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Negotiation behaviour.
Dichotomy or continuum?
Saorín-Iborra, M. Carmen (2007). “Negotiation behaviour. Dichotomy or continuum?”.
EsicMarket, 129, pp. 125-152.
Abstract
Bearing in mind the importance of negotiation processes in today’s business world and how often they take place, this study focuses on the analysis of behaviour that can be adopted by negotiating parties, considered in
the literature to be a key factor in the success or failure of negotiations.
The aim is to propose a typology of behaviour that can be applied to any
situation involving negotiation. From a purposely critical perspective, the
existing ambiguity surrounding the nature of negotiation behaviour in
current literature is made clear. By putting forward four types of negotiation behaviour, the intention is to shed light on and unify the different theories presently circulating, whilst defending the exclusively tangible and
visible nature of negotiation behaviour and the possibility of adopting
intermediate types of behaviour, in contrast with the majority of previous
studies.
Keywords: Negotiation behaviour, collaboration, compromise, soft competition, competition.
JEL Code: M19, L29.
M. Carmen Saorín-Iborra
Departamento de Dirección de Empresas. Juan José Renau Piqueras. Universitat de València. Avda. Tarongers, s/n,
46022 Valencia. Tel nº: +34 96 382 83 12. Fax: +34 96 382 83 33. E-mail: carmen.saorin@uv.es
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negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
1. Introduction
Negotiation behaviour is regarded as a key factor in the development and
outcome of negotiations that are so common in today’s business world
(Rubin and Brown, 1975; Pruitt, 1981; Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Weiss,
1993, 1997; Sánchez, 2005). However, despite the clearly stated importance of negotiation behaviour, there is a certain ambiguity in the relevant
literature with respect to this concept and its nature.
The established dichotomy between the two general types of behaviour,
integrative and distributive or competitive, has been amply defended and
discussed. In my view, such a differentiation is overly simplistic and far
from represents the reality of the situation. Other types of behaviour exist
that come between these two extremes, thus establishing a continuum.
Negotiators present different types of behaviour during the negotiation
process, whose impact produces differing outcomes (Roure, 1997; Sánchez, 2005). I put forward a new typology of negotiation behaviour, proposing the existence of behaviour of an intermediate nature.
With this objective in mind, a definition is given of what should be
understood by negotiation behaviour to then go on to distinguish between this and other concepts. In doing so, the exclusively tangible and visible nature of negotiation behaviour is thereby justified. The second section
will focus on the various existing ideas on behaviour with this author’s
subsequent proposal on behaviour in business negotiations and their nature. In the following section, an empirical approximation is presented in
order to validate the behaviour typology proposal. The paper ends with
conclusions and a description of the main contributions to this study both
at an academic and professional level.
2. Negotiation behaviour: delimiting the concept
There are numerous existing definitions for negotiation behaviour, which
can be grouped into two different types depending on the extent of their
visibility. The first group of definitions, which are broad in nature, are
concerned with negotiation behaviour characterized both by tangible
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negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
aspects and by intangible ones. The following definitions are examples of
this type: “primary parties’ behaviours […] it includes cognitive domains
such as perception, information-processing and judgment” (Weiss, 1993;
p. 279); or “these behaviours can be described in detail. They manifest
themselves in attitudes, actions and styles” (Dupont, 1996; p. 48).
The second type of definition is of a more restrictive nature, as it only
includes visible and tangible aspects. Here, negotiation behaviour is characterized as the group of communicative tactics or actions that guides the
negotiator towards the other participants in the process (i.e. Adler et al.,
1992; Serrano and Rodriguez, 1993; Tiessen, 1996; Rao and Schmidt,
1998). Such communicative tactics can either be of the verbal kind or the
non-verbal kind (Graham, 1985; Adler et al., 1992).
According to Putnam (1990; p.15), negotiation behaviour is defined
thus; “tactics are the communicative behaviours that operationalize strategies”, while Rao and Schmidt (1998; p.666) state that “negotiator
behaviour is tactical […] negotiators attempt to achieve their firms’
goals by gaining their counterparts’ compliance through using influence
tactics”.
A clear distinction is thus established between tangible or visible
aspects and those of an intangible nature. However, the close relation that
exists between these aspects is also underlined. They consider the communicative tactics to be the fruit of intangible aspects (Rubin and Brown,
1975; Thomas, 1992; George et al., 1998).
In relation to this last idea, Thomas (1992) establishes that the creation
of expectations and the emotions experienced by parties involved in the
process of managing conflict pave the way for the appearance of intentions1, which are defined as reactions or decisions on how to act when a
conflict situation arises. These intentions will then lead to a decision on
what kind of behaviour to adopt and this will, in turn, produce particular
results that will constitute the basis for the creation of new expectations
and emotions, thus reinitiating the aforementioned cycle. Therefore, all
behaviour is a function of an intention2.
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08 127
(1) Thomas (1992)
makes the distinction
between five different
types of intention:
competition,
collaboration,
compromising,
accommodation and
avoiding.
(2) It has also been
described using other
terms such as attitude
(George et al., 1998;
Altimira, 2000) and
motivational orientation
(Rubin and Brown,
1975).
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(3) Individualism refers
to the quest for the
maximization of one’s
own outcomes in the
face of others’ interests,
while collectivism is the
desire to obtain positive
outcomes, not only for
one’s own interests but
also for those of other
interested parties.
negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
Although such a relation has been pointed out in a good number of studies, are few empirically contrasted studies that show the relation between intention and negotiation behaviour, although the works of Rubin and
Brown (1975) and Druckman (1994) are some exceptions.
