Should I stay or should I go?
The selectors’ dilemma in post-primaries voting strategy in Italy
Giulia Sandri, Université Catholique de Lille
Antonella Seddone, University of Turin
Paper for Presentation at the ESA Political Sociology Research Network Conference,
University of Milan, 30th November & 1st December 2012
Work in progress
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1. Parties, primary elections and primary voters
Most recent literature that analyzes parties from an organizational perspective focuses often
on the concepts of intra-party democracy and party organizational democratization (Scarrow,
1999; Scarrow and Kittilson, 2003; LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, 2002; Bosco and Morlino, 2007).
Le Duc (2001) and Rahat and Hazan (2007) underline that the most used instrument for
implementing this ‘democratization’ process is the enhancement of the inclusiveness of the
methods for candidate and party leadership selection. The actors endowed with candidate
and leader selection powers are the central actors in the functioning of the party according to
many authors (Gallagher and Marsh 1988, Marsh 1993; Massari, 2004; Hazan and Rahat,
2010). At the moment, the most inclusive method identified by the literature for selecting
candidates for elections or the party leader is represented by party primaries, i.e. internal
direct elections by party members and (sometimes) supporters and voters (Cross and Blais,
2008 and 2009; Kenig, 2009). Although the literature on primaries is quite extensive,
especially concerning the development of this instrument within the US political system (see,
for example, Ranney, 1972; Norrander, 1989; Palmer, 1997; Morton and Gerber, 1998;
Hopkin, 2001; Ware, 2002; Cohen et al., 2008) the analysis of the implementation of primary
elections outside the US and in particular within the European context is not equally
developed (Heidar and Saglie, 2003; Valbruzzi, 2005; Lisi, 2009; Wauters, 2009; Pasquino and
Venturino, 2009 and 2010; De Luca and Venturino, 2010, Seddone and Venturino, 2011).
Nevertheless, this instrument has been adopted by parties in several European countries such
as, for example, Finland, Denmark, France, Spain, Greece and Italy (Laurent and Dolez, 2007;
Lisi, 2009; Kenig, 2009; Mavrogordatos, 2005).
Primary elections are a recurrent theme in the debate about parties and their organizational
change (Gunther and Montero 2002; Wattemberg and Dalton 2000; Farrell and Webb 2000;
Mair 1994; Panebianco 1982) and on the personalization of politics (Calise 2007, 2000;
Poguntke and Webb 2007). Literature on party politics generally argues that primaries
represent a further step in the organizational evolution of political parties. Katz e Mair (1993,
1994; 1995; 2002; 2009) argue that parties have progressively and strategically reduced the
size of the “party on the ground”. The party in public office has taken over the organizational
role of mass membership. Political parties seem to find new legitimacy in the participation in
governments rather than in social integration and encapsulation: the result is a shift in the
mobilizing dynamic of intra-party politics. In this perspective, political parties have changed
their goals compared to the models of mass party theorized by Neumann (1956) and
Duverger (1961). The model of parties as instruments of social integration has been
reformulated within a new mobilizing strategy that goes beyond the traditional ideological
boundaries (Kirchheimer, 1966). Trying to attract the median voter (Downs, 1956), political
parties target their political message for all the electorate, adopting thus a catch-all approach.
The old organizational structures, rooted in the grass-roots membership and ideologically
distinctive, have been replaced by this new logic in the mobilization of party supporters. The
1
processes of party personalization and of professionalization in communication strategies
have been long described by party literature and have become the surrogate of the old
ideological party strength (Panebianco, 1982; Poguntke and Webb, 2005). This new tools for
mobilizing voters may allow to attract new quotas of the electoral market, but do not
guarantee a loyal and faithful electoral support (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000), thus affecting
negatively the transformation of voters into activists (Raniolo, 2004; 2006). Looking at
declining membership data and election turnout (Scarrow, 2000; Scarrow, 1996), it seems
that this new approach to electoral and party mobilization has entailed some problems in the
effectiveness of these mobilizing strategies (Mair and van Biezen, 2001). Furthermore, the
increasing diffusion of anti-party and anti-politics feelings among citizens and voters
strengthen the idea of a emerging deep gap between parties and their supporters (Bardi,
1996; Poguntke, 1996; Poguntke and Scarrow, 1996; Scarrow, 1996).
