p. 4.
71 Doug McAdam, et al., “Introduction: Opportunity, Mobilizing Structures, Framing
Processes – toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movement”,
in Doug McAdam, et al., Comparative Perspective on Social Movement, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 3.
72 For Hamas, see, Glenn E. Robinson, “Hamas as Social Movement”, in Quintan
79
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
are essential to the recruitment process and to achieving the movement’s goals.
Other informal networks including family (kinship) and friends play
significant roles in resource mobilization. These networks can work well
for “micromobilization”.73 Many studies on social movements show that
participants are most likely to join a movement through relatives and friendship
connections.74 Underground organizations often adopt this type of network in
developing their movements.
David A. Snow and his colleagues have identified common patterns of strategy
by which organizations recruit new participants. These patterns encompass
the following methods: (1) using direct encounters with others in public places;
(2) utilizing “institutionalized mass communication mechanisms”; (3) meeting
with others in private places, such as the door-to-door method; and finally (4)
recruiting new followers through “members’ extra-movement social networks”.75
The following paragraphs will discuss some institutions from which the
Salafis have benefited. Salafis make use of existing religious organizations, such
as the Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia and al-Irsyad, by grafting activities
upon them. Vast network of these organizations has paved the way for Salafis to
grow and develop. After Salafis found their following, they started to establish
their own foundations to strengthen the networks among them.
Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia (Dewan Da’wah), Jakarta
Founded by Mohammad Natsir in 1967, the Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah
Indonesia (DDII, or Dewan Da’wah)76 was intended to be a vehicle through which
former Masyumi leaders and activists could actualize their political interests
through da’wa. Since its establishment, the Dewan Da’wah has not drawn a
clear distinction between politics and da’wa. The famous saying of its founder,
73
74
75
76
Wiktorowizc, Islamic Activism, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, 2004, pp. 126-127. For a study of student group activists, see for example,
Hilman Latief, “Youth, Mosques and Islamic Activism: Islamic Source-Books in
University-based Halaqah” in Kultur, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2010, pp. 63-88.
John D. McCharty, “Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting, and Inventing”,
in Doug McAdam, et al. (eds), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, pp. 142-143.
David A. Snow, Louis A, Zurcher, JR. and Sheldon Ekland-Olson, “Social Networks
and Social Movements: A Microstructural Approach to Differential Recruitment,
American Sociological Review, 1980, 45, (October), p. 781.
David A. Snow, Louis A, Zurcher JR. and Sheldon Ekland-Olson, “Social Networks” p. 795.
For a comprehensive account of the Dewan Da’wah, see, for example, Asna Husin,
“Philosophical and Sociological Aspects of Da’wah: A Study of Dewan Da’wah
Islamiyah Indonesia”, PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 1998.
80
THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
“previously we carried out dakwa through politics, and now we run politics
through dakwa”,77 represents the Dewan Da’wah’s vision of politics and da’wa.
For the Dewan Da’wah, da’wa encompasses all social aspects including culture,
economics, education, politics, and science and technology.78 Moreover, it
describes its roles as follows: to be a centre for Islamic da’wa; the guardian of
the Islamic faith; and the unifier of the Islamic community (umma).79 Keeping
these roles in mind, one can understand that the Dewan Da’wah has facilitated
the birth of many Islamic organizations, such as the Komite Indonesia untuk
Solidaritas Dunia Islam (KISDI, Indonesian Committee for Islamic Solidarity), and
the Komite Penanggulangan Krisis (KOMPAK, Crises Rescue Committee). KISDI
was established in 1988 by prominent Muslims including Ahmad Sumargono in
order to support the struggles of the Muslim world. In the aftermath of the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in 1990, KISDI supported the Saudi government, requested
that the American troops leave Saudi and urged Saddam Hussein to withdraw
from Kuwait.80 On other occasions, KISDI often managed tabligh akbar (massive
religious gatherings) to recruit volunteers to support Muslims in Palestine,
Bosnia, and Afghanistan.81 Meanwhile KOMPAK has dealt with ethno-religious
conflicts in the archipelago.
Moreover, it should be noted here that the Dewan Da’wah has become the
entry point of the Ikhwani’s thought which was introduced by ex-Masyumi
figures who had studied in Cairo. In the two decades following the Independence
of Indonesia, these figures were intensely occupied with political activities
causing them to ignore Islamic thought. After the new Soeharto regime had
banned them from political activities, they turned to the dissemination of
Islamic ideas. Thus in the 1980s, through its publishing house, Media Da’wa,
works authored by Ikhwani figures namely Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Said
Hawa were translated into Indonesian and published. However, these ideas did
77 Quoted from Muhammad Wildan, “Mapping Radical Islam: A Study of The
Proliferation of Radical Islam in Solo, Central Java”, p. 196.
78 Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia, Khittah Da’wah Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia,
Jakarta: 2005.
79 H.M. Misbach Malim, Sibghah Da’wah: Warna, Strategi dan Aktivitas Da’wah Dewan
Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia, Jakarta: Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia, 2008, pp.
16-20.
80 http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/1990/08/25/NAS/mbm.19900825.
NAS19301.id.html, accessed on 19 March 2011.
81 See, for example, http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/1994/02/26/NAS/
mbm.19940226.NAS1663.id.html, accessed on 19 March 2011.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
not implant a revolutionary spirit in Dewan Da’wa’s leading figures. The Saudi’s
effort in exporting a non-revolutionary model of the Muslim Brotherhood’s
thought was the rationale behind this.82 Consumed by university students,
particularly on secular campuses, the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood soon
became widespread. Inspired by these thoughts, campus-based Muslim activists
managed Islamic study circles that supported the idea of comprehensive Islam
(Islam kaffah) as discussed earlier in this chapter.
During Natsir’s leadership from 1967-1993, the Dewan Da’wah enjoyed a
privileged relationship with the Saudi government. The Saudi government is unique:
it trusts individuals more than institutions or organizations. Being one of the vice
presidents of the Rabitat al-‘Alam al-Islami (The Muslim World League), Natsir
was without doubt a committed and trustworthy person. The Rabitat accepted
his recommendation for scholarships, grants and financial support for Islamic
educational institutions. Through his assistance, the establishment of LIPIA became
viable. Here we understand why the Saudi Government supported all the activities
of the Dewan Da’wah. When Natsir died, the Saudi Government’s trust weakened,
and consequently, the flow of money to the Dewan Da’wah decreased. However, the
emergence of new Salafi foundations may have been another factor in this.
With regard to the Salafi movement in Indonesia, the Dewan Da’wah has
played a significant role in its rise and development; not only did it pave the way
for the birth of the Salafi movement in Indonesia, but it also provided fertile soil.
Salafi teachers including Dewan Da’wah’s preachers were sent to Saudi Arabia
for further study at the Jami’a al-Imam ibn Su’ud University in Riyadh. Thanks to
Natsir, the Rabitat had awarded them scholarships. These students, for example
Aunurrafiq Ghufran, Abu Nida, and Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin, became Salafi da’wa’s
pioneers in Indonesia and therefore left the Dewan Da’wah. Ghufran is currently
the director of al-Furqan, a Salafi pesantren in Sidayu, Gresik, East Java. I will
discuss his role in Salafi da’wa below in Chapter Four.
Abu Nida, who is currently the director of Pesantren Bin Baz in Bantul,
Yogyakarta, merits mention here. Like Ghufran, Abu Nida was a Dewan Da’wah
preacher in a rural area in West Kalimatan, and he received a scholarship from
the Rabitat. He studied at the Jami’a Imam Muhammad ibn Su’ud University
in Riyadh from 1979 to 1984. Having completed his studies in Saudi Arabia,
he returned to Indonesia and started to preach Salafi da’wa. He spent some
years teaching at Pesantren al-Mukmin, Ngruki, Solo, before he departed and
82 Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in the Post-Suharto
Indonesia”, South East Asia Research, 10, 2, 2002, pp. 124-125.
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THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
commenced his da’wa in Yogyakarta.83
Ahmad Faiz Asifudin is another Salafi preacher who benefited from the Dewan
Da’wah. Unlike the two preachers mentioned earlier, before going to Saudi
he was not a Dewan Da’wah preacher. He was granted a scholarship from the
Rabitat to study at Jami’a Imam ibn Su’ud University, Riyadh, from 1979 to 1984.
He returned to Indonesia, served as a Dewan Da’wah preacher and taught at the
Madrasah Wathaniyyah Islamiyyah (MWI), a traditional pesantren established
by his father, in Petanahan, Kebarongan, Central Java. His efforts to reform the
MWI were repudiated by his colleagues. In 1984, together with Abu Nida, the
Dewan Da’wa assigned him to teach at Pesantren Ngruki. After two years, he left
Ngruki and started to preach Salafi teachings in Solo. He finally established his
own Pesantren, Imam Bukhari in Solo, Central Java.
Since the 1980s, the Dewan Da’wah has developed further steps in its cadre
production by establishing an educational institution. In the 1980s, it founded
the Akademi Bahasa Arab (ABA, Arabic College). Although ABA’s main concern
was teaching the Arabic language, it is certain that ABA also paid particular
attention to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s thoughts.84 Saudi financial
support to the Dewan Da’wah may be the reason of the Dewan Da’wah leaning to
spread the ideas of Wahhabism. This institution was subsequently transformed
into the Lembaga Pendidikan Da’wah Islam (LPDI, Institute for Islamic Da’wa)
in the 1990s. ABA and LPDI produced Salafi leaders such as Zainal Abidin, the
leader of the Salafi community in Tanah Baru, Depok, West Java, and Arman
Amri, the director of Pesantren Minhajus Sunnah in Bogor, West Java. Both
leaders were first introduced to Salafi teachings when they were students at
LPDI.85 A prominent Salafi preacher, Yazid Jawas taught Salafi tenets at the LPDI.
The LPDI has now been transformed into Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Da’wah (STDI) to
incorporate a wider range of disciplines. The students are recruited from all
regions in Indonesia through the regional representatives of the Dewan Da’wah.
In practice, the Dewan Da’wah collaborates with reformist organizations like the
Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam (Persis).
As an Islamic da’wa institution with a close relationship to the Saudi
Government, the Dewan Da’wah is very critical of Shi’ism86 which it sees as a
83 M. Imdadun Rahmat, Arus Baru Islam Radikal, Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 2005, p. 103.
84 Interview with Zainal Abidin, Depok, October 29, 2008.
85 Interview with Zainal Abidin, Depok, October 29, 2008, and with Arman Amri,
Bogor, September 5, 2008.
86 Zulkifli, “The Struggle of Shi’ism in Indonesia”, PhD Dissertation, Leiden University,
2009, p. 261.
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heterodox and deviant Islam against which the Dewan Da’wah’s activities are
directed.87 Zainal Abidin, a prominent Salafi figure in Depok, West Java, is a good
example in this regard. Before attending ABA, he very much admired the success
of the 1979 Islamic Iranian Revolution and he wrote his bachelor thesis on “The
Impact of the Iranian Revolution to the Monarchies in the Middle East” in 1982.
While he attended ABA, lecturers soon alerted him that the revolution was
not Islamic but Shi’ite causing him to radically change his ideas (see for more
Chapter 6).88
The existence of a Salafi-oriented institution within the Dewan Da’wah, and
the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA) located not far from
the Dewan Da’wah, created Salafi teaching centres around the two institutions.
Some LPDI and LIPIA students attended Salafi religious gatherings in a small
prayer house (musalla) in Pramukasari Street in Jakarta. As the number of
participants increased, this Salafi circle was moved to the larger Nurul Iman
Mosque in Pramuka Street, Matraman, Central Jakarta. Teaching was delivered
by Abdul Hakim Abdat, another prominent Salafi preacher.
The affiliation of the Dewan Da’wah with the Salafi movement was strengthened
by the fact that it allowed the Salafis to make use of its grand al-Furqan Mosque
in Kramat Raya, Jakarta. For several years, Yazid Jawas had used this mosque to
teach Salafi doctrines on Tuesday afternoons. The Dewan Da’wah finally banned
this instruction after its senior leaders felt that the teaching had deviated from
the aims of Dewan Da’wah. The main reason of the dissolution was that Yazid
Jawas contended that Muslim engagement in political parties is unlawful, which
is a problem as the Dewan Da’wah has supported Muslim participation in political
parties since its inception. For example, Natsir used to be the leader of Masyumi,
and Anwar Haryono was one of the prominent leaders of the Partai Bulan Bintang
(PBB), the party that claims to be an incarnation of the Masyumi. Moreover,
Dewan Da’wah leaders often approached the government, especially in the last
years of the Soeharto and Habibie administrations when the government showed
more inclination to accommodate Muslim interests. After the New Order regime’s
long suppression of Muslim interests, in the 1990s, the Dewan Da’wah saw an
opportunity to bring Muslim aspirations under the attention of the government.
Concerning this development, the Salafis denounced the ‘ulama who approached
the government as su’ (bad) ‘ulama. As discussed in Chapter One, the Salafis indeed
highlight that obedience to the ruler is one of the main Salafi doctrines. However,
87 Asna Husin, “Philosophical and Sociological Aspects”, p. 140.
88 Interview with Zainal Abidin, Depok, October 29, 2008.
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THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
loyalty is different from nearness. Loyal people will display obedience to the ruler
even though they are oppressed, while those close to him will stay away from the
ruler when they receive unjust treatment.
Taking into account the difference in political stance between the Dewan
Da’wah and the Salafis, one cannot consider the Dewan Da’wah to be a Salafi
institution. Dewan Da’wah’s personnel call themselves Salafi in a different sense
to Salafi preachers. For them, Islam is inseparable from politics. Misbach Malim,
Natsir’s former personal secretary prefers to call the Dewan Da’wah ikhwani
rather than Salafi.89 Ghufran considers Natsir to be a haraki.90 To borrow a Salafi
term, the Dewan Da’wah could be best described as “Salafi ‘aqidatan, ikhwani
manhajan” (Salafi creed, ikhwani method). As mentioned earlier, the Salafis used
the slogan in their initial da’wa when they collaborated with Ikhwani activists.
To compete with the liberal tendency among Muslim thinkers, in 2006, the
Dewan Da’wah created a program called “1000 intellectuals”. The program
was expected to be accomplished in five years. The program was to produce
one thousand Muslim intellectuals consisting of 200 PhD, 400 Master and
400 Bachelor graduates. To achieve this goal, the Dewan Da’wah collaborated
with the Ibn Khaldun Islamic University (UIKA) in Bogor, West Java, and the
Muhammadiyah University of Surakarta (UMS) in Solo, Central Java. In 2008, 25
Bachelor and 8 PhD students were in training at UIKA, while another 40 master
students were in training at UMS Solo. This program was part of the “ghazw alfikr”, a cultural invasion to compete with Western thought and ideas, and was
directed by the young Muslim thinker, Adian Husaini, one of the chairpersons of
the Dewan Da’wah’s central board. It was a response to a government program
sending young lecturers of state–owned Islamic higher institutions to study
Islam in the West. To broaden the analysis on their Islamic knowledge, since
the mid-1980s, the Ministry of Religious Affairs has sent significant numbers
of lecturers to study in the West. In addition, the Dewan Da’wah also had and
still has other programs to support Islamic da’wa. For example, it employed 324
preachers in rural areas in Indonesia by granting them a monthly allowance.91
The concept of “ghazw al-fikr” emerged in Islamic discourse among
fundamentalist activists in response to the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
The defeat introduced the notion of the domination of one culture over another.
A fundamentalist journalist, Muhammad Jalal Kishk, for example, contended
89 Interview with H.M. Misbach Malim, Jakarta, September 23, 2008.
90 Interview with Aunurrafiq Ghufran, Gresik, December 26, 2008.
91 Interview with Avid Sholihin, the Secretary of Dewan Da’wah, Jakarta, September 23, 2008.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
that the notion of dominant culture was not neutral, but intentional to incite
in the minds of people that one culture is superior while others are inferior. He
considers this idea a new form of crusade. He identified three waves of war in his
analysis of the history of the wars between Muslims and the West or Christianity.
The first was the medieval crusader; the second wave was colonialism that began
with Napoleon’s occupation of Egypt and ended with decolonization; and the last
wave is a cultural invasion that penetrates Muslim’s minds on the supremacy of
the West over Islam. For Kishk, Muslims are now facing the last type of crusade.92
Muslim activists in Indonesia soon adopted this concept.
Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA)
Studies on Islam in Indonesia in general, and on Islamic movements in
particular did not pay any attention to the role of the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan
Islam dan Arab (LIPIA, Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic) until Hasan
noticed its significant influence on the Salafi movement in Indonesia. Hasan
explored the material taught at this institution and its contribution to Indonesian
Islam through its alumni.93
The LIPIA was established in 1980 as a branch of the Jami’a al-Imam Muhammad
ibn Su’ud in Riyadh. Natsir of the Dewan Da’wah played a significant role in
its foundation. Prior to its inception, the university sent Sheikh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz
‘Abd Allah al-‘Ammar, a student of the well-known Salafi teacher, the late Bin
Baz, to Jakarta. Bin Baz asked his pupil to meet Natsir and subsequently Natsir
mediated between the Indonesian Government and the Saudi Government about
the possibility of founding an institution to teach Arabic.94 As the Ministry of
Education and Culture was reluctant to issue a permit, the license was eventually
issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 95
92 Ghazwul fikri or Arabisation? Indonesian Muslim responses to globalisation’, in:
Ken Miichi and Omar Farouk (eds), Dynamics of Southeast Asian Muslims in the era of
globalization, Tokyo: Japan International Cooperation Agency Research Institute
(JICA-RI), 2013, pp. 47-70.
93 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, pp. 47-52.
94 Imdadun Rakhmat, Arus Baru, p. 100.
95 This was the only foreign educational institution operated under the license
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. The permit was
made available thanks to the then Minister of Religious Affairs, Alamsjah Ratu
Perwiranegara. See, Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, (eds), Menteri-Menteri Agama
RI: Biografi Sosial Politik, Badan Litbang Agama Departemen Agama RI and PPIM IAIN
Jakarta, 1998, p. 344.
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THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
From 1980 to 1986, the institute focused on Arabic studies under the name
Lembaga Pengajaran Bahasa Arab (LPBA, Institute for Teaching Arabic), but in
1986 was changed into LIPIA in order to include more subjects in more faculties,
such as the Shari’a faculty. However, since the beginning, that Salafi propaganda
is disseminated in the institution was evident. The students not only receive
Salafi doctrines in classrooms but also outside campus. In the classroom the
students learn, understand and memorize Salafi precepts. If a student espouses
a rational interpretation of Islamic doctrine, it may result in getting a low grade
or even to failure. In the dormitory, the students are under surveillance by their
seniors. Senior students hold a regular halqa, and see to it that the conduct of
their juniors conforms to Salafi manhaj.96
The institute provides scholarships for its students, and this attracts fresh
pesantren graduates to enrol. Up to 2009, LIPIA produced 8,604 graduates.97
LIPIA is planning to accept more students by establishing new branches in
Semarang (Central Java), Makassar (South Sulawesi) and Padang (West Sumatra).
The availability of scholarships is not the only reason for the students’ interest;
there is also the attraction of support from pesantren leaders, kyais, and notable
Muslim leaders. Some kyais I met during my visit to pesantrens were reluctant
to let their students study at state-sponsored Islamic higher educational
institutions such as State Islamic Universities (UIN), the State Institutes for
Islamic Studies (IAIN) or the State Colleges for Islamic Studies (STAIN). The
works of Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, “Ada Pemurtadan di IAIN” (“Apostasy at IAIN”),98
and of Adian Husaini99 of the Dewan Da’wah very much influenced the kyais’
view that UINs, IAINs and STAINs are Islamic institutions that spread liberal
thought. In his work, Jaiz highlights the rational and liberal approach to
Islamic studies in the state-sponsored Islamic institutions. According to him,
this approach is a systematic effort leading the students to polytheism.100 He
96 Imdadun Rakhmat, Arus Baru, p. 101-102.
97 http://www.republika.co.id/berita/31004/LIPIA_Lahirkan_Kader_Muslim_
Moderat, accessed on May 23, 2009.
98 Jaiz is critical of the methodology of Islamic studies developed at UIN/IAIN/
STAIN, and has written several books on the subject. See, Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, Ada
Pemurtadan di IAIN, Jakarta: Pustaka al-Kautsar, 2005; Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, et al.,
Islam dan Al-Qur’an pun Diserang: Gejala Bahaya Laten Neo-Komunisme di UIN, Jakarta:
Pustaka Nahi Munkar, 2009.
99 See, Adian Husaini, Virus Liberalisme di Perguruan Tinggi Islam, Jakarta: Gema Insani
Press, 2009.
100 Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, Ada Pemurtadan, p. ix.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
furthermore mentions some UIN/IAIN-based scholars who promote secularism
and pluralism, such as Harun Nasution, Nurcholish Madjid, Kaustsar Azhari
Noer, and Zainun Kamal. Likewise, Adian Husaini criticizes the liberal method of
Islamic studies developed in these institutions. This liberal tendency, according
to him, is visible in the approaches they use to the three essential doctrines of
Islam: deconstruction of Shari’a, de-sacralization of the Qur’an and the hadith,
and deconstruction of ‘aqida (tawhid). The first deals with questioning clear-cut
Islamic laws and interpreting them in line with the time; the second concerns
the application of a hermeneutical method to the Qur’an; while the last deals
with inserting an idea of religious pluralism that sees all religions as similar.101
LIPIA’s in disseminating Salafi da’wa is certain. The Saudi Government
established LIPIA among other things to halt the influence of the Iranian
revolution by spreading Wahhabi doctrines in many parts of the Muslim world,
including Indonesia. Through this institute, the Saudi government grants
scholarships to young students to study at the Jami’a al-Imam Ibn Su’ud in
Riyadh. After the completion of their studies, many of these graduates go on
to teach in existing pesantrens, or establish their own pesantrens as Abu Nida,
Aunurrafiq Ghufron, and Ahmas Faiz Asifudin did. Some others preach Salafi
teachings among Muslims.
A significant number of LIPIA graduates teach at Salafi pesantrens. The
similarities in spirit and mission of LIPIA and pesantrens in the propagation of
the Salafi manhaj is the main reason pesantrens accept LIPIA graduates. Abdul
Hakim Abdat is one of the notable Salafi teachers to have graduated from LIPIA.
He is currently busy in Salafi da’wa. He lectures on Salafi precepts in various
musallas including those of the Jakarta Stock Exchange (BEJ), the Astra Company,
and also in the al-Mubarak Mosque. In the last place, he teaches the Sahih alBukhari every Saturday morning attracting large audiences of more than 700
participants. He often travels to other cities in Indonesia to give lectures on the
Salafi manhaj, and he is also frequently invited to Malaysia to give lectures as
well.
The Religious Attaché of the Saudi Embassy, Jakarta
As the official representative of the Saudi Government, the Religious Attaché
of the Saudi Embassy in Jakarta without doubt has played a significant role in
101 Adian Husaini, “Dari ‘Yahudi Liberal’ ke ‘Islam Liberal’”, in Budi Handrianto, 50
Tokoh Islam Liberal Indonesia, Jakarta: Hujjah Press, 2007, pp. xxiii-xxxvi.
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THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
disseminating Salafi teachings. The embassy is very active in promoting Salafi
teachings in Indonesia by way of supporting prominent preachers such as
Yunahar Ilyas and Chalil Ridwan. Both scholars are graduates of the Jami’a Imam
Ibn Su’ud, Riyadh, and the Islamic University of Medina, respectively. Ilyas is a
member of the central board of the Muhammadiyah where he belongs to the
hardliner faction that promotes a literal interpretation of Islam.102 Ridwan is
currently a member of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Council of
Ulama) and the director of Pesantren Husnayain in Jakarta. From 1990 to 2000,
he chaired the Badan Kerjasama Pondok Pesantren (BKSPP, Coordinating Body
of Cooperation of Pondok Pesantren). They are called “the Attaché’s preachers”
and get a salary from the Saudi embassy.103
In spite of this, the staff members of the Attaché’s office, which has its own
office outside the Embassy’s residence, do not strictly practice the precepts of
Salafi teachings, particularly those dealing with their physical appearance. They
do wear trousers that reach below the ankle (isbal) and do not sport long beards.
Salafis are easily identified by their isbal and their beard. Salafism prohibits the
practice of isbal and shaving the beard. However, when I visited the Attaché’s
office in March 2009, I saw many staff members wearing long trousers below the
ankle and Shobahussurur, for instance, who has worked at the office for many
years, does not let his beard grow. For him, isbal and long beards have nothing
to do with religion, because they are Arab habits. Only those who emulate Arabs
hold the opinion that isbal and cutting beard are not allowed in Islam.104
The religious attaché’s office also offers native teachers of Arabic for Islamic
educational institutions such as Salafi pesantrens and Islamic universities.
These teachers live on the campuses and all expenses, including their salaries,
are borne by the office. The recipient institution only has to provide facilities
such as housing and transportation. The teachers are contracted by the office
for a period of four years, after which they may be replaced by others or their
contract may be extended. Pesantren Al-Irsyad in Tengaran, Salatiga, Central
Java, has received two teachers since 1995. Although the teachers are assigned
to teach Arabic, in practice they also teach other matters in accordance to their
expertise, particularly Salafi doctrines in ‘aqida. To some extent, these teachers
102 On the rise of conservatism within the Muhammadiyah, see Ahmad Najib Burhani,
“Liberal and Conservative Discourse in the Muhammadiyah: The Struggle for the
Face of Reformist Islam in Indonesia”, in Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), Contemporary
Developments in Indonesian Islam, Singapore: ISEAS, 2013, pp. 105-144.
103 Interview with Shobahussurur, Jakarta, March 6, 2009.
104 Interview with Shobahussurur, Jakarta, March 6, 2009.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
function as agents who oversee the implementation of Salafi teachings in the
recipient institutions.
The office of the religious attaché also distributes Salafi books and Qur’ans to
‘attaché preachers’ and to other parties. When I visited the office, for example,
I met Ahmad Romli, a fresh graduate from Pesantren Minhaj al-Sunnah in
Bogor, who was there to ask for books and Qur’ans. He would then return to his
hometown to assist and teach in the newly founded Salafi Pesantren al-Hidayah,
in Tanggamus, Lampung. Besides this, the office also builds many mosques. In
the last ten years, the office has constructed more than 150 mosques throughout
the country. This includes the renovation of the Arif Rahman Hakim mosque,
and the University of Indonesia mosque in Salemba, Central Jakarta.
Al-Irsyad
In early 1990, the Salafis utilized the vast network of al-Irsyad, an organization
established by Ahmad Surkati in 1913. As noted earlier, in 1989, almost all leading
Salafi figures, such as Ja’far Umar Thalib, Yusuf Usman Baisa and Yazid Jawas,
gathered at Pesantren al-Irsyad in Tengaran, and turned it into a centre for
Salafi teachings from which the Salafis spread out. I will return to this pesantren
in another chapter.
The Sekolah Tinggi Ali bin Abi Thalib (STAI, Islamic College) in Surabaya
is another institution that benefits from a connection with al-Irsyad. It was
established in 1996, under the name Ma’had ‘Aly al-Irsyad al-Salafi and it ran its
program on the al-Irsyad campus in Surabaya. It adopted the curriculum of the
Jami’a Imam ibn Su’ud University in Riyadh.105 Later, the relationship between
the Ma’had Aly and al-Irsyad deteriorated because of Ma’had’s persistence in
supporting Salafi tenets. In 2006, the Ma’had was transformed into STAI Ali bin
Abi Thalib with a new campus in Sidotopo Kidul Street No. 51, Surabaya, East Java.
However, the institution maintained the al-Irsyad emblem. Its statutes states
that STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib is under the supervision of the Yayasan Universitas
Islam al-Irsyad Surabaya. This is ironic, since de facto the STAI has separated
from al-Irsyad. STAI Ali ibn Abi Thalib’s director, Abdurrahman al-Tamimi,
told me that the use of the name al-Irsyad is merely for strategic reasons; to
make it easier to get a government permit.106 Abu Haidar, a prominent Salafi
105 Buku Panduan Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Ali Bin Abi Thalib, Surabaya: STAI Ali bin Abi
Thalib, 2008, pp. 5-6.
106 Interview with Abdurrahman al-Tamimi, the director of STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib,
Surabaya, December 22, 2008.
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THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
figure from Bandung, claims that the use of the name al-Irsyad aims to counter
resistance and the criticism of the community against it. In addition to the fact
that the majority of Muslims in Surabaya are affiliated to the Nahdlatul Ulama
and the location of Sunan Ampel’s shrine next to the institute may become a
central point in the institute’s criticism against them.107 Sunan Ampel was one
of the nine saints who successfully preached Islam in Indonesia, and therefore
many Muslims visit his shrine. By consistently using the name al-Irsyad, which
traditionalist Muslims still honour, STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib aims to evade the
community’s criticism.
Similarly, the use of the name Ali bin Abi Thalib is aimed at preventing
criticism from Arab descendants. Some Arabs claim that they are descendants
of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima and her husband, Ali
ibn Abi Thalib. In Indonesia, these Arabs are called habib. Because they claim this
lineage, habibs demand the respect of indigenous Muslims as they claim that the
spread of Islam in Indonesia is due to their role in da’wa. As a result, habibs enjoy
a privileged position among Indonesian Muslims who kiss their hand (taqbil)
when they meet them. On the other hand, Salafis criticize this attitude arguing
that Islam teaches the equal position of all Muslims. Responding to this, the
habibs criticize the Salafis in their turn and accuse them of hating the Prophet’s
descendants. Through using the name Ali bin Abi Thalib, the Salafis want to
show that they do not oppose Arabs.108
The use of the name al-Irsyad helps the pesantren and the al-Irsyad
connection benefits the Salafis. Many students I met during my fieldwork in the
pesantren are alumni of al-Irsyad schools from many regions, such as al-Irsyad
in Tegal and Pekalongan, Central Java.
Pondok Modern Darussalam, Gontor, Ponorogo, East Java
In spite of the valuable contribution of Pondok Modern Darussalam, Gontor
(hereafter referred as Gontor) in colouring Indonesian Islam through its alumni,
little research has been devoted to its study.109 Pondok Gontor was established
107 Interview with Abu Haidar, Amsterdam, May 1, 2009.
108 Interview with Mubarak Bamualim, vice director of STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib,
Surabaya, December 23, 2008.
109 A classic study on Gontor was made by Lance Castles, “Notes on the Islamic School at
Gontor”, in Indonesia, No. 1 (1966), pp. 30-45. See also, Ali Saifullah HA, “Darussalaam,
Pondok Modern Gontor’, in M. Dawam Rahardjo, Pesantren dan Pembaharuan, Jakarta:
LP3ES, 1995, pp.134-154. A more recent work was done by Martin van Bruinessen,
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
in 1926 by three bothers. This “trimurti” consists of Ahmad Sahal, Zainuddin
Fannani, and Imam Zarkasyi. Unlike other pesantrens that belong or are
affiliated to certain Muslims organizations, Pondok Gontor’s founders wanted
the pesantren to be able to unite the entire Muslim community as expressed in
its motto “di atas dan untuk semua golongan”, (above and for all groups).
Bearing this motto and combined with its five pillars, keikhlasan (sincerity),
kesederhanaan (modesty), berdikari (self-reliance), ukhuwwah Islamiyyah (Islamic
brotherhood) and kebebasan (freedom),110 Gontor has produced thousands of
alumni who all went their own ways, ranging from becoming fundamentalist
literalist, to moderate and liberal.111 Some alumni have emerged as national
figures who coloured the Islamic discourses in the country. To name a few, we
can mention Nurcholish Madjid who was in favour of a liberal interpretation
of Islam, the chairman of the Muhammadiyah M. Din Syamsuddin, former
chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama Hasyim Muzadi, former Minister of Religious
Affairs, Maftuh Basyuni, former speaker of the People’s Assembly, Hidayat Nur
Wahid. However, we should not forget to mention Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as an
alumni at the other end of the spectrum.
Since its inception, Gontor has applied modern teaching methods and
has adopted a grading system. It has taught both religious knowledge and secular
sciences. Arabic and English are used in daily conversation among students and
teachers. Many alumni have continued to study at Middle Eastern universities,
particularly at the al-Azhar University in Cairo and the Islamic University of
Medina. Gontor teaches its students the ‘aqida of the ahlu al-Sunna wal al-jama’a,
which resembles that of the Ash’arite. In their study of this subject, the students
read the work of Imam Zarkasyi, Ushuluddin, followed by the Kitab al-Sa’ada by
Abdul Hamid Hakim, and the al-Din al-Islami by Sheikh Hasan Mansur, Abd alWahhab Khayruddin and Mustafa al-‘Inani. All these works teach theological
tenets resembling those of the Ash’arite school. Moreover, in the fifth year of
‘Divergent Paths from Gontor: Muslim Educational Reform and the Travails of
Pluralism in Indonesia’, in: Freek L. Bakker and Jan Sihar Aritonang (eds), On the Edge
of Many Worlds [Festschrift Karel A. Steenbrink], Zoetermeer: Meinema, 2006, pp. 15262 (available online at: http://www.hum.uu.nl/medewerkers/m.vanbruinessen/
publications/Bruinessen_Divergent_paths_from_Gontor.pdf); and Din Wahid,
“Pendidikan Islam di Jawa Timur: Kecenderungan dan Variasi”, in Jajat Burhanudin
and Dina Afrianty (eds), Mencetak Muslim Modern: Peta Pendidikan Islam Indonesia,
Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada, 2006, pp. 72-83.
110 http://www.gontor.ac.id/panca-jiwa, accessed on August 26, 2013.
111 See Martin van Bruinessen, “Divergent Path from Gontor” .
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their study, students are introduced to the comparative study of religion, as they
study Mahmud Yunus’s work, al-Adyan (‘Religions’). The last subject, combined
with Ibn Rushd’s “Bidayat al-Mujtahid” provides a basis for an inclusive attitude
towards other Muslim groups and even to non-Muslims.
However, a significant change took place in 2000. In order to maintain its
accreditation from the Islamic University of Medina, Gontor was required
to incorporate Salafi books, particularly on ‘aqida. Thus, since 2000 Gontor
has taught its students the works of Salih Fawzan al-Fawzan, the multiple
volume Kitab al-Tawhid. The students have to study these books in the fourth,
fifth and sixth year classes. Since they have been introduced to Salafism, it
is no wonder that many Gontor alumni currently turn into Salafi activists.
However, the interest in Salafism of some Gontor alumni is not merely caused
by the introduction of Salafi teachings at Gontor but due to their study in Salafi
learning centres. Gontor alumni Mubarak Bamualim from Surabaya and Khatib
Muwahhid from Banjarsari, Ciamis, for example, have become leading Salafi
ustadhs in their regions. Bamuallim studied Salafism at the Islamic University of
Medina, while Muwahhid learned Salafism in Darul Hadith, Yemen. It is in this
context that Gontor contributes to the spread of Salafism in the country.
Gontor’s close relationship with the Saudi government dates back to earlier
times before it included Salafi books in its curriculum. One of Gontor’s founders,
Imam Zarkasyi, together with M. Natsir of the Dewan Da’wah and Ahmad Syaichu
of the Nahdlatul Ulama, became close counterparts of the Rabita al-‘Alam alIslami.112 Given this fact, it was no surprise that Gontor received and probably
still does receive large amounts of money from the Saudi Government. The threestorey “Saudi buildings” comprising a students’ dormitory, classes, bathrooms
and toilets were constructed with financial support from the Saudi Government.
Moreover, Gontor often welcomes teachers from Saudi Arabia to teach Arabic
for short periods of time (two to three weeks). The Saudi ambassadors and high
official of the Saudi Government often pay a visit to Gontor. My experience
when I studied at Gontor may describe how Gontor welcomes such distinguished
guests. I studied at Gontor from 1981-1987, and taught there for another two
years during my dedication period (masa pengabdian) from 1987-1989. During
this period, I saw how Gontor tried to please these guests satisfactorily. Under
112 ‘Ghazwul fikri or Arabisation? Indonesian Muslim responses to globalisation’, in:
Ken Miichi and Omar Farouk (eds), Dynamics of Southeast Asian Muslims in the era of
globalization, Tokyo: Japan International Cooperation Agency Research Institute
(JICA-RI), 2013, pp. 47-70.
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normal circumstances, Gontor prohibits immature students from smoking, but
allows it for adult ones. Likewise, Gontor normally has pictures of people or
animals on its wall magazine. During the visit of such important figures (Saudi
sheikhs and high officials), Gontor temporary banned its students from smoking
and covered all drawings of living creatures.
All the above organizations and institutions have attributed in one way or
another to the spread of Salafism. As discussed above, the Salafis have benefited
much from these institution’s vast networks. After having gained significant
numbers of followers, Salafis continue to start to establish their own foundations,
to create publishing houses, and to create radio stations. Salafis mobilize all these
resources in order to disseminate the Salafi da’wa. The following paragraphs
will discuss the ways Salafis mobilize their resources.
Lajna Khayriyya Mushtaraka, Jakarta
The Lajna Khayriyya Mushtaraka in Jakarta is a representative office of the
Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami (The Revival of the Islamic Heritage Society)
in Indonesia. The Jam’iyyat Ihya al-Turath is a charitable institution that was
founded in Kuwait in 1981 amongst others by leading Salafi figure Abd alRahman Abd al-Khaliq. Rich individuals donated money to the institution after
which it awarded enormous grants to Salafi institutions worldwide, including
Indonesia.113 The Lajna is now located in Kampung Melayu, East Jakarta. Since
1986, the Kuwaiti government has donated grants to the Muslim community
in Indonesia. After the Gulf War in the 1990s, wanting to know what happened
to their donations, some individual donors began to ask for financial reports
from the Kuwaiti Government, which it was unable to provide. For this purpose,
the Lajna Khayriya in Jakarta was founded in 1992 and it was first housed in
the Gedung Pusat Da’wah of the Muhammadiyah Central Board in Menteng,
Jakarta. Despite the fact that it was placed in the Muhammadiyah’s building, it
was independent from the organization, although some Lajna personnel were,
indeed, members of the Muhammadiyah. The placement of the Lajna in the
Muhammadiyah building was related to the fact that the Muhammadiyah had
received enormous grants from Kuwait. The Lajna subsequently moved to the
Muhammadiyah-owned YARSI University in Cempaka Putih, Central Jakarta. As
the Lajna’s activities increased, the office provided by the Muhammadiyah was
no longer sufficient and in 2002, it moved to its own office, a four-story building
113 On the Ihya al-Turath, see Pall, Lebanese Salafi, pp. 87-97.
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in Kampung Melayu, East Jakarta.
As the representative office of the Jam’iyat Ihya’ al-Turath, the Lajna is the
only channel for grants from the Ihya’ al-Turath. Some Salafi pesantrens have
received large amounts of money from the Ihya al-Turath, such as Biz Baz in
Yogyakarta, Imam Bukhari in Solo, al-Irsyad in Tengaran, Salatiga (all three in
Central Java), As-sunnah in Cirebon, and Ihya al-Sunnah in Tasikmalaya (both
in West Java). To get a grant, a pesantren has to submit a proposal to the Lajna
office in Jakarta after which the Lajna seeks donors within the Ihya al-Turath
in Kuwait. Generally, pesantrens propose projects for the building of an Islamic
Center consisting of a mosque, classes, and a student dormitory.114 In Indonesia,
an Islamic Center is usually a government-funded institution that carries out
the Islamic activities, mainly the da’wa. However, in the context of the Ihya alTurath’s project, the proposed Islamic Center may consist of a pesantren and a
madrasah. Likewise, teachers’ housings are constructed under the project “sakan
al-fuqara’” or “house for the poor.” Teachers in Salafi pesantrens devoted their
time and energy in teaching students. The low salary the pesantrens provide
makes them unable to buy or build their own house. In this sense, teachers are
poor and deserve adequate housing. The projects are classified as either large or
small projects. However, the implementation of the projects depends on the local
situation and currency rate. In the case of Pesantren Imam Bukhari in Solo, for
instance, due to the Indonesian economic crisis, the grants, originally proposed
for construction only, also had to cover the buying of land. Imam Bukhari, Bin
Baz and Ihyaussunah are among the pesantrens that received large donations
from the Ihya al-Turath through the Lajna Khayriyya in Jakarta. At the end of
the project, the pesantren is obliged to provide a report of the project.
In addition to channelling funds to pesantrens, the Lajna Khayriyya also
directly manages three pesantrens for orphans: Pesantren Ibn Taymiyya in
Bogor, West Java, hosts about 500 students; Pesantren al-Maqtu’ in Sukabumi,
West Java, hosts 80 students; and Pesantren Imam Syafi’i in Aceh provides
education for 100 students. The Lajna appoints the directors of the pesantrens
and all expenses are borne by the Lajna. All the costs of the students are paid
for, including meals and books. Minor changes have recently taken place in
Pesantren al-Maqtu’ in Sukabumi, and due to local demand, it now accepts nonorphan students with some payment.115
It is interesting to highlight the Lajna’s policy in granting donations for
114 Interview with Zarkasyi, secretary of the Lajna, Jakarta, March 17, 2009
115 Interview with Zarkasyi, secretary of the Lajna, Jakarta, March 17, 2009.
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institutions. Before the emergence of Salafi pesantrens, as mentioned earlier,
the Kuwaiti government had already granted a large amount of money to
Indonesia. Some Islamic organizations, particularly the Muhammadiyah,
benefited greatly from these grants. Consequently, the Lajna was placed
for a while in Muhammadiyah-owned buildings. The policy of the Lajna for
granting donations is that the recipient institutions should deal with Islamic
da’wa, focusing on the purification of tawhid, and fight against superstitions
and innovation. When the Lajna saw that the Muhammadiyah was no longer
strict in its stance against religious innovations and superstitions, and as Salafi
pesantrens began to emerge following the return of Saudi graduates and Salafi
oriented preachers, these grants began to be transferred to Salafi pesantrens.
The Lajna views the Muhammadiyah and other reformist organizations such
Persatuan Islam and al-Irsyad as too rational and too secular.
This change in grant recipients does not diminish the Lajna’s concern with the
activities of its own organization. It still keeps in touch and cooperates with the personnel
of the Muhammadiyah in continuing da’wa activities in mosques built by the Lajna or by
the Kuwaiti Government. Nevertheless, this cooperation has shifted from institutional to
individual cooperation. At present, the Lajna has built about 1000 mosques throughout
Indonesia and has granted funds to about 120 imams and preachers. Initially, it had
recruited various Persis teachers to work for it but later dismissed them in favour of true
Salafi followers. UU Suhendar, the head of Persis’ Kotamadya Tasikmalaya Branch, for
instance, told me that he used to be a Lajna preacher. His career, however, had ended
with the emergence of larger numbers of Salafi ustadhs who took over preaching from
non Salafi preachers while a Salafi sheikh, he does not remember who, charged him
of being “partly Salaf” (nisf al-Salaf).116 The Lajna also distributes books to its preachers,
institutions and pesantrens. As mentioned earlier, the grants the Ihya al-Turath provided
caused friction among the Salafis.
Economic Resources
The discussion of the Lajna brings us to another essential element of the
movement, its economic resources. It is not an easy task to investigate the
sources of finance of the Salafi movement because almost all organizations are
reluctant to disclose this matter. Another reason is that the donors, especially
local ones, do not want their donation made public. Given this fact, I have
attempted to find ways of discovering the financial sources of the pesantrens.
116 Interview with UU Suhendar, Tasikmalaya, February 11, 2010.
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One possible way appeared to be by looking at the inscriptions on the walls that
usually disclose the name of the donor.
By using this method during my fieldwork I found that Salafi pesantrens
receive money from at least two charitable foreign foundations: the Jam’iyyat
Ihya al-Turath al-Islami from Kuwait and the Mu’assasat Sheikh ‘Aid Al al-Thani
al-Khayriyya from Qatar. Both are Salafi institutions that support Salafism
worldwide, including in Indonesia.
The Mua’assat Sheikh ‘Aid Al Al-Thani al-Khayriyya (Sheikh Eid Charity
Association) was founded by the Emir of Qatar in 1995.117 As Zoltan Pall has
shown, its establishment was aimed at establishing the authority of the Emir
of Qatar against that of the Saudi Government. In 1995, the Qatari Government
hosted the Sahwis (young Salafis who criticize official Saudi ‘ulama who
legitimize government policies and interests) from Saudi and gave them any
positions available such as those of preacher and teacher, and they were bound
by this association. Unlike the Ihya al-Turath that granted many to so-called
“cooperationist” Salafi pesantrens, the role of the Qatari foundation is more
limited. I found that only the Wahdah Islamiyyah in Makassar has received
a significant grant from the foundation for the construction of all kinds of
buildings. Other Salafi groups, such as the Bin Baz Islamic Center in Yogyakarta
received support from this foundation to carry out certain activities including
organizing Salafi dawra.
Apart from these two foundations, I believe that many other charity
foundations give financial aid to Indonesian Salafis, for instance the Mu’assasat
al-Haramayn al-Khayriyya (al-Haramayn Charity Foundation). However, Salafi
figures acknowledged that following the 9/11 attack and due to strict control by
Western authorities, currently less money flows to them. Many individuals have
also donated money to assist the spread of Salafism in the country but not as
much as before. Salafi foundations such as the al-Huda in Bogor and the Ihya alSunnah in Tasikmalaya have channelled donations from individual Saudi donors
for the building of mosques. Attention must also be paid to local donors. For
instance, Ahmad Bawazir, a businessman from Arab descent who owns various
companies in Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, deserves mention here. He is the
main donor of the STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib in Surabaya. All the buildings at this
college were funded by his grants. Moreover, he has allocated all profits from the
117 http://eidcharity.dyndns.info:81/eidweb/about.aspx, accessed on September 1,
2013.
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Andalusia hotel in Surabaya to support the operational costs of the college.118
Religious Teachings in Mosques
Salafis are active in preaching Salafi da’wa in pesantren surroundings
making use of existing public mosques in many regions. In Jakarta, the Salafis
organize regular public lectures at the al-Mubarak Mosque in North Jakarta, the
Dewan Da’wah’s grand mosque al-Furqan in Kramat Raya Central Jakarta, the alTien Mosque in Taman Mini, East Jakarta, and the al-I’tisham Mosque in South
Jakarta. In Bogor, the Salafis run regular religious meetings with the prominent
Salafi teacher Yazid Jawas in the Ahmad ibn Hanbal Mosque. In Yogyakarta, the
mosques most frequently used by Salafis are the al-Hasanah Mosque, Masjid
Kampus of Gadjah Mada University, and the Pogung Raya Mosque. In Surabaya,
the Salafis use the Jami’ Mekkah Mosque. In Cirebon, the Salafis use the grand
mosque al-Taqwa. The availability of Salafi teaching at these mosques does not
indicate that they are Salafi controlled. In fact, they are managed by other groups
and every group of Muslims is welcome to carry out da’wa. The al-Tien Mosque,
for example, was built by former president Soeharto and is controlled by leading
Muslim scholars such as Quraish Shihab. Likewise, the grand mosque al-Taqwa in
Cirebon is managed by the government and all groups, including Islamists, can
hold religious teachings there. What makes it interesting is that the Salafis try to
attract more adherents by organizing regular religious lessons in strategic areas.
In these places, the lectures are regularly delivered by national Salafi figures
such as Yazid Jawas, Abdul Hakim Abdat, Luqman Ba’aduh, and Muhammad AsSewed. These ‘great’ teachers (kibar al-asatidh as-Salafi) frequently travel to other
cities to deliver lectures outside their hometowns.
Interestingly, in some cases Salafis take over public mosques or mosques
belonging to other organizations. The conquest of these mosques has in some
cases led to conflicts with the existing management of the mosque. In the
Dewan Da’wah al-Furqan Mosque, as described earlier, the Salafis were pushed
out by its official. The teaching was then moved to the al-Tien Mosque at Taman
Mini Indonesia Indah, East Jakarta, where they were able to hold some meetings
before being driven out by the al-Tien management. Although Yazid Jawas is
now seeking permission to hold religious gatherings there, he is pessimistic
about obtaining consent. In order to give their permission, the officials at the al118 Interview with Abdurrahman al-Tamimi, Surabaya, December 22, 2008; interview
with Mubarak Bamualim, Surabaya, December 23, 2008.
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Tien Mosque must first ask the opinion of the imams, including Quraish Shihab.
Shihab, the former rector of IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta and at one time
Minister of Religious Affairs, is a prominent Muslim intellectual who specializes
in tafsir and who maintains close ties to the Cendana family of former president
Soeharto. He has authored a number of works including his multi-volume
masterpiece, Tafsir al-Misbah. Moreover, because the Salafis severely criticized
Shihab because of his opinions on the Shi’a it was almost predictable that the
Salafis would never get permission to use the mosque for their purposes.
Another example is the Salafi teaching at the al-Taqwa Mosque in Gresik
where Mubarak Bamualim, one of the Salafi teachers from Surabaya, gives
weekly lectures on Riyad al-Salihin. The mosque belongs to the Gresik branch
of the Muhammadiyah. Some Muhammadiyah officials have voiced their
objections to the Salafi lectures at the mosque and have asked Mubarak to end
them. Since one of the participants of the Salafi teaching is the foremost donor
of the mosque and of the Muhammadiyah organization, the Salafi teachings
continue. The donor has threatened to stop his grants to the Muhammadiyah if
the Muhammadiyah terminates the Salafi teaching at the mosque.
The books used in the above mentioned teaching centres are the same as
those studied in Salafi pesantrens. Some are books on the Salafi creed such as
Kitab al-Tawhid, al-Usul al-Thalatha, Kasyf al-Shubuhat authored by Muhammad ibn
‘Abd al-Wahhab; while others deal with hadith, such as Riyad al-Salihin, al-Arba’in
al-Nawawi, Bulugh al-Maram, Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim. While the tawhid
books are exclusively used by Salafis, the hadith books are used also by other
groups of Muslims. Thus, these hadiths collections are also taught in other majlis
taklim (religious gathering), usually in the mosque. Unlike religious teaching
conducted by other organizations that usually take elements from various
books, Salafi teaching teaches books from beginning to end. The teaching usually
begins with the reading of the text by a teacher, followed by the Indonesian
translation of the text and an explanation of its content. Commentaries on the
books are provided by Salafi sheikhs such as Sheikh al-Uthaymin, from which
the explanation is taken. Only in rare cases do teachers express their own
interpretations. Regarding hadith material, the teachers clarify the status of the
hadith under discussion to convince the participants that the hadith is sahih.
At the end of the session, participants have the opportunity to ask questions.
The questions may deal with previous sessions or may concern other common
and practical religious issues, ranging from ritual matters to mu’amalat (social
interactions), including a Muslim’s attitude to the government and to non-
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Muslims.
The teachers’ explanations and answers basically consist of Qur’anic verses,
hadiths and the opinions of the ‘ulama. Only in a rare cases do the teachers
express their own opinions. This method distinguishes Salafi teaching from that
of others. Dewan Da’wah activist Misbach Malim, for example, teaches the Riyad
al-Salihin to his neighbours taking a different approach using his own logic to
explain the hadiths, which may result in different conclusions from those of the
Salafis.119
The participants come from different backgrounds: university students,
professionals, government employees, private businessmen, and unemployed
people. In large mosques, many people participate in the teachings. In these
mosques, the teachings take place in the morning or in the afternoon. In the
al-Mubarak Mosque in North Jakarta, for example, where Abdul Hakim Abdat
regularly teaches the Sahih al-Bukhari on Saturdays from 9 to 11 a.m., more than
seven hundred participants attend. Some participants attend teaching in many
mosques, moving from one mosque to another seeking more knowledge about
Salafi tenets. They are interested in the Salafi da’wa because the Salafi doctrines
are simple, and based on the Qur’an, the hadith and the sayings of Salafi ‘ulama.
In small mosques where the teaching takes place after Maghrib prayers, only
a small number of people attend. In the al-Taqwa Mosque in Gresik, for instance,
where Mubarak Bamualim gives lectures on the Riyad al-Salihin on Tuesdays, only
some 20 people attend. The teaching start after Maghrib prayers and continues
until Isha’ prayers. After performing the Isha’ prayers, the participants have
the opportunity to ask questions. When I attended the teaching delivered by
Mubarak Bamualim in the mosque on 23 December 2008, a participant asked
the teacher about interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims. As the
Christmas celebration was approaching, the participant, a tailor, described his
own experience: he was once asked by a Christian to make an overcoat for a
Christmas celebration. On another occasion, a Christian came to him to hire an
overcoat for Christmas. In the latter situation, the tailor did not show the best
coat he had to the Christian in the hope that he would not rent it. The participant
asked the teacher’s opinion about this. The teacher’s answer was interesting. He
said that a Muslim should not burden his life by further questions unless he
faces a difficult situation. In fiqh, this case is categorized as ta’annut, seeking a
further question that results in difficulty, and this is prohibited in Islam. In the
case of the tailor, the teacher said that he should not ask his customer questions
119 Interview with H.M. Misbach Malim, Jakarta, September 23, 2008.
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about the customer’s intentions when renting or buying a coat, and thus the
tailor would avoid a complicated situation.
Generally, the motive of the participants attending Salafi circles is to seek
religious knowledge. The participants express boredom with existing religious
teachings delivered by other groups or organizations that emphasize reason
and do not convince the participants in religious matters. The teachers of
these teachings usually answer the questions of the audience by starting with
“according to my opinion”, which quite often conflicts with the opinions of
other teachers. This situation is totally different from the teachings conducted
by Salafi groups. The Salafi teachers do not espouse their own opinions but the
opinions of Salafi ‘ulama, which do not contradict the opinions of other Salafi
teachers. As a result, according to some participants, the Salafi teaching is more
interesting and convincing than that of the others.120
Dawra
Apart from the regular religious teaching at mosques, Salafis run dawras
as a means of consolidating the movement, disseminating Salafi teachings,
and recruiting new followers. Unlike religious gatherings that last only a few
hours, dawras range from three days to three weeks. Dawras are classified into
three categories: for teachers, for followers, and for prospective Salafis. In the
case of dawra for teachers, the organizer requests the attendance of pesantren
leaders and Salafi figures or their representatives. During the dawras the
lectures are delivered by Salafi sheikhs from abroad, mostly from Yemen, Saudi
Arabia, and Jordan. From 20 February – 12 March 2009, for example, Pesantren
Jamilurrahman held a dawra on the Sahih Muslim for Salafi teachers lasting over
three weeks at the Kana hotel, Kaliurang, Yogyakarta. I was present for two days.
This dawra was jointly organized by Pesantren Jamilurrahman, the Jam’iyya ‘Aid
ibn Muhammad Al Thani al-Khairiyya from Qatar and the al-Hilal foundation
from Malaysia. Some sixty-five teachers were present at the dawra, examining
the Sahih Muslim under the supervision of Sheikh Walid Saif al-Nasr from the
Islamic University of Medina. The dawra began each day in the early morning
after performing the dawn prayers (subh) and ended in the late evening. During
the dawra, Sheikh Walid reviewed all hadiths providing explanations when
needed. The participants had the opportunity to ask questions related to the
120 Informal conversation with Saeful Hidayat, a Salafi activist from the Jami’ Mekkah
Mosque, Surabaya, December 22, 2008.
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hadiths during the sheikh’s explanation. Although the aim of a dawra is to
provide the proper understanding of the hadiths included in the Sahih Muslim,
dawra also has a strategic role in the consolidation of the Salafi movement.
During the program, the participants have the opportunity to share their
experience in broadening their da’wa, and the development of their da’wa and
their pesantrens. This exchange of information can result in mutual assistance
among the participants and can encourage teachers to move to other cities or
pesantrens.
Similarly, the Salafi pesantrens pay much attention to other Salafi activists
by organizing special dawras. They design particular materials with special
references, mostly on ‘aqida, such as al-Usul al-Thalatha and Kitab al-Tawhid by
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and the Salafi manhaj. The Salafi activists who
want to understand Arabic are encouraged to take part in a special dawra on
Arabic. Pesantren al-Furqan in Gresik, East Java, holds an annual dawra for Arabic
language that lasts more than a month. Aunurrafiq Ghufran, the director of the
pesantren, published a special book on Arabic language for the training. Salafis
are highly encouraged to mastering Arabic in order to be able to understand
Islam from its primary sources. The participants in the Arabic language training
are mostly university students or fresh graduates.
To disseminate Salafi ideas among new participants, the Salafis also carry
out special dawras for potential participants. Unlike the longer dawras for Salafi
teachers, the dawras for potential participants last for a few days only and target
senior high school students. The dawras are held during school holidays. The
materials covered in the dawras are introductory matters in the Salafi manhaj,
‘aqida and akhlaq. Pesantren Imam Bukhari in Solo and Pesantren As-Sunnah in
Cirebon are among the Salafi pesantrens that regularly organize these dawras.
Radio
In spite of Salafi restrictions on the use of technological means like television
and radio for recreational purposes, Salafis are progressive in the use of
technology for da’wa, such as creating websites, recording lectures on MP3, CD,
and DVD formats and so on. Aware of the influence of the electronic media,
particularly television and radio, Salafis try to compete in and get a hold of
the public sphere by establishing their own radio stations broadcasting their
own da’wa. Salafis believe that the electronic media has been dominated by
non-Muslims wishing to destroy Islamic values, to turn Muslims away from the
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shari’a and to lead Muslims to a false ‘aqida.121 In short, through establishing
radio stations, Salafis aim to defend the ‘aqida and the morality of Muslims.
Owing to Salafi awareness of the negative impact of existing radio stations,
many Salafi pesantrens have established their own da’wa stations, such as Radio
Assunnah (which belongs to Pesantren as-Sunnah), Radio Dhiya’ussunnah (which
belongs to Pesantren Dhiya’ussunnah) in Cirebon, Radio Muslim in Yogyakarta,
Radio Hang in Batam, and Radio Rodja in Cileungsih, Bogor, West Java. Common
features of these stations are Qur’anic recitation and Salafi lectures in the
form of both live and recorded programs. Most of these radio stations have
also created their own websites; Radio Assunnah Cirebon at www.radioassunah.
com; Radio Hang at www.hang106.com; Radio Muslim at www.radiomuslim.com;
and Radio Rodja at www.radiorodja.com. The websites are intended to reach a
wider audience as Salafis can access these websites and follow their programs.
Moreover, some of these radio stations have a streaming channel that enables
Muslims all over the world to listen to their broadcasts. Some of the stations
are still amateurish, such as community stations, while others are professional,
using both AM and FM frequencies.
In Indonesia, Radio Rodja is the leading Salafi radio station. It is broadcasted
from Cileungsih, Bogor, West Java, at 756 AM and has a streaming channel.
Established in 2005, it was a community radio reaching a radius of only two
kilometres. In 2007, Radio Rodja was upgraded to AM frequency and can be
heard by people living in Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi. The people living
outside this area can access the station through a streaming channel at www.
radiorodja.com. It is on air almost all day long, from 3:30 in the early morning
to 12 midnight broadcasting various programs ranging from recitations of the
holy Qur’an, Arabic language lessons and lectures (live and recorded), to fatwas
of Salafi ‘ulama, and health consultations. Islamic teachings include ‘aqida,
fiqh, tafsir, hadith, prayers, and tazkiya al-nufus (soul purification), and are
delivered by leading Salafi teachers like Yazid Jawas, Abdul Hakim Abdat, Abu
Haidar, Badrussalam, Arman Amri, Abu Qatada and Ali Musri. Radio Rodja also
broadcasts live lectures from the Jakarta Islamic Centre while a live lecture from
Medina is delivered weekly by Firanda Andirja, a Salafi teacher who is currently
undertaking his doctoral program at the Islamic University of Medina.
Aside from on-air programs, Radio Rodja’s website provides recorded lectures
in MP3 and e-book format, which can be downloaded so that Salafis can catch
121 http://ww.radiorodja.com/visi-misi, accessed on May 21, 2009.
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up with missed lectures. Salafis can also post comments and suggestions on the
website. The comments and suggestions vary. On May 16, 2009, for example,
Ummu Sakinah wrote a message in the guest book suggesting that the teachers
frequently remind female Muslims to wear true Muslimah attire in accordance
with the shari’a. Ummu Sakinah saw many female Muslims, akhwat, who attended
Salafi teachings and dawras but still wear inappropriate Muslimah dress and use
lipstick and other cosmetics.122
Visitors can also pose questions through the website. These include questions
on Salafi tenets, Islamic law and daily life issues. On May 10, 2009, a visitor,
Faurizki, asked about attending liqa’, a gathering for the purpose of religious
indoctrination conducted by Islamist movements such as Ikhwanul Muslimin.
Responding to the question, the teacher explained that liqa’ is usually held by
people who lack knowledge of Islam and who are loyal and committed to their
group. The teacher, furthermore, quoted a hadith saying that one of the signs
that the Hereafter is imminent is the study (Islam) from the asaghir, the people
who committed bid’a and have a lack of knowledge. The teacher suggested that
the visitor should study with the ‘ulama and teachers with the true manhaj.123
Another visitor, Rezalul Haq, on April 19, 2009, raised a question about his job.
He worked for a private television company. Since the company broadcasts
programs that he sees as creating more negative effects than positive ones, he
asked the teacher whether he should give up the job. Responding to this question,
the teacher said that working for the television company is categorized as
contributing to committing a ma’siat (a small sin), which is prohibited in Islam.
The teacher quoted a Qur’anic verse stating one should not help others commit
sin and enmity. The teacher also reminded the man that God will provide him
with a livelihood.124 At the end, the teacher, nonetheless, did not advise the man
to resign.
It is interesting to carefully examine the teacher’s responses. To the
first question, he gave a firm opinion that the man should abandon the liqa’.
Contrastingly, in the second question, the teacher did not firmly suggest that
the man should resign and he did not provide any solution. Although the answer
implies that the man should give up his job, it was not explicitly stated. The
teacher seemed to be ambiguous, as he could not provide the man with a new
job.
122 http://www.radiorodja.com/buku-tamu, accessed on May 21, 2009.
123 http://www.radiorodja.com/tanya-jawab-ustadz, accessed on May 21, 2009
124 http://www.radiorodja.com/tanya-jawab-ustadz, accessed on May 21, 2009.
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THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
To attract listeners, Salafi radio stations emulate similar programs created by
other radio companies. The Assunnah radio in Cirebon, for example, created “byrequest” programs as its trademark. These programs are “al-Qur’an by request”,
“hadith and du’a (prayer) by request” and “tadarus by phone” (“Qur’anic recital
by phone”). While the first two programs are directed to all listeners, the last
one is aimed at children only. Through these programs, listeners can request
any Qur’anic verse, hadith or du’a (prayer) on a specific issue. Upon request, the
broadcaster will put the Qur’anic verse, hadith or du’a on air. According to the
radio’s manager, Diding, by-request programs are popular. They were invented
to compete with other radio stations who broadcast by-request programs, such
as “song by request”.125
The radio stations are also used to inform listeners about the activities
conducted by Salafis. Radio Assunah, for example, is used to broadcast the
pesantren’s activities, such as general lectures, new student enrolment, and
even to advertise Salafi business, such as herbal products and Salafi books.
Periodicals: Magazines, Bulletins and Pamphlets
Aware of the influence of printed media, Salafis produce monthly magazines,
weekly bulletins and occasionally pamphlets and leaflets. The magazines are
mostly produced by Salafi pesantrens, and include: Assunnah (published by
Pesantren Imam Bukhari, Solo), Salafy (published by Pesantren Ihyaus Sunnah,
Yogyakarta), Fatawa (produced by Pesantren Bin Baz, Yogyakarta), al-Furqan and
al-Mawaddah (issued by Pesantren al-Furqan, Gresik, East Java), Adz-Dzakhiirah
(issued by STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib, Surabaya, East Java), Asy-Syari’ah (published by
Oase Media, Yogyakarta). The content of the magazines commonly includes Salafi
manhaj, hadith, tafsir, fatwa, fiqh, and Muslim figures (mostly the Companions
of the Prophet). Although in some cases the main issues in the magazines are
similar, Salafi participants eagerly consume them. The number of copies of each
magazine ranges from 3,500 to 24,500. Al-Furqan and al-Mawaddah, for example,
reach 19.000 and 12.000 copies per issue respectively. Among these magazines,
Assunnah is the most influential magazine and has become the barometer of the
Salafi discourse in Indonesia. It was the first Salafi periodical to be published
and has now reached a print run of 24.500 copies per issue. The magazines
are distributed through the Salafi networks: pesantrens, religious gatherings,
bookshops, and individuals. Pesantrens or pesantren teachers usually serve
125 Interview with Diding, manager of Assunnah Radio, Cirebon, 2009.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
as marketing agents. The magazines are also available in every mosque where
the religious gatherings take place: small traders using motorcycles display the
Salafi magazines, books and compact disks in the courtyards of the mosques.