Rubin and Brown (1975) show that motivational orientation on the
part of the negotiator, defined by them as a willingness to adopt one type
of attitude or another towards the opponent, influences both behaviour
and consequently the outcome of the negotiation. These authors thus
claim that motivational orientation can take the form of individualism or
go right to the other end of the scale and be characterized by cooperativism3.
Druckman (1994), by means of meta-analysis, concludes that the negotiator’s stance in relation to the opponent has a considerable influence on
the adoption of a behaviour of compromise.
Therefore, a relation exists between the tactical aspects (behaviour) and
those of an intangible nature (attitude or intention) as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Cycle leading to negotiation behaviour
Expectations
Intentions
Behaviour
Outcome
It is assumed in this study that, although there exists a relation between the two aspects (behaviour and intentions), what can be considered
negotiation behaviour should be clearly differentiated from what cannot
be thus described.
Lastly, it is also necessary to distinguish between negotiation behaviour
and other concepts such as strategy, approach, orientation or style of
negotiation.
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negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
08 129
As shown in Table 1, the concepts of strategy, approach and orientation have been used as synonyms. However, the greatest amount of confusion revolves around the use of the term style, as it has occasionally been
used in a similar sense to the previous concepts. On other occasions, it has
been endowed with a much wider meaning, including traits of a structural
kind, such as the size of the negotiating team (Tung, 1982; Graham and
Herberger, 1983; Paik and Tung, 1999).
Table 1. Concepts regarded as synonyms
CONCEPTS
PREVIOUS STUDIES (examples)
Strategy/ Approach
Campbell et al. (1988)
Strategy/ Orientation
Putnam (1990), Serrano and Rodríguez (1993), Graham et al.
(1994), Roure (1997)
Strategy/ Approach / Orientation
Lax and Sebenius (1986), Adler et al. (1992), Thomas (1992)
Strategy/ Style
Thomas (1992), Dupont (1996), Paik and Tung (1999), Nauta and Saunders (2000)
However, the concepts of strategy, orientation and approach are clearly
differentiated from that of negotiation behaviour (Putnam, 1990; Adler et
al., 1992; Dupont, 1996; Yuan, 1998, Rao and Schmidt, 1998). For example, Putnam (1990; p. 15) states that behaviours “ […] reveal a bargainer’s
intentions […]”. In the opinion of Yuan (1998; p. 73): “the negotiation
strategy […] refers to the overall game plan that negotiators employ to
accomplish their goals. Tactics are generally considered the components of
the strategy. They are the communicative behaviours that operationalize
strategies in the bargaining process”.
Rao and Schmidt (1998; p. 666) point out that “[…] An array of behavioural tactics are used in negotiations regardless of the negotiators’ general strategy […]”.
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negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
(4) Integrative
orientation has also
been called value
creation (Lax and
Sebenius, 1986; Roure,
1997), problem-solving
(Campbell et al., 1998;
Graham et al., 1994),
cooperative (Graham et
al., 1988; Dupont, 1996;
Yuan, 1998; Tjosvold et
al., 1999), win/win
situation (Zhao, 2000;
Altimira, 2000),
compromise (Druckman,
1994) and negotiation of
“satisfactory agreement”
(Sánchez, 2005).
Meanwhile, the
distributive strategy or
approach has also been
described as competitive
(Pruitt, 1981; Graham et
al., 1988; Tiessen, 1996;
Roure, 1997; Yuan,
1998; Tjosvold et al.,
1999), as reclaiming
value (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Roure,
1997), win/lose
situation (Zhao, 2000;
Altimira, 2000),
individualist (Graham et
al., 1998; Graham et al.,
1994), confrontation
(Dupont, 1996) and
non-compromise
(Dupont, 1994).
Therefore, the concept of negotiation strategy can be compared to that
of intention proposed by Thomas (1992). In this sense, negotiation behaviour corresponds to intentions, approaches, strategies or general negotiation orientation, but is also separate from them.
[130]
3. A proposal on negotiation behaviour
Despite the difference that exists between the concepts of negotiation behaviour and negotiation strategy, separating the two when analyzing the relevant literature is not always an easy task. In studies that focus on negotiation behaviour as a key factor in the interactive negotiation process, one sees
that this factor has been analyzed with reference to strategies or intentions
and not through the actions or communicative tactics that make it up.
Thus, two extreme types of orientation or general negotiation strategies can be established: integrative and distributive (Walton and Mckersie,
1965; Rubin and Brown, 1975; Pruitt, 1981; Fisher et al., 1983)4.
Integrative strategy is that which searches for reconciliation between
the interested parties, attaining joint benefits or win/win objectives via the
free exchange of information and joint decision-making (Walton and
Mckersie, 1965). This means that it 1) focuses on the interests of both
sides 2) does not imply confrontation, 3) is aimed at qualitative objectives
such as efficiency and fairness, 4) is based on sharing information in an
honest way and 5) its aim is to maximize benefits for all sides as an outcome of the negotiation (value creation) (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Tiessen,
1996). So, integrative strategy of negotiation eases to build a trust relationship and to achieve long term compromise (Rubin and Brown, 1975;
Pruitt, 1981; Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Saorín, 2006). Adopting this type
of negotiation style is key in negotiation such as relational sales (Román,
2005) or strategic alliances (Menguzzato, 1992; Saorín, 2006). The reason
is that in these negotiation situations, to achieve a mutual satisfactory relationship or agreement for long term is essential.