Primary elections can be considered as a tool used by parties in order to compensate the loss
of legitimacy towards the electorate, to regain political credibility and to attract new
supporters. Thus, parties are thought to provide more internal decision-making power to
their grass-roots members and supporters as an incentive to their own membership to
mobilize internally and to present a public image of being open and ‘democratic’ (Mair, 1994,
Seyd, 1999; Scarrow, 1999; Scarrow, Webb and Farrell, 2000). Primaries represent a new
pattern in the relationship between parties and their supporters. On the one hand, the
adoption of internal direct elections contributes to incentive the internal mobilization of
members already enrolled in the party, proposing new militant proceedings that in some way
could represent a re-edition of the traditional mobilizing strategies of mass-based parties. On
the other hand, primaries provide new opportunities for participation to those citizens less
inclined to intra-party, traditional activism. In fact, the open and inclusive character of this
instrument incentive new typologies of political participation, which do not require any
formal affiliation to the party, but instead develop an intermittent participative behaviour that
concerning in particular voters interested by cognitive mobilization (Dalton 2002; 1984). In
this perspective of political economy of leadership and candidate selection methods,
primaries are considered mainly as a tool used and promoted by parties with the specific goal
of building a new relationship with supporters that is subsequent to their own catch-all
electoral strategies.
The effects of the adoption of primary elections on parties’ electoral dynamics are highly
contested within the US literature on the subject. The debated question concerns the electoral
gain in promoting primaries. Some scholars argue that there is a trade-off between the
openness and inclusiveness of the candidate selection process and the electability of these
candidates, but the question of the negative impact in electoral terms of these inclusive
internal elections is still debated. The differences in the ideological positions of the general
electorate and the primary selectorate are thought to explain the argued negative effects in
electoral terms (Kaufmann et al., 2005; Norrander, 1989). The fact that the usually high
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turnout in primary elections could trigger an increase in the electoral consensus for the party
in general elections could be difficult to be valued by the general electorate (Adams and
Merrill, 2008). Other studies focus on the negative stance and the aggressive discourse of
primary campaigns. The mutual de-legitimization between primary candidates could disclose
and emphasize internal conflicts and unsolved rivalries with damages to parties’ electoral
performance: indeed, some supporters, after a negative campaign, could choose for defection
in elections (Djupe and Peterson, 2002; Haines and Rhine, 1998; Peterson and Djupe 2005).
Finally, other stances on this issue refer to the concept of divisiveness (Ware, 1979; Kenny
and Rice, 1984; Kenney, 1988; Atkeson, 1998; Hogan, 2003; Johnson et al., 2010; Makse and
Sokhey, 2010; Wichowsky and Niebler, 2010). Divisiveness in primary elections is thought
thus to demotivate party members and supporters.
Moreover, some authors have argued that primaries would weaken the mobilization potential
of rank-and-file members by diminishing their power of control on the party leadership (Katz
and Mair, 1995). Others have stressed that they would enhance participation of new
supporters that are not traditionally interested in intra-party participation (Heidar and Saglie,
2003). Studies showed that (open) primaries could negatively affect the loyalty of candidates
to the party, because the nomination is legitimated outside the latter and directly by primary
voters (King 1999; Hansolabehere et al. 2001; Hopkins 2001). Indeed, primaries represent a
new way for parties to distribute collective and selective incentives to members in order to
foster their participation, although this new balance of incentives could change (or even
damage) the relationship between grass-roots members and party leadership. In fact, party
organizational change generates potential conflicts between traditional party delegates,
activists and those with looser ties to the party. Including non-enrolled voters, supporters and
sympathizers in the decision-making process could weaken affiliated members’ rights and
privileges and thus the main incentives for their mobilization and involvement in party
activities. In the long run, the use of primary elections could disincentive internal
mobilization. In other words, primaries represent a participatory instrument characterized by
low marginal costs, but with significant implications on party organizational structures and
electoral performances. The idea is that divisiveness in primary elections could demotivate
party members and supporters. In fact the high level of competitiveness could affect the
electoral choices of the supporters of the losing candidate and even lead to their electoral
defection.
This paper focuses on the latter issue and particularly on the consequences of primary
elections for selecting candidates for office. The main research question of this study, thus, is
the following: how do selectors, namely primary voters, react to the defeat of their candidate
in primary elections? Will they support the winning candidates at the following general
elections? Or will they choose defection or abstention? The question appears to be relevant
not only for understanding the dynamics of primary elections and their consequences on
parties but also for analyzing the potential impact of this participatory instrument on
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electoral behaviour in general elections. Our research question is therefore built on the
literature on the political economy of candidate selection methods. We aim at exploring the
consequences of the use of primaries for selecting candidates on parties and particularly on
their electoral performance at subsequent elections as well as the potential disruptive impact
of this instrument on party internal cohesion.
