PAKISTAN’S ROLE IN THE WAR ON TERROR
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Chirasree Mukherjee
Abstract: This paper aims to delineate the contours of
Pakistan’s “war on terror.” Initially a reluctant ally of
the US, Pakistan is now actively involved in the war.
Regarded as an important partner of the US, Pakistan
has been receiving American support, both financial and
military, to wage the war. During the last ten years,
though military rule has given way to a democratically
elected government in Pakistan, its “war on terror” has
continued unabated. With the passage of time, this war
has evolved as a complex, multi-tiered military
operation spread across a large territory. However,
Islamabad’s counterterrorism policies underwent
significant changes, thus influencing the outcomes of the
war. In order to assess the role of Pakistan in this
decade-long war, this paper describes how these policy
changes led to tectonic shifts in Pakistan’s mode of
countering terrorism.
Introduction
“You are either one hundred percent with us or one hundred percent
against us – there is no grey area,” stated Richard Armitage, the United
States (US) deputy secretary of state, while briefing Lieutenant General
Mahmood Ahmed, Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) chief, on
September 12, 2001.1 Immediately after this high level briefing, General
Ahmed pledged Pakistan’s assistance in the “war on terror,” which
America initiated in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Subsequently, that
war has developed into a multi-layered, complex military operation pitting
the Pakistani and the American armies against a number of terrorist
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organizations operating within Pakistan. Little by little, the nature of the
operation changed dramatically.
In order to develop a proper understanding of Pakistan’s role in the “war
on terror,” one needs to analyze the different stages of its evolution.
Initially, Pakistan served as a cooperative ally of the US in waging the
war, but over time it reached accommodations with various terrorist outfits
for strategic reasons. A detailed account of Islamabad’s counterterrorism
policy illustrates the notion that Pakistan has a selective and biased
approach in uprooting terrorism. The execution of Osama bin Laden was a
path-breaking event in the “war on terror” with noteworthy implications
for international terrorism. Given these dynamics, it is fair to conclude that
Pakistan has not proven itself capable of dealing with and curbing
terrorism, as such.
Getting Engaged in the War on Terror
Within hours of the deadly September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the US
administration concluded that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda operatives
from Afghanistan were behind the attacks and that any successful
counterstrike required the support and assistance of Pakistan. On
September 13, 2001, the US handed Pakistan a formal list of demands in
the form of a “non paper.”2 It categorically asked Pakistan to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Stop al-Qaeda operatives coming from Afghanistan to Pakistan,
intercept arms shipments through Pakistan and end all logistical
support for Osama bin Laden.
Give blanket over flight and landing rights to US aircrafts.
Give the US access to Pakistani naval and air bases and to the
border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Turn over all intelligence and immigration information.
Condemn the September 11 attacks and curb all domestic
expressions of support for terrorism.
Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop Pakistani
volunteers from going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban.
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PAKISTAN’S ROLE IN THE WAR ON TERROR
•
Break diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime and provide
full support to the US in the “war on terror.”3
General Pervez Musharraf, then military ruler of Pakistan, informed the
nation on September 19 that since plausible evidence suggested that the
terrorists were al-Qaeda operatives entrenched in Afghanistan, the US had
asked the Pakistan government to provide intelligence, logistical support
and the right to use Pakistani airspace for strikes on al-Qaeda targets.
Musharraf agreed to Washington’s request, without any knowledge of
American future operational plans. Defying the US in the aftermath of the
horrific events of September 11 would be interpreted as evidence of a
direct association between Pakistan and the actions of al-Qaeda.4
The links between al-Qaeda and the Taliban forced Islamabad to choose
between being identified as a co-conspirator with the named band of
terrorists and acquiescing to the American call to sever ties with the
regime of Mullah Mohammed Omar. Pakistan provided the Americans
with use of several military airstrips near the Afghan frontier.5 Musharraf
had committed Pakistan to the “war on terror.” The Pakistani army had to
be reorganized to be more compatible with American interests in the “war
on terror,” and this prompted Musharraf to do more than change the chief
of the ISI. In October, he extended his term as Chief of the Army Staff and
reshuffled all the key positions in the Pakistani army. Pakistan’s decision
to join the US and the international coalition, according to the General,
was deliberate and taken in pursuit of a “just course.”6 The “war on
terror,” he cautioned, could not be confined only to Afghanistan. It must
also take into account other areas where tactics that inspire terror have
been used such as Kashmir, Palestine and Chechnya.7
The Result: Al-Qaeda’s Growing Presence in Pakistan
The following paragraphs give a detailed description of the escalating
presence of al-Qaeda in Pakistan. This information has been derived
exclusively from Richard Jackson’s book, Contemporary State Terrorism.