On the other hand, a distributive strategy or orientation 1) focuses on
coming out on top in the negotiation, 2) implies confrontation, 3) inclu-
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08 131
negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
des concealing information, 4) is aimed at quantitative objectives and 5)
attempts to maximize benefits or work in the interests of only one of the
negotiating parties (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Tiessen, 1996). Adopting this
type of negotiation strategy hinders to achieve agreements. But in case of
achieving an agreement, it will not be based on a long term compromise
(Lax and Sebenius, 1986; O’Connor and Arnold, 2001; Munduate and
Medina, 2005)
Although the majority of studies refer to these two extremes, there are
others that establish intermediate stances in an attempt to make a break
with the integrative/distributive dichotomy. The dual model of Pruitt
(1983) and that of Thomas (1992) particularly stand out in this sense, as
they have served as the basis for subsequent studies. While the former
model focuses on the processes of negotiation, the latter deals with the
wider field of the processes of conflict management.
Pruitt’s dual model (1983) lays down the distinction between four possible negotiation strategies (as previously mentioned, this is a term he uses
to describe the intentions that lead to possible negotiation behaviour) in
two dimensions; concern about the other side’s outcome and concern
about one’s own outcome. This means of classifying would give the results
shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Pruitt’s dual model
Negotiation strategy
Concern about the other side’s outcome
Concern about one’s own outcome
Problem Solving
High
High
Contending
Low
High
Yielding
High
Low
Inaction
Low
Low
Source: Based on Pruitt (1983).
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(5) Assertiveness is
defined as “the extent to
which the party attempts
to satisfy his or her own
concerns and
cooperativism as the
extent to which the party
attempts to satisfy the
other’s concerns”
(Thomas, 1992; p. 668).
(6) Negotiation is a
means of resolving
conflict; therefore
Thomas’ model is
applicable to the analysis
of the processes of
negotiation.
negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
“Problem solving involves an effort to find an alternative that is acceptable to both parties; contending involves an effort to force one’s will on
the other party; yielding involves a reduction in one’s basic aspirations;
and inaction involves doing as little as possible in the negotiation” (Pruitt,
1983; p. 167).
For his part, Thomas (1992) proposes a model of five intentions or
orientations set in two dimensions: the assertiveness and cooperativism5
shown by each party involved in the process of conflict management6
(Figure 2).
Figure 2. Model of intentions
Assertiveness
132 08
Competing
Collaborating
Compromising
Avoiding
Acommodating
Cooperativism
Source: Based on Thomas (1992).
Competing “represents an attempt […] to satisfy one’s own concerns at
the other’s expense”, while collaborating “represents an attempt to fully
satisfy the concerns of both parties to achieve an integrative settlement”.
Accommodating “involves an attempt to satisfy the other’s concerns at the
neglect of one’s own”, avoiding “reflects a desire to ignore or neglect the concerns of both self and other”, and compromising is understood as “midway
between competing and accommodating” (Thomas, 1992; p. 668, 669).
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negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
Both classifications of intentions cited here are very similar. Their
equivalents would be: competing/contending, accommodating/ yielding,
avoiding/inaction and collaborating/ problem solving. The only intention without equivalent is that of compromising that appears in Thomas’
model (1992) but is not expressed in Pruitt’s dual model (1983). However, the intentions of avoiding and accommodating cannot lead to negotiation behaviour as they include the non-fulfilment of some of the defining traits of the whole process of negotiation7. In the case of
accommodating, the characteristic of the tension caused by creatingreclaiming value is not fulfilled, whilst in the case of avoiding, the traits
of the will to arrive at an agreement and the reclaiming-creating value
tension are not present. It can therefore be suggested that the models of
Pruitt and Thomas should be reduced to two or three negotiation intentions or strategies, respectively, with a view to applying them to the
analysis of negotiation.
Although negotiation intention or strategy can help us to understand
the type of behaviour adopted we propose that it is exclusively characterized by tangible aspects. Therefore, it is the visible aspects that should be
analyzed. It is worth pointing out at this stage, that studies that analyze
the tangible nature of negotiation behaviour are few and far between. The
works of Graham (1985), Adler et al., (1992) and Rao and Schmidt
(1998) are notable exceptions and studies by Lewicki and Robinson
(1998), Volkema (1999) Volkema and Leme Fleury (2002) and Elahee et
al. (2002) might also be included in this rather short list.
When analyzing intracultural negotiations,8 Graham (1985) studies
verbal and non-verbal behaviour shown by negotiators. Verbal communication is measured using twelve different categories9, the number of times
the word “NO” is used and the degree of concession, measured by comparing the first offer and the initial concession. With regard to non-verbal
tactics, coordination in communication is analyzed through the studies of
periods of silence and the overlapping of conversations, glances at the
opponent (length) and moments of physical contact.
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08 133
(7) It is said that
negotiation has seven
defining characteristics:
relation of
interdependence,
interests of a mixed
nature, the will on both
sides to reach an
agreement, expectations,
communicative
interaction, participation
of at least two parties
and the tension of
reclaiming-creating value
(combination of
movements aimed at
achieving one‘s own
interests and movements
aimed at arriving at an
agreement which would
mutually benefit all
sides).