As the Salafi magazines are distributed and consumed by Salafi activists
throughout Indonesia, they have become a good media for advertisement.
Pesantrens use the magazines to advertise activities, especially when they open
new enrolment. During my fieldwork in the pesantrens, I found many students
who had found out about the pesantren from these magazines. Many Salafis also
use the magazines’ advertising space to promote their products, such as herbal
medicine, books and Muslim fashion.
In addition to monthly magazines, the Salafis produce weekly bulletins.
These are usually published on Friday and are distributed in mosques free of
charge. In order to avoid people reading the bulletin during the Friday sermon,
they are distributed after Friday prayers, as the people are leaving the mosque.
Salafis also use pamphlets, leaflets and banners to announce their activities.
Important events such as dawras and special lectures by national Salafi figures
are advertised through pamphlets and leaflets left in strategic places like
mosques and campuses. Likewise, the use of banners and leaflets to announce
new enrolment at pesantrens is also common.
C. Strengthening Transnational and Developing Regional Networks
As part of the Salafi global movement, Indonesian Salafis have developed
strong links with their counterparts abroad. Traditional links are maintained
with Yemen, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, as many Indonesian Salafis have graduated
from universities in these countries and continue to receive their support. To
sustain and strengthen these links, Salafis send their cadres to Yemen and Saudi
Arabia for further study. Khatib Muwahhid, for example, sent one of his students
to Yemen, while Asifuddin sent his son-in-law to Saudi Arabia. Through these
students, Salafis often acquire a fatwa concerning a specific case in Indonesia.
Salafis also often manage dawras, inviting Salafi teachers from these countries.
By so doing, the ties between the Salafis and these countries are maintained.
Apart from this traditional network, the Salafis in Indonesia have successfully
developed a regional network with their colleagues in Singapore and Malaysia.
The existence of foreign students in some Salafi pesantrens and the travels
of Salafi figures to other countries to preach Salafi doctrines have confirmed
this connection. In some pesantrens, such as Imam Bukhari in Solo, Bin Baz
and Jamilurrahman in Yogyakarta, and al-Irsyad in Tengaran Salatiga, there
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THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
are some students from Malaysia. These students typically have found the
pesantrens through the Internet, through alumni or through teachers. When
I visited the Bin Baz pesantren in January 2009, for example, I met a Malaysian
Salafi teacher, Fathul Bari, who was visiting the pesantren and who had brought
three prospective students with him from his home state, Perlis, in Malaysia.
Fathul Bari is a graduate from the Islamic University of Medina and a student
of various Salafi sheikhs in Yemen. While he was a student in Medina, he was a
friend of Arif Syarifuddin, a teacher at Pesantren Bin Baz. In Perlis, he founded
the Salafi foundation, Pertubuhan al-Qalam, and currently he acts as the official
representative of Pesantren Bin Baz in Malaysia responsible for new enrolment.
During his visit, Fathul Bari introduced his three students to Pesantren Bin
Baz and Pesantren Imam Bukhari to let them decide at which pesantren they
wanted to study. In its leaflet, Pesantren Bin Baz also mentions having an official
representative in Singapore, thus showing the pesantren’s extensive network.
Salafis in Batam are a good example of the connection between Salafis in
Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. Like Salafis in other cities, the Salafis in
Batam are divided into two factions, “rejectionist” and “cooperationist”. While
the first group is cantered at Pesantren Anshar al-Sunnah in Central Batam,
the latter centres its activities at the Hang Radio station in Central Batam and
at Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu (SDIT, Integrated Islamic Elementary School)
Fajar Ilahi in Batuaji, some 30 kilometres from the city. The Anshar al-Sunnah
educates some students from Singapore. Some Salafis from Singapore attend the
dawra in the pesantren. Moreover, some ustadhs frequently visit Singapore and
Malaysia to deliver lectures.126 Wildan, the director of Anshar al-Sunnah, and
Dzul Akmal from Pekanbaru often visit Kuala Lumpur, while Adil Harahap and
Abu Fairus from Radio Hang often visit Singapore to give lectures among migrant
workers in Kampung Siglap. Another Salafi teacher who often visits Malaysia is
Muhammad Arif. Unlike other teachers who visit Malaysia for da’wa only, Arif
visits Malaysia and Singapore also for business. He sells honey in Malaysia and
while he is there he is often asked to give lectures.127
Hang Radio plays a significant role in the Salafi da’wa in Batam. Initially, it
was a music radio station owned by Zain al-Attas. The radio was transformed into
Salafi da’wa radio in 2000 when the owner converted to Salafism. It is broadcast
as far away as Singapore, and many Salafis in Singapore listen to it. Unlike other
Salafi radios, Hang Radio is a commercial station that has advertisements on air.
126 Interview with Zainal Arifin, teacher of Anshar al-Sunnah, Batam, June 26, 2010.
127 Interview with Muhammad Arif, Salafi ustadh, Batam, June 28, 2010.
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However, as a Salafi station, the advertisements must meet Shari’a criteria, and
are under observation of some teachers. The radio, for example, will not accept
advertisements from conventional banks or cigarette companies as bank interest
and cigarettes are forbidden (haram) in Islam. The radio organizes a regular Salafi
class every Sunday and occasionally holds Salafi dawras. The dawras are frequently
attended by Salafis from Singapore and Malaysia. During my visit to Batam, for
example, I met three Salafis from Johor attending the dawra.
From the perspective of Singaporean Salafis, Rasul Dahri merits mention.
Rasul Dahri is a senior Salafi teacher in Singapore who often delivers lectures
on Hang Radio station. He is Singaporean, married to a Malaysian woman and
lives in Johor, Malaysia. He is very busy with his da’wa activity. Four times every
week he comes to his native country to deliver Salafi teachings in the evening
from 9 p.m. to 11 p.m. Once I attended his teaching at Wisma Indah, Kembangan.
About 35 male followers attended the lesson during which I saw two boxes for
donations circulate among the followers: the first was for da’wa activity, and
the second was for Hang Radio. These donations confirm the close relationship
between Salafis in Singapore and Batam.
Some Salafi teachers frequently travel abroad for Salafi da’wa. Yazid Jawas,
for example, has travelled several times to Malaysia and Japan to give lectures
as part of Salafi dawras. During his visit to Malaysia in early March 2009, he
delivered Salafi tenets in Perlis for four days among Malaysian citizens. The
dawra was held and organized by the Pertubuhan al-Qalam. The content of the
dawra was interchangeably delivered by three teachers: Jawas, Fathul Bari and
Muhammad Fadlan. Jawas has stated that Salafi da’wa in Perlis has started to
become widespread, and more importantly, is now acknowledged by the local
government.
Concluding Remarks
The emergence of contemporary Salafi movements in Indonesia is a part of
global Salafism. It is part of the Saudi project to export its variant of Islam to
the Muslim World in countering revolutionary ideologies, such as Nasserism
and Shi’ism. The abundance of wealth he enjoys enables the Saudi ruler to
undertake all necessary efforts for this project, including providing scholarships,
building mosques, publications, grants for Islamic educational institutions, and
supporting Salafi preachers.
Salafis have adopted a certain pattern in their spread of the Salafi da’wa: in the
early period, they made use of existing fast networks, groups and institutions.
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THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
Later, they departed from these institutions when they had gained more
followers and felt more confident. The Salafis had, for example, benefited from
the huge networks of the Dewan Da’wah and al-Irsyad when they surfaced, but
they abandoned them when they had developed new institutions themselves,
such as the Lanja Khayriyya Mushtaraka. With enormous financial support
from Saudi and Kuwaiti donors, they established foundations and institutions
to mobilize followers in order to accelerate the speed of their da’wa. Informal
networks through various media, including religious gatherings, radio stations,
and publications are essential in the mobilization of Salafi da’wa.
As part of global Salafism, Indonesian Salafis have successfully set up a
regional Southeast Asian network comprising of Indonesia, Singapore and
Malaysia. Pesantrens, radio stations, and the Internet are instrumental in
the development of the Salafi network. The Hang radio station in Batam that
reaches audiences in Singapore and the widely spread of the Internet have done
away with territorial borders. Through these instruments, the Salafis exchange
and share information about each country in order to collaborate in da’wa.
The presence of students from Malaysia and Singapore in Salafi pesantrens in
Indonesia, and the frequent travels of Indonesian Salafi teachers to Malaysia and
Singapore confirm this network.
109
Chapter Three
Salafi Leaders: The Emergence of New
Religious Authorities
Religious leaders (kyai, ‘ulama, and muballigh) play significant roles in the Muslim
community. Having deep knowledge of religion and displaying proper conduct,
they grow into charismatic leaders. They are the ones whose commands the
people obey; people listen to their advice and emulate their behaviour. Although
they are specialists in religion, their role goes beyond this expertise. People
come to visit them for a number of purposes, ranging from asking for religious
guidance and spiritual advice for family or social matters, to business affairs and
politics.
The American anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, highlights the significant
role of kyai in the transformation of society as cultural brokers. He argues
that, as a person of deep religious knowledge, a kyai transforms universal
religious doctrines and values as prescribed in the Qur’an, the hadith and the
books on Islamic law in the different madhhabs (schools of Islamic law), and
adjusts them to local practices. In this regard, the kyai interprets the abstract,
universal and systematic doctrines of Islam in the context of local beliefs and
traditions. It is the kyai, Geertz claims, who determines whether or not local
practices are Islamic.1 Many ordinary Muslims even believe that a kyai has
supra–natural power that enables him to see evil spirits and to forecast future
fortune. Congruent with the animistic belief of villagers, some kyais act as
1
Clifford Geertz, “The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker”,
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 2, No. 2 (January 1960), p. 236.
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dukun (traditional medical practitioners) in curing diseases. Observing this
phenomenon, Geertz concludes that “the kijaji [kyai] thus brings together the
general moral doctrines of Islam and the specific animistic notions of local
tradition, the fragmented, barely conceptualized, practical religion of the
ordinary peasant...”2 A similar assessment is given by Hiroko Horikoshi. Relying
on her research on the role of kyais in Garut, West Java, she maintains that
kyais play a significant role in preserving traditional practices. They filter out
the negative values of modernization and have become agents of change. Thus,
they provide the community with educational and economic opportunities.3 In
short, kyais function as key agents of change and modernization, who actively
introduce modern values to the villagers.4
Along with the changes in social and political conditions in post–Independence
Indonesia, the mediatory role of kyais shifted from being bridges between
what Geertz called ‘Meccan’ universal notions of Islam and ‘Javanese’ beliefs
and practices, to a link between Jakarta and the village. This transformation
occurred when the idea of an Indonesian nation state emerged and needed to
be communicated and understood by villagers. Because a modern nation needs
the political engagement of all its citizens through, among others means, their
participation in political parties, many kyais were involved in supporting the
traditionalist Islamic party, the Nahdlatul Ulama. Through this party, as the
‘owners’ of the umma at the grassroots level, kyais were active in mobilizing the
umma via public gatherings. On these occasions, kyais tried to translate modern
ideas of development into religious terminologies and did so by talking to the
umma in the local languages. Thus, Geertz concludes that as cultural brokers,
kyais shifted from brokers for Islamic civilization to brokers for the national
government.5
Since the last decade of the twentieth century, Indonesia has witnessed the
emergence of new Salafi ustadhs. They graduated from Salafi learning centres in
the Middle East, such as Darul Hadith in Dammaj, Yemen, Jami’a Imam Ibn Su’ud
in Riyadh and the Medina Islamic University in Saudi Arabia. Some of them are
alumni of Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Arab dan Islam (LIPIA, Institute of Islamic
and Arabic Studies), a Saudi–sponsored higher education centre in Jakarta.
2
3
4
5
Clifford Geertz, “The Javanese Kijaji”, pp. 238-239.
Hiroko Horikoshi, Kyai dan Perubahan Sosial, Jakarta: Perhimpunan Pengembangan
Pesantren dan Masyarakat (P3M), 1987, p. 6.
Horikoshi, Kyai dan Perubahan Sosial, p. 5.
Clifford Geertz, “The Javanese Kijaji”, p. 247.
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SALAFI LEADERS
They focus their activities on teaching students in pesantrens and delivering
religious lessons in public mosques, offices or private houses. Their religious
gatherings have attracted a following. Some of their followers have converted
from previous affiliations, having been members of Nahdlatul Ulama or the
Muhammadiyah. Thus, they are becoming new religious leaders who challenge
existing religious authorities, such as kyais, ‘ulama and the religious leaders of
mass organizations, who are acutely aware of the challenge of Salafism. M. Din
Syamsuddin, the current Muhammadiyah chairman, at the opening ceremony
of the International Research Conference on the Muhammadiyah during the
organization’s Centennial Celebration stated that the Muhammadiyah was
fully aware of new challenges from Islamic radical movements, including
infiltration by Salafis. It is a fact that the Salafi movement has attracted young
Muhammadiyah activists. Similar things have happened in the Nahdlatul Ulama
and Persatuan Islam, with many of their followers converting to Salafism. The
phenomenon of this conversion has alarmed these organizations and resulted
in them fortifying themselves from Salafi attacks. The task of this chapter is to
show how these new religious leaders emerge and challenge existing religious
leaders.
A. Defining Religious Authority
Authority, which Weber refers to as imperative coordination or imperative
control, is defined as “the probability that certain specific commands (or all
commands) from a given source will be obeyed by a given group of persons.”6
Authority is different from power, which is defined as “the probability that one
actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will
despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.”7 While
power may make use of force and coercion, authority emphasizes voluntary
submission. The submission to authority, as Gaborieau explains, is based on
the “common values and rules of conduct” between the two parties: those who
hold authority and people who submit to it.8 Weber, furthermore, elaborates a
6
7
8
Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, New York: Free Press,
1964, p. 324.
Weber, The Theory of Social, p. 152.
Marc Gaborieau, “Redefinition of Religious Authority among South Asian Muslims
from 1919 to 1956”, in Azyumardi Azra, Kees van Dijk, and Nico J.G. Kaptein, (eds),
Varieties of Religious Authority, Singapore and Leiden: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies (ISEAS), and International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS), 2010, p. 1.
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number of factors concerning obedience to authority: habit; tradition; material
interest; ideal motives. It is tradition or habit that make people respect and
obey their informal leaders. The compliance of the people with the orders and
commands of their superiors, however, is motivated by material calculation.
Meanwhile, people who submit to a visionary political leader may be motivated
by the leader’s ideals on certain aspects.
There are different kinds of authority. Weber divides authority into three types:
legal; traditional; and charismatic. Legal or rational authority is based on formal and
normative rules that endow the person the right to issue commands to be obeyed by
his followers. Authority of this type is given by the rules and norms to a certain person
with s qualifications and requirements. Loyalty to this authority is based on impersonal
order and not on the person who holds authority. When the authority is taken away
from the person, or the position of the person is removed, he becomes powerless and
authority’s influence decreases. Submission to this authority is, therefore, motivated
by rational calculation, which may be based on material interests and advantages.
Opposition to this command results in punishment. Bureaucratic staffs who obey
their superiors are good example of this type of authority.9
The second type is traditional authority. Traditional authority belongs to
a person who holds a traditional position of authority. Traditional authority is
bound by personal loyalty. Obedience to the authority is not developed and
cultivated by rules, but bound by personal legitimacy on the basis of tradition.
Traditional authority is inherited from the previous holder, usually handed down
to the closest relatives, such as a son or daughter, as the successor. In some cases,
it is handed down through designation when a successor is not found among
relatives. Unlike rational authority that claims the legitimacy of power in the
office, traditional authority has no office.10 In some cases, obedience to personal
loyalty is unlimited as seen in the case of a ustadh who serves his kyai in almost
all aspects, from teaching assistance, welcoming guests and cleaning the house.
The third type is charismatic authority. Weber defines charisma as a “certain
quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from
ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at
least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.”11 All these sources, Weber
explains, are unattainable by ordinary people and regarded as being from divine
origin or a divine gift. Due to these qualifications, charismatic authority is
9 Weber, The Theory of Social, p. 328.
10 Weber, The Theory of Social, p. 341.
11 Weber, The Theory of Social, p. 358.
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SALAFI LEADERS
irrational in the sense that it is against natural rules and laws to gain. Typically,
a charismatic leader must prove that as a person he is sent by God to the people,
and that he is able to undertake his duties. If he fails to prove this, his charisma
disappears and his authority decreases.12 Charismatic leaders often emerge
during revolutionary periods when people expect the coming of a leader who
promises the glory of the struggle and the achievement of improvements in life.
The case of Ratu Adil in Java, or other millenary movement, is a good example
of this type of authority.13 Charismatic leaders are born and not produced by an
institution. However, the meaning of charisma has changed recently. It does not
denote the specific qualities regarded as supernatural or “gifts” from God, but
refers to a leader with certain characteristics such as a deep knowledge, vision
and good behaviour. Their followers believe that some kyais are charismatic
leaders endowed with supernatural power. Kyai Salman Dahlawi, the head of the
Naqshabandiyah order in Pesantren al-Manshur in Popongan, Central Java, and
Kyai Haji Muslim Imampura (Mbah Lim), of Karang Anom in Klaten, are believed
by their respective communities to be charismatic leaders.14
Khaled Abou el-Fadl distinguishes between “coercive authority” and
“persuasive authority”. Coercive authority refers to “the ability to direct the
conduct of another person through the use of inducement, benefits, threats, or
punishment so that a reasonable person would conclude that for all practical
purposes they have no choice but to comply”.15 Coercive authority involves the
power by which the holder can force the people to obey his command. On the
contrary, persuasive authority involves “the exercise of influence and normative
power over someone.”16 It includes the essential element of honesty that directs
people to believe and act to surrender by persuasion and argument. It supports
the people to value the arguments, distinguishing good and sound reasons from
weak ones, and concluding to accept or to refute the arguments as the basis for
final action: obedience or rejection.17
12 Weber, The Theory of Social, pp. 358-360. See also, Max Weber, “The Sociology of
Charismatic Authority” in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, (eds), From Max Weber:
Essays on Sociology, London: Rutledge, 1991, p. 249.
13 On Ratu Adil movements, see A.P.E. Korver, Sarekat Islam, Gerakan Ratu Adil, Jakarta:
Grafitipers, 1985.
14 On the account of these two venerable kyais, see for example, M.C. Ricklefs,
Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java c. 1930 to the Present, Singapore: NUS Press, 2012,
pp. 346-349.
15 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, Oxford: Oneworld, 2001, p. 18.
16 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, p. 22.
17 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, p. 22.
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To borrow R. B. Friedman’s terminology, the above distinction runs parallel
with the difference between “being in authority” and “being an authority”.
“Being in authority,” means having an official position in the bureaucracy of
a structural organization that enables a person to issue orders or guidelines.
This implies that people obey a person “in authority” because of his position. It
suggests that people may disagree with the order, but they have no possibility to
contest.18 In contrast, “being an authority” means having certain requirements of
knowledge and expertise recognized by the people. Obedience to this authority
denotes the acknowledgment of the people to the authoritative person that he
has more knowledge and insight.19
Both types of traditional and charismatic authorities appear in religious
authority or leadership. Gaborieau defines religious authority as “the right to
impose rules which are deemed to be in consonance with the will of God.”20 This
implies that the fundamental source of religious authority is God. Islam teaches
that God has prescribed laws and rules for human beings through revelation to
His messenger. The Prophet is the most authoritative person in religion because
he knows the true meaning of the revelation. After the Prophet died, according to
a frequently cited hadith, the ‘ulama inherit religious authority. However, in the
Muslim world there is a debate on what it is that makes a person authoritative in
religion.
While there are numerous religious sciences, common people usually refer
to only certain kinds of knowledge, namely hadith (Prophetic tradition), fiqh
(Islamic jurisprudence), usul al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory), and tafsir (Qur’anic
exegesis). Only those who have mastered these sciences are usually called ‘ulama.
People who have knowledge in other fields of Islamic studies, such as Sufism
(Islamic mysticism), ‘ilm kalam (Islamic theology) and falsafa (philosophy) are not
considered to belong among the ‘ulama. In tandem with this view, we see that
there is tension and contestation in religious authority between ‘ulama and Sufi
masters and, throughout history of Islam, between ‘ulama and philosophers. In
the Medieval period, the conflict between Abu Hamid al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd
is a fine example of this case.21
18
19
20
21
Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, p. 19.
Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, p. 19.
Marc Gaborieau, “Redefinition of Religious Authority”, p. 1.
Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “The Ulama and Contestation on Religious Authority,”
in Muhammad Khalid Masud, et al., (eds), Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates,
Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2009, pp. 210-212.
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SALAFI LEADERS
However, in the Muslim world we find no single religious authority. Gaborieau
distinguishes three types of religious authority in Islam: Sufi; ‘ulama; and political
leader (king or sultan). Unlike the ‘ulama who put emphasis on the exoteric
aspects of religion, a Sufi stresses the esoteric dimensions of religion through
certain exercises in order to sense the presence of God inside one’s heart. A
Sufi begets his religious authority through immediate access to God by mystical
experience and illumination called unveiling (kashf) or inspiration (ilham). The
‘ulama, however, are those who master religious knowledge in hadith, fiqh, usul
al-fiqh or tafsir. According to Abou el-Fadl, the ‘ulama bases his authority on
his capacity to read, understand and interpret the Will of God as expressed in
the holy text.22 Yusuf Qardawi defines ‘ulama by the institutions that produce
them. They are “the graduates of shari’a faculties and departments of Islamic
Studies, as well as everyone who has a [serious] interest in the shari’a sciences
and Islamic culture and is active and productive as a scholar.”23 The main roles
of ‘ulama, according to Gaborieau, include transmitting religious knowledge,
leading rituals in mosques and managing justice in court. A sultan or king is
believed to be God’s vicegerent or God’s shadow on earth, and therefore, holds
religious authority. The king or sultan appoints the mufti of the state to issue
fatwas, and designates the qadi (judge) to implement Islamic laws in court.24
In Indonesia, religious authority is usually attributed to the positions of
kyai, ‘ulama and ustadh. Different Muslim communities refer to these types
differently. The Sundanese of West Java call him kyai ‘ajengan’, while the Acehnese
use the word teungku for such scholars.25 They are the specialists in religious
sciences, and capable of offer guidance to the people on religious matters and
good conduct in line with religious injunctions. The term kyai is a title given
by the community to scholars of Islam who usually lead a pesantren.26 A person
must pass a hard and difficult path in order to become a kyai. On this path,
they will study religion in pesantren for a number of years and assist the kyai
in teaching junior students until he assigns them with the task of building and
managing a new pesantren. People distinguish between senior and junior kyais.
Traditionally, a junior kyai is a young kyai who establishes a new pesantren with
the support of a senior kyai. A junior kyai may be the son of a senior kyai or a
22
23
24
25
Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name, p. 12.
Quoted from Zaman, “The Ulama and Contestation”, p. 222.
Marc Gaborieau, “Redefinition of Religious Authority”, pp. 2-3.
M. Iskandar, et al., Peranan Elit Agama pada Masa Revolusi Kemerdekaan Indonesia,
Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, 2007.
26 Zamaksyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren, Jakarta, LP3ES, 1982, p. 55.
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senior knowledgeable ustadh who is designated by the kyai to move to a remote
village in order to establish a pesantren there. Moreover, the senior kyai sends
some ustadhs with the junior kyai.27
The term ‘ulama is more general, and includes kyais and non-kyais. ‘ulama28
is a title given to scholars of Islam who do not lead pesantren. Literally, the term
‘ulama connotes people with a broad knowledge. In its original meaning, that
knowledge is universal, covering both secular and religious knowledge. However,
this broad sense changed and narrowed to refer to a limited amount of people:
those who possess a good command of Islamic knowledge, particularly in fiqh
(Islamic jurisprudence) and the hadith.29 Thus, the term denotes a wider coverage
than the term ‘kyai’. However, these terms are often used interchangeably. Like
kyai, the title ‘ulama is given by the community. Broad knowledge of Islam, ethics
and good conduct are the main considerations behind the acknowledgment.30
Horikoshi views kyai as being higher than ‘ulama. She argues that a kyai is more
capable than an ‘ulama in exercising ijtihad (independent reasoning). For her, an
‘ulama still holds on to taqlid (blind imitation) to the opinions of earlier ‘ulamas.
A kyai is also perceived to be more charismatic than an ‘ulama in the eyes of the
community. ‘ulamas function as religious officials in religious institutions such
as madrasahs and pesantrens.31
In practice, the title kyai is also awarded to the chairmen of mass Muslim
organizations. In the Nahdlatul Ulama community, leading figures like Muchith
Muzadi, are called kyai although they do not head a pesantren. A similar tradition
occurs in the Muhammadiyah. Since its foundation in 1912, the chairmen
of the Muhammadiyah have also been called kyai. For example, Abdul Razak
Fachruddin (chairman 1971–1985) and his successor Azhar Basyir (chairman,
1995–1998) were called kyai even though they did not lead a pesantren.
Nevertheless, people simply called them “Pak AR” and “Pak Azhar” respectively.
People call them “kyai” only in formal announcements. This title, however,
ended with Azhar Basyir who was the last chairman of the Muhammadiyah
27 Zamaksyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren, p. 59.
28 Although in Arabic, the term ‘ulama is a plural form of ‘alim, in Indonesian, the
term ‘ulama is singular. In this chapter, in line with Indonesian, the term ‘ulama
connotes the singular.
29 Azyumardi Azra, “Biografi Sosial-Intelektual Ulama Perempuan: Pemberdayaan
Historiografi”, in Jajat Burhanudin, (ed.), Ulama Perempuan Indonesia, Jakarta:
Gramedia and PPIM UIN Jakarta, 2002, p. xxx.
30 Azyumardi Azra, “Biografi Sosial-Intelektual Ulama Perempuan”, p. xxxi.
31 Horikoshi, Kyai dan Perubahan Sosial, pp. 1-3.
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SALAFI LEADERS
to have had a traditional Islamic education. Basyir got his Master degree from
the al-Azhar University in Cairo. The change was caused by the domination of
Muslim intellectuals in the top leadership of the Muhammadiyah after Basyir.
This included Amien Rais (chairman 1995–1998), Syafi’i Maarif (chairman 1998–
2005) and M. Din Syamsuddin (chairman from 2005 - present). Rather than
being representations of traditional kyais, these figures are Muslim intellectuals
who graduated in social sciences from American universities. Rais graduated in
political science at the University of Chicago, Maarif graduated in the history
of political Islam at the University of Chicago, while Syamsuddin graduated
in political Islam at the University of California at Los Angeles.32 They indeed
have a good understanding of religion because they went to Islamic education
institutions before their study abroad. Syamsuddin, for example, went to the
famous modern pesantren of Gontor, East Java. Moreover, he graduated in the
comparative study of religions at the State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN,
now the State Islamic University, or UIN) in Jakarta. Thus, since the last decade,
the Muhammadiyah has been led by Muslim intellectuals, or ‘ulama in a broader
sense.
Besides kyai and ‘ulama, the terms ‘ustadh’ and ‘muballigh’ are commonly
used for a man of religion. The term ustadh connotes a teacher of religious
knowledge. Santris and the surrounding community call the teachers of
pesantren, regardless of the subjects they teach, ustadh. In practice, a person
who frequently delivers religious lessons in mosques is also called ustadh.
Another label for these religious men is muballigh (preacher). In addition to
religious lessons taking place in mosques, offices, and houses, ustadhs and
muballighs deliver Friday sermons. They get paid for these activities, and even
nowadays, we find professional ustadhs and muballighs who earn their daily
living this way. It is worth mentioning here that, unlike the heads of traditional
NU pesantrens who are called kyai, the leaders of Muhammadiyah pesantren
are simply called ustadh. The same label is found in Persatuan Islam (Persis),
another puritan reformist organization. The leaders of this group are called
ustadh while the leaders of Persis’ pesantrens are called ustadh as well.
32 For a brief account on Amien Rais, see, http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/id/
content-167-det-prof-dr-h-amien-rais.html; on Syafii Maarif, see, http://www.
muhammadiyah.or.id/id/content-168-det-prof-dr-ahmad-safii-maarif.html, and
on Din Syamsuddin, see, http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/id/content-169-detprof-dr-h-m-din-syamsuddin.html, accessed on January 2, 2012.
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Salafi teachers are called ustadh. The head of a Salafi pesantren is simply
called ustadh or mudir al-ma’had (director of the pesantren). This title reflects the
equality among the Salafis. It is easy to find ustadhs of Salafi pesantrens talking
to the mudir freely without being nervous. During my fieldwork in Pesantren
Assunnah in Cirebon, for example, I frequently witnessed Thaharah, the then
mudir, sitting in the mosque’s corridor and talking to the ustadhs. Similarly,
this scene occurs in the Salafi religious gatherings where some followers move
closer to the teacher after religious gatherings in mosques. They ask the teacher
about religious matters which have not been addressed during the session. This
equality seems to be attractive for new adherents or sympathizers of the Salafi
movement. An administrative staff member at the Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam
Ali bin Abi Thalib in Surabaya told me that one of the reasons he joined Salafism
was the sense of equality Salafi teachers display. He compared the kyais of
traditional pesantrens affiliated with the NU with the mudir of Salafi pesantrens.
While the ustadhs of Salafi pesantren can approach the mudir easily, the ustadhs
of traditional pesantrens respect their kyais excessively, and show this by means
such as kissing their hand (taqbil), fetching his sandals when the kyai wants to
leave the mosque and massaging the kyai before he commences his teaching.33
These attitudes are aimed at acquiring the kyai’s berkah (Ar., baraka means God’s
blessing). The students believe that through respecting and serving the kyai,
they will receive God’s blessing.
The ustadhs’ attitude towards their kyai has its roots in the traditional
doctrine of the student’s etiquette towards the teacher, the Ta’lim al-Muta’allim
Tariq al-Ta’allum34 of Burhan al-Islam al-Zarnuji. This work deals with a number
of instructions and learning methods. It is divided into 13 chapters, and the
subjects range from the nature and merit of knowledge, the intention of study,
the choice of subject matters of knowledge, the need to respect knowledge and
those who possess it, while there are also chapters on the choice of teachers,
colleagues and permanent association. Most important in this work is the
pupil’s attitude towards his teacher. The author maintains that students should
fully respect their teachers. A student is not allowed to walk in front his teacher,
nor sit on his chair. They are also not to start talking with the teacher without
33 Interview with Muhammad Ali, administration staff of STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib,
Surabaya, December 23, 2008.
34 Imam Burhan al-Islam al-Zarnuji, Ta’lim al-Muta’allim Tariq al-Ta’allum, Surabaya:
Benkul Indah, n.d. The work has been translated into English by G.E. von Grunebaum
and Theodora M. Abel. See, Az-Zarnuji, Ta’lim al-Muta’allim – Tariq al-Ta’allum,
Instruction of the Student: The Method of Leaning, New York: King’s Crown Press, 1947.
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his permission and are not to talk much with the teacher without his consent.35
Moreover, the students have to respect the teacher’s relatives and colleagues.
For example, students have to rise when the son of a teacher arrives simply
in order to show their respect for their teacher.36 Based on these teachings,
students of traditional pesantrens fully respect their teachers.
Although Salafis simply call all their teachers ustadh, there exists social
stratification among them. Thus, some prominent Salafi ustadhs may be
classified as senior ustadhs such as Muhammad as-Sewed and Luqman Ba’abduh
among the so-called ‘rejectionist’ Salafis in Indonesia. These two figures are
regarded as the leaders who replaced Ja’far Umar Thalib. As-Sewed is the mudir
of two pesantrens: Dhiya’ussunnah in Cirebon, West Java and al-Anshar in
Sleman, Yogyakarta. Meanwhile, Ba’abduh is currently the director of Pesantren
Salafiya in Jember, East Java. Before heading this pesantren, he studied with
Sheikh Muqbil al-Wadi’i in Darul Hadith, Dammaj, Yemen. Other Salafi teachers
are located at the second level like Afifuddin from Sidayu, Gresik, and Abdul
Mu’thi from Yogyakarta. In the other so-called “cooperationist” Salafis group,
more senior figures are found. They include the leading ustadhs Abdul Qadir
Jawas from Bogor, West Java, Abdul Hakim Abdat from Jakarta, Abu Nida from
Yogyakarta, Aunurrafiq Ghufran from Gresik, Abdurrahman al-Tamimi from
Surabaya and Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin from Solo. Both Jawas and Abdat studied
Salafism at LIPIA in Jakarta and currently they teach at Pesantren Minhaj alSunnah in Bogor, West Java. Meanwhile, Abu Nida and Asifuddin graduated from
the Jami’a Imam Muhammad ibn Su’ud in Riyadh. Asifuddin currently leads
Pesantren Imam Bukhari in Solo, Central Java, while Abu Nida heads the Bin Baz
Islamic Center in Yogyakarta. At the lower level, other figures emerge, including
Abu Qatadah from Tasikmalaya, Abu Haidar from Bandung and Mubarak
Bamualim from Surabaya.
In the modern era, religious authority is institutionalized in the form of
modern organizations. The wave of modernization and the advance of technology
created new problems that seem to contradict Islamic doctrine. As they appear
to be more sophisticated and more complex, individuals are unable to provide
satisfactory solutions to these problems and in order to cope with them, religious
institutions endowed by religious authority are required. Corresponding with
this demand, the Indonesian government established the Council of Indonesia
35 Az-Zarnuji, Ta’lim al-Muta’allim, pp. 16-17.
36 Az-Zarnuji, Ta’lim al-Muta’allim, p. 17.
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Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) in 1975,37 aiming at mobilizing its support
for the government’s policies and planning.38 The members of the council are
drawn from all Muslim mass organizations. It grasps the grassroots by setting
up branches in the provinces, districts and sub-districts. It has a special fatwa
commission which is responsible for issuing fatwas. The fatwa commission is
the most important one since it is likely to function as the MUI’s mouthpiece
in dealing with prevailing religious issues in the community. A recent study by
Moch Nur Ichwan has shown the tendency of the MUI to shift from moderate
Islam to puritanical moderate Islam. This puritan tendency is apparent in its
fatwas on religious liberalism, secularism, and pluralism. Ichwan observed that
one of the reasons for this change is the recruitment of hard-line figures such
as Adian Husaini, Chalil Ridwan and Amin Djamaluddin as MUI members.39 In
addition to the MUI, each mass Muslim organization has created its own special
fatwa commission. Thus, the NU established its Lajna Bahth al-Masa’il, the
Muhammadiyah established its Majelis Tarjih and Persatuan Islam established
its Dewan Hisbah.
The MUI and other similar religious institutions were established to indulge
in collective ijtihad. Exercising collective ijtihad is proposed to respond, at least,
to two contemporary phenomena: firstly, the lack of ‘ulama with sufficient
capacities to perform individual ijtihad; secondly, the emergence of increasingly
more sophisticated problems in society. In many cases, these problems involve
specialists in secular subjects who provide objective explanations of the cases so
that the ‘ulama understand the problems proportionally. Given this, collective
ijtihad is seen as a viable, if not the only, solution for ‘ulama to deal with societal
problems. According to Zaman, the institutionalization of religious authority
can halt political intervention in religious matters.40
37 On the Council of Indonesian Ulama, see Mohammad Atho Mudzhar, Fatwa-Fatwa
Majelis Ulama Indonesia: Sebuah Studi tentang Pemikiran Hukum Islam di Indonesia, 19751988, Jakarta: INIS, 1993.
38 See Martin van Bruinessen, “Islamic State or State Islam? Fifty Years of Islam-State
Relation in Indonesia”, in Ingrid Wessel (ed.), Indonesien am Ende des 20. Jahrhundrets,
Hamburg: Abera Verlag, 1996, pp. 19-34; available online at: http://www.let.
uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/Bruinessen_State_Islam_
or_Islamic_State.pdf
39 Moch Nur Ichwan, “Towards a Puritanical Moderate Islam: The Majelis ‘Ulama
Indonesia and the Politics of Religious Orthodoxy’, in Martin van Bruinessen, (ed.),
Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the “Conservative Turn”,
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013, pp. 61-64.
40 Zaman, “The Ulama and Contestation”, p. 228.
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SALAFI LEADERS
B. The Social and Political Role of Religious Leaders
It is understood that the primary activity of religious leaders is da’wa: to
preach the messages of Islam and to call upon Muslims to live in conformity with
Islamic principles. This impresses that the role of religious leaders is merely
religious. However, observation in the Muslim community finds that their role
expands beyond religious matters. People visit them for different purposes like
asking for religious guidance, acquiring a solution to family problems, economic
consultation and even political support. In short, the role of religious leaders is
central.
Kyais, ‘ulamas and ustadhs deliver religious lessons in many places like
mosques, majelis taklim (religious gatherings) and in open public fields. In the
mosques, Friday sermons become an effective medium for delivering religious
messages to the umma. In these weekly events, the khatib addresses a number of
issues ranging from ethics to social and political affairs. We frequently hear the
khatib address sensitive issues, such as criticizing government policies. Kyais
and ‘ulamas also often deliver public speeches in front of wider forums, such
as tabligh akbar (great public sermon) and mujahadan. To attract more people,
charismatic kyai and popular muballigh are often invited to these happenings.
On a smaller scale, the majelis taklim is instrumental for transferring religious
messages. As the majority of participants of majelis taklim are women, the
most popular subjects are those concerning family life, such as the relationship
between husband and wife and between parents and children, and also
attitudes toward neighbours. Thus, these occasions are an effective medium for
communication between kyais, ‘ulamas and ustadhs, and the umma.41
The above method of da’wa is called the da’wa bil lisan (oral da’wa). It is a
conventional form of da’wa in which religious leaders deliver religious lessons
in front of the jama’ah (congregation or followers). Muslims have also developed
another type of da’wa called da’wa bil-hal (da’wa with deeds or da’wa with
examples). The notion behind the development of this kind of da’wa was to
accomplish the da’wa bil lisan with concrete activities that can improve the
quality of life. In addition to providing religious lessons, the da’i (preacher)
equips the community with vocational skills such as repairing electrical devices,
41 Moh. Sobary, “Agama dan Perubahan Sosial: Kewibawaan Dunia Pesantren dan
Kepatuhan Massa”, paper presented at the Seminar Hasil Penelitian 1996/1997,
Pengkajian Masalah-masalah Strategis di Bidang Sosial Politik, Pusat Penelitian
dan Pengembangan Kemasyarakatan dan Kebudayaan (PMB-LIPI), Jakarta, 25-27
February 1997.
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making handicrafts and farming. The aim of this da’wa is twofold: on the one
hand, it provides the da’i with an additional income so that he does not rely
solely on the salary of his da’wa activities and on the other hand, it provides the
community with skills to improve their life.
The da’wa bil-hal was initiated by the government when it wanted all
citizens, including religious leaders to support its development policy. Following
the collapse of the Old Order regime, the New Order made national development
focusing on economic growth its prime policy. To support this policy, in the
1970s the government introduced what was called “Dakwah Pembangunan” or
“development da’wa”. The term “pembangunan” related to the government
policy of sustainable development. Within this agenda, the Ministry of Religious
Affairs was assigned to provide the spiritual and ethical foundation for the
development.42 Thus, the program aimed at engaging religious leaders in the
process of sustainable development. The concept of da’wa then soon emerged
in combination with rural development. The aim of the da’wa was not only
the spread of Islamic teachings and calling Muslim to live conform religious
doctrines, but also to improve the quality of life of the poorest and the most
marginal in society. The da’wa had to be combined with real measures to improve
everyday life. In the 1980s, the term “dakwah pembangunan” was changed
into the more acceptable term, da’wah bil-hal that had the same contents. To
support this program, the Ministry of Religious Affairs trained religious leaders
involving 144 associations mostly from mosques and majelis taklim.43 Thus, to
cover community development, the da’wa included a wider range of tasks than
the mere call to accept God’s will.
In tandem with this development, Muslim organizations, such as the
Muhammadiyah and NU, took part in this process. The NU, for example, in
collaboration with the Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi
dan Sosial (LP3ES, Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education
and Information), and with financial support from the German international
NGO, Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, in the early 1970s initiated a pilot project
on pesantren and community development. Pesantren figures were trained
to become the motivators and locomotives for urban and human resources
development. The project continued in the 1980s and 1990s under supervision
42 Johan Meuleman, “Dakwah, Competition for Authority, and Development”, BKI, Vol.
167, No, 2-3, 2011, p. 254.
43 Johan Meuleman, “Dakwah, Competition for Authority, and Development”, pp. 260261.
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of a new NGO, the Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat
(P3M, Center for the Study and Development of Pesantren and Society).44
In addition to religious matters, people also consult the kyai, ‘ulama,
or ustadh in matters pertaining to social life. For example, they ask them to
officiate at traditional ceremonies such as ‘aqiqa (to commemorate the birth of a
baby), khitan (circumcision), wedding ceremonies and deaths. In the ‘aqiqa, the
kyais, ‘ulamas or ustadhs lead the ritual by reciting the Barzanji (the story of the
Prophet’s birth), salawatan (chanting religious formula in praise of the Prophet)
and other prayers. For wedding ceremonies, kyais, ‘ulamas and ustadhs are
often requested to deliver the tawsiya (religious advice). On this occasion kyais
and ‘ulamas give religious advice on love and passion for the bride to sustain the
marriage. Although the content of tawsiya is in particular directed to the bride,
people attending the ceremony can benefit also. Moreover, people ask for advice
to decide on a good time to marry or to commence business.
Aware of the potential power of the kyais and ‘ulamas in the community,
the government makes use of their influence to support its programs. Such
support takes a number of forms, including explaining programs using religious
terminology and the issuance of fatwas. The case of the family planning
program is a good example. Faced with a rapid increasing population, the
government launched its family planning (Keluarga Berencana) program in 1968,
which suggested parents to have two children only. However, the government
faced a serious challenge when in 1971, a group of leading ‘ulama issued a fatwa
stating that the use of IUDs (Intra Uterine Devices) was forbidden in Islam
(haram). The fatwa indeed halted the government’s effort to control population
growth. An intolerable increase in population would create social problems,
such as poverty and insufficient education, health and food. The government
did not give up, and sought another way to persuade the ‘ulamas. In order to
give a comprehensive account of IUDs as a medium of contraception and to gain
a new fatwa on the family planning program, the government held a National
Conference for ‘ulama on Population, Health and Development in Jakarta in
October 1983. The conference was attended by 50 ‘ulamas, four doctors and
high-ranking government officials. At the end of the conference, a new fatwa
on family planning was issued. It mentioned the permissibility of using IUDs
44 Martin van Bruinessen, “Post-Soeharto Muslim Engagement with Civil Society and
Democratization”, in Hanneman Samuel and Henk Schulte Nordholt (eds) Indonesia
in Transition, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004, p. 47.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
as a tool of contraception. Having this support, the government succeeded in
implementing its family planning program without any constraints.45
The role of religious leaders in politics is evident. Suffice it to mention here
their recent engagement in the era of Reformasi (Reformation). Following the
collapse of the New Order regime in 1998, the era of Reformasi has provided
greater opportunities for Muslims to express their political interests. This era
has changed the country’s political landscape; a number of political reforms
have been concluded, including the freedom to create new political parties.
Subsequently, many Muslims have enthusiastically founded political parties,
such as Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, Nation Awakening Party), the Partai
Amanat Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party), Partai Nahdlatul Ulama
(PNU, Nahdlatul Ulama Party), Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, Crescent Star Party)
and Partai Keadilan (PK, Justice Party), now Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS,
Prosperity and Justice Party). Related to the ‘ulamas’ engagement in politics, the
PKB deserves particular attention here. The party was founded by Abdurrahman
Wahid, the former chairman of the executive body of the NU, and it received
full support of the NU. Although the executive body was led by Matori Abdul
Djalil, the former general secretary of the PPP while the consultative body
was directed by Ma’ruf Amin,46 Wahid held a decisive position in deciding the
party’s orientation. Thus, the party was in fact directed by ‘ulama. Moreover,
with the support of the coalition of Poros Tengah (Middle Axis), a political block
created by Amien Rais, the then chairman of PAN and the speaker of the Majelis
Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR, People Consultative Assembly), Wahid became
the first ‘ulama to hold the presidency of the largest Muslim country in the
world.
Unlike other groups that engage themselves in community development,
Salafis focus their activities on da’wa and education. The education sector is no
doubt essential for community development. I will discuss Salafi activities in
education in Chapters Four and Five. For now, I will discuss their activities in da’wa.
Salafi da’wa falls into conventional da’wa, that is da’wa bil-lisan. In their da’wa,
Salafis put strong emphasis on the purification of ‘aqida and the ritual practices
of the Muslim community. They contend that false beliefs and incorrect ritual
practices are widespread among the Muslim community and need purification.
45 Mohammad Atho Mudzhar, Fatwa-Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia, pp. 108-114.
46 Unlike the executive body, which was led by politicians, the consultative board is
occupied by kyais of the NU. See, Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (DPP) Partai Kebangkitan
Bangsa (PKB), Garis Perjuangan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Jakarta: DPP PKB, 1998.
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For Salafi, the purification of ‘aqida and ritual practices has become the priority in
their da’wa, rather than other aspects, including community development. They
believe that true ‘aqida and the proper rituals will result in a strong and developed
community. Given this reason, Salafi da’wa targets the Muslim community, leaving
aside the issue of Kristenisasi (Christianization) to which other Muslim groups such
as the Dewan Da’wah Islamiyyah Indonesia (DDII) and the Muhammadiyah pay
much attention.47
In tandem with the above leaning, Salafis try to ‘Islamize’ popular expressions
of Islam such as wirid, dzikir, and ruqya. Wirid and dzikir are common practices
among Muslims. On particular occasions, wirid and dzikir are read and directed
at certain saints or pious Muslims by sending prayers, particularly by reciting
the first sura of the Qur’an, al-Fatiha. Recently, as mentioned earlier, dzikir
bersama (collective dzikir) has become widespread among Muslims, especially
in urban communities. Some rising young preachers such as Arifin Ilham
and Abdullah Gymnastiar have organized regular ‘dzikir bersama’ programs
that attract thousands of Muslims. Private television channels take part in
blowing up the program through live broadcasts. The programs take place in
big mosques, including the biggest mosques in Indonesia, the Istiqlal Mosque.
Alternative healing using magic and amulets are also commonplace. They
are used, for example, to expel the spirit of the devil from the human body.
These popular practices receive much attention of Salafis. For Salafis, wirid and
dzikir are accepted in Islam, but some prayers and formulas the people chant
are not. For this reason, they want to purify or “Islamize” dzikir by providing
accepted formulas. In their attempt, Salafi ustadhs collect daily prayers based
on accepted hadiths. Mubarak Bamualim, for example, made a compilation of
various selected daily prayers and distributes them among his audiences during
his religious gatherings. Abdul Qadir Jawas authored works on daily prayers
and alternative Islamic healing. Do’a dan Wirid48 provides daily prayers based on
the Qur’an and Hadith. It also guides the readers about how to reject the use
of magic and amulets, and alternative methods of healing (ruqya). This work
received a wide readership and was reprinted nine times between 2002–2009. He
also produced a smaller pocket-size Dzikir Pagi Petang dan Sesudah Shalat Fardu.49
47 Martin van Bruinessen, “Post-Soeharto Muslim Engagement”, p. 39.
48 Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawwas, Do’a & Wirid: Mengobati Guna-guna dan Sihir menurut
al-Qur’an dan As-Sunnah, Jakarta: Pustaka Imam Syafi’i, 2005.
49 Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, Dzikir Pagi Petang dan Sedudah Shalat Fardu menurut alQur’an dan as-Sunnah yang Shahih, Bogor: Pustaka Imam Asy-Syafi’i, 2005.
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What distinguishes the Salafis from other groups is its rejection of association,
such as the Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI). As Ichwan has shown, the MUI
has become an assembly where almost all Muslim organizations have their
representatives. Recently, it has accommodated the interest of militant Muslim
groups such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Forum Umat Islam (FUI).50 In
spite of the growing number of Salafi adherents, Salafis have no representative
in the MUI, both on the central and local boards. However, Tasikmalaya is an
exception in this case. In Tasikmalaya, I found a Salafi representative at the
local MUI office. Maman Suratman, a teacher in Pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah in
Tasikmalaya, was designated by the pesantren to become a member of the local
MUI. Being a native of Tasikmalaya, Suratman was appointed by the pesantren as
spokesman responsible for social relationships. Moreover, he is also assigned as
the pesantren’s representative in the Forum Pengajian Pondok Pesantren (Pondok
Pesantren Study Forum). The forum comprises of pesantren leaders (kyais) and
holds weekly study sessions on Saturday evenings, taking place from one pesantren
to another in the city. Suratman is often present at these gatherings. Despite his
presence, Pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah is reluctant to host the forum. This rejection
surprises other kyais. Normally, a kyai will be honoured when his pesantren is
selected to host such a distinguished forum.51 Aside the Ihya al-Sunnah, I found
no other Salafi figure or pesantren involved in such local forum and association.
The reason of the rejection to associations is Salafi’s belief it is tanzim, which is
regarded as bid’a and causes the fragmentation of Muslims. The rejection confirms
the widespread image of Salafism, that is, that Salafis are anti-social, unwilling to
communicate or associate with the surrounding community.
However, the community’s impression that Salafis are anti-social is not
entirely right. To a certain extent, Salafis are engaged in social services. They
often distribute zakat (alms tax), iftar (meals for fast breaking) and qurban
(slaughtered animals on the Feast of Sacrifice). In 2009, Pesantren Sulalatul
Huda, which is near Pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah, for example, received 3 goats as
qurban. Similarly, Pesantren al-Furqan in Sidayu often distributes zakat, iftar
and qurban to the surrounding community. Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari engaged
in a more tangible social service for the community. It widened the access road
to the pesantren from 0,5 to 3 meters making the village much more accessible;
it built a toilet for a mussalla located near the pesantren, and finally it hardened
the road up to 3 kilometres surrounding the pesantren.
50 Moch Nur Ichwan, “Towards a Puritanical Moderate Islam”, p. 64.
51 Interview with Aminuddin Bustami, Tasikmalaya, February 15, 2010.
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It is clear that a basic Salafi principle is its prohibition of its adherents to
participate in political practices. This attitude is based on the Salafi perception
that participation in political parties is not allowed because it will cause the
fragmentation of the umma. Because of this, Salafis do not vote in elections,
do not support candidates, and do not criticize the government. In spite of this
clear position, Salafis are far from monolithic. For example, Wahdah Islamiyyah
in South Sulawesi supports and advises its members to vote in elections. Voting
is acceptable for certain reasons. Abu Qatadah from Tasikmalaya, for example,
admitted that he personally did not vote in the presidential election in 2004, but
he did vote in the governorate election in 2008. His argument revolves on the
legal maxim of “akhaff al-dararayn” (the lesser of two evils). According to this
maxim, if a Muslim encounters two evils that cause damage, he must choose
the one that creates the less damage. In the West Java governorate election,
he argued, Muslims, or at least, he himself, encountered the dilemma between
going to the polls or residing at home. To vote meant to violate a Salafi principle.
On the other hand, his absence in the polls might give way for a candidate to
hold power other than the one he liked. For this reason, he finally went to the
poll and voted for a devout Muslim candidate. For him, this action caused less
damage than to abstain.52
Moreover, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, we also witnessed another
testimony of Salafi involvement in the politics. Under the banner of Laskar
Jihad and its umbrella organization the Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal
Jama’ah (FKAWJ), as discussed above, Salafis were tempted to and indeed did
engage in politics. Some involved themselves in the jihad in Ambon and Poso,
Central Sulawesi, where local conflicts between Muslims and Christians raged.
However, from out of this case Salafis have returned to activities, which are
solely religious: teaching and preaching.
C. Salafi Ustadhs: Challenging Religious Authority
In West Java, Salafis teachers have made many efforts to establish their
religious authority. Through these attempts, Salafis frequently oppose or
challenge established religious leaders. One of the ways to do so was to organize
public debates, mubahatha. As will be shown below, in one of these debates,
Salafi ustadhs contested leaders of Persis, the puritan modernist movement
that shares similar ideas with Salafism in struggling against bid’a and kharafat,
52 Interview with Abu Qatadah, Tasikmalaya, February 10, 2009.
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and calling on Muslims to return to the fundamental sources of Islam doctrines,
the Qur’an and the hadith. The mubahatha clearly shows two different styles of
Salafi thought and action.
The mubahatha was entitled ‘Mengungkap Gerakan Salafy di Indonesia
[Discovering the Salafi Movement in Indonesia]’ and was conducted on March
27, 2007, in Bandung, West Java, initiated by the head of Persis in West Java. It
was attended by leading Persis figures, including Siddiq Amien (the then Persis
chairman), Aceng Zakaria (the then head of Pesantren Persis in Garut, West Java),
Usman Sholehuddin (head of Dewan Hisbah Persis) and Maman Abdurrahman.
In addition to these prominent Persis figures, the forum was also attended by
Persis delegations from every district in West Java. On the other side, the Salafis
were represented by Abdul Hakim Abdat from Jakarta and Abu Qatadah from
Tasikmalaya, West Java. Other Salafi activists, such as Tonari (Cirebon), Yunus
Anis and Ayip Saefuddin were also present. During the discussion, representatives
of the Salafis and Persis discussed arguments and examined the dalil of the
obligation of following the Salafi manhaj (path). The following account is based on
a CD recording of the event. As a part of their da’wa strategy, the Salafis recorded
the event, transferred it onto CDs and distributed them among followers and
sympathizers, including researchers. Abdat gave me one of these CDs when I
visited Pesantren Minhajussunnah in Bogor in October 2008.53
The discussion was opened by a welcoming speech by the committee and
a brief speech by the head of Persis of the West Java region. Following these
speeches, Siddiq Amien, as keynote speaker, presented his paper on ‘Fenomena
Gerakan Dakwah Salafy di Indonesia dan Menimbang Argumentasi Manhaj
al-Salaf al-Salih sebagai Dasar Ketiga sesudah al-Qur’an dan al-Sunnah’ (The
Phenomenon of the Salafi Da’wa Movement in Indonesia and an Examination
of the Arguments [in favour of accepting] the Salaf Manhaj as the Third Source
after the Qur’an and Sunna). In his talk, Amien highlighted various essential
aspects of the Salafi movement in Indonesia. Firstly, he gave a definition of
Salafism, elaborating on the meaning of ‘Salaf ’ and its derivatives. He explained
that ‘Salaf ’ literally means ‘the predecessor’, and the ‘al-Salaf al-Salih’ denotes
the first three generations of Muslims, consisting of the Companions, the
Followers, and the Followers of Followers. Meanwhile, ‘Salafi’ connotes a person
who follows the path of Salaf.
To this point, Amien’s definition of Salafism is quite similar to that of the
Salafis. Amien then continued his presentation with his observations on the
53 “Mereka Bertanya tentang Manhaj Salaf ”, CD circulated among Salafis.
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rise of Salafi movements in Indonesia. For him, Salafism had inspired various
religious movements to emerge in the country. The Wahhabi movement had
inspired the Paderi movement in Minangkabau, West Sumatra, in the 19th
century. In the 20th century, Salafi ideas influenced the advent of a number of
reformist religious movements, including the Jami’at Khayr in 1905 in Jakarta,
al-Irsyad in 1913 in Jakarta, the Muhammadiyah in 1912 in Yogyakarta and
Persatuan Islam in 1923 in Bandung. These organizations called on Muslims to:
return to the Qur’an and Sunna; support jihad and ijtihad; fight against bid’a,
kharafat, takhayul. They utilized various da’wa methods, including education,
preaching and publications. In Amien’s understanding, all these organizations
are Salafi, because they follow the path of al-Salaf.
The second issue Amien highlighted was the fragmentation of the current
Salafi movement in Indonesia. Quoting the work of Abu Abdurrahman al-Thalibi,
Dakwah Salafiyah Dakwah Bijak,54 he explored the division into ‘Yemeni’ and ‘haraki’
Salafis. The first faction refers to former Laskar Jihad activists under the leadership
of Ja’far Umar Thalib, the followers of Sheikh Muqbil al-Wadi’i from Yemen and
the followers of Sheikh Rabi ibn Hadi al-Madkhali from Saudi Arabia. The second
group is associated with the Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami and the al-Muntada al-Islami.
While the first group rejects the haraki da’wa method, the second maintains that
the haraki method is needed in order to apply da’wa in the modern era. Moreover,
Amien mentioned individual conflicts between various Salafis.
The last matter Amien addressed was the debate over the nature of the
difference between the Salaf across the first three generations of Muslims.
Amien agreed with the Salafis that, besides the Prophet, Muslims must take into
account the examples and opinions of the Salaf on religious matters. However, it
is a fact that the Salaf differed among themselves on a number of issues. To give an
example, he elaborated on the difference between Abu Bakr al-Siddiq and ‘Umar
ibn Khattab on the one hand, and ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan on the other, concerning
the issue of adhan (call for prayer) for the Friday prayers. Following the Prophet,
the first two caliphs implemented the rule of only one adhan before the prayers,
while the third caliph added one more. Therefore, there were two adhans during
the reign of ‘Uthman. Taking this case as an example, Amien asked the question
“whom Muslims should follow: Abu Bakr and ‘Umar, or ‘Uthman”? According to
Persis, the rationale of following ‘Uthman was clear: as the Muslim’s territory
expanded, Muslims were widespread and, therefore one more adhan was
54 Abu Abdirrahman al-Thalibi, Dakwah Salafiyah Dakwah Bijak, Jakarta: Hujjah Press,
2007.
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added to signify prayer time. Thus, following this example, Persis contended
that the Salaf exercised rational thinking. Taking this difference into account,
together with the Prophet’s last message on the necessity of maintaining the
two fundamental sources of Islam, the Qur’an and Sunna, Amien concluded that
Persis found no clear or sound argument for the obligation of Muslims to follow
the Salaf manhaj as advocated by Salafis.
After Amien, two Salafis, Abdul Hakim Abdat and Abu Qatadah, presented
their speeches. Abdat is among the top senior Salafi ustadhs, while Abu Qatadah
is a middle-level ustadh. Abdat started and the focus of his presentation was the
religious arguments of the obligation of Muslims to follow the Salaf manhaj.
Before discussing this issue, he first took the opportunity to refute the analysis
and the remarks Amien made concerning the frictions among Indonesia’s Salafis
and the absence of a clear and sound argument for the necessity of emulating
the Salaf. On the first issue, he denied the frictions among Indonesia’s Salafis and
their division into “Yemeni” and “haraki”. According to him, this fragmentation
only exists in the opinion of outsiders and observers, but is far from the truth. On
the contrary, he claimed that Salafis are monolithic and do not recognize these
factions. In order to understand the issue correctly, Abdat suggested that the
analysis must be applied to the manhaj but not to individuals. On the second issue,
Abdat maintained that Persis’ incapability to find a clear and sound argument for
Muslims’ obligation to follow the Salafi manhaj does not denote the absence of the
argument. This, Abdat further explained, might be caused by the fact that Persis
has not observed the dalil. Abdat took this opportunity to present a number of
religious arguments.
Abdat elaborated on arguments of the obligation for Muslims to follow the
Salafi manhaj from the Qur’an, and the hadith. He presented five dalils from
Qur’anic verses 9:100, 9:119, 12:108, 2:136–137 and 1:6. Because of the limited
space here, I would like to present the arguments concerning only the initial
two. The first verse, 9:100, reads as follows:
“The vanguard (of Islam), the first of those who forsook (their homes)
and of those who gave them aid, and (also) those who follow them in
(all) good deeds, well pleased is Allah with them, as are they with Him:
for them hath He prepared Gardens under which rivers flow, to dwell
therein forever: that is the supreme triumph.”
As explicitly mentioned in the verse, Abdat said that the muhajirun (emigrants)
and the ansar (helpers) were pleasing to God and that God loved their deeds and
actions. According to Abdat, the verse implies an order from God to Muslims to
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follow the Prophet’s Companions in order to obtain God’s satisfaction. The order
emerges in the form of khabar (news), not in the form of an ordinary command. The
second verse, 9:119, reads as follows: “O, ye who believe! Fear Allah and be with
those who are truthful.”
According to Abdat, the term ‘al-sadiqin’ (truthful) referred to the Prophet’s
Companions. Like the first verse, according to Abdat this verse implies an order
for Muslims to imitate the Companions. In addition to Qur’anic verses, Abdat
mentioned the most-often quoted hadith that tells of the best three generations
of Muslims: the Companions; the followers; and the followers of followers.
Relying on these dalils, Abdat concluded that to follow the Salaf manhaj is
obligatory for Muslims.
Here, we see how the Salafis play with logic in responding to Persis questions
and remarks. The answer saying that ‘finding no clear and sound argument on
the obligation of Muslims to follow the Salaf and the third source of Islamic
doctrine does not mean the absence of argument’ is acceptable to rationale.
This points to Persis’ ignorance and inability to find the dalil. Due to this logic,
the Salafi attempts to expose the dalil. Here we see how the Salafis incorrectly
understood Persis’ argument. For Persis, the statement means that after careful
examination, it concludes that the Salafi’s notion on the matter discussed is not
based on the dalil. Or, there are no dalils in the Qur’an and the hadith to support
the idea.
The second Salafi speaker was Abu Qatadah. On commencing his talk, he
acknowledged humbly that he had grown up in the Persis community and
that he had been a Persis activist. He had been at a Persis pesantren for seven
years before his conversion to Salafism. His talk focused on three issues: (1) the
sources of Islamic doctrines; (2) divergent opinions of the Companions; (3) the
possibility of being deviant from the truth without following the Salaf manhaj.
Concerning the first issue, he explained that the sources of Islamic doctrine
are the Qur’an, the hadith, sound ijma’ (consensus) and sound qiyas (analogy).
On the second issue, he acknowledged that the Companions had differed in a
number of religious matters. Responding to these dissimilarities, he maintained
that Muslims can follow one of these opinions but are not allowed to resort to
other opinions. Concerning the third issue, Abu Qatadah argued that a Muslim
may fall into making a mistake if he or she follows only the Qur’an and the
hadith. To strengthen his argument, Abu Qatadah recalled the history of Islam
and, especially, the case of the assassination of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, the fourth
caliph, by Ibn Muljam, a Khawarij adherent. Upon murdering the caliph, Ibn
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Muljam read Qur’anic verse 5:44: “If any do fail to judge by (the light of) what
Allah hath revealed, they are unbelievers.” Referring to this, Abu Qatadah raised
the provocative question: “Look at this case! How did the murderer read the
Qur’an when he murdered the caliph?” Based on this case, he maintained that
the Qur’an and the hadith alone are insufficient as the sources of Islam. Muslims
must follow the Salafi manhaj in understanding these sources. Moreover, he
added that all deviating sects in Islam, such as Khawarijite, Mu’tazilate and Shi’ite
Islam, armed their arguments with the Qur’an and the hadith, but interpreted
them in line with their reasoning.
The next session appeared to be more interesting than the previous one
since it included discussion, dialogue, questions and answers between Salafis
and leading Persis figures. The main question the participants raised concerned
the Salafis’ claim that the Salafi manhaj was the true one. Maman Abddurahman,
a member of Persis’ central board, asked whether Salafism was a method of
thought or the name of a group. If it is a method of thought, Abdurrahman
added, many Muslim thinkers, such as Muhammad ‘Abduh, supported the Salafi
method. In his opinion, the core spirit of the Salafi method is encapsulated in is
reform movement, a movement dealing with the purification of ‘aqida (Islamic
faith), the purification of ‘ibada (rituals) and the reform of mu’amalat (social
interactions). In line with this, Abdurrahman maintained that a number of
Muslim organizations in Indonesia, such as al-Irsyad, Muhammadiyah and Persis,
have adopted the Salaf method. Consequently, they can also be considered Salafi,
meaning that they are adherents of the Salaf ’s method of thought. If Salafism
is accepted as a way of thought, Abdurrahman continued, why must a group of
Muslims claim to be the truest Salafis?
