Title: Who Decides: Elite Influence, Coordination and Vote Choice in Indian State Elections
Purpose: The goal of my project is to understand the conditions under which vote choice among
poor voters is not driven by retrospective or prospective candidate evaluations but the influence
of local leaders/intermediaries. Local leaders-- such as traditional patrons with economic power,
caste/ethnic leaders or fixers, who help voters navigate state institutions for public benefits and
services—often develop relationships with candidates for state assembly (MLA) in which the
former delivers the votes of voters over which they have some influence through a range of
strategies. These strategies may include coercive strategies such as assistance by local leaders in
procuring benefits conditional on vote choice or patron-client ties of economic dependence in which
patrons pressure dependents to vote for their candidate with a threat of economic consequences for
defection. Voters may also coordinate with local leaders to strengthen their bargaining position with
an MLA in procuring state benefits after the election or because a local leader provides an
information shortcut on candidate quality. Which of these strategies are successfully employed by
various intermediaries has implications for accountability as MLA quality or the expectations that he
will deliver public goods may be far removed from a vote decision that is driven by local ties.
Fieldwork in Maharashtra in 2011 will be used to collect qualitative data on linkages between
intermediaries and voters and the extent to which these strategies are employed and effective in
delivering votes in competitive elections for the purpose of theory building. After developing my
theory through fieldwork conducted in poor villages in Maharashtra’s interior, I plan to develop a
survey to be conducted in several districts of the state in summer 2011. In 2012 I plan to test the
generality and implications of my findings in another state where state elections will be held.