I am thankful to him for such a vivid account.8
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The “war on terror” came to Pakistan in the aftermath of Taliban rule in
Afghanistan. Thousands of al-Qaeda fighters fled from the US
bombardment of the Tora Bora caves in eastern Afghanistan, crossed over
unguarded mountain trails and disappeared into the lawless tribal areas of
Pakistan. By mid-December 2001, more than 10,000 al-Qaeda operatives,
including most of the chief planners and presumably bin Laden himself,
had managed to escape bombardment by American B-52s and attack
helicopters that were carrying out attacks in the mountainous terrain of
eastern Afghanistan. Another wave of fugitives entered Pakistan in March
2002, during the allied force’s ‘Operation Anaconda’ against al-Qaeda
positions in the eastern Shahi Kot mountains.
There were not enough US troops to cover all possible escape routes and
Pakistani forces faced serious problems sealing the border. Many of the
terrorists made their escape by bribing Afghan warlords. They journeyed
through twisting mountainous passes whose long history of smuggling
links eastern Afghanistan with Pakistan’s lawless tribal regions and melted
away among sympathetic locals. In many cases the soldiers looked the
other way as foreign fighters crossed over to the Pakistani side and many
in the ISI arranged safe passage for the fugitives. Herein lies the question
of legality. The lawless tribal regions were beyond Islamabad’s rule; the
government’s writ can only run along the main roads. Therefore, security
forces could not set up checkpoints on unfrequented routes. Pakistani
intelligence agencies did not have any effective network to check the
movement of foreign fighters.
Osama bin Laden had around 3000 Arab fighters with him when the USled coalition forces invaded Afghanistan. According to some estimates,
only a few hundred of them were killed by the US bombing or taken
prisoner. The 1500-mile porous border with Pakistan offered many exit
points for the fleeing militants. Many of them used Pakistan as a transit to
the Gulf and other Arab countries. In many cases, Pakistani security
officials and Arab diplomats provided the fugitives with money and
transport to get out of the country. However, most fugitives stayed in
Pakistan. The non-Arab Uzbeks, Chechens and Sudanese took shelter in
the tribal regions. Most al-Qaeda operatives found refuge in Pakistan’s
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crowded cities, like Quetta and Karachi. With the help of their allies
among Pakistani militant organizations and supporters within the
intelligence agencies, many al-Qaeda leaders moved to big urban centers
from where they could regroup and revive contacts with operatives, both
within the country and abroad. The Pakistani and American investigators
were confronted with cells that were all over the place, developing a
horizontal structure, without any apparent large center of coordination.
Thus, al-Qaeda successfully mutated into a form that was no less deadly
and, perhaps, even more difficult to combat. It was evolving as a hydralike menace.
Countering Terrorism: Progressive Role
Hundreds of fugitives fleeing from Afghanistan wanted to turn Pakistan
into a new terror base. A more sophisticated intelligence network was
imperative to successfully counter the new threat. Although the ISI had
vast experience in intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, fighting
terrorism was an entirely new enterprise. Developments since 9/11
resulted in radical changes in the ISI, but it still took several months for
the agency to develop a sound counter-terrorism infrastructure to track the
terrorist network. Meanwhile, the network’s tentacles continued to spread
from the inhospitable mountains in the lawless tribal regions to bustling
city neighborhoods in the heartland of Pakistan.