(8) These were carried
out through simulations
of intracultural,
commercial negotiations
(buyer/seller) between
businesspeople from
three different countries
(U.S., Japan and Brazil).
(9) Definitions of the
proposed categories
(Graham, 1985, p. 88)
are:Promise: A statement
in which the source
indicated his intention to
provide the target with a
reinforcing consequence
which source anticipates
target will evaluate as
pleasant, positive, or
rewarding.
Threat: Same as promise,
except that the
reinforcing consequences
are thought to be
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negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
noxious, unpleasant, or
punishing.
Recommendation: A
statement in which the
source predicts that a
pleasant environmental
consequence will occur
to the target. Its
occurrence is not under
the source’s control.
Warning: Same as
recommendation, except
that the consequences
are thought to be
unpleasant.
Reward: A statement by
the source that is thought
to create pleasant
consequences for the
target.
Punishment: Same as
reward, except that the
consequences are
thought to be unpleasant.
Positive normative
appeal: A statement in
which the source
indicates that the target’s
past, present, or future
behaviour was or will be
in conformity with social
norms.
Negative normative
appeal: Same as positive
normative appeal, except
that the target’s behaviour
is in violation of social
norms.
Commitment: A
statement by the source
to the effect that its future
bids will not go below or
above a certain level.
Self-Disclosure: A
statement in which the
source reveals
In order to analyze negotiation behaviour Adler et al. (1992) used the
findings from the previous study but added an extra category, which is the
number of times the word “YOU” is employed. In addition, they analyze
negotiation strategy, thereby demonstrating the distinction between the
concepts of strategy and behaviour.
Both studies cited above, extreme integrative behaviour (problem solving)
is characterized by the existence of a high frequency of questions and personal revelations, and by a low frequency of threats, promises, commitments,
punishments, demands and rewards. These last categories are more typical of
the opposite type of behaviour. In relation to non-verbal tactics, integrative
behaviour is characterized, above all, by the low frequency of the use of the
words “NO” and “YOU”, by the high level of coordination in the conversation (existence of periods of silence and reduced overlapping), by the high
degree of glances at the opponent and by the low degree of physical contact.
Rao and Schmidt (1998) also study negotiation behaviour from its tangible conceptualization. However, their analysis is carried out in a different way from previous studies. In this case, the authors base their ideas
on the classification of communicative tactics proposed by Kipnis and Schmidt (1985)10.
As previously mentioned, from amongst the studies that analyze negotiation behaviour via the tactics employed, studies by Lewicki and Robinson (1998), Volkema (1999), Volkema and Leme Fleury (2002) and Elahee et al. (2002) are also worthy of note. The last three are based on the
proposal put forward by Lewicki and Robinson (1998), in which group
negotiation behaviour (tactics) under general headings: bluffing, misrepresentation of the firm’s position to an opponent, traditional competitive
bargaining, attacking the opponent’s network and inappropriate information gathering. It is fair to suggest that previous proposals from Graham
(1985) and Adler et al. (1992) are reflected within these groupings.
In this research, adopting and defending the existence of intermediate
stances in negotiation behaviour11 and its tangible nature, four types of
behaviour are proposed that negotiators could predominantly adopt in
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negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
their interaction12: collaboration, compromise, soft competition and competition (Figure 3). The names chosen for each type of negotiation behaviour reflect the importance endowed in this study to the contributions of
the models of Pruitt (1983) and Thomas (1992) to the literature on negotiation and, in particular, to the typology proposed herein. Thus, collaboration is associated with an extreme integrative strategy. Competition is
the type of behaviour based on a highly distributive orientation or highly
competitive intention. With respect to intermediate behaviour, while compromise implies the adoption of an integrative approach, though not to
such an extent as in collaboration, soft competition involves less competitive orientation than competition. This is how the proposal of a continuum of behaviour can be presented in contrast to the widely supported
dichotomy that appears in previous studies.
Figure 3. Proposal on negotiation behaviour
Competitive
Orientation
Competition
Soft
Competition
Pure Competitive
Behaviour
Integrative
Orientation
Compromise
Collaboration
Pure Integrative
Behaviour
As previously pointed out, although intention can help us to anticipate and understand the type of behaviour adopted by negotiators, it is not,
in itself, a sufficient indicator. In reality, it is tactics that delimit different
kinds of behaviour. Therefore, using the studies by Graham (1985) and
Adler et al. (1992) as a starting point, my proposal on negotiation behaviour is characterized as shown in Table 3.
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08 135
information about itself.
Question: A statement in
which the source asks
the target to reveal
information about itself.
Command: A statement
in which the source
suggests that the target
perform certain
behaviour.
(10) They distinguish
between three megacategories of tactics of
influence: “hard”, “soft”
and “rational”. Hard
tactics of influence
include threats, demands
and sanctions. Those of a
soft nature are those that
emphasize friendship (for
example
explanations or
questions) and those of a
rational kind aim to gain
the acceptance of the
counterpart and
suppose a mixture of the
previous two.
(11) Other authors who
support the idea of
intermediate positions
are Fisher et al. (1983),
Lax and Sebenius (1986),
Putnam (1990), Serrano
and Rodríguez (1993),
Roure (1997), Rao and
Schmidt (1998).
