The Shape of Things to Come
Why Age Structure Matters to a Safer, More Equitable World
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The Shape of Things to Come
n
Population Action International
Population Action International
By Elizabeth Leahy with Robert Engelman, Carolyn Gibb Vogel, Sarah Haddock and Tod Preston
The Shape of Things to Come
Why Age Structure Matters to a Safer, More Equitable World
Population Action International
By Elizabeth Leahy with Robert Engelman, Carolyn Gibb Vogel, Sarah Haddock and Tod Preston
Contents
Dedication
Illustrations
Acknowledgments
Preface
5
6
7
8
Executive Summary
Recommendations
9
11
Chapter One
The Shape of Things:
The Meaning of Population
Age Structures
14
Chapter Two
Very Young Structures
Countries in Profile Nigeria
Countries in Profile Pakistan
22
Chapter Three
Youthful Structures
Countries in Profile Iran
34
Chapter Four
Transitional Structures
Countries in Profile Mexico
Countries in Profile Tunisia
42
Chapter Five
Mature Structures
Countries in Profile Germany
Countries in Profile South Korea
54
Chapter Six
Subtypes and a
Speculative Structure
66
Chapter Seven
Things to Come:
Demographic Possibilities
76
Appendices
Glossary of Terms
Data and Methods
Country Data Table
Endnotes
26
29
38
45
49
57
61
80
82
86
92
Mission Statement
Population Action International
(PAI) works to improve individual
well-being and preserve
global resources by mobilizing
political and financial support
for population, family planning
and reproductive health
policies and programs.
Dedication
To the Memory of
Ambassador Marshall Green
1916 – 1998
Robert Fearey
1918 – 2004
Marshall Green served as U.S.
Ambassador to Indonesia and Australia
and as Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs. After
his return to Washington, Ambassador
Green became the State Department’s
Coordinator of Population Affairs,
where he coordinated U.S. international
population policy and headed the
U.S. delegation to the United Nations
Population Commission in 1977 and
1979. After retiring from the Foreign
Service in 1979, he served on the
Board of Directors of Population Action
International until 1996.
Robert Fearey’s career in the U.S. State
Department included positions as the
last Civil Administrator of Okinawa before
the United States returned the islands
to Japan and as Director of East Asian
Affairs. Mr. Fearey joined Population Action
International after retiring from the Foreign
Service in 1979. He brought his dedication
to the cause of universal access to
family planning and reproductive health
services to the position of Administrator
and Assistant Treasurer of PAI until his
retirement in 1997 and, later, as inaugural
Secretary of the Advisory Council to the PAI
Board of Directors.
Illustrations
Chapter One
1.1 Iran’s Population Age Structures:
1980 and 2005
1.2 The Demographic Transition
1.3 Age Structure Types Along the
Demographic Transition
1.4 Age Structure Type Summary
1.5 World Age Structure Types, 2005
(map)
Chapter Two
2.1 Very Young Age Structure Profiles
2.2 Outbreaks of Civil Conflict
2.3 Risk of Civil Conflict by Age
Structure Type
2.4 Age Structure Type and GDP Growth
2.5 Governance and Age Structure Type
2.6 Nigeria’s Age Structures, 1975
and 2005
2.7 Nigeria’s Position Along the
Demographic Transition
2.8 Current Demographic Statistics
for Nigeria
2.9 Nigeria’s Potential Age
Structures, 2025
2.10Pakistan’s Age Structures, 1975
and 2005
2.11Pakistan’s Position Along the
Demographic Transition
2.12Current Demographic Statistics
for Pakistan
2.13Pakistan’s Potential Age
Structures, 2025
Chapter Three
3.1 Youthful Age Structure Profiles
3.2 Risk of Civil Conflict by Age
Structure Type
3.3 Age Structure Type and GDP Growth
3.4 Governance and Age Structure Type
3.5 Iran’s Age Structures, 1980 and 2005
3.6 Iran’s Position Along the
Demographic Transition
3.7 Current Demographic Statistics
for Iran
3.8 Iran’s Potential Age Structures, 2025
Chapter Four
4.1 Transitional Age Structure Profiles
4.2 Risk of Civil Conflict by Age
Structure Type
4.3 Age Structure Type and GDP Growth
4.4 Governance and Age Structure Type
4.5 Mexico’s Age Structures,
1975 and 2005
4.6 Mexico’s Position Along the
Demographic Transition
4.7 Current Demographic Statistics
for Mexico
4.8 Mexico’s Potential Age
Structures, 2025
4.9 Tunisia’s Age Structures, 1970
and 2005
4.10 Tunisia’s Position Along the
Demographic Transition
4.11 Current Demographic Statistics
for Tunisia
4.12Tunisia’s Potential Age
Structures, 2025
Chapter Five
5.1 Mature Age Structure Profiles
5.2 Risk of Civil Conflict by Age
Structure Type
5.3 Age Structure Type and GDP Growth
5.4 Governance and Age Structure Type
5.5 Germany’s Age Structures,
1975 and 2005
5.6 Germany’s Position Along the
Demographic Transition
5.7 Current Demographic Statistics
for Germany
5.8 Germany’s Potential Age
Structures, 2025
5.9 South Korea’s Age Structures,
1975 and 2005
5.10 South Korea’s Position Along the
Demographic Transition
5.11 Current Demographic Statistics
for South Korea
5.12 South Korea’s Potential Age
Structures, 2025
Chapter Six
6.1 Immigration-Youthful Subtype Profiles
6.2 Immigration-Mature Subtype Profiles
6.3 Age Profile of Immigrants to the U.S.
6.4 HIV/AIDS Subtype Profiles
6.5 Aged Structure Profiles
Chapter Seven
7.1 Projections of Age Structure
Types in 2025
Acknowledgments
For their contributions to the research and writing of this report,
the authors thank Zach Miller, Mary Panke, Julia Slatcher and
Preethi Soman. For their guidance on the report, the authors
thank the following staff members of Population Action
International: Tamar Abrams, Terri Bartlett, Amy Coen and
Lindsay Patterson. For their review, the authors also thank
Matthew Connelly, Geoff Dabelko, Rogelio Fernandez-Castilla,
Jack Goldstone, Catherina Hinz, Julia Jakob, Claudia Kennedy,
John May, Tom Merrick, Hugh Pitcher, Nafis Sadik, Fred Sai,
Jennifer Sciubba, John Sewell and Jim Shelton.
Conceptualization and early direction of the report was provided
by Richard Cincotta. Leslie Raabe served as editor. Production
was managed by Roberto Hinojosa. The report was designed by
Design Army and printed by Westland Enterprises. The population
age structure graphics were created by Susan Anderson. For their
additional assistance on the report, the authors sincerely thank
Dina Bogecho, Mark Bryan, Gib Clarke, Michele Duryea, Jennifer
Johnson, Connie Kaldor, Sean Peoples and Carlos Pinto.
preface
“In an increasingly interconnected world, progress in the
areas of development, security and human rights must
go hand in hand. There will be no development without
security and no security without development.”
What follows is the result of more than two years of research and
analysis. From this work, we conclude that population age structure can have a significant impact on countries’ stability, governance, economic development and the well-being of its people.
Most importantly, we find that age structures are dynamic and
These words, contained in a comprehensive 2005 report by former can be influenced – and shaped – through policies that affect
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan,1 underscore the reality that the the demographic forces (i.e. births, deaths and migration) that
threats to the well-being and security of our world – from HIV/AIDS determine these age structures.
and terrorism to climate change and poverty – require a bold mix
of interventions and partnerships that combine elements of both
In looking to the future and the shape of things to come, this
“hard” and “soft” power.
means that programs that promote the demographic transition
– family planning, girls’ education, maternal and child health,
One area of growing attention on the nexus between “hard”
HIV/AIDS prevention, care and treatment – must be an integral
and “soft” power, particularly given the focus of policymakers
part of development assistance. Extreme poverty, disease,
on terrorism and security, is the issue of fragile or failing states.
inadequate health care, and lack of educational and economic
From government to academia, there is an increasing desire to
opportunity – particularly for women – all pose risks, both in
understand what makes a state “healthy” – healthy in the sense
terms of human well-being and in state security.
of more peaceful, more democratic, and better able to provide
for the needs of its citizens. Additionally, there is a growing sense Collectively, we must do more to support developing nations as
that steps must be taken toward achieving poverty alleviation in
they move along the path to universal access to family planning
a more concerted fashion.
and the protection of individual rights. These modest investments can pay enormous dividends, as has been shown in the
development of the Asian Tiger nations in East Asia. With onehalf of the world’s population under the age of 30, and one-half
of the population of sub-Saharan Africa under age 20, the needs
are great. Time is of the essence.
Amy Coen, President and CEO
Population Action International
Executive Summary
All populations, like all individuals, must address issues of age.
Unlike people, however, populations can stay young indefinitely
and can even grow younger with time. This report is about the
ages of populations, how age is structured within populations,
why that matters, and how governments and societies can influence population age structure.
Age structures, or population profiles when they are pictured
graphically as in this report, demonstrate the comparative sizes
of specific age groups relative to others or to the population as
a whole. These age structures yield insights into many of the
political, economic and security challenges that countries face,
now and in the future. Age structures carry particular importance
when a large proportion of a country’s population is passing
through one of life’s dependent stages, such as childhood or
old age, or when a small proportion is passing through an age
of productivity. In these cases, society’s resources are likely
to be stretched and a government’s stability and political and
economic management are likely to be tested.
The Shape of Things to Come presents evidence that certain age
structures in populations can support governments’ efforts to
create and maintain political stability, and that others can impede
such efforts. The report does not argue that these demographic
structures and their dynamics directly cause development failures
or successes. Yet the influence of age structure on a state’s progress toward democracy, on the risk of an outbreak of civil conflict
and on economic development is both significant and quantifiable.
This report identifies for the first time four main types of age
structures present in current populations: very young, youthful,
transitional and mature. Chapters for each structure type
describe their basic demographic parameters and the common
development challenges and opportunities faced. A quantitative
analysis shows that each structure has distinct traits in vulnerability to civil conflict, governance and economic growth.
Each chapter also profiles one or two countries representative of
the age structure type. The case study analysis aims to represent
as many major regions of the world as possible, and individual
countries were selected for their interest to international policymakers and/or because their demographic history has been
particularly noteworthy. Some of the countries profiled, such
as Germany, Mexico and Nigeria, face demographic scenarios
that are emblematic of others in their age structure category or
geographic region. The governments of other countries profiled,
such as Iran and Tunisia, have made uncommon policy decisions that uniquely affected their demographic progress. This
group of both archetypical and distinctive case studies should
offer a wide range of possibilities and lessons applicable to other
countries. Specific recommendations for the following key findings are offered following this summary.
Graphic representations of age structures, such as this one,
are used throughout this publication. They demonstrate the
proportional size of different age groups within a population at
a given point in time by showing the percent of a country’s total
population that is comprised of males and females within fiveyear age groups. Along the side of the graph, the current age
of members of each group, based on the year from which the
profile is drawn, and their birth years are shown. Ethiopia is an
example of a country with a very young age structure, which will
be explained further in Chapter Two.
Key Findings
Population age structure has significant impacts on countries’
stability, governance, economic development and social well-being.
Date of Birth Age
Countries in the transitional category stand to experience
significant benefits from demographic change, if their governments take advantage of the opportunity it presents. Between
1970 and 1999, these countries experienced an average annual
economic growth rate of 3.6 percent, which may be due to their
reduced dependency ratios that allow greater personal savings and
government spending. Their vulnerability to civil conflict and likelihood of undemocratic governance also decreased dramatically.
Ethiopia 2005
< 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
Males
Females
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
Very young and youthful age structures are most likely to
undermine countries’ development and security. Between
1970 and 1999, 80 percent of all civil conflicts that caused at
least 25 deaths occurred in countries in which 60 percent or
more of the population was under age 30. During the 1990s,
countries with a very young structure were three times more
likely to experience civil conflict than countries with a mature
age structure. Nearly 90 percent of countries with very young
structures had autocratic or weakly democratic governments at
the end of the 20th century.
Countries with a mature age structure, in which more than
55 percent of the population is above age 30, have generally
been the most stable, democratic and highly developed.
In the 1980s, none of these countries experienced civil conflict,
and in the 1990s, only two did. More than 80 percent of countries
with mature structures over the time period analyzed have been
full democracies. Countries with a mature population have low
rates of economic growth. But because they typically also have
very high national incomes, so far this slower expansion has not
had major repercussions.
Societies, and especially governments, can influence age
structures through policies that affect the demographic forces
– births, deaths and migration – that shape these structures.
Demographic-based policies that have worked successfully in
many countries with transitional and mature age structures include
improving access to family planning and reproductive health care,
education for girls and economic opportunities for women.
10
Recommendations
Ensuring more balanced age structures, especially among
developing countries with very young and youthful populations, requires strong international partnerships, comprehensive policies and adequate funding to address those
populations’ needs. In particular, policies must focus on
significantly increasing assistance for programs that improve
access to modern contraception and other sexual and reproductive health services, expanding educational opportunities
for girls, increasing women’s participation in government and
throughout society, and enhancing employment opportunities
for youth. In the minority of developed countries confronting
rapid population aging, programs that work to balance
women’s professional and family responsibilities and increase
men’s involvement in childrearing, as well as other innovative
approaches, should be considered.
Given the profound impact of demographic trends on countries’ economic and social well-being that this report documents, governments should implement programs that can
influence the shape of those demographic trends in the future.
A number of interventions, especially in the area of health and
social services, can significantly influence a country’s age
structure. Such steps include the following:
When couples choose to
have smaller families, more
children – especially girls
– attend school and more
women are able to work and
increase their families’ income.
1Expand access to family planning services and improve
sexual and reproductive health as a means to achieve
balanced age structures.
In countries that retain high birth and death rates, particularly those with very young and youthful age structures,
demographic research and experience demonstrate that a
range of social interventions can spur lower birth and death
rates. Predominant among these are increased availability of
voluntary family planning and sexual and reproductive health
services, improvements in girls’ education and income-generating opportunities for women, maternal and child health
programs, and prevention and treatment of sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS.
Greater political commitment and more funding, both from
international donors and countries themselves, are needed to
expand programs that enable women and couples to choose
for themselves the timing and frequency of childbirth, that
promote maternal and infant survival, and that protect reproductive-age adults from HIV and other sexually transmitted
infections. For example, African health ministers recently
developed a plan “to take the continent forward towards
the goal of universal access to comprehensive sexual and
reproductive health services in Africa by 2015.” The plan
recognizes that sexual and reproductive health encompasses
many elements: “adolescent sexual and reproductive health;
safe motherhood and newborn care; abortion care; family
planning; prevention and management of sexually transmitted
infections including HIV/AIDS; prevention and management
of infertility; prevention and management of reproductive
cancers; addressing mid-life concerns of boys, girls, men and
women; health and development; reduction of gender-based
violence; interpersonal communication and counseling; and
health education.”2
While policies and programs in family planning and reproductive health are generally under the purview of donors of development assistance and health and social service agencies
and ministries, non-traditional actors such as the military can
play important roles as well. For example, military commands
should be prepared to lend logistical and organizational
support, with proper training and carefully defined roles, to
organizations working to provide reproductive health care.
Such cooperation is particularly needed in rural areas and
post-conflict environments where the logistical and distributional challenges – and lack of access to health services –
are the most acute.
In recent years, support for family planning and sexual and
reproductive health programs from international donors has
fallen victim to funding reductions, ideologically-based policy
restrictions and competing priorities in international development.* As a result, unmet need for family planning and sexual
and reproductive health care in developing nations remains
high. More than 200 million women in the developing world
who want to delay or end childbearing are unable to access
the services and supplies to do so.
Rather than limiting their funding or tying it to policy restrictions, donors should create and promote development
assistance policies that support universal access to voluntary
family planning and sexual and reproductive health care,
with gender issues fully mainstreamed. For example, the
Danish International Development Agency has developed a
policy stating that “Denmark gives high priority to multilateral
cooperation with organizations that strive to eliminate violence
against women and ensure women’s sexual and reproductive
rights as well as their access to resources…Denmark stresses
the importance of promoting gender equality in the areas of
peace, security, refugees and humanitarian assistance as well
as in regional political dialogues and assistance.”3
Countries with transitional age structures have already benefited from policies and programs that encourage demographic
development. But as mortality and fertility rates decline from
critical levels, their continued progress is not guaranteed
unless governments make deliberate efforts. Access to a
broad range of sexual and reproductive health services,
such as contraceptives, should be expanded to make them
universally available and affordable. Programs to improve
educational attainment and economic opportunities for women
should reach full scale.
With their low fertility and mortality rates symbolizing the end
of the demographic transition, countries with a mature age
structure generally have high economic and governance
standards and are more stable and less prone to conflict than
countries with other age structure types. Governments of
these countries tend to be concerned about the future social
and economic impact of their populations’ aging. To that end,
a variety of more generous family-friendly policies (such as
expanded family and maternal leave policies) could encourage
greater equity for women and, possibly, higher fertility in aging
nations. However, efforts to encourage childbearing should be
based on the rights of individuals and couples to decide for
themselves the timing and number of childbirths.
2Support improvements in the legal, educational and
economic status of women.
Countries in which most girls attend secondary school and
most women are employed in the formal labor sector have
better maternal and child health indicators and lower fertility
rates. When couples choose to have smaller families, more
children – especially girls – attend school and more women
are able to work and increase their families’ income. Governments and donors benefit through greater per capita spending
on health and education, and through increased savings and
investment in the economy. Improving women’s status can
influence social environments, help change cultural norms
and, ultimately, speed demographic transition. The World
Bank has recognized this connection between women’s roles
and development: “Women’s lack of economic empowerment…not only imperils growth and poverty reduction, but
also has a host of other negative impacts, including less favorable education and health outcomes for children and a more
rapid spread of HIV/AIDS.”4
Policies should encourage social and political reforms that help
girls stay in school and strengthen school curricula. Incomegenerating opportunities for women should be promoted, and
women should be fully protected from gender-based violence.
Women should have a full and equal role in the political
process, ranging from the right to vote to greater representation
in parliament and high levels of government.
Governments should promote the judicial oversight of
women’s and family legal disputes in civil courts of law and,
where applicable, their removal from the purview of religious
courts or customary law. Where the decisions of religious
or customary courts have framed family law, on balance,
women have made little progress. In some cases they have
lost ground in securing equal rights to custody of their own
children, to divorce, to access to sexual and reproductive
health services, to inheritance and land title, and to protection
in schools and in the workplace.
Countries and regions with disproportionately low levels of
female children as a result of neglect and sex-selective abortion may face future repercussions. Societies are less stable
when there are large numbers of men unable to marry, due
to unbalanced sex ratios or economic challenges in establishing a home or paying a dowry. There are no easy prescriptions for the dismal status of females in societies in which
skewed demographic disparities in favor of males are actively
promoted. Governments and civil society in such countries
should pursue policies that promote equal status of women
and men and discourage norms and actions that eradicate
naturally occurring gender balance.
3Consider population trends when setting societal priorities.
Population age structure can have significant impacts on
countries’ stability, governance, and social well-being.
However, demography is not monolithic or entirely predictable,
and the demographic situation and potential of geographically
or culturally similar countries can be very different. Policymakers and program managers should focus greater attention
on the nature and impact of demography and age structures,
both regionally and in specific countries. The United Nations
Millennium Project has noted the relationship between
demographics and the broad development objectives of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): “The achievement
of the MDGs is influenced by population dynamics such as
population growth, fertility and mortality levels, age structure
and rural-urban distribution. Each developing country has its
own unique combination of demographic factors that affect the
prospects for progress toward the MDGs.”5
Demographic data, in the form of statistics, case studies and
trend analysis, should be incorporated into research and
publications on security, economic and development issues.
Policymakers should seek to emulate in developing nations
the successful role that programs that impact age structures
– including voluntary family planning, girls’ education, and
women’s empowerment – have had in countries that have
progressed further along the demographic transition.