2. Hypotheses, data and methodology
In order to address the main research question of this study, several aforementioned context
factors could be taken into account, among which the most relevant are the ideological
positioning and argued radicalism of primary voters and the degree of negativeness and
divisiveness of primary elections campaigns. Given that in this paper we focus on the electoral
behaviour and attitudes of the selectors, namely primary voters, we will develop our
preliminary exploration of the main determinants of their voting strategies at subsequent
elections on the basis of explanatory factors at individual level. Explanatory factors dealing
with individual level features of primary voters will be thus taken into account. In particular,
drawing on the US literature arguing that ideological extremism of primary voters impacts on
party electoral gain (or rather loss) in subsequent general elections, this study identifies as
main explanatory factors for accounting for voting strategies of primary voters the political
profile and ideological positioning of the latter.
The dependent variable of this study is thus represented by the attitudes of primary voters
towards the party, and in particular by their voting strategy in subsequent elections. This
variable is measured in a dichotomous way by looking at their declared intention to support
any chosen candidate or rather to defect and abstain from voting for the party in general
elections if the candidate they voted for in primary elections is not nominated. The main
independent variable of this study is represented by the political profiles of primary voters,
but in order to be exhaustive we also take into account more traditional variables such as the
socio-demographic features of the selectors. Therefore, our main hypothesis is that loyalty or
defection attitudes of selectors are determined primarily by their political profile. More
specifically, we hypothesize that more ideologically radical selectors will choose more
disruptive voting strategies in subsequent general elections, refusing to vote for any candidate
but the one they supported in primary elections. The adoption of open primary elections for
selecting candidates for office, by opening up the internal decision-making processes to
simple supporters and party voters, not only could generate conflicts between traditional
party delegates, activists and those with looser ties to the party, but also could impact
negatively on parties’ electoral performance. This is because primary voters are generally
considered to be more ideologically radical than the median voter and this extremism could
also impact on their evaluation of the outcomes of primary elections and on their voting
strategies at subsequent elections. More ideologically radical primary voters would be less
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likely to support a different candidate in general elections than the one they voted for at
primaries.
The formulation of our assumptions and hypotheses are primarily linked to the empirical
scope of this exploratory study. In order to assess our hypothesis, we rely on a case study. We
focus on the case of primary elections for selecting mayoral candidates in Italy. Centre-left
parties have organized primaries for selecting the party candidate for mayoral elections in
several major and middle-sized cities in Italy since 2005. Up to now, more than 400 primaries
have been organized since 2005 at local level for choosing the party candidate as mayor of the
city in more than 70 cities. The “Candidate and Leader Selection” (C&LS) standing group of the
Italian Political Science Association (http://www.candidateandleaderselection.eu/) has
organized exit poll surveys during several of these mayoral primary elections in order to
gauge the profiles, attitudes and behaviors of the selectors. All the primary elections surveyed
have been organized by coalitions of centre-left parties and in most cases primaries have been
promoted by the Partito Democratico (PD, “Democratic Party”), the main social-democratic
party in Italy, and its electoral allies at national and local level (usually the main Italian radical
post-communist left party, SEL “Left, Ecology and Freedom”, and either the small socialist
party and/or the left-wing populist party M5S “Five Star Movement”). In total, 20 exit poll
surveys have been realized in occasion of party primary elections held in several cities from
2005 to 2012. The size of the cities varies significantly, from very small ones (Oristano, 32.015
inhabitants) to very large ones (Milan, 1.348.769 inhabitants). Each survey is realized on the
basis of a sampling of polling places set up by the organizing parties. Therefore, in order to
develop a very preliminary exploration of the voting strategies of Italian primary voters at
subsequent (mayoral) elections, we rely on survey data collected between 2007 and 2012 on
selectors’ profiles, behaviors and attitudes.
Consequently, the formulation of the main hypothesis of the study is primarily linked to the
specific context of Italian politics. Although nowadays Italian political parties are overall
delegitimized and their image is significantly undermined by widespread anti-party attitudes,
they still exert a relevant influence in shaping voting behavior (Cotta and Verzichelli, 2007).
Several scholars have assessed the increasing dissatisfaction and lack of political trust of
Italian citizens (Cartocci, 2007) as well as the spreading of populism and anti-politics within
society. Nevertheless, the influence of Italian parties in determining voting choices and
political identity is still dominant (Bull and Newell, 2006; Mammone and Veltri, 2010). This
phenomenon could be considered as a legacy of the strong Italian mass parties from which
derived the current Italian political organizations. Widespread partisan identities and locally
rooted party organizational structures are still a relevant feature of Italian politics (Bartle and
Bellucci, 2008). This is mainly associated to the persistence of strong ideological ties to
mainstream parties. The voting behaviour in Italy appears to be less volatile than in other EU
member states and membership figures remain higher if compared to other European
countries (Van Biezen et al., 2011). Current Italian parties’ societal reach, either in activism or
electoral support terms, can thus be considered generally comparable to the social boundaries
of old mass parties. In other words, despite a generalized party crisis in terms of internal
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functioning and political trust, the traditional ideological bonds and partisan identification
patterns appear to be quite resilient and still primarily determine electoral loyalties.
