America and Vietnam Study Guide
Week 2: Akira Iriye, The Globalizing of America, pp. 1-18, 131-216
I. The Age of European Domination (pp. 1-18)
A. The Rise of the West
1. Before World War I, the world was European-dominated.
a. Because the European nation-states fought one another constantly
throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, they had to develop centralized
administrative structures to mobilize forces and collect taxes.
i. Competitiveness resulted in an increase in the region’s overall
power and led to developments in science and technology.
c. Two additional factures perpetuated European predominance:
i. The Industrial Revolution
ii. The Enlightenment
2. The United States when it emerged was molded by military, economic, and
cultural developments in Europe.
a. Military developments
i. Its existence came out of the French-British struggle for power.
ii. Founding fathers took for granted the need for a military force
and a bureaucracy.
b. Economic developments
i. Continued economic activities as had done as British colonials,
part of Western economic system
c. Cultural developments
i. American ideology was a product of British liberalism and the
Enlightenment
ii. American ideas were a refinement of, not a departure from,
European thought.
3. United States was significantly different from Europe in the late 1700s in the
cohesiveness of its society and the resulting sense of nationhood.
a. No feudalism, established church, monarchical institutions.
4. America in the nineteenth century.
a. Continued to be part of the Western-dominated world.
b. Cohesiveness began to erode because was divided on economic and
geographic terms.
c. Began to expand economically, culturally.
B. The Emergence of Modern States
1. The end of the Civil War meant that the political unity of the nation would
never again be challenged.
a. The government was free to conduct foreign affairs without worrying
about their impact on domestic cohesiveness.
2. The end of the Civil War coincided with significant developments in Europe,
which brought the continent into the age of modern states.
a. Italian and German unification, Franco-Prussian War, Third Republic in
France, reform bill of 1867 in Britain, emancipation of serfs in Russia in
1861.
b. The Modern State
i. Centralized administration, secular public authorities define
laws, mass participation in politics, unified domestic markets, legal
codes, systems of production and distribution
ii. More powerful than earlier nation-state.
iii. Tendency to extend their sway: imperialism (vs. earlier
colonialism).
3. The United States shared many features with the modern states of Europe, but
lagged behind in overseas colonization.
a. During the 1890s, however, undertook military strengthening and
colonial expansion.
4. The U.S. entered the twentieth century as a global power.
a. Strong militarily, territorially, economically.
b. Ideologies flourished that stressed power, order, and civilization.
i. “White man’s burden”
ii. Growing self-confidence of American leaders in the nation’s
special role in the world.
-Taft’s “dollar diplomacy”: using the nation’s financial
resources to promote an economically (thereby politically)
more interdependent national order.
-Idea of world peace through international law.
II. Totalitarianism and the Survival of Democracy (131-148)
A. Totalitarianism and War
1. The rise of modern totalitarianism can be attributed to the Depression,
discontent with results of the Great War, dissatisfaction with the mood of
internationalism, climate of uncertainty.
2. Fascist movement would gain power both through elections and mass
demonstrations and violence.
a. Entered into alliances with the army and business community.
3. Fascism and communism shared common features:
a. Undisputed power of state, rejection of democracy and pluralism,
nationalism.
4. Totalitarianism was a system of political control that prioritized internal unity,
discipline, and self-sacrifice in the name of national power and glory.
a. Both fascists and communists thought war was inescapable and
established the legitimacy of the domestic order.
B. The Democracies and War
1. During the first half of the 1930s, democracies were confronted with a
challenge to their legitimacy because of severe economic crises.
a. The New Deal struck many as moving the nation toward fascism.
i. No abandonment of pacifism or glorification of war.
C. The Isolationist Impulse
1. Isolationism was a major force in America in the mid-1930s.
a. Thought that should focus on domestic economy.
b. Amounted to abrogating its role as a world leader.
i. Examples include American performance at the London
economic conference, Silver Purchase Act of 1934, failure to
renew naval disarmament agreements with Japan and Britain,
failure to intervene in Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1934, failure
to take lead against Hitler.
2. However, America did undertake some diplomatic initiatives.
a. Recognition of the Soviet Union
b. Good Neighbor policy in Latin America
III. The Emergence of Geopolitics (149 – 169)
A. Wars in Asia and Europe
1. In November 1936 Germany, Japan, and Italy signed an anti-Comintern pact;
for the first time the totalitarian states of the right were pitted against the
dictatorship of the left.
2. Japan was trying to construct a new order in East Asia, began war with China
in 1937.
3. Germany was trying to establish hegemony in Central Europe.
4. Western democracies were on the defensive.
B. America Reenters the International Arena
1. In his second term, Roosevelt took the initiative to bring America back into the
international community and became especially assertive in Asia.