The Pakistani authorities set up a new Counter Terrorism Cell (CTC) with
the ISI to track down al-Qaeda fugitives. Headed by a Brigadier, the cell
worked closely with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CTC set up a swift-acting internal
anti-terrorism department with specially trained personnel. Islamabad also
established a National Crisis Management Cell, within the Interior
Ministry to meet the new challenges posed by ongoing terrorism. Headed
by an active-duty Brigadier, the cell worked closely with the FBI.
With new high-tech equipment and better human intelligence in place, alQaeda operatives lurking in Pakistani cities became more vulnerable to
capture. The CIA developed extensive intelligence assets that helped in
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tracking important al-Qaeda leaders hiding in Pakistan. The agency also
spent large sums of money on information. All of these helped to net top
al-Qaeda operatives. For instance, various Pakistani intelligence cells in
conjunction with the FBI successfully captured prominent al-Qaeda leader
Abu Zubaydah. This significantly set back further al-Qaeda operations.
Meanwhile, Karachi, the country’s largest city and its commercial capital,
had turned into al-Qaeda’s new operational headquarters. Islamic militants
conducted more than half a dozen terror attacks in the city, targeting
western nationals and US assets. All of these attacks carried al-Qaeda
imprints. Even before 9/11, the militants used the city as a transit point to
Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda decentralized its activities as American and
Pakistani intelligence agencies attacked its nerve centers.
The masterminds of 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) and Ramzi
bin al-Shibh, made their base in the city with the help of a vast network of
homegrown jihadists. On September 11, 2002, Pakistani intelligence
officials captured Ramzi bin al-Shibh at the commercial neighborhood of
Karachi’s Defense Housing Society. This success was soon followed by
the capture of KSM in the first week of February in 2003 at Pakistan’s
western border city, Quetta. These high-profile arrests caught many US
officials by surprise, giving Islamabad relief from the continuous
accusations that Pakistan was not doing enough to curb terrorism.
Musharraf’s growing crackdown on al-Qaeda’s command structure forced
the terrorist organization to adapt in order to survive. As a result, the
presence of al-Qaeda in Pakistan thinned. Many militants relocated to Iraq,
in particular. Pakistan was no longer a safe haven for the terrorist network.
Pakistani Army’s Counterterrorism Strategy: A Paradigmatic Shift
On October 1, 2010, Islamabad shut down the supply route for the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan after
NATO forces inadvertently killed 16 Pakistanis.9 The unintentional
deaths of the Pakistanis illustrated the inherent tension both in Pakistan’s
counterterrorism strategy and its allies in fighting the war in Afghanistan.
Since the onset of the war in 2001, interpreting Islamabad’s
counterterrorism policy has been tricky. Pakistan’s counterterrorism
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strategy proved rife with inherent contradictions, caught between a
proclivity to fight some militant forces and a willingness to maintain
partnerships with others in order to strengthen its future bargaining
position. Pakistan’s multiple interests—remaining engaged with the US,
defending itself against Taliban attack, and countering India’s growing
presence in Afghanistan—shaped its counterterrorism policy. Caught
between these three goals, Ayesha Siddiqa argues, “Islamabad’s
counterterrorism policy and objectives continue to lack clarity.”10 The
primary flaw of Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy lies in the fact that it is
defined and dominated by military and strategic objectives.11
In fact, according to Siddiqa, both the US and Pakistan lack clarity in
defining the threat they are facing and the objectives they are pursuing.
Islamabad’s counterterrorism policy suffers from its own set of problems,
the most important being overemphasis on the military approach. The
military’s incomplete control of Pakistan’s territory adds to its woes.12 The
army is unwilling to extend operations into North Waziristan, which has
now become a bone of contention with the US.