In fact, during the First Republic, voting behaviour was characterized by strong party loyalty,
due to widespread ideologization of the electorate and the presence of strong political
subcultures - Christian democratic, Communist, Socialist, laic (Liberal and Republican), Neofascist and, up to the early 1950s, Monarchic. As far as dynamics of competition are
concerned, the First Republic featured a sort of ‘blocked democracy’, with extremely partial
alternation in office. This lead to the presence of territorially concentrated subcultures,
namely the Communist one in the regions dominated by the PCI (the “red belt”: Tuscany,
Emilia-Romagna and Umbria) and the Catholic one in the regions dominated by the DC (the
“white belt”: Abruzzo, Basilicata and Veneto). Except for the fact that Berlusconi’s parties
(Forza Italia, “Forward Italy” and later the People of Freedom) and the Northern League have
taken over the political space vacated by the dissolution of the Christian democratic party in
1993, similar patterns of partisan identity and voting behaviour are still relevant today (Cotta
and Verzichelli, 2007). The role of political culture, ideology and partisan identity in shaping
electoral behaviour remain salient in contemporary Italian politics.
Hence, our analysis aims at understanding which are the main features in terms of ideological
positioning, political culture and more generally of political profile among the selectors. The
aim is also to explore to what extent the variation in the selectors’ political profile could
contribute in explaining the voting strategy they choose in subsequent (mayoral) elections. To
what extent the political profile (and more specifically the ideological positioning) of primary
voters do influence their choice of electoral loyalty (or defection) to the party in the event of
the defeat of the candidate they support? What happen when the incentives associated with a
specific candidate appeal fade away in subsequent elections? Would the primary voters
choose loyalty to the party, supporting the selected candidate or would they choose defection
(not voting for their party) or abstention in subsequent elections? Firstly, we hypothesize that
loyalty attitudes in post-primary voting strategy are associated with a more structured
ideological identity and a stronger relationship with the party. Thus, enrolled members and
party supporters (namely selectors that have previously voted for the party) will remain loyal
to their party regardless the result of primary elections and would therefore vote for any
candidate selected through this instrument. Conversely, an attitude of defection would be
mainly associated to a weaker relationship with the party, and thus with primary voters that
are not party members or supporters and that in the event of the defeat of their preferred
candidate could more easily opt for defection in subsequent elections. Secondly, more
ideologically radical selectors will choose more disruptive voting strategies in subsequent
general elections, refusing to vote for any candidate but the one they supported in primary
elections.
We use a dataset composed by data collected on the basis of 8 exit-poll realized during 8
primaries for selecting the mayoral candidate of the centre-left coalition and promoted by the
Democratic Party. We have taken into account the exit poll data collected in a set of
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comparable cities both in terms of size and social structure. We have retained only the 8
biggest cities from the whole Candidate and Leader Selection (C&LS) dataset for
comparability reasons. Our dataset integrate a sample of around 16000 surveyed individuals.
The core questionnaire focused on three dimensions: the socio-demographic profile of
selectors, their political profile and their voting strategies in post-primary phase. The details
concerning the survey sample and the dataset are presented in Table11.
In particular, the dependent variable of this study, the selectors’ post-primary voting strategy,
is operationalized on the basis of a specific item in the questionnaire. The question asked to
the respondents was the following: “what will you do at local elections in case of defeat of you
candidate?”. Six response categories were presented to the respondents: “I am sure my
candidate will be selected”; “I will vote for any candidate of the Democratic Party even if
he/she is not the one I am supporting now”; “I do not know, it depends on who will win the
primaries”; “I will vote for another party”; “I do not know” and “I will not vote”. These
response categories have then be recoded into a dichotomous variable: 1=loyalty attitude,
considering all the selectors who declared their intention to support any candidate regardless
the result of primary contest; and 0= defection attitude, that consider all the selectors which
either were uncertain about their future voting strategy or showed a clear intention to vote
for other candidates or parties. Therefore, in this paper we provide a very preliminary,
exploratory account of the main determinates of the post-primary voting strategy of selectors
and thus of their loyalty/defection attitudes. We explore also their socio-political profile and
we try to determine the extent to which the matter impact on their voting strategies. After
providing a brief descriptive account of the main dependent and independent variables, we
will use an exploratory logistic regression in order to identify the main dimension that could
influence these two attitudes. Give that this is a first, preliminary exploration of the survey
data, the database has not been weighted yet.