C. The Growth of Geopolitical-Mindedness
1. The consciousness of power and the readiness to consider war as an instrument
of national policy developed; the intellectual development went hand-in-hand
with Roosevelt’s new assertiveness in foreign policy.
a. Roosevelt increased defense spending in 1940, an indication of
American determination to play a role in international affairs.
b. Roosevelt sought to have neutrality legislation repealed.
c. Diplomatic efforts (all took place before the outbreak of the European
war)
i. In Europe, continued effort to appeal to world leaders to settle
disputes peacefully.
i. In Asia, more forceful (abrogation of commerce treaty with
Japan).
IV. The Road to Pearl Harbor (170 – 190)
A. The European War and U.S. Neutrality
1. September 1939 to spring 1940: “phony war” in which war had been declared
but there was little fighting.
2. United States had many choices.
a. Do nothing, support democracies “short of war,” treat Soviet Union
differently from Germany, negotiate compromise with Japan, step up
support of China.
3. U.S. more willing to take hard line in Asia than in Europe.
B. The Axis Versus the Democracies
1. Hitler sought to prevent U.S. intervention after the spring offensive, but failed,
as public opinion turned decisively against Germany.
a. U.S. sent arms and funds to prevent Britain’s defeat and helped protect
the British Empire in Asia.
C. Japan Attacks the United States
1. Lend-Lease Act in March 1941.
2. Talks among U.S. and Britain to coordinate military strategy
3. Extended Lend-Lease to Soviet Union, prevented Japanese attack on USSR
4. With the Pearl Harbor attack, the Asian and European war became joined and
U.S. became deeply involved in both theaters.
V. The Global Conflict (191 A. The Diplomacy of War
1. World War II was more global than WWI, touching most areas of the world.
2. Only the U.S. was involved in all theaters.
3. The U.S. saw its role as more than strategic and faced complicated political
questions.
a. Problems of governance during wartime military occupation of
territories.
4. Wilsonian ideals for postwar planning.
B. The New Internationalism
1. As the tide of war turned, Roosevelt was determined not to let the enemy
dictate the conditions of peace.
2. Allied powers wanted a postwar world in which the Axis powers would be kept
week and the big four would replace them as definers of international order.
a. U.S. would be the major power in the Pacific and in the Western
Hemisphere.
3. Postwar planning committees emphasized a new internationalism — Wilsonian
in inspiration by “new” in the recognition of the need to work closely with other
military powers.
C. Toward a Postwar World
1. After the war, big-power cooperation underwent changes because Britain and
China had become weaker relative to the United States and Soviet Union.
2. The shape of the postwar world would hinge on whether the two powers would
be able to work together.
a. Complicated by the vastly expanded territorial control of the Soviet
Union and the atomic weapon developed in the United States.
3. Two other components of the international order were developed through
American initiative in cooperation with other nations.
a. IMF and the World Bank
b. United Nations charter
D. Conclusion
1. After 1917, the U.S. emerged as a world leader and provided economic and
cultural resources to define and sustain global order.
2. The mid-1930s were an exception, when the nation eschewed leadership.
3. During WWII the U.S. became involved militarily, economically, and
politically in all parts of the world.
Week II
First of all a note on the readings. These are US documents related to foreign policy over the
course of its existence. So, at best I think it’s probably useful to have a general understanding of
the evolution (especially the time and context) of these policies rather than very specifically
understanding the details of these papers as almost none of them are directly related to the
Vietnam War.
The Declaration of Independence July 4, 1776
Since you’ve all read this before I’m sure the take-home message here is that this document
primarily outlines the American colonists discontent with the King of England in that he
deprived them of “unalienable rights,” and declared the United States independent based on its
right to dissolve an illegitimate social contract and institute a new government.
The Northwest Ordinance, July 13, 1787
This document is only peripherally related. It predates the US Constitution and is a constitution
of sorts for the Norhwest territory—outlining rules like inheritance, the structure of the
government, the election of government bodies, the distribution of states in the territory, the
allegiance to the United States, law enforcement, basic freedoms etc.
The Federalist Papers, No. 11
A paper by Hamilton arguing the need for unified policy on foreign trade and a Navy due to
America’s powerful presence in the realm of commerce. He suspects that soon European powers
will attempt to regulate their countries imports in order to restrict American trade and proposes
that the US adopt some defensive policies to counteract those. Also he argues that a Navy will
become necessary to protect such a powerful commercial system.