Yuyu Wahyu, a participant in the discussion from Tasikmalaya, West Java, asked
a similar question in challenging the validity of the Salafis’ arguments. In a direct
manner, he asked: “Who are the Salaf? Are Muhammad ‘Abduh and his disciple,
Rashid Rida, Salaf?” He challenged the arguments for the obligation to follow the
Salafi manhaj. He argued that before the Prophet died, he advised Muslims to hold
on to two sources only, the Qur’an and the hadith. The Prophet promised that
Muslims would not deviate from true Islam if they strictly obeyed the instructions
contained in these fundamental sources. It is true that to understand the two
sources correctly Muslims must learn some methodological approaches, which,
in turn, will result in a number of laws. However, Wahyu added, Persis examines
not only the products (thought and laws) but also the process (method) and the
rationale behind the products. This approach confirms a maxim in Islamic legal
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theory that “the law revolves with the availability and absence of the reason” (alhukm yadur ma’a al-‘illa wujudan wa ‘adaman). The third participant, Zae Nandang,
questioned the Salafis about the different opinions among the Companions. When
the Companions differed on a matter, Nandang asked, who must Muslims follow?
Responding to these questions, Abdat replied that the focus of the discussion
was on the Salafi manhaj as a method of thought and a way of religious life. He
avoided particular issues of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) in which the Salaf had
differed in a number of issues. Abdat contended that the Salaf had agreed on the
essential teachings of Islam; the Salaf believed in God’s punishment in the grave
after death, God’s pre-destination, God’s occupation on His Chair (‘arsh), God’s
Face and Hands being different from those of humans and, also, in the eternality
(qadim) of the Qur’an. The Salaf, Abdat explained, did not differ on these matters.
On the obligation of following the Salafi manhaj, Abdat argued that the Qur’an and
the hadith are true (haqq). However, he continued, not all the people who argue
with Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions are correct. He mentioned a number
of Muslim groups, such as the Mu’tazilite, who rejected some hadiths because
they contradicted the Qur’an. According to Abdat, the Mu’tazilite and Muslim
philosophers refer to the Qur’an and hadiths to support their thought, but they
interpret them in line with their rationalism and, as a result, deviate from true
Islam. In order to avoid making similar faults, Abdat argued that to follow the Salaf
manhaj is necessary in order to understand the Qur’an and the hadith. Thus, the
Salafi slogan “the return to the Qur’an and the hadith”, as advocated by a number
of reformist Muslim organizations, must be accomplished by “understanding of
the Salaf”.
In his reply, Salafi representative Abu Qatadah highlighted the characteristics
of the Salaf. Referring to Yahya Abd al-Mu’in, he elaborated on a number of ahl
al-sunna beliefs. These included the belief in: pre-destination; giving precedence
to Abu Bakr and ‘Umar ibn Khattab in faith and the caliphate; punishment in the
grave; the Day of Resurrection. Moreover, he mentioned a number of Salafi methods
of deriving laws (istidlal): firstly, the return to the Qur’an and the hadith; secondly,
understanding the Qur’an and the hadith in line with the Salafi manhaj; thirdly,
preferring the texts (nass) over ratio (‘aql); fourthly, interpreting the mutashabih
texts (allegorical texts that have more than one and uncertain meanings) to
confirm the muhkam texts (texts that have accurate and precise meaning); lastly,
reconciling arguments in the case of different dalils. Based on these criteria, Abu
Qatadah suggested each individual, group or organization should decide for itself
whether or not it or he/she is a Salafi.
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The discussion continued with the second question–and–answer session, in
which four participants asked questions. Almost all of them inquired about the
validity of the Salafis’ arguments about the necessity to follow the Salaf manhaj.
They also questioned the speakers about whom they must follow when the Salafs
differed on a number of issues. Uus, for example, severely criticized Salafis for
their insistence on following the manhaj. He armed his argument with the widely
accepted hadith telling of a dialogue between the Prophet and Mu’adh ibn Jabal
before the Prophet sent him to Yemen. The Prophet was reported to have asked
his envoy about the sources of religious matters. Ibn Jabal replied that he would
rely on the Book of God and the Sunna. If he could not find answers in these two
fundamental sources, he would exercise ijtihad by using his reason (ajtahid bi ra’yi)
and the Prophet agreed. Relying on this story, Uus continued that the hadith does
not tell us to follow the opinion of the Companions.
Faced with these questions, the Salafis maintained their positions. Abdat,
for example, repeatedly argued that the dialogue should be focused on the Salaf
manhaj as a method of thought and a way of conduct in religious matters. For him,
the different opinions between the Salaf was not an issue, since they appeared
in particularities and disputed matters (juz’iyyat and khilafiyat) and not in the
foundational doctrines of Islam, the ‘aqida.
It appeared that during the mubahatha, Salafis and Persis members remained
in dispute on several aspects. On the one hand, since the beginning Persis raised
questions about the differences among the Companions of the Prophet in regard
to a number of issues. Learning from these differences, Persis suggested Muslims
grasp the ‘spirit’ of the texts and not on ‘the’ texts in order to cope with modern
demands.55 On the other hand, Salafis tried to avoid discussing the differences
among them but, instead, looked for similarities. The Salafis argued that even
though they differed in details, they agreed on essential doctrines. Because of
these different stand points, Persis and Salafis did come to agreement on this
fundamental issue. This subject is crucial since the Salafis made the Salaf their
point of reference, and when some questions concerning the dissimilarities
among the Salaf are asked, the Salafis refuse to discuss the matter. They leave the
nature of the diversity among the Salaf as it is, without attempting to go into a
deep analysis of these divergences in order to draw conclusions.
Both Salafis and Persis agreed that the Salafi manhaj is a method of thought in
concluding Islamic law. Both also agreed that the Salaf are the best generations
55 See, Dewan Hisbah Persatuan Islam, Thuruq Istinbath Dewan Hisbah Persatuan Islam,
2007: Bandung, n.p., pp. 66-71.
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of Muslims because they are considered the people who understand the religion
following the Prophet’s life. At the heart of the debate, however, Salafis and
Persis disputed the obligation of Muslims to follow the Salaf manhaj. As shown
in the Salafis’ arguments, this obligation is inferred from and indirectly ordered
by Qur’anic verses and the hadith. Salafis understand and interpret God’s
satisfaction with the Salaf — the anointed three superior generations of the
Muslim community — to be an order for Muslims to follow their way. Persis
refutes this rationale and believes that there are no clear and sound religious
arguments in the Qur’an and the hadith that obligate Muslims to follow the
Salafi manhaj. Two famous hadiths are cited in this matter. Firstly, there is the
hadith telling of the Prophet’s last advice to Muslims to follow the Book of God
and the Sunna. Secondly, there is the hadith of Mu’adh ibn Jabal. Both hadiths
do not urge Muslims to follow the Salaf manhaj.
This dialogue reveals how Salafis and Persis examined their religious
arguments. The two groups based their arguments on two fundamental sources
of Islam: the Salafis quoted dalils from the Qur’an and the hadith, while Persis
referred to hadiths. Each party also complemented the dalils with stories dating
back to early Islam; Salafis recounted the case of the assassination of the fourth
caliph by a Khawarij adherent, while Persis narrated the case of assignment of
Mu’adh ibn Jabal by the Prophet to Yemen. By the use of all these arguments,
each party challenges the conviction of its counterpart by questioning the
validity of its dalils and by defending its religious belief. Thus, by examining and
contesting each other’s religious arguments, each party attempted to acquire,
establish and confirm its authority. The authority was derived from the ability of
presenting religious arguments and a proper understanding of religion.
In addition to examining religious arguments, during the mubahatha the
Salafis also tried to demonstrate their religious authority by their physical
appearance and their way of presentation. Appearing with a long beard, Abdat
talked to the audience with a different intonation. He spoke loudly and clearly
at one moment, but then continued slowly and calmly at another. On a specific
matter, he repeated his arguments, highlighting important aspects of his speech.
Through the use of these rhetoric means, he tried to convince the audience
that he was authoritative in religion. Abu Qatadah looked different from Abdat
and the other participants. Dressed as an Arab, he wore a red-white blocked
kafiyya. Also, he began his presentation in Arabic and then translated it into
Indonesian. Although the audience most probably understood Arabic well, he
felt he needed to translate his speech and to repeat precisely what he had said
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earlier. Moreover, his speech also was full of quotations from the opinions of
Salafi scholars. His approach endeavoured to impress upon the audience that he
was in possession of all the requirements of religious authority, good command
of Arabic and deep knowledge of religion.
Thus, the mubahatha case shows many of ways the Salafis establish their
religious authority. Firstly, good command of Arabic and foundational religious
texts. Abu Qatadah confirmed this way; he persuaded his audience in Arabic,
followed by translation. Before his teachers and colleagues in Persis, he also
exposed his deep knowledge of religion by referring to fundamental texts on the
subject. Secondly, dress and style of speech. Again, Abu Qatadah attempted to
confirm his religious authority by wearing Arab garb. Abdat managed his rhetoric
by speaking loudly and by repeating two or three times what he had said about the
specific matters he emphasized.
Another way of constructing religious authority is by writing commentaries
(sharh) on earlier works. Qasim Zaman notes that this method is distinctive
of Muslim scholarly works. Writing commentaries is considered a method of
adjusting earlier works to modern-day needs and of presenting them to different
audiences. In other words, writing a commentary is a way of presenting earlier
works to the present.56 Thus, Salafi sheikhs from Saudi Arabia commented on
the earlier works of Muslim scholars, in particular those by Muhammad ibn
‘Abd al-Wahhab. As the founder of Wahhabism, all his works have been the
focus of commentaries by Salafis. Thalatha al-Usul and Kitab al-Tawhid have
been annotated by Muhammad ibn Salih al-‘Uthaymin in his Sharh Thalatha alUsul57 and al-Qawl al-Mufid ‘ala Kitab al-Tawhid.58 Al-Uthaymin also considered alNawawi’s work, al-‘Arba’in al-Nawawi,59 and the work of Ibn Taymiyya, al-’aqida
al-Wasitiyya.60 Another Salafi figure, Sheikh Salih Fawzan al-Fawzan analysed the
work of ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Masa’il al-Jahiliyya in his Sharh Masa’il al-Jahiliyya.61
56 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2002, p. 38.
57 Muhammad ibn Salih al-‘Uthaymin, Sharh Thalatha al-Usul, Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al‘Ilmiyya, 2006.
58 Muhammad ibn Salih al-‘Uthaymin, al-Qawl al-Mufid ‘ala Kitab al-Tawhid, Riyad: Dar
Ibn al-Jawziyya, 2003.
59 Muhammad ibn Salih al-‘Uthaymin, Sharh al-‘Arba’in al-Nawawi, Riyad: Dar al-Thurayya, 2003.
60 Muhammad ibn Salih al-‘Uthaymin, Sharh al-Aqida al-Wasitiyya, Riyad: Dar Ibn alJawziyya, 2003
61 Salih Fawzan al-Fawzan, Sharh Masa’il al-Jahiliyya, Riyad: Dar al-‘Asima, 2001.
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Salafi ustadhs in Indonesia have not commented on the works of earlier
Salafi scholars. Instead, they have followed and repeated the commentaries of
their masters from Saudi Arabia. What has been done by Indonesian Salafis is
translating these works into Indonesian, and teaching them to followers. Many
have written textbooks on Salafi doctrine, such as Abdul Qadir Jawas and Abdul
Hakim Abdat.
During the past decade, Indonesian Muslims have witnessed a contest of
religious authority. Traditional religious authorities (kyai and ‘ulama) recently
have been challenged also by the newly emerging and popular muballighs
(preachers) and da’is (proselytizers), such as Arifin Ilham and Abdullah
Gymnastyar (popularly known as ‘Aa Gym). Supported by electronic media,
particularly national television channels such as TV One, Metro TV, Surya Citra
Television (SCTV) and Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia (RCTI), these young
figures have attracted large numbers of Muslims and have become national
muballighs. This phenomenon can be observed from the participants attending
the religious lessons they deliver. Arifin Ilham’s ‘Majelis Zikir’, for example,
was attended by thousands of Muslims. The participants, mostly women, wear
long white dresses and chant special formulas in remembrance of God. What
is interesting about these Majelis Zikir is that many participants cry during
the program. In addition to the zikr, the content of the lessons Ilham delivers
includes daily duties, such as prayers.62 The other rising preacher whom women
loved very much was Abdullah Gymnastyar from Bandung, West Java. He
developed religious programs and adopted the name ‘Manajemen Qalbu’ (Heart
Management). Like Arifin, Aa Gym’s sermons were attended by thousands of
Muslims, mostly women. His fame, however, declined significantly after he took
a second wife. This decline, according to Hoesterey, was due to the fact that Aa
Gym’s authority did not stem from his deep knowledge of Islam, but from his
image as an ideal husband. His followers saw Aa Gym as a representation of a
husband who was good to his wife and a good father to his children. Thus, his
image fell to pieces when Aa Gym took his second wife.63
Popular preachers are not novel. Before the emergence of these new raising
preachers, we already witnessed senior preacher Zainuddin MZ who was very
62 Andree Feillard, “From Handling Water in a Glass to Coping with an Ocean: Shifts in
Religious Authority in Indonesia”, in Azyumardi Azra, Kees van Dijk, and Nico J.G.
Kaptein, (eds), Varieties of Religious Authority, p.168.
63 James B. Hoesterey, “Marketing Morality: The Rise, Fall and Rebranding of Aa Gym,”
in Greg Fealy and Sally White, Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia,
Singapore: ISEAS, 2008, pp. 95-112.
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popular among Muslims: common people, Middle class, and high ranking
government officials. His sermons, particularly those he delivered in the open
field were attended by thousands of Muslims. He was called “da’i sejuta umat”,
meaning “the preacher with one million people.” In addition to the content of
his sermons, his rhetoric received much attention from the Muslim community
as he inserted jokes about and directed mild criticism to the community as well
as to the government. His criticism did not make the government allergic to his
sermons. Compared to Arifin Ilham and Aa Gym who emphasize the coolness
of Islamic teaching, Zainuddin’s sermons covered various matters of Islamic
teachings, ranging from family affairs, to social and political affairs. Unlike Aa
Gym who does not read Arabic fluently, Zainuddin was eloquent in Arabic and
highly knowledgeable in Islam. Zainuddin’s lectures always included dalils from
Qur’anic verses, hadith and the opinions of great scholars such as al-Ghazali.
In addition to professional preachers, there are also intellectual preachers like
Nurcholish Madjid. Madjid delivered his religious lectures to a limited audience,
mostly university students. For example, Madjid was often invited by officials of
the Mas Agung mosque in Kwitang, Central Jakarta, to give lectures on Sunday
mornings from 10.00 to 12.00. Moreover, with the support of his colleagues, he
established the Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina (Paramadina Foundation) in 1986.
The foundation is located in Pondok Indah, South Jakarta, one of most expensive
areas in Jakarta. The foundation aimed at providing urban Muslims with an
inclusive method of thought in interpreting Islamic doctrines in order to meet the
demands of the changing world.64 The foundation organized monthly religious
lectures called Klub Kajian Agama (Religious Study Club) during which various
aspects of Islamic teachings were discussed. The Paramadina Foundation also
held courses on specific aspects of Islamic doctrine, such as Islamic philosophy
and Sufism. All these programs attracted middle class Muslims who wanted to
study Islam. Some of them were executives and businesspersons who turned to
religion to escape the hustle and bustle of their occupations.
In addition to individual and independent preachers, the Muhammadiyah
and the Nahdlatul Ulama also countered the challenges posed by new mass
organizations like Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Justice Prosperity Party
(PKS). The PKS claims to be a da’wa party of and attracts many fresh graduates
from Middle Eastern universities. It often produces religious fatwas. In 2005, for
example, the PKS declared publicly that the celebration of ‘Id al-Adha should be
celebrated one day earlier than the official day set by the government.65
64 http://paramadina.or.id/?page_id=169, accessed on September 7, 2013.
65 Andree Feillard, “From Handling Water” p.168.
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Notwithstanding these challenges, traditional religious leaders, kyais and
‘ulamas, remain influential among the Muslim community. It is true that in urban
communities, people may attend the religious events of Aa Gym or Arifin Ilham while
HTI and PKS members, mostly university students, indeed refer to their ustadhs or
murabbis (mentors) on religious matters. However, the majority of Muslims continue
to consider traditional kyais and ‘ulamas as their references. They still consult them
on religious issues.
D. The Social Background of Salafi Leaders
The case of the mubahatha saw two prominent Salafi figures on stage:
Abdul Hakim Abdat and Abu Qatadah. It is not clear how Persis delivered the
proposal of the program or how the Salafis chose their representatives to join
the discussion. As the initiative came from the Persis head of West Java, it is
assumed that it proposed to organize the program to Abu Qatadah, the director
of Pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah in Tasikmalaya, and that the latter subsequently
discussed it with his senior, Abdul Hakim Abdat who often visits the pesantren
to deliver public lectures. It is quite likely that this assumption is true for it is the
easiest way to contact Salafi ustadhs. The Ihya al-Sunnah is the Salafi pesantren
located closest from Bandung, and the two ustadhs are popular among Salafis in
West Java.
It is crucial to understand the long path by which the Salafis establish their
religious authority. Unfortunately, I have no sufficient information about Abdat.
What is publicly known is that he is of Arab descent. After finishing high school,
he enrolled in the Lembaga Pengajaran Bahasa Arab (LPBA, Institute for the Arabic
Teaching, now LIPIA). His uncle played a significant role in his study at this Saudisponsored institution. At the time of its inception in the early 1980s, LPBA did
not have its own building, but rented one at Jalan Raden Saleh, Central Jakarta.
It was fortunate that this building belongs to Abdat’s uncle. When Abdat told his
uncle about his willingness to study at the institute, his uncle called the director
recommending his nephew. According to Abdat, the call made him accepted at
LPBA. Having graduated from LPBA, Abdat spent much time and energy to study
hadith by himself, using the books available in the institute’s library.66 This habit
continues to date. He is well known as the most authoritative Salafi ustadh in
66 Conversation with Abdul Hakim Abdat, Bogor, 2008. I made many attempts to
interview him, but I failed. I met him on many occasions as I attended his lessons
in classrooms and his religious lessons in mosques. However, I had no chance to
explore his biography in detail.
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‘ulum al-hadith (hadiths sciences) among the Salafis.
Currently, Abdat is regarded as one of the most senior Salafi ustadhs in
Indonesia. He keeps himself busy with da’wa, teaching and writing Salafi books.
He teaches hadith and Islamic sects (al-firaq al-Islamiyya) in Pesantren Minhaj
al-Sunnah in Bogor, West Java. In Jakarta, he holds religious lessons in various
mosques and offices, including the al-Mubarak Mosque in West Jakarta, and
in the musalla of the Jakarta Stock Exchange (BEJ). As a senior ustadh, he is
often invited by Salafis from outside Jakarta, including Bandung, Tasikmalaya,
Surabaya, and Solo. He also initiated Salafi da’wa in Batam, Riau islands. Abdat
is one of the most prolific Salafi writers. He has authored a number of books,
including the nine volumes of the al-Masa’il, Tafsir al-Kawakib, Lau Kaana Khairan
La Sabaquunaa Ilaihi, Risalah Bid’ah, besides pocket-sized booklets.
At the local level, there are also a number of Salafi ustadhs who devote their
time to Salafi da’wa. They come from different backgrounds. Some of them are
former activists from Islamic movements before they converted to Salafism.
Many of them come from low-income families and, for that reason, were
unable to continue their education. Typically, however, scholarships helped to
secure their education. The majority of Salafi ustadhs graduated from Middle
Eastern universities such as the Jami’a Imam Ibn Su’ud, Riyadh, and the Islamic
University in Medina, Saudi Arabia, while others are LIPIA alumni. The following
section discusses the social backgrounds of a number of selected Salafi figures
from Tasikmalaya, Cirebon, and Surabaya.
Abu Qatadah
Abu Qatadah is a younger brother of Abu Rizal, another prominent Salafi
activist from Tasikmalaya, West Java. In my discussion of the different types
of Salafi conversions in Chapter Six, I shall note Abu Qatadah’s role in the
conversion of his older brother. Both are currently active in Pesantren Ihya alSunnah in Tasikmalaya: the older brother is the chairman of the Yayasan Ihya
al-Sunnah under which the pesantren operates, while the younger one acts
as the pesantren’s director. They work together in the spread of Salafi da’wa:
the former focuses his da’wa on his native town, Tasikmalaya, while the latter
extends his da’wa to Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi.
Abu Qatadah was born in Cipatujah, Tasikmalaya, where he spent his
childhood and finished elementary school in 1986. He went to Pesantren Persis in
Cempaka Warna, Tasikmalaya, for his secondary school education (Preparation,
Tsanawiyah and Mu’allimin) for seven years from 1986 to 1993. Having graduated
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from Pesantren Persis, he spent some years teaching at his alma mater. This
background led him automatically to become a young Persis activist (Pemuda
Persis). He organized religious classes in various mosques inviting Persis figures
from other cities. In addition to his association with Persis, he was active in the
Islamist movement, Ikhwanul Muslimin (IM). He joined this movement in 1990
when he was a student of Mu’alimin at Persis, and he took the oath of loyalty
to the imam (leader). The IM’s goal of the comprehensive implementation of
the shari’a (Islamic laws) fascinated him. The movement charged the ruler of
being kafir (unbeliever) for his failure or resistance to implement the shari’a.
Subsequently, the movement wanted to overthrow the existing ruler and replace
him with an Islamic one.67 While he was a student at the pesantren, he kept a low
profile and hid his active involvement in the clandestine organization.
In 1995, Abu Qatadah moved to Jakarta and studied at LIPIA. As discussed in
Chapter Two, LIPIA had become a centre for the spread of Salafi da’wa. Thus,
it was not surprising when he was introduced to the Salafi manhaj. Here, he
met early prominent Salafi figures such as Farid Uqba and Abdul Hakim Abdat.
However, by his own account, at this time he was not interested in Salafi da’wa.
Instead, he advocated the Ikhwan movement as did LIPIA personnel at the
time. His acquaintance with followers of the Tarbiyah movement intensified
his activism: he recruited new followers by persuading his juniors to join the
movement and by taking the oath from them.
In 1996, Abu Qatadah was sent by his brother, Abu Rizal, to Yemen to study
with Sheikh Muqbil at the Darul Hadith in Dammaj. Abu Rizal knew of this Salafi
learning centre from Husein, a medical doctor and the owner of Holistik hospital
in Purwakarta, West Java. This action was part of his attempt to prepare a cadre
responsible for the development of newly established pesantren. operating
under the Bina Insan Kamil foundation. Abu Rizal established this foundation to
provide religious instruction to his followers in the NII movement. It held religious
discussions in mosque and managed pesantren. Abu Qatadah admitted that he did
not understand Salafism at the time and still held on to his ikhwani thought. Only
after two months studying at Darul Hadith did he understand Salafism. In this
institution, he knew that Qutb’s works which he had read and praised very much
were considered to spread a deviant interpretation of Islam. He spent five years
studying at Darul Hadith and returned home in 2000.
67 Interview with Abu Qatadah, director of Pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah, Tasikmalaya,
February 10, 2009.
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Soon after his return, Abu Qatadah initiated the establishment of the Salafi
Pesantren Ihya as-Sunnah in Tasikmalaya. With the financial support of donors,
mainly the Ihya al-Turath al-Islami, the pesantren developed rapidly and became
one of the leading Salafi pesantrens in the country. Presently, the pesantren
offers various programs: Kindergarten, Madrasah Ibtida’iyah (MI), Madrasah
Tsanawiyah (MTs), Madrasah ‘Aliyah (MA), Tadrib al-Du’at (TD), Tarbiyat alNisa’ (TN), and Tahfiz al-Qur’an. In 2009, the number of students reached 749,
consisting of 323 female and 426 male students. Abu Qatadah is now busy in
directing the pesantren and teaching the students. He is, however, still active
in Salafi da’wa. His da’wa goes beyond the boundary of his native town and
includes Bandung and Jakarta. He regularly teaches Salafi instruction in Jakarta
at mosques and on the premises of the Jakarta Stock Exchange, Toyota Federal,
Setia Budi building, Jakarta Islamic Center, Lippo Cikarang, and others. He often
appears on air at the Marta FM radio channel in Tasikmalaya, and the Rodja
radio station in Cileungsih, Bogor, West Java.68
It is unusual that a Darul Hadith graduate associates himself with the so-called
“cooperationist” faction like Abu Qatadah. Abu Qatadah was a student of Sheikh
Muqbil, but he collaborates with “cooperationist” groups and disassociates
himself from its critics, the “rejectionist” wing. According to his own account,
he used to participate in the religious gatherings of both groups as he saw that
both share a similar manhaj. Later, when his “rejectionist” colleagues learned of
his attendance in “cooperationist’s” religious gatherings, they warned him for
this ambiguous affiliation, and subsequently followed it up by tahdhir69 because
of which he was disassociated from the Yemeni group, and he decided to join the
“cooperationist” group.70
As a man trained in the Persis’ circle, Abu Qatadah knows Persis’s ideas and
thought quite well. He admits that Persis and Salafism share similar ideas on
‘aqida (Islamic faith). However, he views that Persis has become a fiqh-oriented
organization, adopting the opinions of the Dewan Hisbah as its standard. As
a result, any member who contests the opinion of the Dewan Hisbah will be
excluded from Persis. It is true that Persis is more literalist than other reformist
organizations, such as al-Irsyad and the Muhammadiyah. Persis is more rigid
in selecting accepted hadiths. However, according Abu Qatadah, Persis still
68 Interview with Abu Qatadah, Tasikmalaya, February 10, 2009.
69 Tahdhir means strong warning to remind the followers to disassociate with a person
because the person is accused being the adherent of deviant Islam or hizby.
70 Interview with Abu Qatadah, Tasikmalaya, February 10, 2009.
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resorts to rationale. That is to say that after making references to the Qur’an
and the hadith, Persis draws its conclusion on the basis of its own understanding
and interpretation of these sources, instead of taking the example of the early
generations of Muslims (the Salaf).71
Thaharah
Thaharah is one of the leading Salafi figures in Cirebon. Currently, he is
a member of the advisory board of the Yayasan Assunnah Cirebon (YAC),
a foundation under which Pesantren Assunnah operates. He has served in
a number of positions in the foundation, including as head of the da’wa
department (1999–2004) and as the foundation’s chairman (2004–2009). Being
the only graduate from Saudi Arabia, he plays a central role in the pesantren
and is considered its kyai. In addition to his daily activities at the pesantren, he
is active in preaching Salafi doctrines in Cirebon and the neighbouring districts
Kuningan, Majalengka and Indramayu.
Thaharah went to elementary and secondary schools in his native village in
Cirebon. He started to become active in the Islamic movement when he was a
senior high school (SMA 2) student in Cirebon from 1986–1989. As will be discussed
later in Chapter Four, SMA 2 became the centre of Islamic student activism.
During this period, he was active in the Kerohanian Islam section, a special unit
to undergo Islamic activities in the Intra-School Organization (OSIS). OSIS is a
student organization at secondary school level responsible for carrying out extracurricular student activities at school. It has separate sections for sport, the arts,
and religious activities. The religious unit, called Kerohanian Islam, organizes
serial discussions and tutorials on Islam under the supervision of senior students
and teachers of religion. His senior, Ali Hijrah, organized a series of discussions
and training programs for the students under the banner of the Talaba Islamiyya
(Islamic Students) organization. Thaharah joined the Lembaga Pengembangan
Pondok Pesantren Kilat (LP3K, Institute of Development of Lightning Pesantren),
an underground organization established by Ali Hijrah. As mentioned in Chapter
Two, the LP3K was a neo-NII movement that struggled for the creation of the
Islamic State of Indonesia. The LP3K held a radical interpretation of Islam and
considered the existing government as un-Islamic and hence, must be replaced by
an Islamic one.
71 Interview with Abu Qatadah, Tasikmalaya, February 10, 2009.
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Having graduated in senior high school, the low income of his parents
prevented Thaharah from progressing in his studies. He herded goats for two
years (1989–1991), while at the same time he took part in a private Arabic course
organized by LP3K. The conversion to Salafism of the movement’s leader Ali
Hijrah, resulted in Thaharah being introduced to Salafi doctrine. He further
learned about Salafism from other Salafi figures like Yusuf Baisa and Yazid alTamimi. In contrast to the Islamic doctrine he learned about at LP3K which
viewed rulers as taghut, Salafism taught people to maintain a good relationship
with the government. This teaching allowed Salafi adherents to be more open in
holding their religious lessons. This contrasted with LP3K’s religious gatherings,
which were conducted in secret.72
Armed with his knowledge of Arabic that he had learnt at LP3K, Thaharah
took part in the muqabala (student enrolment) program of the Islamic University
of Medina held at Pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran, in 1991, and he passed the
examination. In 1993, he went to Medina, studied Arabic there over a two- year
period (1993–1995), and continued his studies at the Faculty of Da’wa and Usul alDin. In 1999, he completed the program and returned to Indonesia. After that, he
joined the Yayasan Assunnah Cirebon (YAC) and taught at Pesantren Assunnah. He
has since been active in Salafi da’wa. In Cirebon, for example, he is busy delivering
Salafi instruction in many mosques, such as the al-Taqwa Grand Mosque. His da’wa
activities cover various areas in Cirebon, including Gegesik, Gebang, Gunung Djati
and Losari. In Kuningan he has delivered public lectures in Cihideung.73
In line with Assunah’s aspiration to cultivate Salafism in the northern part of
West Java, Thaharah plays a significant role in the realization of this ambition. In
his native village, Bondet, North Cirebon, he established the ‘Umar ibn Khattab
Foundation. The foundation currently runs a kindergarten, elementary school
and religious gatherings. In these schools, teachers from Pesantren Assunnah,
including Thaharah, regularly teach at the ‘Umar ibn Khattab Mosque.74
The foundation is now led by Bahruddin and is under Assunnah supervision.
Assunnah also supported the establishment of Pesantren Nasir al-Sunnah in
Indramayu, and Minhaj al-Muslim in Subang, West Java. The Nasir al-Sunnah
organizes Arabic courses and lessons on the Salafi manhaj. In addition to this, the
pesantren hosts so-called ‘Pesantren Sabtu Ahad’ weekend sessions, abbreviated
72 Interview with Thaharah, Cirebon, November 19, 2008.
73 Interview with Thaharah, Cirebon, April 26, 2010.
74 Interview with Bahruddin, teacher of pesantren ‘Umar ibn Khattab, Cirebon,
January 24, 2010.
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as ‘Petuah’, to accommodate busy people who want to study religion. Unlike the
relationship between Assunnah to Nasir al-Sunnah that seems to be based on
collaborative and mutual support, Assunnah totally supports Minhaj al-Muslim.
This support is evident in the establishment of a mosque and the appointment
of Salafi teachers to teach in this newly established pesantren.
Mubarak Bamualim
Mubarak Bamualim was born in Sumba, East Nusa Tenggara where he grew
up and where he completed elementary school. With the financial support from
Amin Ja’far ibn Abdat, a man of Arab descent from Bogor, he went to Pondok
Modern Darussalam, Gontor to study religion from 1981–1987. At this modern
pesantren, he spent three more years teaching (1987–1990). In 1990, he spent
ten months in Pesantren Dar al-Huffad in Bone, South Sulawesi, to memorize the
Qur’an. Memorizing a number of chapters (juzs) of the Qur’an is a requirement
to enrol in Saudi Arabian Universities. From January 1991 to October 1992, he
taught at Pesantren al-Irsyad in Salatiga, Central Java. Al-Irsyad was established
by Abdat’s family who provided him with the financial support during his study at
Gontor. Thus, his teaching at this pesantren was to compensate for the grant. At
al-Irsyad Tengaran, he got to know about Salafism for the first time. At the time
the pesantren had become the centre of Salafi da’wa in Indonesia.
During his teaching period at al-Irsyad, Bamualim, assisted by his colleague
Mudzakkar Idris from Mataram, Nusa Tenggara Barat, tried to obtain a scholarship
from the Islamic University of Medina. From 1992–1996, Bamualim was indeed
granted a scholarship to study at the Faculty of Islamic Law (shari’a). Having
graduated in Saudi Arabia, he taught Arabic at the Ma’had ‘Aly of al-Irsyad, an Islamic
institution of higher education that belongs to al-Irsyad in Surabaya, East Java. The
Ma’had ‘Aly provided a two-year program focusing on Arabic and Islamic studies.
Some alumni of this program have enrolled in LIPIA or the Islamic University of
Medina. In 2006, due to internal conflicts with the officials of al-Irsyad, the Ma’had
‘Aly moved to a new location in Sidotopo Kidul, Surabaya. In 2007, the Ma’had ‘Aly
was transformed into the Ali bin Abi Thalib Institute of Islamic Studies (STAI Ali
bin Abi Thalib).75 The institute is led by Abdurrahman al-Tamimi, while Bamualim
currently serves as its deputy director. The aim of this institution is to produce
teachers for Salafi pesantrens. The institute focuses on the study of Islamic law.
75 Buku Panduan Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Ali Bin Abi Thalib, Surabaya: STAI Ali bin Abi
Thalib, 2008, p. 5.
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Bamualim is currently continuing his studies in a graduate program at IAIN
Sunan Ampel, Surabaya, and takes fiqh as his major. This step has been criticized
by his opponents, those Salafis who are affiliated with the “rejectionist” faction.
The critics condemn his study at a secular institution, which, they believe, will
introduce him to secular and liberal ideas. Answering this critique, Bamualim
clarifies that this study is an endeavour to secure the future of his institution,
STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib. The government regulates that a lecturer must hold at
least a master degree, and consequently, he has to undergo a master program.
He choose IAIN Sunan Ampel because of the absence of a Salafi institution in
Indonesia that runs a graduate program. Thus, according to Bamualim, he
attends IAIN Surabaya for pragmatic rather than ideological reasons: that is, to
obtain a master’s degree in order to secure his institution. Moreover, Bamualim
argues that this study is useful in explaining Salafism correctly. During the
lectures, he can communicate and discuss Salafism with his colleagues. This
opportunity can be used for da’wa.76
Like other Salafi teachers Bamualim is busy with da’wa, taking it throughout
Surabaya and its neighbouring city, Gresik. Almost every day he delivers lectures
in mosques and other places of religious gathering. His lectures include hadith,
tafsir and fiqh. He uses widely accepted books such as al-Arba’in al-Nawawi, Riyad
al-Salihin and Tafsir Ibn Kathir. Bamualim has published some books of his own on
Islamic rituals in accordance with the Salafi manhaj, such as Meneladani Manasik
Haji dan Umrah Rasulullah77 and Manasik Umrah dan do’a menurut al-Qur’an dan asSunnah.78
From the discussion of the three figures above it becomes clear that Salafi
teachers come from various backgrounds. Socially, they come from ordinary
families in villages such as in the cases of Thaharah and Bamualim. Economically,
they come from low-income families, and this usually prevents them from
having continued their studies. Only scholarships enabled them to further their
education. At the secondary level, they went to different schools: Thaharah went
to a public senior high school; Bamualim studied in Gontor; Abu Qatadah was
educated at a Persis pesantren. Being pesantren students, Bamualim and Abu
Qatadah received a sufficient basic knowledge of Islam and Arabic. In contrast,
76 Interview with Mubarak Bamualim, Surabaya, December 23, 2008.
77 Mubarak bin Mahfudh Bamualim, Meneladani Manasik Haji dan Umrah Rasulullah,
Bogor: Pustaka Imam Asy-Syafi’i, 2007.
78 Mubarak bin Mahfudh Bamualim, Manasik Umrah dan do’a menurut al-Qur’an dan asSunnah, Bogor: Pustaka Imam Asy-Syafi’i, 2007.
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Thaharah went to public school where he learned secular subjects. However, his
activism in the Kerohanian Islam unit and LP3K drove him to study religion. In
tertiary education, Thaharah and Bamualim studied at the Islamic University of
Medina, Saudi Arabia, while Abu Qatadah went to LIPIA, a branch of the Jami’a
Imam Ibn Su’ud in Jakarta, and then continued to Darul Hadith in Yemen. Tertiary
education is what made them Salafi ustadhs.
The case of Bamualim is interesting to highlight for at least two factors: 1)
he is of Arab descent; 2) he is a graduate of Gontor. Concerning the first factor,
many Salafi ustadhs are of Arab descent. They become leading figures in Salafi
movements such as Ja’far Umar Thalib, Abdul Qadir Jawas, Abdul Hakim Abdat
and Abdurrahman al-Tamimi. In a wider spectrum, we also find some figures
of Arab descent who lead radical Islamic movements, for instance, Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir, the former leader of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian
Holy Warriors’ Council) and currently the amir of the Jama’a Ashar al-Tawhid
(JAT), and Habib Muhammad Rizieq, the leader of Front Pembela Islam (FPI,
Islamic Defender Front). These organizations attract young activists to join their
movements. Given this, it could be said that Arab origin has become a factor in
the success of recruitment processes. It is common among Muslims to respect
Arabs as the descendants of the Prophet.
The second factor is Gontor. As one of the older pesantrens in Indonesia,
Gontor has produced alumni with various orientations. Gontor’s motto “di atas
dan untuk semua golongan” (above and for all sects) and its curriculum drive its
alumni to take various paths: liberalist; traditionalist; fundamentalist.79 We can
mention here Nurcholish Madjid, Hasyim Muzadi and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as
representing these different paths respectively. As far as spreading Salafism is
concerned, Gontor has become a factor. As mentioned in Chapter Two, since
2000, Gontor has taught its students the work of Salih Fawzan al-Fawzan, Kitab
al-Tawhid. Moreover, some Gontor alumni enrolled at the Jami’a Imam Ibn Su’ud,
the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, and LIPIA in Jakarta, all of
which provide their students with Salafi doctrines. As a result, various Gontor
alumni have become Salafis.
Some Salafi ustadhs have become active members of radical Islamic
movements before their conversion to Salafism, such as in the case of Thaharah
and Abu Qatadah. Both participated in clandestine organizations striving for
the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia before their conversion to
79 Martin van Bruinessen, “Divergent Paths from Gontor: Muslim Educational Reform
and the Travail of Pluralism in Indonesia”, pp. 192-194.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Salafism. In the case of Thaharah, he moved to Salafism after his mentor, Ali
Hijrah, had accepted Salafism and dissolved the LP3K. Thus, in this case the role
of his leader and friend was crucial in his conversion. Meanwhile, Abu Qatadah
accepted Salafism when he studied with Sheikh Muqbil at his centre, Darul
Hadith in Yemen. Their experience in radicalism enables Thaharah and Abu
Qatadah to compare between the two and make them strongly belief in Salafism.
Concluding Remarks
Salafi ustadhs come from diverse social backgrounds. In spite of economic
constraints, they successfully finished higher education which led them to occupy
top rank positions, both on national and local levels. There are at least three higher
learning institutions abroad from which Salafis graduated: the Jami’a Imam ibn
Muhammad in Riyadh, the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, and the
Darul Hadith, Dammaj in Yemen. In Indonesia, the Institute of Islamic and Arabic
Studies (LIPIA) has produced a significant number of Salafi da’wa proponents. Some
Salafi leaders have been involved in radical Islamic movements or in mass Muslim
organizations, such as Persis.
The emergence of Salafi ustadhs has challenged established religious
authorities, including the most puritan Muslim group Persis. This challenge takes
various forms including their presence in public debates as in the case of the
mubahatha. In a debate, each party exposes and examines its religious argument
of the very basic doctrine of Salafism concerning the obligation of Muslims
to follow the Salafi manhaj. Through this debate, Salafis try to confirm their
authority. For them their authority derives from their correct understanding of
Islamic teachings in accordance with the understanding and the example of the
Salaf.
Unlike other Muslim groups who engage themselves in political practices,
Salafi ustadhs keep away from politics. They instead focus their activities on da’wa
which mostly centres on the purification of Islamic beliefs and ritual practices.
Thus, through da’wa, Salafis want to “Islamize” popular Islam. Despite the clear
Salafi restriction concerning involvement in politics, some Salafis have engaged
in politics under certain conditions.
150
Chapter Four
Salafi Pesantren:
Development and Community’s Responses
Since their emergence in the late 1980s, the Salafis have actively spread their
Salafi da’wa among the community. University students in Yogyakarta were
among the first the Salafi targeted for their da’wa. Following their success in
recruiting a following, the Salafis started to establish pesantrens in order to be
able to provide a more systematic way of studying Salafism, and to train Salafi
cadres (teachers and preachers) to transfer their knowledge to the community.
At present, Salafi pesantrens are spread throughout Indonesia, although most
are located in Java.1 They differ in many respects from both traditional and
modern pesantrens that belong to Indonesia’s largest Muslim organizations, the
Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah. The most distinctive feature of Salafi
pesantrens is their teaching of Salafi doctrines that mostly derive from the works
of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism. Consequently,
many people call the Salafi movement Wahhabism.
The rapid development of the Salafi pesantrens in Indonesia has faced
opposition within local communities, varying from verbal resistance to violent
actions. Pesantren Imam Bukhari in Solo, for example, had to move several times
before finally establishing itself in its current location along the Solo-Purwodadi
main road. The community’s resistance to the pesantren was mainly in reaction
1
See the report of the International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia Backgrounder: Why
Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix, ICG Asia Report No. 83, 13 September 2004,
pp. 36-47.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
to what was seen as offensive Salafi preaching that criticized the beliefs and
practices of the Muslims. No single group is excluded from Salafi criticism: the
traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama, the reformist Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam,
and al-Irsyad.
This chapter discusses community responses to Salafi pesantrens in
Indonesia. The chapter mainly focuses on pesantrens, especially Pesantren alFurqan in Gresik (East Java), Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari in Ciamis (West Java)
and Pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon (West Java). These were chosen for specific
reasons. Firstly, they represent the main Salafi groups in Indonesia with regards
to their attitude towards the Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami in Kuwait, which
according to Ja’far Umar Thalib is a Sururi, or a follower of Muhammad ibn Surur
Nayef Zainal Abidin, who criticized the Saudi government when it called in the
American troops to protect Saudi soil during the Gulf War.2 Thalib argues that
the Ihya’ al-Turath supports the ideas of the Ikhwanul Muslimin, particularly
the tawhid al-hukm or hakimiyya which is categorized as bid’a (a religious
innovation), and Muslims are not allowed to associate with ahl al-bid’a (people
who commit bid’a). Following a fatwa from the late Sheikh Muqbil ibn Hadi alWadi’i from Yemen, Sheikh Muqbil’s Indonesian students who fall under the
tutelage of Thalib do not accept grants from this foundation. Those who follow
Muqbil have come to be known as ‘rejectionist’ Salafis. Another Salafi group, led
by Abu Nida, a Salafi teacher who initiated the Salafi da’wa in Yogyakarta holds
no objections to these grants. This attitude is supported by a fatwa by Bin Baz, a
prominent Salafi sheikh from Saudi Arabia. This group is often called ‘haraki’ or
‘Sururi’ Salafis by their ‘rejectionist’ critics, because of their association with the
Ihya’ al-Turath. I call this group “cooperationist.” Between these two extremes,
there is another Salafi group that holds a neutral position: it neither receives
grants from the foundation, nor condemns recipients who do. This group is led
by Aunurrafiq Ghufran and Abdul Qadir Jawwas. Despite their neutrality, Thalib
also accuses this group of being ‘Sururi’. The three pesantrens discussed in this
chapter represent these three groups: al-Nur al-Atsari, Assunnah and al-Furqan
stand for ‘rejectionist’, ‘cooperationist’ and impartial Salafis respectively.
Despite the fact that Salafis reject these labels, the classification is useful for the
purpose of analysis.
2
On the factions within the Salafi movement in Indonesia, see Noorhaidi Hasan,
Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia, New
York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 2006.
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SALAFI PESANTREN: DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY’S RESPONSES
Related to this fragmentation, the second reason these pesantrens were
selected is that they are different in terms of size and facilities: small, medium,
and advanced. As will be explored below, al-Nur al-Atsari is a small and modest
pesantren with minimum facilities; al-Furqan is a large pesantren with limited
facilities; while Assunnah is a large with advanced facilities.
A. Early Wahhabi-influenced Pesantrens
As the origin of Islam, Saudi Arabia has always had a central place for
Muslims. Millions of pilgrims visit the country each year. Throughout history,
it is evident that the pilgrimage has been instrumental in the transmission of
religious reform: pilgrims see Saudi’s Islam as authentic and they try to emulate
what they have seen there during their pilgrimage. Besides, Mecca and Medina
have been centres of Islamic learning for centuries and many Indonesians have
studied Islam in these places.3 Some pilgrims stayed longer in the holy lands
to study with prominent ‘ulamas in the two holy cities.4 When they returned
home, they made great efforts to spread the doctrines they had learned in Saudi
Arabia. It is through this way that Wahhabi doctrines reached Indonesia, as is
clearly evident in the case of the Padri movement in the Minangkabau in West
Sumatra.5 The movement was started upon the return of three pilgrims from
the holy land in the early nineteenth century. Back home, they saw Muslims
practicing local customs, which were considered non-Islamic, and bid’a. They
denounced these traditions as un-Islamic and called on the Muslims to purify
their ‘aqida (creed) and ‘ibada (rituals). As I will discuss below, early traditional
pesantrens were influenced by Wahhabi doctrines through similar methods. To
explain this in more detail I will start with Madrasah Wathaniyyah Islamiyyah.
Madrasah Wathaniyyah Islamiyyah, Kebarongan, Banyumas, Central Java
The Madrasah Wathaniyah Islamiyyah (MWI) Kebarongan, also well known
as Pesantren Kebarongan, in Kebarongan, Banyumas, is an old pesantren in
Central Java. It was founded in 1878 by Muhammad Habib, a teacher of the
3
4
5
For information on the network between Indonesian and Middle East Ulama, see,
Azyumardi Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reformism in southeast Asia, Leiden: Asian
Studies Association of Australia and KITLV, 2004.
Martin van Bruinessen, Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat: Tradisi-Tradisi Islam di
Indonesia, Bandung: Mizan, pp. 42-48.
See for example, Taufik Abdullah, “Adat and Islam: An Examination of Conflict in
Minangkabau” in Indonesia, 2, 1966, pp. 13-17.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Naqshabandiyah order in Banyumas.6 He had spent two years in Mecca7 and
studied with Sulaiman Zuhdi from whom he was given the ijaza (certificate) to
spread the Naqshabandiyah order.8 What Habib’s activities dealing with this Sufi
order were is not clear. However, a teacher of a Sufi order usually performed
certain rituals in his pesantren, such as chanting particular wirid and dhikr, and
the organization of tawajjuh.9 The pesantren taught the traditional doctrines of
Islam and held on to traditional religious practices.
A shift from traditional to puritan Islam occurred when Abdullah Zawawi
Habib, the founder’s youngest son, led the pesantren from 1911 to 1938. Zawawi
spent many years in Mecca. Upon his return to Kebarongan, he called on the
community to purify their Islamic creeds in line with the Qur’an and the hadith.
He criticized the existing practice of tawassul (intercession) or mediation
between humans and God. In traditional Islam, Muslims believe that the dead are
alive, and the pious dead are believed to be very close to God and therefore can
function as mediators between living Muslims and God. Because of this belief,
many Muslims visit the shrines of saints and ask the dead or help. Traditional
practices such as two adhans (call for prayers) for the Friday prayers and
performing twenty bows during tarawih (recommended prayer at night during
Ramadan) were replaced by one adhan and eight bows respectively. Although
the works of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab were not taught, Zawawi often referred to his
thoughts in his teachings on tawhid.
Zawawi was also an activist in a political movement. He established contacts
with the newly established modernist organization in Solo, the Sarekat Islam
(SI), the first nationalist movement to emerge. It was reported that various
SI prominent leaders such as H.O.S. Cokroaminoto, Agus Salim and R.M.
Soerjo Pranoto, visited the pesantren. A new SI branch in Kebarongan was
soon established and Zawawi Habib became its leader.10 This resulted in the
6
Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, “Pengurusan Dakwah Aktivis Islam di Indonesia (Kajian
tentang Dakwah Salafi di Banyumas, Jawa Tengah, Indonesia)”, PhD thesis, Institut
Alam dan Tamadun Melayu, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, 2008, p. 91.
7 Panitia HUT se-Abad Pondok Pesantren MWI, “Pondok Pesantren Wathoniyah
Islamiyah Kebarongan” in Marwan Saridjo, et al., Sejarah Pondok Pesantren di
Indonesia, Jakarta: Dharma Bhakti, 1980, p. 142.
8 Martin van Bruinessen, Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah di Indonesia, Bandung: Mizan, 1992,
p. 164.
9 Martin van Bruinessen, Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah, p. 157.
10 Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, “Pengurusan Dakwah”, pp. 93-94. See also, Panitia HUT seAbad, “Pondok Pesantren Wathoniyah”, p. 145.
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SALAFI PESANTREN: DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY’S RESPONSES
introduction of the classical system in teaching and the inclusion of non-religious
subjects like reading and writing using the Latin alphabet, mathematics, and
Indonesian language into the pesantren’s curriculum. It was Cokroaminoto who
suggested the name of the madrasah, Madrasah Wathaniyyah Islamiyyah (MWI),
a name that connotes an Islam-based nationalist movement.11
The puritan tendency of the pesantren became more apparent during
Asifuddin Zawawi’s leadership which lasted thirty years (1950-1980). During
this period, the Fath al-Majid sharh Kitab al-Tawhid by Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan
Ali Al-Sheikh, the grandson of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab , was taught to the students.
Through this book, the students were directly introduced to ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s
thoughts. This subject remains compulsory for students to date.12
However, Wahhabi thoughts were not wholly absorbed. Mark Woodward
and his colleagues observed that the pesantren has tried to domesticate the
Wahhabi doctrines by situating them in “the context of local culture, tradition
and Indonesian nationalism.”13 This implies that the pesantren only denounced
those practices that definitely contradict tawhid while maintaining practices
that bear no direct relation to tawhid. Thus, for example, the pesantren still keeps
a bedug (a big drum hit to indicate the coming of prayer times) and participates
in takbir keliling to celebrate Islamic feasts (Id al-Fitr and Id al-Adha).14 Takbir is
to chant “Allahu Akbar” (Allah is the Great), while keliling means ‘to go around’,
and so takbir keliling is a procession around the village or city while people chant
“Allahu Akbar”. The procession is often enlivened by people carrying torches,
the use of loud speakers and the use of vehicles of any sorts and sizes. While the
Salafis see this tradition as bid’a, the pesantren continues its participation.
These were the conditions that Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin, a son of Asifuddin
Zawawi, wanted to reform. Asifuddin got his secondary school education at
MWI Kebarongan, and in 1979 was awarded a scholarship through the Dewan
Da’wah to continue his education at the Jami’a Imam Ibn Su’ud University in
Riyadh. Upon his return from Saudi Arabia, he taught for three years at his alma
mater, the MWI Kebarongan. While teaching, he observed a huge discrepancy
between knowledge and practices within the pesantren’s community. It was
11 Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, “Pengurusan Dakwah” p. 94. Panitia HUT se-Abad, “Pondok
Pesantren Wathoniyah”, pp. 145-147.
12 Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, “Pengurusan Dakwah”, p. 95.
13 Mark Woordward, et.al., “Muslim Education, Celebrating Islam and Having Fun as
Counter-Radicalization Strategies in Indonesia”, in Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 4,
Issue 4, 2010, p. 41.
14 Mark Woordward, et al., “Muslim Education,” p. 43.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
true, Asifuddin admitted, that the pesantren taught its pupils the Fath al-Majid.
However, knowledge alone was insufficient; its total implementation should
follow. Thus, he proposed the adoption of the Salafi manhaj in the students’
daily life. He also suggested introducing more Salafi books, particularly the
introductory works by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, al-Usul al-Thalatha and Kashf alShubuhat. His colleagues resisted and as a result in 1988 he moved to another
branch of MWI at Karangduwur, Petanahan, Solo, where he received a more
positive response from the madrasah. Here he ran a special class, later called
the khitta, where the students were only taught Islamic knowledge. When these
students began to display radical behaviour and held uncompromising views
on local practices, the villagers resisted it and in 1992, the group was dissolved
by the madrasah which forced Asifuddin to move to Solo.15 With the financial
support of the Ihya al-Turath, Faiz successfully established a modern Salafi
pesantren, Imam Bukhari, in Solo. Currently, this is one the most popular Salafi
pesantrens in Indonesia.
Pesantren Maskumambang, Dukun, Gresik, East Java
Established in 1859 by the notable Abdul Jabbar,16 in Dukun, about 10 kilometres
from Sidayu, Pesantren Maskumambang was among the first Islamic institutions in
Indonesia that promoted Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s ideas. It was a traditional pesantren
that taught the doctrines of the ahl al-sunna wa al-jama’a, the school that almost
all Indonesian Muslims affiliate with, including the Nahdlatul Ulama. In practical
life, the school adopted the Ash’ariya and Maturidiya schools in theology, and the
Shafi’iyya school in fiqh. The students were taught classical books such as Safinat
al-Najat, Fath al-Qarib, Fathul Mu’in, I’anat al-Talibin and Fath al-Wahhab in fiqh;
Nayl al-Awtar and Riyad al-Salihin in hadith; Tafsir al-Jalalayn in tafsir; Ihya’ ‘ulum
al-din in Sufism; and ‘Aqidat al-‘Awwam in ‘aqida.17 In the pesantren, students and
teachers practiced traditional religious rituals such as paying visits to shrines,
tahlilan (to utter “la ilaha illa Allah” and other religious formulas) and khaul (the
commemoration of the death of a pesantren leader).
The move to a Wahhabi orientation took place when the pesantren was
under the direction of Ammar Faqih, a grandson of its founder. Ammar learned
15 Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, “Pengurusan Dakwah”, pp. 97-102.
16 M. Dawan Rahardjo, “The Kyai, the Pesantren and Village: A Preliminary Sketch” in
Prisma, Vo. 1, No. 1, 1975, p. 36.
17 Mundzier Suparta, Perubahan Orientasi Pondok Pesantren Salafiyah terhadap Perilaku
Keagamaan Masyarakat, Jakarta: Asta Buana Sejahtera, 2009, p. 128.
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SALAFI PESANTREN: DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY’S RESPONSES
Wahhabism from ‘Umar Hamdan al-Mahrasi (1875-1949) in Mecca while he was
performing the hajj. Al-Mahrasi was considered great scholar who mastered
religious sciences, including tawhid, fiqh, tafsir, tasawuf, nahw and sarf.18 Ammar
stayed in Mecca from 1926 to 1928.19 Fascinated by Wahhabi ideas, he began
to spread Wahhabism when he returned to Dukun. However, he encountered
opposition from both inside and outside the pesantren. In the pesantren, the
opposition came from his father, Muhammad Faqih, for example, who saw the
Wahhabi doctrines as deviations from the ahl al-sunna wa al-jama’a. The son,
nevertheless, succeeded in convincing his father. Likewise, the challenge to
Wahhabism emerged from local religious leader outside the pesantren who held
similar views as Faqih on Wahhabi ideas.20 The fact that the pesantren had so far
produced great leaders of the traditional Islamic organization, the Nahdlatul
Ulama, fuelled the opposition.
Having gained his father’s approval, Ammar now started gradually to teach
Wahhabi doctrines in his pesantren. The classical books of fiqh were still taught
to the students, but he replaced the ‘aqidat al-‘awwam with his own books,
Hidayat al-Umma, and Tuhfat al-Umma fi al-‘aqa’id wa Radd al-Mafasid. These books
deal with the purification of Islamic creeds with reference to Wahhabi thought.
Traditional practices, however, such as tahlilan were still accepted.21
Outside the pesantren, Ammar disseminated Wahhabi doctrines through his
political activism. In the Masyumi, the Islamic political party in which traditional
(NU) and reformist (Muhammadiyah) Muslim figures were active members,
Ammar actively promoted Wahhabi ideas to his puritan Muhammadiyah friends.
Representing the Masyumi, he became a member of the local parliament (DPRD,
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) of the district of Surabaya, and subsequently
a member of national House of Representatives (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan
Rakyat). He left the Masyumi in 1952 when the party suffered from conflicts, and
he began to preach Wahhabi doctrines through the Muhammadiyah, in which
he was the chairman of the Dukun branch in Gresik.22
18 http://syeikhyasinalfadani.blogspot.sg/2012/11/syeikh-umar-hamdan-almahrasi-1875-1949.html, accessed on September 7, 2013.
19 Suparta, Perubahan Orientasi. pp. 130-131.
20 Nadjih Ahjad “Ta’thirat Kitab al-Tawhid Ta’lif al-Muslih al-‘Azim al-Shaykh Muhammad
ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab fi al-Harakat al-Islahiyya al-Diniyya bi Indunisiya”, paper presented
in the “Week of Shaykh Muhammab ibn Abd Wahhab, Riyad, 1980, p. 12.
21 Suparta, Perubahan Orientasi. p. 149.
22 Suparta, Perubahan Orientasi. pp. 133, 145.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
A radical move to Wahhabi orientation occurred when the pesantren
leadership was handed over to Nadjih Ahjad who led the pesantren from the early
sixties up till now. In this period, the work of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was taught for
the first time to the students at Maskumambang. In the 1960s, Ahjad established
a Madrasah Tsanawiyah within the pesantren and he invited teachers from
Pesantren Kebarongan, Banyumas, Central Java. These teachers introduced Ibn
Abd al-Wahhab’s work, Kitab al-Tawhid, to Ahjad.23 At that time, senior students
of the Madrasah ‘Aliyah studied the Kitab al-Tawhid, while junior students at the
Madrasah Tsanawiyah read the al-Tibyan fi al-‘Aqa’id, a book written by Ahjad
that was very much inspired by the ideas of the Wahhabi founder. In tandem
with curriculum reform, traditional religious practices were also abandoned.
This shift to the Wahhabi orientation was not without its effect. Students left
the pesantren, and many parents withdrew their children from the pesantren as
they were afraid they were being trained in deviant Islam.24
Despite the fact that the pesantren tended towards Wahhabi thought, the
current leader, Nadjih Ahjad, is reluctant to accept either the Wahhabi or the
Salafi label. He also repudiates the Muhammadiyah label as the people brand
it. Instead, he rather calls his orientation Islam qabl al-tafarruq (Islam before
the fracture), that is, Islam of the period of the Prophet and the Companions.
He agrees with the Wahhabi on some parts of its doctrines. For example, he
denounces tahlilan as bid’a and tawassul as polytheist (shirk). However, he differs
from the Wahhabis in various other issues, such as isbal and wearing a beard. In
his opinion, isbal is only applicable to sarongs, but not too long trousers. He
believes that the reason behind the Prophetic tradition of letting the beard grow
is to distinguish Muslims from Jews. Since this is no longer an issue, the order is
no longer applicable.25
Like his predecessor, Ahjad had once been active in politics. In 1999,
politicians of the Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, Star Crescent Party) approached
him to join them and he accepted. From 1999-2004, he was a member of the
House of Representatives for the PBB. Ahjad’s political orientation was clear.
The party he joined was an Islamic political party, PBB, a party that claims to
be a new incarnation of the Masyumi. He refused to join secular or inclusive
political parties that included the involvement of non-Muslims, like the
23 Rofhani, “Konstruksi Faham Wahhabi pada Santri di Pesantren Maskumbambang”,
Laporan Penelitian Individual, IAIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, 2004, pp. 28-30.
24 Suparta, Perubahan Orientasi, p. 176.
25 Interview with Nadjih Ahjad, Gresik, May 11, 2010.
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SALAFI PESANTREN: DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY’S RESPONSES
National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN). According to him,
this involvement falls within the category of muwalat ghayr al-Muslim (taking
a non-Muslim as protector or ruler), which is prohibited in Islam because it
could harm Muslims and Islam.26 Furthermore, he sees two types of cooperation
between political parties. The first is collaboration between Islamic political
parties and non-Islamic political parties in the interest of common goals. This
cooperation is permissible in Islam. The second is cooperation between Muslims
and non-Muslims in one political party. This type of cooperation is prohibited in
Islam.27 He refers to Qur’anic verse 3:28 that reads: “Let not the believers make
unbelievers their protectors rather than the believers; anyone who does so will
have nothing to hope for from Allah, except if you do so as a precaution to guard
yourself against their tyranny.”
Here we see Ahjad’s consistency in applying the al-wala’ wa al-bara’ concept,
one of the essential Salafi doctrines as discussed in Chapter One. According to
this concept, Muslims are not allowed to make a non-Muslim their ruler. Thus,
the inclusion of non-Muslims as members of the House of Representatives as
done by the inclusive PAN party, can be categorized as muwalat ghayr al-Muslim.
The House of Representatives, together with the ruler, has the right to issue new
regulations governing important aspects that deal with common interest, and
the right to control the government. It has also the right to approve the state
annual budget proposed by the government. Given these tasks, a member of the
House of Representatives holds a strategic position in the political arena: he or
she will contribute to and orient national politics. It is assumed that
non-Muslim members of the House of Representatives will strive for their own
interests in agreement with their own beliefs.
Through his fraction in Parliament, Ahjad strove for the implementation
of the shari’a during the Amendment sessions in the People’s Consultative
Assembly. Following the collapse of the Soeharto regime, between 1999 and 2004,
the People’s Assembly held annual sessions to amend the 1945 Constitution. One
of the sensitive matters to amend was Article 29 of the Constitution on religion.
The existing version of the article reads “Negara berdasar atas ketuhanan yang
Maha Esa” (“The State is founded on the Oneness of God”). This article is a
copy-paste version of the Pancasila state ideology, of which the first pillar reads
“Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa” ([the belief] in the Oneness of God). In spite of the
26 Nadjih Ahjad, Partai Politik Lintas Agama dalam Perspektif Islam, Surabaya: Tri Bakti
Offset, 1998, p. 19.
27 Nadjih Ahjad, Partai Politik Lintas Agama, pp. 21-22.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
fact that the majority of Muslims has accepted this formulation, a small number
of them want to return to the Jakarta Charter in their attempt to implement
the shari’a. In the Jakarta Charter, the formulation of the first pillar from
which later the Pancasila was derived sounded: “Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban
menjalankan syari’at Islam bagi pemeluknya” ([the belief] in the Oneness of God
with the obligation of the enforcement of the shari’a for its adherents). For some
Muslims, the Jakarta Charter has become the basis for the demand to implement
the shari’a. Whenever they saw the opportunity, Muslim figures tried to revive
the Jakarta Charter. Thus, when they saw the opportunity to realize this
constitutional right in the process of the amendment of the Constitution, they
tried to revive the Jakarta Charter and to include it the amendment of Article 29
of the 1945 Constitution.
In 2002, during the Annual Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly, the
Islamic parties namely Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United Development
Party), Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, Crescent and Star Party), and Partai Keadilan (PK,
Justice Party, now PKS, Justice and Prosperity Party) proposed to amend article 29
of the 1945 Constitution by returning to its original formulation as included in the
Jakarta Charter. The coalition of Islamic parties failed due to majority opposition.
However, Ahjad’s role it is worth noting here. During the Session, he became the
spokesperson of the PBB fraction at the People’s Consultative Assembly. In the last
session, he stood on the podium saying that his party, PBB, would not give up the
struggle for the implementation of the shari’a by reviving the Jakarta Charter. He
concluded his speech by saying that the PBB fraction was not responsible for the
final formulation of Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution.28
Having ended his assignment in the House of Representatives, in 2004 Ahjad
resigned from the political party and returned to Pesantren Maskumambang. Taking
the leadership of the pesantren was the reason for his resignation. He acknowledged
that during his active role in the political party, he often left the pesantren to its
own devices, and consequently, the pesantren declined. At present, in addition
to his activities in the pesantren, Ahjad is active in the Dewan Da’wah and the
Muhammadiyah. He has written a number of books to be used as teaching materials
in pesantrens, including three volumes on ‘aqida, al-Tibyan fi al-‘Aqa’id,29 and three
28 Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat, Jakarta: Gramedia, in collaboration with PPIM,
Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina, Freedom Institute and Danish Embassy, 2007, pp. 72-73.
29 Nadjih Ahjad, al-Tibyan fi al-‘Aqida, Vol. 1, Gresik: Pondok Pesantren Maskumambang,
2006; Nadjih Ahjad, al-Tibyan fi al-‘Aqida, Vol. 2, Gresik: Pondok Pesantren
Maskumambang, 2009; Nadjih Ahjad, al-Tibyan fi al-‘Aqida, Vol. 3, Gresik: Pondok
Pesantren Maskumambang, 2009.