* In the case of the United States as an international donor,
such restrictions have included the Mexico City Policy and
components of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR). The Mexico City Policy, sometimes called the Global
Gag Rule, denies U.S. family planning assistance to foreign
organizations that use their own non-U.S. funds to provide legal
abortion, counsel or refer for abortion, or lobby for the legalization
of abortion in their country. In addition to forfeiting U.S. financial
assistance, foreign organizations also lose valuable technical
assistance and U.S.-donated contraceptives, including condoms.
PEPFAR mandates that a minimum of one-third of U.S. bilateral
HIV/AIDS prevention funds (20 percent of the $3 billion authorized
annually) be dedicated solely for “abstinence-until-marriage”
programs. PEPFAR also includes a requirement that organizations receiving U.S. HIV/AIDS assistance have an official policy
explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking as a condition
of eligibility for funds. Both of these provisions limit the ability of
organizations working on HIV/AIDS prevention to address the
critical health needs of married women, sex workers, intravenous
drug users, and other highly vulnerable populations.
1
Chapter one
The Shape of Things: The Meaning
of Population Age Structures
“Are we really going to be able to give these extra people
jobs, homes, health care and education?” Official in
Uganda’s Ministry of Finance, discussing population growth
in The Guardian, August 25, 20066
“Germany is becoming the world’s nursing home…Germans
really are a dying breed.” The Economist, March 18, 20067
14
All national governments inherit the legacy of population dynamics
shaped by demographic history stretching back into the dimmest
human past. The structure of age within a population is among
these dynamics. Along with population growth or decline, density
and distribution, age structure can help a government’s policies
succeed or challenge its resources and undermine its legitimacy.
Fortunately for those who understand the connections among
demographics, national stability and development, age structures can be influenced through population-relevant policies and
programs. International actors can improve the efficacy of such
policies and programs by helping countries establish and maintain
public health and education systems.
Snapshot: World Population Today
World population today is moving in several directions that
may seem contradictory. Its growth rate is slowing, but it is still
gaining almost as many people each year – 76 million – as ever.
Humanity’s median age is rising (it was 28 in 2005), yet every
year there are more people under the age of 30. And finally, while
analysts and policymakers in much of the industrialized world
fret about falling birthrates and the reality or possibility of population decline, world population continues to climb with no certain
end in sight. In 2006, the number of human beings on the planet
surpassed 6.5 billion, and projections indicate it will reach nine
billion by 2050. Only significant further declines in fertility and
unexpected decreases in life expectancy could prevent the addition of another billion people over the next two decades.8
Demographically, the world is more diverse than ever before.
Fifty-five percent of the world’s people live in countries whose
birthrates guarantee indefinite future growth. Nearly one billion
people live in countries – Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan,
the Palestinian territories, Somalia and Sudan among others
– in which fertility averages four or more children per woman.
Assuming no changes in family size or life expectancy, these
countries’ populations will double in fewer than 35 years.
Simultaneously, population aging and decline have risen in prominence on the public policy agenda in many regions. Nearly 45
percent of the world’s people live in countries in which the average
family size is below the number needed over the long term (usually
slightly more than two children per woman) to avoid population
decline. Populations with higher median ages have experienced
smaller family sizes and, thus, slower growth or even shrinkage
in recent years – usually along with increases in life expectancy.
Most of these countries are developed, but not all – among
them are Chile, China (with 1.3 billion people), Iran, South Korea
and Thailand. Population decline has not yet begun in most of
these countries and is likely to proceed gradually when it does,
in contrast to the still-rapid pace of growth in the dozen or more
fastest-growing national populations. So far, despite fears about
its future impacts, population aging has not caused demonstrable
harm to the economy, security or environment of any country.
Rapid population growth correlates closely with young populations. Countries with high proportions of young people tend to
have, or to have had recently, a preponderance of large families.
Moreover, existing high proportions of young people build significant growth into a country’s future, even if members of the rising
generation have smaller families than their parents did. Countries
with high rates of population growth often experience increased
strain on environmental and social resources. Unless economic
growth steadily keeps apace with an increasing population and is
equitably distributed, per capita incomes also shrink.
Because young populations grow, any government efforts to
slow aging by increasing birthrates or encouraging youthful
streams of immigrants also induce growth in population size and
density. For most of the world’s countries, in any event, aging is
a future rather than a present worry. High birthrates and low life
expectancies in these countries all but assure youthful population age structures for many years to come.
Favorable and Adverse Age Structures
When a country’s age structure is favorable, its government and
institutions stand to experience a relatively easy time (under
average global and regional conditions) improving the welfare
of the country’s people and solving economic and political
problems. When a country’s age structure is adverse, it is more
difficult to meet these challenges, resulting in lost opportunities
and sometimes state failures.
Favorable age structures, though they vary depending on a country’s economic prospects and its government’s security intentions,
generally include a large proportion of the population comprised
of working-age adults, with smaller proportions and slower growth
among dependent children and older adults. A favorable age
structure provides a sufficient tax base for government services
and a social safety net for the more dependent age groups.
Adverse age structures, in contrast, often develop when there is a
bulge in the proportion of young, dependent age groups or under
conditions of economic stagnation and high unemployment.
The notion of a favorable or unfavorable age structure, however,
is static – a snapshot in time. Population age structures can shift
relatively rapidly and sometimes dramatically in response to policies and programs, to epidemic diseases and to other natural
and human-induced events. Economically and socially significant shifts in age structure can occur in under a decade, and
profound reconfigurations of the profile can occur in 25 years,
as happened in Iran (Figure 1.1). Two examples of such rapid
changes are Iran’s recent decline from high to low birthrates and
the ongoing toll of AIDS-related deaths in southern Africa.
15
Such rapid changes in age structure, and the gradual ones that are
more common, are often the result of one or more modern demographic forces. These include the demographic transition, AIDSrelated mortality and international migration. High rates of death
from AIDS, which have been most profound in southern Africa,
shrink the number of working-age adults and leave dependent
children with fewer economic resources. Relatively high levels of
inward-migration have benefited the economies and kept the populations of countries such as the U.S. relatively youthful compared to
many European countries, where fertility rates are lower and restrictions on immigration are tighter. Even more dramatic effects are
found in the Persian Gulf, where extremely high immigration keeps
various economic sectors growing and makes working-age adults
the most prominent segment of the population.
Figure 1.1
Iran’s Population Age Structures: 1980 and 2005
These two population profiles, showing Iran 25 years apart, illustrate
how a decline in fertility rates can make a dramatic impact on age
structure in a relatively short amount of time. In the case of Iran,
fertility rates declined from 6.6 children per woman in 1980-1985 to
2.1 children per woman in 2000-2005, producing a more balanced
and favorable age structure. Over the 25 years, the share of
Iran’s population under age 30 decreased from 71 to 64 percent.
Chapter Three discusses Iran’s transition in detail.
Date of Birth Age
Iran 1980
< 1880
1881 - 1885
1886 - 1890
1891 - 1895
1896 - 1900
1901 - 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
Males
Females
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
10
Date of Birth Age
Iran 2005
< 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
Males
Females
10
16
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
The demographic transition – the transformation of a population
characterized by large families and short lives into a population of small families and long lives – is one of the seismic shifts
that have shaped the world in which we live. Others include the
agricultural transition, by which farming in developed countries
evolved from a household livelihood to a specialized industry in
the 20th century, and the epidemiological transition, by which the
dominant cause of death shifted from infectious to noncommunicable disease, also in the 20th century.
Like these other great changes, the demographic transition
unfolds distinctly in each population and is rarely continuous or
smooth. The general trend in recent history, nonetheless, has
been similar and nearly universal in overall changes in death
and birth rates despite differences in time periods. The transition
began in some European populations as much as 250 years
ago, but in many African populations death rates only began to
decline after World War II.
In all country populations, death rates have declined – especially
among infants and the very young – and life expectancy has risen.
This is the initial phase of the demographic transition. In the vast
majority of populations, with important exceptions that will be
described in more detail in this report, some time after death rates
have declined, birth rates have begun to descend as well, usually
in response to higher rates of modern contraception use. In a
few cases, also to be described in this report, the demographic
transition has stalled or actually moved backward. In these cases,
life expectancy has fallen, most often in response to a very high
prevalence of HIV/AIDS in certain country populations.
The decline in the infant death rate that launches the demographic transition typically follows public health improvements
such as more comprehensive access to clean water and better
sanitation as well as higher rates of girls’ education. The increase
in the share of children surviving to adolescence tends to widen
the population profile’s base, which reflects the larger proportional size of age groups in infancy and early childhood within
the total population.
Research provides substantial evidence that girls’ education,
later marriage and women’s employment outside the home have
played important roles in improving nutrition and decreasing
mortality in childhood, and increasing the demand for contraception in adulthood.9 In turn, increased use of contraception leads
to a decline in fertility rates, the second key characteristic of the
demographic transition.10 This typically comes later than a decline
in infant death rates, and it narrows the base of the age profile.
Figure 1.2
The Demographic Transition11
Figure 1.3
Age Structure Types Along the Demographic Transition
This pictorial representation of the demographic transition
shows that as death rates decline, followed later by a decline in
birth rates, populations grow rapidly but eventually plateau at a
relatively stable level, presuming no further drastic changes in
mortality or fertility.
The demographic transition is represented as a line marking the
path populations make toward a more balanced age structure.
Each point represents a country’s population, with four colors
distinguishing the four major age structure types (very young,
youthful, transitional, mature) and their location along the
demographic transition function in 2005.
Demographic Transition
Very Young Age Structure
Youthful Age Structure
Transitional Age Structure
Mature Age Structure
100
90
40
Population Growth
Birth
Rate
30
80
Death
Rate
20
70
Population (increasing)
10
0
60
50
Time >
Population ages 0-29 (percent of total population)
Birth and Death Rates (per thousand people)
50
40
30
20
10
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
Population ages 60+ (percent of total population)
17
In recent decades, the demographic transition’s impact on
country population profiles has been surprisingly rapid. The full
transitions that took most European countries about 150 years
to complete occurred in parts of East Asia and the Caribbean
in less than 50 years. Yet more than one-third of all countries
remain in the transition’s early and middle phases.12 Rates
of birth and death – particularly among infants, children and
women in pregnancy and childbirth – remain high in most of
sub-Saharan Africa and in parts of South and Central Asia. And
although death rates have declined, birthrates remain high in
much of the Middle East and in several Latin American countries
and Pacific Islands. This places these countries in the middle of
the demographic transition, mostly with youthful age structures.
Population Geometry: Age Structures Defined
This report characterizes all national populations into one of
four major types of contemporary age structures: very young,
youthful, transitional, and mature types. These four profiles
represent progressive steps along the path of the demographic
transition. Because only four major categories have been
devised to contain more than 150 countries, a range of structures
occurs within each type. Still, countries in each of these types
experience similar challenges and successes in their economic,
political and social development.
By themselves, these profiles provide an incomplete view of
a country’s current and future risks and opportunities. Demographic projections do not account for the historic, ethnic and
cultural factors that could contribute either to government
resilience or weakness in the face of challenges and threats, and
they ignore the conditions in the country’s geographic neighborhood. Nonetheless the associations found in comparing age
structures strongly suggest that demographics should be examined in every country analysis. Governments should consider the
programs and policies targeted at health, education and employment that can influence their population dynamics.
The four current age structure types are created by dividing a
country’s population into three age groups – youth (ages zero to
29 years), mid-adults (30 to 59 years) and older adults (60 and
older) – and using those proportions to track the country’s position
along the demographic transition. Calculated this way using
demographic data, any age structural bulges (large proportions
of individuals within specific age groups) and contractions (small
proportions) within the population can be identified.
18
Opportunities at Every Age
Among the three major age structure components, youth
includes life’s most formative years, and some of its riskiest.
When education, health care and employment are available,
young women and men hold the potential to renew and revitalize
the country’s economy and institutions. Without access to these
social services, however, countries with a large proportion of
young people tend to face escalating demands for jobs and
education. These countries have historically been the most volatile and vulnerable to civil conflict.13 A contraction in the youthful
age groups, meanwhile, generally indicates an actively declining
birthrate or previous declines. This presents opportunities for
governments and parents to save and to invest more in each
child’s education and health.
The middle age segment – composed of adults ages 30 to 59
– is typically the most productive group in a country’s development through the accumulation of technical expertise and
financial assets. A large bulge in this age group is characteristic
of populations that have experienced considerable progress
along the demographic transition. With effective governance,
this increases federal revenue and provides funding for state
programs including education, health care for children and a
social safety net for the needy and elderly. Conversely, a contraction in this age group can limit government spending unless
alternative sources of revenue are available.
Most countries will eventually experience significantly larger
proportions of older adults than in the past. In industrial countries,
the need for health care funding for a large number of older
adults and elderly was historically met by the significantly larger
cohorts of younger people who could assume responsibility for
their care. As populations continue to age and younger generations grow smaller, the development of a large proportion of
older adults in countries with state-run pensions and health care
benefits is likely to severely challenge these systems.
Figure 1.4
Age Structure Type Summary
120
Number of countries in each age structure category
This table shows the number of countries in each of the four
major age structure types across the past 35 years. The range
of possibilities for the number of countries in each type (and
one speculative type) within two different future population
projections is also shown.
Very Young Youthful Transitional Mature Aged
100
80
60
40
20
0
1970
Figure 1.5
World Age Structure Types, 2005
Countries are indicated by color in each of the four major types and
three subtypes of age structures, based on their 2005 population.
HIV/AIDS Very Young Immigration-Youthful Youthful
Transitional Immigration-Mature Mature No Data
1980
1990
2000
2005
UN estimate/projection
2025 Low 2025 High
Age Structure, Security and Development
In addition to describing a new typology of population age
structures, The Shape of Things to Come analyzes how countries
in each age structure type experienced three critical aspects of
the development process at the end of the twentieth century.
The three measures selected – civil conflict (hostilities within
a country’s borders in which at least one party is a state actor
and at least 25 people are killed annually), economic growth
and level of democracy – are just a few of the many factors that
contribute to a country’s development and the well-being of its
residents. These three happen to offer high-quality data and a
demonstrated relationship to population dynamics, but other
measures of development are equally intriguing.14
Age structures’ influence on a state’s security, democracy and
development is significant and quantifiable. Previous research
has linked the incidence of civil conflict to the share of young
people in a population.15 Based on this report’s classification,
countries with the most youthful age structures are statistically
much more likely to have experienced civil conflict in the 1970s,
1980s and 1990s. Countries with older age structures have
historically been more peaceful. In the 1990s alone, countries with
a very young age structure were more than three times more likely
to experience conflict than countries with a mature age structure.
The particular economic challenges faced by developing countries with high rates of population growth are well-documented.
Population growth increases the pressures on a country’s natural
resources and demands for social spending, and reduces or
negates the scale of improvements in national income.16 Aging
countries experience their own economic challenges as fewer
working-age adults must support higher numbers of elderly citizens and taxation revenue shrinks. Economic growth rates vary
among age structure categories, with highest rates of economic
expansion among countries with very young and transitional age
structures. The high rates of growth experienced by countries
with a transitional age structure may be due to the rapid demographic changes they are undergoing.
Finally, countries with very young age structures have historically
had a nearly 90 percent probability of autocratic or only partially
democratic governance, while the majority of countries with
transitional and mature age structures are full democracies.
The likelihood of democratic governance increases markedly
with each successive age structure type, and increases especially between countries with a youthful and transitional age
structure. Democracy does not equate to good governance, but
such measures of political freedom can be important to donors
in deciding where and how to invest in developing countries.
It is important to highlight two caveats of this research. First, while
the results suggest that countries with younger age structures are
more likely to experience challenges regarding their stability, development and governance, this does not mean that age structures are
direct or unique causes of these challenges. Many other political,
20
economic, environmental and geographic factors are at play in
complex relationships. Also, some age structures – particularly the
most aged, with very large proportions of people over age 60 – have
not yet materialized. So far, countries with a relatively large share
of older adults remain generally peaceful, stable and high-income.
The absence of current statistical evidence does not preclude future
problems among age structures that have yet to develop.
The Impact of Policies and Programs
At the beginning of the 21st century, the range of contemporary
population age structures and the extent of their interplay with
economics and domestic politics are broader than ever before.
The demographic changes that have created this array of age
structures do not happen automatically. In many cases, they
have been inspired by national and regional policies. Such policies can have either a passive effect on demographics – as in
the case of efforts to scale up educational and economic opportunities and build more housing – or an active effect – as in the
case of encouraging or discouraging immigration.17
Public policies are often purposefully meant to reshape the
population profile. Historically this has been done through rightsbased approaches such as national family planning programs
and expanded social welfare systems as well as more coercive
methods such as financial incentives to increase or decrease
fertility, and even forced sterilization or China’s restrictive onechild policy. In sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia, the
Middle East and Latin America, attention has been focused on
rapid growth in the numbers of children and adolescents in an
environment with inadequate educational and health infrastructure, and a dearth of teachers and jobs. Although life expectancies have lengthened and fertility rates have declined across the
developing world in recent decades, epidemic diseases continue
to decimate the most vulnerable – particularly women and
children – while hundreds of millions of couples lack access to
contraceptive services. Many countries, often with the assistance
of international partners, have implemented state-supported
voluntary family planning programs that provide affordable
contraception, counseling and related reproductive health care.
They hope that these programs, along with efforts to increase
girls’ educational attainment, will help instigate a voluntary shift
to small families, as they have in other developing countries.
Recently, in the industrialized countries in Europe and East Asia,
policymakers have been engaged in addressing just the opposite issue – fertility rates that have declined to precipitously low
levels. In response, governments have implemented a spate of
incentives to encourage childbearing, such as financial bonuses
and subsidized day care.18 These inducements to childbearing
have had, in recent decades, little quantifiable impact on fertility
rates.19 Many observers attribute these ongoing low fertility rates
to the tension between women’s professional advancement in
these societies and their continued traditional role in family life,
in which they are often expected to assume the majority of child
care and elder care responsibilities.
Summary Point Countries with more favorable age structures are generally more peaceful and democratic, allowing
governments to better meet the needs of their people. An
adverse age structure, in contrast, presents challenges when
national resources are insufficient to improve economic and
social welfare. Countries that progress along the demographic
transition – changing from high rates of mortality and fertility to
smaller families and longer lives – generally demonstrate more
favorable age structures. Shifts in a country’s position on the
demographic transition can occur rapidly and can be dramatically influenced by government policies and programs.
Policy Recommendation Policies and programs that result in
progress along the demographic transition – such as access
to family planning and sexual and reproductive health care
and girls’ education – should be designed, funded and prioritized in a context of individual rights. The European Union,
for example, has set the following objectives for its population
assistance in developing countries: to “secure the right of
women, men, adolescents to good reproductive and sexual
health; enable women, men and adolescents to have access
to a comprehensive range of safe and reliable reproductive
and sexual health care; reduce maternal mortality rates.”20
Governments and international policymakers should consider
the position along the demographic transition of their own
countries and others of strategic interest. Given their country’s
mortality and fertility rates, they should evaluate changes that
might result in a more favorable age structure.
Age structures’ influence
on a state’s security, democracy
and development is significant
and quantifiable.
2
Chapter Two
Very Young
Age Structures
With generally low levels of development, countries with a very
young age structure are consistently the most likely to face major
challenges. When countries that experienced new conflict in the
1970s, 1980s and 1990s were cross-referenced with their age structure at the beginning of each of those decades, very young structures were found to have the strongest correlation with occurrences
of civil conflict. In the 1990s, for example, countries with a very
young structure were three times more likely to experience conflict
than countries with a mature structure. Between 1970 and 1999, 80
percent of all new outbreaks of civil conflicts occurred in countries in
which 60 percent or more of the population was under age 30.