(12) In all negotiation,
each side adopts different
types of behaviour,
although there is always
one which predominates
during the process
(creating-reclaiming
value tension) (Lax and
Sebenius, 1986;
Putnam, 1990; Roure,
1997; Sánchez, 2005).
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negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
Table 3. Nature of proposed negotiation behaviour
Frequency
Collaboration
Compromise
Soft
Competition
Competition
Questions
High
Medium
Low
Low
Explanations
High
Medium
Low
Low
Personal disclosures
High
Medium
Low
Low
Treatment of key issues
High
Medium
Low
Low
Threats
Low
Low
Medium
High
Refusals
Low
Low
Medium
High
Conversational Overlaps
Low
Low
Medium
High
Demands
Low
Low
Medium
High
Unforeseen interruptions
Low
Low
Medium
High
Tactics
(13) Effective
communication involves
a higher frequency of
questions, explanations
and personal
disclosures, as, through
these tactics,
information is better
obtained and
transmitted.
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Collaboration implies sharing information in an open, clear, honest,
complete manner. It is a type of behaviour that implies establishing effective communication between all sides (obtaining and transmitting information)13.
Competition implies that a negotiator can hide the maximum amount
of information, and in particular basic information. In this situation, the
communication established is ineffectual.
In between these two types of behaviour, are those of Compromise and
Soft Competition. Compromise is similar to the behaviour associated with
collaboration, but the communicative effectiveness and mutual knowledge reached between sides is less than in the case of collaboration. Information is shared in an open, fairly clear, honest way.
On the other hand, Soft Competition, from its conceptualization as distributive or intermediate competitive behaviour, implies establishing rea-
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negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
08 137
sonably ineffective communication. It involves the biased hiding of information on basic aspects.
4. Empirical approximation
4.1. Methodology justification
Although this research has been proposed more as a theoretical contribution, a first empirical approximation was carried out in order to validate
the behaviour typology. A series of case studies were analyzed in relation
to three negotiation processes of external growth strategy. It should be
noted that this choice is based fundamentally on two aspects. The first is
due to the requirements of a qualitative study. The objective is the analysis of behaviour and, more precisely, negotiation behaviour. Therefore, in
order to attain this objective, emphasis is placed on answering questions
such as how? and why? As stated by Eisenhart (1989), Yin (1994, 1999)
and Hurley (1999) among others, the use of case studies is the most suitable qualitative methodology, in particular because it allows the researcher to study a phenomenon as a dynamic process within its own context.
The second aspect stems from an attempt to avoid the limitations presented by other methodologies used in the analysis of negotiation behaviour,
such as laboratory experiments. Although it is clear that extremely valuable conclusions can be drawn from this type of analysis, they also represent controlled situations that may not entirely reflect real life. The aim of
this study is therefore to carry out an empirical analysis that is appropriate, not only according to the phenomenon itself, but also from the perspective of real situations and contexts. It should be pointed out, however,
that this makes the study of non-verbal characteristics impossible as there
has been no direct observation of the negotiation processes.
From amongst the possible business negotiation situations that might
have been used for this analysis, acquisition negotiations were chosen, as
these have been seldom analyzed due to the lack of information provided
by top management of firms involved in negotiation processes, a challenge addressed in this empirical approximation.
january · april 2008 · esic market
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negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
The information obtained through interviews with high-ranking managers, key participants in negotiation processes. The chosen number is based on
previous studies such as those by Weiss (1987, 1990) or Yan and Gray (1994).
Characteristics of the firms involved, along with the particularities of
the information gathering process are shown in Table 4. For reasons of
confidentiality, real names of firms and individuals do not appear.
4.2. Procedures for gathering, assessing and validating information
A story telling (Douglas, 1985) approach was used for the interviews, in
which interviewees were asked to recount how the negotiation developed,
which tactics were mainly adopted and which aspects or key factors affected the final outcome. However, this does not imply that the interviewer
took on the role of a passive listener. Indeed, in the terms used by Douglas
(1985) a creative strategy was employed for these sessions. He stated that
“creative interviewing […] involves the use of many strategies and tactics
of interaction, largely based on an understanding of friendly feelings or
intimacy, to optimize cooperative, mutual disclosure and a creative search
for mutual understanding” (Douglas, 1985; p. 25).
Previous to the interviews, as much information as possible was gathered on the cases by looking at the firms’ web pages and studying
newspaper reports as a way of better understanding the context of the
negotiation process.
The interviews, which were recorded in their entirety and later transcribed verbatim, focused on a series of topics including; attitudes of the
negotiators, the type of communication established (exchange of information), the relationship created between the parties involved in the negotiation, and the evolution both of attitudes and of the nature of the information being exchanged. However, for the purposes of this study, the data
obtained was placed into three main categories: 1) negotiation strategy, 2)
negotiation tactics and 3) negotiation behaviour and its evolution.
It should be noted that the information obtained from the interviews
was verified on three fronts. On the one hand, external documentation
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negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
was revised and analyzed. It was then verified by checking internal documentation, with the exception of one case, and then contrasted with the
opinions of interviewees from the firms involved.
Assessment was carried out on all categories upon which information
was based. In this sense, interviewees were asked their opinion regarding
a series of topics related to all the previously indicated categories (table 5).
All the information was analyzed using the methodology proposed by
Miles and Huberman (1984). Mainly seven-point semantic scales14 were
used. An expert on the topic was given transcripts of the interviews and
subsequently validated the assessments. The validation procedure used
was the same as that proposed by Larsson and Finkelstein (1999).