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more volumes on fiqh, al-Tibyan fi al-Ahkam al-‘Amaliyya.30 All these books are taught
to the students of Madrasah Tsanawiyah in his pesantren. In addition to teaching
materials, he authored various other books for general readership, including Iman
Jalan menuju Hidup Sukses,31 Kitab Haji: Tuntunan Menunaikan Haji dan Umrah menurut
Sunnah Rasulullah SAW,32 and Kitab Jazanah.33
B. The Development of Contemporary Salafi Pesantrens
The first Salafi pesantren to emerge in Indonesia was Pesantren Al-Irsyad in
Tengaran, Salatiga, Central Java, as mentioned above.34 It was established in 1988
by Umar Abdat, an al-Irsyad official from Semarang. Initially, the pesantren was
designed to adopt the system and the curriculum as used in Pesantren Gontor
in Ponorogo, East Java, which uses the grade system and teaches both religious
and secular subjects.35 The founder sent his son, Tariq Abdat, to study at Gontor,
and asked Gontor to send its fresh graduates to teach at al-Irsyad. Emulating
Gontor, the pesantren applied a six-year program called Kulliyat al-Mu’allimin
al-Islamiyya (KMI, Training for Islamic Teachers), a program aimed to produce
Islamic teachers equivalent to senior high school education.
Under the direction of Ja’far Umar Thalib who came to teach in the early
1990s, the pesantren veered towards a Salafi orientation. Thalib replaced the
30 Nadjih Ahjad, al-Tibyan fi al-Ahkam al-‘Amaliyya, Vol. 1, Gresik: Pondok Pesantren
Maskumambang, 2006; Nadjih Ahjad, al-Tibyan fi al-Ahkam al-‘Amaliyya, Vol. 2,
Gresik: Pondok Pesantren Maskumambang, 1990; Nadjih Ahjad, al-Tibyan fi alAhkam al-‘Amaliyya, Vol. 3, Gresik: Pondok Pesantren Maskumambang, 2009.
31 Najih Ahjad, Iman Jalan menuju Hidup Sukses, Surabaya: Bina Ilmu, 1991.
32 Najih Ahjad, Kitab Haji: Tuntunan Menunaikan Haji dan Umrah menurut Sunnah
Rasulullah SAW, Gresik: Jama’ah Haji Maskumambang, 2000.
33 Najih Ahjad, Kitab Jazanah, Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1991.
34 Contrary to Indonesian scholar Noorhaidi Hasan’s observation that the first Salafi
pesantren to emerge was Pesantren Ihya’ al-Sunnah of Ja’far Umar Thalib which
was founded in 1994, I found two Salafi pesantrens whose establishment dates from
before Thalib’s established his pesantren: al-Irsyad in Tengaran and al-Furqan in
Gresik. They were founded in 1988 and 1989 respectively. See Noorhaidi Hasan,
“The Salafi Madrasas of Indonesia” in Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand and Martin
van Bruinessen (eds), The Madrasa in Asia: Political Activism and Transnational Linkages,
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008, p. 254.
35 For more information on Gontor, see Lance Castles, “Notes on the Islamic School at
Gontor”, Indonesia, 1, 1966, pp. 30-45; Ali Saifullah HA, “Darussalam, Pondok Modern
Gontor”, in Dawam Rahardjo (ed.), Pesantren dan Pembaharuan, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1974,
pp. 134-154.
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materials on Islamic knowledge used at the time with those in line with the Salafi
manhaj. This resulted in a conflict between Gontor-oriented and Salafi-oriented
teachers. Having been through the pesantren in its early stages, the first group
did not want to hand over the pesantren to a party with a different orientation.36
Ultimately, the Salafi group won, and it was during Thalib’s management that
the pesantren became the centre of Salafi activism, where prominent Salafi
teachers, such as Abdul Qadir Yazid Jawas and Yusuf Usman Baisa gathered and
with whom many Salafi teachers studied. Even though predominantly managed
by Indonesian Arabs, the pesantren has also attracted students of non-Arabic
descent.
However, the conflict over the orientation remained. This led to Thalib’s
replacement by Baisa, who had been invited by Thalib to teach in the pesantren.
In addition to neutralizing the conflict, the replacement was aimed at achieving
wider interest in the pesantren to get more funds from Saudi donors. From
the point of view of the pesantren board, Thalib’s inflexible style would not
achieve this goal.37 Disappointed by this replacement, Thalib established his own
pesantren in 1994, the Ihya al-Sunnah, in Degolan in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta. This
conflict marks the beginning of the frictions within the Salafi movement.
The Salafi-orientation of the pesantren, however, raised another conflict
between the pesantren and al-Irsyad. On the one hand, the Salafis who ran the
pesantren believed that al-Irsyad has gone too far beyond its spirit of reformation
when it was established by Ahmad Surkati. Salafis regard al-Irsyad as a secular
organization that deviates from its original goal: the purification of the Islamic
beliefs. On the other hand, al-Irsyad claims that the pesantren belongs to alIrsyad, since it had been established under the supervision of the Semarang alIrsyad branch. Meanwhile, Umar Abdat, the founder of the pesantren felt that
al-Irsyad had not given him enough support when he founded the pesantren.
Abdat continued to label his pesantren ‘al-Irsyad’ because of his affiliation to
the organization.
The conflict between Pesantren al-Irsyad and the Semarang branch office of
the national al-Irsyad worsened for at least two reasons. First, the new Yayasan
Pesantren al-Irsyad Semarang foundation was established and the management
of the pesantren had been transferred from the Semarang al-Irsyad branch office
to the new foundation. This shift made the conflict more complicated because
36 Interview with Thoyyib, a teacher of pesantren and a party activist, PKS, Tengaran,
February 23, 2009.
37 Interview with Yazid Jawwas, Bogor, March 13, 2009.
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the officials of the foundation comprised of both conflicting parties. Second, a
new Salafi-oriented organization called the Perhimpunan al-Irsyad (Al-Irsyad
Association) was created by Baisa, the former director of Pesantren al-Irsyad
Tengaran. Baisa did not only keep the name al-Irsyad, but also used the al-Irsyad
emblem. Geis Ammar, the then chairman of the national al-Irsyad board, reacted
to the creation of this new Perhimpunan al-Irsyad by taking the case to court
because it used the same emblem. The Supreme Court decided in favour of the
national al-Irsyad and as a consequence, the pesantren was to belong to the
national al-Irsyad organization. Responding to the defeat, the Perhimpunan alIrsyad left the Pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran just as it was and did not change
anything because it did not want to lose its assets in the pesantren.38 In effect,
the decision of the Supreme Court was all but ignored. For Baisa, using the name
al-Irsyad was advantageous because it attracts many students and, indeed, many
students whom I met during my fieldwork in the pesantren were alumni of alIrsyad schools originating from many cities.
Later Salafi pesantrens developed out of Pesantren al-Irsyad. After the return
of Saudi, Yemeni and Pakistani graduates to Indonesia, and together with LIPIA
alumni, the Salafi da’wa gained momentum and also the number of Salafi
pesantrens multiplied and spread to many regions in Indonesia.
Pesantren al-Furqan, Srowo, Sidayu, Gresik, East Java
In Gresik, the Salafis have their roots in Pesantren Maskumambang as
discussed above and in the Muhammadiyah reformist movement. Two figures
merit mention in this regard: Nadjih Ahjad who we have seen before, and Madjid
Ilyas from Muhammadiyah Surabaya. In the early 1960s, Ilyas and Ahjad were
often invited to visit the sub district Sidayu in Gresik to deliver religious teachings
among the activists of Hizbul Watan, the Muhammadiyah’s scouting movement.
The lessons were held at the al-Furqan Mosque, an old mosque founded in 1926
and many Hizbul Watan activists lived in the vicinity of this mosque. Both Ilyas and
Ahjad called for the cleansing of Islamic doctrines from religious innovation and
superstition. Under their influence, the Hizbul Watan, for example, performed the
Idul Fitri and Idul Adha prayers in the open field rather than in a mosque as other
people did. At that time, holding these prayers in the open field was, and still is, an
act of Islamic reformism as it follows the practice of the Prophet.
38 Interview with Nafi’ Zainuddin, director of pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran, Salatiga,
February 25, 2009.
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Pesantren al-Furqan was founded in 1989 by Aunurrafiq Ghufran, an activist
of the Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia Young Ghufran was a cadre of the
Muhammadiyah. He attended the Muhammadiyah secondary school called
Pendidikan Guru Agama 4 Tahun (PGA, School of Religious Teachers lasting
four years) in Sidayu, and then continued at the PGA Muhammadiyah 6 Tahun
(adding two years to PGA4) at Paciran in Lamongan. He then joined the Dewan
Da’wah to preach Islam in the rural areas among the migrant people in West
Kalimantan. After serving da’wa for two years, the Saudi Government granted
him a scholarship to study at the Jami’a al-Imam Muhammad ibn Su’ud
University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, from 1977 to 1982. Having graduated in
Riyadh, Ghufran spent some years teaching in his colleague’s pesantren, Darul
Islah, in Kediri, East Java. He then left the Darul Islah and returned to his native
village, Sidayu where he was appointed teacher at Perguruan Muhammadiyah
(Muhammadiyah schools) before eventually founding his own pesantren, alFurqan, in Srowo village, Sidayu, Gresik, East Java.
Muhammadiyah figures had invited Ghufran to Gresik to provide better
education in his hometown. At the time, the Muhammadiyah was looking for
someone who could direct the newly established Pesantren al-Hikmah. The
pesantren was aimed at complementing the education of the students of the
Muhammadiyah senior high school with Islamic knowledge out of school hours.
Ghufran was appointed to take charge of daily matters in the pesantren. When
the Muhammadiyah launched its new program, the Pondok Pesantren Ilmu
Dakwah dan Teknologi (PPIDT), Ghufran was made its director. PPIDT was a
program in which the students were taught Islamic knowledge and trained in
simple crafts such as sewing, and technical skills such as installing and repairing
electrical appliances. The program aimed to endow the students with skills
so that they would not have to be solely reliant on the income they would get
from their da’wa activities. In the meantime, Ghufran taught religion at the
Perguruan Muhammadiyah. Already at this early stage, Ghufran’s teaching
raised controversy among Muhammadiyah activists. For example, he taught his
students not to salute the national flag, nor put the picture of Ahmad Dahlan,
the founder of the Muhammadiyah, on the wall. He also asked female students
not to join parades on occasions where male and female students would usually
mix. Influenced by this teaching, some students were reluctant to attend the
weekly flag-raising ceremony when the students usually salute the national
flag. This created discomfort between the Muhammadiyah and the government.
Moreover, Ghufran’s harsh criticism of traditional religious practices heightened
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SALAFI PESANTREN: DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY’S RESPONSES
tensions between the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama. In the end, the
Muhammadiyah dismissed Ghufran from his teaching posts at its schools and
from his role as pesantren director.
Ghufran then established Pesantren al-Furqan in Srowo village located about
500 meters from Pesantren al-Hikmah. Aided by a grant from a Saudi donor
to the amount of 10,000 riyal, he started to erect some buildings on land he
had inherited from his parents.39 The name al-Furqan was borrowed from the
existing foundation, Yayasan Masjid al-Furqan. Currently, the foundation runs a
Kindergarten, a Taman Pendidikan al-Qur’an (TPQ, Qur’anic Learning Center for
Children), and a Madrasah Ibtida’iyah. Ghufran used this foundation to obtain
a government permit for his new pesantren. Later, when the new pesantren
expanded, officials from Yayasan Masjid al-Furqan suggested him to establish
his own foundation.
Pesantren al-Furqan looks plain. The buildings are made of concrete (not
bamboo like in Pesantren Al-Nur al-Atsari), and many are two stories high, yet
still insufficient to properly accommodate all students. Students live densely
packed in rooms with minimal facilities and some even sleep in the mosque. The
courses take place everywhere: in classrooms, corridors in the student housing
facilities, offices, the mosque and the library. This condition is related to the
availability of funds to finance the pesantren. Unlike other Salafi pesantrens
that receive donations from foreign donors through the Ihya’ al-Turath, this
pesantren prefers to mobilize local funding. Ghufran refrains from asking any
donations that require proposals and issuing reports. During my visit to this
pesantren in December 2008, I found only one inscription on the wall that
identified a donor, Barida bint Khalaf al-‘Utaybi from Saudi Arabia, next to the
drilled well in front of the student accommodation. During my second visit in
May 2010, the pesantren was constructing a new and large mosque with financial
support from a Saudi donor. Other buildings are constructed with local funding
from participants and Salafi da’wa sympathizers.
In addition to donations, Pesantren al-Furqan mobilizes other sources to
finance its expenses. These sources include tuition fees, a publishing house
and a fishery. The students pay IDR 150.000 (about US $15.00) each month
for accommodation, tuition fees and food. The pesantren also publishes the
monthly Salafi magazines, al-Furqan and al-Mawaddah with 19,000 and 12,000
copies per issue respectively. While the former is directed to a general public,
39 Interview with Aunurrafiq Ghufran, founder and director of al-Furqan, Gresik,
December 26, 2008.
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the latter is especially directed to women readers. The magazines are circulated
through Salafi marketing agencies across the country. Complementary to these
periodicals, the pesantren established the Pustaka al-Furqan publishing house
to produce Salafi books. Fishery is another source of income. The pesantren
manages 28 hectares of fishponds, containing fish and shrimps, under the
management of senior teachers. Usually the teachers employ villagers to work
so that they can concentrate on teaching at the pesantren
In addition to al-Furqan, another Salafi pesantren has emerged. Al-Bayyinah
was officially founded in 1998 and directed by the young Muhammadiyah cadre
Agus Su’adi with the assistance of his brother, Afifuddin. While the former was
a student of the Muhammadiyah’s school at Paciran, the latter was a student of
Ghufran at al-Furqan. In 1994, after attending al-Furqan for one and half years,
Ghufran had sent Afifuddin to study with Thalib when Thalib had opened the
Tadrib al-Du’at program at his pesantren, the Ihyasussannah. In early 2001, he
went to Yemen to enrol at the Darul Hadith, Sheikh Muqbil’s Salafi learning
centre. In 2004, Affifuddin completed his studies and returned home to teach in
his brother’s pesantren, al-Bayyinah.
Tension between the two Salafi pesantrens is apparent. As his former student,
when a dispute between the Salafis comes up, Afifuddin takes Thalib’s side. He
criticizes what he sees as Ghufran’s inconsistency. For example, he is critical of
Ghufran’s collaboration with the Muhammadiyah and his readiness to attend a
panel also attended by hizby people such as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. In the first case,
Afifuddin criticizes Pesantren al-Furqan’s involvement in Pesantren al-Hikmah
that belongs to the Muhammadiyah. Some al-Furqan ustadhs teach at this
institution. While in the second case, on one occasion Ghufran was invited by
Nasir Mansur to attend the wedding ceremony of his first son. Nasir Mansur was a
political activist who had converted to Salafism. He sent his children to Pesantren
al-Mukmin, Ngruki, and then to al-Furqan. For the occasion of his son’s wedding
party, he had invited three figures from different backgrounds: Ba’asyir, Ahjad
and Ghufran.40 Ba’asyir is the spiritual leader of Pesantren al-Mukmin, Ngruki, a
pesantren that has been alleged by many parties to have linkage with terrorist
networks. As said above, Ahjad is the leader of Pesantren Maskumambang, and
former member of the House of Representatives; and Ghufran is the leader of
al-Furqan. These persons reflect the various phases of Mansur’s life from having
being a Muslim activist to being a Salafi adherent: as an Islamic activist, Mansur
sent his children to Pesantren al-Mukmin, Ngruki and he had joined the Partai
40 Interview with Nasir Mansur, Gresik, May 14, 2010.
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SALAFI PESANTREN: DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY’S RESPONSES
Bulan Bintang (PBB), the party to which Ahjad was affiliated; later when he had
converted to Salafism, he sent his daughter to al-Furqan. During the wedding
ceremony, the three figures appeared on the stage with different tasks: Ba’asyir
was to deliver a speech on behalf of the host; Ghufran was to deliver the khutbah
nikah (advice and guidance for the new couple); and finally, Ahjad was to lead
the prayers. Afifuddin sharply criticized Ghulfran’s presence together with
Ba’asyir. He acknowledged that he himself attended the party but did not sit on
the same panel. According to Afifuddin, Ghulfran’s presence violated the true
Salafi manhaj that prohibits Muslims from attending a panel in the presence of
hizby figures. His presence would, Affifuddin argued, lead ordinary people to
suggest that Salafis agree with the thoughts and actions of the Muhammadiyah
and Ba’asyir.41 The conflict between the two pesantrens is also visible among
their teachers and students: they hardly communicate or interact.
Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari, Banjarsari, Ciamis, West Java
Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari was established in 2001 by Khatib Muwahhid, a son
of Nunung Muhiddin, a notable local kyai and founder of the old Pesantren al-Nur.
Muwahhid established his own pesantren after a conflict with his brothers about
leadership and the curriculum reform of the old pesantren. After the death of the
founder of the old pesantren and during Muwahhid’s absence for study, his brotherin-law, Ajengan42 Ade Hanan, took over the pesantren leadership. The old pesantren
provided religious instruction for adults and Qur’anic recitation for children in the
afternoon. In an effort to create a cadre that would continue his religious institution,
Muhiddin sent his son Muwahhid to pesantren Gontor where he was introduced
to Salafi teachings for the first time. Muwahhid spent 6 years in Gontor, and in
1991, he continued his studies in Pesantren Darul Huffaz in Bone, South Sulawesi,
to memorize the Qur’an. Darul Huffaz is a special pesantren for memorizing the
Qur’an. It was established in 1975 by Lanre Sa’id, a former prominent activist of
Kahar Muzakkar’s NII movement in South Sulawesi. The presence of Sa’id’s sons
at Gontor in the 1980s and their reputation for memorizing the Qur’an made the
pesantren famous among Gontor students who wished to memorize the Qur’an.
Since the late 1980s, supported by Hasan Abdullah Sahal, one of Gontor’s kyais,
many Gontor alumni have enrolled in Pesantren Darul Huffaz. Muwahhid spent two
years at Darul Huffaz. From 1993 to 1994, he was involved in educational institutions
41 Interview with Afifuddin, Gresik, May 12, 2010.
42 “Ajengan” is a Sundanese term that denotes religious teacher or ustadh.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
like Ulumul Qur’an in Sawangan in Depok, West Java. In 1994, he met Husein, the
owner of the Holistik hospital in Purwakarta, West Java, from whom he discovered
the Salafi institution of Sheikh Muqbil from Yemen. At the time, the hospital was
developing an alternative non-chemical and herbal form of medication that focuses
on food intake.43 Muwahhid eventually decided to go Yemen and studied with the
sheikh from 1996 to 2000.44
In 2000, Muwahhid returned to Indonesia. As the only son expected to continue
his father’s struggle in da’wa, the family and local people enthusiastically
welcomed him. However, they were shocked by his Salafi teachings. He called for
the purification of tawhid and religious practices. He began reforming materials
taught in the pesantren and incorporated Salafi books into the curriculum,
particularly those of Muhammad ibn Abd Wahhab on tawhid such as the Kitab
al-Tawhid and Kashf al-Shubuhat. His reform initiatives were challenged by his
family who feared the loss of the pesantren’s assets, as, for example, his uncle
had endowed lands to it. Another uncle was aware of this endowment and was
scared by Muwahhid’s dominant control of this asset.
In 2000, Indonesian Muslims witnessed the emergence of the Laskar Jihad that
called Muslims for jihad in Ambon and Maluku on the ground of protecting local
Muslims. Muwahhid joined this group and was appointed head of the West Java
region of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jama’ah (FKAWJ, Forum for
Communication of the Community of Ahlussunnah), an umbrella organization
of the Laskar Jihad. He mobilized the people to join the Laskar Jihad and even
used the pesantren as the centre for the physical training of combatants.
Muwahhid’s activities in the Laskar Jihad made him famous among the Salafis.
He travelled a lot to mobilize the people to join the Laskar. When he returned to the
pesantren, he was often accompanied by Salafis willing to study with him. In 2000,
some 20 students from other cities were accommodated in the old Pesantren al-Nur.
The Salafis used the village’s mosque in front of the pesantren for study, and thus it
turned into a place where Salafis and villagers mixed during collective prayers. Here
the differences between the Salafis and the villagers became apparent. Local people
saw different physical gestures of prayer, which were alien to them. Muwahhid’s
denouncement of local practices as bid’a added to the people’s anxiety about the
43 http://pro-sehatalami.com/topik/148-rs-holistic-antara-dicerca-dan-dicari,
accessed on February 2011. Many Salafis run small businesses in herbal medicines to
earn a living. Some even do cupping (hijama), a traditional medical method claiming
to originate from the Prophet. This method is now widespread in Indonesia.
44 Interview with Khatib Muwahhid, director of Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari, Ciamis,
January 25, 2010.
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SALAFI PESANTREN: DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY’S RESPONSES
Salafis. The tension flared up when the people celebrated the Prophet’s birthday
in 2002 in the village mosque. On the day of the celebration, the Salafis went out in
the early morning to avoid attending the celebration, and returned to the pesantren
when the people were tiding up. This enraged the people and they caused damaged
to the student’s accommodation.
Following the conflict, a dialogue between the Salafis and the people was held
in the mosque. The forum was attended by the Musyawarah Pimpinan Kecamatan
(Muspika, a council consisting of the head of the sub-district, the police, and the
army). Various prominent figures, such as Abdul Rasyid and Khalil Chaidar (the
then chairman and vice-chairman of MUI, respectively), and Hisyam Ahyani, the
leader of the traditional Pesantren Nahdlatul Fatah, attended the meeting. Some
rumours had been spreading among the people that Muwahhid had prohibited
the utterance of salawat (prayers to the Prophet), that he had thrown the classical
books of the Shafi’ite madhhab away, that he banned performing the hajj and that
he had called his father kafir (unbeliever). These accusations were put to him
during the meeting. It was not Muwahhid himself who answered the accusations
but Amung Ma’mun, the person Muwahhid’s father most trusted to manage the
old pesantren. 45 This position gave him credibility among the local people. In
his clarification, Ma’mun refuted all rumours. Ma’mun said that Muwahhid did
not forbid the people to chant the salawat as it is prescribed in the holy Qur’an.
Similarly, Ma’mun said that Muwahhid did not throw away the Shafi’ite books. It
was discovered that a student had found a Shafi’ite book on the bank of the river
near the pesantren. He had reported his discovery to his teacher, Ajengan Yayan
who reported it to Ajengan Ade Hanan. In the following days, Ade Hanan told
the people that Muwahhid had thrown the book away. According to Ma’mun, it
was not clear if Muwahhid had done it. On the prohibition of the hajj, Ma’mun
also refuted the charge. What was true was that Muwahhid’s aunt had visited
him telling him that she would go on the pilgrimage. Muwahhid had replied
that his aunt should go with her mahram (lit. means one who is not eligible to
marry. In this case, the mahram serves as protector) or otherwise she could not
perform the hajj. It could not be inferred from this statement that Muwahhid
had banned the hajj. The last accusation was also incorrect. Muwahhid fully
respected his father, and it was impossible that he would have labelled his father
kafir. For Salafis, a Muslim cannot charge another Muslim of being kafir on the
grounds of outer appearances. At the end of the meeting, the MUI declared that
Muwahhid was clear of all accusations. Nevertheless, the dialogue did not solve
45 Interview with Amung Ma’mun, Ciamis, January 23, 2010.
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all problems, it only temporary put an end to the tension within the community.
The neutral position of the MUI and the police during the meeting played an
important role in cooling down the community’s anger.
This first dialogue resulted in momentary tranquillity in the community.
When the tension resurfaced in 2003, a second dialogue was held at the Kantor
Urusan Agama (KUA), a sub-district office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs
responsible for marriage and divorce registrations. Similar to the first dialogue,
the second dialogue was attended by the Muspika, the MUI, and the conflicting
parties (traditional religious leaders and Salafis). Unlike in the previous meeting
when the MUI had remained impartial, now the MUI did take sides with the
traditionalists opposing the Salafis. This shift was caused by the traditionalist
affiliation of the new MUI chairman MUI, Khalil Chaidar (who was vice chairman
during the first meeting). The meeting resulted in an agreement to separate the
two parties: Muwahhid should move to another place to avoid the continuation
of the conflict.
Following the agreement, Muwahhid built a new mosque on his father’s
land, about one kilometre from the old pesantren at the westernmost point
of the village. The mosque became the centre of his new Pesantren al-Nur alAtsari. While the name ‘al-Nur’ was kept to keep the historical link with the old
pesantren, the term ‘al-Atsari’ was added to indicate the pesantren’s new Salafi
orientation. The term ‘atsari’ is derived from the word ‘atsar’ which has a similar
meaning to sunna or hadith, Prophetic tradition. Salafis are often associated
with ahl al-hadith or ahl al-atsar, a group that advocates the sunna. Many Salafi
pesantrens include ‘sunna’ or ‘atsar,’ in their name such as the Ihya al-Sunnah
in Tasikmalaya (West Java) and Yogyakarta, and the Darul Athar in Lamongan
(East Java).
Muwahhid’s patience in teaching Salafi doctrines in the village promotes
his pesantren and Salafi da’wa among the community. The villagers no longer
resist his da’wa . His family, who used to resist his da’wa, currently supports it
by sending their children to the pesantren. The buildings of the old pesantren
are now used by the new pesantren as student dormitory. Although it has not
grown rapidly, the Salafi da’wa continues to exist and keeps expanding. The fact
that Muwahhid is a native of Ciamis and the son of the respected kyai contribute
to his success in developing Salafi da’wa there.
The pesantren grows slowly and looks very poor. The buildings are made
of bamboo and wood, and include a classroom, a dormitory and a kitchen, and
are built semi-permanently on the bordering paddy fields. The classroom is
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SALAFI PESANTREN: DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY’S RESPONSES
integrated with the dormitory in the same construction: the ground floor is
used as student accommodation, while the second floor is used as a classroom.
The upstairs classroom is open without partitions, and many groups of students
occupy part of the hall-like room. The only permanent buildings are the girls’
dormitory and the mosque, both of which have not yet been finished. The girls’
dormitory and the classes are located separately, about 500 meters from the
pesantren’s main complex.
In addition to students, some 60 Salafi families live around the pesantren.
Some of them are former Laskar Jihad activists who migrated to this village
longing for companionship and to learn about religion and in order to
practice the Salafi manhaj in daily life. They come from various cities in Java
(Bandung, Yogyakarta and others) and from outer islands, such as Kalimantan
and Sumatra. Richer families built new houses or bought existing ones, while
poorer families rented houses from the villagers. Others are the local villagers
who are interested in Salafi da’wa and who converted to Salafism. While precise
data on the Salafi composition between migrant and indigenous converts is
unavailable, one informant told me that half of the Salafis are local, while the
other half are former Laskar Jihad activists from outside. If this is true, it shows
the present success of the Salafi da’wa in Banjarsari, after it had been rejected by
the local community. To take another Salafi enclave as a comparison, in Tanah
Baru, Depok, West Java, which comprises of 250 Salafi families, almost all are
former Laskar Jihad activists who migrated to this urban area and created the
enclave. During my visits to this enclave, I found only two local families who had
converted to Salafism.
Pesantren Assunnah Cirebon
Unlike the two pesantrens discussed above, Pesantren Assunnah Cirebon
represents a more developed Salafi pesantren in terms of facilities and the
educational system it adopts. It applies a grade system and employs competent
and skilful teachers complemented by advanced teaching media, such as audio
visual appliances and computers. The buildings for classrooms, offices, student
accommodations, the canteen, bookstore and others are permanent, and some
are two-story high. The mosque, the first building that was erected, is a twostory construction. The ground floor is used for daily prayers and religious
instruction, while the upper floor is used for student accommodation.
The pesantren was established in 1993 under umbrella of the Yayasan
Assunnah Cirebon (YAC) by three young people: Ali Hijrah, Agus Setiawan and
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Andi Sutoro. In the 1980s, they were prominent young activists of the Islamic
movement in the region, who regularly ran religious courses for senior high
school students in Cirebon. These courses were later called pesantren kilat
(lightning pesantren), short and intensive courses or indoctrination in Islamic
studies. More than just a program, pesantren kilat was designed as a sustainable
Muslim leadership training program with three levels: elementary, intermediate
and advanced.
Like many other activists, Ali Hijrah became an activist when still in senior
high school. Between 1981 and 1984, when he studied at the Sekolah Menengah
Atas Negeri 2 (SMAN 2, State Senior High School) in Cirebon, he was active in
the Unit Kerohanian Islam of the official Intra-School Student Organization
(Organisasi Siswa Intra Sekolah [OSIS]) Each secondary school has an OSIS that
takes care of extracurricular activities, with sections for sports, the arts, and
religious activities. The Unit Kerohanian Islam (Rohis for short) organized study
and discussion sessions in the school’s mosque at six o’clock in the morning
before school began and after class hours in the afternoon. Additional lessons on
natural sciences such as chemistry and physics were also given to attract more
students to join the program. The study group that was thus established adopted
the name Talaba Islamiyya, ‘Islamic Students’, and included Rohis activists from
other schools. Their studies and discussions focused on how to live as a good
Muslim, and one issue in particular came to dominate discussion and action: the
adoption of Islamic covering or jilbab by female students.46
The Talaba Islamiyya was supported by graduates of SMAN 2 who were studying
at the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB), one of the major centres of Islamic
student activism who often organized leadership training programs for senior
high school students in Cirebon, Majalengka, Kuningan and Indramayu. The
training paid special attention to Islamic teachings stressing a comprehensive
Islamic way of life. Among the trainers were Malam Sabat Ka’ban, former
Minister of Forestry and the current chairperson of the national board of the
Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, the Crescent and Star Party), and Eggy Sujana, an
activist of the Muslim Defenders Team (Tim Pembela Muslim, TPM).
In late 1984, while he was in the third grade of senior high school, Ali Hijrah
joined the underground organization, the Lembaga Pengembangan Pondok
Pesantren Kilat (LP3K, Institute for the Development of Lightning Pesantren) that
regularly organized pesantren kilat programs for senior high school students in
many cities including Cirebon. Established in 1983, the institute was established
46 Interview with Ali Hijrah, Cirebon, November 21, 2008.
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SALAFI PESANTREN: DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY’S RESPONSES
by activists including Mursalin Dahlan, Rizal Fadillah, Syarif Hidayatullah, and
Yazid al-Tamimi. The first three were activists of the Darul Islam (DI)/Negara
Islam Indonesia (NII, Islamic State of Indonesia) movement in Bandung,47 while
the last was a member of al-Irsyad. They established a new institution after they
had become disappointed with the existing student organizations like Ikatan
Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (IMM, Muhammadiyah Students Association) and
Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, Islamic Students Association). Supported by his
colleague, Yazid al-Tamimi, Ali Hijrah set up an LP3K branch in Cirebon. Through
this institute, he carried out pesantren kilat programs. The first pesantren kilat
program was held in 1984 at the campus of the al-Irsyad Junior High School.
Another centre that was frequently used for pesantren kilat was the al-Nur
Mosque in the so-called Kampung Arab (Arabs village), Panjunan. At al-Nur, Ali
Hijrah was recruited in the mosque’s Dewan Kemakmuran Masjid (DKM, Mosque
Management Board) and he lived there from 1984 to 1986. From 1987 to 1989, he
was active in al-Irsyad, where he taught in the Madrasah Diniyyah Islamiyyah
(Islamic elementary school) and in the al-Nur kindergarten. From 1989 to 1990,
he moved to the al-Shafi’i Mosque, an old mosque where Salim Bajeri, a Muslim
intellectual activist, delivered his regular teaching on tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis).
Ali Hijrah’s activism for LP3K made him travel a lot to cities in Java to train and
monitor his juniors who continued to study at institutions of higher education.
All costs for his activities were borne by LP3K. Yazid al-Tamimi, the then LP3K
treasurer, was active in raising funds from Arabs in Indonesia.48
The return of various colleagues in 1990, like Yazid al-Tamimi from Saudi Arabia,
and Bintoro and Salim from Afghanistan introduced Ali Hijrah, Agus Setiawan and
Andi Sutoro to Salafi teachings. Yazid al-Tamimi was an activist in the Pemuda
al-Irsyad and LP3K. Having graduated from senior high school, he continued his
studies at LIPIA. In 1986, LIPIA awarded him a scholarship to study in Pakistan.
After studying in Pakistan for one year, he moved to Saudi Arabia to work and
returned to Indonesia in 1990. Meanwhile, Bintoro and Salim were Afghanistan
combat veterans who had joined the faction of Jamilurrahman, a leader of the
Jama’at al-Da’wa ila al-Qur’an wa Ahl-i Hadith during the Afghan war.49
Discussion with Salafis particularly on the ideals of Islamic da’wa and the
Salafi position towards the government led Ali Hijrah and friends to become
47 See ICG, Asia Report, N0. 92, Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the
Australian Embassy Bombing, 22 February 2005, pp. 12-13.
48 Interview with Ali Hijrah, Cirebon, November 21, 2008.
49 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, p. 71.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
aware of what they saw as their false understanding of Islamic doctrines.
Moreover, they attended the Salafi i’tikaf50 in Pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran
and other dawras carried out by Salafi foundations such as al-Shafwa, Lajna
Khayriyya Mushtaraka, and al-Haramayn in Jakarta. They were interested in the
teaching on Salafism and eventually converted to Salafism and dissolved the
LP3K. From then onwards, they became involved in Salafi da’wa in Cirebon.
Before the establishment of YAC, from 1990 to 1993, the Salafis had started to
gradually buy land in Kali Tanjung, Cirebon, where the pesantren is now located.
This was followed by the establishment of YAC in 1993 and the building of the
mosque in 1994. Sukardjo Renggo played an important role in this. He is the
former Regional Head of Bina Marga, a state-owned construction company in
Cirebon. He started to study religion in 1989 and became a committed Muslim. In
the early 1990s, he was introduced to Salafism and soon became a sympathizer
of the Salafi da’wa. When the Salafis encountered financial problems in order to
buy land to base their activities, he collected donations from his colleagues and
associate Bina Marga companies.51 The mosque became the centre of Salafi da’wa
in Cirebon. In the following years, the pesantren grew rapidly through opening
educational programs. The programs start from a very basic level, kindergarten,
and go on to higher educational levels.
Besides the Assunnah, there is another Salafi pesantren in Cirebon, Dhiya’us
Sunnah. This pesantren is led by Muhammad As-Sewed, a former Laskar Jihad
deputy commander. The pesantren was established in 2003 after Laskar Jihad’s
dissolution. Compared to the Assunnah, the pesantren looks much simpler: two
permanent classrooms, one rented semi-permanent house and a small mosque
that functions as the centre of learning. The pesantren offers the Tadrib al-Du’at
(Training for Preachers) and Tahfiz (Memorizing Qur’an) programs, with 10 and
37 students respectively. In 2010, the pesantren received a grant amounting
to IDR. 1,6 billion (US $170,000.) to build a huge mosque. When I visited the
pesantren in 2010, the mosque was under construction and looked luxurious.
These two Salafi groups are in dispute. As-Sewed from Dhiya’us Sunnah
accused the Assunnah, of being Sururi or haraki. The fact that Assunnah accepted
a grant from the Ihya al-Turath was the reason for their criticism. Since Ihya alTurath was charged with being ahl al-bid’a, Assunnah was also categorized as
50 I’tikaf literally means to seclude or isolate one’s self in a mosque to worship God.
The term here includes attending Salafi teaching given by Salafi scholars.
51 Interview with Sukarjo Renggo, Cirebon, November 20, 2008.
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SALAFI PESANTREN: DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY’S RESPONSES
ahl al-bid’a, on the basis of their cooperation. Responding to this accusation, the
Assunnah group remained calm. Thoharah, the leader of the pesantren, said that
Assunnah is more open than the Dhiya’us Sunnah. He also refuted As-Sewed’s
argument, saying that the cooperation was aimed at accelerating Salafi da’wa
and to oppose bid’a practices in the Muslim community.52
In addition to these Salafi pesantrens, there is another Salafi-inspired
pesantren in Cirebon, al-Muttaqien, which was established in 1995 by Salim
Bajeri, a prominent Muslim figure from Cirebon.53 This pesantren offers an
integrated school program that combines the national and the pesantren
curriculum. The students have to study Salafi works such as the Kitab al-Tawhid
of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Tafsir ibn Kathir. Although not Salafi, the pesantren
adopts and applies the Salafi manhaj including avoiding isbal, not saluting the
national flag, the prohibition of music and television, and wearing the niqab for
female students. The pesantren also calls on Muslims to purify their creeds. Due
to their similarity with Salafi pesantren, the Assunnah welcome al-Muttaqien’s
teachers and students. Abdul Mu’ith, a senior teacher at al-Muttaqien, for
example, often meets Assunnah’s teachers.54 This does not mean that the two
groups are in harmony. They differ in their attitude towards the government.
While the Salafis emphasize total submission to the government, al-Muttaqien
sees that in specific cases Muslims are allowed to criticize it. Therefore, in some
cases, al-Muttaqien students are mobilized for demonstrations.55 Because of
this, Bajeri criticizes Ali Hijrah, his former student , for his lack of jihad spirit.
Despite the fact that the Salafis criticize traditional Muslims for their taqlid
(blind imitation), Bajeri believes that Salafis also hold on taqlid in relation to
their sheikhs in Saudi Arabia.56
The previous discussion on the development of Salafi pesantrens evidences
the Middle Eastern influence on the making of contemporary Indonesian Islam
and confirms Islamic transnational networks. Muwahhid, the founder of al52 Interview with Thaharah, director of Assunnah, Cirebon, November 20, 2008.
53 Salim Bajeri is an activist in various Muslim organizations: he is a member of the ahl
al-hall wa al-‘aqd of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), member of the Cirebon
branch of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Council of Ulama), member
of al-Irsyad Cirebon, and currently chairman of the Forum Ukhuwwah Islamiyya
(FUI, Forum for Islamic Brotherhood).
54 Interview with Abdul Mu’ith, senior teacher of pesantren al-Muttaqien, Cirebon,
April 17, 2010.
55 Interview with Abdul Mu’ith, April 17, 2010.
56 Interview with Salim Bajeri, April 16, 2010.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Nur al-Atsari, and Ghufran, the founder of al-Furqan, studied Salafism directly
with their Salafi masters in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, Ali Hijrah, the
founder of Pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon, studied Salafism with his colleagues
who had just returned from Saudi Arabia as migrant workers and from Afghani
veterans. As Peter Mandaville has shown, studying abroad and labour migration,
together with two other elements, new media and pilgrimage, have become
crucial instruments in the development of global networks.57
Studying religion in the Middle East has become an objective to achieve by
Islamic students. As the place where Islam grew, the students think that Saudi
Arabia represents authentic Islam. The Malay world and Saudi Arabia have been
connected since before the seventeenth century, with Mecca and Medina as
major destinations for study.58 However, the emergence of Islamic reformism in
Egypt in the late nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century led
Indonesian students to study in Cairo, particularly at al-Azhar University.59
Moreover, in the second half of the last century, supported by the oil boom, Saudi
Arabia provided scholarships attracting students to study at Saudi universities
and some grants were also available for those who wanted to enrol in Pakistan.
Migrant labour has become an important phenomenon since four decades
ago. The rich Gulf countries have become more and more reliant to migrant
workers from South and Southeast Asia, and their number multiplies every year.
In addition to earn their livelihoods, they are exposed to the religious practices in
the country. When they return home, many of them try to emulate the religious
practices they saw in the Middle East. New media, especially satellite television
and the Internet contribute to accelerate the spread of religious messages. We
now find global preachers, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi broadcasting on television
channels delivering religious lectures. The common use of the Internet has
made the world borderless and we can easily find religious lectures on YouTube.
Similarly, the annual pilgrimage plays an important role in disseminating Salafi
doctrines. Although the performance of the pilgrimage is currently rather short,
about forty days only, this ritual is without doubt impressive. It has become
a source of inspiration for Muslims in evaluating their conduct. The short
57 Peter Mandaville, “Transnational Islam in Asia: Background, Typology and
Conceptual Overview”, in Peter Mandaville, et al., Transnational Islam in South and
Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks and Conflict Dynamics, Washington, NBR Project
Report, April 2009, p. 13.
58 Azyumardi Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reformism, p. 1.
59 Mona Abaza, Islamic Education, Perceptions and Exchanges: Indonesian Students in Cairo,
Paris: Cahier d’Archipel 23, 1994, p. 39.
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SALAFI PESANTREN: DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY’S RESPONSES
experience they gain during the pilgrimage contribute to their new religious
understanding.60 In Indonesia, it is common that women change their outlook
by using the veil after having performed the hajj.
C. Community Responses
All the pesantrens discussed here have grown in the heartlands of the
Nahdlatul Ulama, to which a large number of Indonesian Muslims are affiliated.
NU followers maintain Islamic practices like slametan, tahlilan, and ziarah
which are common in Muslim societies. Clifford Geertz noted that the slametan
had become the focal point of the Javanese religious system.61 The slametan
ritual is held almost every time when a Javanese traditionalist Muslim makes a
wish or has a specific need (hajat, from Arabic, haja, and the host is called sahibul
hajat), ranging from celebrating life cycle rituals to starting a business. Taking
into account slametan’s different events and objectives, Geertz classified them
into four types: 1. those related to accompany the commemoration of life cycles;
2. those concerned with festival days of the Islamic calendar; 3. those that deal
with rural social integration; 4. irregular slametan at a specific occasion such as
moving to a new house and getting a new job.62
The term “slametan” is a Javanese adoption of Arabic “salama” that means
“peace” or “safety”. Through the slametan ritual, the host hopes for good fortune
and safety in his or her life. During the rite, the host invites relatives, neighbours, and
friends to pray to God led by someone believed to have a good command of Islamic
knowledge such as a kyai, an ustadh, or a modin (official religious functionary).
Food and beverages are served to be consumed on the spot and to be taken home
by the people who pray. The slametan ceremony is usually held to commemorate
a life cycle, such as a tingkeban (to celebrate seven months’ pregnancy), birth,
circumcisions, marriage and death. By carrying out the slametan, the individual
concerned is expected to pass this life in a peaceful and safe manner. Apart from
this, the slametan ritual is conducted for other purposes as well, such as moving
to a new house and to commence rice cultivation.63 When a family occupies a new
60 Peter Mandaville, “Transnational Islam in Asia”, p. 13.
61 Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago
Press, 1960, p. 11.
62 Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java, p. 30.
63 A.G. Muhaimin, The Islamic Tradition of Cirebon, Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006, pp. 136137; Ridin Sofwan, “Interelasi Nilai Jawa dan Islam dalam Aspek Kepercayaan dan
Ritual” dalam Darori Amin (ed.), Islam dan Kebudayaan Jawa, Semarang: Pusat Kajian
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
house, the family members expect that by organizing a slametan they will live
peacefully and safely. Similarly, in the case of rice cultivation, the farmer hopes for
a good and fruitful harvest.
Tahlilan is a part of the slametan rituals held after a person’s death. It is
usually held during the first seven days following the death, and then held
intermittently in the 40th, the 100th, and 1000th day. The commemoration of these
days is believed to have a relation with the decaying stages of the dead body.64
Literally, tahlilan means “to utter ‘la ilaha illa Allah’” [“there is no god but God”].
Like in other slametan rituals, during the tahlilan, invited guests also chant
specific prayers led by a specialist of religion. They read some Qur’anic verses:
the whole Suras of Yasin, al-Fatiha, al-Ikhlas, al-Nas and al-Falaq, followed by other
verses and certain formulas to invoke God’s Name. In the end, they pray for the
dead person and the family. Tahlilan are also held weekly on Thursday evenings
in mosques or in private houses.
Ziarah constitutes one of the main traditions traditionalist Muslims practice.
The ziyarat al-qubur (tomb visit) is, no doubt, allowed or recommended in Islam,
because it reminds Muslims of death. However, in practice many people pay
visits to graves, especially those of saints (wali) or pious dead, for different
purposes: to pray, to recite the Qur’an, to make requests to God through the dead
person’s intercession, or to share his blessing (berkah). The last two objections
are based on the belief that the pious dead are alive and are in near proximity
to God and therefore they can mediate between the visitor and God. Although
making the visit to a grave is possible at any time, most visitors prefer to do
so on certain days which are considered to be the most blessed times to pay
such a visit, such as on jum’at kliwon (kliwon Friday).65 In the pesantren tradition,
ziarah is a reflection of the teacher-disciple relationship. Students must display
feelings of high respect to their teacher; this attitude should continue even after
the teacher’s death by paying a visit to his grave. This is why some pesantrens
Islam dan Budaya Jawa IAIN Walisongo Semarang, in collaboration with Gama
Media, 2000, pp. 130-136.
64 A.G. Muhaimin, The Islamic Tradition of Cirebon, pp. 151-152.
65 In addition to the seven-day week, Javanese people also have another week
consisting of five days called Pon, Wage, Kliwon, Legi, and Pahing. Multiplying
these two weeks creates a thirty-five-day month. James J. Fox, “Ziarah Visits to
the Tombs of the Wali, the Founders of Islam on Java,” in M.C. Ricklefs, Islam in the
Indonesian Social Context, Annual Indonesian Lectures Series No. 15, Victoria: Centre
of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991, p. 20.
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SALAFI PESANTREN: DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY’S RESPONSES
regularly organize the annual khaul of their founders.66 The great kyai Chudlori,
the founder of Pesantren Tegal Rejo, Magelang, Central Java, for example, in his
testament asked his students to recite the whole Qur’an at his grave at least once
in their lives.67
There are many other traditions in traditionalist Muslim communities in
Indonesia, such the celebration of Islamic holy days. The students of traditional
pesantrens learn all these traditions in order to keep them alive. In Sidayu, there
are various traditional pesantrens associated with the NU, such as Al-Munawwar
and Manba’ul Hisan. Established in the 1970s, Al-Munawwar is a pesantren
specially known for memorizing of the Qur’an (tahfiz). Currently it educates
some fifty students.68 The other pesantren, Manba’ul Hisan, established in 1950,
was well known because of its tahfiz program in which thousands of children
were trained in memorizing the Qur’an. As many methods of Qur’anic learning
developed and spread across the country, the number of students decreased.
In 2000, K.H. Abdul Muqsid Muhammad transformed his pesantren by setting
up a Kindergarten, Madrasah Ibtida’yah (MI), Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs) and
Madrasah Aliyah (MA) and by transforming his programs accordingly.69 Another
educational institution associated with the NU is the Yayasan Kanjeng Sepuh
that manages Islamic schools that educates more than 2000 students. It started
to gain significance in the village after the decline of Manba’ul Hisan. There are
also less important pesantrens in Sidayu, such as Qiyamul Manar for tahfiz and
Darul Ikhlas for kindergarten.70
Similarly, Cirebon is an area of traditional Muslims and has hundreds of
traditional pesantrens.71 Some pesantrens, like Pesantren Buntet, Pesantren
Kempek, Pesantren Gedongan and Darut Tauhid, are influential in shaping the
66 Martin van Bruinessen, “Traditions for the Future: The Reconstruction of
Traditionalist Discourse within NU”, in Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds), Nahdlatul
Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia, Victoria: Monash Asia Institute,
1996, p. 170.
67 M. Bambang Pranowo, “Traditional Islam in Contemporary Rural Java , the Case of Tegal
Rejo Pesantren”, in M.C. Ricklefs, Islam in the Indonesian Social Context, Annual Indonesian
Lectures Series No. 15, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991, p. 47.
68 Interview with K.H. M. Syafiq Munawwar, leader of pesantren al-Munawwar, Gresik,
May 8, 2010.
69 Interview with K.H. Abdul Muqsid Muhammad, leader of Pesantren Manba’ul Hisan,
Gresik, May 8, 2010.
70 The Ministry of Religious Affairs records 102 pesantrens in Gresik district.
71 According to current record of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, there are 351
pesantrens in Cirebon.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
religious thought and behaviour of the community. Pesantren Buntet, for example,
has a significant role in sustaining the Shatariyya and Tijaniyya Sufi orders.72
Moreover, as in other cities in Java, the people in Cirebon usually celebrate life
cycle events and Islamic Holy Days. Of these events, the commemoration of the
Prophet’s birthday (mawlid al-nabiy) on 12 Rabi’aul Awwal, receives enormous
attention from the community.73 The celebration centers on the Kasepuhan,
Kanoman and Kecirebonan Palaces. The existence of the palaces, which combine
Islamic beliefs and Javanese spirituality, has contributed to the rise of Islamic
syncretism. The palaces regularly hold mawlid al-nabiy celebrations by displaying
sacred objects called the panjang jimat (lit. means “long amulets”), the public
parading of sacred heirlooms (pusaka) such as keris, plates, etc. As Muhaimin
has described in detail, the panjang jimat festival starts with a ceremony in the
palace, followed by a parade exposing the panjang jimat and other heirlooms
from the Bangsal Agung Panembahan to the Langgar Agung at 9.00 p.m. and
back to the Bangsal Agung at 11.00. p.m. In the Langgar Agung, the penghulu
(religious official) leads the recitation of the Arabic poem “ashraqalan”, followed
by serving the sega rasul (literally means “Messenger’s rice”, cooked yellow and
spicy rice) to those who attend the ceremony. Thousands of people from all
social levels in Cirebon and surrounding cities come to attend the festival. Some
of them scramble to get some of the food.74 They believe that the food will bring
good luck and fortune for their future. In addition to this kind of celebrations,
there are many shrines, such as the Astana Gunung Djati, where people go for
many purposes including seeking blessing (baraka).75
Likewise, the majority of Muslims in Banjarsari are affiliated with the
Nahdlatul Ulama. Yet, the NU has only two pesantrens there, Pesantren Nahdlatul
Fatah led by Hisyam Ahyani and Pesantren Ihya’ al-‘Abidin led by Abdul Rasyid.
While the first has deteriorated, the latter has improved significantly and offers
various programs. Apart from these institutions, traditional Muslim leaders
are active in regular religious gatherings in mosques. Other famous pesantrens
72 A.G. Muhaimin, “Pesantren and Tarekat in the Modern Era: An Account of the
Transmission of Traditional Islam in Java,” in Studia Islamika, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1997, pp. 16.24. Ahmad Zaeni Hasan, Perlawanan dari Tanah Pengasingan, Kyai Abbas, Pesantren Buntet
dan Bela Negara, Jakarta: Lembaga Studi Agama dan Sosial (ELSAS), 2000, p. 84-85.
73 On the traditions of Cirebon, see A.G. Muhaimin, The Islamic Traditions of Cirebon,
Jakarta: Center for Research and Development of Socio-Religious Affairs, Ministry
of Religious Affairs Republic of Indonesia, 2004, pp. 178-180.
74 A.G. Muhaimin, The Islamic Tradition of Cirebon, p. 128.
75 A.G. Muhaimin, The Islamic Tradition of Cirebon, pp. 259-268.
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SALAFI PESANTREN: DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY’S RESPONSES
are located outside Banjarsari, such as Pesantren Darussalam in Ciamis. Other
Muslims are affiliated with the Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam, and Persatuan
Umat Islam (PUI). These organizations manage educational institutions: the
Muhammadiyah and PUI run their institutions from kindergarten to senior high
school levels, while Persis runs Pesantren Persis 100.
Banjarsari has also witnessed the emergence of a radical Islamic movement,
the Front Hizbullah, an organization established in 1994 by Cecep Bustomi in
Pandeglang, Banten. Like the Front Pembela Islam (FPI, the Islamic Defender
Front), a radical organization in which Bustomi was one of the co-founders, the
Front Hizbullah often perpetrates acts of violence in applying the idea of amar
ma’ruf nahy munkar (enjoining good and forbidding wrong).76 Under the leadership
of Mujahid, a local Muslim activist, the front is said to have taken actions against
alcoholic beverages and prostitutes.77 Many hardliner Muslim figures like Bustami
himself, Habib Rizieq,78 the commander of the FPI, and Ja’far Umar Thalib, the
former commander of the Laskar Jihad, have visited the site to deliver lectures.
Given these social and religious circumstances, the emergence of Salafi
pesantrens in Gresik, Ciamis and Cirebon has brought about controversy,
tension and conflict among the people. The opposition is mainly caused by
two factors: Salafi teachings and attitudes. The Salafis, bearing puritan ideas,
call upon Muslims to cleanse Islam by purifying their tawhid from shirk
(polytheism) and their religious practices from bid’a. For Salafis, pristine
Islam is completely described in the Qur’an, in the hadith and in the practices
of the al-Salaf al-salih (the pious predecessors, the first three generations of
Muslims). Emulating the pious predecessors is essential and obligatory for
Salafis, as they are seen as the people who understand the religion best. For this
reason, the Salafis believe that a return to the Qur’an and the hadith alone is
insufficient, as Muslims could still stray from the true Islam.79 The necessity of
76 http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/2000/08/13/0029.html, accessed on
February 2011.
77 Interview with Mujahid, Ciamis, January 24, 2010.
78 Habib Rizieq was born in the ahl al-bayt (descendants of the Prophet) family. He
went to elementary and secondary schools in Jakarta. He enrolled in LIPIA in
preparation for study at the Faculty of Islamic Law in the Jami’a Imam ibn Su’ud
in Jakarta. For a brief biography of Rizieq, see Jajang Jahroni, Defending the Majesty
of Islam: Indonesia’s Front Pembela Islam, 1998-2003, Chiang Mai: Asian Muslim Action
Network and Silkworm Books, 2008, pp. 13-17.
79 The Salafis have posed some arguments on the necessity of emulating the pious
predecessors. See, for example, Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawwas, Mulia dengan Manhaj
Salaf, Bogor: Pustaka al-Taqwa, 2008, pp. 55-158; Abdul Hakim bin Amir Abdat, Lau
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
emulating the pious predecessors has become point of dispute between Salafis
and reformist Muslim groups, the Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam. The
reformist groups argue that in the last speech before his death, the Prophet
warned Muslims to refer to the Qur’an and the hadith only for religious guidance.
The Salafis severely target all religious traditions that are alien to Islam. The
religious traditions practiced by other Muslims, mostly by traditionalists, such
as mawlid, tahlilan, ziarah, and istighatha (common religious gathering to chant
dhikir or the Names and Attributes of God, and praying to God in order to reach
certain aims) are subject to the Salafis harsh criticism. The Salafis frequently
condemn these traditions as being practices that have no roots in Islamic
doctrines, and even charge actors to have deviated from true Islam. The Salafis
argue that “was the act good, the Companions would have enacted it before us.”80
Local people perceive Salafis as an exclusive group. Interaction between
Salafis and the rest of community is limited. It is common that the pesantren
regulates the students’ life by limiting or even prohibiting them to interact with
the local people. This is aimed at minimizing the local community’s influence on
the students. Apart from students, Salafis act in a number of ways towards the
local community. While some Salafis act in a friendly manner, many others are
hostile to the extent that they do not even greet villagers. Ade Abdurrahman,
the Persatuan Islam Chair in Banjarsari, Ciamis, told me that his former student,
Undang Herwaman, who had converted to Salafism, greeted only him but
refused to greet other teachers. He observed similar behaviour from other of
his former followers who had converted to Salafism: they did not greet him and
even tried to avoid meeting him.81 This attitude very much relates to one of the
most fundamental doctrines of the Salafi manhaj, al-wala’ wa al-bara’ meaning
‘alliance and disassociation.’ Although the doctrine, as clearly mentioned in
Qur’an [3:28], is exclusively directed at unbelievers and infidels, the Salafis apply
this doctrine in a strict way: they limit their association with Muslims outside
their group in order to preserve their true manhaj. They are afraid of becoming
contaminated by incorrect beliefs through contact with other groups.
In Sidayu, in its earlier phases Salafism gave rise to religious disharmony. In
addition to internal conflicts within the Muhammadiyah as mentioned earlier,
the traditionalist NU objected to Ghufran’s lessons. The tension peaked in 1994,
Kaana Khairan Lasabaquunaa Ilaihi, Jakarta: Pustaka Mu’awiyah bin Abi Sufyan, 2007,
pp. 118-125; 155-162.
80 Abdul Hakim bin Amir Abdat, Lau Kaana Khairan.
81 Interview with Ade Abdurrahman, Ciamis, January 25, 2010.
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SALAFI PESANTREN: DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY’S RESPONSES
when a medical student, Awan Widodo, who studied at al-Furqan, destroyed a
tomb in Kanjeng Sepuh’s shrine, which is located in front the grand Kanjeng
Sepuh Mosque. Kanjeng Sepuh was the eighth Lord (Adipati) in Sidayu who ruled
the region between 1816 and 1855. It is said that during his rule, Kanjeng Sepuh
took sides with the interest of the people and opposed the Dutch colonialist.82
In addition to the annual commemoration of his death (haul), the shrine is
frequently visited by Muslims to pray or to ask for God’s mercy through his
mediation (tawassul). As Salafis and other reformist Muslims consider these acts
shirk (polytheism), Awan Widodo demolished the tomb. The action enraged
traditional Muslims in the district who highly respected Kanjeng Sepuh and
who carried out rituals at the shrine. The people urged Ghufran to close the
pesantren and some even called for it to be burned down. This action was
blocked by K.H. Muhammad Suhail, a highly respected NU leader. Asked by
the police to intervene, Suhail came to the pesantren, calmed down the crowd
and sent Ghufran to the police station.83 Following the incident, the Muspika,
the local Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Council of Indonesian Ulama) and
members of the police office decided to dissolve the pesantren on the grounds
of community rejection. The students were asked to return to their hometowns.
Moreover, the case of the tomb destruction was then brought to court. Based on
a psychological analysis confirming the mental depression of the suspect, the
court held him not responsible and cleared him of all charges.
The Salafis in Cirebon face serious, although not violent, challenges from
other groups of Muslims. Mustafa Aqiel of Pesantren Kempek considers the Salafi
criticism of traditional religious practices as proof of their failure to properly
understand and appreciate the tradition of da’wa. The nine walis (saints) adopted
local traditions to make their da’wa more acceptable to the local people. As the
traditions were adopted they became permeated with Islamic values. As they are
Islamized, in his view, these traditions do not contradict Islamic tenets.84 Yahya
Zainul Arifin (popularly called Buya Yahya) of Pesantren al-Bahja sharply criticizes
the Salafi methodological approach to the manhaj. Generally, the Salafis would say
that if someone is a Salafi he should follow the al-Salaf al-salih by emulating all the
attitudes and thoughts of the Salaf in understanding the Qur’an and the hadith.
This argument, according to Buya Yahya, is problematic, since the Salaf did not set
82 http://lovesidayu.blogspot.com/2009/03/bupati-kanjeng-sepuh-Sidayu-dikenal.
html, accessed on September 20, 2009.
83 Interview with K.H. Muhammad Suhail, a respected NU leader, Gresik, May 9, 2010.
84 Interview with Mustafa Aqiel, leader of pesantren Kempek, Cirebon, April 21, 2010.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
up the methods for approaching the two principle sources of Islamic teachings,
the Qur’an and the hadith. It was Imam Shafi’i who first set up this method in
his al-Risala. A true Salafi is therefore, for him, a person who follows al-Shafi’i’s
method and those who do not are false Salafis.85
The Radio Assunnah radio station is very popular among the people in Cirebon.
It broadcasts Salafi da’wa through various programs: tartil or Qur’anic recitation,
hadith by request, religious talks and Salafi lessons. It reaches a broad audience in
the Cirebon, Kuningan and Majalengka regions, which would otherwise be difficult
to reach. Instead of listening to other commercial radio stations that are seen to air
anything, including idle gossip, the emergence of Salafi radio is perceived as a good
alternative. Didin Nurul Rasyidin, a lecturer at the Institute Agama Islam Negeri
(IAIN, State Institute for Islamic Studies) Sheikh Nurjati Cirebon, for example, often
listens to this channel when he drives on his way home from Cirebon to Kuningan.
He himself is not a Salafi, but he turns on the radio so as not to have to listen to
inappropriate gossip broadcasted by other channels.86 Yet the Salafi da’wa on the
radio has also raised concern, as it often publicly criticizes religious traditions as
practiced by traditional Muslims. Countering on-air da’wa, NU leaders have launched
similar radio stations, Radio Qu and Al-Kisah FM, aimed at protecting the beliefs of
their community. While the first radio is managed by the rising young preacher,
Buya Yahya, the latter is run by the Lembaga Dakwah Nahdlatul Ulama (Institute
for Da’wa of the Nahdlatul Ulama) in Cirebon. The NU has also formed the Forum
Santri Cirebon (Forum of Pesantren Students in Cirebon) which aims, yet again, at
protecting the students’ beliefs from Salafi attacks.
Unlike the traditionalist NU, the modernist Muhammadiyah is more open
to Salafism. As discussed in Chapter One, the Muhammadiyah and the Salafis
share the identical slogan that reads: al-ruju’ ila al-Qur’an wa al-hadith (back to
the Qur’an and the Prophetic tradition). The Muhammadiyah often ignores
the opinion of the four acceptable madhhabs in Islam and goes directly to the
Qur’an and the hadith in formulating their fatwas (legal religious opinion). Like
the Salafis, the Muhammadiyah criticizes the religious traditions of traditional
Muslims. Thus, it is logical that many Muhammadiyah activists view the Salafis
as their partners in da’wa, particularly in combatting religious innovations and
superstitions. Moreover, many Muhammadiyah active members have converted
85 Cahaya Nabawy, No. 82, April 2010, pp. 105-106. Interview with Buya Yahya, Cirebon,
April 21, 2010.
86 Interview with Didin Nurul Rasyidin, lecturer at IAIN Nurjati, Cirebon, April 22,
2010.
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SALAFI PESANTREN: DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY’S RESPONSES
to Salafism. However, the Muhammadiyah and the Salafis are sharply divided
in their application of the idea of al-ruju’ ila al-Qur’an wa al-hadith. While the
Muhammadiyah tries to grasp the spirit of Islam by exploring the asbab al-nuzul
(reasons behind the revelation) of the Qur’an and asbab al-wurud (reasons of
occurrence) of the hadith, the Salafi takes all texts as they are without further
interpreting or questioning them.87
The dispute between the Muhammadiyah and the Salafis is more apparent in
practical life. The tension between them heightens when the Salafis take over
Muhammadiyah assets like mosques and pesantrens and indeed, the Salafis
have seized some Muhammadiyah mosques. They, for example, have succeeded
in capturing the Abu Bakr Mosque in Palimanan, Cirebon and converted 20
Muhammadiyah followers to Salafism.88 The way they take assets over is rather
clear. To start, the Salafis ask the official of the Dewan Kemakmuran Masjid
(DKM, Board of Mosque Management) to give them the opportunity to hold
religious gatherings in the mosque. In this phase, the teaching is only attended
by their own followers. When the Salafis have succeeded in attracting new
followers from the jama’a (that particular mosque’s congregation), especially
DKM officials, there is no doubt they have taken over the mosque.89 The takeover
means that the Salafis have penetrated the DKM, dominate the activities in the
mosque, and censor preachers. As the owner of the mosque, the Muhammadiyah
indeed continues to use it. However, as the most active jama’a have converted to
Salafism, the activities in the mosque are mostly organized by Salafis.
Muhammadiyah figures have long perceived that this reformist organization
has suffered from the absence of ‘ulamas qualified to teach classical Islamic
knowledge such as fiqh, hadith and tafsir. This deficiency lies behind this
takeover. The Muhammadiyah is too busy managing and running its educational
institutions, hospitals and other social institutions such as orphanages. The
Muhammadiyah often neglects conventional da’wa in the form of religious
gatherings. It only manages its monthly religious gatherings through its branch
offices. The infrequency of their religious gatherings has led some activists to
turn to other groups, including Salafis.90
87 Fathurrahman Jamil, Metode Ijtihad Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah, Jakarta: Logos
Wacana Ilmu, 1995, pp. 58-59.
88 Interview with Chafifuddin, head of the Majlis Tabligh, Pimpinan Daerah
Muhammadiyah (PDM) Cirebon, April 20, 2010.
89 On the takeover, see Abdurrahman Wahid, (ed.), Ilusi Negara Islam, Jakarta: Gerakan
Bhineka Tunggal Ika, The Wahid Institute, and Maarif Institute, 2009, pp. 171-220.