Washington’s Farewell Address, 1796
Washington leaves his post as President with some advice, predictions about possible problems
in the future and how to solve them including restricting the competition between political
parties, remember the importance of the basic freedoms, etc etc. Most relevant are his
isolationist foreign policy ideals which become apparent here. He basically argues that getting
involved in the “insidious wiles” of foreign influence and the best way to avoid manipulation by
Europe is to avoid dealing with them all together. He extends his argument to commercial
policy—that trade should not be selectively restricted, and that the US should depend only on
very defense strategies and only temporary alliances in emergency situations.
The Monroe Doctrine, 1823
While still basically supporting isolationism, Monroe argues that only when the United States’
own citizens’ rights are seriously invaded will they take action in foreign affairs. However, one
condition of that is the extension of colonialism, which directly contradicts the US’ policy. He
declares that any new attempt at colonization on independent nations will be considered a danger
to the peace of the United States.
TR’s Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, 1904
After the German/Italian/English presence on the coast of Venezuela, near the US’ Panama
canal, TR extended the Monroe doctrine so that the US would serve as an international
policeman. First he presents an extended disclaimer that the US does not intend to use the
Monroe doctrine as an excuse to justify self-aggrandizement and that the US’ neighboring
nations have nothing to fear as the US intends merely to protect not overtake. Essentially, he just
argues that we must take an interest in general peace and justice in the world, intervening when
necessary.
Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points, 1918
An even further extension of the US into foreign affairs. This is Wilson’s proposal for peace
post WWI. In it he basically outlines how all relevant powers should direct their war resolution
efforts such as opening navigation, and removing trade regulations, as well as specific demands
such as granting the sovereignty of those war-torn states—Belgium, France’s Alsace-Lorraine,
Austria-Hungary, Poland, Turkey, the Balkans, He also presents the idea of a general association
of nations to keep international peace (this eventually becomes the UN.)
FDR’s 4 Freedoms, 1941
His mid-WWII policy where he outlines four unalienable freedoms: freedom of
speech/expression, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.
However, in the document he also argues that the time has come to prepare for entry in the war
as it has begun to threaten the United States. He basically just demands an increase in defense
budget and armament development, and outlines a national policy of self-defense, support of
oppressed peoples, rejection of peace proposed by aggressors.
Week 3
Robert. J. McMahon, Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, 3rd
edition (D.C. Heath, 2003), chapter 2
In the introduction to Chapter 2, “The Development of Vietnamese
Nationalism,” with the claim that “American officials were often accused of
approaching Vietnam with little understanding of its culture and language,
and even less appreciation of its rich history—forces that, specialists now
agree, contributed mightily to the war’s outcome.” Therefore, the goal of
the chapter is to explain the “genesis of modern Vietnamese nationalism.”
At the beginning of French rule in 1914, Phan Boi Chau sets up the
theme of Vietnam as an oppressed protectorate in his reflections from
prison. He writes “Before the time of the French Protectorate, Vietnam only
knew a world with China. And when the French arrived we only knew a
world with France.” His account is mostly filled with sadness and a sense of
hopelessness, but he is willing to fight no matter what, acknowledging that
“At most I am an empty-handed rogue with nothing to my name, weak in
force and feeble in ability. Yet I am ready still to fight long-toothed tigers
and sharp-clawed panthers.” The earliest account sets up a history of
oppressive occupation and forced resistance as foundations of Vietnamese
nationalism.
In Ho Chi Minh’s attack on “imperialist crimes” of the French he makes
his appeal as a member of the Socialist Party in 1920. Ho claims that, under
the French, the Vietnamese “have not only been oppressed and exploited
shamelessly, but also tortured and poisoned pitilessly. Plainly speaking, we
have been poisoned with opium, alcohol, etc. I cannot…reveal all the
atrocities that predatory capitalists have inflicted on Indochina.” While Ho
strikes out against capitalists to go along with the Socialist Party’s definition
of the French as “the bourgeois class,” he also strikes out against the lack of
freedom of speech, press, assembly and association that foreshadows the
heavy influence of the United States’ Declaration of Independence on Ho’s
Vietnamese Declaration of Independence in 1945.
Ho’s speech at the founding of the Communist Party of Indochina in
1930 sets up French imperialism as a result of France’s desire to recuperate
the heavy losses from World War I. Ho goes on to predict the outbreak of
World War II with the warning that increased conflict will see even harsher
treatment of the Vietnamese from the French. Ho supports a Vietnamese
revolution from below, with the workers striking and forming a general
uprising against the French. To appeal to the masses, Ho lists goals of the
Communist Party that include such wide goals as the “overthrow [of] French
imperialism, feudalism and the reactionary Vietnamese class” and complete
Indochina independence. Also, Ho includes specific reforms such as the
implementation of an eight-hour workday that draws a heavy Western
influence.