22
Date of Birth
Age
< 1905
100+
1906 - 1910
95 - 99
1911 - 1915
90 - 94
1916 - 1920
85 - 89
1921 - 1925
80 - 84
1926 - 1930
75 - 79
1931 - 1935
70 - 74
1936 - 1940
65 - 69
1941 - 1945
60 - 64
1946 - 1950
55 - 59
1951 - 1955
50 - 54
1956 - 1960
45 - 49
1961 - 1965
40 - 44
1966 - 1970
35 - 39
1971 - 1975
30 - 34
1976 - 1980
25 - 29
1981 - 1985
20 - 24
1986 - 1990
15 - 19
1991 - 1995
10 - 14
1996 - 2000
5-9
2001 - 2005
0-4
Afghanistan 2005
Males
Females
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
Date of Birth Age
10
Democratic Republic of the Congo 2005
Haiti 2005
Uganda 2005
Males
Females
Males
Females
Males
Females
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
Figure 2.1
Very Young Age Structure Profiles
8
10
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
Youth (ages 0-29) approximately 67
percent or more of total population
Mid-Adults (ages 30-59) approximately
18-27 percent of total population
Seniors (ages 60+) approximately 3-6
percent of total population
Demographic character Pyramidal
shaped; progressively larger bulges
in young adults and child portion
of the age profile
10
10
8
6
< 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
Population doubling time 20-35 years
Country count (2005) 62
Regional prevalence sub-Saharan Africa
Civil conflict risk 26 percent likely to
experience civil conflict, 1970-99
Economic performance 3.6 percent
median average GDP annual growth
rate, 1970-99
Governance 13 percent likely to have
fully democratic governance, 1970-99
23
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
The finding that countries with very young populations are more
vulnerable to conflict holds true despite the maturation of age
structures globally at the end of the twentieth century. This
suggests that the vulnerability of countries with a very young
population was not merely a result of the large numbers of
institutionally weak states in the early stages of industrialization. Although age structures in most countries in East Asia, the
Caribbean and Latin America matured significantly over this
three-decade period and many countries in these regions moved
into more advanced age structures, the likelihood that countries
with very young age structures would experience civil conflict
actually increased in each decade from the 1970s to the 1990s.
A positive relationship between the proportion of young adults in a
population and its vulnerability to conflict has already been established. Other analyses have demonstrated that countries with a
youth bulge (proportion of the adult population ages 15 to 29) of 41
percent or greater are at high risk of civil conflict.21 This correlates
with this report’s finding that the vast majority of new civil conflicts
in recent decades have occurred in countries in which at least
60 percent of the entire population is comprised of youth (ages
0 to 29). Although the 21st century is still young, the eight new
outbreaks of civil conflict that occurred between 2000 and 2004
appear to follow the same general pattern around age structure.
Once conflict has broken out in a country, there is little evidence
that changes in age structure help restore peace. Persistent and
recurring conflicts have occurred in some of the most mature
populations in the world in recent years, such as the Basque
separatist movement in Spain and ongoing religious and political
divisions in Northern Ireland. Therefore, the connections between
population age structure and civil instability are most relevant to
new outbreaks of conflict. Nonetheless, it is plausible to suspect
that the nature of civil conflict may change when recruitment of
insurgents becomes difficult, leaving uprisings with isolated criminal elements rather than full-scale revolutions. Such a change
could occur when a greater share of young people, particularly
men, have decent economic prospects, a development that may
be spurred by a shift toward a more mature age structure.
Figure 2.2
Outbreaks of Civil Conflict
Countries in which more than 60 percent of the population was
under age 30 have been at least four times as likely than countries with more mature population age structures to experience
new outbreaks of civil conflict.
Figure 2.3
Risk of Civil Conflict by Age Structure Type
> 60% Youth < 60% Youth
1970s 1980s 1990s
25
25
20
20
Likelihood of experiencing civil conflict (%)
Number of Outbreaks of Civil Conflict
30
15
10
5
0
1970-79
1980-89
1990-99
15
10
5
0
0
Very Young
Youthful
Transitional
Age Structure Type (first year of decade)
Mature
Countries with very young and transitional age structures experienced an almost identical average median GDP growth rate
over the entire 30-year period, at 3.6 percent. Countries with very
young age structures are generally very poor; their median per
capita GDP in 2005 was just $1,800. Historically, rapid rates of
GDP growth are common in these countries, especially those
with crude natural resources available for export. However, a
high percentage growth rate in a country with a tiny per capita
national income usually does little in the short term to improve
the living situation of the millions of people living in poverty.
Historically, the vast majority – nearly 90 percent – of countries
with very young age structures had governments that were
autocratic or only partially democratic. Countries with a very
young structure were consistently likely to have an autocratic
government and, over most of the period surveyed, their median
democracy rating was nearly the lowest possible. In the 1990s,
this rating improved slightly for countries with a very young
structure, but they were still overwhelmingly likely to have an
autocratic or partially democratic government.
When an age profile contains a bulge in a dependent or institutionally demanding component of the population, the government may struggle to properly address its obligations and may
fail to meet citizens’ expectations. Bulges in the youth cohort of
a population (teenagers and those in their twenties) can pose a
particular problem if unemployment is high, especially if youth
are well-educated and expect financial stability.
Figure 2.4
Age Structure Type and GDP Growth23
Figure 2.5
Governance and Age Structure Type
1970s 1980s 1990s
1970s 1980s 1990s
100
Percent of countries that were full democracies at end of decade
6
5
Median average GDP growth rate
4
3
2
1
0
Very Young
Youthful
Transitional
Age Structure Type (first year of decade)
Mature
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Very Young
Youthful
Transitional
Age Structure Type (first year of decade)
Mature
Countries in Profile: Nigeria
Demographic Development: Reversing Course?
Figure 2.6
Nigeria’s Age Structures, 1975 and 200525
With the largest population in Africa, more than 40 percent of
the region’s GDP, and a government maintaining a delicate hold
on democracy, Nigeria’s political and economic developments
reverberate across the continent. Nigeria is the eighth largest
oil-exporting country in the world. The petroleum industry is
responsible for about two-thirds of national revenue and a great
deal of international interest in the country, but it has also been
the target of recent political instability. In 2006, militant rebels
angry about the distribution of Nigerian oil revenue initiated
a series of attacks against the industry, including kidnapping
foreign workers, which resulted in the country’s petroleum output
dropping by 25 percent.24 Fighting has also broken out between
Christians and Muslims; the society is extremely heterogeneous,
with more than 250 different ethnic groups.
Nigeria’s population age profile has remained virtually unchanged
since 1975 in a classic pyramid shape, with bulges in the
youngest age groups and steady declines in the proportional size
of each successively older age group. This is unusual, compared
to most developing countries, which have been experiencing at
least gradual declines in fertility and mortality. Nigeria’s age structure has not matured since 1975, reflecting the country’s reversal
in position along the demographic transition.
Date of Birth Age
Nigeria 1975
< 1875
1876 - 1880
1881 - 1885
1886 - 1890
1891 - 1895
1896 - 1900
1901 - 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
Males
Females
Since its independence from Great Britain in 1960, Nigeria’s development has been hampered by extended periods of governmental
corruption, instability and general mismanagement, all of which have
created a weak infrastructure. Despite its vast size and agricultural
resources, Nigeria must import food. Environmental challenges
include rapid urbanization, pollution from both high population
density and the oil industry, and deforestation and loss of arable land.
Nigeria is firmly within the category of a very young age structure,
with nearly three-quarters of its population under the age of 30.
In fact, its population has actually grown more unbalanced over
time. Between 1975 and 2005, the share of young people in the
country’s population increased while the share of older adults
slightly decreased. Thus Nigeria has reversed course along the
path of the demographic transition – an anomaly in the process
of most countries’ development (Figure 2.7)
Nigeria’s lack of progress along the demographic transition
can be explained by its stagnant death rate and only slightly
declining birth rate. Mortality rates have barely changed since
1975, from 20 to 19 annual deaths per 1,000 people. While HIV/
AIDS has not reached the scale in Nigeria that it has in southern
Africa, four percent of reproductive age adults are infected with
the virus. Total life expectancy is around 44 years for men and
women, a decline from previous decades. Meanwhile, the total
fertility rate dropped from 6.9 to 5.9 children per woman between
1975 and 2005, but remains extremely high. Only eight percent
of married women of reproductive age use a modern method of
contraception, partially because the ideal number of children is
nearly seven. A number of factors may explain this high desired
fertility, including poor child survival rates – one-fifth of all children born in Nigeria die before they turn five – and low educational attainment among women, 42 percent of whom have never
been to school at all.26
26
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
10
Date of Birth Age
Nigeria 2005
< 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
Males
Females
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
Following the end of military rule in 1999, Nigeria was rated as a
partial democracy, an improvement from 15 years spent under
an autocratic regime.27 Still, corruption extends to the highest
reaches of government, with state governors immune from prosecution within the country’s borders and the vice president implicated as accepting bribes from a U.S. Congressman.28 Despite
President Olusegun Obasanjo’s promises of reforms, no highranking government official has yet been convicted of corruption
during his presidency. In 2006, an unsuccessful attempt, not
publicly opposed by Obasanjo, was made to alter the country’s
constitution to allow him to run for a third term in office. Elections
in 2007 should mark the first time that one democratically elected
Nigerian president turns over power to another.29
Figure 2.7
Nigeria’s Position Along the Demographic Transition
The disparities among age groups in Nigeria’s population have
actually grown more pronounced over the past three decades, as
the share of people under 30 has increased and the proportion of
older adults has declined. Even if fertility rates drop rapidly, Nigeria
will have a youthful age structure in 2025.
Although many previous international development projects had
poor results, Nigeria and its donors have taken steps to reduce
its debt to foreign creditors. Through currently active projects, the
World Bank is funding nearly $2 billion in development assistance
to the country. Still, one-third of the population lives in poverty,
and Nigeria is among the 20 poorest countries in the world.
90
In order to project a plausible range of demographic changes for
several decades into the future, United Nations demographers
generate a series of scenarios including the low-, medium- and
high-fertility variants.31 Figure 2.9 shows the range of possibilities for
Nigeria’s age profile in 2025 based on the low-fertility variant, which
assumes a rapid fertility rate decline to 3.1 children per woman, and
the high-fertility variant, which projects a fertility rate of 4.1 children
per woman. Nigeria’s population more than doubled between 1975
and 2005, and is projected to increase by 40 percent by 2025,
according to the UN’s medium fertility scenario. Even if its fertility
and mortality rates begin the rapid decline of the low-fertility variant,
Nigeria will have a youthful age structure in 2025.
80
2005
1975
2025 High
2025 Medium
2025 Low
70
60
50
Population ages 0-29 (percent of total population)
Now that the country has established a democratic government
and increased support from international donors, priority must
be given to improving its people’s standard of living. Improvements in health and economics would likely lead to a much more
stable situation for one of Africa’s leading states. Critical areas
include maternal and child health, increased use of contraception, and entrenchment against HIV/AIDS and other infectious
diseases. Nigeria and its international partners should also
focus on greater access to basic education, especially for girls,
and a more equitable distribution of wealth together with other
programs to diversify and balance the economy.
Demographic Transition
Nigeria’s Position Along Demographic Transition
100
40
30
20
10
Points for 2025 are based on the
range of fertility projections produced
by the UN Population Division.
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
Population ages 60+ (percent of total population)
27
Figure 2.8
Current Demographic Statistics for Nigeria30
Figure 2.9
Nigeria’s Potential Age Structures, 2025
Population 1975 59 million
Population 2005 132 million
Population 2025 (medium term projection) 190 million
Population 2050 (medium term projection) 258 million
Median population age 18 years
Population under age 15 44%
Total fertility rate (2005-2010) 5.3
Contraceptive prevalence rate (modern methods, 2003) 8%
Unmet need for family planning 17%
Life expectancy 44 years male and female
HIV prevalence rate (ages 15-49, 2005) 4%
GNI per capita (Atlas method, current US$, 2005) $560
Population living below poverty line 34%
Unemployment rate 3%
Adult literacy rate (2003) 67% total, 59% women
Arable land (% of total) 33
Even if birthrates begin to decline rapidly and meet the UN lowfertility variant, they are currently so high that Nigeria will transition
just one category and have a youthful age structure in 2025. A
more favorable age structure should develop once priority attention
is given to both mortality and fertility aspects of health.
Date of Birth Age
Nigeria 2025
10
28
< 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
2006 - 2010
2011 - 2015
2016 - 2020
2021 - 2025
Low Fertility
Variant Male
Population
High Fertility
Variant Male
Population
Low Fertility
Variant Female
Population
High Fertility
Variant Female
Population
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
Countries in Profile: Pakistan
A Youthful Population, Beginning to Mature
Figure 2.10
Pakistan’s Age Structures, 1975 and 2005
With 165 million people, Pakistan is today the sixth most populous
country in the world. Its population has historically grown rapidly
and, if current projections are on target, growth will continue
well into the 21st century. Between 1975 and 2005, the country’s
population more than doubled, and the United Nations estimates
that another 54 million people will be added in the next 15 years.
Around the early 2040s, Pakistan will have surpassed Brazil and
Indonesia to become the fourth most populous country in the
world, following behind China, India and the United States.32
In 1975, due to extremely high fertility rates, Pakistan’s age structure was more youthful than it is today. Approximately 30 percent of
the population was comprised of children ages nine and younger.
Today, Pakistan has a very young age structure that still holds a
classic pyramid shape. However, a gradual decline in mortality
and fertility rates has decreased the scale of difference between
each successively younger age group. Pakistan is on the verge of
shifting to a youthful age structure.
Pakistan is representative of countries that, while still maintaining
a young age structure, are beginning to mature. Its demographic
trends are particularly noteworthy because of its high strategic
interest. Geographically, the country is situated between India
– with whom it has maintained a fractious relationship since the
two states were partitioned in the mid-twentieth century – and
Afghanistan, whose political troubles have crossed Pakistan’s
border in recent decades. Two other neighbors are Iran, also
profiled in this report, and China.
Pakistan’s current age structure is similar to those of Cambodia,
Nepal and Sudan. Its population profile maintains a classic
pyramid shape, but the discrepancy in proportions between the
age groups that include children and those comprising adolescents and young adults is less pronounced than in the youngest
age structures. This gradual shift to a youthful age structure in
Pakistan is due to the declines in birth and death rates that occur
at the beginning of the demographic transition.
Date of Birth Age
Pakistan 1975
< 1875
1876 - 1880
1881 - 1885
1886 - 1890
1891 - 1895
1896 - 1900
1901 - 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
Males
Females
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
10
Date of Birth Age
Pakistan 2005
< 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
Males
Females
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
10
29
Pakistan’s government is a parliamentary democracy that has
experienced repeated periods of authoritarian and/or military
rule in the 60 years since independence. Major civil conflicts
in recent decades have included the secession of Bangladesh
in 1971 and continuing separatist struggles in other regions.
Ongoing hostilities with India, centered over the Kashmir region,
have escalated in geopolitical importance since both nations
possess nuclear weapons.
Between 1975 and 2000, Pakistan’s school-age population
doubled.33 As placement in public schools became increasingly
competitive, low-income parents turned to religious schools
(in Urdu, madarasas) as the only affordable alternatives for
educating their sons. While estimates of the number of madarasas vary, a recent analysis suggests that there may be as
many as 45,000 of these schools in Pakistan, with anywhere from
ten to several thousand male students in each.34 The madarasa
system is self-perpetuating. Boys and young men who enter
madarasas receive no scholastic or technical training. They leave
qualified only for Pakistan’s already over-staffed religious hierarchy, or to teach in a madarasa or start their own school.
The fundamentalist ideology that took hold in Afghanistan in the
form of the Taliban has crossed into some parts of Pakistan as
well. Pakistan was one of only three countries to recognize the
Taliban-led government, and some of Pakistan’s madarasas are
believed to have ties with radical religious groups. State security
remains threatened by extremists angered by the government’s
ties to the United States and its anti-terrorism activities in the
region. In addition, Pakistan has served as a destination for
millions of refugees from Afghanistan over recent decades,
which has also affected its age structure. Nearly 60 percent of
refugees living in Pakistan in 2003 were under the age of 18.35
As access to family planning has improved, Pakistan’s total
fertility rate has declined from 6.6 children per woman in 19751980 to 3.7 children per woman in 2005-2010. However, this
current fertility rate produces a population growth rate above two
percent annually, equating to a population doubling time of less
than 40 years. Pakistan still remains in the early stages of the
demographic transition and its position along that path has not
changed significantly since 1975 (Figure 2.11). In order to make
the progress along the demographic transition that the United
Nations’ medium-fertility variant projects it will, fertility will need to
decline by one full child per woman in less than 20 years.
Around the early 2040s, Pakistan
will have surpassed Brazil and
Indonesia to become the fourth
most populous country in the
world, following behind China,
India and the United States.
30
Figure 2.11
Pakistan’s Position Along the Demographic Transition
Figure 2.12
Current Demographic Statistics for Pakistan36
Pakistan’s path along the demographic transition has not changed Population 1975 68 million
Population 2005 158 million
significantly in the past 30 years. As fertility rates and mortality
rates decline, the country’s age structure will mature.
Population 2025 (medium term projection) 229 million
Population 2050 (medium term projection) 305 million
Median population age 20 years
Population under age 15 38%
Total fertility rate (2005-2010) 3.7
Contraceptive prevalence rate (modern methods, 2001) 20%
Unmet need for family planning 32%
Life expectancy 65 years, male and female
HIV prevalence rate (ages 15-49, 2005) 0.1%
GNI per capita (Atlas method, current US$, 2005) $690
Demographic Transition
100
Pakistan’s Position Along Demographic Transition
Population living below poverty line 33%
Unemployment rate (2002) 8%
Adult literacy rate (2004) 63% male, 36% women
90
Arable land (% of total) 24
With a per capita GNI estimated at just under $700 annually,
Pakistan is a low-income country, like more than three-quarters
of all other countries with very young age structures. Nearly onethird of the population lives below the poverty line. Development
prospects remain hampered by poor education – less than twothirds of adult men are literate and only slightly more than onethird of women are. However, economic growth has improved
markedly since 2000. Pakistan receives development assistance
from a number of multilateral and bilateral donors, including a
new program valued at over $6 billion from the World Bank.
80
70
1975
2005
60
2025 High
2025 Medium
2025 Low
Population ages 0-29 (percent of total population)
50
40
30
20
10
Points for 2025 are based on the
range of fertility projections produced
by the UN Population Division.
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
Population ages 60+ (percent of total population)
31
As future population projections reflect, Pakistan has the potential to transition into a more favorable age structure within 15 to
20 years. However, this requires that health care be expanded
to a growing population, including the 32 percent of married
women with an unmet need for family planning. In order to maintain the current decline in fertility rates to a level that will produce
major changes in age structure, Pakistan’s government should
prioritize universal access to modern methods of family planning
and reproductive health care. Education should also be a focus
area of development for the country, by strengthening the overall
quality of curricula, improving enrollment rates and paying particular attention to the needs of girls and women, whose access to
education and achievement are highly inequitable.
Figure 2.13
Pakistan’s Potential Age Structures, 2025
Comparisons of two future population projections from the
United Nations show the difference in age structures possible
depending on a range of fertility scenarios. If fertility rates decline
from today’s level of 3.7 to 2.3 children per woman (the UN’s
low-fertility projection), Pakistan’s age structure will mature
significantly and all age groups under the age of 35 will have
roughly equal proportions. However, if fertility rates only decline
to the UN’s high projection of 3.3, the age structure will remain
similar to today’s, with progressively larger population proportions among successively younger age groups.
Date of Birth Age
Pakistan 2025
< 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
2006 - 2010
2011 - 2015
2016 - 2020
2021 - 2025
Low Fertility
Variant Male
Population
High Fertility
Variant Male
Population
Low Fertility
Variant Female
Population
High Fertility
Variant Female
Population
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
A high percentage growth
rate in a country with a tiny
per capita national income
usually does little in the
short term to improve the
living situation of the millions
of people living in poverty.