4.3. Assessment outcomes
Although this study is based on the analysis of negotiation behaviour via
the tactics that constitute it, with a view to seeing the extent of the presence of the relation with strategies, analysis begins by assessing exactly
what these intentions were. Using the information from the interviews, the
tactics used in each case are subsequently identified. Due to limitations of
space, we will now present the most relevant information used for our
assessment.
08 139
(14) They were used
with a view to reflecting
the perceptions or
opinions of interviewees
more exactly. Each
semantic point on the
scale corresponded to
the following
assessment: very low,
low, medium-low,
medium, medium-high,
high and very high.
Acquisition 1
Two stages can clearly be distinguished in which negotiation behaviour
presents marked differences. During the first stage, the climate surrounding the negotiation was extremely tense and conflictive. Despite the
willingness on both parts to reach an understanding, there was obvious
pressure to achieve their own interests. Indeed, it was stated that one of
the sides adopted particularly belligerent behaviour during the first stage
of the negotiation process.
The exchange of information was not the cause of the climate created.
In this case, all the necessary information was at the disposal of both negotiating parties. Moreover, no additional information was required. On
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[139]
140 08
(15) An agreement was
reached regarding the
organizational chart
(managerial structure),
the equation of the deal
and the degree of
participation of the
acquired firm. At the
same time, a consensus
was reached on
establishing a series of
limitations as to the
maximum percentage of
shares that could be
owned by each holder
(33%), along with the
establishment of
sanctions that could be
enforced for infringing
this agreement.
[140]
negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
another note, consultants were used to see through the operative side and
produce an agreement. In other words, they were given the responsibility
of establishing the equation of the deal, subsequently presenting the agreement so that all stakeholders could approve it. The tense situation at the
beginning was due to existing differences on the desirability of carrying
through the acquisition at all, so that only one firm would be bidding for
the contract offered by firm A’s main client. The two sides held different
viewpoints on the situation of the water market.
Therefore, in this negotiation process, there were many ups and downs
and a good deal of tension although, in the last year (the negotiation process lasted a total of two and a half years), after a change of management
in firm A, development of the process was far more amicable, reaching an
agreement after six months following the shake-up. Managers who took
part in the interviews expressed the view that trust between the two sides
increased during this last period.
Topics discussed during negotiation were the key ones, according to
the interviewees15. Participation percentages and the code of conduct for
members of the Board of Directors became two sources of grave disagreement. In relation to the tactics employed, they were regarded as fairly
negative, as indicated at the start. This could even have resulted in both
companies presenting a bid for the contract, endangering firm A’s chances
of renewing their major contract, with serious repercussions for the survival of the firm. At the same time, little was given away due to the attitude of either side as to their position. However, the changes in management
brought about more of a consensual perspective and the more negative
tactics (demands, threats) gave way to a healthier exchange of information, personal disclosures and explanations.
Acquisition 2
According to the interviewees, the climate created was cordial along the
process (six months). In this sense, it was stressed that the culture of the
Americans was a key factor as it is characterized by a tendency towards
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negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
08 141
formality and good manners in this context. It was also underlined that,
previous to starting negotiations, the Managing Director of the area of
expansion of firm C had already made contact with the other party, and a
climate of understanding or mutual interest could be perceived, in which
positions could be seen as relatively in line with one another. Firm C produced an initial project with clear objectives and action plans to be implemented, supposing an agreement was reached. Moreover, in the opinion of
the interviewees, only certain differences arose among managers that were
retained from the acquired firm several months after the agreement was
reached with regard to the departure of the Commercial Director who had
held the post of treasurer prior to the acquisition.16.
There had been a markedly rich exchange of information. Right from
the beginning, there was a fair amount of access to relevant information
on firm D, such as monthly reports and all kinds of documentation relative to topics that most concerned the acquirer firm or which they wished
to analyze.
In addition, information provided by firm C also played an important
role right from the start of the negotiation. Information was provided on
a wide range of topics related to all the functional areas and on the preestablished objectives and action plans that had been laid down for implementation once the agreement was signed and the firm had been acquired17.
With regard to the topics discussed during the negotiation, it was stated that all key areas of the operation were discussed, establishing review
clauses that depended on the existence of due diligence that the terms of
the agreement would be honoured18. Although the choice of a Managing
Director and “controller” occurred after the signing of the agreement,
firm C had already expressed its interest in the human capital possessed
by firm D during the negotiation stage. Therefore, discarding personnel
from the acquired firm was not among the objectives of firm C. On the
contrary, they were counting on the continuation of all of firm D’s human
resources after the acquisition19.
(16) This last piece of
information was
essential for the
assessment of
negotiation strategy.
(17) For example the
number of new antennae
that would have to be
erected as established,
along with the maximum
percentage of missed
calls, the new design for
mobile phones, new call
tariffs, market
objectives, advertising
campaigns etc.
(18) Thus an agreement
was reached in terms of
the price of the
acquisition and the form
of payment (in cash), the
state of the firm’s
facilities and a range of
contingencies that might
arise later on were
reflected in clauses
established in a
pre-contract.
(19) The only changes
that were made were that
the highest ranking
representative of firm D
was named as President
and the Financial
Director was made Head
of the Department for
New Development. The
new Managing Director
was named from the
acquirer firm and the
Control Department
Manager or
(”controller”) also came
from among the
managers at firm C.