In the fourth entry of the chapter a Vietnamese writer explains the
shift in attitude caused by the famine of late 1944 and 1945. He believes
that the general belief among the Vietnamese is that “if they eat less, save
some money, and work hard, then no matter how difficult life is for them,
the can still ‘patch things up.’” However, with a severe famine that was set
up with three typhoons in northern Vietnam in September 1944, conditions,
already tight due to constraints from the Japanese fighting WWII, became
impossible to live under. Prices shot up and it was speculators that took
advantage, resulting in the death of between one and two million people in
northern Vietnam. Although the Viet Minh is not mentioned in the account,
the account describes the hopelessness felt by the peasants that Ho would
channel into support for the Viet Minh.
On September 2, 1945 Ho Chi Minh issued the Vietnamese Declaration
of Independence. Using The Declaration of Independence of the United
States and the Declaration of the French Revolution of 1791 on the Rights of
Man and the Citizen as inspiration, Ho details the numerous economic and
social contraints that have been forced on the Vietnamese by the French for
eighty years up to that point. With the end of World War II recent history,
Ho’s appeal for independence comes from the belief that “we have wrested
our independence from the Japanese and not the French.” By allowing
Japan to take their place in Indochina, Ho believes that France showed that
they were not only unable to protect Indochina, but were willing to support
the wrong side of aggression, as the French chose passive compliance with
Japan over partnership with the Viet Minh in opposition. Ho used the
uselessness of France as the primary call for Independence following V-J
day.
Summary of The Colonial Impact by David G. Marr
McMahon, Chapter 2: The Development of Vietnamese Nationalism
In 1938, 27,000 French troops were monitoring 18M Vietnamese
people. However, as Dien Bien Phu would illustrate in 1954, a revolution of
the Vietnamese would erupt in a transfer of power which researchers
attribute to a timely combination of patriotism, fury of oppression, and
“sophisticated communist organizing techniques.” French educated colonial
subjects would learn the concepts of freedom and liberty, resulting in a
rejection of Eastern philosophy of the “preordained life.” The second essay,
Mark Philip Bradley, emphasizes the influence of the American Revolution on
the educated masses in Vietnam. Though exposure to American experiences
was through Russian, Chinese, and Japanese commentaries of American
history and society, the ideas about a fight for independence greatly affected
a public increasingly discontent with colonial rule. This new consciousness,
over time, established a stronger, more unified, and defiant Vietnamese
public who wanted equal standing among other nations.
Vietnam has a long history of subordinate existence. In order to
understand the context of the 1945 revolution which established the Viet
Minh as the dominant force in intellectual Vietnamese patriotism, it is
important to consider the change in social consciousness in the early 20 th
century. The French introduction of privatization disrupted the communal
structure of Vietnam. This resulted in an increased statificaiton between the
wealthy and the poor (those who owned land and those who lived on and
cultivated the land). Those who amassed enough land, would often leave
villages entirely and reside far away only to return to collect rent.
Additionally, the transformation into a cash economy greatly affected the
socio-economic interaction which relied less and less on personal contact.
Rice, which the French taxed heavily, became the key Vietnamese
export for “non-local interests.” After France, weakened after WWI, was
dominated by Germany in the 1940s, Japanese-sympathizing Vichy France
(still in control of Indochina) produced loads of rice for Japan, either for
consumption or for fuel (fermentation) which resulted in the famine of 1945
where two million Vietnamese were without food.
Realizing the need to establish a Vietnamese force free from
domination by other countries, the youth “seized the day” and vocalized the
current ideals about socio-economic change in Vietnam. After the Viet
Minh’s establishment in 1941, it gained huge support 1945. Though it was
neither the political nor the intellectual “vanguard of society (that was the
ICP party), they spoke for the peasants and workers.
The optimism that permeated the intellegentsia’s experience from the
1920s to the 1940s was a product of a gradual shift from “Western” to
internalization. As their struggle for progress reached the peasants by the
1930s, their merging found a home in the Viet Minh and ICP organizations.
“They defended the rights of the poor, encouraged women to participate in
the political struggle, stressed the importance of mass literacy, promised
democratic freedoms, and portrayed the contemporary world in terms of a
decisive confrontation between good and evil.” Eventually, when the time
was right, a Revolution took place cementing the ideals that finally were
mature enough for manifestation. The August Revolution of 1945 was “a
justification for previous agaonist, capping three generations of struggle
against unbelievable odds.”