32
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
Summary Point As a group, countries with very young
population age structures are extremely vulnerable to political
instability. Six of every seven new outbreaks of civil conflict
(80 percent) that emerged between 1970 and 1999 occurred
where 60 percent or more of the population was under age
30. About one-fourth of all countries that entered any single
decade with more than 60 percent of their populations under
30 left that decade having experienced armed civil conflict.
Summary Point Since 1970, countries with very young age
structures have been likely to have undemocratic governments. As the 20th century drew to a close, an average of 13
percent of countries with very young age structures had fully
democratic governments. Countries with weak or undemocratic governments and young populations may also face
other major political challenges, such as civil unrest or poor
economic performance.
Policy Recommendation Military and intelligence strategists
should consider age structure when assessing a country or
region’s vulnerability to conflict and policymakers should
recognize the importance of investing in young people,
particularly in education, family planning and sexual and
reproductive health. Governments should prioritize cooperation between sectors that are traditionally focused on social
welfare, such as health and population ministries, and those
focused on political and economic development.
Policy Recommendation Activists, policymakers and
observers who value the importance of democracy should
consider the relevance of population age structure and study
the experiences of countries at a similar stage of the demographic transition that have seen regime change. They should
also consider how demographic challenges can be alleviated
– namely through proven successful policies such as voluntary
family planning, sexual and reproductive health programs
and girls’ education.
Summary Point Very young countries, with very low national
incomes, can experience generally high rates of GDP growth
because their economies are small to start with.
Summary Point In addition to high birthrates, countries with
a very young age structure tend to face many other serious
health challenges, including high infant and maternal mortality
rates. The status of women is often also low, leaving them less
able to protect the health of themselves and their children.
Policy Recommendation At this early stage of the demographic transition with accompanying high rates of population
growth, increasing numbers of young people will be continually entering the job market. Economic development policies
should be targeted at ensuring they have adequate education
and training and that industries will be able to provide a sufficient number of jobs.
Policy Recommendation Urgent attention to improving
maternal and child health – including improving access to
family planning and reproductive health services – is key to a
government’s efforts to achieve a more favorable age structure.
Governments should prioritize funding for such programs and
create a supportive policy environment. In addition, governments should seek donor assistance specifically for these
purposes. Efforts must be made to improve the status of
women, including increasing access to educational, economic
and political opportunities and implementing and enforcing
laws against gender-based violence.
3
Chapter three
Youthful Structures
Countries with a youthful age structure have made noticeable
progress along the demographic transition compared to those
in the very young category. Some countries, such as Iran, have
experienced significant declines in both mortality and fertility rates.
However, these countries have not reached the point in the demographic transition where lower birthrates have been sustained
long enough to offer opportunities for major economic growth
and other development improvements. Their further advancement
along the demographic transition is not guaranteed and requires
government intervention in order to be achieved.
34
Countries with youthful age structures have experienced lower
incidence of civil conflict than those with very young structures,
but higher incidence than countries with transitional and mature
age structures. Between 1970 and 1999, countries with youthful
age structures had a 13 percent probability of experiencing civil
conflict, the second highest level among the four major age
structure types. Although in the 1980s they experienced a lower
frequency of new outbreaks of conflict than countries in the transitional category, the probability of conflict among countries with
a youthful age structure increased to 21 percent in the 1990s.
Date of Birth
Age
< 1905
100+
1906 - 1910
95 - 99
1911 - 1915
90 - 94
1916 - 1920
85 - 89
1921 - 1925
80 - 84
1926 - 1930
75 - 79
1931 - 1935
70 - 74
1936 - 1940
65 - 69
1941 - 1945
60 - 64
1946 - 1950
55 - 59
1951 - 1955
50 - 54
1956 - 1960
45 - 49
1961 - 1965
40 - 44
1966 - 1970
35 - 39
1971 - 1975
30 - 34
1976 - 1980
25 - 29
1981 - 1985
20 - 24
1986 - 1990
15 - 19
1991 - 1995
10 - 14
1996 - 2000
5-9
2001 - 2005
0-4
Egypt 2005
Males
Females
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
Date of Birth Age
10
Bangladesh 2005
Peru 2005
Philippines 2005
Males
Females
Males
Females
Males
Females
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
Figure 3.1
Youthful Age Structure Profiles
8
10
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
Youth (ages 0-29) approximately 60-67
percent of total population
Mid-Adults (ages 30-59) approximately
27-32 percent of total population
Seniors (ages 60+) approximately 6-8
percent of total population
Demographic character Maintaining a
basic pyramidal shape, but youngest age
groups (0-25) flattening to approximately
equal proportions of population
Population doubling time 35-50 years
10
10
8
6
4
< 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
Country count 27
Regional prevalence Central Asia,
North Africa, parts of Middle East
Civil conflict risk 15 percent likely
to experience civil conflict, 1970-99
Economic performance 3.1 percent
median average annual GDP growth
rate, 1970-99
Governance 21 percent likely to have
fully democratic governance, 1970-99
35
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
Figure 3.2
Risk of Civil Conflict by Age Structure Type
Countries with a youthful age structure had an average GDP
growth rate of 3.1 percent across the entire period, lower than
countries in the very young and transitional categories. As
economies begin to grow and fertility rates start the gradual
decline that signifies the beginning of the demographic transition, it is not surprising to find a slowing median growth rate
among countries in the youthful type. These countries are still
relatively low income, and large groups of children and youth
keep dependency ratios high and savings low. In addition, donor
support has often waned and the government must be more
self-sufficient at stimulating the economy, a task it may lack the
capacity or resources to accomplish.
1970s 1980s 1990s
30
Likelihood of experiencing civil conflict (%)
25
20
15
10
5
0
0
Very Young
Youthful
Transitional
Countries with a youthful age structure are more likely to have
had democratic governance than countries in the very young
age structure type, just as they have been less vulnerable to
civil conflict. Countries with youthful structures had a 21 percent
probability of fully democratic governance between 1970 and
1999, an eight percent increase from countries with very young
structures. However, countries with a transitional structure, the
next category along the demographic transition, had a democratic governance rate more than three times greater than countries with a youthful structure.
Mature
Age Structure Type (first year of decade)
these countries have not
reached the point in the
demographic transition where
lower birthrates have been
sustained long enough to
offer opportunities for major
economic growth and other
development improvements.
36
Figure 3.3
Age Structure Type and GDP Growth37
Figure 3.4
Governance and Age Structure Type
1970s 1980s 1990s
1970s 1980s 1990s
100
Percent of countries that were full democracies at end of decade
6
5
Median average GDP growth rate
4
3
2
1
0
Very Young
Youthful
Transitional
Age Structure Type (first year of decade)
Mature
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Very Young
Youthful
Transitional
Age Structure Type (first year of decade)
Mature
Countries in Profile: Iran
Demographics Ahead of Development
By the late 1970s, Iran had reached a breaking point. While Shah
Mohammed Reza Pahlevi’s family and government elite lived in
luxury, Iranian citizens faced severe economic challenges. GDP
growth had been negative for three years and prices of consumer
goods rose by 10 to 12 percent each year.38 With more than 70
percent of the population under age 30 and a population growth
rate of 3.3 percent annually, demographic pressures exacerbated
the country’s troubles. The situation exploded in 1979, when a
popular revolution deposed the shah and installed a conservative Islamic government headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini. A
few months later, a group of students captured the U.S. embassy
and held American employees hostage for 444 days, marking
the beginning of a decades-long estrangement between Iran and
many developed countries, particularly the United States.
Iran’s new regime made religious law, shari’a, the foundation of
the country’s new constitution, and – counter to the secular policies of the shah – the ruling clerics initially took a very restrictive
approach to social issues. This included a pro-natalist strategy
designed to promote population growth that lowered minimum
marriage ages to nine for girls and 14 for boys and outlawed
abortion (a ban that remains in place today).39 However, 10 years
after the revolution, the Iranian government’s attitude toward
family planning and reproductive health shifted dramatically.
As a result, Iran has experienced rapid progress along the
demographic transition over the past two decades.
The change in the government’s attitude toward population
dynamics and family planning came quickly. Six years into a
grinding war with Iraq that resulted in hundreds of thousands
of casualties, the 1986 national census showed rapid rates of
population growth, and many officials were enthusiastic. They
believed that a large and growing population was necessary to
support the war effort and as a defense mechanism against other
foreign threats. However, some government agencies understood
the economic consequences that Iran was suffering as demand
for public services and jobs escalated. In the late 1980s, as the
country created its first development plan, a publicity campaign
successfully convinced key officials that the government needed to
address population. Conferences organized by supportive finance
and health officials, combined with public media debates among
members of the religious hierarchy, academics and professionals,
successfully raised awareness of and interest in population issues.
By 1989, commitments to reestablish a national family planning
program – with the support of key clerics – had been secured.41
The national family planning program that was fully implemented
by the early 1990s is quite extensive, although it neglects the
reproductive health needs of young and unmarried individuals.
Modern contraceptive methods are available free and at-will in
public clinics, university students take a mandatory course on
population and family planning, and both prospective spouses
must attend a government-sponsored class on family planning
in order to receive their marriage license.42 All of these requirements support the government’s policy to encourage smaller
family sizes, increase the age of marriage and first pregnancy,
and lengthen spacing between pregnancies.
Figure 3.5
Iran’s Age Structures, 1980 and 200540
In 1980, with 71 percent of its population under the age of 30 and
small age groups among those older than 35, Iran had a very young
age structure. By 2005, less than 20 years after the initiation of a
government-supported family planning program, Iran had shifted to
the middle of the range of countries with a youthful age structure.
Date of Birth Age
Iran 1980
< 1880
1881 - 1885
1886 - 1890
1891 - 1895
1896 - 1900
1901 - 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
Males
Females
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
10
Date of Birth Age
Iran 2005
< 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
Males
Females
38
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
Iran’s family planning efforts have been more successful than the
government anticipated. Current national fertility rates are just
two children per woman, down from 6.5 children per woman at
the time of the revolution. More than half of married women are
using a modern method of contraception. Iran’s age structure
has shifted from being very young in 1980 to approximately
halfway through the range of youthful structures in 2005. While
there are still large bulges in the age groups between 10 and 24,
the age groups of younger children are about one-third smaller.
Figure 3.6
Iran’s Position Along the Demographic Transition
In 1975, Iran had a very young age structure, but in 30 years
it has made demonstrable progress along the demographic
transition. Even more dramatic changes are predicted for the
future. By 2050, more than one-fourth of the country’s population
is projected to be over age 60.
Iran’s demographic changes and comprehensive family planning
program have recently been challenged by President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, a political conservative. In late 2006, he stated
that the country’s fertility rate should be higher than two children
per woman. In announcing a plan to reduce women’s working
hours as an effort to increase fertility, the president said that the
country’s population could reach 120 million, an increase of 70
percent from its current level.43
90
80
Despite its demographic progress, Iran faces a number of other
development challenges, primarily political. It remains a lowermiddle income country, with an economic growth rate averaging
slightly above four percent in recent years. Although oil wealth
is a significant contributor to the national economy, inflation and
unemployment remain high. Since the revolution, there have
been intermittent periods of civil conflict, combined with a disastrous war with Iraq through most of the 1980s. Iran is home to
nearly one million refugees from neighboring Afghanistan, where
recent politics have been even more tumultuous.
70
1975
2005
60
50
2025 High
Population ages 0-29 (percent of total population)
The Iranian government remains an outcast from much of the
international community. The country’s political establishment,
with power centered in Supreme Leader and former president
Ayatollah Khameini and other clerics, has resisted recent efforts
toward political reform and openness. Since his election in 2005,
President Ahmadinejad has raised tensions with the U.S. and
other developed nations by refusing to suspend his country’s
efforts to develop nuclear technology.
Demographic Transition
Iran’s Position Along Demographic Transition
100
40
2025 Medium
2025 Low
30
20
10
Points for 2025 are based on the
range of fertility projections produced
by the UN Population Division.
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
Population ages 60+ (percent of total population)
39
Figure 3.7
Current Demographic Statistics for Iran44
Population 1980 39 million
Population 2005 70 million
Population 2025 (medium term projection) 89 million
Population 2050 (medium term projection) 102 million
Median population age 23 years
Population under age 15 29%
Total fertility rate (2005-2010) 2.04
Contraceptive prevalence rate (modern methods, 1997) 56%
Unmet need for family planning no data
Life expectancy 69 years male, 72 years female
HIV prevalence rate (ages 15-49, 2005) 0.2%
GNI per capita (Atlas method, current US$, 2005) $2,770
Population living below poverty line (2002) 40%
Unemployment rate (2003) 12%
Adult literacy rate (2004) 84% men, 70% women
Arable land (% of total) 10
If the UN’s low-fertility variant for 2025 is achieved, and fertility rates
decline to 1.4 children per woman, Iran will have a mature age
structure, similar to Europe and much of East Asia today. Under
the high-fertility scenario, in which fertility increases from its current
level to 2.4 children per woman, by 2025 Iran will have moved into
the third category, a transitional structure. Despite the range of
predictions, Iran is almost certain to make continued rapid progress along the demographic transition in the coming decades.
The Iranian experience suggests that economic growth and transformation to democracy are not necessary prerequisites to fertility
decline. Although it has an extremely successful national family
planning program and has made more demographic progress
than most countries in its region, Iranian politics remain controlled
by a small group of hard-line clerics, and economic challenges
strain national resources. This mix of a progressive attitude
toward family planning and reproductive health combined with
other policies that inhibit development is uncommon. Analysts
doubt that Ahmadinejad’s proposal to reverse demographic
changes by limiting women’s role in the work force and raising
fertility rates is likely to be accepted by the population, given how
firmly the national family planning program and the changes it
has brought are entrenched within Iranian society.45
Age structure will continue to play a central role in Iran’s development in the future. With large age groups from previous high
fertility still entering their adolescent and early adult years, it is
critical for Iran to maintain its emphasis on universal access to
reproductive health care, and implement better coverage for
youth, in the coming years. The government should recognize
that its demographic progress is paying dividends and use
the country’s more favorable age structure to address other
pressing issues, especially in economics. As Iran learned in
1979, the combination of a population of educated youth with
poor employment prospects and the appeal of a fundamentalist
ideology can have volatile results.
Figure 3.8
Iran’s Potential Age Structures, 2025
Two comparative age structures of Iran in 2025, based on the
UN’s low- and high-fertility variants, show that even if fertility
rates increase significantly from their current level, Iran’s age
structure is likely to graduate into the transitional category. If
fertility rates continue their rapid decline, Iran’s age structure will
reach the mature category within 20 years.
Date of Birth Age
Iran 2025
< 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
2006 - 2010
2011 - 2015
2016 - 2020
2021 - 2025
Low Fertility
Variant Male
Population
High Fertility
Variant Male
Population
Low Fertility
Variant Female
Population
High Fertility
Variant Female
Population
10
40
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
Summary Point Countries with a youthful age structure have
begun the demographic transition, with mortality and fertility
rates in decline. However, dependency ratios are still high,
and economic growth tends to stall. These countries are more
prone to outbreaks of civil conflict than countries with a more
balanced age structure, and are less than one-third as likely
as countries with a transitional age structure to have fully
democratic governance.
Policy Recommendation Further progress along the demographic transition is possible even in countries with political and
economic challenges. Policymakers must remain committed to
increasing access to family planning and reproductive health
services. With more control over fertility, women and couples are
better able to participate and contribute to a healthy economy.
Countries must improve the status of women by encouraging
them to participate in the political process and the economy.
The Iranian experience suggests
that economic growth and
transformation to democracy
are not necessary prerequisites
to fertility decline.
4
Chapter four
Transitional
Age Structures
Countries with a transitional age structure are so termed because
they are in the middle of the demographic transition, with mortality
rates usually not much higher than those of fully industrialized countries and fertility rates on a similar decline. They have been passing
through the demographic transition long enough for the proportion
of children and adolescents to stabilize with that of young workingage adults. Transitional age structure countries are presented with
a clear opportunity to experience the greatest economic benefits
of the demographic transition. To do so, however, is not automatic:
Governments must make wise investments in health and education,
and the economy must be sufficiently developed to offer a sufficient
number of jobs to new entrants into the labor force.
42
Over the thirty-year period at the end of the twentieth century, the
risk of civil conflict among countries with a transitional structure
has held fairly steady. On average, countries in this category
have been slightly more likely to experience conflict than those
in the mature category and slightly less likely than those with
a youthful structure. In the 1990s, the four new outbreaks of
conflict in these countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia,
Moldova and Serbia and Montenegro) were all in a region
affected by the demise of the Soviet Union.
Date of Birth
Age
< 1905
100+
1906 - 1910
95 - 99
1911 - 1915
90 - 94
1916 - 1920
85 - 89
1921 - 1925
80 - 84
1926 - 1930
75 - 79
1931 - 1935
70 - 74
1936 - 1940
65 - 69
1941 - 1945
60 - 64
1946 - 1950
55 - 59
1951 - 1955
50 - 54
1956 - 1960
45 - 49
1961 - 1965
40 - 44
1966 - 1970
35 - 39
1971 - 1975
30 - 34
1976 - 1980
25 - 29
1981 - 1985
20 - 24
1986 - 1990
15 - 19
1991 - 1995
10 - 14
1996 - 2000
5-9
2001 - 2005
0-4
Turkey 2005
Males
Females
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
Date of Birth Age
10
Costa Rica 2005
Indonesia 2005
Thailand 2005
Males
Females
Males
Females
Males
Females
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
Figure 4.1
Transitional Age Structure Profiles
10
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
Youth (ages 0-29) approximately 45-60
percent of total population
Mid-Adults (ages 30-59) approximately
27-40 percent of total population
Seniors (ages 60+) approximately 8-15
percent of total population
Demographic character Although older
age groups are still very small proportions
of the population, there are only gradual
declines in proportion among those age
groups under 40.
Population doubling time 50-125 years
10
8
6
< 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
Country count 40
Regional prevalence Latin America,
Caribbean, South Asia, China, parts
of Middle East
Civil conflict risk 9 percent likely to
experience civil conflict, 1970-99
Economic performance 3.6 percent
median average annual GDP growth
rate, 1970-99
Governance 74 percent likely to have
fully democratic governance, 1970-99
43
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
Countries with a transitional age structure have a high average
GDP growth rate, at 3.6 percent, which may be tied to those countries’ demographic development. As death rates and birthrates
decline, every country experiences a decades-long “demographic
bonus” when working-age adults make up the largest share of
its population, and there are relatively small groups of dependent
children and older adults compared to previous generations. The
lower dependency ratios during this period can lead to higher
savings, greater per capita government spending on education
and health, and increased wages. Such benefits of the demographic bonus contribute to boost countries’ economies, as was
the case of the “Asian Tigers” in the 1970s and 1980s.46
Nearly three-quarters of countries with a transitional structure
were fully democratic, on average, between 1970 and 1999.
Their probability of democratic governance was more than three
times greater than that of countries with a youthful age structure,
the previous category along the demographic transition. By the
1990s, many of the countries of Western Europe and other highly
developed regions had mature age structures, and were replaced
in the transitional structure category by countries in Eastern
Europe and a few each from East Asia and South America.
Complete governance data were not available for many of the
Eastern European states, which may have made the average
democratic score for countries in this group artificially higher.
The opportunity for countries to take advantage of this demographic window is relatively short, usually less than 40 years,
until the median age of the population increases and the higher
proportion of older adults begins raising dependency ratios.
Countries in the later stages of a transitional age structure, such
as Chile, will see their window of opportunity close by 2015.
Countries in the early stages of a transitional age structure or
with a youthful age structure are just at the beginning of the
demographic bonus period, and it has yet to occur in countries
with very young age structures.47 In order to take advantage of
the demographic bonus and the economic benefits it offers,
governments must implement policies focused on young people,
to ensure that they have adequate education and employment
and that the transition toward smaller families continues.