As a result of this confusing and opaque counterterrorism policy, three
kinds of terrorist forces now hold sway inside Pakistan: the friendly or
‘good’ Taliban in North Waziristan, the unfriendly or ‘bad’ Taliban in
North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Swat and rest of the country in the
form of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other ‘friendly’ militants
such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jamaat-ud-dawa (JuD) and Jaish-eMohammad (JeM). Such is the obduracy of the Pakistani army that the
then-US commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, was unable
to convince the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, General Kayani, of the
need to attack those whom the White House and Pentagon consider
unfriendly. On the other hand, Pakistan seems to be pushing the US to
negotiate with the Haqqani network, which it considers to be
fundamentally significant to the future of Afghanistan.13
The military is not inclined to cater to the US concerns about the various
Taliban groups operating in North Waziristan, who have formal and
informal agreements with the Pakistani army not to attack the state if the
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army does not attack them. Islamabad does not want to start a battle on all
fronts and is willing to talk to militant forces that do not attack Pakistan.
Pakistan’s perspective is problematic for the US, which wants Pakistan to
take a tougher line against the Afghan Taliban. However, the Pakistani
military is making an effort to clear Swat and South Waziristan of
militants and establish control with the intent of denying them to the
Taliban.14 This “clear and hold operation” facilitates the state’s integration
of these areas into Pakistan, as historically, these areas remained outside
the state’s legal and political systems.
On the other hand, Pakistan has suffered terribly during the “war on
terror.” Being the main ally of the US since the very beginning of the war
in 2001, it was a fixed target of the terrorists. Militant forces have
combined their strength to attack the Pakistani state and its citizens,
resulting in the deaths of more than 10,000 civilians and security
personnel since 2003.15 The militants, especially the TTP, have not
hesitated to attack the Pakistani army headquarters in Rawalpindi and
installations of the ISI. Since 2001, the threat posed to Pakistan by this
militancy has greatly increased poverty, underdevelopment, and the
ongoing conflict have made it easier for the Taliban to recruit foot
soldiers. The following table illustrates the casualties suffered from
terrorist activities that wreak havoc inside Pakistan:
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PAKISTAN’S ROLE IN THE WAR ON TERROR
FATALITIES IN TERRORIST VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN: 20032011
Year
Civilians
Security Forces
Terrorists Total
(SFs)
2003
140
24
25
189
2004
435
184
244
863
2005
430
81
137
648
2006
608
325
538
1471
2007
1523
597
1479
3599
2008
2155
654
3906
6715
2009
2307
1011
8267
11585
2010
1796
469
5170
7435
2011*
226
98
384
708
Total
9620
3443
20150
33213
* Data till February 20, 2011, Source: SATP
The threat posed by the TTP is difficult to counter. It is a franchise of alQaeda, with a similar structure, clearly indicating that over the years, alQaeda has managed to acquire a more local character. Amir Rana, an
expert on terrorism, believes that the July 2, 2010 terrorist attack against a
Sufi shrine in Lahore represented an internal scuffle for the leadership of
al-Qaeda’s Pakistani franchise.16 Moreover, the Pakistani army is equally
unwilling to eliminate other militant groups, which have found safe haven
in mainland Pakistan. LeT got international attention because of its
involvement in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, whereas JeM enjoys a long
partnership with the army for what Rawalpindi considers strategic
reasons.17
Another major concern that influences the Pakistani army’s
counterterrorism policy is India’s presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s
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military establishment is of the opinion that India is fomenting instability
in Pakistan’s southwestern province of Baluchistan that can only be
checked by a policy of counterforce.18 The growing conventional and
unconventional military imbalance in India’s favor compels Pakistan’s
military commanders to continue supporting proxy war against India as a
policy tool. The Kashmir issue is central to Pakistan’s military interests
and LeT and JeM remain relevant to the army in this theater.
The Result: Degenerative Role in Counterterrorism
Musharraf’s growing crackdown on al-Qaeda’s command structure forced
the terrorist organizations to adapt, breeding new militant Islamic threats
in Pakistan that the security forces found harder to uproot. Several new
terrorist cells emerged out of the outlawed militant outfits. However, the
pressure on the terrorists gradually decreased as Musharraf faced a number
of obstacles executing counterterrorism policies. The military campaign in
Iraq increased already strong anti-American sentiment in Pakistan.