90 Interview with Mukhlas, head of the Muhammadiyah branch in Banjarsari, and
Ujang Bazari, Muhammadiyah Activists, Ciamis, February 2, 2010.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
The case of Pesantren al-Hikmah represents the best example of the shortage
of ‘ulamas within the Muhammadiyah. As mentioned earlier, the Muhammadiyah
established the pesantren in 1985. However, the position of directors was given to
Salafi figures: Ghufran, ‘Abid Radli and Ma’ruf Nur Salam. In his clarification of the
Muhammadiyah’s acceptance of the Salafi presence at al-Hikmah, Nawawi Bakri,
chair of the Muhammadiyah branch in Sidayu, recognized that the Muhammadiyah
was suffering from a lack of human resources. The Muhammadiyah had no cadres
who were able and ready to teach religion. To illustrate this, he gave the following
example: when a khatib to deliver the Friday sermon was unable to come, the
easiest thing to do was to ask a Salafi to replace him. However, he said that the Salafi
presence within the Muhammadiyah pesantren would only be temporary. The
moment cadres would be ready, the pesantren would be taken back from the Salafis.
Nevertheless, I see a more fundamental reason for this condition: the congruity
between Muhammadiyah and Salafi ideas. Personally, Bakri has no objection to
Salafi ideas on the purification of religion. According to him, any teaching that
corresponds to the sunna is in line with Muhammadiyah notions as it fights bid’a and
kharafat (superstition).91 Thus, Salafis can act as the Muhammadiyah’s Companions
in fighting bid’a and kharafat. Personally, although he himself is not Salafi, he grows
his beard long and practices isbal. Viewing Salafis as the Muhammadiyah’s partners
in da’wa, is common among Muhammadiyah activists. Usman Saleh,92 former chair
of the Muhammadiyah branch in Banjarsari, Cimais, and Ahmad Dahlan,93 chair of
the Muhammadiyah in Cirebon, confirm this view.
It goes without saying that anxiety about the pesantren exists among
Muhammadiyah figures. During my talk with Yunus Mansur, the person in
charge of the foundation of the pesantren, this uneasiness cannot be denied.
According to him, the identity and the modern values of the Muhammadiyah
will disappear in the religious teachings the Salafis deliver in the pesantren.94
The Salafis do not refer to Muhammadiyah sources, although they teach in a
Muhammadiyah centre. Thus, the Muhammadiyah provides ample opportunities
for the dissemination of Salafi doctrines. Arif Radhi, head of Sekolah Dasar (SD,
Elementary School) Muhammadiyah, suggested a more concrete action to halt
Salafi influence in Muhammadiyah schools. He recommended expelling all Salafi
teachers from all Muhammadiyah educational institutions in Sidayu.
91
92
93
94
Interview with Nawawi Bakri, Gresik, May 9, 2010.
Interview with Usman Saleh, Banjarsari, January 22, 2010.
Interview with Ahmad Dahlan, Cirebon, April 16, 2010
Interview with Yunus Mansur, Gresik, May 9, 2010.
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SALAFI PESANTREN: DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY’S RESPONSES
The Salafis’ questioning of religious traditions popularly practiced by
Muslims indeed disrupts the established religious authority enjoyed by religious
scholars (kyai, ajengan, ustadh). They derive their authority from many sources:
intellectual lineage, kinship and knowledge.95 Having this privileged position,
the people referred to religious scholars to consult them about every aspects
of their life: social, economics and politics. They are invited to give religious
sermons on many occasions, such as religious celebrations and life cycle events.
For example, in the month Rabi’ul Awwal of the Islamic calendar in which
Muslims commonly celebrate the mawlid al-naby, kyais and ustadhs have a full
schedule of public lectures. They receive money for their public sermons. The
payment varies corresponding to the level of kyai or ajengan, and size of the
gathering. A senior kyai or ustadh will be paid more than a junior one. Similarly,
kyais or ustadhs who deliver sermons in larger public gatherings will get more
money than if they do so in smaller ones. In addition to cash, food and meals will
be sent to their residences for the family. Thus, when Salafis start to question
the tradition of the mawlid celebration, the question in fact shakes religious
authority and sources of income. Having deep knowledge of Islam, kyais and
ustadh are undeniably authoritative. According to the findings of the Lembaga
Survey Indonesia (LSI), the majority of Muslims still recognize their authority.
In its 2006 survey, it was revealed that the majority of Indonesia Muslims agreed
with the activities and agendas of the NU, the MUI and the Muhammadiyah
(71.7%, 59.1% and 54.1% respectively).96 As these organizations are institutions
where religious scholars gather, the trust in these organizations reflects the
trust in religious scholars.
The critical point in this matter is that Salafis seem to have no trust in
the existing religious authorities in Indonesia. This is evident as they request
fatwas from their sheikhs in the Middle East. They do not take into account the
domestic fatwas of existing Indonesian institutions such as the Bahth al-Masa’il
of the NU, the fatwa committee of the MUI, the Muhammadiyah’s Majelis Tarjih
and Persatuan Islam’s Dewan Hisbah.
The decline of traditional institutions may turn the prejudice of local
religious leaders towards the Salafis. Whereas Salafi pesantrens have persisted
and developed, traditional pesantrens have started to decline. As noted earlier,
95 Martin van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru,
Yogyakarta: LKIS, 1994, p. 152-153.
96 Cited from Jajat Burhanudin, “Islamic Knowledge, Authority and Political Power:
The ‘Ulama in Colonial Indonesia”, PhD Thesis, Leiden University, 2004, p. 2.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
all traditional pesantrens in Sidayu are far behind al-Furqan, a situation similar
to that in Banjarsari. The old pesantren, al-Nur, which is currently run by Ade
Hanan, Muwahhid’s brother-in-law, educates some 30 children only. The other
pesantren, Nahdlatul Fatah, led by Hisyam Ahyani, educates 20 children. It is
assumed that this decline is not caused by the presence of Salafi da’wa only,
but also by the effects of the modernization policy of the government.97 Salafi
students who attend the pesantren come from other cities. The development of
this Salafi pesantren, however, raises anxiety among religious leaders because
their activists convert to Salafism.
In addition to negative reactions, Salafis also get positive responses. In Banjarsari
and Sidayu, they have won the people’s sympathy through their social activities.
Contrary to the villagers, the Salafis in these places are active in performing
community services, such as cleaning the environment (kerja bhakti). Moreover, the
pesantrens often distribute zakat al-mal (alms) qurban (meat of sacrificed animals
such as beef and goat) and provide food for iftar (meal for breaking the fast) to
the poor.98 Pesantren al-Nur has widened and hardened 300 meters of access road
to the pesantren and hardened another road along 3 kilometres surrounding the
pesantren. The villagers are quite happy with this, as the road to their village is
no longer muddy when the rain falls. This environmental improvement has raised
the value of the land surrounding the pesantren. Moreover, Pesantren al-Nur also
built a toilet in the langgar (a small prayer house) of the village.99
Salafis have been renowned for their morality, in particular their honesty. This
has led some ordinary people to trust them. Haji Itin, the owner of a clothes store in
Banjarsari, for example, trusts Salafis to guard his warehouse. Itin himself is not an
adherent of Salafism, but he trusts Salafis more than he trusts others. Before, he had
employed non-Salafis for this task and found he could not trust them as he lost some
clothes. Since five years, he has employed Salafis to guard his warehouse. In addition
to honesty, according to Itin, Salafis are hard workers, sincere and do not demand a
high salary. He often goes out leaving his store for a couple of days, but he now feels
97 On the modernization of Islamic institutions, see, Karel Steenbrink, Pesantren,
Madrasah and Sekolah, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986; Azyumardi Azra, Pendidikan Islam, Tradisi
dan Modernisasi Menuju Milennium Baru, Jakarta, Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2002.
98 Interview with Ahmad Yasa, secretary of village Srowo, Sidayu, Gresik, May 12,
2010.
99 Interview with Karli, chief of Rukun Tetangga, (RT, Neighbourhood Association,
the smallest unit of citizen association consisting of some, at least, forty houses),
Banjarsari, February 2, 2010.
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SALAFI PESANTREN: DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY’S RESPONSES
secure.100 For ordinary people, the Salafis’ attitude towards the government creates
tranquillity and certainty in managing their business. A coffee kiosk owner in Sidayu,
for example, told me that he loves Salafism because it prohibits demonstrations and
open criticism to the government. This teaching, according to him, results in no
threats to his economic activities. Mamay, a salt retailer in the traditional market in
Banjarsari, has the same perception. What makes Salafism interesting, according to
him, is its religious argument: every action and each ritual Salafis enact is based on
the Qur’an and the hadith. He also observes that Salafis are very steadfast in running
their business even though they only earn small profits.101
Concluding Remarks
Salafi pesantrens have passed the most difficult phase in their early
development during which local people resisted them, particularly the elites and
religious leaders. The most fundamental reason for this resistance was Salafi’s
criticism of existing religious traditions through questioning their roots in Islam
and condemning them as religious innovations. While traditionalist religious
leaders maintained and preserved these traditions, questioning the religious
roots of these traditions means challenging their religious authority. As these
traditions form sources of their income, so, to some extent, this challenge also
poses a threat to their livelihood.
However, Salafis have secured their da’wa, and have gained the sympathy of
the villagers. As the Salafi da’wa spreads in Banjarsari and Sidayu, the villagers
became more familiar with Salafism and do not oppose Salafi da’wa unless they
bother them. The people are accustomed to the Salafis’ presence and they let
them spread their da’wa. There are two factors in this achievement. First, the
origins and the inherited charisma of its leaders. Ghufran is a native of Sidayu,
while Muwwahid was born in Banjarsari. Muwahhid has inherited the charisma
of his father, Ajengan Nunung Muhiddin. Their origins and charisma has turned
into social capital for Salafis in the spread of their da’wa. Second, the Salafis’
perseverance in da’wa and social activities has won the sympathy of the people
in their neighbourhood.
100 Interview with Itin, owner of ACB shop, Banjarsari, February 3, 2010.
101 Interview with Mamay, a salt retailer, Banjarsari, January 15, 2010.
189
Chapter Five
Salafi Pesantren:
Nurturing the Salafi Manhaj
A pesantren is usually defined as a religious institution that specifically teaches
religious knowledge. Physically, a pesantren can be described as follows: it is
a separate complex consisting of various buildings: the house of the kyai (the
pesantren’s founder and leader), a mosque, classrooms and a students’ dormitory.
Kyai and ustadhs (teachers) teach in the mosque and during class, the ustadhs
(pesantren students) listen to the explanations of their teacher while sitting in
a circle around him. They perform their daily prayers collectively under the
guidance of their kyai or his substitute. At a certain times, usually after sunset or
during dawn prayers, the kyai or a senior ustadh delivers a public lecture. These
activities look simple. However, through these routine activities a pesantren
creates what Abdurrahman Wahid, former chairperson of the executive body
of the Nahdlatul Ulama, calls a “sub-culture.”1 He refers to the distinctive values
and culture of the pesantren, which are very different from those outside. Wahid
explains that a sub-culture must consist of at least three elements: a way of life,
values or a worldview, and a hierarchy of authority.2 To support his argument,
he highlights some important traditions and living values that prevail in their
pesantrens, such as the concept of time, its curriculum, sincerity and authority.
1
2
Abdurrahman Wahid, “Pesantren sebagai Subkultur”, in Dawam Rahardjo, Pesantren
dan Pembaharuan, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1995, pp. 39-61.
Abdurrahman Wahid, “Pesantren sebagai Subkultur”, p. 43.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
A pesantren community has a special way of denoting time. Each activity
is conducted at a certain time. It is hard to understand how Muslims can meet
their religious obligations without deciding on the exact time. To determine
prayer times and the moment of breaking the fast (iftar), a definite time
scheme is required.. Various Qur’anic verses remind Muslims to be careful with
specific times such as al-fajr (dawn), al-duha (sunrise), al-‘asr (afternoon), and
al-layl (night). People in a pesantren have a specific method of organizing and
scheduling their activities. Instead of mentioning the exact time, they prefer
to link their activities to obligatory prayers’ times. Thus, for example, rather
than say that they have a class at one o’clock in the afternoon, they will say that
the class will be held ba’da zuhr (after noon prayer). This implies that time in a
pesantren is relative rather than exact. Ba’da zuhr covers a long period of time:
from 12.30 to 15.00.
Its specific curriculum constitutes the next distinctive feature of a pesantren.
It depends highly on the kyai and is managed in a less systematic way. The
students study their subjects starting with explanations that are simple in
the first year but become increasingly sophisticated in the years to come. For
example, in fiqh, students starts with the Kashifat al-Saja Sharh Safinat al-Naja
written by Muhammad Nawawi al-Jawi to continue with the Fath al-Qarib and
subsequently the Fath al-Mu’in. Due to this unsystematic method of instruction, a
student spends a long period of study in the pesantren. In some cases, a student
also moves from one pesantren to another to pursue specific knowledge, such
Arabic and tasawuf (Sufism). The duration of study depends very much on the
kyai and the student. When a student thinks that he has mastered enough
knowledge, he may decide to move to another pesantren or return home.
Abdurrahman Wahid maintains that together, the activities in a pesantren
create a fundamental value in life, ikhlas (sincerity). In Javanese, the term “ikhlas”
is best described as “nerimo” (to accept with pleasure) or “sepih ing pamrih rame
ing gawe” (“to work diligently without expecting return”). Ikhlas means to accept
everything (bad and good fortune, livelihood) that God gives with equanimity.
Thus, in a pesantren studying and teaching should be based on ikhlas. Kyais
and ustadhs are happy to teach, while students are glad to learn. Teachers are
paid little but are happy with their modest salary because they believe that a
small amount of money earned with berkah (God’s blessing) will be sufficient to
sustain their life. A pesantren community believes that a person’s fate has been
determined by God. This implies that every activity should be done in order to
gain God’s blessing and satisfaction (rida’). Ikhlas, no doubt, directs a pesantren
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community to the world hereafter. All activities in this world should be oriented
to life in the Hereafter.
The kyai he holds absolute authority in his pesantren. He is the one who
decides everything also whether or not he accepts changes in the educational
system he uses in the pesantren. With his deep religious knowledge, a kyai
emerges as a charismatic leader. Many people believe that a kyai is endowed
supernatural power that enables him to see unseen matters and to be able
predict the future. Because of his charisma, a student is bound to his kyai for all
his life; he often consults his kyai in practical matters, such as choosing a spouse
or whether or not to accept a job.3
A pesantren has thus three main roles in Muslim society: the production of
‘ulamas, the transmission of religious knowledge, and preserving the Islamic
tradition.4 As discussed in Chapter Three, an ‘ulama is a person knowledgeable in
religion. Although recently some popular preachers with a secular educational
background have emerged, pesantrens continue to produce ‘ulamas in the
traditional meaning of the word: religious specialists. This production of ‘ulama
relates to a pesantren’s second role, the transmission of religious knowledge.
The major subjects taught in a pesantren concern religious sciences, mainly
‘aqida (Islamic creed), fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), hadith (Prophetic tradition),
tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis), and tasawuf (Islamic mysticism). The Arabic language
as a requirement to master these sciences, no doubt, is necessary as well. The
last role, preserving Islamic tradition is undeniable. Islamic traditions, such as
khaul, tahlilan, qira’a (methods of reciting the Qur’an) are kept alive in pesantren.
In sum, a pesantren functions as a bastion in which Islam is guarded.
The above description of pesantren sketches the old perception of pesantren.
With few exceptions, since a few decades, pesantren have changed through the
adoption of the graded educational system and the inclusion of secular sciences.
The pesantren’s role has also expanded to include community development.
These changes have caused pesantren to be more inclusive in accepting new
ideas and teaching methods as well as in the contents of the curriculum. Have
these trending changes also affected Salafi pesantren? How does Salafi pesantren
respond to these changes? These questions will be addressed in this chapter.
The idea behind the founding of Salafi pesantrens was to nurture a Salafi
generation capable of preaching the Salafi manhaj. This aspiration is apparent,
3
4
Wahid, “Pesantren sebagai Subkultur”, pp. 40-42.
Azyumardi Azra, Pendidikan Islam, Tradisi dan Modernisasi Menuju Milenium Baru,
Jakarta, Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2002, p. 104.
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for example, in the goal of Pesantren Imam Bukhari, “to create a generation of
knowledge seekers (talib ‘ilm) who adhere to the Salafi manhaj in faith, rituals,
ethics, social interactions, and da’wa.”5 Through the pesantren system, Salafis
educate their ustadhs all day long. The pesantren creates an environment
conducive to learning: the ustadhs live on campus under the control of the
kyai, teachers, administrators and senior ustadhs. Here, the students can see for
themselves examples of good conduct, such as performing collective prayers,
reading the Qur’an, and wearing appropriate clothing. Thus, educators can
implant Islamic values in their students and control their behaviour. When a
student behaves improperly or contradicts the Salafi manhaj, his teachers will
remind him instantly. It is through this mechanism that the students internalize
the Salafi manhaj in their daily lives.
In Chapter Four, we have discussed how Salafi pesantrens developed and how
local people respond to the rise of pesantrens. In this chapter, I will look at the
“contents” of the Salafi pesantrens by exploring their educational programs,
curricula, textbooks, and students’ activities. This chapter will also discuss the
ways in which pesantrens instil Salafi doctrines into their students, and support
them in their practice of the Salafi manhaj in daily life.
A. Educational Programs
Salafi pesantrens offer all levels of education, from pre-school to university.
Pesantrens affiliated with so-called ‘rejectionist’ Salafis usually have less
programs, comprising Tahfiz (memorizing the Qur’an), Tadrib al-Du’at
(Preacher Training) and Tarbiyat al-Nisa’ (Women’s Education), while those
associated with the so-called ‘cooperationist’ Salafis offer a wider range of
programs from kindergarten to university. However, some pesantrens offer
specific programs only. Pesantren Minhajus Sunnah in Bogor, for example,
only runs the Tadrib al-Du’at program. In general, pesantrens affiliated with
‘cooperationist’ Salafis are more flexible in accommodating the national
curriculum and include general subjects into their curriculum. This policy aims
at gaining government recognition for their programs. In contrast, pesantrens
associated with ‘rejectionist’ Salafis are more exclusive, focussing on teaching
religious knowledge only. Secular subjects taught in the latter group are limited
to Indonesian language and mathematics. The methods of learning also sharply
5
“Membentuk generasi Thalibul ‘Ilmi yang bermanhaj Salaf dalam Berakidah,
Beribadah, Berakhlaq, Bermu’amalah dan Berdakwah”, see, http://www. Bukhari.
id/, accessed on 17 October, 2011.
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differ between these two types of pesantrens: while the former applies a grading
system, the latter employs the halaqa method.
Pesantren al-Furqan offers all levels of education: kindergarten, Tahfiz,
Mutawassitah (junior high school), Tsanawiyah (senior high school),6 Takhassus
(special program), and Ma’had ‘Aly (Islamic higher school). The Tahfiz is a six-year
program that focuses on memorizing the Qur’an, and is equivalent to elementary
school. Established in 1999, the program was initially open to santriwatis (female
students) only, but since 2003, the program has started to accept santris (male
students) as well. The program aims to produce graduates who have memorized
the Qur’an. In addition to this, elementary religious knowledge, such as ‘aqida
(Islamic creed), akhlaq (ethics), hadith (Prophetic tradition) and fiqh (Islamic
jurisprudence), are taught. The only secular sciences taught are Indonesian
language and mathematics. However, the demands of some parents who are
anxious about their children’s future education have brought about significant
changes. Some parents proposed the incorporation of more general subjects
into the curriculum so that their children can obtain certificates and enrol at
higher education levels. Accordingly, male students who used to only memorize
the Qur’an (Tahfiz) and to study religious knowledge have recently also been
taught general subjects, such as basic social and natural sciences, mathematics,
Indonesian language and civic education. The textbooks for these materials are
the same as those used in public schools. However, the female program retains
its original design and is only complemented by mathematics and Indonesian
language. This different policy reflects a different educational orientation
between boys and girls, as the latter are educated only to be ‘good girls’. The
inclusion of secular knowledge, though limited, puts a heavier burden on
pesantren students than on those of public schools. While students of public
schools only study secular subjects and one obligatory religious subject, called
the Pendidikan Agama Islam (Islamic Knowledge Education), pesantren students
have to study both religious and secular sciences. In the final examination, they
should pass in all subjects. A lack of competent teachers able of teaching secular
sciences, together with the minimum facilities and teaching media available
6
Some Salafi pesantrens utilize the Middle Eastern nomenclatures for the
educational programs. They prefer to use the terms Ibtida’iyyah, Mutawassitah and
Tsanawiyyah, instead of Ibtida’iyyah, Tsanawiyyah and ‘Aliyah which are officially
used by the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. In addition to
this indicating a Middle Eastern influence, the use of Middle Eastern nomenclature
is intended to avoid administrative confusion, since these pesantrens expect
mu’adala (recognition) from Middle Eastern universities.
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often causes pesantren students’ to have an inadequate command of secular
subjects.7
Despite the factors described above, the Ministry of Religious Affairs has
recognized that Pesantren al-Furqan’s Tahfiz program is a Salafiya8 institution
that runs a basic education program. Responding to the rapid growth of
pesantrens that exclusively offer programs teaching religious subjects, the
Ministry of Religious Affairs has recently incorporated these programs into the
national programs of the Salafiya Ula (traditional elementary school), Salafiya
Wusta (traditional junior high school), and Salafiya ‘Ulya (traditional senior high
school). These are equivalent to Madrasah Ibtida’iyyah, Madrasah Tsanawiyah and
Madrasah Aliyah through the Package A, B, and C programs respectively. The
Package A, B and C programs are non-formal educational programs equivalent to
elementary school, junior high school, and senior high school, respectively. The
programs are managed and supervised by the Ministry of National Education.
They were initially created to accommodate adults who had no opportunity
to go to school in their childhood and when they were in their teens, and
school-aged teenagers or drop-outs who cannot enrol in the formal education
system for whatever reason. Subsequently, however, the scope of the programs
expanded to include special programs on certain subjects, such as the Tahfiz
program. Through these Packages, pesantrens can maintain their characteristic
teaching of religious knowledge while adopting the more general subjects of
the social and natural sciences, mathematics, Indonesian language, English, and
civic education.9 Hence, the alumni of the Tahfiz program are equivalent to the
graduates of the Madrasah Ibtida’iyah through the Package A program.10
The higher programs (Mutawassitah, Tsanawiyah, and Ma’had ‘Aly) at al-Furqan
are solely devoted to Islamic subjects. The Mutawassitah program is designed to
last two years and is equivalent to junior high school. Students who wish to study
7
This describes the general condition in Islamic educational institutions. Generally,
Islamic educational institutions suffer from a shortage of financial means, facilities
and teaching staff. See for example, Elisabeth Jackson and Lyn Parker, “‘Enriched
with knowledge’: Modernisation, Islamisation and the Future of Islamic education in
Indonesia”, Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2008), pp. 28-29.
8 Here, “Salafiya” means “traditional”, in contrast to modern educational institutions
with a grade system. Thus, Salafiya institution means “traditional institution”.
9 For more details on the curriculum of the Packages, see, Acuan Kurikulum Pendidikan
Kesetaraan, Program Paket A, B dan C, Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, 2006,
pp. 14-76.
10 Interview with Anwari Ahmad, deputy director of Pesantren al-Furqan, Gresik,
December 24, 2008.
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at this level are not required to bring any entry certificate. The Tsanawiyah is a
three-year program and is equivalent to senior high school. Having graduated
from the Tsanawiyah, male students continue to the highest program, the
Ma’had ‘Aly, a three year program, while female students do not continue but are
awarded the pesantren’s certificate. In addition, the pesantren provides a special
program (Takhassus) to prepare non al-Furqan alumni who wish to study in the
Tsanawiyah. In fact, many students of this program are alumni of public Senior
High Schools, or university students who want to pursue religious studies. The
program focuses on teaching Arabic and Islamic knowledge. In 2008, the total
number of students reached more than 500. Each student has to pay IDR. 150.000
(US $ 15.00) per month for tuition fees, accommodation and meals.11
Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari in Ciamis offers four programs: Kindergarten,
Tahfiz, Tadrib al-Du’at and Tarbiyat al-Nisa’. The Salafi kindergarten is just like any
public one, except that the Salafi kindergarten teaches Salafi doctrines in a very
simple way: memorizing some important prayers based on accepted hadiths only;
prohibiting children from drawing living creatures, such as people and animals;
prohibiting children from singing songs; and separating girls from boys and
putting them in separate classes. These children are taught by female teachers
who wear a niqab (headscarf covering their face), but take the niqab off during
their teaching in the classroom. During my visit to the pesantren, I saw one girl
wearing a niqab, while the rest sported a simple jilbab (veil). In December 2008, 70
children attended the program. Each student had to pay IDR 125,000 (about US$
14.00) for enrolment and IDR 10,000 (about US$ 1.00) as monthly tuition fee.
The Tahfiz program of Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari is the same as that at Pesantren
al-Furqan. The only difference is that al-Nur al-Atsari does not award certificates
to its alumni. By adopting this policy, the pesantren wants to emphasize that the
objective of study is to seek knowledge and not to obtain a certificate. For further
study, the students can continue at few other Salafi pesantrens such as Pesantren
Ansharus Sunnah in Batam, Riau islands, and Pesantren Salafiya in Jember, East
Java which provide higher levels of study, and which do not require any certificate.
The students of the Tahfiz program are taught by senior students of the Tadrib alDu’at program. When I visited the pesantren in December 2008, the program was
attended by 32 students. Each of them paid IDR 170,000 (US$ 19.00) monthly for
tuition fees, meals and accommodation.12
11 Interview with Ahmad Sabiq, senior teacher at Pesantren al-Furqan, December 25, 2008.
12 Interview with Malik al-Banjari (Agus Iskandar), a teacher of the Tahfiz program,
Banjarsari, December 12, 2008.
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The Tadrib al-Du’at (Training for Preachers) seems to be the main program
of the pesantren. It is open for teenagers who have completed the Mutawassitah
program, and adult students. Many are alumni of senior high schools. The
pesantren does not set a specific time to join the program and thus a student
can start and leave the program at any time. A new student can simply join
the lessons given by the teachers without the requirement of having attended
earlier courses. Senior students eagerly help new ones, especially in Arabic.
Abdurrahman, a senior student from Tangerang, Banten, who has attended the
program for four years, tells me that he often temporarily leaves the pesantren
to work in his hometown. When he has a sufficient amount of money, he returns
to the pesantren to continue his studies.13 Students usually leave the pesantren
for a number of reasons, such as being satisfied with their knowledge and
feeling ready to preach the Salafi manhaj in their community, or to move to
another pesantren. In December 2008, there were 35 participants of the program
comprising of four batches. Most students came from Ciamis and surrounding
districts, while others came from other islands such Lampung (Sumatra), Ambon
and Pontianak (Kalimantan). Although students of Tadrib al-Du’at pay only IDR
35,000 (about US $ 4.00) per month, many of them cannot afford even this. Those
who cannot afford it can do some extra work, such as growing vegetables in the
rice fields, cooking, and assisting the pesantren staff with administrative affairs.
The low cost and flexibility of this pesantren attract many students.14
The Tadrib al-Du’at program has no specific curriculum. The curriculum is
decided upon by each teacher personally. Usually, the teacher teaches two or
three subjects using a textbook. The pesantren applies the mulazama method,
in which students meet the teacher for specific lessons. The teacher reads the
books from the beginning to the end and gives his own explanation. Meanwhile
the students listen to the teacher’s explanation and write important comments
in their own textbooks. Because of the adoption of the mulazama method, the
courses depend on the availability of teachers: when a teacher is absent for
whatever reason, the class will automatically be cancelled. This system makes it
uncertain when the students can finish the program.
The objective of the Tarbiyat al-Nisa’ program is to prepare female students to
become good wives for their husbands, so that they can support their husband’s
activities, particularly in preaching Salafism. In general, subject matters for
13 Interview with Abdurrahman, a senior student, Banjarsari, December 12, 2008.
14 Interview with Abdul Hakim, a senior student of Tadrib al-Du’at, Banjarsari,
December 11, 2008.
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female students are similar to those of male students. However, the pesantren
teaches female students on specific issues on womanhood, by using Sheikh
Muqbil’s ‘Nasiha li al-Nisa’ (Advice for Women). The gender relationship between
wife and husband is essential in this matter. Moreover, the pesantren also trains
the girls various skills such as sewing and cooking.
The subject on womanhood receives great attention. The Salafis allocate
special space for women affairs in their magazines. The oldest Salafi magazine,
Assunnah, for example, has a special supplement for women. Articles for women
include various rubrics, such as ‘Shakhsiyya’ (‘Personality’) and ‘Baytuna’ (‘Our
Home’). The first rubric presents various female figures like the Companions’
wives; the second discusses topics such as family affairs and children’s education.
The Fatawa magazine, published by the Bin Baz Center, has the ‘Keluarga Sakinah’
(‘Harmonious Family’) rubric, Salafy magazine publishes materials for women
under the ‘Muslimah’ heading, and Asy-Syari’ah has the ‘Sakinah’ (‘Harmony’)
rubric. Since 2007, Pesantren al-Furqan has published al-Mawaddah (‘Love’), a
special magazine for women.
All these rubrics discuss issues dealing with women, ranging from the Salafis’
views on women to creating a harmonious family, to rituals practices and child
education. Salafis’ perception on women is recurrent theme of discussion. In
general, Salafis view that Islam truly respects women. This respect takes various
forms, including regulating relationships between men and women, and special
women’s dress. In the al-Furqan magazine, Ahmad Sabiq, for example, wrote an
article ‘Keagungan Wanita dalam Naungan Islam’ [Grandeur of Women in the
Shadow of Islam], where he refutes the notion that Islam does not respect women.
His argues that Islam rejects the pre-Islamic tradition of killing daughters at
birth.15 To respect them, Islam orders women to cover their ‘awra (parts of
the body that should be covered). Discussion on this matter often appears in
Salafi periodicals.16 To build a ‘harmonious family’, a good relationship between
husband and wife is essential and in this context, the wife’s obedience to her
husband is of paramount importance. Submission to her husband leads a wife
to enter paradise.17 Moreover, when a wife encounters the dilemma between
dedication to her parents and submission to her husband, she must choose
15 Ahmad Sabiq bin Abul Lathif Abu Yusuf, “Keagungan Wanita dalam Naungan Islam,”
Al-Furqan, No. 09, Vol.VI, 2007, pp. 57-58.
16 See, for example, “Aurat Wanita di Hadapan Laki-laki Asing (Bukan Mahram)”,
Salafy, No. 7, Vol. 5, pp. 77-81.
17 See for example, Ahmad Sabiq bin Abul Lathif Abu Yusuf, “Ukhti…Raihlah Surgamu”,
Al-Furqan, No, 7, Vol. 5, 2006, pp. 57-61.
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compliance to her husband.18 In their argumentation, Salafis refer to a hadith
narrated by Ibn Majah and al-Tirmidhi which says: if human beings were allowed
to bow to other creatures than God, the Prophet would have ordered a wife to
bow to her husband.19
Unlike the other two pesantrens, Pesantren Assunnah is managed
professionally, employing qualified teachers in general subjects and using
advanced teaching instruments such as multi-media. In 1996, it launched
its first program, Taman Kanak-kanak Islam Terpadu (TKIT, Integrated Islamic
Kindergarten), followed by Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu (SDIT, Integrated
Islamic Elementary School) in 1998. These two take the form of full-day school
programs where the pupils study in the classroom from seven in the morning
to twelve o’clock midday. After this, they have lunch together, pray collectively,
and take a rest. The full-day school was a response to the change of working
hours of private employees and some civil servants from six days to five days
a week. As a consequence, the daily working hours were changed from eight
o’clock in the morning until two o’clock in the afternoon, to seven o’clock in
the morning until four o’clock in the afternoon.20 The kindergarten program
fully adopts the national curriculum as provided by the Ministry of National
Education, combined with Salafi doctrines. Similarly, the SDIT curriculum is set
in line with the national curriculum of the Ministry of National Education in
terms of general knowledge and Salafi elements in religious subjects. In religious
subjects, the pesantren adopts the curriculum developed by Salafi institutions,
such as the al-Irsyad schools in Semarang and Purwokerto, and the al-Safwah
foundation in Jakarta.21 Al-Safwah is a Salafi foundation that supports the spread
of Salafi teachings by producing Salafi textbooks for Salafi pesantrens. Like
other Salafi institutions, al-Safwah often holds Salafi dawras (workshops) for
Salafi teachers.22
The TKIT and SDIT programs are so attractive that many parents who are not
Salafis send their children to the pesantren. In November 2008, there were 220
18 See, Ummu Isqah al-Atsariyah, “Antara Berbakti kepada Orang Tua dan Taat kepada
Suami”, Asy-Syariah, No. 45, Vol. IV, 2008, p. 75.
19 Ahmad Sabiq, “Ukhti…”, p. 60.
20 Interview with Sukarjo Renggo, Cirebon, November 20, 2008
21 Interview with Muhyiddin, teacher at Pesantren Assunnah, Cirebon, November 18,
2008.
22 Noorhaidi Hasan, “Saudi Expansion, the Salafi Campaign and Arabised Islam in
Indonesia”, in Madawi al-Rasheed (ed.), Kingdom without Borders: Saudi political,
religious and media frontiers, London: Hurst and Company, 2008, p. 273.
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children in the TKIT program and 670 students in the SDIT program. Compared
to other private educational institutions in the region, Assunnah’s TKIT and SDIT
are quite expensive. To enrol in Kindergarten, parents have to pay IDR 150,000
(US$ 16.50) in monthly tuition fees and an extra IDR 90,000 (US$ 10.00) for lunch
per month, whereas to attend the SDIT, the students have to pay slightly less for
tuition fees but the same amount for their lunch each month. While state schools
do not charge any tuition fees, other private schools require less payment, ranging
from IDR 30,000 (US $ 3.25) to IDR 80,000 (US$ 9.00) per month.
The parents’ interest in the pesantren is not only ideological but also pragmatic.
They may not care about the pesantren’s Salafi doctrines, but they take into
account the quality of the program and the ethics adopted in the schools. Living
in an urban city like Cirebon, though not a metropolitan, parents still worry about
their children’s morals. The parents are afraid that their children may become
ensnared by moral ‘diseases’, especially drugs abuse and free sex. For this reason,
rather than sending them to public schools and leave them unattended at home
after school hours, they prefer to send their children to the pesantren, leaving
them there all day under the teachers’ control. By doing so, the parents indirectly
control their children and secure their proper behaviour. On their way to the
workplace in the morning, the parents take the children to the pesantren and in
the evening on their way back after work, they take their children back with them.
In this way, the pesantren functions as a childcare institution.
Notwithstanding the pesantren’s efforts to introduce and accustom the
students of Kindergarten and SDIT with the Salafi manhaj, the teachers believe
that Salafi educational program’s goal cannot be achieved by a full-day school
program. The objective of the Salafi educational program is to produce a Salafi
generation and to encourage the practice of the Salafi manhaj in daily life. It also
aims to prepare Salafi teachers and preachers to disseminate the Salafi tenets
among the community. In the full-day school programs, where students attend
from morning to afternoon, the internalization of the Salafi manhaj among the
students cannot be ensured as this process is interrupted if the students are not
supported in their practice of the Salafi manhaj at home. To give an example,
in the pesantren, students are not exposed to songs and are not allowed to
watch television. The continuation of this habit cannot be guaranteed when the
students have returned to their homes where they can watch television, listen
to the radio or a tape recorder, browse the Internet, and read newspapers and
magazines. The majority of the parents are not Salafis and they have no intention
to let their children become Salafis. The goal of these parents in sending their
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children to the pesantren is that their children become armed with religious
knowledge so that they behave well. In addition to a proper command of general
and religious knowledge, a child’s ‘good’ lifestyle, such as performing daily
prayers and reading the Qur’an are sufficient to represent its piety.
Aware of the weaknesses of the full-day school program, in 2004 the pesantren
opened a new program, Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs), followed by Madrasah Aliyah
(MA) three years later in 2007. Unlike the TKIT and SDIT programs, MTs and MA
programs are boarding school programs where all students live in the pesantren.
They not only receive instruction in Salafi doctrines but also practice the Salafi
manhaj in their daily lives. Thus, the pesantren begins preparing Salafi cadres at
the level of MTs and MA. With few exceptions, most parents of MTs and MA pupils
are Salafis. Recently, a significant change has occurred in the MTs program. In the
new enrolment for 2010, the pesantren has set up a non-boarding MTs program.
This policy is based on the assumption that more students would attend the
program if it were not a boarding program. As the SDIT has numerous alumni,
many teachers worry about their future if they are not accommodated by the
Assunnah. The objective was to attract as many students as possible to enrol in
the pesantren, In 2008, there were 41 male students and 56 female students in
the MTs, and 5 male students and 32 female students in the MA. Students at the
MTs and the MA pay IDR 450,000 (US$ 50.00) per month for tuition fees, food,
accommodation, and health services.
In 2007, Pesantren Assunnah established a new program, Ma’had Aly. It is
designed to take two years to complete and annually accepts 10 students only.
This program targets the alumni of public senior high schools who want to
intensively study religious knowledge. While in the first year, they are taught
Arabic and its tools (‘ilm al-alat) such as nahw (grammar) and sarf (morphology),
religious knowledge and the Salafi manhaj. In the second year, they practice da’wa
in mosques in Cirebon. The majority of the alumni of this program continue their
study at the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahun Islam dan Arab (LIPIA, Institute for Islamic
and Arabic Studies) in Jakarta.
The educational fee gives us an indication of the social and economic
background of the students’ families. In low cost pesantrens, such as al-Nur alAtsari and al-Furqan, the majority of students come from lower class families.
Some parents cannot afford it even though they are inexpensive.23 Abdul Hakim,
who has studied at Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari for three years, for example, could
23 Interview with Abdul Malik al-Banjari, teacher of the Tahfiz progam, Banjarsari,
December 12, 2008.
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not pay because he comes from a very poor family. However, he feels very happy
that he could study in Pesantren al-Nur. To compensate, he helps the pesantren
in running its administrative affairs.24 Contrarily, the students in expensive
pesantrens come from middle class families. In Pesantren Assunnah, for example,
I found a student whose parents are lecturers at the State Institute for Islamic
Studies (IAIN). A lecturer, though not rich, can be categorized as middle class.
It is interesting to discuss why Pesantren Assunnah prefers to adopt the
integrated Islamic school rather than the traditional pesantrens al-Furqan
and al-Nur al-Atsari that specifically teach religious knowledge. In general,
the emergence of integrated Islamic schools in Indonesia is a response to the
discontent with the national educational system, which is regarded insufficient
to meet the current demand of grasping the advancement of technology and
science. It is also a reaction to the failure of the national educational system to
shape the students’ morality and protect them from vices, such as free sex and
drugs abuse.25 In order to solve these problems, Muslim activists offer a solution
by creating integrated Islamic schools. Some of these schools adopt the boarding
system, such as Madania and Dwi Warna in Parung, Bogor, West Java, while
others emerge in the form of full-day schools, such al-Azhar, al-Izhar and Labs
School in Jakarta. These schools arm their students with science and technology,
and religious knowledge, putting emphasis on ‘aqida (Islamic theology), ‘ibada
(ritual) and akhlaq (Islamic ethics). However, the establishment of these schools
was also driven by other motives: ideology and economics. Before the emergence
of these schools, it was common among middle class Muslims to send their
children to non-Muslim schools, such as Penabur, Tarakanita, Kanisius and Santa
Ursula. The good education these schools offer was the reason why parents send
their children there. Along with the expansion of urban middle-class Muslims,
their awareness of providing their children with better education grew. Thus,
they started to found integrated Islamic schools to compete with their Christian
counterparts, and targeted children of middle-class Muslims.26
As Hasan has shown, the mission of integrated Islamic school is adopted from the
ideas of Hasan al-Banna, the founder of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, in creating
24 Interview with Abdul Hakim, senior student of the Tadrib al-Du’at program,
Banjarsari, December 11, 2008.
25 Noorhaidi Hasan, “Education, Young Islamist, and Integrated Islamic Schools in
Indonesia”, Studia Islamika, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2002, p. 86.
26 Ismatu Ropi, “Sekolah Islam untuk Kaum Urban: Pengalaman Jakarta dan Banten”,
in Jajat Burhanudin and Dina Afrianty (eds), Mencetak Muslim Modern, Jakarta:
RajaGrafindo Persada in collaboration with PPIM UIN, 2006, pp. 246-248.
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a “rabbani” generation, a generation that is fully aware of the existence of God as
the Creator of the universe. Al-Banna believes that only through a long process
of education a “rabbani” generation can materialize. Young Muslim students in
Indonesia have studied al-Banna and his movement’s ideas since the 1980s to date.
These young activists formed the so-called Tarbiyah (education) movement, in which
they held religious discussions on campuses. Later, the movement transformed into
an Islamic party, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice and Prosperity Party).27 These
activists have found Islamic integrated schools, such as Nurul Fikri in Bandung, West
Java, al-Syifa in Subang, West Java and al-Bayan in Sukabumi, West Java.
In the light of this movement, we understand why Pesantren Assunnah adopts
the integrated Islamic school system. I would argue that Assunnah figures’
engagement in Islamic activism is the reason behind this choice. Two figures
deserve special attention in this context: Ali Hijrah and Muhyiddin. As discussed
in Chapter Four, Ali Hijrah, the founder of Pesantren Assunnah, participated in
the Islamist movement before he converted to Salafism. He was the leader of the
Lembaga Pengembangan Pesantren Kilat (LP3K), an underground neo-Negara
Islam Indonesia (NII, Islamic State of Indonesia) movement, in Cirebon. Being
an activist of this Islamic radical movement, Ali Hijrah became familiar with alBanna’s ideas. Another important figure at Pesantren Assunnah is Muhyiddin
who currently serves as the head of the department of education at the Yayasan
Assunah Cirebon (YAC), a foundation under which the pesantren operates.
Like other teachers at Pesantren Assunnah, in the seventies and the eighties,
Muhyiddin participated in different Islamist movements such as the Muslim
Brotherhood, NII and the Pesantren Kilat movement. In 1990, he converted to
Salafism following the conversion of his leader, Ali Hijrah. He then attended
Salafi ‘itikaf in Pesantren Tengaran and studied Salafism under Ja’far Umar
Thalib, Yusuf Baisa and Yazid Jawas. He learned Salafism in Pesantren Alamus
Sunnah in Bogor from 1996-1997. Before joining Pesantren Assunah, he worked
at the al-Azhar integrated Islamic school in Cirebon for 12 years, from 1992 to
2004, in which in the last four years of that period he served as al-Azhar’s vice
head.28 His experience at al-Azhar was essential in setting up a new integrated
Islamic school and developing the curriculum at the pesantren.
27 On the transformation from the Tarbiyah movement to Partai Keadilan, see Ali
Said Damanik, Fenonema Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di
Indonesia, Bandung: Teraju, 2002; and Imdadun Rahmat, Ideologi Politik PKS: dari
Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen, Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2008.
28 Interview with Muhyiddin, teacher of pesantren Assunnah, Cirebon, November
2008.
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B. Curriculum: Between Middle Eastern Orientation and National Demands
Its curriculum is one of the most important elements of an educational
institution. It reflects the pesantren’s vision and goal. It directs the teachers and
the administrative staffs to achieve the educational objective. The vision of the
pesantren, the national policy on education, and the interests of stakeholders
such as parents and the market, all contribute to the model of the curriculum
developed by education institutions. In the case of a pesantren, the vision of the
pesantren’s founder is influential. It could be said that the type of pesantren’s
curriculum reveals the ideals, way of thinking, and aspirations of its founder.
Salafi pesantrens are no exception.
Traditionally, a pesantren is an Islamic education institution characterized
by some features: a kyai-cantered institution, Islamic-oriented teaching, the use
of halaqa as method of learning without a grading system, and the absence of
a systematic curriculum.29 Responding to the demands of the era, pesantrens
have made reforms as regards curriculum, institution, methods and function.
A number of reasons lie behind the central role of kyais in pesantrens. First, a
pesantren is usually founded by a kyai at his own expense. It may be established
on land that the kyai inherited from his parents or that has been endowed to him.
Second, a kyai’s expertise in religious matters makes him the only authoritative
person in the pesantren. Third, a kyai’s humble appearance. Although some kyais
now live in luxury because of their participation in politics and business, the
majority of kyais still maintain a humble lifestyle which relies on the essential
living value of the pesantren, ikhlas. Last, the community believes a kyai has
supernatural power enabling him to cure diseases with prayers, or to see the
future of one’s fate. With this capital, kyais have become the most charismatic
persons in their pesantrens and in the villages where they live, and they have
the respect of the people.30
Throughout history, Islamic educational institutions in general and pesantren
in particular have encountered serious challenges from public schools and
government policies. In the colonial period, in the 1870s, the Dutch government
introduced public schools, called volksschoolen, which focused on secular sciences
to educate the indigenous peoples and to prepare them for work in government
offices. When the colonial government wanted to expand public schools by
transforming existing Islamic schools, Muslims responded in different ways.
29 See, for example, Abdurrahman Wahid, “Pesantren sebagai Subkultur”, p. 40.
30 Nurhayati Djamas, Dinamika Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia Pascakemerdekaan, Jakarta:
Rajawali Pers, 2009, pp. 21-24.
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Muslims in West Sumatra, for example, responded positively to the policy. On the
contrary, Muslims in Java gave a negative response, accusing the government of
taking Muslims away from their religion. In the early twentieth century, moreover,
pesantrens encountered the internal challenge posed by modernist Muslims
who established modern schools in the form of public schools with religious
subjects, and modern madrasahs (Islamic schools). In the face of these challenges,
pesantrens had no choice but to adjust their systems by adopting a grading system
and by including secular sciences in their curriculum. Some general subjects,
such as English, mathematics and history, were included in some curricula.31
More secular sciences were added into the curriculum in the 1950s, when the
government introduced a new educational policy to incorporate general sciences
into the educational system. In the following years, the pesantrens started to
establish madrasahs on their campuses.32
In 1975, through the Joint Decree of three Ministers (Minister of Education
and Culture, Minister of Religious Affairs, and Minister of Home Affairs) the
government imposed the rule that all basic educational institutions should
provide their students with general sciences. The decree explicitly regulated the
madrasah curriculum: they were to offer 70% general sciences and 30% religious
knowledge. The aim of this decree was to lift the quality of the madrasah to
the same level as that of public schools, and hence, madrasah graduates could
continue their education at a higher level at public schools.33 The joint decree was
a response to Muslims’ harsh criticism towards a previous Presidential Decree
(Keputusan Presiden or Keppres), No. 34 of 1975, and Presidential Instruction
(Instruksi Presiden or Inpres), No. 15 of 1974, which proposed the integration of
all educational institutions under the Ministry of Education and Culture. The
joint decree thus secured the position of Islamic education under the authority
of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. It was followed by another joint decree by
two Ministers (Minister of Education and Culture, and Minister of Religious
31 See, Karel Steenbrink, Pesantren, Madrasah and Sekolah, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986, pp. 23-25;
Azyumardi Azra, Pendidikan Islam, p. 97-100; Robert W. Hefner, “Islamic Schools, Social
Movements and Democracy in Indonesia”, in Robert W. Hefner (ed.), Making Modern
Muslims: the Politics of Islamic Education in Southeast Asia, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i
Press, 2009, pp. 62-63.
32 Azyumardi Azra, Pendidikan Islam, pp. 101-103.
33 Azyumardi Azra, Dina Afrianty and Robert W. Hefner, “Pesantren and Madrasa:
Muslim Schools and National Ideals in Indonesia”, in Robert W. Hefner and
Muhammad Qasim Zaman (eds) Schooling Islam: the Culture and Politics of Modern
Muslim Education, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 186.
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Affairs) in 1984 that provided further regulations for the national curriculum in
public and Islamic schools. It stipulated that the curriculum of Islamic schools
should be similar to that of public school in general subjects. In 1989, the
National Educational System Law (Undang-Undang Sistem Pendidikan Nasional),
incorporated madrasahs into the national education system as public schools
with Islamic characteristics. Following this law, the government produced the
1994 curriculum, allocating religious subjects to range from 16 per cent to 18 per
cent of the school hours. Madrasah students should learn all general subjects. In
the new the National Educational System Law of 2003, madrasahs became part
of the national educational system.
Responding to these regulations, pesantrens no doubt had to make adjustments
and had to adapt in order to survive. Pesantrens have made reforms in terms of
curriculum, methodology, institution and function. They continue to include
more subjects, such as social and natural sciences, mathematics, the Indonesian
language, and even vocational subjects, in their curriculum. Endowment Boards
(Badan Wakaf) or Foundations (Yayasan) have been established, which are
responsible for the future of pesantrens, and for establishing madrasahs and
Islamic schools within pesantrens. Although the role of the kyais have remained
central in pesantrens, the presence of Endowment Boards or Foundations has
distributed the authority over many people: a pesantren no longer exclusively
belongs to a kyai as its founder. In terms of the method of teaching and learning,
pesantrens have also adopted the grading system so that the students can finish
their studies within a given time. The role of pesantrens has expanded beyond their
traditional role of transmitting religious knowledge, producing ‘ulama (religious
scholar), and preserving Islamic traditions. The pesantrens now cover community
development as well as economic development.34 Thus, to follow the assessment
of Robert Hefner, an American anthropologist who currently pays much attention
to Islamic education in Indonesia, the government’s decrees on education have
changed the orientation of Islamic educational institutions from producing
religious scholars to producing pious labour in line with market demands.35
While most pesantrens accommodate national interests by the inclusion
of non-religious subjects in their curriculum, some pesantrens have remained
34 Azyumardi Azra, Pendidikan Islam, Tradisi dan Modernisasi Menuju Milenium Baru, pp.
104-105.
35 Robert W. Hefner, “Islamic Schools, Social Movements and Democracy in Indonesia”,
p. 66; Muhaimin AG, et.al., Madrasah Tafaqquh Fiddin, Jakarta: Gaung Persada Press,
n.d, p. 1.
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consistent in their nature. These have ignored the grading system and focused
on religious knowledge only. Among these few pesantrens is Pesantren Lirboyo
in Kediri, East Java. Although the pesantren has independently developed new
schools and madrasahs within the pesantren compound to teach non-religious
subjects, Pesantren Lirboyo itself still maintains its original program and teaches
only the religious subjects. This program remains at the core of the pesantren.
However, this choice is not without consequences. The spectrum of jobs available
for the alumni of this pesantren will mainly be in religious positions, such as
preachers and teachers.
How have Salafi pesantrens responded to the government policies regarding
the educational system? In general, the Salafi pesantrens can be classified into
two currents. The first is represented by pesantrens which are affiliated with socalled ‘cooperationist’ Salafis, such as Pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon, Pesantren
al-Furqan in Gresik, Pesantren Imam Bukhari in Solo, and Pesantren al-Irsyad
Tengaran in Salatiga. This group of pesantrens has adopted the national policy
of education by the inclusion of non-religious subjects. They not only include
non-religious subjects in their curriculum, but also apply a grading system.
This adoption of national policies aims at gaining the government’s recognition
of their programs. In order to get government legitimacy, the pesantrens
furthermore have to take part in national examinations. Thus, for example,
Pesantren Assunnah takes part in the national examination held by the Ministry
of Religious Affairs, while the students of Pesantren Imam Bukhari participate
in the national examination provided by the Ministry of National Education.
On the other hand, these pesantrens have adopted religious materials from
Saudi Arabia. Again, the adoption of these materials aims at obtaining mu’adala
(accreditation) from Saudi Arabian universities. To obtain this recognition,
the pesantrens have to teach some of the materials taught in Saudi Arabian
madrasahs. For this purpose, some Salafi pesantrens, such as Pesantren Imam
Bukhari, use textbooks published by the Saudi Arabian Wazarat al-Ma’arif
(Ministry of Education). This effort has resulted in receiving mu’adala from the
Islamic University of Medina (Saudi Arabia) on July 31, 2011.36 A more pragmatic
reason lies behind this adoption: to pursue financial support from Middle
Eastern countries. Many Salafi pesantrens have received significant amounts of
money from charitable foundations in the Middle East, particularly the Jam’iyya
Ihya’ al-Turath in Kuwait, and the Mu’assasat ‘Aid Al Thani in Qatar.
36 http://www.bukhari.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36,
accessed on November 9, 2011.
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The second current is represented by pesantrens associated with ‘rejectionist’
Salafis, or former Laskar Jihad activists, such as Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari in
Ciamis, Pesantren al-Anshar in Yogyakarta, and Pesantren al-Bayyinah in Gresik,
East Java. This group of pesantrens has retained their original pesantren style
that teaches religious subjects only. Instead of adopting the national curriculum,
these pesantrens preferred to adopt the Darul Hadith curriculum of Sheikh
Muqbil in Dammaj, Yemen. These pesantrens even try to imitate the Dammaj
model of learning, including materials and methods.
Viewed from the perspective of educational system reform, this type of Salafi
pesantren can be considered a setback. However, this type of pesantren can also
be understood as an effort to revitalize pesantrens’ traditional roles: transmitting
religious knowledge, preserving the Islamic tradition and producing ‘ulama. As
noted earlier, the pesantren’s adoption of a grading system with the inclusion of
religious subjects, as many scholars see it, has changed the ustadh’s orientation
from mastering religious teachings to simply obtaining a certificate. The burden
of the students has doubled and makes them inadequate in mastering both
religious and secular sciences. Thus, in the decrease of the student’s command of
religious sciences, the emergence of Salafi pesantrens with a focus on religious
subjects may be seen as an attempt to revitalize pesantrens’ core role.
It is clear from the discussion above that the curriculum in Salafi pesantrens is a
mix of a Middle Eastern orientation and national demands. The orientation towards
the Middle East is not merely encouraged by ideological considerations but also by
pragmatic ones. This means that the adoption of Middle Eastern curricula aims to
not only disseminate Salafi doctrines, but also to achieve mu’adala and financial
grants. Meanwhile, the adoption of national curricula is intended to attract more
students to enrol.
The discussion of the curriculum of Salafi pesantrens shows that these
pesantrens function as “hub[s] in a transnational network.”37 As a hub, a pesantren
has become an axis where many currents of religious thoughts and ideas meet
and then spread to diverse directions. A pesantren has become a place where
students from different regions come to learn, and then depart to wider areas. A
pesantren is connected to its counterparts both inside and outside the country
through many ways of affiliations, such as teacher-disciple or disciple-alma
37 Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen, “Behind the Walls:
Re-Appraising the Role and Importance of Madrasas in the World Today”, in idem
(eds), The Madrasa in Asia: Political Activism and Transnational Linkage, Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 2008, p. 17.
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mater relations, and collegial affiliation. Salafi teachers at the pesantren often
require fatwas from their sheikhs in the Middle East, and send their students to
pursue higher education in their alma mater. Salafi sheikhs from the Middle East
and Salafi teachers attend annual dawra held by every Salafi group throughout
Indonesia which is another form of this transnational network. Attendance
in such annual dawra gives a strong feeling to those present that they belong
to transnational Islam. Collegial bonds create mutual support between Salafi
pesantrens through teacher and student exchange. Thus, it is hard to imagine
in today’s connected world that pesantrens are isolated religious institutions.
Pesantren and madrasah are always linked to other educational institutions.
To provide a different perspective on pesantrens, a comparison with modern
pesantrens, namely Pondok Gontor and Pesantren Ngruki, is needed. Though
Gontor is not a Salafi pesantren, as discussed in Chapter Two, it has become
an important factor in the spread of Salafism. Meanwhile, Ngruki is “haraki”
Salafism. Pondok Gontor offers the Kuliyyat al-Mu’allimin al-Islamiyyah (KMI,
Islamic Teachers Training), a six-year program equivalent to the Madrasah
Tsanawiyyah and Madrasah Aliyah programs. Since its establishment, Gontor has
applied a graded system and has incorporated general sciences in its curriculum.
Pondok Gontor initially educated only male students, but since 1990, Gontor has
accepted female students as well who are trained in a special campus located far
away from the male one, in Mantingan, Ngawi, East Java, about 100 kilometres
from Gontor. In 1963, Gontor established the Insititut Pendidikan Darussalam
(IPD, Darussalam Institute of Education) which was later transformed into the
Institut Studi Islam Darussalam (ISID, Darussalam Institute for Islamic Studies)
and has three faculties: Education, Theology and Shari’a.
Like other pesantrens, Gontor teaches all religious subjects such as fiqh, usul
al-fiqh, hadith, tafsir, and ‘aqida. Arabic has become its benchmark, and hence
it teaches Arabic tools such as nahw, sarf, and balagha. However, Gontor uses
books, which is unusual in traditional pesantrens, such as al-Fiqh al-Wadih, and
al-Nahw al-wadih. Because of this, many people criticize Gontor as it does not use
the so-called ‘Kitab Kuning’ (‘Yellow Books’, classic textbooks printed on yellow
paper). Countering this critique, Gontor remains consistent. General sciences
such as basic social and natural sciences, mathematics, and English are taught
to the students.
Concerning religious subjects, some materials namely fiqh, usul al-fiqh and aladyan deserve particular attention. After the introductory books learned in the
first two years, students in third and fourth year classes read the Bulugh al-Maram
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by Ibn Hajr al-‘Asqalani, a hadith-based book. The book provides the students
with dalils from hadiths. Moreover, in the fifth and sixth year classes, students
study Ibn Rushd’s work, Bidayat al-Mujtahid, which introduces the students to the
different opinions of Islamic jurisprudences from different schools. By reading
this book, Gontor introduces the students to a broader perspective on Islamic
jurisprudence. Complementary to this subject is usul al-fiqh where pupils study
al-qawa’id al-fiqhiyya (Islamic legal maxims) by which they can put forward
arguments in support of their opinions. Through all these subjects, Gontor has
provided its students with the foundations of Islamic knowledge so that they can
substantiate their opinions and arguments. More important is the subject of aladyan (religions) in which students are introduced to the comparative study of
religions. Although this subject aims at strengthening students’ belief in Islam, the
material used presents a wider perspective of religions.
However, as mentioned earlier, a minor but significant change occurred in
2000. In order to maintain its accreditation from the Islamic University of Medina,
Gontor was forced to incorporate Salafi books. Thus since 2000, Gontor has taught
textbooks written by the Salafi Sheikh Salih Fawzan al-Fawzan, Kitab al-Tawhid, to
the students in classes four, five and six. As a consequence, teachers and students
of Gontor currently have become more familiar with the idea of Salafism.
Pesantren Ngruki wants to combine the good aspects of three Islamic educational
institutions, namely Gontor, Persis Bangil and al-Irsyad. The pesantren aims at
producing so-called ‘ulama ‘amilin fi sabilillah, or Muslim scholars who believe in a
comprehensive teaching of Islam (Islam Kaffa) and implement these teachings in
daily life. Ngruki alumni should have the following characteristics: 1. True ‘aqida
(creed); 2. Correct rituals; 3. Deep knowledge of Islam (tafaqquh fi al-din); 4. Good
conduct; 5. Broad knowledge; 6. Health; 7. Skills and self-reliance; and 8. Ready to
carry out the jihad fi sabil Allah.38 In order to realize this objective, the pesantren pays
particular attention to the following matters: 1. True ‘aqida (Islamic creed); 2. Good
command of religious knowledge based on the Qur’an, the hadith and the practice
of the al-Salaf al-salih; 3. Good command of Arabic; 4. Self-reliance.39
Pesantren Ngruki offers various programs: Kulliyyat al-Mu’allimin/alMu’allimat al-Islamiyyah (KMI), Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs), Madrasah ‘Aliyah
38 http://www.almukmin-ngruki.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=53&Itemid=66, accessed on September 11, 2013.
39 Puslitbang Pendidikan Agama dan Keagamaan, Depag RI, Pondok Pesantren Islam
al-Mukmin Ngruki Solo (Studi tentang Pendidikan, Faham Keagamaan dan Jaringan),
Jakarta: Puslitbang Pendidikan Agama dan Keagamaan, Balitbang Agama dan Diklat
Keagamaan Departemen Agama, 2004, pp. 25-28.
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(MA), Takhassus, and Ma’had ‘Aly. The KMI has become the pesantren’s core
program. Initially, it was designed to last six years, but it changed to a three-year
program in 1995, and is equivalent to the Madrasah Aliyah. As a result, Ngruki
accepts alumni from secondary schools outside the pesantren. Non-Ngruki alumni
who want to enrol in the pesantren must undertake a one year special program
(takhassus) for matriculation in Arabic and religious knowledge. The Madrasah
Tsanawiyah and the Madrasah Aliyah programs are the same as those outside
the pesantren. The programs accommodate the national curriculum in general
sciences, combined with the pesantren’s curriculum in religious knowledge.
What distinguishes Ngruki from Gontor? Ngruki no doubt offers more
diverse programs than Gontor. Like Gontor, Ngruki emphasizes Arabic: Ngruki
uses some Gontor books on Arabic and students and teachers practice it in daily
conversation. Following Persis Bangil, Ngruki replaced the materials on fiqh
with Qur’an and the hadith studies.40 Moreover, Ngruki teaches its students the
doctrines of Salafism, particularly its tawhid and the concept of al-wala’ wa albara’. The division of tawhid into tawhid al-rububiyya, al-uluhiyya and al-asma’ wa
al-sifat is also taught to the students. The pesantren adopts materials provided
by the Institute of the Study of Islam and Arabic (LIPIA).41 However, Ngruki, or
more precisely Ba’asyir, has spent some more thought on what full belief in
tawhid entails, in particular with regards to God’s governance on earth. First,
God is the Creator of the universe, and hence all power belongs to God only.
Second, governance on earth should be based on divine laws. Third, all man-made
laws violate God’s laws. Fourth, making references to man-made laws in finding
answers and solutions for governance amounts to assigning God’s positions and
His Laws to a lower level. Finally, political association and mobilization that are
not intended to maintain the basic doctrine of tawhid is similar to demoting
God’s position to a lower level and is considered an act of shirk (polytheism)
and hence un-Islamic.42 Considering these implications, I would say that Ngruki
40 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Divergent Paths from Gontor: Muslim Educational
Reform and the Travails of Pluralism in Indonesia’, in: Freek L. Bakker and Jan
Sihar Aritonang (eds), On the Edge of Many Worlds [Festschrift Karel A. Steenbrink],
Zoetermeer: Meinema, 2006, note number 25, p. 197, available online at: http://
www.hum.uu.nl/medewerkers/m.vanbruinessen/publications/Bruinessen_
Divergent_paths_from_Gontor.pdf.
41 Interview with Wahyuddin, 27 September 2012.
42 Farish A. Noor, “Ngruki Revisited: Modernization and Its Discontent at Pondok
Pesantren al-Mukmin of Ngruki, Surakarta”, Working Paper Series at S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, Singapore, No. 139, October 2007, pp. 19-20.
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adopts the fourth aspect of tawhid, tawhid al-mulikiyya or hakimiyya. As discussed
in Chapter One, tawhid al-mulikiyya means that only God governs the earth and a
ruler has no choice but to implement God’s laws.
The doctrine of al-wala’ wa al-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal) is one of the main
differences between Ngruki and Gontor. While Gontor does not specifically
teach this concept, Ngruki pays special attention to this matter. In Ngruki, the
students read “al-Wala’ wa al-Bara’ fi al-Islam by M. Sa’id al-Qahtani.43 As discussed
in Chapter One, al-wala’ wa al-bara’ is one of the basic Salafi doctrines. It teaches
Muslims to love and help fellow Muslims and to work in the interest of Islam
while at the same time, Muslims should display their hatred of non-Muslims.
Wahyuddin admits that pesantren Ngruki not only teaches this doctrine to the
students, but also encourages them to implement it in daily life.44 As a result,
students reject Western cultures and other symbols associated with the West.
One student of Ngruki, for example refuses to eat at Kentucky Fried Chicken, a
widespread American franchise restaurant in Indonesia.45
Pesantren Ngruki also puts strong emphasis on jihad, and supports its students
to carry out it. In the mid-1990s, the students read the work of Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood, Sa’id Hawwa, ‘Jund Allah’ (Warriors of God). The book provides Muslims
with arguments of the necessity of establishing an Islamic State.46 Quotations from
the Qur’an and short expressions by Muslim activists that encourage jihad are
easily found on the campus. For example, a short expression of three key words
is written on the wall of one building and reads ‘iman, hijrah, jihad’. The three key
words derive from the Qur’an 8:72 that reads “Those who believed and emigrated
and fought for the faith with their property and their persons, in the cause of
Allah, as well as those who gave (them asylum) and aid. These are (all) friends
and protector one of another”. Referring to this verse and other similar verses in
the Qur’an, one may relate ‘iman to the idea of jihad. Although the term ‘jihad’
has a broad meaning, its specific meaning referring to the holy war is inevitable.