Figure 4.2
Risk of Civil Conflict by Age Structure Type
Figure 4.3
Age Structure Type and GDP Growth48
1970s 1980s 1990s
30
6
25
5
20
4
15
3
10
5
0
0
Very Young
Youthful
Transitional
Age Structure Type (first year of decade)
44
Mature
Median average GDP growth rate
Likelihood of experiencing civil conflict (%)
1970s 1980s 1990s
2
1
0
Very Young
Youthful
Transitional
Age Structure Type (first year of decade)
Mature
Figure 4.4
Governance and Age Structure Type
Countries in Profile: Mexico
Health Reforms Address Double Burden of Disease
Perhaps the most unique feature of Mexico’s demographic and
health situation is the stark difference in social and economic
status between subpopulations. In many respects, Mexico
resembles a developed country completing the demographic
transition, with a life expectancy of 75 years, and crossing into the
transitional age structure category. At the same time, marginalized
populations within indigenous regions of the country more closely
resemble the demographic characteristics found in the very young
age structure that lag far behind in health, economic and social
status. Interestingly, within the Mexican state of Chiapas, demographic statistics more resemble a conflict-marked country with
a very young or youthful age structure. In 1994, after the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed, Zapatista
rebels began the “Ya Basta” uprising in Chiapas. The conflict,
focused on issues of land reform and globalization, faced rapid
reprisals from the Mexican army, and the Zapatistas and the
government currently remain in a tense standoff.
1970s 1980s 1990s
Percent of countries that were full democracies at end of decade
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Very Young
Youthful
Transitional
Age Structure Type (first year of decade)
Mature
This marked difference between subpopulations in Mexico has left
the country facing a double burden of disease. As a country moves
through the demographic transition, it also goes through an epidemiologic transition whereby the diseases of poverty persist even as
diseases of affluence become more prevalent. Eventually, as overall
health continues to improve, the country will leave behind most of
the diseases of poverty. The health system of Mexico, in the middle
of this transition, faces the double burden of disease. While still
suffering from illnesses associated with poverty, including malnutrition, communicable diseases and reproductive health problems,
other diseases typically associated with industrialized societies have
emerged, creating a higher strain on health resources. These include
conditions such as cardiovascular disease, obesity and cancers.49
Mexico’s development of a transitional age structure occurred
very recently and very rapidly. The country had a very young age
structure as recently as 1990. In 15 years’ time, the age structure
progressed through two categories, reaching the transitional
type in 2005. It is projected to remain in, but be nearing completion of, the transitional category in 2025.
45
Figure 4.5
Mexico’s Age Structures, 1975 and 2005
Mexico’s age structure profile changed dramatically in a short
period of time. In 1975, with nearly 73 percent of the population younger than 30, Mexico’s age structure held a classic
pyramid shape, with significantly decreasing proportional size
among each successive older age group. By 2005, the share
of the population under 30 had declined to 59 percent, and the
younger half of the profile was much more balanced.
Date of Birth Age
Mexico 1975
< 1875
1876 - 1880
1881 - 1885
1886 - 1890
1891 - 1895
1896 - 1900
1901 - 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
Males
Females
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
10
Date of Birth Age
Mexico 2005
< 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
Males
Females
10
46
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
Until the early 1970s, when the population reached 54 million (up
from 20 million in 1940) and the average woman had 6.5 children, Mexico’s population policies were traditionally pro-natalist.
Change occurred when the National Family Planning Program
was created in 1972 followed by the National Population Council in
1974. By the latter half of the 1970s, family planning began to gain
widespread acceptance with an estimated 42 percent of Mexican
women of childbearing age using contraceptive methods.
Through the National Family Planning Program, states provided
free family planning services and information as mandated under
the general population law of 1974. This increased availability
of health services led to a rapid decline in fertility and is today
viewed as one of the most successful family planning programs.
The strength and success of the family planning program and
the fact that per capita income rose above $5,000 in 1990 led
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
to withdraw support for contraceptives beginning in 1992.50 After
the International Conference on Population and Development in
1994, Mexico was one of the first countries (and the first in Latin
America) to replace population-control strategies with rightsbased policies and programs.51
Figure 4.6
Mexico’s Position Along the Demographic Transition
Mexico progressed along the demographic transition in a fairly
typical way, beginning with falling death rates in the 1930s, followed
by a period of rapid growth. Between 1955 and 1975, the population
growth rate exceeded three percent annually. The 1970s saw the
beginning of fertility decline and major reform of population policy.
Demographic Transition
Mexico’s Position Along Demographic Transition
100
90
80
1975
70
60
2005
50
Population ages 0-29 (percent of total population)
2025 High
2025 Medium
40
2025 Low
30
20
10
Points for 2025 are based on the
range of fertility projections produced
by the UN Population Division.
0
0
10
20
30
Population ages 60+ (percent of total population)
40
50
Figure 4.7
Current Demographic Statistics for Mexico52
Population 1980 68 million
Population 2005 107 million
Population 2025 (medium fertility projection) 129 million
Population 2050 (medium fertility projection) 139 million
Median population age 25 years
Population under age 15 31%
Total fertility rate (2005-2010) 2.15
Contraceptive prevalence rate (modern methods, 1997) 56%
Unmet need for family planning no data
Life expectancy 74 years male, 79 years female
HIV prevalence rate (ages 15-49, 2005) 0.3%
GNI per capita (Atlas method, current US$, 2005) $7,310
Population living below poverty line 20%
Unemployment rate (2004) 3%
Adult literacy rate (2004) 90% female, 92% male
Arable land (% of total, 2003) 13
The recent emergence of a democratic government in Mexico has
had profound effects on the health system, ushering in radical
health reforms. After more than 70 years of dominance, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was defeated by the center-right
PAN (the National Action Party) party. Vicente Fox succeeded PRI
president Ernesto Zedillo in the 2000 presidential election, Mexico’s first truly democratic election in a century.53 The 2006 election,
after very close balloting, led Felipe Calderón, the PAN candidate,
to be declared the winner by the electoral tribunal.
Overwhelmed by the double burden of disease and facing stark
inequalities in access to health care, the new democratic era
empowered the people and government to embrace a rightsbased health agenda. Although social insurance has been
offered in Mexico for more than 50 years, it was limited in scope
and left the majority of the population vulnerable to impoverishment in the face of poor health. About half of the population
lacked health insurance, and the poorest paid the most for
health services. Research showed that catastrophic health care
costs were impoverishing families, creating a cycle of poverty
that crossed generations. Mexico faced a paradox: While good
health care was needed to combat poverty, the high costs of
health care services were contributing to that impoverishment.54
48
The period from 2000 through 2006 has been quite remarkable for Mexico. The change in regime from near dictatorship
to democracy in 2000 led to radical health systems reforms. A
cornerstone of these reforms is the Seguro Popular program,
an extension and outgrowth of the Oportunidades program.
Oportunidades is Mexico’s national health, nutrition and education program designed to interrupt the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Started in 1997, the strategy is based on
cash transfers to female heads of household predicated on the
performance of responsibilities including sending children to
school, nutritional supplementation, clinic attendance and the
use of preventive health measures such as reproductive health
services.55 While successful, Oportunidades could not keep up
with the emerging double burden of disease, requiring a new
and expanded program. Initiated in 2004, Seguro Popular aims
to realize national universal health insurance by 2010.56
Mexico’s health care reform efforts combine a strong analytical
foundation with the creation of a social movement for change.
The reforms are being watched closely by international partners
as a test case for how radical and well-planned health reform can
help mitigate the effects of difficult development, demographic
and epidemiologic transitions. With substantial investment in
research, evaluation and advocacy, interest in the program’s
successes is high, as evidenced by a recent series in The
Lancet.57 However, the reforms are still being fully implemented,
and the administrations of the ruling PAN party have given voice
to more socially conservative views. Abortion remains illegal (with
a few exceptions), and gender inequality and violence against
women remain major challenges for Mexico.
Figure 4.8
Mexico’s Potential Age Structures, 2025
Countries in Profile: Tunisia
An Early Success Story
Under the UN’s high-fertility scenario for 2025 – in which Mexico’s
fertility rate would rise from its current level of 2.15 to 2.4 children
per woman – the country would remain in the transitional structure
category. However, unless the government pursues an actively
pro-natalist policy or there is a general collapse of the health care
system and family planning program, an increase in fertility rates is
unlikely. In contrast, under the UN’s low-fertility projection, fertility
rates would decline to 1.4 children per woman, pushing Mexico
into the mature age structure category. Perhaps more likely is
the medium-fertility variant between these two extremes, which
assumes a decline in fertility rates to 1.9 and the population’s
continued progression through the transitional structure category.
The Tunisian government made a forceful commitment to demographic change earlier than most other developing countries.
With the full support of President Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia
launched a national family planning program in the 1950s. In
addition to educating the population about family planning and
working to earn the support of religious leaders, the government raised the legal age for marriage and legalized abortion.
As a result, Tunisia’s fertility rate declined from a high of more
than seven children per woman in 1960 to two children today,
an extremely rapid improvement that took developed countries
decades longer to achieve. Tunisia’s fertility rate is lower than
each of its North African neighbors – Algeria, Egypt, Libya and
Morocco. The country’s population growth rate has likewise
dropped from 2.6 percent in the late 1970s to 1.1 percent at the
beginning of this century.58 General health has improved as well,
with life expectancies climbing from less than 50 years in the
1950s and early 1960s to above 70 years today.
Date of Birth Age
Mexico 2025
< 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
2006 - 2010
2011 - 2015
2016 - 2020
2021 - 2025
Low Fertility
Variant Male
Population
High Fertility
Variant Male
Population
Low Fertility
Variant Female
Population
High Fertility
Variant Female
Population
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
10
mexico was one of the
first countries to replace
population-control
strategies with rights-based
policies and programs.
49
Figure 4.9
Tunisia’s Age Structures, 1970 and 2005
In 1970, toward the beginning of Tunisia’s national family planning program, the country had a very young age structure, with
69 percent of the population under age 30. In 2005, Tunisia
had progressed across two categories into the transitional age
structure group, a development that can be attributed to the
success of the government’s efforts to make family planning
available comprehensively.
Date of Birth Age
Tunisia 1970
< 1870
1871 - 1875
1876 - 1880
1881 - 1885
1886 - 1890
1891 - 1895
1896 - 1900
1901 - 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
Males
Females
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
10
Date of Birth Age
Tunisia 2005
< 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
Males
Females
10
50
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
Tunisia, with a transitional age structure, continues to emphasize access to reproductive health care, even as it has made
remarkable achievements in recent decades. More than half of
women of reproductive age (53 percent) were using a modern
contraceptive in 2001, an increase from 40 percent in 1988.59
Condoms, pills and emergency contraception are available for
free at clinics. The government spends $10 million annually on
the extremely comprehensive national family planning program.
It includes efforts targeted at providing young people with confidential access to services, at educating men, and at reaching
traditionally underserved populations in rural areas.60 Women
are highly integrated into Tunisian society: Nearly 70 percent are
employed in the formal sector and a greater number of women
than men are enrolled in secondary and tertiary education.61
Figure 4.10
Tunisia’s Progress Along the Demographic Transition
Figure 4.11
Current Demographic Statistics for Tunisia62
Demographic Transition
Tunisia’s Position Along Demographic Transition
100
90
80
70
1975
60
2005
Population ages 0-29 (percent of total population)
50
40
Tunisia has remained very stable politically for many decades,
with no outbreaks of civil conflict for more than 25 years. The
economy has grown at up to five percent annually in recent
years, and foreign investors are showing interest in establishing
companies in Tunisia. The country does still face political and
economic challenges. Handovers in political power are extremely
rare. President Ben Ali won the most recent election with 95
percent of the vote and faces no term limits. Unemployment
rates remain high, near 15 percent.
2025 High
2025 Medium
2025 Low
30
20
10
Points for 2025 are based on the
range of fertility projections produced
by the UN Population Division.
0
0
10
Population 1980 6 million
Population 2005 10 million
Population 2025 (medium fertility projection) 12 million
Population 2050 (medium fertility projection) 13 million
Median population age 27 years
Population under age 15 26%
Total fertility rate (2005-2010) 1.9
Contraceptive prevalence rate (modern methods, 2001) 53%
Unmet need for family planning 12%
Life expectancy 72 years male, 76 years female
HIV prevalence rate (ages 15-49, 2005) 0.1%
GNI per capita (Atlas method, current US$, 2005) $2,890
Population living below poverty line 8%
Unemployment rate (2003) 14%
Adult literacy rate (2004) 83% male, 65% female
Arable land (% of total, 2003) 18
20
30
40
50
Although Mexico, Tunisia and other countries that have made
progress toward more favorable age structures still have areas
of development that require attention, their histories can serve as
models for other developing countries. The concentrated focus
these countries’ governments have placed on family planning
and reproductive health care have brought their populations to
the third – transitional – age structure category where the potential benefits of the demographic transition are at their peak.
Population ages 60+ (percent of total population)
51
Figure 4.12
Tunisia’s Potential Age Structures, 2025
Projections of Tunisia’s population age structure for 2025 show
a dramatic difference between the low- and high-fertility variants.
If Tunisia’s fertility increases to 2.3 children per woman as in the
high-fertility projection, the country will be in the final stages of the
transitional age structure category. The population will include a
resurging youth bulge among children and teenagers. In the lowfertility projection, with the fertility rate declined to 1.3, the share of
those under 30 will shrink to 36 percent of the total population.
Date of Birth Age
Tunisia 2025
< 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
2006 - 2010
2011 - 2015
2016 - 2020
2021 - 2025
Low Fertility
Variant Male
Population
High Fertility
Variant Male
Population
Low Fertility
Variant Female
Population
High Fertility
Variant Female
Population
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
10
Transitional age structure
countries are presented with a
clear opportunity to experience
the greatest economic benefits
of the demographic transition.
52
Summary Point Progress along the demographic transition into
the transitional age structure category occurs when death and
birthrates have made significant declines. Countries’ population
structures begin to stabilize as the share of dependent children
and adolescents becomes slightly larger than or equal to that
of working-age adults. This progress creates opportunities for
countries’ social and economic development.
Summary Point Countries that make significant progress
through the demographic transition and reach a transitional
age structure see rebounds in their economic growth rates.
This improvement in economic growth between countries in
the youthful and the transitional categories may show that
progress along the demographic transition creates a “bonus”
of working-age adults that can help spur economic expansion.
Policy Recommendation Countries with a transitional structure
cannot assume that their advancement along the demographic
transition will continue automatically and unfettered. In order to
take full advantage of the demographic opportunities they have
achieved, countries in this category should continue to work
to improve general health and further reduce fertility, bolster
women’s status, and provide economic and employment
opportunities for young women and men in equal measure.
Policy Recommendation Countries moving into the transitional
age structure category should take advantage of the potential
for the demographic bonus by investing in health and education
programs and making certain that jobs are available for young
people. Sound investments in infrastructure will ensure that as
they move toward a mature age structure, the economy will
remain robust as the demographic bonus passes.
5
Chapter five
Mature Structures
Countries that have completed the demographic transition reach
the fourth and final major category, mature age structures. They
have very low mortality and fertility rates and, in many cases,
birthrates have declined below the point necessary to sustain the
population at a stable level. The mature category encompasses
all of the most industrialized countries in the world. While they
are stable and prosperous as a group, there is significant
variation in levels of health and economic development across
the structure type. Russia and some countries with a mature
structure in Eastern Europe tend to have worse health indicators
than other countries in the category.
54
Date of Birth
Age
< 1905
100+
1906 - 1910
95 - 99
1911 - 1915
90 - 94
1916 - 1920
85 - 89
1921 - 1925
80 - 84
1926 - 1930
75 - 79
1931 - 1935
70 - 74
1936 - 1940
65 - 69
1941 - 1945
60 - 64
1946 - 1950
55 - 59
1951 - 1955
50 - 54
1956 - 1960
45 - 49
1961 - 1965
40 - 44
1966 - 1970
35 - 39
1971 - 1975
30 - 34
1976 - 1980
25 - 29
1981 - 1985
20 - 24
1986 - 1990
15 - 19
1991 - 1995
10 - 14
1996 - 2000
5-9
2001 - 2005
0-4
Japan 2005
Males
Females
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
Date of Birth Age
10
Croatia 2005
Ireland 2005
Italy 2005
Males
Females
Males
Females
Males
Females
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
Figure 5.1
Mature Age Structure Profiles
6
8
10
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
Youth (ages 0-29) approximately 30-45
percent of total population
Mid-Adults (ages 30-59) approximately
40-55 percent of total population
Seniors (ages 60+) approximately 15-26
percent of total population
Country count 47
Demographic character Mid-adult age
groups compose the largest proportion
of the population, with declining proportions among young adults, teenagers
and adolescents
10
10
8
6
< 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
Population doubling time 125-2,400 years
Regional prevalence Europe, former
Soviet republics, East Asia
Civil conflict risk 6 percent likely to
experience civil conflict, 1970-99
Economic performance 2.4 percent
median average annual GDP growth
rate, 1970-99
Governance 83 percent likely to have fully
democratic governance, 1970-99
55
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
Countries with mature age structures have experienced very low
levels of civil conflict in recent decades. In the 1980s, countries
in this age structure type were entirely free from any outbreaks
of civil conflict. In the 1990s, the only two conflicts to break out
among this group were in Croatia and Slovenia. Many of the
conflicts in countries with a mature age structure have been
ongoing separatist movements, such as those in Northern
Ireland and the Basque region of Spain.
Countries with a mature age structure had the lowest average
GDP growth rate of all the major age structure types at 2.4
percent between 1970 and 1999. Countries at the end of the
demographic transition have nearly all achieved upper-middle
or high income status. With a median per capita GDP in 2005
of nearly $24,000, it is not surprising that these typically welldeveloped, diversified economies do not achieve the rapid rates
of growth evident in developing countries. However, these countries are beginning to face strains on their pension systems and,
in some cases, high unemployment, leading to apprehension
about the impact of future population aging on their economies.
Figure 5.2
Risk of Civil Conflict by Age Structure Type
Figure 5.3
Age Structure Type and GDP Growth63
1970s 1980s 1990s
30
6
25
5
20
4
15
3
10
5
0
0
Very Young
Youthful
Transitional
Age Structure Type (first year of decade)
56
Mature
Median average GDP growth rate
Likelihood of experiencing civil conflict (%)
1970s 1980s 1990s
2
1
0
Very Young
Youthful
Transitional
Age Structure Type (first year of decade)
Mature
From 1970 to 1999, 83 percent of countries with a mature age
structure were full democracies. The incidence of autocratic and
partially democratic government among countries with a mature
structure has been very low. By the turn of the century, the only
countries with a mature structure that were not rated as full
democracies were Russia and four Eastern European states.
Countries in Profile: Germany
Growing More Family-Friendly in Response to Aging
Germany’s population trends are typical of most advanced
industrial countries. The country has completed the demographic
transition and now has a mature age structure type. In the late
1950s and during the 1960s, both East and West Germany
experienced “baby booms,” stimulated by a heightened sense of
security and greater economic prosperity following the devastation of World War II. For the past 30 years, however, fertility rates
have been declining, from a peak of 2.5 between 1960 and
1965, to 1.3 between 2000 and 2005.64 Fewer babies were born
in Germany in 2005 than in the final year of World War II.65 At the
same time that fertility has fallen, life expectancy has risen significantly to more than 80 years at the beginning of this century.66
Figure 5.4
Governance and Age Structure Type
1970s 1980s 1990s
Percent of countries that are full democracies at end of decade
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Very Young
Youthful
Transitional
Mature
Age Structure Type (first year of decade)
57
Figure 5.5
Germany’s Age Structures, 1975 and 2005
Germany’s fertility rates began declining in the early 1960s, and
for the past 30 years the country has had a mature age structure.