Table1. Survey design
CITY
GENOVA
BOLOGNA
CAGLIARI
TORINO
MILANO
FIRENZE
BOLOGNA
GENOVA
TOTAL
YEAR
2012
2011
2011
2011
2011
2009
2009
2007
-
SAMPLE (N)
3800
1085
2272
2175
1407
1722
1388
2270
16119
FRAME (N)
25090
28120
5629
53185
67499
37468
24920
35296
277207
COVERAGE (%)
15,1
3,9
40,4
4,1
2,1
4,6
5,6
6,4
5,8*
Note: * = average value.
For further details concerning the dataset, the questionnaire and the polling stations sampling procedure
please visit the website of C&LS: http://www.candidateandleaderselection.eu/.
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3. Profiling selectors
In this paper we develop a preliminary assessment of the participatory dynamics entailed by
primary elections in Italy. If it is true that the primary electorate differ significantly from the
one mobilized in the general election (Pasquino and Venturino 2009; Kaufmann et al. 2003;
Ranney and Epstein 1966) then it is particularly relevant to assess the nature and rationales
of this variation. In fact, the differences in terms of socio-demographic and political profiles
between the two electorates could impact on the type of candidates selected through
primaries. Nevertheless, as underlined by Kaufmann et al. (2003) differences among
“selectors”, namely primary voters, and general elections voters are not that wide in case of
open primaries. Therefore, as primary elections for selecting the mayoral candidate in Italy
are open to party members, supporters and in general to the whole electorate of the party
promoting the consultation (PD or center-left coalition), we can expect that the socio-political
profile of these selectors would not vary significantly with regard to the one of the general
electorate of the center-left. Table 2 presents the data concerning the socio-demographic
profile of primary voters and their voting strategy in subsequent elections.
Gender represents the first indicator used to assess the profile of primary voters. From the
data presented in Table 2 we can see that our sample is consistent with previous literature on
primary elections in Italy. Male participation (51,7%) is higher than female one (48,3%).
Nevertheless, the dependent variable of this study vary substantially on the basis of gender:
among selectors choosing defection, 52,6% are women, conversely among loyalist men are
the majority (53,7%). The variation of post-primary attitudes in terms of voters’ age is even
stronger. Data reported in Table 2 show that primary elections indeed do mobilize different
generational cohorts. A quick overview of the table shows a prevalence of older voters not
only in the general sample but particularly among those selectors that remain loyal to their
party.
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Table 2. Contingency table: socio-demographic profile and voting strategy
Age*
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-64
>65
N
Gender*
Female
Male
N
Defection (%)
11,7
14,0
20,0
26,7
27,7
4034
Elementary
Junior High School
Education* High School
Higher Education
N
Manager, judge, university professor
Entrepreneur
Self-employed/Business owner
Professional (doctor, lawyer, etc.)
Teacher
Employee
Professional Worker
Status*
Temporary worker
Retired
Unemployed
Housewife
Student
Other
N
Never
2-3 times per year
Religious 1 time per month
practice** 2-3 times per month
Every week
N
Loyalty (%)
Total
7,1
8,7
11,7
12,6
15,2
16,9
36,1
32,7
29,9
29,1
7340
11374
52,6
47,4
5090
46,3
53,7
10762
48,3
51,7
15852
6,8
16,5
35,7
40,9
5133
6,1
2,1
3,8
11,1
12,0
16,0
4,4
1,6
22,4
2,9
4,2
9,9
3,6
4588
54,9
16,3
5,6
6,9
16,3
3466
10,3
18,5
36,8
34,4
10868
5,6
1,3
2,7
9,0
9,3
14,5
3,4
1,1
37,7
1,8
4,6
5,5
3,4
9218
55,0
17,6
5,7
5,7
16,1
7164
9,2
17,9
36,5
36,5
16001
5,8
1,6
3,1
9,7
10,2
15,0
3,8
1,2
32,6
2,2
4,4
7,0
3,5
13806
55,0
17,2
5,7
6,1
16,1
10630
Note. * = p <0.01; * = p = 0.089.