Ba’asyir, in his textbook on ‘aqida, for example, writes:
“We have to form a well-organized army…We must prepare weapons…
Fight against satanic human beings is compulsory and must be carried
out seriously with a willingness to sacrifice property and soul. A fighter
43 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Divergent Paths from Gontor,” p. 197.
44 Interview with Wahyuddin, 27 September 2012.
45 Jajang Jahroni, “Merumuskan Modernitas: Kecenderungan dan Perkembangan Pesantren
di Jawa Tengah”, in Jajat Burhanudin and Dina Afrianty (eds), Mencetak Muslim Modern,
Jakarta: Rajawali Pers in collaboration with PPIM UIN Jakarta, 2006, p. 130.
46 Van Bruinessen, ‘Divergent Paths from Gontor”, p. 197.
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has only two intentions in carrying out the jihad: glory and becoming
a martyr.”47
Thus, the difference between Gontor and Ngruki on the one hand and
Salafi pesantrens on the other hand is clear. Gontor’s tendency of teaching the
Salafi ‘aqida is motivated by pragmatism, that is acquiring the mu’adala from
the Islamic University of Medina. While Ngruki’s leaning to Salafism is driven
by its tendency to militant Islam. Ngruki’s adoption of the tawhid al-mulkiyya
distinguishes Ngruki from other Salafi pesantrens.
C. Kitabs Used and Basic Materials
Kitabs (books) Used
As noted earlier, Salafi pesantrens have developed their own curricula,
combining general subjects from the national curriculum with religious matters
adopted from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The textbooks used in Salafi pesantrens
are very different from those studied in traditional pesantrens.48 However, like in
traditional pesantrens, Arabic with its instrumental sciences (‘ilm alat) like nahw
(Arabic grammar) and sarf (morphology) remain essential in their teaching.
Comprehensive modules on Arabic language, the Silsilat Ta’lim al-Lugha al-‘Arabiyya
and al-‘Arabiyya li al-Nashi’in, provided by Saudi Arabia are used in the pesantrens.
Besides the famous books on nahw and sarf such as al-Ajurrumiyya by Muhammad
ibn Daud al-Sanhaji, the work of Ghufran, Talkhis Qawa’id al-Lugha al-‘Arabiyya is also
used in Salafi pesantrens. These instrumental sciences are essential requirements
for students in order to understand religious texts correctly.
Unlike the traditional pesantrens of the Nahdlatul Ulama that put more
emphasis on fiqh, Salafi pesantrens prioritise Islamic faith (‘aqida). The texts used
in this subject are mainly the works of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, such as alUsul al-Thalatha (Three Principles), Kitab al-Tawhid (Book of Islamic Monotheism),
Kashf al-Shubuhat (Disclosure of Dubious Faith and Practices) and Masa’il al-Jahiliyya
(Problems of Ignorance) and their commentaries written by Salafi scholars such
as Muhammad ibn Salih al-Uthaymin and Salih ibn Fawzan ibn ‘Abd Allah alFawzan. In addition to these books, pesantrens use al-‘Aqida al-Wasitiyya (Creed of
Moderation) by Ibn Taymiyya, and its commentary by al-Uthaymin, Sharh al-‘Aqida
47 Quoted from Jajang Jahroni, “Merumuskan Modernitas”, p. 129.
48 For the books used by the traditional pesantrens, see Martin van Bruinessen, “Kitab
Kuning: Books in Arabic Script used in the Pesantren Milieu” in BKI 146, 1990, pp.
226-269.
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al-Wasitiyya, and al-‘Aqida al-Tahawiyya by al-Imam al-Tahawi and its commentary
by Ibn Abi al-‘Izzi. The subject of hadith is seen as second only to ‘aqida. Some
hadith books learned in the Salafi pesantren are similar to those in traditional
pesantrens. Thus, students also read al-Arba’in al-Nawawiya (Forty Hadiths by alNawawi). Where these pesantrens differ from more traditional ones, is that Salafis
select books with commentaries authored by Salafi scholars, such as al-‘Uthaymin.
The two most authoritative hadith collections, the Sahih al-Bukhari and the Sahih
Muslim, are also studied. By emphasizing hadith, Salafi pesantrens teach hadithbased fiqh texts. The works al-Wajiz fi Fiqh al-Sunna wa al-Kitab al-‘Aziz by ‘Abd alAzim ibn Badawi, and ‘Umdat al-Ahkam by Ibn Qudama, with its commentary Taysir
al-‘Allam by ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Salih Alu Bassam, have become the
most widespread reference books for Salafis. Other courses like akhlaq (Islamic
ethics) and Sirat al-Nabiy (History of the Prophet) are also studied. Some pesantrens
also use the famous book on akhlaq, Ta’lim al-Muta’allim by Al-Zarnuji, while for
Islamic history, the Khulasat Nur al-Yaqin by ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Jabbar is read.49
Basic Material and Texts
This section will outline some of the fundamental doctrines of the Salafi manhaj,
which appear in the textbooks used by pesantren students. It also identifies how
the pesantrens teach these doctrines to their students, from an elementary
program to higher ones, ranging from the simplest method of teaching to the most
complicated. Due to the limited sources available, I have chosen the textbooks
used at Pesantren Imam Bukhari in Solo, Central Java. As mentioned earlier, this
pesantren uses materials published by the Wazarat al-Ma’arif in Saudi Arabia.
Although Pesantren Imam Bukahri is not the main pesantren I have studied in
this research as a whole, the textbooks used, particularly for ‘aqida, are similar to
those of other Salafi pesantrens. I have selected only materials on certain subjects:
‘aqida, hadith and fiqh. The reason for this selection is that these subjects remain
the most important subjects to learn in the pesantren.
1. ‘aqida
The texts the students use for this subject derive from the works of
Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, namely al-Usul al-Thalatha, and Kitab al-Tawhid.
49 The first overview on books learned in the Salafi madrasah was made by Noorhaidi
Hasan. See, Noorhaidi Hasan, “The Salafi Madrasas of Indonesia”, in Farish A. Noor,
Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen (eds), The Madrasa in Asia, Amsterdam:
ISIM and Amsterdam University Press, 2008, pp. 260-263.
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The first work is studied by Madrasah Ibtida’iyyah students study the first
work, while the second is studied by the students at the Mutawassitah level.
Since these works have been commented on by numerous Salafi scholars, it
is not certain whose commentary the students learn. What is clear is that the
pesantren adopted the materials provided by the Wazarat al-Ma’arif (Ministry of
Education) in Saudi Arabia.
These materials are introduced to the students of Salafi pesantrens in the
early years of their study. The first grade students of the Madrasah Ibtida’iyyah
learn al-Usul al-Thalatha. The first material they learn is al-Masa’il al-Arba’ (the
Four Subjects). These subjects include al-‘ilm (knowledge), the implementation
of knowledge, the call to this knowledge, and the patience in calling (da’wa) to
this knowledge. The first subject, al-‘ilm, includes three essential objects: God, His
religion, and His messenger (Muhammad).50
The three domains of knowledge are called al-Usul al-Thalatha (the Three
Principles) which, Salafis argue, Muslims are to know correctly. The first
principle is Allah. He is the only God to worship (al-ma’bud) and the Creator
(al-Khaliq) of the universe. The second principle is religion. This knowledge
has three levels: Islam, Iman (faith) and Ihsan (beneficence). Islam is defined as
submission to God with full obedience and free from any act of polytheism.51 It
has five pillars: confession of monotheism, prayer, alms giving, fasting during
Ramadan, and pilgrimage to Mecca.52 Iman is the belief in God. It has more
than seventy manifestations; the highest aspect of which is the confession that
“There is no god to worship but Allah”, and the lowest is to remove a harmful
object from the street.53 Meanwhile, ihsan can be defined in Islamic ethics as the
manifestation of the true way of worshiping God.54 These basic principles, alUsul al-Thalatha, are repeatedly taught to the students of Madrasah Ibtida’iyyah
in the subsequent second, third, fourth and fifth grades.55
50 See, Ma’had Imam al-Bukhari, Muqarrar al-Tawhid wa al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Awwal alItbida’i, Solo: n.d., p. 1.
51 Ma’had Imam al-Bukhari, Muqarrar al-Tawhid wa al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Awwal al-Itbida’i, p.12.
52 Ma’had Imam al-Bukhari, Muqarrar al-Tawhid wa al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Awwal al-Itbida’i, p.12.
53 Ma’had Imam al-Bukhari, Muqarrar al-Tawhid wa al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Awwal al-Itbida’i. P. 15.
54 The textbook does not provide a clear-cut definition of ihsan. Quoting a famous
hadith on the coming of the angel Gabriel to the Prophet asking about these three
principles (Islam, Iman and ihsan), the text simply describes the term ihsan by the
following explanation: “To worship God as if you see Him, or if you do not see Him,
He truly sees you.” Ma’had Imam al-Bukhari, Muqarrar al-Tawhid, p. 16.
55 Ma’had Imam al-Bukhari, Muqarrar al-Tawhid , pp. 1-4.
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This subject is addressed through a very simple method: a short and brief
explanation, like a definition, followed by dalil (argument) from the Qur’an and
the hadith. In some cases, the lesson is formulated as a dialogue, with questions
and answers. To give an example, when describing the first principle, God, the
text reads as follows:
If you are asked: “Who is your God?”
Say, “My God is Allah who educates me and all creatures with His
blessing. Allah is my Lord, and I have no lord but Him.”
The argument is the Qur’an [1:2] that reads: “Praise be to Allah, the
Cherisher and Sustainer of the worlds”
The text follows:
If you are asked: “How do you know your God?”
Say: “From His signs and creatures. Among His signs are night, day, sun,
moon. Whereas among His creatures, are the seven heavens and earth,
and whoever lives between these heavens and earth and whatever is
available on them.”
The dalil is the Qur’anic verse: among His Signs are the Night and the
Day, and the Sun and the Moon. Prostrate not to the Sun and the Moon,
but prostrate to Allah, Who created them, if it is Him ye wish to serve.56
The lesson for the students of the first year class is complemented by pictures, such
as those of the moon and the stars. The teachers require students to memorize the
lesson. To evaluate the students’ adequate command of what is taught, some questions
are posed at the end of each lesson.
The content of tawhid (Islamic monotheism) for the students of the first year
class to the fifth year class is quite similar. It consists of the al-Masa’il al-Arba’ and
the al-Usul al-Thalatha. The difference appears in the method of teaching. The
move to further lessons on tawhid takes place in the sixth grade of the Madrasah
Ibtida’iyyah. The students at this level learn the division of tawhid into tawhid
al-rububiyya, tawhid al-uluhiyya and tawhid al-asma’ wa al-sifat.57 Furthermore, they
learn about shirk (polytheism), kufr (unbelief), nifaq (hypocrisy) and their models.
Shirk, the antonym of tawhid, is divided into three types: hidden shirk, lesser
shirk, and greater shirk. Hidden shirk is unseen and insensible. To say: “if God
wishes and if you wish” is included in this type of shirk. The true statement that
56 Ma’had Imam al-Bukhari, Muqarrar al-Tawhid , p. 6.
57 For an explanation on this division, see Chapter one, on the basic principles of the
Salafi tenets.
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must be made is “if God wishes” without the additional phrase “and if you wish”.
Adding the additional phrase would imply that God alone would not be sufficient.
Riya’ (‘to be seen’) is included in lesser shirk. The greater shirk is classified into
four categories: shirk caused by praying to something or someone other than
God (du’a), shirk caused by intention, will and aim (niyyat, iradat, maqsud) that
are directed to other than God; shirk of obedience (al-ta’a); and shirk caused by
loving other entities (mahabba) and thus directing feelings of love away from God.
Similarly, kufr (unbelief) falls into two categories: lesser and greater kufr. While
the first type does not exclude the perpetrator from being a Muslim, the second
kufr does. Nifaq (hypocrite) is also classified into two: i’tiqadi (dogmatic) and ‘amali
(practice). Included in the dogmatic nifaq are the denial of the Prophet, and the
denial of some of the doctrines of the Prophet.58
Another work by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Kitab al-Tawhid, is taught to the students
of the Mutawassitah program (equivalent to junior high school). The students
in the first year class begin theirs with the division of tawhid into tawhid alrububiyya, uluhiyya and al-sifat wa al-asma’,59 and continue with related themes,
such as shirk, and the implementation of tawhid in daily practices. Unlike the
material of tawhid for Ibitida’yyah students, the lesson is presented through
a more advanced method. The lesson starts with quotations from Qur’anic
verses or from the Prophetic tradition, and continues to explain critical words.
Substantial discussions and explanations of the theme come after an explanation
of the vocabulary. The lesson ends with some questions, posed to examine
whether or not the students have understood the lesson.
More forms of the manifestation of tawhid in daily life are taught in
subsequent years. In the second year, students study materials about the
prohibition of shafa’a (asking help from saints and pious Muslims). According
to Salafis, asking shafa’a from the saints and the dead is considered prayer to
another god, and an effort to compare God with other creatures.60 Meanwhile,
in the third year, in the pesantren the students learn about the urgency of the
application of Islamic law in governing society. The textbook, for example,
calls on Muslims for total submission to God, by obeying all His laws from the
Qur’an and the hadith. Belief in Islam is imperfect unless Muslims resort to the
58 Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiya al-Su’udiya, Al-Tawhid wa al-Fiqh wa alHadith li al-Saff al-Sadis al-Ibtida’i, n.p.: 1995, pp. 5-13.
59 Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiya al-Su’udiya, al-Tawhid li al-Saff al-Awwal
al-Mutawwasit, Riyad: 1998, pp. 9-10.
60 Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Tawhid li al-Saff al-Thani al-Mutawwasit, , p. 9.
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Qur’an and the hadith in all aspects of their life: in faith, ‘ibada (rituals), ethics,
mu’amalat (social interactions), and everything else.61 Adopting Islamic laws
will result in fortunes in this world.62 Furthermore, the book says that to judge
by using other laws amounts to judging with taghut (tyrant), and this is a sign
of hypocrisy. Muslims should judge with the shari’a (Islamic law) and be pleased
with this judgment. Any person who does not judge with the shari’a is a kafir
and a mushrik (polytheist). Rather than being beneficial, judging with other laws
will result in damage. The book says that the virtues of human beings and all
other creatures will materialize only when the laws of God as set down in the
Qur’an and the hadith are followed.63 Furthermore, Muslims are not allowed to
humiliate religion and its attributes, such as, for instance, the Qur’an, the hadith
and other religious symbols. Anyone who denigrates the religion is considered a
kafir. Included in this category is to think that the shari’a will not bring human
virtues, mocking men with long beards and women in niqab, and insulting the
Companions of the Prophet.
Outside of the classroom, the students also read other books on tawhid,
such as the Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s Masa’il al-Jahiliyya. The term
jahiliyya derives from the term “jahl” (ignorance), which is the opposite of “ilm”
(knowledge). In this book, matters that have no roots in the Qur’an and the
sunna are discussed64. It also refers to the era before Muhammad’s Prophethood.
The work contains a hundred and twenty eight aspects of the Salafi doctrines,
particularly tawhid. These issues are the beliefs and practices of the Arabs before
Islam, which the Prophet challenged. The first issue, for example, discusses the
practice of the Arabs to ask the pious dead65 to act as mediator between them
and God. According to the author, this practice is considered shirk.
The discussion above shows how Salafi pesantrens introduce the strict
doctrines on tawhid to the students from the very start. The students have to
know all subjects by heart, particularly those on argumentation (dalil). Through
this method, it is not surprising that the students grow capable of providing these
arguments whenever they want. In addition to this, the students should follow
up the lessons by practicing the Salafi creeds in daily life. Thus, as mentioned in
the guidelines for the teachers, the aim of the learning process is not limited to
61
62
63
64
Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Tawhid li al-Saff al-Thalith al-Mutawwasit, p. 26.
Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Tawhid li al-Saff al-Thalith al-Mutawwasit, p. 25.
Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Tawhid li al-Saff al-Thalith al-Mutawwasit, p. 30.
Salih ibn Fawzan ibn ‘Abd Allah Fawzan, Sharh Masa’il Jahiliya, Riyad: Dar al-‘Asima,
2001, pp. 9-10.
65 Salih ibn Fawzan ibn ‘Abd Allah Fawzan, Sharh Masa’il Jahiliya, pp. 20-21,
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merely knowledge transfer, but includes the habituation of practicing what the
students have learned.
The general content of the subjects learned in the Salafi pesantren meet the basic
standards set up by the government. However, the details of the contents differ. The
Ministry of Religious Affairs sets the basic competences for ‘aqida for students of
the Madrasah Diniyyah (religious education institution held in the afternoon) at the
level of Awwaliyah (Elementary level), for example, students have to understand the
six pillars of the Islamic faith (arkan al-iman). The students’ understanding of these
principles must be verified by certain indicators, including the students’ ability to
state these principles with their arguments (dalil). The national standard of the
Madrasah Diniyyah curriculum continues that students must know the twenty
Attributes of God, such as God is Omnipresent, The One, and The Greatest.66 At the
Wusta (Secondary) level, which is equivalent to the Mutawassitah program in Salafi
pesantrens, students continue to learn, in detail, the other pillars of the faith (arkan
al-iman): belief in God’s Messengers, His Books, His Angels, the Hereafter, and Qada
and Qadar (predestination).67 Meanwhile, at the Ulya (high) level, the students learn
the divisions of tawhid into tawhid uluhiyya, rububiyya and ubudiyyah. The students
are also introduced to the schools of Islamic theology, such as Qadariya, Jabariya,
Ash’ariya and Mu’tazila, and Islamic mysticism (Sufism).68
2. Hadith
Hadith is the second most important subject taught in Salafi pesantrens. Although
some pesantrens use the textbooks published by the Ministry of Education of Saudi
Arabia,69 close examination of these materials shows that there is no significant
difference with those learned in non-Salafi pesantrens. What is distinctive is that
the hadith materials are integrated into other lessons, particularly in tawhid. Thus,
66 Direktorat Pendidikan Keagamaan dan Pondok Pesantren, Direktorat Jenderal
Kelembagaan Agama Islam Departemen Agama, Standar Nasional Kurikulum Diniyah
(Berbasis Kompetensi) Mata Pelajaran Aqidah Akhlaq Tingkat Awwaliyah, Wustha dan
Ulya, Jakarta: 2003, pp. 23-62.
67 Direktorat Pendidikan Keagamaan dan Pondok Pesantren, Standar Nasional
Kurikulum Diniyah, pp. 65-86.
68 Direktorat Pendidikan Keagamaan dan Pondok Pesantren, Standar Nasional
Kurikulum Diniyah, pp. 88-103.
69 Pesantren Imam Bukhari in Solo adopted these materials for the students. See for
example, Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiya al-Su’udiya, al-Hadith li al-Saff
al-Awwal al-Mutawwasit, Riyad: 1988; Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Hadith li al-Saff al-Thani
al-Mutawwasit, Riyad: 1988; Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Hadith li al-Saff al-Thalith alMutawwasit, Riyad: 1988.
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the selected hadiths are very much related to the basic tenets of Salafism in general,
and to tawhid in particular. The first year students of the Mutawassitah program,
for example, learn hadiths on shirk, such as the three greatest sinful acts: shirk,
humiliating one’s parents and false oath.70 In the second year, the lessons continue
with the matters of iman and riya’.71 Other materials include a variety of Islamic
tenets, such as Muslims’ ethics in dealing with other Muslims and non-Muslims, the
right conduct during rituals, daily prayers and others.
A lesson starts with the presentation of a hadith and continues with a short
biography of the main rawi (transmitter), the meaning of important words
and phrases, and an explanation of the hadith’s essential contents. The lesson
ends with some questions. It is interesting that a lesson briefly discusses the
transmitter’s biography. Although the explanation is far from perfect and
lacks critical analysis, it contributes to the tradition of hadith critique (naqd
al-hadith), especially of the transmission (naqd al-isnad). For example, on the
Muslim obligation to obey the ruler, the hadith reads: “Muslims should listen
to and obey (the ruler) in what he loves and hates as far as the ruler does not
order to disobey God. If the ruler orders Muslim to disobey God, he is not
entitled to listening and obedience.” The text explains that the hadith contains
some essential doctrines: the obligation of Muslims to appoint a ruler, and the
obligation of Muslims to obey the ruler as far as the ruler orders them to do
good actions. The text, furthermore, elaborates the benefits of the obedience:
the unity of the umma, and living in harmony and peace.72
The main transmitter of the hadith is ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Umar. When describing
this transmitter, the textbook says as follows: “He is an honoured Companion of
the Prophet, the son of ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab al-Qurayshi, may God be pleased
with them. He became a Muslim in Mecca, migrated to Medina, and participated
in the Uhud War and subsequent wars. He was considered an ‘alim and a jurist
among the Companions. He was among the Companions who frequently
transmitted the hadiths of the Prophet.”73
In addition to the materials discussed above, the work of Muhyi al-Din Abu
Zakariya Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (well-known as al-Nawawi), al-Arba’in alNawawiya, receives much attention. This collection of forty-two hadiths is widely
accepted by Muslims in Indonesia and is taught in most pesantrens and mosques.
70
71
72
73
Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Hadith li al-Saff al-Awwal al-Mutawwasit, p. 8.
Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Hadith li al-Saff al-Thani al-Mutawwasit, p. 6.
Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Hadith li al-Saff al-Thani al-Mutawwasit, p.18.
Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Hadith li al-Saff al-Thani al-Mutawwasit, p. 17.
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However, Salafis have selected this work together with a Salafi commentary.
Thus, Salafis read the commentary by Muhammad Salih al-‘Uthaymin in which
he maintains that al-Nawawi is a mujtahid (Muslim scholar capable of formulating
independent legal reasoning). As a mujtahid, al-Nawawi could be right or
mistaken. According to the sheikh, al-Nawawi was mistaken in interpreting alsifat wa al-asma’ (God’s Attributes and Names). He, for example, interpreted the
Qur’anic verse “istawa ‘ala al-arsh” (God sits on the Chair) as “God occupies (rather
than actually sit on) the Chair”. However, al-‘Uthaymin maintains that although
al-Nawawi used a different interpretation, he did not reject the term “istawa” (sit)
but accepted the notion.74 Any Muslim who would reject the idea of “istawa’”, al‘Uthaymin continues, would be considered a kafir (infidel), because God Himself
used the term ‘istawa’. Thus, although al-Nawawi is incorrect in his interpretation,
being a mujtahid, he will still receive God’s reward.
3. Fiqh
Like the subject of hadith, there is no significant difference between the
materials on fiqh taught in Salafi pesantrens and those studied in non-Salafi
pesantrens.75 Like other books on fiqh, the subject begins with cleanliness
(tahara), prayer (salat) and other Muslim obligations (zakat, fasting during
Ramadan and the hajj). Other materials on mu’amalat (social interactions), such
as the Islamic laws concerning meals, ways of dress, slaughtering, and promises
(al-ayman) follows lessons on rituals. Each subject begins with a definition, and
moves on to what Islamic law has to say on the subject, dalil, and then to a
discussion of materials related to the subject.
Salafis pay particular attention to the subject of salat. It is one of the most
important subjects taught not only in the classroom, but also in regular religious
gatherings in mosques. The work of Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Sifat
Salat al-Nabiy (Attributes of the Prophet’s prayer),76 is the main reference for
74 Shaykh Muhammad ibn Salih al-‘Uthaymin, Sharh al-Arba’in al-Nawawiya, Unayza:
Dar al-Thurayya, 2003, p. 7-8.
75 See, Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiya al-Su’udiya, al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Awwal
al-Mutawwasit, Riyad: 1988; Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Awwal al-Mutawwasit,
Riyad: 1988; Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Awwal al-Mutawwasit, Riyad: 1988
76 This work has been translated into the Indonesian language and appears in many
editions, from paper back to hard cover editions. This book seems to receive a
wide readership and is displayed in many bookstores, including the Gramedia, the
bookstore with the largest network in the country. See, Muhammad Nasiruddin AlAbani, Sifat Shalat Nabi, Yogyakarta: Media Hidayah, 2000.
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this subject. Al-Albani wrote the work in response to a widely accepted hadith
which states that Muslims should perform their prayers in accordance with the
practice of the Prophet. Al-Albani elaborates on the way the Prophet performed
his prayers using this sahih (sound and accepted) hadith. He describes every
gesture and invocation of the prayers. Having mastered this book, Salafis adopt
the way the Prophet prayed in their daily practice. When they perform their
prayers collectively, for example, Salafis rigidly adhere to the practice that
during prayers, the toes of the men have to touch those of their neighbours
when they are standing. In individual prayer, Salafis also use a ‘shield’ (sutra),
such as a wall, a person or any other physical object to indicate to other people
not to pass in front of them.77
As mentioned above, the works of ‘Abd al-‘Azim ibn Badawi, al-Wajiz fi Fiqh
al-Sunna wa al-Kitab al-‘Aziz, and of Ibn Qudama, ‘Umdat al-Ahkam, as well as its
commentary, Taysir al-‘Allam by ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Salih Alu
Bassam, have become the books most Salafis most refer. Unlike other works on
fiqh that discuss the subjects at length, these works provide a brief discussion on
the subject and they stress the dalil in the Qur’anic verses and the hadith. ‘Abd
al-‘Azim ibn Badawi provides a definition of the subjects and their legal status,
followed by arguments (dalils) from the Qur’an and the hadith.78 Thus, this work
integrates two branches of Islamic knowledge: fiqh and hadith.79 Meanwhile,
the ‘Umdat al-Ahkam contains selected hadiths from the two most authoritative
hadith books, Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim, which are structured in line
with the fiqh subject matters. In its commentary, the Taysir al-‘Allam, the author
provides the reader with an explanation of some vocabulary and important
phrases in the hadith, and continues to explain the general meaning (al-ma’na
al-ijmali), followed by a discussion of the laws included in the hadith. When
different opinions exist on the subject discussed, the author presents them,
followed by his preference.80
77 Muhammad Nasiruddin Al-Abani, Sifat Shalat Nabi, pp. 94-98.
78 See, for example, the author’s explanation on the first chapter, al-Tahara
(cleanliness). ‘Abd al-Azim ibn Badawi al-Khalafi, al-Wajiz fi Fiqh al-Sunnah wa alKitab al-‘Aziz, al-Mansura (Egypt): Dar Ibn Rajb, 2001, p. 23.
79 See the “preface” by Muhammad Safut Nur al-Din, Chairman of the Jama’a Ansar alSunna al-Muhammadiya (Society of Helpers of the Sunna of Muhammad) in Egypt,
in Ibn Badawi al-Khalafi, al-Wajiz, p. 10.
80 For a discussion of different opinions and author preference, see ‘Abd Allah ibn
‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Salih Alu Bassam, Taysir al-‘Allam, Sharh ‘Umdat al-Ahkam, Riyad:
Maktaba al-Rush, 2006, p. 16-19.
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D. Internalizing the Salafi Manhaj in Daily Practice: the Students’ Lives
Character building is one of the characteristics of the education pesantrens
offer. A pesantren does not limit its education to transferring only knowledge to
the students, but it also instils the right conduct and behaviour into them. Through
diverse activities, pesantrens implant the values of life into their ustadhs. Salafi
pesantrens make every effort to accustom their students to live in line with the Salafi
manhaj. In addition to mastering religious knowledge, the students are encouraged
to put the Salafi doctrines into practice. They also observe the examples their
teachers display. This section will discuss how students internalize Salafi doctrines
in their daily activities. Some basic tenets on behaviour will be presented before a
discussion of the students’ lives is presented. At the end of this section, an evaluation
will be given as to how influential the Salafi manhaj is on students’ behaviour.
Rejecting Entertainment (Music, Radio and Television)
In general, Salafis view music as haram (unlawful)81 because it causes
Muslims to neglect their duties and to waste time. Salafis distinguish between
religious music and religious songs. Al-‘Uthaymin contends that religious music,
such as nashid, was created by Sufis, and therefore, he considered it bid’a and
thus prohibited in Islam. Religious songs without musical accompaniment
are permissible under specific conditions. First, the song should be sung
spontaneously, without rhythm. Second, singing is not a hobby. Third, the
song does not cause a person to think that he will benefit only from the music.
Fourth, it does not contradict the shari’a.82 Based on these criteria, the use of
musical instruments, except the tambourine (rebana), is strictly prohibited. The
tambourine can only be played by and before women during a wedding party or
a celebration.83 This belief is based on various hadiths, including a hadith that
reads: “Two voices are damned in this world and the hereafter: music during
pleasure and a crying during disaster.”
Moreover, Salafis contend that listening to music and other entertainment
such as listening to radio or tape recorders and watching television are haram.
As a technological advancement, these devices are neutral, that is, they can be
utilized for either good or bad purposes. However, Salafis view that the programs
81 Bin Baz, for example, says that music is haram. See, Zainal Abidin, “Canda di
Panggung Hiburan”, Majalah As-Sunnah, no. 9, vol. XI, 2007, p. 26.
82 Majalah As-Sunnah, no. 9, vol. XI, 2007, pp. 5-6.
83 Majalah As-Sunnah, no. 9, vol. XI, 2007, p. 6.
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on the television result in more damage than advantages. There is also a number
of fatwas (legal opinions) that support this opinion. The late Abdullah ibn Baz, a
great sheikh from Saudi Arabia, for example, states that watching television is
dangerous because television channels feature dangerous programs. Programs
such as films, music shows and family dramas cause more damage than good and
Muslims, he stresses, reap no benefits from watching these programs.84 A similar
fatwa was issued by Nasir al-Din al-Albani. In his fatwa, he asserts that watching
television is haram because it presents awful and terrible programs that contradict
the shari’a. Furthermore, he maintains that if the government was to present good
television programs, Muslims could watch them.85 Al-Uthaymin supports this
view. For him, it is preferable and safer for Muslims to avoid watching television.
He presents three different laws regarding watching television. First, watching
news programs on television is permissible. Second, watching television programs
that contain bad elements and inspire people to conduct crime is haram. Lastly,
watching television programs that have no bad content just to waste time could
be haram, because it consumes electricity and wastes money.86
Referring to Al-Uthaymin’s fatwa, Salafis still tend to watch television to watch
the news. Abu Rida Ahmad Sunanto, a temporary resident from a Salafi enclave
in Depok, West Java, for example, acknowledges that he keeps a television in his
home in Bintaro. He only switches it on for watching the news. He also tries to
implement the Salafi manhaj in his family. When I visited his house in October
2008, I did not find any pictures hanging on the wall, although he did have a picture
of his family. This picture was taken before he converted to Salafism.87 When he
showed me the picture, I saw a handwritten note on its back that reads “For family
documentation only, not to be hung on the wall” dated February 9, 2003.
Congruent with this belief, Salafis contend that using entertainment, such as
drama in any da’wa activity is regarded bid’a. Drama is categorized as tashabbuh
(imitation) of non-Muslim culture.88 Salafis believe that da’wa methods are not
ijtihadi but tawqifiyya matters (matters that have been agreed on), which have
been clearly formulated by the Prophet and the Salaf generation. The argument
departs from the belief that Islam is a comprehensive and all-encompassing
religion; Islam has prescribed all aspects of human life, and therefore, it does not
84
85
86
87
88
Fatawa, no. 2, vol. II, 2004, p. 12.
Fatawa, no. 2, vol. II, p. 13.
Fatawa, no. 2, vol. II, p. 27.
Interview with Abu Rido Ahmad Sunarto, Bintaro, October 14, 2008.
“Sinetron Islami?”, Risalah Dakwah al-Hujjah, leaflet, no. 9, vol. VIII, Rabi’ul Akhir 1426.
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need any additional doctrines or practices.89 Salafis reject the opinion that da’wa
methods fall into the ijtihadi category, which states that in line with the principle
of common good (maslaha mursala), the preacher can innovate any method suitable
to the recipients of the da’wa (mad’u). Salafis criticizes this stance, because they
believe that it leads to a principle of legitimating all methods to achieve goals.
Salafis believe that God, not human beings, determines the common good. Quoting
Ibn Taymiyya’s opinion, Salafis argue that God has laid down the common good
in religious doctrines. Consequently, Salafis do not accept man-made religious
practices based on common good and consider them bid’a.90 According to Ibn
Taymiyya, every action has harmful and beneficial effects. When the advantages
outweigh the damage, God will obligate it. On the contrary, when damage prevails,
God will outlaw it. Based on this belief, Ibn Taymiyya argues, God will not ignore
matters or actions that contain benefit for human beings. When God does not
prescribe it, it will cause more damage than benefit.91
Isbal, Jalabiya, Lihya, and Niqab
Salafis pay special attention to dress. As I will describe in Chapter Six, their
dress has become one of the most distinguishable elements of Salafi identity.
People can easily recognize them from their clothes. Isbal, jalabiya and niqab are
worth discussing here in more detail. Isbal means to let clothes hang beneath
the ankles. Arguing on the basis of various hadiths, Salafis believe that isbal is
forbidden in Islam. The Prophet is reported to have said “A sarong that hangs
beneath the ankles is in hell.” Another hadith says “God will not look at a person
who drags his clothes for arrogance, in the hereafter.”92 Applying the example of
the Salaf, Salafis avoid isbal in their daily life. They believe that isbal prevents
Muslims from entering paradise. Therefore, their trousers, etc. are short and
never cover the ankles.
Closely related to the doctrine of isbal is the jalabiya, a long and loose cloth
covering the body until the knee. There is no specific Salafi doctrine concerning
the type of cloth, except for the principle that it should cover the ‘awra (genitals,
part of the body that should be covered). In order to meet this condition, Salafis
89 Shaykh Abd al-Salam ibn Barjas bin Nasir Abd al-Karim, Menyingkap Syubhat Dakwah,
Tegal: Maktabah Salafy Press, 2003, pp. 25-35, 87-94.
90 Shaykh Abd al-Salam, Menyingkap Syubhat, pp. 72-73.
91 Shaykh Abd al-Salam, Menyingkap Syubhat. pp. 76-77.
92 Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Hadith li al-Saff al-Thani al-Mutawwasit, p. 111.
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choose a loose cloth that conceals the body’s shape. Moreover, following the
hadith that orders Muslim to use white cloth, Salafis prefer white cloth.93
In addition to clothing, Salafi men grow their beard long. This is based on
various hadiths that instruct Muslims to shave their moustaches and to let their
beard grow.94 According to another hadith, this is to distinguish Muslims from
adherents of Mazdaism,95 and polytheists. Salafis argue that shaving the beard
is an effort to change God’s creation and to adopt the appearance of a woman.96
Based on these hadiths, Salafis make every effort to differentiate themselves
from non-Muslims. In practice, some Salafis, for example, use their wristwatch
on their right wrist, because non-Muslims usually wear it on their left.
Salafis’ literal interpretation of these texts has resulted in different attitudes
to those of other Muslims. Using the same hadith, the Muhammadiyah, for
example, contends that the ‘illat (rationale) of the prohibition of isbal is arrogance
(khuyala’). Isbal was the tradition of the Arabs of the time. They dragged their
clothes on the street to demonstrate their wealth and their social status. If this
‘illat disappears, the Muhammadiyah argues, Muslims are allowed to indulge in
isbal. A similar argument is applied to the lihya (long beard). According to other
groups of Muslim, such as Persis, the Prophet’s instruction to keep the beard is
to distinguish Muslims from the adherents of Mazdaism. When this difference
is no longer important, Muslims have no obligation to wear their beards long.
As nowadays adherents of other religions can have long beards too, Persis
sees no urgency in keeping the lihya.97 Reformist Muslim groups, such as the
Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam, apply the maxim in legal reasoning that
reads “al-hukm yaduru ma’a al-‘illa wujudan wa ‘adaman” (“the law revolves around
the availability and the absence of rationale”). Confronted with this rational way
of thinking, Salafis argue that religion is not subject to reason. They maintain
that their attitudes are manifestations of following the sunna of the Prophet.
In addition to wearing long and loose clothes, female Salafis wear a niqab. The
basic argument for this is the Qur’anic verse “And say to the believing women
93 The hadith reads: “Use white cloth, because it is cleaner and better, and death is wrapped
in white cloth.” Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Thalith al-Mutawwasit, p. 68.
94 Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Thalith al-Mutawwasit, p. 62.
95 Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Thalith al-Mutawwasit, p. 62. See also, Abu
Ubaidah Yusuf bin Mukhtar bin Munthohir as-Sidawi, Bangga dengan Jenggot, n.p.:
Pustaka An-Nabawi, 2009, pp. 20-35.
96 ‘Abd al-Azim ibn Badawi al-Khalafi, al-Wajiz p. 30.
97 Interview with Maman Abdurrahman, Chairman of Central Board of Persatuan
Islam, Bandung, 10 February, 2010.
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that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that they should not
display their beauty and ornaments except what (ordinarily) appear thereof;
that they should draw their veils over their bosoms.”
Kunya Name
A Kunya name is a given name or an alias. This pseudonym usually refers to
the name of the first son or daughter, by adding the term ‘Abu’ (‘father’) for the
child’s father, or ‘Ummu’ (‘mother’) for the child’s mother. When a Salafi has a
child named ‘Fauzan’, for example, people will call the father ‘Abu Fauzan’, and
the mother ‘Ummu Fauzan’. Single Salafis or married Salafis without children
can use a kunya name as an expectation or du’a (prayer). Indeed, a kunya name
is unofficial. This name is not written in official documents and Salafis keep
their original names on their passports and identity cards.
Salafis believe that a kunya name is sunna. The Prophet was reported in a
hadith to have asked Abu al-Hakam to change his name, using the name of his
oldest son. The hadith continues:
Then the Prophet said: “Indeed, God is the only Judge (al-Hakam), to
Him we ask judgment.” Abu Shuraih said: “My community always
asked me for a judgment when they disputed a matter, and they would
be pleased by my judgment.” The Prophet said: “How wonderful it
was! Who are your children?” I answered: “Shuraih, Muslim and ‘Abd
Allah”. The Prophet asked: “Who is the oldest?” I replied: “Shuraih.”
The Prophet said: “Then, you are Abu Shuraih”.98
The kunya name is an Arabic cultural tradition that was adopted by Islam.
Thus, the Prophet Muhammad was often called Abu al-Qasim, referring to his
son, al-Qasim. In addition to having a name related to a son or a daughter,
references can also be made to the general habits of a person. Some Companions
are thus famous for their nicknames, such as Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Thus, Abu Bakr
al-Siddiq, the first caliph, is named so because he domesticated bakr (young
camels). Similarly, Abu Hurayra is so called because he used to raise kittens
(hurayra). Ali ibn Abi Talib was often called Abu Turab, because he used to sleep
on the floor (turab).99
98 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Salafi-Indonesia/message/1175, accessed on 10
November, 2011.
99 http://blogal-furqon.blogspot.com/, accessed on 10 November, 2011.
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Having Meals
Salafis pay much attention to the etiquette of eating and drinking. The
Prophet has set various practical guidelines for having meals: using the right
hand and utilizing three fingers (thumb, index finger and middle finger).100 The
Prophet also encourages Muslims to have meals together because God’s blessing
lies in togetherness. The argument for this is the hadith that reads “Meals
which are enough for one person will be enough for two persons, meals for two
persons will be enough for four people, and meals for four people will be enough
for eight people”.101
Following this hadith, Salafis usually eat collectively from one big tray
for three to five people. They sit together in a circle. In addition to following
the sunna, they argue, this way of having meals instils companionship
among them. However, not all Salafi pesantrens implement this way of
consuming meals. In Pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon, for example, the
students eat from a small container provided by a catering company.
Similarly, the students of Pesantren al-Furqan in Gresik eat from their own
plates. Simplicity and hygiene seem to be the reasons behind this choice.
Students’ Lives
Normally, students start their activities in the early morning before the dawn
prayer by memorizing Qur’anic verses or hadiths in the mosque. Memorizing
the Qur’an is one of the benchmarks of Salafi pesantrens for all students. In
Pesantren Assunnah, for example, MTs and MA students have to memorize 5
juzs and 6 juzs (chapters) respectively, out of the 30 juzs that make up the Qur’an.
Following the prayer, certain teachers deliver general lectures on ‘aqida or other
Salafi doctrines.
After breakfast, the formal class begins at seven o’clock in the morning. It
usually ends with the noon prayer. After noon prayer, while the students of
Tahfiz or its equivalent, MI or SDIT, rest until the afternoon prayer, MTs and MA
students have additional courses in secular sciences. After the afternoon prayer,
the students have the opportunity to pursue their own interests. In pesantrens
with good facilities, such as Pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon, Pesantren Imam
100 Wazarat al-Ma’arif, al-Fiqh li al-Saff al-Thalith al-Mutawassit, Riyad: 1988, p. 38.
101 http://kaahil.wordpress.com/2008/12/19/adab-makan-minum-bg11-makanberjamaah/, accessed on 10 November, 2011.
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Bukhari in Solo, Pesantren Ihya Assunnah in Tasikmalaya and Pesantren alIrsyad in Tengaran, the students spend this leisure time exercising, such as
playing football and volleyball. There are no so-called “Islamic sports” in the
pesantren: horse riding, swimming and archery. Horse riding and archery are
expensive so that they are rare in Islamic education institutions. Although
swimming is affordable and common among students, the students of Salafi
pesantrens usually do not swim. The unavailability of a swimming pool in the
pesantren and the use of swimsuits may be the reasons behind this. Meanwhile,
students of modest pesantrens spend this free time in their own way: the pupils
of Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari, for example, have fun in the paddy field or cultivate
vegetables. However, other students spend this time learning or memorizing the
Qur’an. At Pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon, for example, students sit individually
or collectively in the mosque and memorize the Qur’an. They sit in groups
listening to someone’s recitation from memory and correct him if they hear a
mistake. After the sunset prayer, another general lecture is usually delivered in
the mosque where students stay until evening prayer. After evening prayer, the
students have to study individually or collectively. At Pesantren al-Furqan in
Gresik, the students have evening classes from eight until nine o’clock.
The students are accustomed to living in compliance with the Salafi manhaj.
They are not allowed to watch television programs, read magazines, listen to
radio, or have electronic devices such as a mobile phone or MP4 player. Walkman
and MP3 players are allowed for limited purposes only: listening to Qur’anic
recitation and Salafi da’wa. Apart from incidental inspection by teachers, it is not
clear how the pesantren controls that these devices are used for the correct use
only. Internet access is strictly prohibited. Adult students (students of Ma’had
‘Aly at Pesantren al-Furqan, students of Tadrib al-Du’at at Pesantren Assunnah
and Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari), however, are permitted to have mobile phones
and can access the Internet to run their businesses. These adult students are
usually university students or married Salafis who attend takhassus (special
program for preparation) programs or regular lessons in mosques. They live
outside the pesantren and have their own business to support their family.
Male students have to wear a loose t-shirt (jalabiyya or baju kokoh), a Muslim
cap and trousers above their ankles. They have long beards and have their
moustaches cut. This Salafi style constitutes the pesantren uniform. Interestingly,
at Pesantren Assunah in Cirebon, the students, particularly Kindergarten and
SDIT pupils, wear a modified national uniform. Thus, SDIT students wear long
red trousers and a white T-shirt. The adoption of the national uniform reflects
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this pesantren’s flexibility to accommodate to national interests as far as they do
not contradict the Salafi manhaj. Likewise, female students at Salafi pesantren
normally wear a niqab. Again, Pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon is an exception
as wearing a niqab is not mandatory . The girls are free to choose whether they
want to wear a jilbab or a niqab. During my visits to the pesantren in November
2008 and April 2010, I found many female students wearing a jilbab, while others
wore a niqab. Among Salafi scholars, there are two opinions concerning the
niqab. According to Bin Baz, the former Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, wearing
a niqab is mandatory, while al-Albani, a Jordanian great Salafi scholar, sees it as
not compulsory. In the face of these different opinions, Indonesian Salafis accept
both as valid and students are allowed simply to wear either one. However, as
the majority of Salafis consider that a woman’s face is the source of calamity,
they prefer to adopt Bin Baz’s opinion rather than that of al-Albani. Ja’far Salih,
the director of a Salafi pesantren in Depok, for example, argues that a woman’s
face can tempt and encourage men to sexual harassment.102
Female students are separated from males under tight surveillance of the
director or teachers. At Pesantren al-Furqan, female students live in their own
buildings surrounded by a high wall separating them from male students. At
Pesantren al-Nur in Ciamis, they live on a different campus built especially for
them. Ideally, they are taught by female teachers but due to the limited number
of female teachers, they are also taught by male teachers, and are separated
from them by a curtain. When the teacher needs to write something, he writes
on a white board and places it in front of the curtain so that the students can see
and copy what he has written.
The students’ lives may seem relaxed, but they abide to strong discipline.
During my visits to various pesantrens in Java from September 2008 to April
2009, it was not uncommon to see students coming late to the mosque to perform
their daily prayers collectively. This is in total contrast to modern pesantrens,
such as Pondok Modern Gontor, where the students do their daily activities
under strict surveillance. Pesantren al-Irsyad in Tengaran, Central Java, applies
even stricter regulations. At al-Irsyad, senior ustadhs stand in front of the doors
of the mosque to record students who come late to perform the sunset prayer.
After the prayer, the students who came late are invited to stand in front of
the audience and are punished. In general, the Salafi pesantrens attempt to
accustom the students with the practice of the Salafi manhaj by making them
conscious of their duties. In the classrooms or during religious instruction in
102 Interview with Ja’far Shalih, director of Madrasa Salafiya, Depok, 10 September, 2008.
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the mosques, the teachers explain the religious doctrines to make the students
aware of their religious duties.
The Influence of Salafi Doctrines on the Students’ Behaviour
It is not easy to measure the influence of Salafi tenets on children’s behaviour.
Although students are accustomed to practice the Salafi manhaj in their daily
lives within the pesantren, the atmosphere at home and in their neighbourhoods
also play a crucial role in building their characters. A few cases show that Salafi
doctrines change students’ behaviour. As mentioned earlier in Chapter Two, the
parents of some students in Pesantren al-Irsyad in Tengaran, complained about
the changes in their sons’ attitude towards militancy. After having returned
home, the students appalled their parents by removing pictures and electronic
devices, such as televisions and radios, from their homes.103
The case of Fawaz, a fifth year class student of SDIT Assunnah Cirebon, is
interesting to consider. His parents, Wawan Ridwan and Rina Rindana, are
lecturers at Sheikh Nurjati State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) in Cirebon
and affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama. Rina’s father is the kyai of the
traditional Pesantren ‘Ulum al-Din in Karang Mulya, Cirebon, West Java. Having
this background, they were aware of the possible problems they might face if
they decided to send their son to Pesantren Assunah. The Salafi tendency to
condemn traditionalist beliefs and practices could cause serious problems within
their wider family. Rina’s parents objected to the plan to send Fawaz to a Salafi
pesantren. However, Rina and her husband persisted and explained to them that
they were motivated by the high quality of the education the pesantren offers.
In addition to Islamic knowledge, the pesantren also provides the students with
secular subjects. Finally, Rina and her husband successfully convinced their
parents.104
In the first few years, the parents had no problems with their son. In order
to become familiarized with the practices of Islam common among traditionalist
Muslims, the parent advised their son to memorize some du’as (prayers) such as
qunut, (a special formula chanted at dawn prayer). However, Fawaz has recently
come to try to limit his mother’s activities. He always questions his mother
whenever she goes out for any purpose, especially when she goes to campus to
103 Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New
Order Indonesia, New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 2006, p. 76.
104 Interview with Wawan Ridwan and Rina Rindana, lecturers of IAIN Cirebon and
parents of student of SDIT As-Sunnah, Cirebon, April 16, 2010.
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teach or engage in other activities. He poses curious, but suspicious-sounding,
questions: “Where are going?” “For what purpose?” “Who are you going to
meet?” “What time will you be back?” Moreover, Fawaz has started to scrutinize
his mother’s mobile phone. When he finds short messages from male colleagues,
he always asks her who they are. He also tries to tell his mother not to leave the
house without being accompanied by a mahram (relatives who are forbidden from
marring her). Surprisingly, the influence of the Salafi tenets appears only in his
perception of the role of women in public. He still keeps his other habits, such as
singing popular songs, watching television, drawing living creatures and so on.
Encountering this problem, his father explained to his son that he has
permitted his mother to go out, and the reason for going out is good: to teach
students. However, the son’s conduct remains a problem. His parents complained
several times to the pesantren about this, asking the teachers about their son’s
possible misunderstandings. The parents wondered if the teachers incorrectly
taught the students about the role o women in public life. However, they have
had no response from the pesantren. Despite this complaint, the parents have
no intention of withdrawing their son from the pesantren as they still believe
that the quality of education at Pesantren Assunnah is worth the problem, and
that Fawaz’s perceptions may yet change over time.105
Fawaz’ questions suggest how Salafi students internalize the Salafi manhaj,
particularly concerning the relationship between men and women. According
to Salafis, female Muslims are prohibited from meeting men unless they are
guarded by their mahram. For Salafis, the safest place for women is in their
homes, and their best role is to act as their children’s educator. If women are to
teach children at school, they should teach female students only. The case also
shows that the influence of Salafism on elementary school pupils does not extend
to their hobbies or other pleasures, such as singing and watching television.
This is understandable because a child of this age is fond of entertainment. The
influence of Salafis on hobbies will start to appear in students at higher levels,
at the Madrasah Tsanawiyah or Madrasah Aliyah, as in the case of the students
of Pesantren al-Irsyad, Tengaran. While we cannot generalize the influence of
Salafi doctrines on students from the single case discussed above, it may be used
as evidence of the influence of Salafism on pupils. If the process of teaching and
familiarizing Salafism continues, the pesantren will, no doubt, produce devoted
Salafis.
105 Interview with Wawan Ridwan and Rina Rindana, Cirebon, April 16, 2010.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Concluding Remarks
Salafi pesantrens provide educational programs at all levels, ranging from preschool to higher education. They have developed their own curriculum, varying
from total emulation of the Middle Eastern curriculum to a combination of elements
of Middle Eastern and national curricula. Those pesantrens associated with the
“rejectionist” faction, such as Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari, represent the old type
of pesantren that specifically teach religious subjects. Educational programs in
these pesantrens are managed less systematically, without a clear curriculum and
utilizing the halaqa method instead of the graded system. While other pesantrens
affiliated to the “cooperationist” faction adopt the national curriculum, teach
both religious knowledge and secular subjects, and utilize the graded system. The
adoption of Middle Eastern contents in religious subjects is intended to acquire
mu’adala or the recognition of certain higher education institutions, such as the
Islamic University in Medina.
Salafi pesantrens have imparted Salafi doctrines to their students from their
childhood on by using very simple ways, such as the prohibition of singing songs
and making picture of living creatures. In the pesantrens, the students are not
only introduced to the tenets of Salafism, but also exposed to the practice of
the Salafi manhaj. The pesantren milieu has created an environment conducive
for the application of the Salafi manhaj, such as performing collective prayers,
avoiding isbal, wearing the jalabiya and having meals together eating from one
big plate. These practices become habits in the student’s attitudes. In some
cases, the influence of Salafism in the children cause problem to their parents,
as in Fawaz’ case.
234
Chapter Six
Transforming Individuals
and Society
So far, in Chapters Four and Five, I have discussed a number of issues directly
related to Salafi pesantrens: their history, educational programs, teachers,
subjects of study and student activities. Although the main objective of these
pesantrens is to provide religious education in accordance with the Salafi
manhaj and to produce a Salafi generation, Salafi pesantrens have also changed
individuals’ lives – they start a new life, which is definitely different from the
one they had before their conversion to Salafism. Conversion of individuals takes
various forms: ‘retreat’ from the world, being a ‘reborn’ Muslim, and change
in personal attitude towards the government from ‘radical’ to ‘moderate’. Such
individuals feel that they have been reborn in order to become good and true
Muslims. They reject their previous beliefs, habits, behaviour, and religious
practices. In some cases, converts live together in one area, creating an enclave
where they can freely observe and practice the Salafi manhaj.
This chapter will discuss modes of individual conversion to Salafism and how
this process changes converts lives. As discussed in earlier chapters, in addition
to formal programs and regular religious teaching both in the pesantrens and
other places such as mosques, Salafi pesantrens provide a special program
named Tadrib al-u’at, to train Salafi preachers. While religious learning in the
pesantrens is usually attended by students and other Salafis, teaching in mosques
is open to the general public. The aim of providing religious teaching in public
places is to introduce Salafi doctrines to the wider community. Moreover, the
establishment of da’wa radio in a number of pesantrens also extends the reach of
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Salafi da’wa to a wider audience. There is a pattern to conversion: Once attracted
by Salafi da’wa, sympathizers will seek out further instruction in a pesantren.
As this process continues, they will become fascinated by and finally convert to
Salafism, ultimately rejecting their old ways and starting a new life. In its wider
manifestation, conversion leads to the creation of an enclave where Salafis can
put the Salafi manhaj into practice. Below, I will discuss the framing process by
which Salafis try to convince potential members to become adherents.
A. Framing: Struggle against bid’a, opposing the West, and back to ‘true’
Islam.
In the discussion in Chapter Two of the growth and development of the Salafi
movement and its networks, I employed the Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT).
In that chapter, I demonstrated that Salafis have two strategies in building up
their network: using existing institutions and creating new ones. In addition, I
also analysed the emergence of the Salafi movement in the global and local social
and political contexts, applying the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) theory.
However, these approaches are insufficient for understanding how the movement
attracts more followers, and converts bystanders into potential activists. The
recruitment of new participants follows a process called framing, which plays
crucial role in converting potential members and sympathizers of the movement
and turning them into active participants. Framing functions as a guide for
activists and directs their actions. In order to attract new recruits, the framing
process involves local and indigenous languages and symbols.
Framing is defined as meaning construction.1 It is the process of constructing
the values of those involved in a movement. The framing process begins with
a participant’s interpretation of his beliefs and values with respect to his
involvement in the movement. It is followed by the dissemination of these values
to others in order to attract them to and engage them in the movement. Framing
has three main tasks: diagnostic, prognostic and motivating.2 Diagnostic framing
aims at the identification of the problems an individual community faces and
their attributions (social, political, economic). At this point, an activist usually
blames parties or individuals he believes to be responsible for causing these
1
2
Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements:
An Overview and Assessment” in, Annual Review Sociology, 2000, Vol. 26, p. 614.
David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, Ideology, “Frame Resonance, and Participant
Mobilization”, in Bert Klandermans, et al., From the Structure to Action, Greenwich:
JAI Press, 1988, pp. 199-204.
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TRANSFORMING INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY
problems. Prognostic framing attempts to find solutions to these problems. At
this level, framing not only offers solutions but also elaborates on strategies,
tactics and targets. Using diagnostic and prognostic framings, an activist tries to
make outsiders realize the presence of injustices and accept that other parties are
part or even the source of the problems. As Klandermans et al. argue, diagnostic
and prognostic framing is an effort to reach consensus mobilization.3 One more
step in the framing process, motivational framing, is required. This framing
attempts to provide a rationale and an argument for further participation in
the movement. Being merely an observer is ineffective in terms of changing the
condition. Participation in the movement is required to transform injustices.
The framing process raises the question of how Salafis view the current
condition of Muslims. It is widely accepted that the Muslim world is in a state
of backwardness. Poverty is a serious and widespread problem in many Muslim
countries. As a result, illiteracy, malnutrition and unemployment are common
in the Muslim world. From the political perspective, Salafis believe that the
Muslim world is dominated by the West. At the heart of this lies the problem
of Israeli-occupied Palestine, an issue which has fragmented the Muslim world.
Salafis identify two factors they think are responsible for Muslim
backwardness: internal and external. The chief internal cause they identify
is the spread of bid’a (religious innovation); the major external cause of the
decline of Islam is the West. Bid’a is defined as new creation in religious matters.
All bid’as are bad and deviant.4 This view is based on the belief that Islam is a
comprehensive religion. Islam has prescribed all fundamental doctrines: ‘aqida
(beliefs) ‘ibada (ritual), law and behaviour. The basic tenets of Islam have been
laid down in the Qur’an and the hadith. These two sources have not only decided
‘aqida and ‘ibada (beliefs and ritual), but also mu’amalat (social interactions
between human beings). As a way of life, Islam has set all essential guidelines
pertaining to the system of Islamic government and even decides simple daily
practices such as etiquette for entering a house, eating and drinking, and ways
of dress. This implies, Salafis argue, that Islam has prescribed all aspects of
human life.5 Consequently, Islam needs no additional doctrines or rituals. All
3
4
5
Bert Klandermans, “The Formation and Mobilization of Consensus” in Bert
Klandermans, et al., From the Structure to Action, pp. 178-183.
Abdul Hakim Abdat, Risalah Bid’ah, Jakarta: Maktabah Mu’awiyah bin Abi Sufyan,
2004, pp. 29-31.
Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, Prinsip Dasar Islam menurut Al-Qur’an dan As-Sunnah
yang Shahih, Bogor: Pustaka At-Taqwa, 2007, p. 151. See also, Abdul Hakim bin Amir
Abdat, al-Masa’il (Masalah-Masalah Agama), Vol. 1, Jakarta: Darus Sunnah Press, 2005,
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
doctrines and rituals have been clearly laid down by God through His messenger,
the Prophet. However, Salafis believe that bid’a has spread over all aspects of
Muslim beliefs and rituals. The presence of bid’as pollutes the true religion and
contaminates the community.6 The practice of bid’a makes Islam vulnerable,
which, in turn, results in the absence of a spirit of struggle, jihad.
Furthermore, Salafis believe that bid’a is the source of all evil and responsible
for all the disasters befalling Muslims. The only solution for this condition is a
return to sound faith as described by the Prophet.7 For example, Malik al-Banjari,
a teacher at Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari in Banjarsari, Ciamis, West Java believes
that if Muslims will hold on to the true ‘aqida and practice true rituals, they will
regain their past glory. He frequently speaks about the glorious periods in early
Islamic history and, according to him, the early generations of Muslim were able
to conquer the Byzantium and Roman Empires as a result of their true Islamic
beliefs (‘aqida). Consequently, Salafis believe that Muslims can only win battles
if they adhere to the true ‘aqida.8
Salafis perceive the West – the external factor – as an enemy willing to
destroy Islam and Muslims, or at least, to weaken the Muslim world. This view
of the West can perhaps be illustrated by an experience I had once had when I
wanted to pay a visit to Pesantren Salafiya in Jember, East Java. This pesantren
is led by Luqman Ba’abduh, a prominent Salafi teacher and a former Laskar
Jihad activist. Ba’abduh was a student of Sheikh Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi’i in
Yemen. In my initial telephone contact, I introduced myself and expressed
my intention to visit the pesantren for the purpose of academic research.
After briefly outlining my research, including the details of my study in the
Netherlands, he granted me permission to visit his pesantren. He even informed
me that there is a Salafi of Dutch origin at the pesantren, although he did not
mention his name. Furthermore, Ba’abduh asked me to send him an official
letter from my institution including a short version of my research proposal
and a recommendation letter from my supervisor, Martin van Bruinessen and
they were duly sent. As a member of the board of directors of the International
Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM), Van Bruinessen
wrote his recommendation letter on ISIM-headed paper.
6
7
8
pp. 84-97; Shaykh Abd al-Salam ibn Barjas ibn Nasir Abd al-Karim, Menyingkap
Syubhat Dakwah, Tegal: Maktabah Salafy Press, 2003, pp. 25-35.
Ali bin Hasan Abdul Hamid al-Halabi al-Atsary, Mengupas Tuntas Akar Bid’ah dalam
Timbangan al-Qur’an dan Sunnah, Bekasi: Pustaka Imam Adz-Dzahabi, 2009, p. 267.
Ali bin Hasan al-Atsary, Mengupas Tuntas Akar Bid’ah, p. 266.
Interview with Malik al-Banjari, Ciamis, February 2010.
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TRANSFORMING INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY
Then a problem emerged. On the eve of my departure to Jember, East Java,
Ba’abduh called me and told me that he had revoked his permission. The reason
for this cancellation was clear; my study in the West (the Netherlands), and my
association with the West. During the telephone conversation, he explained that
he had searched the Internet for information on my supervisor, Van Bruinessen,
and his institute, ISIM. He concluded that my supervisor and his institute were
working in the interest of Christian missionaries. However, Ba’abduh could not
elaborate on what he meant by these ‘Christian missionaries’.9 Ba’abduh refused
to accept my explanation that my research on Salafi pesantrens was for an
academic purpose, a PhD thesis. His argument was simple: at present, I study
in the Netherlands, which is a part of the West; hence, I am associated with the
West. He was absolutely convinced that the West would make use of my research
findings in order to destroy Islam. For him, the West is simply against Islam.
He cannot distinguish between academic purposes and political interests. At
the end of our conversation, Ba’abduh said that he would be happy to welcome
me in his pesantren on the condition that I am a true Muslim and free from
any association with the West. Furthermore, he asked me not to disrupt Salafi
pesantrens by visiting them. As the man who is supposed to replace Ja’far Umar
Thalib among the so-called “rejectionist” Salafis, he is influential. Indeed, he
used his position to warn the leaders of other pesantrens not to allow me to
conduct research in their institutions.10
The story above demonstrates Salafis’ anti-Western attitude. For them, the
West is synonymous with Christianity, a religion adhered to by the majority of
the people in the West. Salafis quote the famous Qur’anic verse 2:120, which
states that ‘the Jewish and the Christians will never be pleased with you, until
you follow their faith’, in order to contend that the Jews and Christians (the
West) are true enemies of Islam and are determined to destroy it. They argue
that the West, represented by the United States and the United Kingdom, always
supports Israel, which is responsible for the death of Muslims in Palestine.11 They
9 Personal communication with Luqman Ba’abduh, December 15, 2008.
10 I discovered this warning when I visited Pesantren Dhiya’ al-Sunnah in Cirebon and
interviewed the chairman of the Dhiya’ al-Sunnah foundation, Abu Abdillah. In fact,
Abu Abdillah and Muhammad As-Sewed, the director of the pesantren, still allowed
me to carry out research in the pesantren as they saw a positive side to my work.
According to Abu Abdillah, this research would be helpful in disseminating the
information of Salafism in general, and on the pesantren in particular. Interview
with Abu Abdillah, Cirebon, 2010.
11 Fatawa, no. 11, vol. II, 2006, p. 8.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
point to incidents such as the cartoons of the Prophet published in a Danish
newspaper as evidence of the West’s hostility towards Islam. Muhammad ibn
Musa Alu al-Nashr, a Salafi sheikh from Saudi Arabia, relates this case to the
spirit of the crusaders and their hostility towards Islam. Moreover, according
to him, the only way to defeat non-Muslims is a return to true Islam and the
application of Islamic law in Muslim society.12
Salafis’ view on the West, as represented by Ba’abduh and others, resembles
Huntington’s analysis on the relationship between the West and Islam. In 1993,
Huntington published a provocative article, ‘The Clash of Civilizations’,13 in which
he predicted a future global conflict. His main thesis is that ‘the central and the
most dangerous dimensions of emerging global politics would be the conflict
between groups from differing civilizations’.14 He argues that the end of the Cold
War, marked by the collapse of Communism, will enable another power to emerge
and will create a new balance. His analysis points out that that power is most likely
to emerge from within Islam and Confucianism. Although he acknowledges the
two civilizations (Islam and Confucianism) are different in their manifestations
(religion, culture and social structure), they could coalesce in order to create a
new balance block against Western domination. Thus, he predicted that future
global conflicts would be between Islam and China, on the one hand, and the
West on the other. 15 In recent decades, the world’s politics has moved to confirm
Huntington’s analysis. This is evidenced by bloody tragedies such as the attack on
the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001, the subsequent US
policy on the war against terrorism, and the attack by the Western allies on Iraq.
Ba’abduh’s objection not only represents the Salafis’ view of the West, but also
displays the view of the Muslim majority in Indonesia. A survey conducted by
the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) of Syarif Hidayatullah State
Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta in 2005 revealed that the majority of Muslims
in Indonesia were not in favour of the West, particularly not of the United States
and Australia. It found that 66.2 per cent and 50.5 per cent of Muslims hate the
United States and Australia, respectively. Moreover, the survey also exposed
that 54.9 per cent and 33.1 per cent and 35.6 per cent of Muslims believe that the
US, Australia and the United Kingdom are against Islam, respectively. Muslims
12 “Sikap atas Penerbitan Karikatur Nabi”, Majalah As-Sunnah, no.1, Vol. X, 2006, p. 51-53.
13 The article was first published in Foreign Affairs, and reprinted in his extensive book,
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, pp. 183-206.
14 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p. 13.
15 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p. 185.