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[141]
[142]
ACQUISITION 3
ACQUISITION 2
ACQUISITION 1
Case
FIRM F
FIRM E
FIRM D
FIRM C
FIRM B
FIRM A
Firm
Interviewees: 4 (Top management)
Feedback with interviewees
Feedback with interviewees
Objective: to increase the size of the company and create greater opportunities for the firm’s professionals
Nationality Spanish
Geographical area of activity: regional
Interviews were recorded
1.5 hours per interview
Objective: growth in the Spanish market (in particular in the Valencia area)
35 employees. Turnover: approx. 2 million euros
Interviewees: 2 (Top management)
Geographical area of activity: national
Financial and legal consultancy sector
Type of interview: individual (2)
Nationality Spanish (though the owners are a U.S. multinational corporation)
1.000 employees. Private company. Turnover: approx 96 million euros
Financial and legal consultancy sector
Objective: to withdraw investment from a non-profitable business
Geographical area of activity: national
Nationality Chilean (although the company was the property of an American consortium)
Interviews were recorded
2.5 hours per interview
618 employees. Private company. Turnover: approx. 66 million U.S. dollars
Interviewees: 3 (Top management)
Objective: entry into the telecommunications sector in a new Latin American country (Chile)
Telecommunications sector
Type of interview: individual (2) and group (1)
Geographical area of activity: national and international
Feedback with interviewees
Interviews were recorded
Nationality Spanish
30.000 employees. Private company. Turnover: approx. 14000 million euros
Generation and distribution of electrical power
Objective: to bid for and win a contract for managing water services with firm A’s main client
Geographical area of activity: regional
Nationality Spanish
370 employees. Private company. Turnover: approx. 43 million euros
Water sector, treatment and installation of purifiers
client
Objective: to avoid competitionin bidding for the renewal of a contractwith its main, and almost exclusive 2 hours per interview
Type of interview: individual (3) and group (1)
Geographical area of activity: mainly regional (minimal presence in Latin America)
Information gathering
Nationality Spanish
1300 employees. Private company. Turnover: approx. 120 million euros
Water sector, treatment and installation of purifiers
Firm characteristics and acquisition objectives
Table 4. Characteristics of participating firms and procedure for gathering information
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negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
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negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
08 143
The negotiating sides were constant in the behaviour shown. Just as the
interviews indicated, this was in accordance with the tactics that predominated throughout the negotiations which included questions, personal
disclosures, responses and explanations of everything that both sides desired or needed to know. Negative responses occasionally cropped up at
particular moments of the negotiation but these were minimal.
Acquisition 3
A reasonably relaxed climate was indicated particularly during the first
stage of approximation in which information was willingly provided.
The interviewees expressed the opinion that this process was characterized by a clear desire for understanding on both sides, which allowed the
occasional discrepancy to be overcome without excessive problems. At
times where there was tension, explicit mechanisms were used to solve any
rifts. They opted to delay a decision on those occasions and a proposal
was made on the terms under which an agreement could later be reached.
A cordial, good-natured relationship was never jeopardized, despite the
fact that the sides did not coincide on some points. Negotiations were
aimed at creating a relationship of trust. A key factor here was the existence of previous personal and professional relationships that already existed between the interviewees.
Another important trait that was stressed during the interviews was the
free exchange of information that increased at later stages in the negotiation. The process was carried out with complete transparency on both
sides, with a view to creating a balance between the two parties.
This assessment was ratified when it was indicated that all the key
topics related to the operation were treated in as much depth and detail as
possible, as both sides considered that a correct analysis of each others’
concerns was fundamental to the success of the relationship20.
Finally, with regard to tactics, all those interviewed did not hesitate in
replying that throughout the process (which lasted two and a half
months), a great deal of questions, personal disclosures, responses and
january · april 2008 · esic market
(20) Interviewees stated
that discussion took
place on topics such as
financing, production,
organization, power,
strategy, salaries,
management, human
resources, decisionmaking, etc.
[143]
144 08
negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
explanations were discussed and no threats, refusals or demands were present at any moment, as they both regarded this as an erroneous way to
conduct a negotiation aimed at mutual understanding and long-term commitment. Having an extremely clear professional career plan for the acquired firm’s human resources was essential to this process, particularly due
to their key role. It was of utmost importance for personnel not to decide
to leave the company after the acquisition as theirs was a source of knowledge that was basic to creating the value involved in this acquisition operation.
Table 5. Assesment of categories
CASES ANALYZED
ACQUISITION 1
ACQUISITION 2
ACQUISITION 3
Medium
Very high
Very high
Yes
Yes
Yes
Willingness on both sides to search
for mutual understanding
Medium-low
Very high
Very high
Orientation towards the creation of
a relationship of trust
Medium-low
Very high
Very high
Evolution of negotiation behaviour
Yes
No
No
Reciprocal behaviour
Yes
Yes
Yes
NEGOTIATION STRATEGY
Perception of the degree of effective
communication
Discussion of key issues
NEGOTIATION TACTICS
Integrative (questions, explanations, From little to a good
Fairly frequent use
personal disclosures)
deal of use
Competitive (threats, refusals,
demands)
NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOUR
[144]
Common use
From marked to
scarce use
Low level of use
Absence of use
Soft competition to
compromise
Compromise
Collaboration
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negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
08 145
4.4. Pattern fit
As can be drawn from the assessments of the varying cases analyzed
herein, it can be observed that they all fit the expected patterns described
by the typology and accompanying characterization proposed in this
study. However, the results should be regarded with caution for two main
reasons. This is partly due to the number of negotiation processes studied
and also to the impossibility of analyzing behaviour through direct observation which would allow for the analysis of non-verbal tactics. However,
it can be suggested that these limitations do not affect the validity of the
results obtained.