The very oddly shaped profile for 1975, partially an effect of the
death toll in World War II, has evolved into a structure with a bulge
among middle-aged adults and steadily declining proportional
size among younger age groups.
Date of Birth Age
Germany 1975
< 1875
1876 - 1880
1881 - 1885
1886 - 1890
1891 - 1895
1896 - 1900
1901 - 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
Males
Females
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
10
Date of Birth Age
Germany 2005
< 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
Males
Females
10
58
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
Other health indicators are similar to those of wealthy developed
countries, and indicative of Germany’s advanced health care
system. Reproductive health services, including family planning, are
specifically mandated by law, and thus they are widely available and
affordable. Nearly three-quarters of women who are married or in
union use modern methods of contraception.67 State health insurance, which covers 90 percent of the population, is legally required
and mandates that the insured have the right to medical examinations and prescriptions for family planning devices.68
Germany’s health care system is highly regarded by international standards. A 2000 report by the World Health Organization
ranked Germany twenty-fifth out of 191 countries based on a
cost-effectiveness ratio, better than both the United States and
Canada. However, Germany’s system is very costly and might
prove unsustainable in the long term. Germany is the secondhighest spender of public funds on health care as a percent
of gross domestic product (GDP) in the world.69 Currently, the
system is supported by contributions from workers, who pay
roughly 14 percent of their wages toward health care.70 But
Germany’s high unemployment rates and the future prospect of
financing support for an older population are causing concerns
about the sustainability of the current health care system.
Germany’s pay-as-you-go pension system is already undergoing
reforms. Demographers anticipate that when the “baby boom”
generation reaches retirement age, the current ratio of those
paying into the pension system (roughly 2:1) is likely to shift
towards 1:1.71 For the first time since World War II, the German
government has deviated from the long-held promise that
government benefits alone could maintain workers’ living standards in retirement. Major reforms enacted within the past six
years include scaling back future public pension benefits, linking
pension adjustments to the ratio of employees contributing to
the scheme relative to the number of pensioners, encouraging
employees to invest in private old-age insurance and raising the
minimum age for early retirement.
Figure 5.6
Germany’s Position Along the Demographic Transition
Figure 5.7
Current Demographic Statistics for Germany72
Germany was already near the end of the demographic transition in 1975, and has advanced further in the decades since.
The range of fertility projections for 2025 all show the country
continuing to progress along the transition to a point reached by
few other countries, in which the share of people older than 60
will equal or surpass those younger than 30.
Population 1980 78 million
Population 2005 83 million
Population 2025 (medium term projection) 82 million
Population 2050 (medium term projection) 79 million
Median population age 42 years
Population under age 15 14%
Total fertility rate (2005-2010) 1.3
Contraceptive prevalence rate (modern methods, 1992) 72%
Unmet need for family planning no data
Life expectancy 76 years male, 82 years female
HIV prevalence rate (ages 15-49, 2005) 0.1%
GNI per capita (Atlas method, current US$, 2005) $34,580
Population living below poverty line 8%
Unemployment rate (2005) 9%
Adult literacy rate (2003) 99% female and male
Arable land (% of total, 2003) 34
Demographic Transition
Germany’s Position Along Demographic Transition
100
90
80
70
60
Population ages 0-29 (percent of total population)
50
1975
40
2005
2025 High
30
2025 Medium
2025 Low
20
10
Projections based on UN Population
Division’s medium-fertility variant.
0
0
10
20
30
Population ages 60+ (percent of total population)
40
50
Germany boasts the fifth largest economy in the world.73 However,
declining economic growth rates and relatively high unemployment combined with low fertility have made policymakers
concerned about the impact of population aging. Since the end
of the boom period sparked by reunification in 1990, Germany’s
rate of per capita GDP growth has been the third slowest of the
25 European Union member states, and one of the slowest of all
the major industrial countries.74 The fall in government revenues
and the rise in expenditures have raised the external deficit to a
looming $3.6 trillion.75 Moreover, structural rigidities in the labor
market have made unemployment a chronic problem.
The unemployment challenge has encouraged significant migration within Germany, especially among women, who still have a
lower employment rate than men. Since reunification, approximately 1.5 million people have left East Germany, nearly two-thirds
of whom were women.77 Thus, fertility rates continue to be lower in
East Germany, where young people, and women in particular, are
likely to migrate to the West in search of employment. In both the
East and the West, Germany is becoming increasingly urbanized,
and remote rural areas are aging more quickly.
Since the 1950s, Germany has attracted millions of immigrants
seeking employment, citizenship or asylum, such that roughly
one in six German residents has an “immigration background.”78
Immigration could help mitigate population aging, given that
fertility rates are greater on average among immigrants than
among native Germans, but it is unlikely to ever completely
reverse the aging effect. Immigrants are twice as likely as native
Germans to be unemployed and dependent on social welfare,
and 18 percent of immigrants’ children do not complete school.79
Much more needs to be done to ensure that immigrants are
successfully integrated into German society – including ensuring
their access to sexual and reproductive health services – and
that their children can capitalize on the education system.
In efforts to bolster the country’s declining birthrates, German politicians are aiming to transform Germany into a more family-friendly
nation. Policymakers are particularly interested in neighboring
countries, such as France and Sweden, where both the numbers
of professional women and birthrates are high. While there is no
doubt that numerous factors are contributing to Germany’s low
fertility, many experts agree that a change in values in support
of family-friendly working conditions is paramount. On average,
both men and women desire fewer than two children, well below
the level necessary to sustain the population.80 However, desired
fertility (1.6 children for men and 1.75 for women) is higher than
the actual fertility level of 1.3, signifying that changes could help
couples achieve their full desired fertility.81
The government’s response includes a variety of measures that
take into account parental needs for infrastructure and time, in
addition to money. Currently, mothers are allowed to take up to
six months of paid maternity leave and unpaid leave of up to
three years. The state is working on ways to make motherhood
more attractive to women, particularly by providing monetary
incentives for fathers to play a larger role in child care.82
Germany has also set its sights on improving the country’s day
care offerings and providing tax relief for families.
In order to increase the birthrate and make an older society
more sustainable, Germany will need to continue to experiment
with a variety of policy measures in a two-pronged effort. Such
measures should aim to better integrate immigrants into the
education system and channel the positive impact of immigration to the job market; to improve work opportunities for young
potential parents (especially women), and also for older people
so that they stay in the work force longer. They should also help
potential parents balance their professional and family lives to
allow parents to have the number of children they desire, and
perhaps in so doing also increase desired fertility.
The mature category
encompasses all of
the most industrialized
countries in the world.
60
Figure 5.8
Germany’s Potential Age Structures, 2025
Countries in Profile: South Korea
The Demographic Transition on Fast-Forward
If fertility rates decline from the current level of 1.3 to 1.05 by
2025, as in the UN’s low-fertility projection, Germany will cross
into the unprecedented category of aged age structures.
Achieving the high-fertility projection, in which the country would
remain in the mature age structure category, would require
a dramatic increase in fertility to more than two children per
woman. Germany’s fertility rates will have to increase to 1.55
even to meet the medium-fertility projection.
In mid-2006, Korea’s news media announced that 23 local governments were offering payments of up to $1,000 at the birth of a
couple’s second child or beyond, with additional plans under way
to award supplemental payments of $1,000 a month to families
with children under age five. These bonuses and other incentives
to encourage childbearing are only one component of the Korean
government’s plan to invest more than $19 billion over five years
to raise the national fertility rate.83 South Korea’s official fertility rate
is 1.2 children per woman, one of the lowest in the world, although
the nationally reported rate is even lower. South Korea exemplifies
the few dozen countries in which population aging has become a
major public policy concern, but its demographic situation today is
very different than just a few decades ago.
Date of Birth Age
Germany 2025
< 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
2006 - 2010
2011 - 2015
2016 - 2020
2021 - 2025
Low Fertility
Variant Male
Population
High Fertility
Variant Male
Population
Low Fertility
Variant Female
Population
High Fertility
Variant Female
Population
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
After the Korean War ended in 1953, the following decade marked
the beginning of a period of rapid development for South Korea
in which demography played a key role. Education rates rose and
improvements in public health were evident through declining
mortality rates. In 1962 the Korean government, concerned that
population growth would inhibit the country’s economic development, established a national family planning program with
extensive community-based education.85 The program was scaled
up further in the 1970s through campaigns aimed at eliminating
families’ preference for sons, more fully integrating women into
society, and establishing a two-child family as a general ideal.
After the national fertility rate reached replacement level in the early
1980s, the government shifted its strategy from encouraging two
children to just one as the social ideal. At the same time ultrasound
technology became widely available, allowing expectant couples to
determine the sex of their fetus at an early stage of pregnancy. This
development, coupled with continuing cultural preference for sons,
increased abortion of female fetuses. By 1993, the sex ratio at birth
was 116 boys born for every 100 girls – a significant increase from
a natural sex ratio of about 105 boys for every 100 girls – and the
distorted ratio has continued in recent years.86
Today, South Korea has completed the demographic transition and
is classified as having a mature age structure type. In 1970, with
two-thirds of the population under age 30, Korea had a very young
age structure; it progressed steadily through each of the following
age structure types over the following 35 years. The country is still
on the younger end of the range of mature age structures, with a
relatively large proportion of people under 30 and a small share of
older adults compared to other countries of that type.
61
Figure 5.9
South Korea’s Age Structures, 1975 and 200584
In 1975, South Korea’s age profile was beginning to show signs of
its rapid progress through the demographic transition. Though the
profile still retained a pyramidal shape from historically high fertility
and mortality rates, the largest age groups were older children and
adolescents, and declines in birthrates were evident in the smaller
proportion of younger children. Thirty years later, South Korea’s
age structure has moved fully into the mature type and rapid fertility
declines are evident in the small share of age groups under 30.
Date of Birth Age
South Korea 1975
< 1875
1876 - 1880
1881 - 1885
1886 - 1890
1891 - 1895
1896 - 1900
1901 - 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
Males
Females
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
10
Date of Birth Age
South Korea 2005
< 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
Males
Females
10
62
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
South Korea’s swift progress through the demographic transition
paid major economic dividends. Korea and other countries in the
region are often called the “Asian Tigers” because of their rapid,
dramatic economic expansion in the 1980s. As was the case in its
neighbors Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand, much of
South Korea’s economic growth can be explained by a specific shift
in its population age structure known as the “demographic bonus.”
Social changes in the 1960s, including investment in family
planning programs, improved education and employment
opportunities for girls and women, and later marriage ages,
combined to reduce South Korea’s fertility rate from nearly six
children per woman in the early 1960s to 2.2 children per woman
20 years later. As family sizes decreased and the proportional
size of children and teenagers in the population became smaller,
parents and the government alike were able to invest more on a
per capita basis in education. Families could also save more of
their income, creating an increase in domestic investment levels.
Labor force growth slowed, wages rose and the government
encouraged the development of technology-based industries
to take advantage of an educated work force. The impact of the
demographic bonus contributed to an annual GDP growth rate in
South Korea that reached seven percent in the 1960s.
Korea has been a remarkably prosperous and peaceful country
for decades. The country has not experienced any recorded form
of civil conflict since the end of its war with North Korea in 1953.
Its governance record has been more mixed; after more than 30
years of military rule, full democracy was only achieved in the
1990s. Although, like the other Asian Tigers, South Korea experienced economic setbacks in the mid- to late-1990s, its economy
has recovered and returned to its previous trend of dramatic
expansion. In the first five years of the twenty-first century, the
economy grew at more than five percent annually.
Figure 5.10
South Korea’s Position Along the Demographic Transition
Figure 5.11
Current Demographic Statistics for South Korea88
With its total fertility rate declining by two-thirds from six children
per woman to two in about 20 years, accompanied by similarly
dramatic declines in mortality, South Korea made one of the most
rapid progressions through the demographic transition in history.
Even assuming an increasing fertility rate, the country is still
projected to have a mature population by 2050.
Population 1975 35 million
Population 2005 48 million
Population 2025 (medium term projection) 50 million
Population 2050 (medium term projection) 45 million
Median population age 35 years
Population under age 15 19%
Total fertility rate (2005-2010) 1.2
Contraceptive prevalence rate (modern methods, 1997) 67%
Unmet need for family planning no data
Life expectancy 75 years male, 82 years female
HIV prevalence rate (ages 15-49, 2005) <0.1%
GNI per capita (Atlas method, current US$, 2005) $15,830
Population living below poverty line 15%
Unemployment rate 4%
Adult literacy rate (2002) 99% male, 97% female
Arable land (% of total) 17
Demographic Transition
South Korea’s Position Along
Demographic Transition
100
90
South Korea is an example of how, with the support of international partners, a country can rapidly achieve a more favorable
age structure through a comprehensive, education-based family
planning program. However, the government’s emphasis on small
family size worked too well once fertility rates had reached replacement level in the mid-1980s. With one of the lowest birthrates in
the world, population aging is likely to remain a major political and
economic issue in Korea in the coming decades. The government is targeting its efforts toward this problem at increasing the
country’s birthrate, rather than other areas such as immigration.
However, financial incentives are having little impact on Korea’s
extremely low fertility rates, and concern is rising that a shortage of
new workers is already slowing the rate of business creation.
80
70
1975
60
Population ages 0-29 (percent of total population)
50
40
2005
30
2025 High
2025 Medium
2025 Low
20
10
Points for 2025 are based on the
range of fertility projections produced
by the UN Population Division.
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
Population ages 60+ (percent of total population)
63
United Nations demographers, when creating their projections
of future population trends, assume that extreme fertility rates
(both high and low) will gradually correct toward replacement
level. Thus, the UN’s medium-variant population projections
show South Korea’s fertility rate rising 0.07 children per woman
every five years, from its current very low level of 1.2 children per
woman to reach nearly 1.8 by 2050. Even with this assumption,
total population will decline below its current level by 2050.
Population aging in Korea has so far had little impact on the
country’s political and economic development, but policymakers
are wise to consider its future implications. History has provided
few examples of proven public policy strategies to increase
birthrates on a national scale in low-fertility settings. However,
improvements in women’s status have been conclusively linked
to population stabilization in high-fertility settings, and the same
may be true in low-fertility countries.89 In South Korea, women
remain underrepresented in universities, and only six percent of
corporate executives, political leaders and senior managers are
women.90 Such inequities are reflected in a continuing social preference for sons and an artificial sex ratio within the population,
issues that should remain a central focus for the government.
Figure 5.12
South Korea’s Potential Age Structures, 2025
If South Korea achieves the United Nations’ low fertility projection
of less than one child per woman in 2025, its population age structure will remain in the mature type. However, with just 24 percent
of its population under age 30, the country would be nearing the
aged age structure category that has not yet occurred. If the UN’s
high fertility projection is achieved, fertility would increase to 1.9
children per woman from today’s level of 1.2, but the largest age
groups in the population would still be those in their late fifties.
Date of Birth Age
South Korea 2025
< 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
2006 - 2010
2011 - 2015
2016 - 2020
2021 - 2025
Low Fertility
Variant Male
Population
High Fertility
Variant Male
Population
Low Fertility
Variant Female
Population
High Fertility
Variant Female
Population
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
10
population aging in Korea
has so far had little impact
on the country’s political
and economic development,
but policymakers are wise to
consider its future implications.
64
Summary Point Although many countries have experienced
slowdowns in economic growth and upticks in unemployment,
there is little evidence that population aging in countries with
a mature age structure has so far caused major economic
distress. However, if aging countries maintain their low fertility
rates and such trends are not offset by significant immigration,
the economic effects of further aging are unknown.
Policy Recommendation Countries concerned about the
economic impact of aging populations could consider implementing policies already being tested, such as increasing
retirement ages, reforming pension schemes, and bringing
greater balance to women’s professional and family responsibilities. Although these countries often focus on the needs and
problems of the older segments of the population, they must
continue to address the needs of their young people, including
strengthening a support system for their childbearing decisions.
65
6
Chapter six
Subtypes and
a Speculative
Structure
In addition to the four major profiles, this report identifies three
contemporary subtypes of age structures and one future, speculative type. The first two subtypes are age structures in which the
typical effects of the demographic transition on a country’s
population are altered by the influx of international immigrants
(immigration-youthful structures, immigration-mature structures).
66
A third subtype, HIV/AIDS structures, reflects the impact of
extremely high HIV prevalence rates (18 percent or above among
adults) on the age structures of countries with very young and
youthful populations. The speculative type, a fifth potential category
of age structures, would demonstrate the impact of population
aging in a few countries with the very lowest fertility rates.
Date of Birth
Age
< 1905
100+
1906 - 1910
95 - 99
1911 - 1915
90 - 94
1916 - 1920
85 - 89
1921 - 1925
80 - 84
1926 - 1930
75 - 79
1931 - 1935
70 - 74
1936 - 1940
65 - 69
1941 - 1945
60 - 64
1946 - 1950
55 - 59
1951 - 1955
50 - 54
1956 - 1960
45 - 49
1961 - 1965
40 - 44
1966 - 1970
35 - 39
1971 - 1975
30 - 34
1976 - 1980
25 - 29
1981 - 1985
20 - 24
1986 - 1990
15 - 19
1991 - 1995
10 - 14
1996 - 2000
5-9
2001 - 2005
0-4
United Arab Emirates 2005
Males
Females
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
Date of Birth Age
10
Bahrain 2005
Kuwait 2005
Qatar 2005
Males
Females
Males
Females
Males
Females
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
Figure 6.1
Immigration-Youthful Subtype Profiles
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
Youth (ages 0-29) approximately 45-55
percent of the population
Mid-Adults (ages 30-59) approximately
45-50 percent of the population
Seniors (ages 60+) approximately 1-5
percent of the population
Country count 4
Demographic character Highly aberrant
compared to all other types; largest proportion of population comprised of mid-age
adults with an even proportion among
children and adolescents and almost
no seniors. Also likely to skew unevenly
10
8
6
< 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
towards males due to higher numbers of
men migrating in for work opportunities
Population doubling time about 30 years
Regional prevalence Persian Gulf
Civil conflict risk No immigration-youthful
countries experienced conflict between
1970-99
Economic performance 4.8 percent
average annual GDP growth rate, 1970-99
(no data for Qatar)
Governance No immigration-youthful
countries were measured as having fully
democratic governance, 1970-99
67
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
How Immigration and AIDS Change
the Demographic Transition
At sustained high levels, international migration can have a major
impact on population age structures. In countries where inward
migration has averaged 0.35 percent or more over the past 25
years, age structures have been altered. In immigration-youthful
countries, such as the small states of the Persian Gulf, immigrants
– primarily men – fill both managerial and service positions in
expanding economies. Labor migration to the Arab Gulf states
makes their age structures, which are in the middle of the demographic transition, more mature than expected. Although mortality
rates have declined in these countries, fertility rates among the
native-born population remain above replacement level. Since
most immigrants in this region are of working age and policies
discourage or prohibit their remaining in the country after retirement, the countries’ age structures contain a bulge in the middle of
the population, with an extremely small proportion of older adults.
At sustained high levels,
international migration
can have a major impact on
population age structures.
68
Date of Birth
Age
< 1905
100+
1906 - 1910
95 - 99
1911 - 1915
90 - 94
1916 - 1920
85 - 89
1921 - 1925
80 - 84
1926 - 1930
75 - 79
1931 - 1935
70 - 74
1936 - 1940
65 - 69
1941 - 1945
60 - 64
1946 - 1950
55 - 59
1951 - 1955
50 - 54
1956 - 1960
45 - 49
1961 - 1965
40 - 44
1966 - 1970
35 - 39
1971 - 1975
30 - 34
1976 - 1980
25 - 29
1981 - 1985
20 - 24
1986 - 1990
15 - 19
1991 - 1995
10 - 14
1996 - 2000
5-9
2001 - 2005
0-4
United States 2005
Males
Females
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
Date of Birth Age
10
Australia 2005
Canada 2005
Greece 2005
Males
Females
Males
Females
Males
Females
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
Figure 6.2
Immigration-Mature Subtype Profiles
10
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
Youth (ages 0-29) approximately 35-43
percent of the population
Mid-Adults (ages 30-59) approximately
40-50 percent of the population
Seniors (ages 60+) approximately 13-23
percent of the population
Demographic character Largest proportion of population comprised of adults age
30-55, with a slightly smaller proportion of
youth and a pyramid shape for seniors.