Week 3
From the Sourcebook:
Elliott, Duong Van Mai, ''The Third Month in the Year of the Famine,''
SACRED WILLOW, pp. 103 - 135.
“The Third Month in the Year of the Famine” primarily serves to
reinforce the Ho’s observations concerning French compliance with Japanese
occupation of Indochina. The collapse of France in World World II led to
Japanese occupation of Indochina while the French were still in place. “By
being compliant, the French hoped Japan would let the colonial governemtn
stay in place, which was exactly what the Japanese, wanting to avoid the
costs and complexities of an outright takeover, allowed it to do at first.” The
Vietnamese were first ambivalent to Japanese occupation but soon found the
Japanese to be more quick to punish and execute those who disobeyed
them. The famine in Tonkin and north Annam in 1944 was made worse by
Japan’s control over the country. In the midst of fighting World War II,
Japan forced the French colonial government to collect for army reserves
despite vast shortages. “Warehouses were bulging with food stored for
Japanese soldiers, while people died by the hundreds and thousands.” To
make matters worse, “[t]he colonial government made no effort to deal with
the famine, except to issue rice ration cards to the urban population to
stretch out the supplies. The countryside was left to die.”
On March 9, 1945, Japan finally moved to crush the French. “It was the
hour of humiliation for the French. Colonial rule had been predicated on the
myth of the Europeans’ cultural superiority and military might, now
Vietnamese everywhere saw how quickly the French could be brought down
from their lofty perch.” “In government offices, French employees continued
to show up for work, but they were now under Japanese control.”
“Suddenly, the French no longer looked so mighty to the Vietnamese.”
The famine and the poor handling of it by the Japanese was used as an
opportunity by Ho Chi Minh. Writes Elliott, “[t]he only group that was
opposing the Japanese and dealing seriously with the famine was the Viet
Minh, short for League for the Independence of Vietnam.” Ho was very good
at predicting history and anticipated the power vacuum that would be
created after Japan’s loss, something he predicted following D-Day.
“On August 8, Japan surrendered. Upon hearing the news, the Viet
minh immediately issued an order to the people to rise up and seize power.
General vo Nguyen Giap, then a trusted lieutenant of Ho Chi Minh, led a
detachment of the Viet Minh army toward Hanoi. Peasants in Tonkin and
northern Annam took over their villages under Viet Minh leadership. In the
urban areas, with the power vacuum created by the Japanese surrender,
euphoric cries and demonstrations erupted spontaneously in every city, as if
a dam had broken. The Viet Minh moved quickly to harness this emotion.”
(16)
On August 30 Ho gained further support as Emperor Bao Dai abdicated,
saying “he was happier becoming a citizen of a free country than he had
been as the king of an enslaved nation.” Following the August Revolution
the Viet Minh had unlimited power and worked to indoctrinate the masses.
Full power for the Viet Minh rapidly came to an end, however, as Chinese
forces occupied Hanoi by September 9. The next three months saw Ho
“carry out a precarious balancing act” in which he convinced the Chinese to
particpate in a coalition government with the Viet Minh instead of fully
occupying the country. Ho pushed for elections in December 1945 to be a
show of good faith to opposing political factions. The rigged elections gave
Ho 99.9% of the vote and confirmed the Viet Minh’s dominance. By the
summer of 1946, the Chinese left Hanoi facing difficuly domestic issues and
scared by the prospect of having to fight the French, who had already
recapture South Vietnam and were wagin guerilla war with the Viet Minh in
the southern regions already.
Ho Chi Minh, still not in a powerful enough position to commit to all out
war, saw French ships leave for Hanoi as soon as the Chinese pulled out.
“Ho Chi Minh realized that he was too weak to stop the French from coming
back and that his best option was to negotiate. On March 6, 1946, he
signed an agreement accepting the return of the French to relieve the
departing Chinese, with the understanding that all French troops would leave
Vietnam at the end of five years.” Of course, violations of the March 6
agreement occurred right after their introduction and the path was set for a
prolonged war that would not conclude until Dienbienphu in 1954.
“The Third Month in the Year of the Famine” shows how Vietnam fell
under control of four different governments in a short span of time beginning
with the end of World War II. The Viet Minh worked to take control from the
Japanese, the Chinese and the French. The Viet Minh used the image of
Vietnam as a country under attack from foreign influence to gain the support
of the masses and following World War II there were plenty of examples.
The United States would become another example as their influence became
more noticeable following the Geneva Accords of 1954.
Week 4
Robert J. McMahon, Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, Chapter 4.