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TRANSFORMING INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY
(41 per cent) also believe that the attack against Afghanistan equates an assault
against Islam. They (37 per cent) believe that the war on terrorism is, in fact, a
war against Islam. The survey also found that 40 per cent of the Muslims support
the idea of demonstrations against the US, while 30 per cent of them agree with
boycotting American products. Another 20 per cent suggest cutting diplomatic
ties with United States.16 Anti-American sentiment is stirred in particular by the
US foreign policy that projects itself as the only world power. This policy, in
many cases, shows double standards, especially when dealing with Israel.17
The study of Islam in the West stirs controversy among Indonesian Muslims.
Although research on Muslim perceptions of the study of Islam in the West has not
yet been conducted, there are indicators to suggest that the majority of Muslims
in Indonesia are against it. The objectives of such study are questioned. Many
Muslims believe that Islamic studies in the West are motivated by political interests
and by orientalism that still dominates the Muslim world. There is certainly some
evidence of misconceptions on Islam and the Muslim community in Western
studies.18 For the Muslim majority, the right place for Islamic studies is Muslim
countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, not Western countries. Interestingly, in
spite of this criticism, the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Indonesia continues to
send lecturers from IAINs/STAINs to study Islam in Western countries. This policy
was restarted by Minister of Religious Affairs, Munawir Sjadzali.19
Since the 1970s, Muslim intellectuals have been involved in heated debates
about the study of Islam in non-Muslim countries. These debates were driven by
the ‘liberal’ ideas advocated by Western graduates, namely Harun Nasution20 and
Nurcholish Madjid,21 in order to instil progressive Islamic thought. Nasution, for
16 Saiful Mujani, et al., Benturan Peradaban, Jakarta: PPIM UIN Jakarta in collaboration
with Freedom Institute and Nalar, 2005, pp. 42-49.
17 Saiful Mujani, et al., Benturan Peradaban, p. 17.
18 Azyumardi Azra, “Studi Islam di Timur dan Barat: Pengalaman Selintas”, Ulumul
Qur’an, No. 3, Vol. V, 1994. p. 9.
19 Bahtiar Effendy, et al., “Munawir Sjadzali, MA; Pencarian Ketegasan Ideologis”, in
Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, (eds), Menteri-Menteri Agama RI, Biografi Sosial
Politik, Jakarta: Badan Litbang Agama Departemen Agama RI, in cooperation with
PPIM-IAIN Jakarta, 1998, pp. 403-404.
20 On Harun Nasution, see for example, Saiful Muzani, “Mu’tazilah Theology and the
Modernization of the Indonesian Muslim Community: An Intellectual portrait of
Harun Nasution”, Studia Islamika, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1994, pp. 91-131.
21 On Nurcholish Madjid, see for example, Greg Barton, “Indonesia’s Nurcholish Madjid
and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual ‘Ulama: The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism
and Modernism in Neo-Modernist Thought”, Studia Islamika, vol.4, no.1, 1997, pp. 29-81.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
example, consistently promoted rational methods in the interpretation of Islamic
sources and he introduced the early rationalist school of Islamic theology, the
Mu’tazila,22 as a subject of teaching at the then Syarif Hidayatullah State Institute
of Islamic studies (IAIN), Jakarta. He later wrote a book on this subject. He also
wrote a book entitled ‘Islam ditinjau dari Berbagai Aspeknya’23 [Islam Viewed from a
Variety of its Aspects], which introduced a new approach to Islamic studies. Both
approaches to Islamic doctrine are compulsory for all IAIN students throughout
Indonesia. Meanwhile, Madjid’s slogan ‘Islam yes, Partai Islam no!’ [Islam yes,
Islamic party, no!] was designed to encourage Muslims to adopt secularization.
While the usual meaning of secularization suggests a total separation between
religion and the state, Madjid’s views infer a place for both religious and mundane
matters.24 Without doubt, the ideas of both Nasution and Madjid triggered
controversy among Muslim intellectuals. One prominent figure who sharply
criticized this progressive point of view was Muhammad Rasjidi, the first Minister
of Religious Affairs.25 With regards to Nasution, for example, he directed his
criticism to the concept of monotheism (tawhid). According to Rasjidi, Nasution
had a tendency to judge all religions (Islam, Christianity and Hinduism) as equal.
He accused Nasution of instilling doubts about the Islamic faith among students.26
He also criticized Madjid’s interpretation of secularism for being different from
that in the West. For Rasjidi, secularization is the application of secular ideas
resulting in the separation between state and religion.27 The majority of Muslims
believed that Nasution’s and Madjid’s ideas were influenced by the rational and
secular approaches prevalent in the West. This was despite the fact that when
Madjid launched his ideas about secularization he had not yet studied in the West.28
22 At least, Nasution wrote two books on this subject; Harun Nasution, Teologi Islam:
Aliran, Sejarah, Analisa, Perbandingan, Jakarta: UI Press, 1978; Ibid, Muhammad ‘Abduh
dan Teologi Rasional Mu’tazilah, Jakarta: UI Press, 1987.
23 Harun Nasution, Islam ditinjau dari Berbagai Aspeknya, Jakarta: UI Press, 1979.
24 Nurcholish Madjid, Islam: Keindonesiaan dan Kemodernan, Bandung: Mizan, 1987, p. 207.
25 On Rasjidi’s criticism to Harun Nasution and Nurcholish Madjid, see H. M. Rasjidi,
Koreksi terhadap Dr. Harun Nasution tentang “Islam Ditinjau dari Berbagai Aspeknya”,
Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1977; Ibid, Koreksi Prof. Dr. HM. Rasjidi terhadap Prof. Dr. Harun
Nasution dalam Uraiannya: Ajaran Islam tentang Akal dan Akhlaq, Jakarta: Fajar Shadiq,
1985; Ibid, Koreksi Terhadap Drs. Nurcholish Madjid tentang Sekularisasi, Jakarta: Bulan
Bintang, 1972.
26 Rasjidi, Koreksi terhadap Harun Nasution, p. 24.
27 Rasjidi, Koreksi terhadap Drs. Nurcholish Madjid, pp. 17-18.
28 Fuad Jabali and Jamhari (eds), IAIN dan Modernisasi Islam di Indonesia, Jakarta: Logos,
2002, p. 43.
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TRANSFORMING INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY
If the majority of Muslims in Indonesia perceive the study of Islam in the West
negatively, Salafis prohibit it categorically. Salafis contend that learning about
Islam from the people of bid’a is forbidden, let alone studying Islam from infidel
scholars in Western universities.29 On this basis, many Salafis have asked me why
I choose to study Islam in the West. Even though I have repeatedly explained
that I am not studying Islam per se, but rather that I am learning methodological
approaches to Islam and Muslim societies, Salafis remain sceptical of my study.
It could be said that they do not fully understand the difference between Islam
as a doctrine, on the one hand, and Islam as a social phenomenon practiced
by Muslims, on the other. For Salafis, Islam is one; a normative Islam, the
doctrine. The existence of different Muslim societies does not represent Islam
as a doctrine. The anxiety about studying Islam in the West is apparent in the
rhetoric of a number of leading Salafi figures. Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin, the leader
of Pesantren Imam Bukhari in Solo, for example, asked me during my interview
with him; ‘why do you study Islam in the West?’30
These two factors can be seen as contributing to the decline of the Muslim
world. To follow Benford and Snow on framing, Salafis have diagnosed the problem
of Muslims: They charge the West and Muslims themselves with being the sources
of the problem. The only solution to remedy this decline, according to Salafis, is to
reject all forms of bid’a and to return to true Islam. This call is the second task of
framing, the prognostic framing. The question, then, is what is true Islam?
The question of true Islam is an enduring dilemma encountered by Muslim
thinkers. It has been central to discussions about how to cure the Muslim
ailments of poverty and underdevelopment. A number of great thinkers, such
as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, Rashid Rida,31 Hassan al-Banna,
Sayyid Qutb, and Abul A’la al-Maududi, to mention some, have addressed this
problem and have offered their solutions. Muhammad ‘Abduh, for example,
provides a theological foundation for the rational interpretation of Islam in
order that Muslims can develop and move towards progress. All these scholars
claim that their interpretation of Islamic doctrine is in line with the spirit of
Islam and is thus true Islam.
29 See for example, Abu Isma’il Muhsin al-Atsari, “Jangan Mengambil Ilmu Agama dari
Ahli Bid’ah”, Majalah As-Sunnah, no. 3. Vol. X, p. 31.
30 Interview with Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin, Solo, February 21, 2009.
31 On Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Ridla, see for example,
Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in Liberal Age, 1798-1939, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983.
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How, then, do Salafis view true Islam? As Abu Rizal, the prominent Salafi figure
from Tasikmalaya, West Java, reveals, Salafis believe that Islam is a complete and
all-encompassing religion. Therefore, Islam does not need any interpretation or
additional doctrines concerning ‘aqida and ‘ibada. As Islam was revealed to the
Prophet Muhammad, Muslims should accept the Prophet’s explanations – and
reject any other explanations – because Muhammad is the person who knows the
religion best. Following the Prophet, and based on the accepted hadith, the first
three generations of Muslims (the Salaf) were the people who best understood
religion; hence, Muslims should follow their examples.32 This argument leads
Salafis to conclude that true Islam is Islam as practiced by the Prophet and the Salaf
(Companions, Followers and Followers of the Followers). At this point, following
the framing process, Salafis come to the third process of framing – motivational
framing – which calls on Muslims to follow the Salafi manhaj.
B. Being Salafi: Retreat from the ‘World’
One of the most radical changes in the life of persons who have become
Salafis is a change of attitude that may be called a “retreat from this world”. This
refers to a situation in which a Salafi ‘withdraws’ from this worldly existence: he
leaves his previous activities behind, starts a new life, isolates himself in a place
far from the hustle and bustle of the modern world, and focuses his activities on
religious activities such as teaching and learning. In short, he changes his entire
life. Salafism does not demand this kind of extreme attitude towards this worldly
life, since it also supports its adherents in preaching its doctrines, which requires
social contacts.
Abu Musa is a good example. He was born into a Muhammadiyah family in
Klaten, a small city between Yogyakarta and Solo, Central Java. He went to high
school in his hometown between 1998 and 2001. In his teenage years, he actively
attended religious lessons provided by the local Muhammadiyah branch. He then
continued his education, studying veterinary medicine at Gadjah Mada University,
Yogyakarta. As shown in Chapter Two, Yogyakarta has become a centre of the
Salafi movement in Indonesia. Consequently, it was no surprise that Abu Musa
encountered Salafi da’wa in the early years of his study at Gadjah Mada University.
In 2002, He began to attend Salafi religious gatherings on campus, including those
held at the al-Hasana Mosque. Furthermore, he studied Arabic in order to be able
32 Interview with Abu Rizal, Tasikmalaya, February 10, 2009.
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TRANSFORMING INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY
to understand the Islamic tenets from their original sources.33 It seems that his
previous activism in Muhammadiyah religious circles led him to seek out religious
teachings. During his search, he discovered that Salafi doctrines are close to those
of the Muhammadiyah, particularly with regard to the cleanse of Islamic beliefs
and ritual practices.
In 2005, Abu Musa completed his study and obtained his bachelor’s degree in
veterinary medicine. In order to become a veterinarian, he was required to pass a
co-assistance program, which usually takes one to two years. However, it was at this
point that he made an astonishing decision: he left campus, ignoring his ambitions
and those of his parents to become a veterinarian, and focused his attentions on the
study of Salafism. This decision was made in order to avoid sinful deeds (ma’siya), such
as the mixing of men and women (ikhtilat), which was very common on campus.34 As
a student, it was inevitable that Abu Musa mixed with women in the classroom, the
canteen and in other places. In order to avoid this sinful deed, he decided to end his
study and leave campus. This decision disappointed his parents and aroused their
anger. He had to explain the reasons for his decision to his parents and to convince
them that he had made the right choice.
In 2006, Abu Musa moved to Pesantren Dhiya’ al-Sunnah in Cirebon in order to
pursue religious studies. As his parents were no longer willing to support him, one of
his colleagues provided him with financial assistance. When this support came to an
end, he started teaching students in the Tahfiz program in the pesantren. According
to Abu Musa himself, when he is in the pesantren he refrains from leaving the
compound, except in an emergency. He also refrains from associating with people
outside the pesantren. Once again the reason for such isolation is the desire to avoid
ma’siya. When reminded that Indonesia is not an Islamic state and, therefore, it is
impossible to avoid mixing with women wherever he goes, Abu Musa responds that
he seeks out the virtues of life (fada’il) for the sake of the afterlife. He adds that life in
this world is temporary, whereas life in the hereafter is eternal.35
It is interesting to analyse Abu Musa’s line of reasoning. A number of factors
contributed to his decision. First, Salafi teachers encourage university students to
abandon their campuses because campus life is perceived as un-Islamic. Ahmad
Halim, a student of Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII) in Yogyakarta confirmed
this pressure. He, for example, refused to participate in his own graduation
33 Interview with Abu Musa, Cirebon, November 26, 2008.
34 On ikhtilat, see for example, Ummu Ishaq al-Atsariyyah, “Ikhtilath antara Lawan
Jenis”, Asy-Syari’ah, No. 45, Vol. IV, 2008, pp. 81-87.
35 Interview with Abu Musa, Cirebon, November 26, 2008.
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ceremony, because in his view, the event stems from a Western tradition which
was implanted in the Muslim world. Consequently, although he completed his
study at the UII, he does not hold a bachelor’s certificate. Instead, he went to
live in the Salafi enclave located in the veteran compound in Ngaklik, Sleman,
Yogyakarta, where he attended Salafi religious teachings in Pesantren al-Anshar.
He sold mineral water and gas to earn money.36 Currently, Halim studies Salafism
in Dammaj, Yemen. Second, Salafism is appealing as it is a new doctrine. It attracts
adherents like magic and influences followers to change their lives. It is a common
phenomenon that new thoughts fascinate adherents.
The case of Abu Musa is evidence that participation in a strict religious
movement like the Salafi requires total commitment. Indeed, committed Salafis
dedicate their energy, time and money to the movement. They also make every
effort to live in accordance to the Salafi manhaj, such as praying collectively
and regularly attending Salafi religious gatherings. In some cases, like in Abu
Musa’s case, they limit their communication with the outside community and
even with their own family members. Certainly, such behaviour invites stigma
from society. Despite this, many people participate in the movement. This raises
the question as to what attracts people to join such a strict movement.
Lawrence Iannaccone’s analysis of strict churches and sects is relevant here.
His starting point is Dean Kelley’s research on the steady growth of conservative
churches in the United States. In this study, Kelley concludes that conservative
churches grow consistently, whereas mainstream churches lose adherents. He
argues that the key factor in this growth is the demand for absolute loyalty,
unquestionable faith and strict observance and practice, something with often
means adopting a particular lifestyle.37 Kelley identifies three characteristics
of strict churches: absolutism, conformity and fanaticism. These traits differ
from those of moderate and liberal churches: relativism, diversity and dialogue.
According to him, strict churches claim exclusive truth – closed, all-encompassing
and eternal doctrines. They demand distinctive ways of behaviour and lifestyles.
They condemn outside communities as deviant; consequently, outsiders are
shunned. The followers of these churches maintain unusual characteristics
such as sporting a particular kind of dress, adopting specific diets and resort to
isolation.
36 Interview with Ahmad Halim, Yogyakarta, January 19, 2009.
37 Laurence R. Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches are Strong”, American Journal of
Sociology, Vol. 99, No. 5, 1994, p. 1182.
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TRANSFORMING INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY
Corresponding to this finding, Iannaccone’s study finds that although
members of sects are poorer and less educated, they demonstrate greater
commitment, including contributing more money to organizations, attending
more religious rituals and services, maintaining stricter beliefs, engaging in
more religious groups and avoiding participation in secular activities.38
Following Kelley’s argument, Iannaccone analyses religious movements by
using an economic approach – i.e. in terms of producer and consumer, supply and
demand, cost and benefit. According to Iannaccone, churches, sects and other
religious movements are producers that supply commodities to the market, while
adherents are consumers who buy these products, weighing up the costs they
pay with the benefits they receive.39 Unlike physical goods, such as computers, or
services, such as banking, which are based on the quality of the products, religious
commodity is classified in a third category – ‘household commodities’, which offer
both materials benefits, such as meals, as well as abstract ones, such as love.40 In
this regard, religion not only relates to what individuals feel, but also to what
others sense. This deals with the situation and feelings of adherents when they
perform rituals. In Muslim communities, for example, this relates to the calmness
and quietude in a mosque when believers listen to recitations of the Qur’an; to the
peace they feel when they listen to a sermon; to the warmth they receive when
greeting each other (saying ‘al-salam ‘alaykum’), shaking hands, and receiving a hug
from fellow Muslims; and to the spiritual satisfaction they feel when performing
prayers. Moreover, religious commodities are based on supernatural forces,
promising eternal life, a peaceful life on earth, and lasting perfect happiness.
Utilizing the language of economics, Iannaccone posits a cost-based analysis
of strict sects. He defines a sect as ‘a religious organization with a highly
committed, voluntary, and converted membership, a separatist orientation, an
exclusive social structure, a spirit of regeneration, an attitude of austerity and
demanding strict asceticism’.41 A sect is different from a church, which is defined
as ‘a religious organization that accepts the social environment, embracing
the norms and values of the prevailing culture’. 42 His main argument is that
38 Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches”, p. 1194.
39 Iannaccone., “Religious Markets and the Economics of Religion”, Social Compass, 39
(1), 1992, p. 123.
40 Iannaccone, “Religious Market”, p. 125.
41 Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches”, p. 1192.
42 Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches”, p. 1194.
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‘strictness increases commitment, raises levels of participation, and enables a
group to offer more benefits to current and potential members’.43
Iannaccone also argues that strict religious demands – such as diet, dress,
isolation, and other restrictions – often limit the social interaction of participants.
This behaviour frequently causes stigma and makes engagement in other
activities outside the group costly. Faced with this condition, there are only two
possibilities available to potential members: full participation or rejection. While
doubtful adherents will be eliminated, only members with total commitment will
participate in strict religious movements. Consequently, Iannaccone argues that
‘perfectly rational people can be drawn to a decidedly unconventional group’.44
Stressing this aspect of rational choice, Iannaccone refutes the popular view that
conversion to fundamentalist groups is caused by psychological alienation. He
argues that ‘a high-cost group maintains its strict norms of conduct precisely
because they limit participation in competing activities and thereby raise levels of
participation within the group’.45
Iannaccone also notes that if a strict group is to be successful, it must provide
its members with an alternative ‘close substitute’, something that compensates
for the sacrifices they have made for the movement. A devoted member will
have to sacrifice many things and endure harsh conditions including living in
an isolated place deprived not only of material pleasures such as meals, but also
of family, friends, and other associates. Consequently, a group must provide
its members with alternative networks that offer a new family, friends and
colleagues.46
Abu Musa’s case indeed displays an extreme conversion to Salafism. Like
joining a sect in Christianity, to follow Salafism is voluntarily. It demands the
adherents to follow the sunna in their daily life such as sporting a long beard,
wearing certain dress (jalabiya), and avoid isbal. Abu Musa strictly practices these
common features of Salafism. Moreover, he isolates himself in the pesantren
focusing on studying religion and teaching children. Although Salafism does not
demand sacrifices like disassociating from this world, he sacrificed his future
career as a veterinarian which would have provided him with good living.
Consequently, he disappointed his parents, and lost his cheerful classmates
in the university. Abu Musa may suffer from social stigma. However, he feels
43
44
45
46
Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches”, p. 1182.
Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches”, p. 1188.
Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches”, p. 1197.
Iannaccone, “Why Strict Churches”, p. 1204.
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happy with this choice. This is because he found what Iannaccone calls a “close
substitute” for his lost family and friends. In his pesantren, he found a new
“family”, that is his teachers, colleagues, and students.
C. Being Salafi: ‘Reborn’ Muslim
Adherents react differently to Salafism. In addition to retreating from the
world, as in the case of Abu Musa, others see adherence to Salafism as having
been ‘reborn’ as a true Muslim. This implies that a Salafi acknowledges that he
previously adhered to a false understanding and the wrong practice of Islam,
and that now he has found true and authentic Islam. Unlike those Salafis who
make the decision to retreat from the world, another type of followers maintains
their activities and businesses in order to sustain themselves. That said, they
make major adjustments to their businesses in order to make them compatible
with Islamic law (shari’a), such as avoiding bank interest, as Salafis believe that
bank interest is riba’ (usury) and forbidden in Islam.
Heriyanto provides us with a good example. In 1993, he obtained his bachelor’s
degree in Islamic Education from the Faculty of Education at the Wali Songo State
Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN), Semarang in Central Java. As a governmentsponsored institution, the IAIN teaches a rational interpretation of Islamic
doctrines and contextualizes them to modern conditions. Furthermore, since
the 1980s there has been a shift in Islamic studies at the IAIN from a normative
approach, which supports an idealistic Islam, to historical, sociological and
empirical approaches, which incorporate social and historical realities in the
interpretation of Islamic doctrines.47 By maintaining this course, the IAIN has
established itself as the basis for moderate and mainstream Indonesian Islam.
As a student of the IAIN, Heriyanto was occupied with the rational interpretation
of Islam. However, his religiosity changed in 1992. In his last year of study at the IAIN,
a friend of his introduced him to Salafism. His friend who had been active in Salafi
religious gatherings took him to Salafi gatherings at a mosque in Semarang. This
provided him with a new interpretation of Islam, diametrically different from what
he had studied at his alma mater. While the IAIN advocates a rational interpretation of
Islam, the Salafi manhaj supports a scriptural interpretation of Islamic doctrines. For
a while, Heriyanto was ambiguous about these two approaches. However, intensive
attendance during Salafi religious gatherings, complemented by discussions with
47 Azyumardi Azra, “The Making of Islamic Studies in Indonesia”, in Abd, Samat Musa,
et al, (eds), Islamic Studies in World Institutions of Higher Learning, Kuala Lumpur:
Islamic University College of Malaysia, 2004, pp. 32-33.
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Salafi teachers, has driven him to follow the Salafi manhaj. He believes that the Salafi
approach to Islam is the true one. He argues that the religion of Islam was revealed
to and practiced by the Prophet, and consequently, Muslims should first follow the
explanation and the practices of the Prophet, and second the examples of the early
generations of Muslims who knew Islam best. Accordingly, Muslims have no right to
interpret the Prophet’s saying according to their own rationale. Religion, he argues,
is not a subject of rationale, but a subject of faith.48
After completing his study at the IAIN, Heriyanto did not try to find a white
collar job, but started earning money as a petty trader, selling eggs to villagers.
This choice was not unrelated to his Salafi worldview and his desire to stay aloof
from all that was not halal. Initially, people ridiculed him for doing such lowly work
as a Bachelor Degree holder, but he persevered. After some months selling eggs,
it was clear to Heriyanto that the egg business was totally dominated by Chinese
businessmen. He deduced that he could not achieve the necessary progress in his
business because of that. After a considered market analysis, he decided to change
his business into selling rice to the same customers who had earlier bought his
eggs. He started off by selling rice from Kendal but when a number of customers
complained about the quality he switched to rice from Solo.
Heriyanto’s network of Salafi friends proved extremely useful in expanding
his business for it provided him with trustworthy and hardworking collaborators.
His business flourished and soon he was able to manage to controle the entire
rice business: from production to distribution. Indeed, he began to produce rice;
to collect rice from farmers, and to package and distribute it to a number of sales
points. Today, his rice production is based in Semarang from where he distributes
the rice to other cities. Heriyanto learned a great deal from observing Chinese
businesses, including the need to secure his own business from sabotage by his
competitors. That said, he still feels that the rice industry is insecure and fragile.
According to his estimation, 80 per cent of his market is vulnerable. This is the
portion managed and run by distributors and clients whose loyalty he still doubts.
To counter this, Heriyanto secures the remaining 20 per cent of his market by
allocating this portion to the people he can rely on most - his Salafi colleagues.
This strategy is twofold: securing 20 per cent of his business and providing
opportunities for Salafis with job. Heriyanto believes he can rely on Salafis.
According to him, his business is doing well. He claims that his production has
reached 60-100 tons of rice per month.49
48 Interview with Heriyanto, Solo, February 22, 2009.
49 Interview with Heriyanto, Solo, February 22, 2009.
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Allocating certain portions of the business to the most trusted people is a rational
strategy. Trust is one of the main factors of successful business. In his study on the
relationship between Protestant sects and the spirit of capitalism,50 Max Weber
found that adherents of some strict sects in the United States, such as Baptists and
Methodists, were successful in managing their business because of trust. The key
factor of this success was membership in sects that demanded special traits. In order
to become a member of a sect one would have to meet certain requirements: he or
she must undergo probation, a trial period when he or she should behave correctly
in accordance with the ethical principles outlined by the sect. During this period,
the moral qualities of the prospective member, especially those related to business
matters would be scrutinized. Once he or she passed the probation, he or she would
be admitted into the sect, and hence, would be granted a membership certificate.
Thus, admission to a specific sect became the guarantee of good conduct and a
certificate of moral qualification.51
Furthermore, Weber found that the members of a sect took their certificate
with them when they moved or travelled to other cities. Having this certificate
would grant them good business opportunities, for it made them not only
welcomed by other members of their sect, but also gave them credit. Creditors
believed that the sect guaranteed certificate holders. When they faced financial
difficulties caused by external factors beyond their responsibility and caused not
by their own fault, the sect settled the problem by issuing a letter of guarantee
to the creditors, and made every effort to help them. Thus, creditors felt secure
when they gave credit to sect members.52
The sect members’ work ethos no doubt contributed to the success they
had in their business. Weber found that members of puritan sects, especially
Calvinist, were hard workers, displaying their strong desire to be successful
in their entrepreneurship. Weber noted that this ethos has its roots in their
religious doctrine of “calling.” The term “calling” is a translation of a Germany
term “beruf”, which denotes “task set by God” to fulfil a humane mission in this
worldly life. This “calling” is “the life-task” to work,53 which had become the
50 Max Weber, “The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism”, in H.H. Gerth and
C. Wright Mills, (eds), From Max Weber: Essays on Sociology, London: Routledge, 1991,
pp. 302-322.
51 Max Weber, “The Protestant Sects”, pp. 305-306.
52 Max Weber, “The Protestant Sects”, pp. 305.
53 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, London and New York:
Routledge, 1992, p. 39.
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highest form of the moral obligation an individual had in the fulfilment of God’s
task in this worldly life. The concept of “calling” relates to another religious
teaching: predestination. Protestant sects, such as the Baptists, the Methodists
and the Calvinists, doctrine says that only few people are chosen and will be
saved by God from entering hell. In order to avoid damnation, human beings
have to prove themselves as having been elected by God. To be chosen, believers
must have a “sign” consisting of having a good life and being prosperous in
this world. This “sign” can only be achieved by hard work. To show a living
acceptable to God, believers should work hard in this world.54
Salafis are strict adherents of Islam. Although Salafism has no specific doctrine
of working such in the Protestant sects, Salafis are well known to have moral
qualities which are essential in running business, such as honesty, reliability,
responsibility and dedication. Having these traits, Salafis are good collaborators
to work with and reliable. Once they get job or are given an opportunity to work,
they will work patiently and dilligently. They are hard workers even though
they do not make much money. They are content with the small salary they get
or with the little profit they make. They really believe in predestination (taqdir):
that human fate has been destined by God; that what humans can do is only
make an effort (ikhtiyar). In certain cases, this kind of interpretation undermines
their work ethos.
Heriyanto tries to run his business in line with Islamic law (shari’a). This
includes not accepting bank interest. Conventional banking charges, including
interest, are an inevitable aspect of running a big business. However, according
to his own account, Heriyanto only engages in conventional banking when
absolutely necessary, i.e. when it is impossible to avoid bank administration
charges for transfers, etc. However, he will not take a bank loan. For example,
when he needed a distribution truck, but had insufficient funds to buy one, he
did not borrow money from a bank, but instead he rented one. He only bought a
truck when he had enough money to do so.
Heriyanto does not spend all his time on business activities. He also devotes
time for Salafi da’wa activities in his hometown, Karanganyar, Central Java. He
manages regular Salafi religious gatherings at the public al-Furqan Mosque
in Karangpandan, Karanganyar, where some forty Salafis usually attend. In
addition, he manages a Kindergarten. He often invites well-known Salafi
teachers from other cities, such as Abu Qatadah from Tasikmalaya and Abdul
Hakim Abdat from Jakarta, to deliver public lectures in Karanganyar.
54 Anthony Giddens, “Introduction”, in Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic, pp. xii-xiii.
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As a Salafi, Heriyanto believes that he is now reborn as a true Muslim. He
often recalls his religious attitude when he was an IAIN student. At that time, he
tried to interpret religious doctrine according to his own rationale; he sought
a rational foundation for every doctrine. He now believes that religion is not
subject to rationality. Rather, he believes that religion is a matter of belief and
sometimes goes beyond human rationale. As a result of this belief, Heriyanto
claims to have found serenity, peace and satisfaction when he performs his
religious duties; a feeling that he never knew in the past.
D. From radical to ‘moderate’: a life history
At the individual level, the change to a Salafi attitude occurs not only
in terms of a person’s orientation towards the world, but also in his or her
orientation towards the movement. The change takes place in individuals who
were members or even leaders in radical organizations, such as Darul Islam (DI)
or Negara Islam Indonesia (NII, Islamic State of Indonesia) movement. Prior to
conversion to Salafism, these DI or NII activists demonstrated a radical attitude
towards the government. Indeed, they perceived the Indonesian Government as
un-Islamic and tyrannical and had to be replaced by an Islamic alternative. The
basic argument behind this attitude is the Qur’anic verse that stipulates that
any ruler who fails to implement Islamic laws is a kafir. The thought of Sayyid
Qutb, the ideologue behind Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood is influential in this
regard. However, conversion to Salafism results in a change of this radical view
and their. attitude towards the government shifts from one of confrontation and
opposition to onr of loyalty. The following paragraphs discusses the life history
of Abu Rizal, a former NII activist who converted to Salafism. It presents his
personal journey and demonstrates his shift in attitude towards the government
– from radical to moderate.
Abu Rizal, Tasikmalaya, West Java
Abu Rizal is currently the chairperson of the Yayasan Ihya’ussunnah,
Tasikmalaya, West Java, under which Pesantren Ihya’ussunnah operates. Like
other children in his village, he was schooled in a traditional environment, taught
to recite the Qur’an and to perform prayers. Having completed his education
at an Agricultural Secondary High School (SPMP, Sekolah Pertanian Menengah
Pertama), between 1982 and 1984, he moved to Jakarta where he attended
religious lectures given by prominent preachers, such as Abdul Qadir Jaelani and
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Mawardi Noor who belonged to the radical wing of the Dewan Da’wah, which is
close to the NII. Abu Rizal also attended a three-day dawra Islamiyya organized by
the Korps Muballigh (Preachers Corp) DKI Jakarta. It was during this time that he
learnt about religion. However, the religion that he learnt was a radical version
of Islam, one which views the ruling Indonesian government as un-Islamic.55 As
will be discussed later, tensions between Muslims and the government in the
early 1980s affected the relationship between Muslims and the state. In 1984,
Abu Rizal returned to his home town of Tasikmalaya and joined the Persatuan
Islam (Persis), a purist reformist organization. He became active in the da’wa
movement, giving religious lectures and organizing religious gatherings with
preachers from outside the city. Persis calls on Muslims to return to the Qur’an
and the sunna; it is strictly against bid’as in Islamic doctrines and practices. Abu
Rizal admits that Persis has shaped the way he performs his religious rituals.
After having been active in Persis for three years, Abu Rizal was drawn
into the NII movement without however giving up his affiliation with Persis.
The NII is a separatist movement, originally founded by Kartosoewirjo at the
time of Indonesia’s independence struggle that aims to establish an Islamic
state. He was recruited to this clandestine movement by his Persis teacher,
Basuni, in Tasikamalaya. Abu Rizal joined the Komando Wilayah 01 (Regional
Commandment) that covers West Java. For him, of the various factions into
which the NII had split, this was the one considered closest to the original
movement. It was also the faction that well-known radical personalities such
as Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, H. Ismail Pranoto (well-known as
Hispran), and Abdul Qadir Jaelani joined. Abu Rizal developed his career in this
clandestine organization and was appointed as a non-territorial leader. This
position enabled him to travel to cities such as Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya and
Majalengka to supervise and monitor cadres.
Friction within this faction emerged when Abdullah Sungkar accused its
leader, Ajengan Masduki, of engaging in deviant religious practices. Sungkar
and Ba’asyir warned that the movement was vulnerable because its leader had
deviated from true Islam. The two men accused Masduki of committing shirk
(polytheism). This accusation led to the split of the movement into two: one
faction sided with Sungkar and Ba’asyir, while the other remained loyal to
Masduki. Encountering this situation, Abu Rizal refrained from taking sides and
instead opted to become inactive in the movement. As a result of this decision,
he was demoted from his position as non-territorial chief and repositioned as
55 Interview with Abu Rizal, Tasikmalaya, February 16, 2010.
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regional preacher. This move aimed to isolate him from NII members. However,
the action failed because he remained in touch with his cadres in the cities.
Already at this time, Abu Rizal was critical of the movement. At a meeting
with his colleagues, he criticized it for its vague goals. According to him, the
movement would perish unless it met certain requirements: it must have a goal
(ghaya), a creed (‘aqida), and a method (manhaj). The movement’s goal should
be achieving God’s satisfaction (rida Allah). There are two ways to achieve this:
being sincere and following the Prophet. With regards to ‘aqida, he contended
that the movement should adhere to the true faith – the faith of the Salaf.
Likewise, the movement should adopt the manhaj of the Salaf. 56 At this juncture,
the influence of Salafi doctrines on Abu Rizal is obvious, but he rejects this.
Instead, he says he was influenced by Abdullah ‘Azzam’s thought,57 a Palestinian
jihadist ideologue, and specifically by his work, ‘Aqida al-Jayl al-Awwal’ (Creed
of the First Generation). ‘Azzam played an important role in mobilizing people
to engage in the jihad in Afghanistan; he established a coordination office for
the Afghan jihad in Pakistan. His work on the obligation of jihad in Afghanistan
attracted thousands of Muslims, including some activists from Indonesia’s Darul
Islam, to take part in the jihad against the Soviet Union.58 As an NII activist, Abu
Rizal held a militant view of Islam. Indonesia is considered dar al-harb (the abode
of war) and not dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam). He perceived the Indonesian
government as the enemy – an enemy he should fight against. Other Muslims
outside NII are regarded as kafir (unbelievers).59
As previously mentioned, Abu Rizal was also a Persis member. This activism
led him to adopt other ideas, including those of the Ikhwanul Muslimin. He
claims that he read the works of Ikhwanul Muslimin figures, particularly Sayyiq
Qutb, Hasan al-Banna, and Said Hawwa. Furthermore, he frequently organized
religious gatherings and discussions on Islamic doctrines in the small mosque
he had built in 1990. He also established an Islamic foundation called Yayasan
Bina Insan Kamil that runs a small pesantren. As part of his work in preparing
cadres responsible for the pesantren’s future, he sent his younger brother, Abu
56 Interview with Abu Rizal, Tasikmalaya, February 16, 2010.
57 On brief biography of Abdullah ‘Azzam, see for example, Thomas Hegghammer,
“‘Aballah ‘Azzam”, in Roel Meijer, Global Salafism, (ed.), London: Hurst & Company,
pp. 443-444.
58 Sholahuddin, NII Sampai JI, Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia, Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu,
2011, p. 22.
59 Interview with Abu Rizal, Tasikmalaya, February 10, 2009. See also, Sholahuddin,
NII Sampai JI, p. 53.
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Qatadah, for study to Yemen in 1996. At the end of his first year, Abu Qatadah sent
a letter to the Yayasan Bina Insan Kamil telling his brother and other colleagues
about the true Islam according to the Salafi manhaj, and explaining what he
believed to be the deviations in NII teachings. He was also keen to point out a
number of deviant ideas held by Ikhwanul Muslimin thinkers, in particular Qutb.
This last point is critical because, as an activist, Abu Rizal had adopted Qutb’s
ideas in his own works, specifically in Fi Zilal al-Qur’an and Ma’alim fi al-Tariq.
Abu Qatadah went on to suggest that his brother should meet some prominent
Salafi preachers, such as Farid Uqba, Abu Haidar and Abu Nida. Abu Rizal took
this advice and met with Farid Uqba, who went on to introduce him to the Salafi
manhaj. The initial meetings between the two men were characterized by heated
debates on Salafi teachings. Uqba suggested that Abu Rizal read three books on
the Salafi manhaj: al-Usul al-Thalatha by Muhammad ibn Abd Wahhab; al-Firqa alNajiya by Sheikh Muhammad Jamil Zainu, and al-Ba’ith al-Hathith by Ibn Kathir.
His curiosity led Abu Rizal to meet and talk with other Salafi preachers, such as
Abu Haidar and Abu Nida. His interest in the Salafi manhaj had been sparked and
he now started to attend lectures given by Abdul Hakim Abdat.60
Fascinated by the Salafi doctrines, Abu Rizal discussed them with his colleagues
in the NII. He urged them to arm themselves with religious knowledge in order to
achieve the movement’s goals as the spirit of jihad alone is insufficient to reach
them. He criticized other leaders for their religious ignorance. Consequently, he
was marginalized within the NII. However, he maintained his alliance with the
movement. He continued to hold discussions on religious matters with his loyalist
comrades. He eventually converted to Salafism and in 2000 he left the NII movement
for good. He declared his conversion before his loyalists and called on them to join
him in the new movement. Thanks to his charisma, some of his followers, including
Maman Suratman and Kosasih, joined him. Upon the return of his younger brother,
Abu Qatadah, in 2000, he established a new foundation, the Yayasan Ihya al-Sunnah,
which also runs Pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah in Tasikmalaya.61 Kosasih owns a large
clothing store in Tasikmalaya and he has become one of the foremost donors of
the pesantren. The first buildings of the pesantren were constructed on the land
endowed by Kosasih.62
60 Interview with Abu Qatadah, the director of pesantren Ihyaussunnah, Tasikmalaya,
West Java, February 10, 2009.
61 Interview with Abu Rizal, Tasikmalaya, February 10, 2009.
62 Kosasih is one of the main donors of Pesantren Ihya’ussunnah in Tasikmalaya, West
Java. Interview with Kosasih, Salafi activist in Tasikmalaya, February 16, 2010.
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Main argument: Loyalty to the Government
Abu Rizal explains that the goal of the NII movement is to replace the
government. The reason for such a rebellious aim is the government’s resistance
to implement shari’a law. This reluctance means that the government is
regarded as kafir, and therefore should be overthrown and replaced by an Islamic
government. As an NII member, Abu Rizal shared this radical attitude to the
government. However, this changed when he converted to Salafism. As a Salafi,
Abu Rizal shows no hostility to the regime; on the contrary, he demonstrates his
loyalty to the government. This radical change leads to a critical question: what
is the reason for this shift from his radical, activist attitude to moderation?
According to Abu Rizal, the key factor that drove this change is the Salafi
doctrine on obedience to the government. As discussed in Chapter One, this
doctrine says that Muslims must obey the ruler; they have no right to rebel
against the ruler, even if the ruler is repressive and tyrannical (zalim). This dogma
also stipulates that fighting against an existing ruler is forbidden, because it
will result in more damage to a country than any ruler could do. Muslims are
prohibited from criticizing the ruler in public arenas, such as in sermons, public
lectures and demonstrations.
Based on this doctrine, Salafis oppose any idea of confronting the
government. Salafis criticize those Islamist movements that criticize the
government publicly, such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defender Front),
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian Mujahidin Council) and Hizbut
Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). The Salafis accuse these groups of mobilizing unrest
via demonstrations, or by their sporadic cleansing actions to rid the country
of, for example, foreigners or alcohol consumption. According to Salafis, the
aim of Islamic da’wa is to call upon Muslims to return to true Islam. The task
of a preacher is to deliver (tabligh) the message of Islam, and not to mobilize
the masses. Mobilization via demonstrations and cleansing actions is not a true
method of Islamic da’wa and will result in damage to the country.
In tandem with this principle, Salafis also oppose terrorist acts such as the Bali
bombings that killed hundreds of people. Although the perpetrators of the Bali
bombings claim to be Salafis, Salafis criticize their actions. According to Ba’abduh,
a leading Salafi figure, such action is influenced by the idea of takfir (labelling
other Muslims as kafir). The basic argument of takfir is rooted in Qur’anic verse
[5:44], which reads: ‘Those who do not judge by the law which Allah has revealed
are indeed kafirs (unbelievers)’. The Kharijite used this verse to charge Ali ibn
Abi Talib and Mu’awiya of being kafir. In modern times, radical Muslim thinkers
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have used this verse, such as Sayyid Qutb, to accuse Muslim rulers who do not
implement Islamic laws of being kafirs. Radical groups in Indonesia have adopted
this idea. Quoting the opinion of Ibn ‘Abbas, the early Qur’an exegete and cousin
of the Prophet, Ba’abduh maintains that the term ‘kufr’ referred to in the Qur’an
[5:44] is the lesser kufr. Consequently, the person accused of being kafir is not
necessarily seen as an unbeliever.63
Social and Political Context
In addition to the above religious arguments the Salafis use, it is worth
discussing the social and political conditions in Indonesia. This examination
will locate the Salafis’ changing attitude in the context of the social and political
discourse from the period when Abu Rizal participated in the NII movement to his
conversion in the late 1990s. I would argue that the shift in government policies
towards Muslim interests had contributed to the Salafis’ changing attitude.
It is widely accepted that Muslims contributed to the emergence of the New
Order. Nevertheless, Indonesian Muslims have suffered from state repression
since the late 1970s. The Indonesian Government argued that political stability
was necessary to achieve economic growth and consequently opted to marginalize
political Islam. As an ideology, the New Order viewed Islam as a threat to political
stability. The government adopted a number of important measures in this regard,
including the fusing of political parties and the indoctrination of the national
ideology, Pancasila. All political parties, except the ruling party Golkar, were
forced to merge. Islamic parties were integrated into the United Development
Party (PPP), and nationalist into the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI).
While there was little resistance to the fusion of political parties, Muslim
activists strongly opposed the policy of Pancasila indoctrination which started in
the late 1970s and involved all segments of society, from civil servants, students
and young leaders to political and community leaders. The government organized
various indoctrination programs, called Penataran Pedoman Penghayatan dan
Pengalaman Pancasila (P4, State Pancasila Ideology Indoctrination), with programs
lasting from 25 to 200 hours. The Pancasila was also incorporated into school and
university curricula.64
63 Ba’abduh, Mereka adalah Teroris: Sebuah Tinjauan Syari’at, Malang: Pustaka Qaulan
Sadida, 2005, pp. 505.
64 Martin van Bruinessen, “State-Islam Relations in Contemporary Indonesia; 19151990”, in C. van Dijk and A.H. de Groot, State and Islam, Leiden: Research School
CNWS, 1995, p. 105.
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TRANSFORMING INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY
In spite of the Muslims’ rejection of the P4 program, the government
persisted with the indoctrination and, in fact, developed it further by proposing
Pancasila as the sole foundation for all organizations in 1984. This meant that all
organizations, whether a political party or a mass organization, had to discard
their own foundations and replace them with the Pancasila or face being banned.
After much deliberation, mass Muslim organizations, including the Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU) and the Muhammadiyah, accepted the policy. However, some
Muslim youth organizations such as Pelajar Islam Indonesia (PII, Islamic Student
Association) and Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, Muslim Student Association)
refused and faced a ban. The former was banned in 1988, while the latter split
into two factions: one faction that adopted the Pancasila as its foundation, while
the other, HMI Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi (MPO, Assembly of the Saviours of
Organization) resisted it.
Without doubt, the policy aroused resistance at the grassroots level. Noncompliance took many forms and often emerged during Friday sermons and via
underground leaflets. The protests reached a peak in the riot in Tanjung Priok,
North Jakarta in September 1984, in which, according to unofficial reports,
hundreds were killed. During the 1980s the government was troubled by several
violent actions run by radical Islamic movements or by oppositional groups.
These actions included the Komando Jihad, the Borobudur temple bombing, and
the case of Talangsari, Lampung, in 1989.65
On the other side, there were lessons to be learnt from the failure of the
various attempts to create an Islamic state. This period witnessed the emergence
of new intellectual Muslims, namely Nurcholish Madjid, Djohan Effendi, Dawam
Rahardjo and Abdurrahman Wahid, who changed the discourse from one of
Islamic ideology to one of cultural and substantial Islam. Instead of struggling
for a formalistic and legalistic approach to Islam, as represented in the notion of
the Islamic state, these new emerging intellectuals asserted that Islamic values
should be absorbed in daily life and in behavioural patterns. Thus, the struggle
for Islam was oriented to universal values (rahmat li al-‘alamin), such as social
justice, human rights and equity which are not exclusively Muslim.66
In the meantime, Muslims witnessed a shift in the government’s policy. From
the late 1980s the Indonesian regime changed its policies from repression of
Islam to accommodating approaches towards Muslims. Bahtiar Effendy notes
four categories of government policies: structural, legislative, infrastructural and
65 Martin van Bruinessen, “State-Islam Relations”, pp. 107-110.
66 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, Singapore: ISEAS, 2003, p. 150.
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cultural accommodations. 67 Of these categories, the legislative accommodations
were the most relevant to Muslim interests. First, the Law of National Education
(UUPN 1989) incorporated lessons on religion into the national curricula. It also
acknowledged the right of students to receive religious instruction in accordance
with their religion. Second, the promulgation of the Religious Court Law (UUPA
1989), followed by the Compilation of Islamic Laws (KHI 1991),68 empowered
the religious court and upgraded it to a level equal to other civil courts. Before
the enactment of the new law, the religious court had less authority and its
verdicts required validation by a public court before implementation. Related
to the issue of the religious court was the fact that until the KHI was introduced,
there had never been a single source or text for religious judges to refer to
when considering their verdicts. The acceptance of the KHI filled this gap.
Third, in 1991, there was a revision of the edict on school uniforms to include
the jilbab (veil). Before this law, female students were not allowed to wear the
jilbab in public schools; those who flouted this rule faced intimidation. The
last significant legislative change was the withdrawal of the Sumbangan Dana
Sosial Berhadiah lottery (SDSB, Philanthropic Donation with Prizes) in 1993. In
addition to Muslim’s belief that SDSB was gambling and therefore prohibited in
Islam, the lottery led to a number of social, economic and moral problems. As a
direct result of the harsh criticism by Muslims, the government terminated the
lottery at the end of 1993.69
In addition to the legislative reforms, as early as 1990, Muslims observed
more signs of the government’s acceptance of Islam. In 1990, the government
permitted the establishment of the Association of Muslim Intellectuals of
Indonesia (ICMI) headed by B.J. Habibie. In the following year, the first Islamic
bank, Bank Mu’amalat Indonesia (BMI) was established. President Suharto’s
pilgrimage to Mecca in 1991 was of huge symbolic importance. In addition to
this demonstration of piety by the president, for many Muslims it marked the
peak of the government’s acceptance of Muslim interests.
Some scholars view these fundamental changes of the New Order regime
towards Islamic interests in different ways, in particular to the emergence of
ICMI. The American anthropologist Robert W. Hefner, who paid much attention
67 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State, p. 151.
68 On the practice of KHI, see, Euis Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition and Identity:
The Kompilasi Hukum Islam and Legal Practice in the Indonesian Religious Courts,
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010
69 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State, pp. 154-167.
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to political Islam in Indonesia, sees it as the success of middle-class Muslims
in convincing the government that Islam could no longer be conceived as an
ideological threat to the state, and hence, the government accommodated
Muslim interests. It was the result of a long process of Islamization within
the bureaucracy and the urban middle class that changed the perception of
higher level officials towards Islam.70 However, critical views on the emergence
of the ICMI also appeared. The American political scientist R. William Liddle,
for example, views that the ICMI cannot be understood as “an expression of
demands of the Indonesian Muslim community,” but it is a part of Soeharto’s
political strategy and tactic in controlling political Islam and sustaining his
power.71 He argues that the nature of Soeharto’s political strategy was the
promotion of individual piety and resistance to political Islam. In this rationale,
he understands why Soeharto depoliticized political Islam. Liddle sees that the
roots of Soeharto’s political supports were anchored in the armed forces and
the Golkar. Soeharto always put control on these two political sources. However,
when he saw that he lacked army support, he turned to the Muslim community
to gain the massive support he needed for his re-election as president.72
Given this social and political context, it is reasonable to argue that the 1990s
provided solid grounds for the behavioural change of radical Muslim activists
towards the government. This is reflected in our case study. Abu Rizal held a radical
view towards the government in the 1980s and moved to a more accommodating
position by the end of the 1990s, in response to the shifting government policy.
E. Creating a Salafi enclave: Imagining and practicing the model of the
early Islamic community
Perhaps even more successful than its conversion of individuals, has been
Salafism’s ability to create communities in the form of enclaves where Salafis
collectively and freely practice the Salafi way of life. Through the creation of
these enclaves, they try to emulate the early Islamic community. The dwellers
comprise of a number of families, mostly immigrants who moved to the sites
to live together with their fellow adherents. Some enclaves take the form of a
compound, while others merge with villages.
70 Robert W. Hefner, “Islam, State and Civil Society: ICMI and Struggle for Indonesian
Middle Class”, Indonesia, 56, (October 1993), p. 32.
71 R. William Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation”, The
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Aug., 1996), p. 631.
72 Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia”, p. 625.
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The aim of creating an enclave is to provide an environment conducive to
the free and daily practice of Salafi doctrines. To realize this atmosphere, the
enclave is often complemented by a mosque and a madrasah, or a pesantren,
where Salafis receive religious instruction. In fact, mosques are central to the
Salafi community. Besides being places of worship, mosques are centres of
activities, and venues where religious instruction takes place. Madrasahs and
pesantrens provide a more systematic method of learning Salafi doctrines. Not
just adults, but also children in the enclaves are accustomed to put the Salafi
manhaj in practice. Zainal Abidin, the leader of the Salafi enclave in Depok, West
Java, talks of the enclave as ‘an incubator for the next Salafi generation’.73 As an
incubator, the enclave will produce Salafi generation willing to support Salafi
da’wa.
Emmanuel Sivan has identified a number of characteristics of an enclave.
Life in the enclave is voluntary; members of the community can come and go
at any time without punishment. The only bond that ties members is morality,
and moral reward often goes hand in hand with economic advantages. Loyalty
to the leader is another trait of the enclave. The leader obtains his authority
through charisma and knowledge.74 These characteristics demonstrate the
strong bonds that bind community members. Sivan also notes that the enclave
offers an imagined boundary, a ‘wall of virtues’.75 This ‘boundary’ separates the
community from life outside. Life in the enclave is based on morality, virtue and
kindness. This is believed to be in contrast with life outside, which is deemed
immoral and evil. Inside the community, life is seen as pure, good and safe,
whereas life outside is ‘polluted, contagious, dangerous’.76 Therefore, it is crucial
to limit contact with outsiders. The following paragraphs discuss the Salafi
enclave in Depok, West Java. As a comparison, global information about the
Salafi enclave in Sleman, Yogyakarta, will be provided.
The Salafi Enclave in Beji, Depok, Bogor, West Java
This enclave is located in the village of Tanah Baru, Beji, Depok, West Java,
and is home to about 250 Salafi families. The centre of this Salafi enclave is
73 Interview with Zainal Abidin, Depok, September 5, 2008.
74 Emmanuel Sivan, “The Enclave Culture”, in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby,
Fundamentalisms Comprehended, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago
Press, 1995, pp. 17-19.
75 Sivan, “The Enclave Culture”, p. 17.
76 Sivan, “The Enclave Culture”, p. 18.
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the Fatahillah Mosque, which was founded by the Dewan Da’wah Islamiyyah
Indonesia (DDII) using a grant from Saudi Arabia. The community members
live among the local villagers. Some buy plots of land from the villagers and
build new houses, while others rent their homes. Although they mix with
the villagers, Salafis are easily distinguished from the rest because of their
appearance: the men have long beards and wear jalabiya, while the women wear
the niqab. Living together in the enclave creates a collective identity among
these Salafis. This collective identity refers to ‘a shared definition of a group
deriving from common interests, experiences, and solidarity, involving wefeeling, constructed, activated, and sustained through interaction in movement
communities’.77 As Snow and McAdam have indicated, the essence of collective
identity resides in ‘a shared sense of ‘one-ness’ or ‘we-ness’ among those
individuals who compose the collectivity’.78
Salafis began to occupy this area in Depok in 2000. Zainal Abidin, the leader of
the enclave, made the decision to live in this particular village. Abidin received
a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from the School of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (Sekolah Departemen Luar Negeri, or Sesdelu) in Jakarta in
1981. He wrote his undergraduate thesis on the Impact of the Iranian Islamic
Revolution on the Monarchies in the Middle East. Like other Muslim activists
at the time, he was fascinated by the revolution. He believed that the Iranian
revolution was an Islamic revolution and would affect other monarchies in the
region. Rather than continue his career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abidin
turned to the Islamic da’wa movement. In 1982, he attended the Academy of
Arabic Studies (Akademi Bahasa Arab, ABA) of the Dewan Da’wah, but he did
not complete his study. He continued at the Institute of Education for Islamic
Da’wa (Lembaga Pendidikan Da’wah Islamiyah) of the Dewan Da’wah.79 Again, he
did not finish his course. It was at these institutes that he was first introduced
to Salafi doctrines. Influenced by lecturers at the institutes, he began to change
his view of the Iranian revolution being an Islamic revolution to believing that
it had, in fact, been a Shi’ite one. The close relationship between the Dewan
77 Sheldon Stryker, “Identity Competition: Key to Differential Social Movement
Participation?”, in Sheldon Stryker, et al., Self, Identity and Social Movements,
Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000, p. 23.
78 David A Snow and Doug McAdam, “Identity Work Processes in the Context of Social
Movements: Clarifying the Identity/Movement Nexus” in, Sheldon Stryker, et al.,
Self, Identity and Social Movements, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota
Press, 2000, p. 42.
79 Interview with Zainal Abidin, Depok, September 5, 2008.
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Da’wah and the Saudi government had resulted in tensions with the Shi’ite
community. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Dewan Da’wah views Shi’ism as
a deviant variation of Islam.
Abidin became an activist of the da’wa movement as a student at ABA. In
this period, he started to persuade children living around the Dewan Da’wah’s
headquarters in Kramat Raya, Central Jakarta, to come and learn how to recite
the Qur’an. The magnificence of the al-Furqan Mosque proved to be a draw and
the children came to the mosque and joined the program. His experience in
teaching children contributed to his method of teaching the Qur’an when he
moved to Depok, West Java, and established ‘Rumah Belajar Ibn ‘Abbas’ (the Ibn
‘Abbas House of Learning).
In the second half of the 1980s, Abidin moved to Srengseng Sawah, Lenteng
Agung, South Jakarta, and initiated the preaching of Salafi doctrines among
university students at the Academy of Company Leadership (Akademi Pimpinan
Perusahan, APP) and the National Institute of Science and Technology (Institut
Sains Teknologi Nasional). In order to earn money, he ran a small catering business
for students. While delivering meals, he discussed religious matters with the
students and called on them to attend his religious gatherings on Salafi doctrines.
Through this approach, he succeeded in attracting a number of students and
families around the campuses to join his program. In 1990, he began to teach
children to read the Qur’an at the Fatahillah Mosque, outside of Lenteng Agung.
Abidin found many children willing to attend his program. Furthermore, in 1998,
he founded the abovementioned Ibn ‘Abbas House of Learning.
Abidin considered Depok a good site to conduct his da’wa. In recent years,
Depok has transformed into an urban centre comprising of newly established
housing compounds and shopping malls. Consequently, it has become a busy and
polluted area. The site of the enclave, by contrast, offers a different environment.
Located in the village, it has a cool and calm atmosphere, surrounded by green
trees and with fresh air. In 2000, Abidin, together with a number of Salafi families
from Srengseng Sawah, moved to the area. Keen to avoid demographic turbulence
and social shock at the new site, he managed the Salafis’ migration to this village
carefully, bringing in new residents to the enclave only every six months. The
influx of Salafis occurred after the dissolution of the Laskar Jihad in October 2002
after which Abidin asked the Dewan Da’wah if he could use the Fatahillah Mosque
for Salafi activities. The Dewan Da’wah gave its consend under the condition that
the Salafis would not make any changes to the mosque. Ever since, increasing
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numbers of Salafis have come to live in the area surrounding the mosque.
According to Abidin, currently more than 250 Salafi families live in the enclave.
To prevent infiltration by other parties, Abidin has adopted a ‘one gate’ system:
anyone who wishes to migrate to the area must first seek his permission. This
policy means that Abidin gets to know the community members well and ensures
that unexpected incidents, such as the infiltration of terrorists, can be avoided.80
The Ibn ‘Abbas House of Learning is an educational institution equal to an
elementary school. It focuses on religious subjects with particular attention to
memorizing the Qur’an. Indeed, after six years of study, students are expected
to have memorized the entire Holy Book. In terms of religious subjects, students
are trained in basic religious knowledge such as ‘aqida, hadith, Islamic history,
Islamic ethics and Arabic. In addition, they are taught mathematics and the
national language. After graduation, the students continue to study in other Salafi
pesantrens, which provide higher levels of education, such as Pesantren As-Sunnah
in Batam, Riau Islands, and Salafi Madrasah in Jember, East Java. The trademark
of the Ibn Abbas House of Learning is its integration with the environment; the
learning process takes place not only in the classrooms, but also in the open spaces
of the compound. More importantly, parents are also expected to learn what their
children study at the school. Consequently, parents, too, are required to memorize
the Qur’an, under the supervision of Abidin and other Salafi teachers. In order to
achieve this, Abidin insists that parents who send their children to study at the Ibn
‘Abbas House of Learning move to the village. In turn, this policy encourages more
Salafis to migrate to and live in the enclave.
In addition to this program, Salafis have established another educational
institution, Pesantren Salafiya led by Ja’far Salih. Salih completed his senior
high school education in Jakarta. While he was a student, he was active in the
Islamic section (Unit Kerohanian Islam) of the school’s students association. In
addition, he also attended the religious gatherings organized by activists of the
Tarbiyah movement. Such activities were keys in transforming his studies from
secular to religious. He then studied Arabic at the al-Manar institute, an Arabic
learning centre founded by LIPIA alumni. In 1997, he went to Cairo and studied
Arabic for one year in preparation to study at al-Azhar University. However, he
was disappointed by his al-Azhar colleagues. He felt that they did not behave in
a truly Islamic way, for example they neglected the obligation to pray five times
a day on time. Consequently, he decided not to study at al-Azhar. In the last six
months of his stay in Cairo, he attended Salafi lectures delivered by Usamah al80 Interview with Zainal Abidin, September 5, 2008.
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Qushi at ‘Ain al-Shams. In the year that followed, he went to Yemen to study with
Sheikh Muqbil, and returned to Indonesia in 2001. Upon his return, he was asked
to join and teach at the Salafi community in Depok. In 2003, together with his
colleague, Yuswaji, he established a Salafi pesantren in Depok.81
The pesantren provides a six-year program for teenagers and adults, and
focuses on religious subjects, in particular ‘aqida, fiqh and Arabic. Like other Salafi
pesantrens, the works of Salafi scholars such as Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab
and Ibn Taymiyya are taught. In fact, many university students attend this
program. Some of the alumni have gone on to study in Yemen, such as Ayub. Ayub
was a student of Electrical Engineering at the prestigious Gadjah Mada University
in Yogyakarta between 1998 and 2000. He went to Ambon for a year when Ja’far
Umar Thalib called on Muslims to join the jihad. After the jihad, he attended
the Salafi madrasah in Depok and went to Yemen in 2004. In 2008, he returned
home and started to teach Salafi tenets in the Salafi community in Depok.82 In
2008, an internal rife between leading figures led to the temporary closure of the
pesantren. Recently, the madrasah was moved to Parung, West Java.
In addition to these education institutions, Salafis in Depok organize daily
religious teaching at the Fatahillah Mosque, in the evening after the ‘Isha prayer.
The lectures, which were organized by the Yayasan al-Muhajirin wa al-Ansar,
discuss various aspects of Islam, in particular ‘aqida, hadith and fiqh. Primary
Salafi texts such as the Kitab al-Tawhid and Thalathat al-Usul by Muhammad ibn
‘Abd al-Wahhab, Lum’at al-‘I’tiqad, ‘Umdat al-Ahkam, Kitab al-Ad’iyat wa al-Adhkar,
Tafsir al-Sa’di, and Tarbiyat al-‘Abna’ are studied. Some other famous books on
hadith such as al-‘Arba’in al-Nawawi and Riyad al-Salihin are also included in
the lectures. Lectures are delivered by Salafi teachers, including Ja’far Salih,
Asasuddin, Abdullah Sya’roni, Abdul Barr, Barmen and Ayub.
Despite the fact that this version of Salafism has attracted people to migrate
to the area, it clearly does not attract local people. In fact, only a few local
families practice the Salafi manhaj. The presence of Salafis at this site does not
appear to affect the villager’s level of religious piety. For example, while female
Salafis wear the niqab, female villagers do not. This suggests that Salafis have
no influence on local people, or, to put it in other words, the Salafi da’wa has
failed. When asked about this failure, Salih, replied that the success of Salafi
da’wa cannot be measured by the number of adherents. For him, it is enough
that local people allow Salafis to practice their manhaj in their environment.83
81 Interview with Ja’far Salih, director of Salafi madrasah, Depok, September 10, 2008.
82 Interview with Ayub, a Salafi teacher, Depok, August 27, 2008.
83 Interview with Ja’far Salih, director of Salafi madrasah, Depok, September 10, 2008
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Like Salafi communities in other cities, the Depok Salafis restrict their
interaction with local people. This behaviour causes tension with the villagers.
Tension can be triggered by trivial issues, such as not greeting. For example,
Salafis usually greet people when they meet in the street. However, some local
people refuse to respond to this greeting. This, in turn, led to Salafis withholding
their greetings. This change in attitude aroused the anger of the local people,
who felt the Salafis were behaving arrogantly. Another source of tension was
the Salafis’ resistance to take part in the village activities commemorating
Independence Day. To celebrate this historic day, local people usually put on a
variety of fun activities for everyone. At the peak of these activities is a collective
prayer, usually held in the evening at an open area, such as a field. Every person
is supposed to attend this ritual. The villagers offer meals, including yellow rice.
Salafis believe that these activities are a waste of time, energy and money, and
hence, are prohibited by religion. Indeed, they consider many of these activities
as bid’a, and so they refuse to engage in them. This resistance has caused
conflict between Salafis and local people who accuse the Salafis of being antinationalist. These conflicts can generally be resolved through dialogue between
Salafi figures and village leaders.
There are a number of jobs Salafis undertake in order to earn money. They
range from casual jobs to permanent ones, such as teaching or being street
vendors. The essential criterion in selecting a profession is its compatibility with
the shari’a. As a result, many Salafis abandon their job when they realize that it
contradicts Islamic law. Maman Sumanta, who converted to Salafism in 2001, left
his job in the sales and marketing of insurance and credit cards. He realized that
this job related to riba’’. Now, he sells Salafi books, VCDs, and CDs.84 Other Salafis
sell herbal life medicines such as habbat al-sawda, Salafi uniforms, honey and nonalcoholic perfumes. They usually display their merchandise in front of mosques
after Friday prayers, or in small stalls. Others choose to be vendors of ice cream
and bakso (meatball). Because these jobs are considered halal (lawful) they are not
embarrassed to do them. Salafis claim that these casual jobs give them the space
to manage their time flexibly, allowing them to collectively perform their daily
prayers. Abu Hafsah, for example, sells ice cream in the school from 09.00-12.00,
and from 13.00-15.00. He returns home for noon and afternoon prayers.85
A similar scene can be found in another Salafi enclave in Ngaklik, Sleman,
Yogyakarta. Unlike the Salafi enclave in Depok, where Salafis live among
84 Interview with Maman Sumanta, Salafi follower, Depok, September 10, 2008.
85 Interview with Abu Hafsah, Salafi follower, Depok, September 8, 2008.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
villagers, this enclave is a separate compound. The compound comprises one
hundred small houses, which the government had initially provided veterans
of the war of independence. When the owners left these houses, Salafis rented
or bought them. The influx of Salafis to this compound occurred after Laskar
Jihad’s disbandment in October 2002. Recently, Salafis have occupied 83 per
cent of the houses. As in other enclaves, the Salafis in this compound face no
constraints in terms of putting Salafi doctrines into daily practice.