10
8
6
< 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
Population doubling time 60-500 years
Country count 7
Regional prevalence North America,
Australia, southern Europe
Civil conflict risk 5 percent probability of
experiencing civil conflict, 1970-99
Economic performance 4.7 percent
average annual GDP growth rate, 1970-99
Governance 76 percent probability of fully
democratic governance, 1970-99
69
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
In immigration-mature countries, such as the United States and
Australia, age structures are generally younger than they would
be otherwise, because immigrants tend to have higher fertility
rates than the native-born population.91 Though these countries
are far along the demographic transition and their mortality and
fertility rates have already declined, the impact of immigration
keeps most of them in the earlier stages of the mature category.
Most documented immigrants to industrialized countries are
between 15 and 44 years of age (Figure 6.3).92 These immigrants
have helped keep labor sectors fully employed and economies
growing even as fertility rates among native-born residents
decline and population growth slows.
Figure 6.3
Age Profile of Immigrants to U.S.93
This population profile of recent documented immigrants to
the United States shows that more than half of all immigrants
entering the country are 25-39 years old, the prime working ages.
Immigrants to U.S. in 2004
Males
Females
75+
65 - 74
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
16
70
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
Percent of Total Immigrant Population
8
10
12
14
16
Date of Birth
Age
< 1905
100+
1906 - 1910
95 - 99
1911 - 1915
90 - 94
1916 - 1920
85 - 89
1921 - 1925
80 - 84
1926 - 1930
75 - 79
1931 - 1935
70 - 74
1936 - 1940
65 - 69
1941 - 1945
60 - 64
1946 - 1950
55 - 59
1951 - 1955
50 - 54
1956 - 1960
45 - 49
1961 - 1965
40 - 44
1966 - 1970
35 - 39
1971 - 1975
30 - 34
1976 - 1980
25 - 29
1981 - 1985
20 - 24
1986 - 1990
15 - 19
1991 - 1995
10 - 14
1996 - 2000
5-9
2001 - 2005
0-4
Botswana 2005
Males
Females
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
Date of Birth Age
10
Lesotho 2005
South Africa 2005
Swaziland 2005
Males
Females
Males
Females
Males
Females
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
Figure 6.4
HIV/AIDS Subtype Profiles
(HIV prevalence among adults
18 percent or greater in 2005)
6
8
10
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
Youth (ages 0-29) approximately 60 to 75
percent of the population
Mid-Adults (ages 30-59) approximately 20
to 32 percent of the population
Seniors (ages 60+) approximately 5 to 8
percent of the population
Demographic character Very low proportions and classic pyramid shape among
those 30 and older; rapidly increasing
cohort size among consecutively
younger age groups.
10
8
6
4
< 1905
1906 - 1910
1911 - 1915
1916 - 1920
1921 - 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
Population doubling time Ranges between
declining populations to those with a
doubling time of 75 years
Country count 6
Regional prevalence Southern Africa
Civil conflict risk 17 percent probability of
experiencing civil conflict, 1970-99
Economic performance 5.5 percent
average annual GDP growth rate, 1970-99
Governance 5 percent probability of fully
democratic governance, 1970-99
71
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
The age structure changes caused by AIDS, which has reversed
the decline of death rates in more than 30 countries, were wholly
unforeseen by those who first recognized the demographic
transition and projected its spread. The age structure-altering
capacity of this disease is unprecedented: Some 90 percent of
fatalities associated with HIV infection occur among people of
working age, with the largest concentration of deaths from the
age of 25 to 39 years. The impact of AIDS mortality on countries’
economies has been pervasive, as skilled workers and professionals are often the hardest hit. In the countries most heavily
affected by the disease, two to three percent of working-age
adults die each year – more than 10 times the normal rate –
leaving behind a large number of “AIDS orphans” with little adult
support. Still, high fertility rates mean that AIDS mortality is not
having significant impact on population growth, while straining
educational opportunities for children left behind.
From the projections of future populations devised by the United
Nations, a fifth major age structure type beyond completion of the
demographic transition (aged structures) could develop by 2025.
The profiles in this type, with the bulges in the share of their population older than 50, reflect the impact of continued low fertility and
population aging. In the UN’s medium-fertility variant for 2025, Italy
and Japan would reach the aged category, and in the low-fertility
variant, six other countries would join them. However, no country
has yet developed this structure and demographic shifts could
alter it, so it should be regarded as speculative.
In the countries most heavily
affected by the disease, two
to three percent of workingage adults die each year –
more than 10 times the normal
rate – leaving behind a large
number of “AIDS orphans.”
72
Date of Birth
Age
< 1925
100+
1926 - 1930
95 - 99
1931 - 1935
90 - 94
1936 - 1940
85 - 89
1941 - 1945
80 - 84
1946 - 1950
75 - 79
1951 - 1955
70 - 74
1956 - 1960
65 - 69
1961 - 1965
60 - 64
1966 - 1970
55 - 59
1971 - 1975
50 - 54
1976 - 1980
45 - 49
1981 - 1985
40 - 44
1986 - 1990
35 - 39
1991 - 1995
30 - 34
1996 - 2000
25 - 29
2001 - 2005
20 - 24
2006 - 2010
15 - 19
2011 - 2015
10 - 14
2016 - 2020
5-9
2021 - 2025
0-4
Japan 2025
Males
Females
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
Date of Birth Age
10
Italy 2025
Singapore 2025
Slovenia 2025
Males
Females
Males
Females
Males
Females
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
Figure 6.5
Aged Structure Profiles*
4
6
8
10
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
Youth (ages 0-29) approximately 20-27
percent of the population
Mid-Adults (ages 30-59) approximately
40-45 percent of the population
Seniors (ages 60+) greater than 30
percent of the population
Demographic character Bulges among
mid- and senior adults above age 50,
10
10
8
6
< 1925
1926 - 1930
1931 - 1935
1936 - 1940
1941 - 1945
1946 - 1950
1951 - 1955
1956 - 1960
1961 - 1965
1966 - 1970
1971 - 1975
1976 - 1980
1981 - 1985
1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
1996 - 2000
2001 - 2005
2006 - 2010
2011 - 2015
2016 - 2020
2021 - 2025
4
2
0
2
Percent of Total Population
4
6
8
10
steadily decreasing proportion sizes
among age cohorts younger than 50.
Country count No countries in 2005; 2
countries in UN’s medium-fertility population projection for 2025; 8 countries in
low-fertility projection for 2025
*Profiles shown are speculative, based on
UN’s low-fertility projection for 2025.
100+
95 - 99
90 - 94
85 - 89
80 - 84
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4
a fifth major age structure
type beyond completion
of the demographic transition
(aged structures) could
develop by 2025.
Summary Point Countries with the highest rates of HIV prevalence – currently clustered in Southern Africa – are experiencing
unprecedented age structures. High rates of mortality among
adults who should be in the most productive years of their lives
have resulted in costs to employers, shortages of employees
in critical sectors such as education and health care, and
increased dependency ratios with more children and adolescents relying on fewer adults for their survival and well-being.
Summary Point Countries that receive high numbers of immigrants, particularly those seeking employment opportunities,
experience changes in their age structures. In countries with
developed economies, high fertility rates and a youthful nativeborn population, immigration concentrated among workingage adults makes countries’ age structures more mature than
they would otherwise be. Meanwhile, in aging countries, immigrants boost fertility rates and make age structures younger.
Policy Recommendation All necessary steps must be taken
by country governments and the international community
to prevent as many new HIV infections as possible, both in
countries already experiencing high prevalence and those in
which the epidemic has not become entrenched. To that end,
together with care and treatment of those affected, comprehensive and evidence-based HIV-education programs and
provision of prevention supplies, namely condoms, should be
a priority. International donors should help national governments care for the young people left behind by funding education, health and employment opportunities, and working to
ensure that the infection is not continued in the next generation. Donor assistance should be as unfettered as possible
by policies that restrict the autonomy of recipient countries to
determine how to address their particular HIV/AIDS situation.
Policy Recommendation In the case of both youthful and
aged countries, immigration that boosts the labor force can
have economic benefits. Countries should determine if their
current immigration rates, whether high or low, create a more
or less favorable age structure and should consider tailoring
their migration policies accordingly. In doing so, native and
immigrant populations should be fully integrated into society,
especially in their access to high-quality education and health
care. Immigrants should have equal access to family planning
and sexual and reproductive health programs in order to have
control over their own reproductive decisions.
Chapter seven
Things to Come:
Demographic Possibilities, 2025
Natural and human events influence the play of demographic
forces, making the future of populations hard to predict.
The findings of this report highlight trends that are likely or at
least possible over the next few decades. The classification
of age structures suggests policies and programs through
which governments can encourage favorable and balanced
age structures. Through this lens, lessons emerge from the
experiences of countries that have taken steps to positively
influence the direction of population dynamics.
76
Barring unforeseen developments that will shape future demographics in ways we have no way of knowing, these projections
suggest both opportunities and threats. The opportunity is that
more countries will move into transitional and mature age structures – assuming fertility rates continue to decline and that neither
HIV/AIDS nor any unforeseen factor sharply boosts death rates. As
this study has found, more balanced age structures tend generally to favor national stability and development. Countries such as
Nigeria, that have stalled or reversed progress in the demographic
transition and have very young age structures, face serious demographic challenges likely to undermine political and economic
development and cause scarcities of natural resources.
Figure 7.1
Projections of Age Structure Types in 202594
The number of countries classified in each of the four major age
structure types in 2005 is compared to two different projections of
populations in 2025, based on assumptions of dramatic declines
in fertility rates (the low variant) and smaller, though still significant,
drops in fertility (the high variant).
2005 2025 Low 2025 High
80
70
60
50
40
30
Number of countries
Population projections produced by the United Nations Population Division for 2025 under a range of scenarios show overall
improvements in countries’ progress along the demographic
transition. Both the low- and high-fertility variants show an
increase in the number of countries with transitional and mature
age structures. The consistent correlations between such age
structures and reduced vulnerability to emerging civil conflict, as
well as to higher income and democratic governance, suggest
a robust linkage between these structures and development
outcomes. In the low-fertility projection for 2025, which assumes
further declines in their already low birth rates, eight countries
would move into the aged age structure. This type of population
would be characterized by unprecedently high median ages. So
far, no country’s population has reached this category.
20
10
0
0
Very Young Youthful
Age Structure Type
Transitional
Mature
0
Aged
77
The projection that more countries will move into transitional and
mature age structures in the future does not equate to certain
prediction that there will be less conflict and better overall
security in the world. Nor can we be assured that reduced
population pressures will free up more financial resources for
governments to allocate to education, employment and other
investments that promote development.
Governments should be aware that even the high-fertility scenario
of future population growth assumes continued strong improvements in use of contraception, provision of reproductive health
care and a mitigation of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In this scenario,
the number of countries in the very young age structure type
would decline from 35 percent to 20 percent of all countries.
To achieve the high-fertility projection, which assumes a relatively
modest decline in birthrates, 36 million additional married women
of reproductive age in sub-Saharan Africa will need to be using
modern methods of contraception by 2025. Meeting the lowfertility projection, a more ambitious goal, would mean that 76
million women of reproductive age in sub-Saharan Africa would
be using contraceptives, nearly five times as many as today.
All of the population projections, even those suggesting
the most rapid growth, assume greater future spending on
contraceptive and related services than the world has ever
seen. The variations in projected future family planning spending
are merely differences of degree. Because of the nature of family
planning and reproductive health service provision, especially in
developing countries, much of this spending must come from
country governments. Foreign assistance from donors is also
critical. Unfortunately, funding for family planning and reproductive health has been stagnant in recent years.
Clearly, the advancements in age structure projected for 2025 will
require significant progress along the demographic transition by
many countries that today have very young and youthful populations. Getting past the early stages of the demographic transition requires continued declines in death and birth rates. Such
declines occur when access to health care improves, diminishing
the impact of infectious diseases and improving life expectancy.
Next, fertility rates drop as more children survive through their
earliest, vulnerable years. Parents who know they can expect most
children to live generally choose to have fewer and to invest more
in the nutrition, general health and education of each one.
78
For national governments and international donors, the costs
of completing the demographic transition come in the provision
of supplies and the implementation of comprehensive health
systems that provide counseling and treatment. Distributed across
the developing world through decades of successful family planning programs run cooperatively by national governments, NGOs
and international donors, contraceptives also are key to preventing
unintended pregnancies and thus reducing fertility rates. Among
other supplies needed to improve reproductive health are materials to make birth safer, anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) to prolong
the lives of people infected with HIV and nevirapine to reduce
the chance that HIV-positive mothers will transmit the infection to
their babies during pregnancy or birth. By preventing unintended
pregnancies among HIV-positive women, condoms and other
contraceptives slow the spread of HIV/AIDS.
By 2015, the number of contraceptive users in the developing world
is projected to grow by 28 percent, due to population growth and
increased demand for – and, hopefully, better access to – family
planning services. However, in 2004, the gap between funding for
condoms and other contraceptives from international donors and
estimated need for such supplies in the developing world was
about $800 million, leaving hundreds of millions of women with an
unmet need for family planning.95 The estimated cost of meeting
such need in contraceptives and other supplies would be $696
million, with personnel and capital expenses more than four times
higher. However, these expenditures would save 1.5 million lives
per year in countries with youthful populations, and would create
significant progress along the demographic transition.96
Meeting current and future needs for health and education,
including demand for reproductive health supplies, is a public
policy challenge, but one that governments understand and have
successfully addressed in many countries in recent decades. In
such cases, governments, donors and civil society have worked
together to expand access to health and other social programs.
Over a few decades, the populations of most countries have
made remarkable progress through the demographic transition
and into more mature, favorable age structures. The examples
of these countries’ past successes, such as Mexico and Tunisia,
can serve as models today for governments and institutions that
recognize the importance of age structure to their development.
Completing the Transition
Age structures in which the demographically dominant groups
are older than 30 lend themselves to government efforts to build
and maintain political stability and legitimacy. Countries with
transitional and mature population age structures as a group have
historically been politically stable, democratic and wealthy. Likewise, very young age structures pose serious challenges that tend
to undermine political and economic development. Responding
to these challenges requires an effective national government with
strong institutions and well-allocated resources, often in partnership with other countries and organizations.
Research demonstrates that women who have completed most
or all of secondary school have lower fertility rates, and that large
family sizes that keep women out of the work force are incompatible with sustained economic growth. However, policymakers
have been slow to act on the connections between women’s lives,
population dynamics and broader development. This policy lapse
has stunted the development of many countries and regions that
remain stalled in the early stages of the demographic transition.
The education of children and employment of young adults are
the foundation of a country’s development. A country may be
less vulnerable to political instability when young men perceive
that the government is working to improve their employment
opportunities and to overcome economic barriers to starting a
family. Governments are better able to meet those expectations
when demographic conditions such as balanced age structure
support a focus on the young.
To achieve a world of more favorable and balanced age structures
by 2025, a series of steps related to population change are needed:
Governments, local organizations and international partners
should make voluntary access to modern contraception and
sexual health information as widespread as possible, for all who seek it, including youth.
Policies should also work to increase girls’ educational attainment and make it easier for women to enter and compete
in the work force – while strengthening education generally.
Gender issues should be mainstreamed into all development
and social welfare policies.
National education programs should be targeted at reducing
cultural discrimination of women; reducing families’ preference
for sons, which can lead to sex-selective abortion and neglect of
female children; campaigning against sexual violence; and ending
exclusive male control over decisions regarding sex and fertility.
Policies and programs should be tailored to countries’ specific
population dynamics in order to sustain and expand the
opportunities that progress along the demographic transition
has already created in many countries, and encourage their
expansion to the rest of the developing world. For example,
industrial countries with aging populations should not let oldage pension and health care costs take resources away from
investments in youth.
The fears of runaway population growth that were widespread
in the 1960s and 1970s have eased as family size has declined
worldwide and population growth rates have fallen. In some
regions, the fear is now that fertility decline is going “too far,”
threatening stability and economic security in countries with
aging and declining populations. As world population adds 76
million people per year, however, the evidence of recent demographic transition supports a different conclusion: Countries
tend to be less vulnerable to civil conflict, more able to resolve
their economic and political problems, and better poised to
face future changes and challenges when adults 30 and older
outnumber those who are younger than 30 in the population.
Demographic transition has not gone too far; in fact it is not yet
complete in most of the world’s countries. Access to family planning and reproductive health services for all who seek them – in
concert with improvements in the lives of women – contribute
to more balanced age structures. Evidence suggests that
these healthier, mature age structures, in turn, support secure,
stable and prosperous societies. Although most governments
have fallen short of their financial commitments to make family
planning and reproductive health available to all, that objective
remains crucial to beneficially shaping not only the population
age structure, but all that the future sends our way.
Legal regulations must also afford women equal rights to
custody of their own children, to divorce, to access to reproductive health services, to inheritance and land title, to security
from gender-based violence, and to protection in schools and
in the workplace. Such issues should be removed from the
purview of religious courts or customary law.
79
A
appendix 1
Glossary of Terms
1
Age Structure The comparative size of specific age groups relative to others or to the population as a whole.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) The sum of the economic value
added by all resident producers of a country, plus any product
taxes not included in output. GDP per capita is total GDP divided
by the midyear population of a country.99
Civil Conflict A violently contested hostility including the use of
armed force. In this report, statistics concerning civil conflict assume
that it results in at least 25 battle deaths in a given calendar year
Median Age The age where there are an equal number of people
and involves at least one party associated with a state.
older in the population as there are younger.
Democracy The presence of institutions and procedures through
which citizens can express preferences about policies and
leaders; existence of institutionalized constraints on the power of
the executive; and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens.98
Autocracy is the absence of democracy.
Demographic Bonus A defined period of time during the process
of the demographic transition in which working-age adults
make up the largest share of the population, with relatively small
groups of dependent children and older adults compared to
previous generations.
Demographic Transition The transformation of a population
characterized by large families and short lives into a population of small families and long lives. Varies among populations,
but generally occurs as death rates decline and life expectancy
increases, followed later by a decline in birthrates.
Dependency Ratio The share of those too young and too old
to generally be productive workers relative to the age group
comprising those likely to be in productive working years. The limits
of productive working years are often given as ages 15 to 64.
Reproductive Age Among women, reproductive age includes
the years in which childbearing is generally physically possible:
ages 15 to 49.
Reproductive Health A state of complete physical, mental and
social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or
infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to
its functions and processes. This definition implies that men and
women have the right to be informed and to have access to safe,
effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of
their choice, as well as other methods of their choice for regulation of fertility that are not against the law, and the right of access
to appropriate health care services that will enable women to go
safely though pregnancy and childbirth and provide couples with
the best chance of having a healthy infant, and of keeping themselves and their family free of sexually transmitted infections.100
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) The number of live births that a woman
entering her reproductive years would experience, on average,
during her lifetime, if the rates of childbearing for women of
all ages remained the same during her reproductive years.
TFR is a composite indicator, calculated in a population by
adding the age-specific fertility rates of women across the
span of reproductive years.
81
A
appendix 2
Data and Methods
2
List of States
Countries were drawn from the United Nations 2005 list of states,
using independent countries with a population over 100,000.
Each decade of analysis includes a slightly different set of countries because of the emergence or dissolution of states, primarily
connected to the breakup of the Soviet Union and renewed
independence of many states in Eastern Europe in the early
1990s. The number of countries analyzed also varies by indicators (conflict, economics, governance) because some countries
did not have data available for one or more indicators. This was
especially true of the economic growth analysis. In order to
correct for the large size and heterogeneity of their populations,
five states were removed from the analysis of conflict, governance and economics: China, India, Indonesia, Russia and the
United States. In these states, regional populations are larger
than most country populations, and national demographic data
are not representative of their variability.