In fact, if we look at the differences between the two electoral strategies, we notice that
among loyalists there is an higher proportion of older selectors (66%) and this data could be
explained by looking at the professional status. One third of the sample is composed by
retired citizens. In Italy, older supporters tend to mobilize more in primary elections than
younger voters. Primaries, and in general any type of open and inclusive consultation,
represent a strategy promoted by parties to broaden their societal reach and to interact with
their base in order to compensate the weaker legitimacy triggered by anti-party feelings
(Bardi 1996; Poguntke 1996; Poguntke and Scarrow 1996). In other words, through the claim
9
of internal democratization parties try to strengthen (or to mend) the relationship with their
members and voters. Primaries appear thus to renew the traditional pattern of participation
typically associated with mass party organizations, deeply rooted within Italian society and
territory.
Even if open primaries’ aim is to mobilize less active supporters and sympathizers, those that
have weaker ties to party organization and that are less inclined to intraparty activism, this
kind of elections appears to be mobilizing mainly elderly voters. The older selectors are more
used to the forms of political participation promoted by parties than younger voters, usually
more apathetic with respect to conventional forms of political participation. Another indicator
that has to be considered in order to understand the dynamics of participation in primary
elections is the voters’ educational attainment. The data reported in Table 2 show quite
significant differences with regard to this variable. Considering the general sample, we can see
that almost 73% of selectors have a high school diploma. Moreover, among “defectionists”
there is a significantly higher proportion of college graduates (40,9%). Those selectors are
thus usually more oriented towards cognitive mobilization than towards more traditional and
structured form of political activism. These are citizens highly interested in politics but not
directly engaging in traditional forms of political activism. Therefore, it appears rather logical
that, in case of defeat of their candidate, the strategy they adopt is to not be involved further
in intra-party decision-making and activities nor to support the party candidate (that they did
not previously supported) in general elections. Finally, the religious element seem to be
irrelevant with regarding to post-primaries choices: the majority of the sample (55%) never
attends religious practice while no relevant variation between defectionists and loyalist
emerge with regard to this variable.
Table 3 presents the data concerning the political profile of the surveyed selectors. It is
interesting to note that 76,4% of the selectors have already participated to a primary election
(“Veterans”, while “Newcomers” are those voting for the first time in primary elections). If we
take into account the selectors’ post-primaries strategies, we can see that “Veterans” show
more loyal attitudes (82,5%) than those participating in primary elections for the first time.
Electoral behavior in general election appears not to vary significantly according to the
ideological positioning (self-placement) of the respondents. Unsurprisingly, we can see that
the sample is composed by a wide proportion of not enrolled citizens (78,6%), while selectors
formally enrolled in parties are less than a quarter of the sample (21,3%). Political activism
seems to be relevant in influencing loyalty or defection strategies in general elections. Among
loyalist, the proportion of enrolled members rises to 26%, with a variation of more than 5
percentage points from the general sample. Conversely, the proportion of non-members is
significantly higher among “defectionists” (87,2%), with a variation of slightly less than 10
percentage points to the general sample. Conversely, if we look at the post-primary strategies
of the supporters of the parties promoting primary elections– that is, those selectors that have
previous voted for this given party in general elections- the situation is less clear. There is a
higher proportion of PD supporters (65,5%) in the general sample, who represent also the
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most relevant group among loyalist (70,1%). Indeed, 39,5% of “defectionists” are voters
supporting other left-wing parties than PD.
Table3. Contingency table: political profile and voting strategy
Defection(%) Loyalty(%) Total
82,5
76,4
63,1
36,9
17,4
23,6
4925
10647
15572
Previous participation
to primary elections*
Veterans
Newcomers
N
Ideological selfplacement*
(1-5)
Left
Center-left
Center
Center-right
Right
N
48,2
38,6
9,8
2,3
1,0
4476
51,9
43,5
4,2
,3
,1
9179
50,7
41,9
6,0
1,0
,4
13655
Party Activism*
Not enrolled
PD member
Left-wing party member
Right-wing party member
N
87,2
9,2
3,4
0,2
5151
74,6
22,3
3,2
,0
10893
78,6
18,1
3,2
,1
16044
Party Supporter*
PD voter
Left-wing party voter
Abstention– Blank Ballot
N
55,1
39,5
5,4
4298
70,1
28,4
1,5
9978
65,6
31,7
2,7
14276
Note. * = p <0.01.
4. The main determinants of selectors’ voting strategy in subsequent elections
In order to explore the strength of the argued association between the political profile of
selectors and their loyal attitudes towards the party promoting primaries in the following
local elections we have simply analyzed how the two sets of variables correlates. Table 4
summarizes the correlation coefficients between post-primary strategies and socio-political
variables. Orientation towards defection or loyalty – in the hypothesis of defeat of the
supported primary candidate - appears to be significantly related to gender, age, and
educational level, previous experience in primary voting, ideological position, political
activism and electoral support to center–left parties in general elections.