Documents
Dwight D. Eisenhower Appeals for British Help, 1954
Eisenhower tells Winston Churchill he doubts the French will be unable to hold Indochina by
themselves, and that it is essential for the strategic interest of both the US and Britain that
Southeast Asia remain out of Communist hands. With Geneva less than four weeks away and
France tired of the war, he fears the Communists driving a wedge between them, and does not
think negotiations will be fruitful. Eisenhower proposes forming an ad hoc coalition of nations to
provide France with military aid, in part to show China it is not in their interest to support the
Viet Minh.
Eisenhower Explains Domino Theory, 1954
Eisenhower explains domino theory to the press, suggesting that if Indochina falls under
Communist rule, the rest of Southeast Asia will subsequently fall, putting millions under
dictatorship and threatening Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the rest of the free world.
Vo Nguyen Giap on Dienbienphu (1954), 1964
These were the greatest victories won by their people at the time, marking “a momentous change
in the evolution of the Resistance War for national salvation put up by our people against the
aggressive French imperialists propped up by U.S. interventionists.” The victory, inspiring the
rest of the world, was regarded by other socialist peoples as their own victory. Without
Dienbienphu, peace could not have happened at the Geneva Conference. The imperialists lost,
despite massive spending and manpower, because it was an unjust war of aggression against a
people of indomitable spirit.
Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on Indochina, 1954
 End of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.
 Vietnam will have open, democratic elections in July 1956.
 Prohibition of introduction into Vietnam of foreign military personnel an all arms and
ammunition.
 Demarcation line in Vietnam is temporary to facilitate a cessation of hostilities, not to be
regarded as a permanent or territorial border.
 Free movement of peoples in Vietnam.
 No reprisals for past collaborations on either side in Vietnam.
 French are withdrawing from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.
National Security Council Discussion of Sect Crisis, 1955
Dulles explains that fighting had broken out in Saigon. Diem ordered all-out action against the
Binh Xuyen. Dulles is not afraid of Diem losing the showdown with the gangster group—he
wouldn’t—but of the civil unrest that would precipitate if he won. They speak of Diem’s
strengths but highlight his weaknesses as a northerner and one who does not trust people or
delegate power; he mentions they would consider an alternative to Diem. Any other government
would probably include the Boa Dai, which would not be favorable.
General Collins names the factors on which the future of a free Vietnam would depend:
1. Possibility of overt attack by Vietminh (little danger at present)
2. Loyalty of Vietnamese National Army to Diem
3. The problem of Sects
4. The attitude of the French.
5. The personality of Diem
South Vietnamese Statement on Reunification, 1955
The government does not consider itself bound in any respect by the Geneva Agreement which it
did not sign, and places national interest above all. The Vietminh are pushing for elections, but
this is Communist propaganda cloaked as championing territorial unity. The south will press for
the freedom of all of Vietnam from totalitarianism.
Elbridge Durbrow Assesses the Diem Regime, 1957
Diem was pro-West and anti-communist and brought relative stability and security to S. Vietnam
for the first two years. In the last year, however, “Diem has avoided making decisions required to
build the economic and social foundations necessary to secure Viet Nam’s future independence
and strength.” He is suspicious and authoritarian, and much of the population is discontented.
We need to bring strong pressure on Diem to reform and move his country forward.
National Security Council Discussion of Diem’s Growing Problems, 1960
Diem had been faced with increasing insurgency, and his own ranks had been crumbling, and
people were openly critical at all levels. He in out of touch with his people, and leaves all
administration to his brothers. President asks if the situation might be improved if he wrote Diem
a letter, and thinks the U.S. should do everything possible at that point to prevent the
deterioration of South Vietnam.
Essays
The Tragedy of U.S. Intervention by David L. Anderson
“He contends that while Eisenhower may deserve high marks for choosing not to rescue the
beleaguered French garrison at Dienbienphu, his administration’s subsequent commitment to
Diem regime represented a massive intervention in Vietnamese affairs. Anderson says that the
Eisenhower administration’s generous economic, military, and political support for the Saigon
government that it helped to establish never proved sufficient to create a viable nation. Instead,
the United States became tied to a corrupt, inefficient, and unrepresentative regime in South
Vietnam that never commanded popular support. In the process, it sowed the seeds for future
troubles.
The Failure of Vietnamization by Ronald H. Spector
“Analyzes the shortcomings of the first American military advisory mission in Vietnam. Depicts
the growth of the Vietcong insurgency in the late 9150s as an ominous threat to the South
Vietnamese regime, on that American military advisers had not adequately prepared South
Vietnam’s armed forces to meet.”
Week 4
America’s Lost War: Vietnam 1945-1975
Charles Neu
Chapter 1: The First Indochina War 1945-1954
Origins of the Revolution.