Firstly, with regard to the proposed relationship between the type of
intention or strategy and behaviour (tactics), it has been observed that those of an integrative nature are linked with integrative tactics and are
directly proportional. In other words, in cases where a highly integrative
strategy has been adopted, it has been associated with collaboration behaviour (acquisition 3). In the case of a less marked integrative strategy, the
adopted behaviour was that of compromise (acquisition 2). Meanwhile, a
competitive strategy is associated with soft competition behaviour. From
all of this, it can be concluded that there is a direct relation between the
type of strategy adopted and negotiation behaviour.
Secondly, the validity of the proposal on characterization has been
analyzed in this study. As can be seen, the fit is equally present for the
negotiation processes studied herein. The use of integrative verbal tactics
(questions, explanations, personal revelations) is greater in cases of collaborative behaviour and this is less true for cases assessed as employing
behaviour based on compromise. On the other hand, verbal tactics of a
competitive nature (threats, refusals, demands) are not normally used,
though they may arise at certain points in the development of integrative
negotiations. It has been observed that in competitive negotiations, tactics
of this kind predominate and the use of integrative tactics is scarce. An
inversely proportional relation can also be observed between the use of
integrative and competitive tactics. The greater the use of integrative tac-
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[145]
146 08
negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
tics, the lesser the use of competitive strategies and vice versa. Thus, the
two types of pattern fit are confirmed in this empirical approximation.
The first is concerned with the relation between negotiation strategy or
intention and behaviour. The second confirmed pattern is linked to the
characterization proposal regarding the typology of negotiation behaviour
put forward in this study.
5. Conclusions
Although the importance of negotiation behaviour has been underlined
due to the influence it has over the success or failure of negotiations, a certain amount of imprecision is still to be found the literature, as pointed out
in the review section. This critical study focuses on the different existing
conceptions and characterizations of negotiation behaviour. It is my view
that behaviour is exclusively defined by tangible and visible aspects (communicative tactics or actions of a verbal and non-verbal nature), thereby
marking out a clear differentiation and delimitation with regard to the
concepts of strategy, approach, orientation and style of negotiation. These last concepts represent the intangible aspects that form the basis of
negotiation behaviour.
Whilst making a break with the widely supported integrative/distributive dichotomy appearing in previous studies, four types of negotiation
behaviour have been proposed that support the idea of the existence of
intermediate positioning. This proposal thus presents a continuum of
negotiation behaviour, from what is considered clearly delimited, purely
competitive behaviour to one which is entirely integrative. It contains a
typology that can be applied to any negotiation situation from a tangible,
visible perspective, which may help us to better understand negotiation
behaviour in determining the success or failure of a negotiation.
Although this study is intended to be, above all, a theoretical proposal,
its validity for negotiation behaviour and characterization has been tested.
Evidence suggests relation between negotiation strategy and the tactics
employed (behaviour).
[146]
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negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
08 147
It is necessary for future research, not only to empirically contrast this
proposal on negotiation behaviour, but also to analyze to what extent the
proposed continuum of behaviour corresponds to a continuum of different negotiation outcomes.
Another contribution is to be found in the methodology employed and
the type of negotiation process analyzed. Negotiation behaviour has been
mainly studied in the past via laboratory experiments under totally controlled conditions. Case studies, on the other hand, allow us to study
negotiation behaviour in a real context from a dynamic perspective. In
addition to this, the choice of the object of analysis should be underlined
in the context of acquisition negotiations; a situation that has received little attention on the part of researchers due to the difficulties involved in
accessing information from top level managers, who are key players in
such negotiations.
It is clear that the empirical analysis of the proposal contained in this
study is merely a first approximation. Broader analysis should be undertaken in future research, not only of a larger number of case studies across
different negotiation contexts, but even a subsequent empirical contrast of
a quantitative nature might be considered of the typology and characterization proposed here. Another project for the future might be to analyze
to what extent the continuum of the types of behaviour proposed correspond to a continuum of different situation outcomes. The relation between the type of negotiation behaviour and the final outcome is a line of research that goes further than the objectives laid down for this study though
it is considered to be of enormous interest and should be one of the questions that researchers should address in the future.
The contributions at a professional level are also important. In particular, it is worthwhile pointing out the usefulness of this proposal for business professionals when participating in a negotiation process. A successful outcome is the primary objective of all negotiators and therefore,
understanding the different types of behaviour they might adopt to this
end and which other negotiators may use, constitutes a fundamental pre-
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[147]
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negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?
mise. In this way, professionals can approach the problems that characterize these processes by anticipating conflicts that may arise and, consequently, adopt the type of behaviour suitable for each situation with a
view to putting the negotiation back on the right track towards a successful conclusion. This work might also lead us to reflect on the importance
of the choice of the negotiating team, as it should be made up of people
with the ability to be flexible with regard to the choice of the type of behaviour to adopt in a given process.
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