Decades of Analysis
The report’s analyses of civil conflict, economic performance and
governance were conducted on distinct decades. The decade of
the 1990s was assumed to last from 1990 through 1999; the 1980s
spanned from 1980 to 1989; the 1970s spanned from 1970 to 1979.
Defining Age Structure
Within this publication, population age structures are divided into
three 30-year age components: youth, from infants to 29 years
of age; mid-adults, 30 to 59 years; and older adults, 60 years
and older. Each component is measured as a proportion of the
total population, indicated as a percentage. Because the third
proportion depends on the sum of the other two, two dimensions
are sufficient to describe variation in these data. In this guide, we
position country age structures using the population proportions
that are currently of most interest to researchers: the proportion
of youth (0 to 29 years) along the vertical axis; and the proportion of older adults (60 years and older) along the horizontal axis.
In these graphs, a solid line depicts the statistical center of the
path of the demographic transition. Countries typically move
along this transition from left to right as they advance through the
demographic transition, making their age structure more mature.
Determining Age Structure Type
Countries were plotted on a graph comparing their youthful population (percent of total population ages 0-29) on the y-axis and
older adult population (percent of total population ages 60 and
above) on the x-axis. The function describing the demographic
transition [y = –20.47 ln(n60+) + 102.6)] was also applied to the
graph. Four lines perpendicular to the slope of the demographic
transition were drawn, to designate the divisions of the four age
structure types. The equations for the four lines were determined
to be: Very Young/Youthful divider (y = 0.278 (x) + 65.41719),
Youthful/Transitional divider (y = 0.391 (x) + 56.86343), Transitional/Mature divider (y = 0.815 (x) + 31.41875) and Mature/Aged
divider (y = 1.695 (x) - 28.8063). An “expected” y (percentage
of population under age 30) was created for each country using
its older adult proportion of the population as the x value in the
above equations. The “expected” proportion of the population
under age 30 was then subtracted from the actual proportion
value. When the result of that subtraction was negative (meaning
the country’s position was below the corresponding perpendicular line on the demographic transition function), the country was
determined to be in the next highest (older) age structure type.
The same equations were used to calculate age structure type
for each of the three decades analyzed, using population data for
the first year of the decade, and for 2005. It is assumed that the
same equations, used to mark progress along the demographic
transition, could be used indefinitely into the future to determine
countries’ age structure types.
Determining Age Structure Subtypes
Three age structure subtypes were created: Two to reflect
countries whose age structures have been altered by absorbing
a high number of immigrants into their population, and one to
reflect countries whose age structures have been altered due to
high mortality rates from HIV/AIDS. Although counterfactual data
are not available to determine whether these countries would be
classified in a different major structure type without the influence of immigration or AIDS, the shape of their profiles and their
placement within an age structure type has clearly been modified
because of their unique demographic situation.
83
To determine the immigration subtypes, all countries with an
average migration rate of 0.35 percent or greater over the period
from 1980 to 2005 were initially eligible. Then, countries with less
than 40 percent of their population between the ages of 30 and
59, which are prime working years, were eliminated. This was to
remove countries in which migration has occurred for political
or other non-economic reasons (such as Israel). When immigration occurs for non-economic reasons, it is difficult to predict or
explain and such instability makes migration rates a less valuable indicator to political theorists. Finally, countries that fit both
criteria – an average immigration rate over the 25-year period of
0.35 percent or greater and a mid-adult population proportion
of 40 percent or greater – were classified as belonging to the
immigration-youthful subtype if their major age structure type
was very young, youthful or transitional (reflecting less progress
along the demographic transition). Countries were classified as
immigration-mature if their major age structure type was mature
(reflecting greater progress along the demographic transition).
The HIV/AIDS subtype was created through a simpler formula,
by grouping all countries with a 2005 HIV prevalence rate of 18
percent or greater among adults ages 15 to 49. This high prevalence rate cutoff restricted the subtype to only include those
age structures that have been most intensely impacted by the
epidemic. It is important to note that for the purposes of the civil
conflict, economics and governance analyses, countries were
classified by major age structure type (very young, youthful, transitional or mature) only. Countries with subtypes were only analyzed
separately in order to determine characteristics of that subtype
group. The 17 countries classified in the three subtypes only
comprise 10 percent of all countries analyzed in this publication.
Graphing Population Age Structures
Each population age profile (the graphic representation of a
population age structure) in this publication is composed of two
sets of horizontal bar graphs: the male subpopulation on the left,
females on the right. These subpopulations are divided into fiveyear age groups, each measured as a percentage of the total
population (indicated on the horizontal axis). Percentages are
scaled to a maximum of 10 percent to standardize comparison
84
across age structure types, except for the two country populations
(Uganda and the UAE in 2005) in which a cohort comprises a larger
proportion. In all profiles, the youngest age group, ages zero to
four years, lies on the bottom of an age profile; the oldest age
group is at its top. The age profile features two vertical axes
that label each group’s range of ages during the year from
which the profile is drawn and the range of birth years for
individuals in each group.
Analysis of Age Structures’ Risk of Civil Conflict
Data on armed conflicts are drawn from the Uppsala Conflict
Data Project: States in Armed Conflict, Uppsala University,
Uppsala, Sweden (available online: http://www.pcr.uu.se/
research/data.htm).101 Uppsala researchers define armed conflict
as a “contested incompatibility which concerns government and/
or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of
which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least
25 battle deaths.” This definition excludes international wars,
border disputes and acts of terrorism committed by individuals or
organizations unaffiliated with a national government. Analyses
in this report do not distinguish between the intensity of conflicts.
Instead, this report is concerned with the initiation of conflict, and
particularly civil conflicts (intrastate conflicts, involving a state and
a non-state insurgent or between state factions).
The analysis was then narrowed to only include countries that
experienced new conflict and those without any measurable
conflict in each of the decades studied. Countries that experienced persistent conflict and those in which conflict had just
ended in the previous five years were removed from the equation. This is because the strength of the demographic transition’s
effects is much less certain after soldiers have been mobilized,
arms have been circulated and blood has been spilled. Countries that experienced a civil conflict within the previous five years
had a more than 80 percent probability of further civil conflict
during the next decade. The likelihood of civil conflict for any
category in an analysis is equal to the sum of conflicts in the
category, divided by the total eligible states in the category
(after eliminating states with persistent or recurring conflicts).
The number of countries analyzed in each decade was 177.
Analysis of Age Structure and Economic Development
By 2005, the positive correlation between national income and
mature age structures was apparent, as 70 percent of countries
with a very young age structure type were classified as lowincome and 61 percent of countries with a mature structure as
high-income by the World Bank. In contrast, the more complex
relationship between population dynamics and economic growth
over time has been analyzed in various ways by numerous
researchers, with inconclusive results.102
For this analysis, countries were divided by age structure categories
at the beginning of three consecutive decades: the 1970s, 1980s
and 1990s. The median gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate
for each age structure type in each decade was determined from
the average of each country’s annual GDP growth rates across the
ten-year period. As long as a country had at least one year of GDP
growth data during the decade in consideration, it was included
in the analysis. This left 112 countries analyzed for 1970-79, 145
countries for 1980-89, and 160 countries for 1990-99.
Analysis of Age Structure and Governance
Data for the governance analysis are drawn from the Center
for International Development and Conflict Management at the
University of Maryland, which produces the Polity Project on
political regime characteristics and transitions annually for the
period between 1800 and 2004 (available online at: http://www.
cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/). The data assign each country an
annual governance score ranging from -10 to 10 on a singlepoint basis. Countries with scores from -10 to 0 are classified as
autocracies; scores from 1 to 7 are classified as partial democracies; and scores from 8 to 10 are classified as full democracies.
The total number of countries analyzed was 131 for 1979 and
1989 and 158 countries for 1999.
Countries were classified according to their age structure type at
the beginning of three successive decades (1970, 1980, 1990) and
whether their governments were rated as full democracies at the
end of the corresponding decade.103 Countries that began a decade
as non-full democracies and ended it as full democracies, and vice
versa, were also noted, but this sample size was extremely small. In
each decade, a total of fewer than 10 countries made either switch.
85
A
appendix 3
country data table
3
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2.18
2.39
6.43
2.25
1.36
1.75
1.40
1.85
2.26
2.96
1.22
1.66
2.82
5.42
3.84
3.50
1.30
2.92
2.25
2.29
1.23
6.34
6.80
3.72
4.08
1.47
3.37
4.58
6.65
1.94
1.74
2.47
4.30
6.70
6.29
2.10
4.46
1.35
1.63
1.60
1.22
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22.4
5.9
4.3
7.0
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4.7
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4.2
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5.6
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11.6
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3,130
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32,854 61.8
15,941 74.0
38,747 51.9
3,016
48.0
20,155 40.4
8,189
33.3
8,411
53.8
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50.4
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9,755
39.2
10,419 34.9
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66.4
8,439
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2,163
67.5
9,182
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71.0
57,549 74.6
3,999
74.3
4,327
56.5
18,154 71.5
4,551
35.7
11,269 39.6
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Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia & Herz. Botswana
Brazil
Brunei
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Central African Rep.
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Congo, Republic
Costa Rica
Cote d’Ivoire
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
149
25
37
139
15
30
5
5
76
14
59
15
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31
105
56
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14
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27
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98
116
8
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26
58
119
72
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118
7
6
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no data
2,580
2,730
1,350
4,470
1,470
32,220
36,980
1,240
no data
470
2,760
35,700
3,500
510
870
1,010
2,440
5,180
3,460
no data
3,450
400
100
380
1,010
32,600
1,870
350
400
5,870
1,740
2,290
640
120
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4,590
840
8,060
no data
no data
10,710
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1.76
4.50
2.56
2.58
2.99
2.68
5.89
5.05
1.43
5.42
2.70
1.72
1.85
3.53
4.17
1.39
1.34
3.84
1.25
4.15
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7.07
2.11
3.60
3.31
0.96
1.28
1.93
2.76
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4.24
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15.4
20.8
15.8
7.9
8.4
6.4
4.5
15.1
13.3
25.6
10.2
26.3
5.1
11.3
4.1
11.2
13.7
nt
va
ria
nt
va
ria
- fe
rti
l
i ty
20
05
10
l),
l),
ta
to
of
(%
029
n
ti o
6
5
20
05
10
) 104
nd
s
ou
sa
(th
88
ag
es
n,
20
05
ti o
Po
pu
la
po
pu
la
al
To
t
ou
nt
ry
C
Denmark
5,431
36.1
Djibouti
793
69.5
Dominican Republic 8,895
61.8
Ecuador
13,228 60.1
Egypt
74,033 62.7
El Salvador
6,881
62.8
Equatorial Guinea 504
70.8
Eritrea
4,401
73.8
Estonia
1,330
37.9
Ethiopia
77,431 72.2
Fiji
848
59.7
Finland
5,249
36.1
France
60,496 37.2
Gabon
1,384
68.4
Gambia
1,517
66.5
Georgia
4,474
42.6
Germany
82,689 31.8
Ghana
22,113 68.5
Greece
11,120 34.6
Guatemala
12,599 71.0
Guinea
9,402
70.1
Guinea-Bissau
1,586
73.3
Guyana
751
58.4
Haiti
8,528
69.6
Honduras
7,205
68.5
Hong Kong (China) 7,041
35.1
Hungary
10,098 36.9
Iceland
295
44.1
India
1,103,37159.2
Indonesia
222,781 56.4
Iran
69,515 63.7
Iraq
28,807 69.3
Ireland
4,148
42.9
Israel
6,725
51.7
Italy
58,093 30.5
Jamaica
2,651
57.3
Japan
128,085 31.8
Jordan
5,703
66.0
Kazakhstan
14,825 51.0
Kenya
34,256 74.0
Korea, North
22,488 48.1
Korea, South
47,817 41.1
5
93
35
25
37
26
102
65
10
100
22
4
4
58
77
40
4
62
6
39
106
120
49
62
32
4
8
3
68
43
34
94
5
5
5
15
3
23
61
68
46
4
47,390
1,020
2,370
2,630
1,250
2,450
no data
220
9,100
160
3,280
37,460
34,810
5,010
290
1,350
34,580
450
19,670
2,400
370
180
1,010
450
1,190
27,670
10,030
46,320
720
1,280
2,770
no data
40,150
18,620
30,010
3,400
38,980
2,500
2,930
530
no data
15,830
nt
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20
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To
t
4
3
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4
4
2
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3
4
4
4
2
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3
3
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4
2
4
4
3
4
3
3
1
4
2
3
4
4
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4
3
3
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3
3
3
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3
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3
2
4
3
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4
4
4
2
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3
3
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4
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3
3
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4
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4
3
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3
3
3
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3
3
1
3
2
2
4
4
3
1
1
4
3
3
1
3
2
3
3
3
2.26
2.47
4.28
1.29
2.21
3.27
6.77
2.72
1.26
1.74
1.45
4.89
5.67
2.62
3.78
6.58
1.50
5.45
1.94
2.15
4.18
1.21
2.21
2.58
5.11
2.08
3.47
3.30
1.72
1.95
2.94
7.51
5.32
1.80
3.22
3.73
5.00
2.56
3.60
3.54
2.66
2.84
09
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ru
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2
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3
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ty
ru
ct
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7.6
5.3
22.5
10.3
7.5
3.6
6.5
20.7
18.3
15.5
4.8
4.7
7.0
5.1
4.2
18.8
5.3
9.6
7.8
4.9
13.7
5.7
6.8
5.2
7.5
5.3
5.8
19.2
16.7
4.9
3.3
4.8
20.0
4.2
5.8
4.5
8.8
3.9
5.6
7.8
6.1
st
Ag
e
51.1
60.5
68.9
37.1
55.3
72.2
74.6
62.3
38.9
36.4
43.6
71.0
75.0
58.6
70.3
75.9
39.7
70.0
49.4
58.9
67.9
45.7
62.0
60.8
71.8
58.3
70.1
66.9
35.7
42.2
69.7
75.5
72.5
37.8
65.4
67.4
72.2
56.5
67.8
65.7
60.2
63.9
m
lo
w
ed
i
ta
to
of
(%
60
+
ag
es
n
Po
pu
la
ti o
um
- fe
rti
l
i ty
20
05
10
l),
l),
ta
to
of
(%
029
va
ria
6
5
20
05
10
) 104
nd
s
ou
sa
(th
ti o
n
ag
es
n,
20
05
ti o
Po
pu
la
po
pu
la
al
To
t
ou
nt
ry
C
Kuwait
2,687
Kyrgyz Republic
5,264
Lao PDR
5,924
Latvia
2,307
Lebanon
3,577
Lesotho
1,795
Liberia
3,283
Libya
5,853
Lithuania
3,431
Luxembourg
465
Macedonia
2,034
Madagascar
18,606
Malawi
12,884
Malaysia
25,347
Maldives
329
Mali
13,518
Malta
402
Mauritania
3,069
Mauritius
1,245
Mexico
107,029
Micronesia
110
Moldova
4,206
Mongolia
2,646
Morocco
31,478
Mozambique
19,792
Myanmar
50,519
Namibia
2,031
Nepal
27,133
Netherlands
16,299
New Zealand
4,028
Nicaragua
5,487
Niger
13,957
Nigeria
131,530
Norway
4,620
Oman
2,567
Pakistan
157,935
Palestinian Terrs. 3,702
Panama
3,232
Papua New Guinea 5,887
Paraguay
6,158
Peru
27,968
Philippines
83,054
10
55
88
10
22
67
142
19
9
5
16
79
111
10
43
133
7
97
15
21
38
26
58
38
101
75
44
64
5
5
30
153
114
4
16
79
21
21
71
37
33
28
no data
440
440
6,760
6,180
960
130
5,530
7,050
65,630
2,830
290
160
4,960
2,390
380
13,590
560
5,260
7,310
2,300
880
690
1,730
310
no data
2,990
270
36,620
25,960
910
240
560
59,590
no data
690
no data
4,630
660
1,280
2,610
1,300
89
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2
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1
4
4
3
3
2
4
1
2
3
4
3
3
3
1
4
3
4
1.24
1.47
2.79
1.26
1.40
5.20
3.93
3.57
3.58
4.46
1.58
6.47
1.30
1.19
1.21
3.79
6.04
2.64
1.35
1.86
2.18
2.16
3.95
2.45
3.48
1.72
1.40
3.08
3.35
4.45
1.87
7.17
4.80
3.17
1.61
1.87
2.31
2.50
7.10
1.15
2.36
1.66
09
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ct
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4
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19.3
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6.5
5.7
4.6
4.9
18.5
5.5
12.2
16.2
20.5
4.2
4.2
6.8
21.4
10.7
9.7
8.9
5.6
9.0
5.4
23.4
21.8
4.7
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5.1
10.5
5.0
4.9
8.8
10.7
8.6
8.0
6.2
3.8
20.9
1.6
21.2
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Ag
e
40.9
35.8
47.6
39.4
39.9
75.0
65.1
72.5
64.6
71.8
40.8
69.0
38.3
41.3
34.8
70.1
71.3
61.2
35.0
50.7
56.9
60.2
67.5
57.2
74.6
35.9
34.2
68.8
68.7
72.1
49.1
70.0
72.0
64.3
51.1
56.1
56.6
61.8
78.2
37.8
52.7
37.2
m
lo
w
ed
i
ta
to
of
(%
60
+
ag
es
n
Po
pu
la
ti o
um
- fe
rti
l
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20
05
10
l),
l),
ta
to
of
(%
029
va
ria
6
5
20
05
10
) 104
nd
s
ou
sa
(th
ti o
n
ag
es
n,
20
05
38,530
10,495
813
21,711
143,202
9,038
185
157
24,573
11,658
10,503
5,525
4,326
5,401
1,967
478
8,228
47,432
43,064
20,743
161
119
36,233
449
1,032
9,041
7,252
19,043
6,507
38,329
64,233
947
6,145
102
1,305
10,102
73,193
4,833
28,816
46,481
4,496
59,668
Po
pu
la
al
po
pu
la
ti o
90
To
t
ou
nt
ry
C
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Samoa
Sao Tome & Prin. Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia & Mont.
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
St. Lucia
St. Vincent & Gren. Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad & Tobago Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
UAE
United Kingdom
9
6
12
18
17
116
26
82
23
83
13
165
3
8
5
34
126
43
5
17
15
26
72
26
73
3
4
18
89
104
20
94
93
21
14
22
42
78
81
16
9
5
7,110
16,170
no data
3,830
4,460
230
2,090
390
11,770
710
3,280
220
27,490
7,950
17,350
590
no data
4,960
25,360
1,160
4,800
3,590
640
2,540
2,280
41,060
54,930
1,380
330
340
2,750
750
350
2,190
10,440
2,890
4,710
no data
280
1,520
no data
37,600
nt
gh
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20
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05
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ty
ru
ct
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5.1
7.6
7.5
3.6
4.6
5.4
st
Ag
e
41.7
47.0
63.1
67.5
59.0
59.1
75.0
75.6
73.9
m
lo
w
ed
i
ta
to
of
(%
60
+
ag
es
n
Po
pu
la
ti o
um
- fe
rti
l
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20
05
10
l),
l),
ta
to
of
(%
029
va
ria
6
5
20
05
10
) 104
nd
s
ou
sa
(th
ti o
n
ag
es
n,
20
05
ti o
298,213
3,463
26,593
211
26,749
84,238
20,975
11,668
13,010
Po
pu
la
po
pu
la
al
To
t
ou
nt
ry
C
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
7
13
58
34
18
30
69
95
62
43,740
4,360
510
1,600
4,810
620
600
490
340
“demographic bonus:” when
working-age adults make up the
largest share of its population,
and there are relatively small
groups of dependent children
and older adults compared
to previous generations.
91
A
appendix 4
endnotes
4
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