Another major reason behind Musharraf’s declining support was the
widely held belief that Pakistan did not receive adequate financial
compensation in exchange for its cooperation with the US. The war in
Afghanistan had hurt Pakistani industry and international aid did little to
cover the costs of its participation in the war. Coupled with this is the stark
reality of the fatalities that Pakistan suffered.
In order to address the situation, President George W. Bush in June 2003
pledged a $3 billion aid package to Pakistan to be disbursed over five
years. This package is also tied to annual reviews of Pakistan’s
cooperation in the war.19 However, in an interview with Time magazine in
October 2005, Musharraf acknowledged that he was not eager for Osama
bin Laden to be caught in his country.20 Faced with mounting US pressure,
Musharraf, in February 2004, ordered his forces to launch a major
offensive in the tribal region of Waziristan.
Despite Pakistan’s considerable cooperation with the US, however, the
two countries’ interests are far from identical. The present policy of
counterterrorism formulated by the Pakistani army continues to cherry
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pick the various terrorist groups it will pursue on the basis of their tactical
positions vis-à-vis the Pakistani state. As long as it does so, terrorism will
continue unabated. Pakistani officials seem unwilling to marginalize or
eliminate the core militant groups operating within the country. For
instance, the chief of ISI, General Shuja Pasha, once declared Taliban
leaders such as Fazlullah and Baitullah Mehsud as patriots and
nationalists.21 Moreover, Pakistan regards the friendly Taliban as a natural
boost to Islamabad’s drive to protect its interests, particularly in the
Kashmir dispute and thwarting the growing Indian influence in
Afghanistan. The US diplomats stationed in Pakistan believe that the
continuation of the fight against terrorist organizations helps Islamabad
extract money from Washington.22 On the other hand, the bulk of the
Pakistani diplomats believe that the US interests in the region will wane
when it withdraws its military from Afghanistan.23 Therefore, it arguably
benefits Pakistan to keep the threat of terrorism alive.
“Geronimo EKIA”: Pakistan’s Role After the Assassination of Osama
bin Laden
The killing of Osama bin Laden in a covert operation in Abbottabad by
US Navy Seals on May 2, 2011, was a major blow to Pakistan. The notion
that Pakistan’s intelligence agencies were unaware of the presence of the
world’s most wanted terrorist is difficult to believe. The fact that bin
Laden was killed on Pakistani soil illustrates the notion that Islamabad
was either unbothered about his presence or was instrumental in providing
safe haven. Barack Obama, during his 2008 American presidential
election campaign, pledged that if there was “actionable intelligence”
about bin Laden in Pakistan, he would authorize action with or without
Islamabad’s help.24 Eventually, “Neptune Spear” (the code-name for the
operation to eliminate bin Laden) happened without Pakistan’s help. Then
CIA Director, Leon Panetta rubbed more salt in Pakistan’s wounds when
he revealed that the US did not give prior notice to Islamabad about the
operation because it feared it might be leaked to al-Qaeda founder.25
Pakistan faced major embarrassment as a result of bin Laden’s execution
on its soil. Many segments of Pakistan’s political and religious leadership
regard bin Laden’s killing as a violation of the nation’s sovereignty.26 Bin
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Laden’s death has also prompted many terror outfits to step up their
offensive actions against the Pakistani state. Therefore, Pakistan should
review its policy of fighting this war. In the words of Mariana Babar, a
clamor is taking shape inside Pakistan “to review its strategies, stop
treading in grey areas and treat a terrorist as a terrorist without getting
entangled in the rhetoric of ‘your terrorist is my freedom fighter.’”27
Pakistani officials contend that Pakistan is providing the US with full
cooperation in the war in spite of all the allegations and mistrust in the
context of bin Laden’s killing. The authorities intensified reconciliation
efforts to win the “minds and hearts” of people in their campaign against
al-Qaeda and the Taliban militants. Dr. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri of
Islamabad Policy Research Institute acknowledged the US commitment to
eliminate the threat of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other extremist groups,
and argued that “Pakistan was being squeezed despite playing a major role
in the decade-old war on terror.”28
The Dubious Future
Considering the gradual evolution of the costly, decade-long war that
Pakistan has been waging, under the US pressure, against the terrorist
outfits operating from its soil, it is clear that the complexion of the
operation has morphed significantly. This stems from the protean nature
of the hydra-like terrorist outfits. In order to pursue their objectives, the
terrorist organizations changed their modus operandi, from primitive to
more sophisticated, technology-based modes.