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After the long struggle the French conquered Vietnam in 1883 and separated the country
into three protectorates. Tonkin Annam in the North and the colony of Cochin China.
A small number Vietnamese elite prospered, but French policies impoverished the
peasantry, driving them off land in order that they might provide cheap labor for rubber
and rice plantations in the south and coal mine in the north.
The brutality of the French rule sparked rebellion and opened the door for Ho Chi Minh
to become one of the great revolutionaries of the 20th century.
The Impact of WWII
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The effects of WWII allowed Ho Chi Minh to be able to fight a revolution in Vietnam.
US OSS soldiers parachuted into the Viet Minh jungles and helped train Minh’s guerrilla
units.
In 1945 Ho wrote a letter to President Harry Truman asking for recognition of Vietnam
as a free and independent state.
British helped restore French power in the south while Ho retained power in the north.
Ho tried to negotiate with the French but told an America reporter later that it would
come to war. “it will be a war between and elephant and a tiger. If the tiger ever stands
still the elephant will crush him with his mighty tusks. But the elephant does not stand
still. He lurks in the jungle by day and emerges by night. He will leap upon the back of
the elephant, tearing huge chunks from his hide, and then he will leap back into the dark
jungle. And slowly the elephant will bleed to death. That will be the war of Indochina.”
In December 1946 fighting broke out between French and Viet Minh in Haiphong and
soon spread to Hanoi
America’s Response
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Harry Truman, had little interest in what seemed to him an obscure part of the world in
April 1945
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The US also feared that Ho and his followers were politically immature and susceptible
to outside manipulation. They viwed Ho and his comrades as part of a monolithic
communist conspiracy.
The US did not really know what to do at this time; they despised the French’s colonial
rule but at the same time did not want to help give power to Ho who had direct
communist connections.
The Expansion of the Cold War
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In 1950 both China and the Soviet Union recognized the Ho and his northern DRV
The US became concerned that if Vietnam fell to communism it would create a domino
affect that would take all the entire island chain all the way through the pacific.
In response the US recognized Southern Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, all French puppet
government, and began to support the French in their war against the North.
The Deepening Commitment
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June 25, 1950 confirmed the US’ worst fear when N Korea invaded S Korea. Truman
proclaimed “Korea is the Greece of the Far East” and they decided they had to become
involved or lose credibility in the eyes of Stalin.
During this time America increased its military aid to the French dispatching more arms,
ammunition, naval vessels, aircraft and armored vehicles.
In July 1950 a mission was called the Melby Missions was launched. John Melby
traveled to Indochina to asses the French War effort.
Melby concluded that the interests of the French and the US were not only different but
mutually exclusive. This did not shake the resolve of the American leaders to preserve
their support of the French.
The Elephant and the Tiger
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After many defeats the French, in December 1950, dispatched their best field general
Jean de Lattre Tassingny, to rally the French forces and turn the tide of the war.
Time was at the hand of the Viet Minh. The French needed a quick victory or the moral
at home would be lost as more and more French soldiers died. For the viet minh a slow
protracted war would be beneficial. As Ho said, you may kill ten of my men for every
one I kill of yours but victory will still be ours.
Also the Terrain was very difficult for a western army which is not used to moving in
these conditions of swamps and hills. The terrain gave an advantage to guerrilla forces.
America’s Dilemma
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Seeing no end to the War insight the American’s urged the French to take a more
aggressive military stance. They also told the French to give more recognition to the
government of Bao Dai’s and get the Vietnamese people to rally around that form of
government for it was the only way to diminish the power of the communist north.
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The French did not agree and asked instead for more aid from the American’s. By 1953
the US was paying for more than 40 percent of the war.
The French asked for American ground troops but the US would not agree at this time.
However they did not want to the French to pull our so they increased more aid.
Eisenhower Takes Charge
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They did not want to see the war in Vietnam end the same was as the Korean war with an
negotiated settlement.
IKE urged the French to continue their war
At this time the French were in trouble with their armies confined to the densely
populated Red River Delta in the north and entrenched in cities in central and southern
Vietnam.
The Battle of Dien Bien Phu
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On March 13, 1954 Giap(general of the Viet Minh) launched an attack against the French
stronghold in Dien Bien Phu. They out gunned the French and their artillery was located
so as to be impervious to air strikes.
They did not think that Giap would use tunnels to get closer to the base and maintain a
high ground stronghold that would allow they to cut off air support to for French to
evacuate their wounded and re-supply. The French also underestimated Giap’s ability to
move large numbers of troops into position. The French fatally miscalculated.
On may 7, 1954 the French surrender at Dien Bien Phu and the French suffered a huge
military and psychological defeat.