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Table 4. Correlation matrix between voting strategy, socio-demographic profile and
political profile
Voting strategy
Gender
Education
Professional Status
Religious practice
Prev. participation
Age
R-L Self-placement
Party Activism
Party Supporter
(1)
(2)
(3)
1
,059**
-,076**
,006
-,009
,213**
,104**
-,109**
1
-,046**
,007
-,082**
,021**
-,058**
,019*
1
-,163**
-,041**
,082**
-,073**
,017*
,112**
,103**
-,162**
,012
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
-,022*
-,005
-,004
1
-,033**
,062**
,233**
1
-,162**
,111**
1
-,075**
1
-,053**
,020*
-,058**
-,108**
,010
-,041**
-,055**
,268**
,009
-,151**
-,060**
,065**
(10)
1
,034**
1
-,020*
Note. ** = p <0.01; * = p <0.05.
In order to develop further our analysis of the association between primary voters’ political
profile and their voting strategy in subsequent elections, we have also run an exploratory
logistic regression. This is a preliminary exploration of the main determinants of their voting
strategies at subsequent elections on the basis of explanatory factors at individual level.
Therefore, the data have been also modeled with logistic regressions in order to assess
whether our predictor variables significantly predicted whether or not a primary will develop
loyalty attitudes towards the party in subsequent elections2. For developing our exploratory
analysis, we relied on two hypotheses. Firstly, we hypothesized that loyalty attitudes in postprimary voting strategy are associated with a more structured ideological identity and a
stronger relationship with the party. Secondly, we argued that more ideologically radical
selectors will choose more disruptive voting strategies in subsequent general elections,
refusing to vote for any candidate but the one they supported in primary elections. The
logistic regression, although performed on unweighted data and for exploratory reasons,
could contribute in clarifying to what extent our preliminary hypotheses are supported by the
data.
2
In order to simplify the interpretation of the logistic model’s outcomes, we have recoded some of the
independent variables into additive scales. The professional status has been recoded into a “social class” variable
based on four categories: upper class (manager, judge, entrepreneur, self-employed, professional); middle class
(employee, teacher); lower class (worker, temporary worker) and inactive citizens (all the other categories). The
latter is taken as reference category in the analysis, as it is also the case for the category “male” for the gender
variable, the category “>65” for the age variable, the category “higher education” for the education variable, the
category “every week” for the religious practice variable; the category “newcomers“ for the participation
variable; the category “right“ for ideological positioning; the category “Abstention– Blank Ballot “ for the
electoral support variable; and the category “Right-wing party member “ for the activism variable.
12
1
The results are reported in Table 5. Among socio-demographic variables, only age and gender
seem to exert a statistically significant impact, with male and older selectors being more likely
to remain loyal to the party in subsequent elections even if their chosen candidate loses the
primary contest. Moreover, the data presented in Table 5 seem to support our hypothesis of
the significant impact of the individual political profile on the voting strategies of selectors.
Unsurprisingly, political identity is the most relevant dimension for explaining the choice of a
more or less loyal attitude in general elections. All political variables are statistically
significant and contribute in in explaining the adoption by primary voters of a loyal attitude
towards the party disregarding the outcomes of primary competition. As expected, the
selectors’ political profile indeed matters in shaping their voting choices in general elections.
Being a party member, having some previous participatory experience in primaries, being a
supporter of the party or of the center-left coalition seems to be political features of individual
selectors that incentive more loyal attitudes in general elections.
For instance, in Table 5 we can see that the odds of scoring 1 (=loyalty attitudes) have
increased by a factor of 1.5 having increased the level of previous experience in participatory
instruments by one unit (from newcomers=0 to veterans=1). The same goes for the
ideological positioning: a one unit increase in the predictor (ideological L-R scale ranging
from 1 to 5, where 5 represent right positions and 1 left ones) triggers a decrease in the odds
of being loyal to the party of a factor of 0.3. Here too, enrolled members of the Democratic
Party or of one of the other parties of the center-left coalitions are way more likely to be loyal
to the party even if their candidate is not selected as a result of primary elections. Moreover,
as expected, the fact of having previously voted for the party or the coalition promoting
primary elections is directly related to post-primary voting strategies: being a Democratic
Party supporter increases the odds of remaining loyal to the party by a factor of 2.5, and the
exponentiation of regression estimate is also significant. In conclusion, loyalty attitudes in
post-primary voting strategy are indeed associated with a stronger relationship with the
party. On the contrary, more ideologically radical, left-wing selectors seem not to be more
likely to choose more disruptive voting strategies in subsequent general elections, but rather
support whatever candidate is selected by the primary competition.