Salafis need educational institutions when their children reach school age.
Sending the children to existing madrasahs or schools is problematic because
they do not meet Salafi conditions. Thus, the Salafis in Ngaklik have established
the new Pesantren al-Anshar. It was founded in 2004, with the support of
Sugiharto, a Salafi sympathizer, who endowed 1000 square meters of land to
the Salafi pesantren. Currently, the pesantren provides a program for children
(Tarbiyat al-Awlad), a special program for women (Tarbiyat al-Nisa’) and a training
program for preachers (Tadrib al-Du’at). In addition to these educational
programs, the pesantren is often used for national Salafi dawra. In these annual
dawras, Salafis usually invite Salafi sheikhs from Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
As mentioned earlier, the enclave provides Salafis with the opportunity to put
Salafi doctrines into daily practice. The religious atmosphere is tangible when
one visits the enclave in Depok. Women wearing the niqab, men sporting long
beards and wearing the jalabiya and children reading the Qur’an, are common
sights. In the Fatahillah Mosque, one can often see a man reading religious books
or the Qur’an. This is in sharp contrast to the scene found on the other side
of the village, which is only few meters from the mosque, the centre of Salafi
activities. There, women are not veiled; some even wear miniskirts. Clearly,
Salafis use their dress to create an imagined boundary. This is what Emmanuel
Sivan calls the ‘wall of virtue’;86 it is a boundary that is based on morality. Through
this imagined boundary, Salafis set a clear-cut distinction between themselves
and others. In addition to their dress, Sivan notes, the distinction is apparent
in their conversations and sermons.87 Thus, specific phrases such as “qadara
Allah” (meaning, ‘God decided’) and “jazakum Allah”88 (may God reward you) are
86 Sivan, “The Enclave Culture”, p. 17
87 Sivan, “The Enclave Culture”, p. 18.
88 During my fieldwork, Salafis often advised me to say “jazaka/jazakum Allah” instead of
saying “shukran”, when I should thank someone for any help. Although the two phrases
convey the same meaning, Salafis argue that saying the first phrase will provide the
actor with two rewards; one from thanking and the other one from following the
sunnah. Meanwhile, the second phrase will give the actor only one reward.
268
TRANSFORMING INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY
frequently heard in their conversations. While in terms of their sermons, Salafis
usually begin by warning Muslims to avoid bid’a, which will lead Muslims to hell.
Concluding Remarks
Salafism has transformed individual lives and society. Individual changes
appear in three forms: “retreat” from the world, being “reborn” Muslims
and changes in individual attitudes towards the ruler from opposition to
cooperation. In the first case, a Salafi totally changes his life by abandoning
previous habits and activities, and starts a new life in a new environment. In
the effort of making a clear demarcation between past and new lives, Salafis of
this type limit themselves by reducing contacts with outside community and
preferring to live in isolated areas. Unlike the first of type of conversion, the
second model of Salafis maintains their activities in this world and changes
occur in their religious thought and practices. However, these changes in turn
lead Salafis to adjust their activities to Salafi doctrines. The third variety of
conversion appears among Salafis who were active in militant movements and
who opposed the government. Salafis changes their attitude towards the ruler
from strong resistance to acceptance.
Meanwhile, the transformation of society takes place in the creation of
enclaves in which Salafis live together and practice the Salafi manhaj freely. Life
in these enclaves is characterized by morality and good conduct, which contrasts
with life outside the enclaves. The enclaves create “imagined boundaries” or
“walls of virtue” between living in the community within the enclaves and
society outside.
269
Conclusion
Salafism is an Islamic religious movement that calls on Muslims to purify their
Islamic belief and their rituals from bid’as and kharafat through the return
to the Qur’an and the hadith, and the examples of the al-Salaf, the first three
generations of Muslims. A Salafi is a person who follows the manhaj (path) of
the Salaf. For Salafis, this path is the third source of Islamic doctrines after
the Qur’an and the hadith and therefore to follow the examples of the Salaf is
obligatory for Muslims. They argue that for Muslims to return to the Qur’an
and the hadith alone is insufficient since they may still deviate from true Islam,
unless they follow the manhaj of the Salaf in understanding the Qur’an and the
hadith. It is on this matter, the obligation of Muslim to follow the Salaf that
Salafism differs from other reformist organizations in Indonesia, such as the
Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam and al-Irsyad.
Although all Salafis agree on the basic principles of the Salafi manhaj,
they are far from monolithic. As I have discussed in this book, there are three
main tendencies in the Salafi movement, “purist”, “haraki” and “jihadi”. The
main difference between them concerns their attitude towards the ruler or
the government. The key problem concerning this matter is to what extent
Muslims should obey the ruler. Purists urge Muslims to surrender to the ruler
unconditionally, while the “haraki” contend that loyalty to the government is
not without conditions. For them, loyalty to the government is conditional on
its submission to God’s law. When the government fails to apply the shari’a,
Muslims have are not obliged to obey. This means that “haraki” Salafis leave room
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
for disobedience to the government. However, Muslims can only demonstrate
this disloyalty through peaceful means like verbal criticism and organizing
demonstrations on the streets. Meanwhile, the “jihadi” faction goes further by
legitimizing the use of violent actions against the authorities and ultimately
to topple the ruler. The difference between “haraki” and “jihadi” is slight, and
therefore, a “haraki” Salafi may easily move and turn into a “jihadi” Salafi.
The majority of Indonesian Salafis fall into the first “purist” category.
Within this category, I further divide them into “rejectionist”, “cooperationist”
and “tanzimi”. “Rejectionist” purists are exclusive because they reject all
collaboration with hizby (partisan, causing divisions) people and organizations.
In education, it rejects the national curriculum. Laskar Jihad’s former activists
fall into this category. “Cooperationist” purists are more inclusive in their
collaboration with other Muslim groups and the government. Abu Nida and his
group who receive grants from the Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath may be classified
among this faction. The “tanzimi” is a Salafi group that adopts an organizational
format, such as the Wahdah Islamiyah in Makassar. In addition to the purist,
there is a small number of Salafis who can be identified as “haraki” or “jihadi”.
Pesantren Ngruki is categorized as a “haraki” group, while the Bali bombers fall
into the “jihadi” category. Ngruki, for example, often criticizes the government
because it refuses to implement the shari’a.
Salafi pesantrens have developed rapidly; their numbers keep increasing, and so do
the numbers of their students. Salafi pesantrens differ from other pesantrens because
they teach Salafism, which mostly derives from Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s
works such as the al-Usul al-Thalatha and Kitab al-Tawhid. They use both classical and
mulazama methods of instruction. The first is applied in grading programs, such as
Tahfiz (memorization of the Qur’an), Tsanawiyah and Aliyah, while the mulazama is
commonly used in the Tadrib al-Du’at (Preachers Training) program. The mulazama
method is similar to the bandongan method traditional pesantren use, in which a
group of students sits in front of their kyai or ustadh, and listens to his lesson.
Salafi pesantrens offer various educational programs from Kindergarten
up to the tertiary level, and they have developed their own curriculum.
There appear some differences between them. Pesantrens associated with
“rejectionist” Salafis offer less programs, notably Tahfiz, and Tadrib al-Du’at.
They have adopted their curriculum from Yemen and only teach religious
subjects. Through these programs they want to duplicate the Darul Hadith, a
Salafi learning centre founded by Sheikh Muqbil in Damaj, Yemen, where many
“rejectionist” Salafis have graduated. The only secular subjects these pesantrens
272
CONCLUSION
teach to their students are the national language and mathematics. These
subjects are needed because Indonesian is a tool for communication, while
mathematics is important in doing business.
On the other hand, pesantrens associated with “cooperationist” Salafis offer a
wider range of programs: Kindergarten, Elementary School, Tsanawiyah, Aliyah,
and Ma’had ‘Alyi. These pesantrens, such as al-Furqan and Assunnah, show a
more inclusive tendency than their “rejectionist” Salafi counterparts. They have
adopted the national curriculum for secular subjects, combining this with the
Saudi curriculum for religious subjects. They teach all secular subjects outlined
by the government and let their students participate in national examination so
that they can continue their studies at higher levels in public schools.
The methodology used to teach Salafism varies in line with the ages of the
students. Children at kindergarten and elementary school levels, for example, are
introduced to Salafism in a simple way, such as by memorizing prayers based on
accepted hadiths and not allowing them to sing songs or to draw living creatures like
animals and people. Meanwhile, students at higher levels learn Salafism by studying
textbooks and they have to memorize the lessons, especially the dalils (religious
arguments). More importantly, Salafi pesantrens not only teach their students
about Salafism but also stimulate them to practice Salafi manhaj in daily life such
as by wearing the jalabiya, sporting a long beard, avoiding isbal, and having meals
together eating from one big tray. All these practices aim at accustoming them to
the Salafi manhaj so that they become true Salafis (Salafi kaffa).
The good education (some) Salafi pesantrens offer motives non-Salafi parents
to send their children there, as in the case of Pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon. It
offers a full-day study program in the form of an integrated Islamic school. The
pesantren teaches both religious and general sciences and employs professional
teachers. In spite of the low costs, the quality of education is relatively good and
therefore non-Salafi parents send their children there to study, not because they
are driven by Salafism, but because of the quality of the education. Moreover,
ethical consideration becomes another reason of these non-Salafi parents.
They are afraid that their children will be entrapped in moral diseases, such as
indulging in free sex, using drugs and drinking alcoholic beverages. Rather than
sending their children to public schools and leaving them at home unattended
after school, they prefer to take them to pesantren on their way to work, leaving
there all day long under the control of their teachers, and picking them up on
their way back home. Thus, they do not want their children to become Salafis;
instead, they just want them to become good Muslims. Likewise, the parents
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
are not influenced by Salafism, as in the case of Fawaz’s parents. They remain
affiliated with the traditionalist NU.
However, not all Salafi pesantrens offer good education, as in the case of Pesantren
al-Nur al-Atsari in Ciamis. The pesantren is very poor in term of facilities and does
not organize educational programs well. Despite this fact, it attracts students to
study there mainly because it is cheap and flexible. Because of the limited capacity
of education at cheap public schools and because education at private schools is
expensive, Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari is a good alternative as it offers inexpensive
educational programs; the pesantren provides education for the poor.
The quality of the educational facilities at Salafi pesantrens very much depend
on the grants the pesantren receives. Pesantrens that receive financial support
from international donors, such as the Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath, look good and
more developed. On the contrary, pesantrens that have no access to international
donor funds look poor and plain. However, as the grants of international donors
are meant for building constructions only, pesantrens have to mobilize other
sources to generate income. General sources of income are students’ payments
for tuition fees, meals and accommodation, besides money brought in by local
donors. The pesantren can also create programs that generate income, such
as publishing publications. Pesantren al-Furqan in Gresik is a good example of
mobilizing local economic resources. In addition to publications, Pesantren alFurqan manages 28 hectares of fishponds producing shrimp and fish.
The flow of international donors to Salafi pesantren proves the existence of
pesantren transnational networks. The Salafis and Salafi pesantrens are connected
to their counterparts in the Middle East, notably Saudi Arabia and Yemen, from
which Indonesian Salafis graduated. Like Salafis worldwide, Indonesian Salafis
maintain their traditional networks that connect them with their sheikhs in
the Middle East through various means, such as seeking their fatwas on specific
matters, asking them to deliver religious lessons in their dawras, and sending
students to study with them. Moreover, as indicated in this study, Indonesian Salafis
have developed regional networks in Southeast Asia, especially between Salafis in
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Salafi pesantrens, dawras and radio stations
are instrumental in establishing and maintaining this network. The presence of
some students from Malaysia and Singapore at Salafi pesantrens in Batam and
Solo, and the invitation of Indonesian Salafi ustadhs by their counterparts in
Singapore and Malaysia to deliver Salafi lessons confirm this network. Hang radio
station in Batam deserves particular attention in this connection. It broadcasts
religious lectures to which Salafis in Singapore listen.
274
CONCLUSION
Muslim communities have responded in various ways to the emergence
of Salafi pesantrens in their areas. Traditionalist Muslims from the NU show
strong opposition to Salafism which ranges from verbal attacks to violent
actions. The main reasons of their opposition are the Salafis’ critique of their
religious practices which they consider bid’as; and the Salafis’ attitude towards
other Muslims. The Salafis’ criticism of the religious beliefs and practices of
the local community has aroused the anger of the community and especially
of its religious leaders. For these leaders, Salafis’ questioning of the religious
arguments behind their practices means challenging their religious authority.
Moreover, as I have indicated, local religious leaders who maintain these
traditions benefit economically. Thus, Salafis’ questioning of their religious
arguments poses a threat to their religious authority and thus to their economic
resources. Moreover, some Salafis limit their social interaction to their own
circles and therefore local people perceive them as anti-social, exclusive and
arrogant, which, in some cases, also invokes the local people’s anger.
A more positive response comes from the local leaders of reformist Muslim
organizations, the Muhammadiyah and Persis. Although they disagree with the
Salafis on the obligation of Muslims to follow the examples of the Salaf, these
organizations view them as their partners in combating the spread of bid’as.
This assessment is obvious from the arguments of Nawawi Bakri, the chair of the
Muhammadiyah branch in Sidayu, and Ade Abdurrahman, the chair of the Persis
branch in Banjarsari. Both leaders voice their appreciation of Salafism in its struggle
against bid’as. However, conflict between them flares us when Salafism takes
over their assets, such as seizing mosques and pesantrens. The case of Pesantren
al-Hikmah in Sidayu reflects the Muhammadiyah’s view towards Salafism. The
pesantren belongs to the Muhammadiyah but its management is assigned to Salafis
due to lack of Muhammadiyah figures to lead it. Despite the fact that Bakri has no
objection to this assignment, other Muhammadiyah figures show their anxiety.
However, Salafi pesantrens have passed this difficult period and survived.
There are at least two factors that play a role in this survival: strong personal
roots in the village, and the Salafis’ passion and dedication they display in their
da’wa. The case of Khatib Muwahhid, the founder of Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari
in Banjarsari, and Aunurrafiq Ghufran, the founder of Pesantren al-Furqan
in Sidayu, confirm this. Muwahhid and Ghufran are natives of Banjarsari and
Sidayu, respectively. Moreover, Muwahhid inherited the charisma of his father,
Ajengan Nunung Muhiddin, the founder of the old Pesantren al-Nur. Strong
opposition of the local community cannot expel them from their native villages.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
In addition to offering educational programs, Salafi pesantrens have become
centres of Salafi da’wa. They organize both da’wa bi al-lisan (oral da’wa) and da’wa
bi al-hal (da’wa by deeds and examples). The pesantrens usually hold regular
religious lessons in mosques located near the pesantren. For example, teachers
from Pesantren Assunnah in Cirebon teach Salafism at the Taqwa Grand Mosque
and in the Pertamina Hospital Mosque; teachers from Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari
teach Salafism at the Banjarsari Grand Mosque; and teachers of Pesantren alFurqan teach Salafism in all the mosques around the pesantren. Moreover, almost
all Salafi pesantrens have established da’wa radio stations, such as Assunnah
radio owned by Pesantren Assunah and Salafiya da’wa radio of Pesantren al-Nur
al-Atsari. A shared feature of these Salafi radio stations is that they broadcast
Salafi lectures, both recorded and live, tartil (Qur’anic recitation) and religious
consultations. However, some of them have created other programs as well,
including health consultation by Salafi medical doctors. With these radio stations,
Salafi da’wa reaches more audiences in more areas.
More importantly is the da’wa bil hal carried out Salafi pesantrens for the
benefit of local communities. The three pesantrens (al-Furqan, al-Nur al-Atsari
and Assunnah), for example, often distribute zakat al-mal (religious alms), iftar
(meals for fast breaking), and qurban (slaughtered animal) meat. Moreover,
Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari has helped local community with more concrete
actions: widening the access road to the village where the pesantren is located,
building a toilet next to a musalla (small prayer house) close to the pesantren, and
hardening the roads around the pesantren. These actions invoke more sympathy
of the villagers than mere words (da’wa bi al-lisan) can ever do. Because of this
da’wa, perhaps, some people have become interested in Salafism. As indicated
in this book, there are some sixty Salafi families living around Pesantren al-Nur
al-Atsari, half of whom consist of local villagers who have converted to Salafism.
While, the local people in Sidayu have become more familiar with Salafism, they
do not accept nor oppose it but let it spread.
Considering the activities Salafi pesantrens carry out, especially in
teaching Salafism to their students, I conclude that Salafi pesantrens tend to
revive pesantren’s traditional roles: transferring religious knowledge, and the
production of ‘ulamas. This role was in danger to disappear since traditional
pesantrens started to adopt the madrasah and Islamic school systems where
students learn less religious subjects and more secular sciences.
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B. Interviews and Personal Conversations by Author
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Abdul Hakim, senior student of pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari, Banjarsari, December
11, 2008.
Abdul Malik al-Banjari, teacher at pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari, Banjarsari,
December 12, 2008.
Abdul Malik, senior teacher at HASMI, Bogor, March 19, 2013.
Abdul Mu’ith, senior teacher of pesantren al-Muttaqien, Cirebon, April 17, 2010.
Abdurrahman al-Tamimi, director of STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib, Surabaya, December
22, 2008.
Abdurrahman, a senior student of pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari, Banjarsari,
December 12, 2008.
Abu Abdillah, senior teacher of pesantren Dhiya’ussunnah, Cirebon, April, 2010.
Abu Hafsah, Salafi activist, Depok, September 8, 2008.
Abu Haidar, senior ustadh, Amsterdam, May 1, 2009.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Abu Musa, senior student at pesantren Dhiya’ussunnah, Cirebon, November 26,
2008.
Abu Qatadah, director of pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah, Tasikmalaya, February 10,
2009.
Abu Rido Ahmad Sunarto, Salafi activist, Bintaro, October 14, 2008.
Abu Rizal, senior ustadh at pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah,Tasikmalaya, February 10,
2009.
Ade Abdurrahman, head of Persis, Banjarsari, Ciamis, January 25, 2010.
Afifuddin, director of pesantren al-Bayyina, Gresik, May 12, 2010.
Ahmad Halim, former activist of Laskar Jihad, Yogyakarta, January 19, 2009.
Ahmad Sabiq, senior teacher of pesantren al-Furqan, December 25, 2008.
Ahmad Yasa, secretary of village Srowo, Sidayu, Gresik, May 12, 2010.
Ahmas Faiz Asifuddin, director of pesantren Imam Bukhari, Solo, February 21,
2009.
Ali Hijrah, founder of pesantren Assunnah, Cirebon, November 21, 2008.
A.M. Lutfi, Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, Jakarta, September 12, 2008.
Aminuddin Bustami, religious leader, Tasikmalay, February 15, 2010.
Amung Ma’mun, teacher, Banjarsari, January 23, 2010.
Anwari Ahmad, deputy director of pesantren al-Furqan, Gresik, December 24,
2008.
Arman Amri, director of pesantren Minhajussunnah, Bogor, September 5, 2008.
Aunurrafiq Ghufran, director of pesantren al-Furqan, Gresik, 26 December 2009.
Avid Sholihin, secretary of Dewan Da’wah Islamiyyah Indonesia, Jakarta,
September 23, 2008
Ahmad Dahlan, head of Pemuda Muhammadiyah, Cirebon, April 16, 2010
K.H. Muhammad Suhail, a respected NU leader, Gresik, May 9, 2010.
Saeful Hidayat, Salafi activist in Jami’ Mekkah Mosque, Surabaya, December 22,
2008.
Ayub, Salafi teacher, Depok, August 27, 2008.
298
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bahruddin, teacher of pesantren ‘Umar ibn Khattab, Cirebon, January 24, 2010.
Buya Yahya, young kyai of pesantren al-Bahja, Cirebon, April 21, 2010.
Cepi Burhanuddin, murabbi of al-Huda, Parung, Bogor, March 15, 2013.
Chafifuddin, head of the Majlis Tabligh, Pimpinan Daerah Muhammadiyah
(PDM) Cirebon, April 20, 2010
Didin Nurul Rasyidin, lecturer of IAIN Nurjati, Cirebon, April 22, 2010.
Diding, manager of Assunnah Radio, Cirebon, 2009.
H.M. Misbach Malim, Dewan Dakwah Islamiyyah Indonesia, Jakarta, September
23, 2008
Heriyanto, Salafi activist, Solo, February 22, 2009.
Hermawan, local informal leader, Cianjur, December 2008.
Ikhwan Abdul Jalil, senior teacher at Wahdah Islamiyyah, Makassar, July 21, 2010.
Itin, owner of ACB shop, Banjarsari, February 3, 2010.
Ja’far Salih, director of Salafi madrasa, Depok, September 10, 2008.
Ja’far Umar Thalib, senior ustadh, Yogyakarta, June 12, 2010.
K.H. Abdul Muqsid Muhammad, leader of Pesantren Manba’ul Hisan, Gresik,
May 8, 2010.
K.H. M. Syafiq Munawwar, leader of pesantren al-Munawwar, Gresik, May 8, 2010.
Karli, Chief of Rukun Tetangga, Banjarsari, February 2, 2010.
Khatib Muwahhid, director of Pesantren al-Nur al-Atsari, Ciamis, January 25,
2010.
Kosasih, Salafi activist, Tasikmalaya, February 16, 2010.
Luqman Ba’abduh, Salafi ustadh, December 15, 2008.
Maman Abdurrahman, Chairman of Central Board of Persatuan Islam, Bandung,
February 10, 2010.
Maman Sumanta, Salafi activist, Depok, September 10, 2008.
Mamay, salt retailer, Banjarsari, January 15, 2010.
Mubarak Bamualim, vice director of STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib, Surabaya, December
23, 2008.
299
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Muhammad Ali, administration staff of STAI Ali bin Abi Thalib, Surabaya,
December 23, 2008.
Muhammad Arif, Salafi ustadh, Batam, June 28, 2010.
Muhyiddin, teacher of pesantren Assunnnah, Cirebon, November 18, 2008.
Mujahid, local religious leader, Ciamis, January 24, 2010.
Mukhlas, head of Muhammadiyah branch in Banjarsari, February 2, 2010.
Mustafa Aqiel, kyai of pesantren Kempek, Cirebon, April 21, 2010.
Nadjih Ahjad, kyai of pesantren Maskumambang, Gresik, May 11, 2010.
Nafi’ Zainuddin, director of pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran, Salatiga, February 25,
2009.
Nasir Mansur, Muhammadiyah activist, Gresik, May 14, 2010.
Nawawi Bakri, head of Muhammadiyah Sidayu, Gresik, May 9, 2010.
Nur Salam Sirojuddin, senior teacher at Wahdah Islamiyyah, Makassar, July 24,
2010.
Qasim Saguni, secretary of Wahdah Islamiyyah, Makassar, July 22, 2010.
Rasyid, teacher of Pesantren Al-Nur al-Atsari, Ciamis, January 22, 2010.
Rina Rindana, lecturer of IAIN Cirebon and parent of student of SDIT As-Sunnah,
Cirebon, April 16, 2010.
Salim Bajeri, religious leader, Cirebon April 16, 2010.
Sarbini, chairperson of HASMI, Bogor, March 19, 2013.
Shobahussurur, staff of Religious Attaché of the Saudi Embassy, Jakarta, March
6, 2009.
Sukarjo Renggo, senior Salafi activist, Cirebon, November 20, 2008
Supendi, member of Departemen Dakwah Umum, Dewan Dakwah Hasmi, Bogor,
March 19, 2013.
Thaharah, director of Assunnah, Cirebon, November 20, 2008
Thoyyib, teacher of pesantren and a party activist, PKS, Tengaran, February 23,
2009.
Ujang Bazari, Muhammadiyah Activists, Banjarsari, Ciamis, February 2, 2010.
300
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Usman Saleh, Muhammadiyah activist, Banjarsari, January 22, 2010.
UU Suhendar,head of Persis Tasikmalaya, February 11, 2010.
Wahyuddin, director of Ngruki, Surakarta, September 27, 2012.
Wawan Ridwan, lecturer of IAIN Cirebon, parent of student of SDIT Assunnah,
Cirebon. April 16, 2010.
Yazid Jawwas, senior ustadh, Bogor, March 13, 2009.
Yunus Mansur, Muhammadiyah activist, Gresik, May 9, 2010,
Zainal Abidin, senior Salafi activist, Depok, October 29, 2008; September 5, 2008.
Zainal Arifin, teacher of Anshar al-Sunnah, Batam, June 26, 2010.
Zarkasyi, secretary of the Lajna Khayriyya Mushtaraka, Jakarta, March 17, 2009
C. Magazines and Tabloid
Adz-Dzakirah
Al-Furqan
Al-Mawaddah
Assunnah
Asy-Syari’ah
Cahaya Nabawy
Fatawa
Laskar Jihad
Salafy
E. Websites:
http://alghuroba.org/front/node/r/184
http://blogal-furqon.blogspot.com/
http://dpdhasmibogor-depok.blogspot.com/2011/05/harakah-bidah.html
http://eidcharity.dyndns.info:81/eidweb/about.aspx
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Salafi-Indonesia/message/1175
http://kaahil.wordpress.com/2008/12/19/adab-makan-minum-bg11-makanberjamaah/
301
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
http://lovesidayu.blogspot.com/2009/03/bupati-kanjeng-sepuh-Sidayudikenal.html
h t t p : / / m a j a l a h . t e m p o i n t e ra k t i f . c o m / i d / a r s i p / 1 9 9 0 / 0 8 / 2 5 / N A S /
mbm.19900825.NAS19301.id.html
http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2001/12/26/LU/mbm.20011226.
LU86755.id.html
http://paramadina.or.id/?page_id=169
http://pro-sehatalami.com/topik/148-rs-holistic-antara-dicerca-dan-dicari
http://salafiyunpad.wordpress.com/2008/08/21/walhamdulillah-pernyataanresmi-tentang-ruju-nya-ust-jafar-umar-thalib-hafizhohullah/
http://syeikhyasinalfadani.blogspot.sg/2012/11/syeikh-umar-hamdan-almahrasi-1875-1949.html
http://www. Bukhari.or.id/
http://www.almukmin-ngruki.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=art
icle&id=53&Itemid=66
http://www.bukhari.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36
http://www.gontor.ac.id/panca-jiwa
http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/2000/08/13/0029.html
http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/id/content-167-det-prof-dr-h-amien-rais.
html
http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/id/content-168-det-prof-dr-ahmad-safiimaarif.html
http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/id/content-169-det-prof-dr-h-m-dinsyamsuddin.html
http://www.republika.co.id/berita/31004/LIPIA_Lahirkan_Kader_Muslim_
Moderat
http://www.salafy.or.id/modules/artikel2/artikel.php?id=1619
302
List of Abbreviations
ABA
ANU
BEJ
BMI
DDII
DKM
DPR
DPRD
FKAWJ
FPI
FUI
HASMI
HBI
HMI
HTI
IAIN
ICG
Akademi Bahasa Arab (Arabic College)
Australian National University
Bursa Efek Jakarta (Jakarta Stock Exchange)
Bank Mu’amalat Indonesia
Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council for
Islamic Propaganda)
Dwan Kemakmuran Masjid (Mosque Management Board)
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (National House of Representatives)
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Local House of
Representatives)
Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jama’ah (Communication
Forum for the Followers of Sunna and the Jama’a).
Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front)
Forum Umat Islam (Islamic Community Forum)
Harakah Sunniyyah untuk Masyarakat Islami (Sunni
Movement of Islamic Community)
Halaqah Bimbingan Islam (Islamic Guidance Circle)
Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic Student Association)
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Institute for Islamic
Studies)
International Crisis Group
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ICMI
IKIP
IM
IMM
IPB
ISIM
ITB
IUDs
JAT
JI
KHI
KISDI
KMI
KOMPAK
KUA
LIPI
LIPIA
LMD
LP3ES
LP3K
LPBA
LPDI
MA
Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Association of
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals)
Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan (Institute for Education
and Teaching)
Ikhwanul Muslimin
Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Students
Association)
Institut Pertanian Bogor (Bogor Institute of Agriculture)
International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern
World
Institut Teknologi Bandung (Bandung Institute of Technology)
Intra Uterine Devices
Jama’ah Anshar Tauhid (Community for the Helpers of Tawhid)
Jama’ah Islamiyyah (Islamic Congregation)
Kompilasi Hukum Islam (Compilation of Islamic laws)
Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian
Committee for Islamic Solidarity)
Kuliyyat al-Mu’allimin al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Teachers
Training)
Komite Penanggulangan Krisis (Crises Rescue Committee)
Kantor Urusan Agama (Sub-district Office of the Ministry of
Religious Affairs)
Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Institute of
Science)
Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (Institute for the
Study of Islam and Arabic)
Latihan Mujahid Dakwa (Training for Preachers)
Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan
Sosial (Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education
and Information)
Lembaga Pengembangan Pondok Pesantren Kilat (Institute for
the Development and Lightning Pesantren)
Lembaga Pengajaran Bahasa Arab (Institute for Teaching
Arabic)
Lembaga Pendidikan Da’wah Islam (Institute for Islamic
Da’wa)
Madrasah Aliyah (Senior High School)
304
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Malari
MI
MMI
MPR
MTQ
MTs
MUI
MWI
NII/DI
NKK/BKK
NTU
NU
OIC
OSIS
P3M
PAN
PBB
Persis
PGA
PII
PKB
PKS
PNU
POS
PPIDT
PPIM
PPP
PUI
RAI
Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari (15th of January Disaster)
Madrasah Ibtida’iyah (Elementary School)
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesia’s Council of Warriors)
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative
Assembly)
Musabaqa Tilawat al-Qur’an (Qur’anic Recitation Competition)
Madrasah Tsanawiyah (Junior High School)
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Ulama)
Madrasah Wathaniyyah Islamiyyah
Negara Islam Indonesia/Darul Islam (Indonesian Islamic
State/Abode of Islam)
Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kampus
(Normalization of Campus Activities/Campus Coordinating
Body)
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Nahdlatul Ulama
Organization of Islamic Conference
Organisasi Siswa Intra Sekolah (Instra School Student
Organization)
Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat
(Center for the Study and Development of Pesantren and
Society)
Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandat Party)
Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent and Stars Party)
Persatuan Islam
Pendidikan Guru Agama (School of Religious Teachers)
Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Islamic Students Union)
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (Nation Awakening Party)
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice and Prosperity Party)
Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (Nahdlatul Ulama Party)
Political Opportunity Structure
Pondok Pesantren Ilmu Dakwah dan Teknologi
Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (Center for the Study
of Islam and Society)
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
Persatuan Umat Islam
Rabitat al-‘Alam al-Islami (The Muslim World League)
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
RCTI
RMT
SCTV
SDIT
Sesdelu
SMA
STAIN
STDI
STIBA
TKIT
TPQ
UGM
UI
UIKA
UIN
UMI
UMS
Unhas
YAC
YFM
YWI
ZMO
Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia
Resource Mobilization Theory
Surya Citra Televison
Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu (Integrated Islamic Elementary
School)
Sekolah Departemen Luar Negeri (School of Ministry of
Foreign Affairs)
Sekolah Menengah Atas (Senior High School)
State Islamic College
Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Da’wah (College for Islamic Da’wa)
Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Islam dan Bahasa Arab (College for the
Study of Islam and Arabic)
Taman Kanak-kanak Islam Terpadu (Integrated Islamic
Kindergaten)
Taman Pendidikan al-Qur’an (Qur’anic Learning Center for
Children)
Universitas Gadjah Mada (Gadjah Mada University)
Universitas Indonesia (University of Indonesia)
Universitas Ibnu Khaldun (Ibn Khaldun University)
Universitas Islam Negeri (State Islami University)
Universitas Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim University)
Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta (University of
Muhammadiyah Surakarta)
Universitas Hasanuddin (University of Hasanuddin)
Yayasan Assunnah Cirebon (Cirebon Assunnah Foundation)
Yayasan Fathul Mu’in (Fathul Mu’in Foundation)
Yayasan Wahdah Islamiyyah (Wahdah Islamiyyah Foundation)
Zentrum Moderner Orient (Center for Modern Oriental
Studies)
306
Glossary
‘Aqida
‘Aqiqa
‘Awra
‘Ibada
‘Illat
‘Ilm Kalam
‘Ulama
Adhan
Ahl al-Athar or Ahl al-Hadith
Ahl al-ittiba’
Ahl al-ra’y
Ahlu al-Sunna wa al-Jama’a
Ajengan
Akhlaq
Al-Amr bi al-Ma’ruf wa al-nahy
‘an al-munkar
Al-Firqa al-Najiya
Al-Ghuraba’
Al-Jama’a
Al-Salaf al-Salih
Creed
ommemorating the birth of a baby
Parts of the body that should be covered
Ritual
Rationale
slamic Theology
Religious scholar
Call for prayer
Followers of the Prophetic tradition
Followers
Followers of rational judgment
People who follow the Prophet and who
belong to the Congregation.
Religious leader
Islamic ethics
Commanding right and forbidding wrong
Saved group
Strangers
Congregation
The pious predecessors consisting of the
first three generations of Muslims
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Al-Ta’ifa al-Mansura
Al-Wala’ wa al-Bara’
Ansar
Asas Tunggal
Badan Wakaf
Bandongan
Bay’a
Berdikari
Berkah
Bid’a
Bid’a ‘amaliya
Bid’a haqiqiya
Bid’a i’tiqadiya
Bid’a idafiya
Da’i
Da’wa bil hal
Da’wa bil lisan
Dalil
Dar al-harb
Dawra
Dukun
Dzikir Bersama
Fatwa
Fiqh
Furu’
Ghaya
Ghazw al-fikr
Halaqa
Hijra
Hizby
Iftar
Ihsan
Ijma’
Ijtihad
The victorious group
Loyalty and disavowal
Supporters in Medina
The sole foundation
Endowment Board
Collective study in which a group of
students sit in front of a kyai or an ustadh
listening to his instruction
Oath of loyalty
Self-reliance
God’s blessing
Religious innovation
Bid’a of religious practice or ritual
Essential bid’a
Creedal bid’a
Additional bid’a
Proselytizer
Da’wa with deeds or examples
Oral da’wa
Religious argument
The abode of war
Training for studying religion ranging
from three days to three weeks.
Traditional medical practitioner
To chant God’s Names collectively
Religious opinion from a religious scholar
Islamic jurisprudence
Practical matters
Goal, aim
Cultural invasion
Learning circles
Migration
Partisan, causing division
Meal for fast breaking
Beneficence
Consensus
Independent reasoning
308
GLOSSARY
Ikhtilat
Ikhtiyar
Ilham
Iman
Isbal
Islam kaffa
Istighatha
Jahiliyya
Jalabiya
Jibillat
Jilbab
Kebebasan
Keikhlasan
Kesederhanaan
Khatib
Khaul
Khitan
Khurafat
Khuruj ‘ala al-hakim
Khutbah Nikah
Kitab Kuning
Kufr
Kufran Bawwah
Kyai
Langgar
Lihya
Ma’siya
Madhhab
Madrasah
Free social intercourse between men and
women
Making an effort
Inspiration
Faith
Wearing trousers that reach bellow the
ankle
Comprehensive Islam
Asking for help from God; common
religious gathering to chant God’s Names
and Attributes and to pray to God in order
to achieve certain aims.
The age of ignorance
Long and loose men’s dress covering the
body until the knee
Natural disposition or temper
Veil
Freedom
Sincerity
Modesty
Preacher
Commemoration of one’s death
Circumcision
Superstitions
Rebellion against the ruler
Advice and guidance for a new couple
“Yellow books”, classic textbooks printed
on yellow paper
Unbelief
Genuine disbelief
Religious scholar usually who leads a
pesantren
Small prayer house
Beard
Sinful deed
School of Islamic law
Islamic school
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Mahram
Majelis Taklim
Manhaj
Maslaha mursala
Modin
Mu’adala
Mu’amalat
Mubahala
Mubahatha
Muballigh
Mudir
Mufti
Muhajir
Mujtahid
Murabbi
Musalla
Mushrik
Nahw
Nerimo
Nifaq
Panjang Jimat
Pesantren Kilat
Pesantren
Pusaka
Qadi
Qurban
Rajm
Rebana
Riba’
One who is not eligible to marry
Religious lesson, usually held in mosques
Path or method
Common good
functionary
Accreditation
Social interactions
A kind of prayer in which all conflicting
parties meet and ask God for His verdict
by casting His curse on a lying participant.
Dialog, discussion
Preacher
Director of a pesantren
Religious scholar who issues fatwas
Emigrant who follows the Prophet from
Mecca to Medina
Muslim scholar capable of formulating
independent legal reasoning
Guide, mentor
Small prayer house
Polytheist
Arabic grammar
To accept with pleasure
Hypocrisy
Lit. “long amulets”; public parading of
sacred heirlooms.
Lightning Pesantren, short and intensive
courses or indoctrination in Islamic
studies
Islamic boarding school
Heirlooms
Religious judge in an Islamic court
Slaughtered animal on the Feast of
Sacrifice
Stoning to death
Tambourine
Usury
310
GLOSSARY
Ruqya
Salaf
Salafi
Salawatan
Santri
Santriwati
Sarf
Sekolah
Sepih ing pamrih rame ing gawe Shafa’a
Shahada
Shirk
Slametan
Sorogan
Sururi
Ta’assub madhhabiy
Ta’til
Tabligh Akbar
Tadrib al-Du’at
Tafsir
Tafwid
Taghut
Tahfiz
Tajdid
Takfir
Takyif
Alternative medical treatment, which asks
for God’s protection with His Words
The first three generations of Muslims
Person who follows the path of the Salaf
Chanting religious formulas in praise of
the Prophet
Male student
Female student
Morphology
Public school
To work diligently without expecting return
Asking help from saints and pious Muslims
Islamic confession
Polytheism
Special ritual at certain events by reciting
the Qur’an and chanting some religious
formulas to ask good fortune from God
Individual consultation in which a student,
usually an advanced one, comes to a kyai
or a senior ustadh to learn certain books.
Follower of Muhammad ibn Surur Nayef
Zainal Abidin
Fanatically following a particular school of
thought
Negation or denial of some of God’s
Attributes
Massive religious gathering
Training for preachers
Qur’anic Exegesis
Not to decide the meaning of God’s
Attributes as prescribed in the Qur’an and
in accepted hadith.
Tyrant
Memorization of the Qur’an
Religious reformation or modernization
Excommunication
Posing further questions about what God’s
Attributes are.
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
Taqbil
Taqdir
Taqlid
Tarbiya
Tarbiyat al-Nisa’
Tarekat
Tartil
Tasfiya
Tashabbuh
Tashbih
Tawassul
Tawhid
Tawhid al-asma’ wa al-sifat
Tawhid Mulkiya or hakimiya
Tawhid Rububiya
Tawhid Uluhiya
Tawqifiya
Tawsiya
Tharif or Ta’wil
Tingkeban
Ukhuwwah Islamiyyah
Umma
Usra
Ustadh
Ustadha
Usul al-Fiqh
Wali
Zakat
Ziara
Kissing the hand
Predestination
Blind imitation
Education
Women’s Education
Sufi order
Qur’anic recitation
Purification
Imitation
Comparing the Attributes of God to those
of living creatures such as human beings.
Intercession
Monotheism
Oneness of God’s Names and Attributes
Oneness of Governance
Oneness of Lordship
Oneness of Godship
Matters that have been agreed upon
Religious advice
Changing or interpreting the literal
meaning of God’s Attributes into other
more rational meanings
Celebration of the seventh month of
pregnancy
Islamic Brotherhood
Islamic community
Family, a small group consisting of five to
ten people to study religion as method of
recruitment in the movement
Religious teacher
Female religious teacher
Islamic legal theory
Saint
Alms tax
Shrine visitation
312
Samenvatting
Deze studie handelt over de rol van Salafi pesantrens (Islamitische kostscholen)
in Salafi da’wa in Indonesië. Een Salafi pesantren is een pesantren die onderwijs
verzorgt in het Salafisme zoals die met name is verwoord in de werken van
Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, de grondlegger van het Wahhabisme in Saudi
Arabië. De oorsprong van de Salafi doctrine gaat terug op een oudere periode
en is gebaseerd op de leerstellingen van Ibn Taymiyya en Ahmad ibn Hanbal.
Tegenwoordig worden Abdul Aziz Abdullah bin Baz en Muhammad Nasir al-Din
al-Albani gerekend tot de invloedrijkste Salafi auteurs. Salafi teksten, zoals de
Kitab al-Tawhid and al-Usul al-Thalatha van Ibn Abd al-Wahhab en de al-‘Aqida alWasitiyya van Ibn Taymiyya behoren tot de belangrijste leerboeken die in Salafi
pesantrens worden gebruikt. Salafi pesantrens kwamen op in the late tachtiger
jaren van de twintigste eeuw en werden gesticht door pas afgestudeerden uit
Saudi Arabië en Jemen terwijl ze ondersteund werden door het Instituut voor de
Studie van Islam en de Arabische Taal (LIPIA) in Jakarta.
Als onderdelen van de wereldwijde Salafi beweging zijn Salafi pesantrens de
moeite van bestudering meer dan waard. De opkomst van de Salafi beweging in
het grootste Islamitische land ter wereld veroorzaakt spanningen en conflicten
in de maatschappij. In Mataram op Lombok, bijvoorbeeld, ontstonden in
April 2006 conflicten tussen Salafis en traditionele moslims toen traditionele
moslims een musalla (klein gebedshuis) van de Salafis beschadigden. Andere
conflicten traden op onder meer in Banjarsari in Ciamis, West Java en in Sidayu
in Gresik, Oost Java. Een ingrijpend fenomeen van de Salafi beweging die veel
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
wetenschappelijke aandacht kreeg was de opkomst van de Laskar Jihad. Onder
leiding van Ja’far Umar Thalib mobiliseerde deze paramilitaire groep de steun
van moslims en riep hen op zich aan te sluiten aan de jihad in de Molukken om
de moslims aldaar te verdedigen tegen christelijke aanvallen. Deze ontwikkeling
veranderde het imago van de islam in Indonesië van ‘the smiling face of Islam’
zoals Martin van Bruinessen het verwoordde tot ‘conservative Islam’.
In deze studie concentreer ik me op drie pesantrens: al-Nur in Ciamis,
Assunah in Cirebon (beiden in West Java) en al-Furqan in Gresik in Oost
Java. Ik heb ze gekozen omdat ze representatief zijn voor drie verschillende
stromingen binnen het Salafisme in Indonesië. Ik analiseer een aantal aspecten
van deze onderwijsinstellingen: hun historische ontwikkeling, de reacties
van de omliggende gemeenschap, netwerken en fondsenwerving. Ik besteed
ook speciale aandacht aan de wijze waarop studenten de Salafi manhaj in hun
dagelijkse leven toepassen. De vraag die zich hierbij voordoet is hoe Salafi
pesantrens hun studenten bijbrengen hoe te leven volgens deze Salafi manhaj,
hoe ze deze internaliseren en analyseer ik de dynamiek van het studentenleven
in de pesantrens. Ook besteed ik aandacht aan de interactie tussen de mudir
(directeur), ustadhs (onderwijzers) en santris (studenten) en de interactie
tussen individuen in de pesantrens met personen buiten de kostscholen. Om
data te verzamelen heb ik zeventien maanden veldwerk verricht verdeeld over
twee perioden waarin ik het gemeenschappelijke leven binnen pesantrens heb
geobserveerd, heb meegedaan aan allerlei activiteiten en heb ik onderwijzers,
studenten en lokale religieuze leiders geinterviewd.
De Salafi beweging roept moslims op om hun geloof en hun religieuze optreden
te ontdoen van bid’as door terug te keren naar de Koran en de Hadith en te leven
naar het voorbeeld van de al-Salaf al-salih, de eerste drie generaties moslims. Islam
zoals voorgeschreven in de Koran en Hadith wordt beschouwd als autenthiek en
onbedoezeld door lokale tradities. De hedendaagse Salafi beweging in Indonesië
is onderdeel van de globale Salafi beweging die volledig wordt gesteund door de
regering van Saudie Arabië. De Saudi regering spande zich op allerhande wijze in
om de Saudi variant van de Islam in te voeren in de rest van de islamitische wereld
om de voortschrijdende invloed van het Arabische socialisme in Egypte en van de
Iraanse revolutie van het eind van de zeventiger jaren een halt toe te roepen. Deze
pogingen omvatten ook uit het verlenen van studiebeurzen aan jonge moslims om
te studeren aan Saudi universiteiten, het bouwen van moskeeën in islamitische
landen, het publiceren en gratis verspreiden van leerboeken en het ondersteunen
van islamitische organisaties.
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SAMENVATTING
In Indonesië ondersteunde de Saudi regering de Dewan Da’wah Islamiyyah
Indonesia (DDII of Dewan Da’wah, de Indonesische Islamitische Da’wa Raad),
een islamitische organisatie die veel aandacht schenkt aan het verzorgen van
islamitische propaganda op het platteland in de archipel. Via de DDII verstrekte
de Saudi regering studiebeurzen aan haar kameraden die geinitieerd waren in de
Salafi da’wa in Indonesië. Belangrijker was het Saudi initiatief om de Lembaga Ilmu
Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA) in Jakarta, een tak van de Jami a Imam Ibn Su’ud
in Riyadh, op te zetten. De Salafi beweging werd levendiger door de ondersteuning
van LIPIA afgestudeerden. De Dewan Da’wah was echter niet de enige islamitische
organisatie die de weg vrijmaakte voor de opkomst van het Salafisme in Indonesië.
Reformistische islamitische organisaties, zoals de Muhammadiyah en al-Irsyad
droegen ook bij aan de verspreiding van het Salafisme.
Indonesische Salafis zijn verre van monolithies. Ik onderscheid in Indonesië
drie categorien: “puristen”, “haraki” en “jihadisten”. Puristen zijn zij die
volstrekte volgzaamheid aan de heerser propageren en die hun activiteiten
concentreren op da’wa en onderwijs. Ze gebruiken vreedzame middelen om
hun doel, de islamitische gemeenschap, te bereiken. Binnen deze categorie
zijn drie subgroepen aan te wijzen die ik “afwijzers”, “cooperatisten”, en
“tanzimi” noem. “Afwijzende” puristen zijn exclusief; ze wijzen elke vorm
van samenwerking af met groepen en organisaties die zij als hizbi (partizaan)
bestempelen – en ze bedoelen hiermee vrijwel iedereen. In het onderwijs wijzen
zij het nationale currculum af. Binnen deze categorie vinden we de voormalige
Laskar Jihad activisten. “Cooperatieve” puristen zijn meer inclusief; ze zijn, onder
speciale omstandigheden, bereid tot samenwerking met andere islamitische
groeperingen en met de regering. Abu Nida en zijn groep die beurzen ontvangen
van de Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath vallen onder deze groep.
Ik gebruik de term “tanzimi” (van Arabisch tanzim, “organisatie”) voor die
quiëtistische Salafis die het toelaatbaar vinden om formele organisaties op
te zetten. De Wahdah Islamiyah in Makassar in Zuid Sulawesi en de Harakah
Sunniyah untuk Masyarakat Islami (HASMI) in Bogor in West Java die beiden
zijn georganiseerd kompleet met hoofdbestuur en lokale besturen, behoren
tot deze categorie. Verschillend van “afwijzers” en “cooperatisten”, die een
structurele organisatievorm afwijzen als zijnde bi’da, geloven de “tanzimi” dat
een organisatorische vorm nodig is om de uitdagingen die de da’wa ondervindt
het hoofd te bieden.
De tweede soort Salafis zijn de “haraki” (van Arabisch harakah, “beweging”),
ook “politicos” genoemd. Verschillend van “puristen” die onvoorwaardelijke
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
gehoorzaamheid aan de heerser voorstaan, verzetten de “harakis” zich
hiertegen. Zij geloven dat islam een allesomvattende wereldbeschouwing is die
alle aspecten van het leven omvat inclusief rituelen, sociale normen, ekonomie
en politiek. Een heerser dient dus islamitische normen en regelingen door te
voeren en hij dient zich dus te onderwerpen aan islamitisch recht. Indien hij
de islamitische wet niet invoert kan een heerser becritiseerd worden. Pondok
Pesantren Islam al-Mukmin, Ngruki in Surakarta, Midden Java wordt geachte
te behoren tot deze groep. De laatse Salafi categorie is die van de “jihadisten”.
Verschillend van de “haraki” die de regering verbaal en zonder geweld
bekritiseren gaan de “jihadisten” verder door tegen islamitische heersers de
wapens op te nemen.
Salafi pesantrens bieden verscheidene onderwijsprogramma’s aan van
kleuterschool tot het tertiaire niveau en ze passen hun eigen curriculum toe.
Er zijn verscheidene verschillen tussen pesantrens. Pesantrens die worden
geassocieerd met “afwijzende” Salafis bieden een minder breed programma
aan namelijk Tahfiz (Uit het hoofd leren van de Koran) en Tadrib al-Du’at
(Priestertraining). Ze passen het curriculum uit Jemen toe en beperken zich tot
religieuze onderwerpen. Via hun programma’s proberen ze de Darul Hadith,
een Salafi onderwijscentrum gesticht door Sjeik Muqbil in Damaj, Jemen te
repliceren waar veel “afwijzende” Salafis zijn afgestudeerd. De enige seculiere
onderwerpen die deze pesantrens aanbieden zijn de nationale taal en rekenkunde
die nodig zijn omdat kennis van het Indonesisch nodig is voor communicatie en
rekenkunde van belang is voor handel.
Pesantrens die worden geassocieerd met “cooperative” Salafis bieden een
wijder spectrum aan programma’s: Kleuterschool, Basisschool, Tsanawiyah,
Aliyah, en Ma’had ‘Aly. Deze pesantrens, zoals al-Furqan en Assunah vertonen
een meer inclusieve neiging dan hun “afwijzende” Salafi tegenhangers. Ze
passen het nationale curriculum toe voor seculiere onderwerpen en combineren
dit met het Saudi curriculum voor religieuze onderwerpen. Ze onderwijzen alle
seculiere onderwerpen zoals die door de regering zijn vastgesteld en laten hun
studenten meedoen aan het nationale examen zodat ze hun studie kunnen
voortzetten op hogere onderwijs niveaus op openbare scholen.
De onderwijsmethodes die gebruikt worden om het Salafisme to onderwijzen
hangen af van de leeftijden van de leerlingen. Kinderen op kleuter- en basisschool
niveaus, bijvoorbeeld, worden op een eenvoudige manier onderwezen in het
Salafisme bijvoorbeeld door het memoriseren van gebeden gebaseerd op
geaccepteerde Hadith en door hen te verbieden liedjes te zingen of tekeningen te
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SAMENVATTING
maken van dieren en mensen. Studenten op hogere niveaus leren over Salafisme
door leerboeken te bestuderen waarbij ze de lessen uit het hoofd moeten leren,
met name de religieuze argumenten (dalils). Belangrijk is dat pesantrens niet
alleen onderwijs geven over het Salafisme maar hun studenten ook aansporen
te leven volgens de Salafi manhaj bijvoorbeeld door een jalabiya en een lange
baard te dragen, vermijden van isbal (dragen van broeken die tot onder de enkels
vallen) en door gezamenlijk te eten van een grote schotel om hen aan te sporen
waarlijke Salafis te worden (Salafi kaffa).
De stroom van internationale donoren bewijst de aanwezigheid van
Salafi pesantren netwerken. Mijn onderzoek toonde aan dat de meeste Salafi
pesantrens finacieel worden ondersteund door internationale donoren zowel
door charitatieve instellingen als door individuen. De belangrijkste donor blijft
de Koeweiti Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turatch al-Islami die grote sommen geld geeft aan
Salafi pesantrens en andere instellingen. Kleinere bedragen worden geschonken
door de Qatari Sheikh Eid Charity Foundation.
Salafis en Salafi pesantrens zijn nauw verbonden met hun tegenhangers in
het Midden Oosten, met name in Saudi Arabië en in Jemen waar Indonesische
Salafis zijn afgestudeerd. Net als Salafis elders ter wereld onderhouden
Indonesische Salafis hun traditionele netwerken die hen verbinden met hun
sjeiks in het Midden Oosten. Zij doen dit door hen te verzoeken om fatwas over
speciale gevallen, door hen te verzoeken religieuze lessen te verzorgen in hun
dawras en door studenten te zenden om bij hen te studeren. Indonesische Salafis
hebben bovendien een regionaal netwerk opgezet in Zuidoost Azië, met name
tussen Salafis in Indonesië, Malaysië en Singapore. Salafi pesantrens, dawras
en radiozenders zijn van het grootste beland in het opzetten en onderhouden
van dit netwerk. De aanwezigheid van verscheidene studenten uit Malaysië
en Singapore in Salafi pesantrens in Batam en Solo en de uitnodiging van
Indonesische Salafi ustadhs door hun tegenhangers in Singapore en Malaysië
om Salafi lessen te verzorgen bevestigen het bestaan van dit netwerk. In dit
verband verdient de Hang radiozender in Batam, Riau speciale aandacht. Het
verzorgt religieuze lezingen waar Salafis in Singapore naar luisteren.
Islamitische gemeenschappen reageren gemengd op de opkomst van Salafi
pesantrens in hun omgeving. Traditionele NU moslims vertonen een sterke
afwijzing van het Salafisme en zij uiten dit door verbale aanvallen en soms
door geweldadige acties. De voornaamste reden dat zij het Salafisme afwijzen
is dat de Salafi kritiek hebben op hun religieuze praktijken die zij zien als
bid’a (religieuze vernieuwingen) en de Salafi houding ten aanzien van andere
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NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
moslims. Salafi kritiek op de religieuze overtuigingen en praktijken van de
lokale gemeenschappen wekt de woede van de gemeenschap en vooral van hun
religieuze leiders. Voor hen betekenen de vraagtekens die Salafis zetten bij de
religieuze argumenten achter hun praktijken een aantasting van hun religieuze
autoriteit. Bovendien hebben ze ekonomisch voordeel door het handhaven
van deze tradities. Salafi twijfel aan hun religieuze argumenten bedreigt dus
hun religieuze autoriteit en dus hun bron van inkomsten. Bovendien beperken
Salafis hun sociale omgang tot hun eigen kringen zodat de lokale bevolking
hen beschouwd als anti-sociaal, exclusief en arrogant waardoor, in sommige
gevallen, ook de woede van de lokale bevolking wordt gewekt.
Lokale leiders van reformistische islamitische organisaties zoals
Muhammadiyah en Persis reageren meer positief. Hoewel zij het niet eens zijn
met de Salafis aangaande de plicht van moslims om het Salafi pad te volgen
zien ze hen toch als partners in de bestrijding van bid’as. Dit blijkt overduidelijk
uit, bijvoorbeeld, de argumenten van Nawawi Bakri, de voorzitter van de
Muhammadiyah afdeling in Sidayu en van Ade Abdurrahman, de voorzitter van
de Persis afdeling in Banjarsari. Beiden uiten hun waardering jegens het Salafisme
vanwege haar strijd tegen bid’as. Confict tussen hen en Salafis komt echter op
wanneer de Salafis proberen hun bezittingen zoals pesantrens en moskeeën
over te nemen. De kwestie van Pesantren al-Hikah in Sidayu weerspiegelt
de Muhammadiyah’s visie op het Salafisme. De pesantren is het bezit van de
Muhammadiyah maar wordt geleidt door Salafis omdat de Muhammadiyah niet
genoeg leiders heeft. Hoewel Bakri hiertegen geen bezwaar heeft hebben andere
Muhammadiyah leiders hun zorgen hierover.
Ik concludeer dat Salafi pesantrens een belangrijke rol spelen in de
verspreiding van het Salafisme. Behalve dat ze studenten onderwijzen in het
Salafisme, prediken Salafis ook op andere wijzen tot de lokale gemeenschap
onder meer door het verzorgen van religieuze lessen in moskeeën en door het
opzetten van Salafi radiozenders.
318
Quaestiones Infinitae
Publications of the department of
philosophy and religious studies
volume 21.
volume 22.
volume 23.
volume 24.
volume 25.
volume 26.
volume 27.
volume 28.
volume 29.
volume 30.
volume 31.
volume 32.
volume 33.
D. van Dalen, Torens en Fundamenten (valedictory lecture), 1997.
J.A. Bergstra, W.J. Fokkink, W.M.T. Mennen, S.F.M. van Vlijmen,
Spoorweglogica via EURIS, 1997.
I.M. Croese, Simplicius on Continuous and Instantaneous Change
(dissertation), 1998.
M.J. Hollenberg, Logic and Bisimulation (dissertation), 1998.
C.H. Leijenhorst, Hobbes and the Aristotelians (dissertation), 1998.
S.F.M. van Vlijmen, Algebraic Specification in Action (dissertation),
1998.
M.F. Verweij, Preventive Medicine Between Obligation and Aspiration
(dissertation), 1998.
J.A. Bergstra, S.F.M. van Vlijmen, Theoretische Software-Engineering:
kenmerken, faseringen en classificaties, 1998.
A.G. Wouters, Explanation Without A Cause (dissertation), 1999.
M.M.S.K. Sie, Responsibility, Blameworthy Action & Normative
Disagreements (dissertation), 1999.
M.S.P.R. van Atten, Phenomenology of choice sequences (dissertation),
1999.
V.N. Stebletsova, Algebras, Relations and Geometries (an equational
perspective) (dissertation), 2000.
A. Visser, Het Tekst Continuüm (inaugural lecture), 2000.
319
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
volume 34.
volume 35.
volume 36.
volume 37.
volume 37a.
volume 38.
volume 39.
volume 40.
volume 41.
volume 42.
volume 43.
volume 44.
volume 45.
volume 46.
volume 47.
volume 48.
volume 49.
volume 50.
volume 51.
volume 52.
H. Ishiguro, Can we speak about what cannot be said? (public lecture),
2000.
W. Haas, Haltlosigkeit; Zwischen Sprache und Erfahrung (dissertation),
2001.
R. Poli, ALWIS: Ontology for knowledge engineers (dissertation), 2001.
J. Mansfeld, Platonische Briefschrijverij (valedictory lecture), 2001.
E.J. Bos, The Correspondence between Descartes and Henricus Regius
(dissertation), 2002.
M. van Otegem, A Bibliography of the Works of Descartes (1637-1704)
(dissertation), 2002.
B.E.K.J. Goossens, Edmund Husserl: Einleitung in die Philosophie:
Vorlesungen 1922/23 (dissertation), 2003.
H.J.M. Broekhuijse, Het einde van de sociaaldemocratie (dissertation),
2002.
P. Ravalli, Husserls Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität in den Göttinger
Jahren: Eine kritisch-historische Darstellung (dissertation), 2003.
B. Almond, The Midas Touch: Ethics, Science and our Human Future
(inaugural lecture), 2003.
M. Düwell, Morele kennis: over de mogelijkheden van toegepaste ethiek
(inaugural lecture), 2003.
R.D.A. Hendriks, Metamathematics in Coq (dissertation), 2003.
Th. Verbeek, E.J. Bos, J.M.M. van de Ven, The Correspondence of
René Descartes: 1643, 2003.
J.J.C. Kuiper, Ideas and Explorations: Brouwer’s Road to Intuitionism
(dissertation), 2004.
C.M. Bekker, Rechtvaardigheid, Onpartijdigheid, Gender en Sociale
Diversiteit; Feministische filosofen over recht doen aan vrouwen en hun
onderlinge verschillen (dissertation), 2004.
A.A. Long, Epictetus on understanding and managing emotions (public
lecture), 2004.
J.J. Joosten, Interpretability formalized (dissertation), 2004.
J.G. Sijmons, Phänomenologie und Idealismus: Analyse der Struktur
und Methode der Philosophie Rudolf Steiners (dissertation), 2005.
J.H. Hoogstad, Time tracks (dissertation), 2005.
M.A. van den Hoven, A Claim for Reasonable Morality (dissertation),
2006.
320
QUAESTIONES INFINITAE
volume 53.
volume 54.
volume 55.
volume 56.
volume 57.
volume 58.
volume 59.
volume 60.
volume 61.
volume 62.
volume 63
volume 64
volume 65
volume 66
volume 67
volume 68
volume 69
volume 70
volume 70a
volume 71
C. Vermeulen, René Descartes, Specimina philosophiae: Introduction
and Critical Edition (dissertation), 2007.
R.G. Millikan, Learning Language without having a theory of mind
(inaugural lecture), 2007.
R.J.G. Claassen, The Market’s Place in the Provision of Goods
(dissertation), 2008.
H.J.S. Bruggink, Equivalence of Reductions in Higher-Order Rewriting
(dissertation), 2008.
A. Kalis, Failures of agency (dissertation), 2009.
S. Graumann, Assistierte Freiheit (dissertation), 2009.
M. Aalderink, Philosophy, Scientific Knowledge, and Concept Formation
in Geulincx and Descartes (dissertation), 2010.
I.M. Conradie, Seneca in his cultural and literary context: Selected
moral letters on the body (dissertation), 2010.
C. van Sijl, Stoic Philosophy and the Exegesis of Myth (dissertation),
2010.
J.M.I.M. Leo, The Logical Structure of Relations (dissertation), 2010.
M.S.A. van Houte, Seneca’s theology in its philosophical context
(dissertation), 2010.
F.A. Bakker, Three Studies in Epicurean Cosmology (dissertation),
2010.
T. Fossen, Political legitimacy and the pragmatic turn (dissertation),
2011.
T. Visak, Killing happy animals. Explorations in utilitarian ethics.
(dissertation), 2011.
A. Joosse, Why we need others: Platonic and Stoic models of friendship
and self-understanding (dissertation), 2011.
N. M. Nijsingh, Expanding newborn screening programmes and
strengthening informed consent (dissertation), 2012.
R. Peels, Believing Responsibly: Intellectual Obligations and Doxastic
Excuses (dissertation), 2012.
S. Lutz, Criteria of Empirical Significance (dissertation), 2012
G.H. Bos, Agential Self-consciousness, beyond conscious agency
(dissertation), 2013.
F.E. Kaldewaij, The animal in morality: Justifying duties to animals in
Kantian moral philosophy (dissertation), 2013.
321
NURTURING THE SALAFI MANHAJ
volume 72
volume 73
volume 74
volume 75
volume 76
volume 77
R.O. Buning, Henricus Reneri (1593-1639): Descartes’ Quartermaster in
Aristotelian Territory (dissertation), 2013.
I.S. Löwisch, Genealogy Compostion in Response to Trauma: Gender
and Memory in 1 Chronicles 1-9 and the Documentary Film ‘My Life Part
2’ (dissertation), 2013.
A. El Khairat, Contesting Boundaries: Satire in Contemporary Morocco
(dissertation), 2013.
A. Krom, Not to be sneezed at. On the possibility of justifying
infectious disease control by appealling to a mid-level harm principle
(dissertation), 2014.
Z. Pall, Salafism in Lebanon: local and transnational resources
(dissertation), 2014.
D. Wahid, Nurturing the Salafi Manhaj: A Study of Salafi Pesantrens in
Contemporary Indonesia (dissertation), 2014.
322
Curriculum Vitae
Din Wahid was born in Indramayu, West Java in 1968. He is a lecturer at the
Faculty of Islamic Theology and Philosophy, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic
University (UIN) Jakarta, and a researcher at the Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan
Masyarakat (PPIM, Center for the Study of Islam and Society) UIN Jakarta. He
went to Pondok Modern Gontor for his secondary school where he studied Arabic
and basic Islamic doctrines (1981-1987), and taught there for two years (19871989). In 1994, he graduated in Islamic Theology and Philosophy at IAIN Syarif
Hidayatullah Jakarta, and got his Master in Islamic Studies from Leiden University
in 1999. From February 2008 to January 2012, he was granted a scholarship for
his doctoral program at Utrecht University, The Netherlands, under framework
of “Training Indonesia’s Young Leaders Program”. His interest includes modern
thought in Islam, and contemporary Islamic movements in Indonesia. His
published articles include: “Pentas Jihad Gerakan Salafi Radikal Indonesia”,
Studia Islamika, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2007, pp. 343-362; “Negara Islam atau Masyarakat
Islam?” in Rizal Sukma and Clara Joewono, (eds), Gerakan dan Pemikiran Islam
Indonesia Kontemporer [Islamic Movements and Thoughts in Contemporary Indonesia],
Jakarta: CSIS, 2007, pp. 73-112; and “MMI dan Penegakkan Syari’at Islam di
Indonesia” in Mimbar, Jurnal Agama dan Budaya, vol. 23, no. 4, 2006, h. 385-400.
323