Today they possess
modernized weaponry as well as surveillance systems, enabling them to
make their geopolitical presence felt throughout the world, particularly in
the Middle East. Intelligence agencies worldwide fear that these terrorists
will gain control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The trend is transparent
enough: terrorist activity within Pakistan is escalating and getting deadlier.
Further, it is worth mentioning that Pakistan has paid a heavy price for its
involvement in this war by providing support, training and financial aid to
the terrorist outfits operating on its soil. An advertisement placed in The
Wall Street Journal marking the 10th anniversary of 9/11 stated: “Since
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PAKISTAN’S ROLE IN THE WAR ON TERROR
2001, a nation of 180 million has been fighting for the future of world’s 7
billion. Can any other country do so? Only Pakistan.”29According to
official estimates, 21,672 Pakistani civilians have lost their lives or have
been injured since 9/11 in 3,486 bomb blasts, including 283 suicide
attacks. 2,795 soldiers of the Pakistani Army have been killed and 8,671
wounded. In addition to the high human cost, the “war on terror” has
internally displaced 3.5 million people and resulted in the economic loss
of $68 billion.30 Terrorism, therefore, has been haunting Pakistan in a
Frankenstein-like manner.
Pakistan began as an unenthusiastic collaborator of the US in the “war on
terror” and failed to evolve as a progressive ally. The bin Laden
assassination in particular reveals Pakistan’s lack of commitment in living
up to the expectations of the US with regard to the “war on terror.”
Chirasree Mukherjee is a MPhil candidate in Foreign Policy at Institute
of Foreign Policy Studies. She earned her M.A. in International Relations
from Jadavpur University, with a specialization in Peace, Conflict and
Security. Her functional interests include international terrorism,
particularly the “war on terror,” and US foreign policy.
1
Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and
America’s War on Terror (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005), 217-236.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan at Crosscurrent of History (Lahore: Vanguard
Books Pvt. Ltd., 2004), 295-319.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Richard Jackson ed., Contemporary State Terrorism (London: Routledge,
2010), 119-140.
9
Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends
from Enemies,” The Washington Quarterly, Volume 34, No.1, Winter 2011,
149-162.
10
Ibid.
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CHIRASREE MUKHERJEE
11
Ibid.
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Abbas, 217-236.
15
“Pakistan assessment 2011,” South Asia Terrorism
Portal,www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/# (13 July 2011)
16
Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends
from Enemies,” The Washington Quarterly, Volume 34, No.1, Winter 2011,
149-162.
17
Ibid.
18
“India supporting militancy in Balochistan” The Express Tribune,
http://tribune.com.pk/story/60862/india-supporting-militancy-in-balochistanmusharraf/ (21 November 2012).
19
Richard Jackson ed., Contemporary State Terrorism (London: Routledge,
2010), 119-140.
20
Ibid.
21
Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends
from Enemies”, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 34, No.1 (Winter 2011),
149-162.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
“What the end of bin Laden means”, The Hindu, 3 May 2011.
25
Mariana Babar, “The False Prophets”, Outlook, 16 May 2011, 38-41.
26
Ali Abbas, “Pakistunned”, The Week, 15 May 2011, 42.
27
Babar,38-41.
28
“Pakistan making strides in the war on terror, say officials”, Straits,
http://www.nst.com.my/nst/articles/41kami1/Article... (12 August 2011)
29
Anita Joshua, “In a cleft stick”, Frontline, September 24-October 7, 2011,
http://www.flonnet.com/fl2820/stories/20111007282001600.htm (1 January
2012).
30
Ibid.
12
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