13
Table 5. Logistic regression: impact of socio-demographic profile and political profile
on voting strategy
B
GENDER
Female
AGE
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-64
EDUCATION
Elementary
Junior High School
High School
PROFESSIONAL STATUS
Upper class
Middle class
Working class
RELIGIOUS PRACTICE
Never
2-3 times per year
1 time per month
2-3 times per month
L-R SELF-PLACEMENT
Left
Center-Left
Center
Center-Right
PREV. PARTICIPATION
Veterans
ACTIVISM
Not Member
DP’s Member
Left wing party’s Member
PARTY SUPPORTER
PD voter
Left-wing party voter
Constant
S.E.
-,309
Sig.
,061
Exp(B)
,000
,734
0,000
-,360
-,189
-,327
,087
,137
,102
,087
,079
-,227
-,100
,066
,235
,109
,067
-,190
-,124
-,105
,092
,085
,129
,026
,034
,278
-,149
,092
,108
,153
,143
1,148
1,116
,201
-,951
,574
,574
,584
,688
,440
,068
,008
,065
,000
,269
,697
,828
,721
1,091
0,214
,334
,358
,321
,797
,905
1,069
0,257
,039
,143
,415
,827
,884
,900
0,194
,776
,755
,070
,298
1,026
1,034
1,320
,862
0,000
,045
,052
,730
,167
3,153
3,052
1,223
,386
,000
1,553
0,000
2,173
2,902
2,756
1,161
1,164
1,171
,934
,237
-3,332
,153
,156
1,292
,061
,013
,019
8,781
18,207
15,739
0,000
-2 Log likelihood
,000
,128
,010
2,546
1,268
,036
6863,245a
Further empirical support to our hypotheses is also provided by the detailed analysis of the
motivations that shaped selectors’ voting choices in primary elections. In the questionnaire
presented to the respondents, a question was in fact asked concerning the reasons for
choosing a specific candidate in primary elections. A total of 8 response categories were
presented to the respondents and the frequencies and label of each category are reported in
Figure 1. Figure 1 shows that the personal appeal of the individual candidate is one of the
most relevant rationales at the basis of the selectors’ preferences. The second most important
14
motivation for choosing a primary candidate is the political programme proposed by the
candidate. Moreover, we can see from Figure 1 that the respondents adopting loyal attitudes
in subsequent elections declare to have chosen their candidate mainly on the basis of his/her
specific profile, but a significant proportion (almost 30%) of respondents declares to have
taken into account the political proposal of the candidate and the fact that the latter is closer
to own political and partisan identity. This shows that there is a relevant relationship between
voting strategy in general elections, the primary voters’ political profile and his/her
motivations. The political stances of primary voters appear to be as relevant as the evaluation
of the personal profile and career of individual candidates in primary elections.
Figure 1. Motivations for candidate choice
Conclusions
The raw data and exploratory analyses presented in this study focused on the political
attitudes towards the party of primary voters and particularly their loyalty in terms of
electoral behavior. This study aimed at assessing the hypothesis generally developed by the
literature on the American case of the negative impact of primary elections on parties in
15
electoral terms. This study also focused on a specific case study, namely primary elections
organized for selecting the candidates for mayoral office of the center-left coalition in major
Italian cities between 2007 and 2012. These primaries were overall promoted by the
Democratic Party. The study is based on an original dataset composed by survey data on a
sample of more than 16000 individuals. The very preliminary exploration developed in this
draft version of the paper shows that selectors, namely primary voters, elaborate their voting
strategies in subsequent elections (in this case, the local elections for selecting the mayor)
mainly on the basis of their relationship with the party that promoted the consultation. One of
the main determinants of their voting strategy in subsequent elections, and thus of there is
indeed their political profile and particularly their ideological positioning and their degree of
political activism. Selectors formally affiliated to the party promoting the primary elections
are unsurprisingly more loyal to their party than unaffiliated voters, but also simple
supporters tend to be less likely to defect than other citizens. Although not surprising and
quite logical, this empirical evidence seems to show that parties indeed do matter nowadays.
Literature on primary elections in Europe seem to suggest that this instrument of intra-party
democracy is bound to led parties to an organizational decline by broadening excessively
their societal reach and bringing conflict at their core by opposing ordinary members’ to
supporters with weaker organizational ties to the party. Our preliminary analysis seems to
support, on the contrary, the idea that primary elections do not undermine the organizational
dimension of parties but rather trigger the development of a new form of relationship
between parties, supporters and voters.
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