Washington’s Response
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The US would still not commit troops or even conduct air strikes unless the French would
meet many American terms. One major term was to allow the US to take control of the
War but the French could not pull out and also the French had to give all power to the
Democratic Southern Vietnam after the war which at the time they were still not ready to
do
Furthermore the Administration found difficulty with Congress in trying to send troops to
save the French so this never happened.
The Geneva Settlement: The Emergence of Two Vietnams
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April 26, two weeks before the fall of Dien Bien Phu, a big conference convened at
Geneva to seek a more permanent settlement of the Korean War and a settlement of the
war in Indochina.
The Soviets and Chinese urged the Viet Minh to make concessions so that the
American’s would not become involved militarily. Reluctantly the Viet Minh agreed to
military disengagement and the formation of two Vietnams along the 17th parallel.
The division was to be only temporary for the accord stated that in two years their would
be a country wide election for a president of a unified Vietnam. The accord stated that
there would be no military involvement froma third party and that neither the north or
south would be allowed to make a military alliance with a third outside nation.
This resulted in nothing more than a cease fire, not a permanent resolution. The only part
of the document signed was the cease fire signed between the French and the Viet Minh.
There was still a powerful need in the heart and mind of Ho to form a unified Vietnam
not to Vietnams. After the convention in the mind of Ho and the Viet Minh the US
became the new enemy to the Vietnamese.
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Chapter 2: The Emergence of South Vietnam, 1954-1961
The Rise of Ngo Dinh Diem
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Diem was a 53 year French educated catholic frfom central Vietnam. He served in 1933
as Boa Dai’s minister of the interior but soon resigned because the French refused to give
him more authority.
The South at this time was leaderless. The Binh Xuyen (organized crime syndicate) ran a
large prostitution and gambling ring and controlled the police force. And religious
groups, the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao controlled the outlying peasant regions along with
Southern sects of the Viet Minh.
CIA operative Edward Lansdale was given the daunting task of helping and advising
Diem on how to consolidate his power. However Diem, not having lived in Vietnam,
during the initial Vietnam revolutionary period was displaced and didn’t understand what
lied at the hearts of the Vietnamese like Ho in the North did.
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The US and Ngo Dinh Diem
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On Sep. 8, 1954 the US along with Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand,
Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand signed the accords creating the Southeast Asian
Treaty Organization which was a loose regional alliance that did not require an automatic
response from all its member should one of them come under attack.
During this time the US took over the previously help position of the French. They
helped 800,000 thousand catholic refugees relocated from the north to south Vietnam.
They helped train the southern Vietnamese army and helped Diem gain power.
The relocated Catholics became Diem’s most loyal supporters.
In 1954 General J. Laughton Collins went to Saigon to evaluate Diem. He cabled
Washington and told them that Diem was hopeless and convinced them to replace them.
However before that oculd be done bloody fighting broke out between Diem and the
different sects, the Binh Xuyen, Cao Dai, and the Hoa Hao, in the South. Diem’s army
won the battle and quelled any doubt back in Washington about his ability to rule.
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Consolidation of Diem’s Rule
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Diem did not allow for the possibility of elections to reunify Vietnam as the Geneva
Accords called for and in October 1955 called for a referendum on the Monarchy. By
an overwhelming 98 percent he won and Boa Dai was disposed and Diem became the
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President of the Republic of Vietnam. While based on democratic values Diem’s
regime was more like an authoritarian regime run by him and his brother Ngo Diem
Nhu
In the summer of 55 Diem began the Denunciation of Comminists Campaign aimed at
systemic repression of remnants of the Viet Minh and other individuals and groups that
opposed his regime. (Check No Other Road To Take by Nguyen Dinh)
Progress in South Vietnam
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Most of the American money found its way to the Southern military. Little was spent on
economic development or on long term projects that might have created a self sustaining
economy. In reality SV was a heavily subsidized US protectorate, with the form but not
the substance of a nation.
With the help of General Samuel T. Williams the ARVN was transformed into a large
seven-division army of 150,000 men. However, Diem was more concerned about
protecting himself as President that promotions in his army were given to his friends and
people he trusted rather than people who were best for the job.
Mounting Discontent
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In 57 and 58 discontent with Diem’s rule began to emerge. Many feared and resented the
president’s repressive measures. The remnants of the Viet Minh began to organize the
peasantry, assinate officials and ambush ARVN patrolling units. The South Vietnamese
government labeled these groups the Viet Cong which was meant to be a derogatory term
but ended up sticking for the remainder of the war.
There was a difference between Diem and the US however that would cause a problel.
The US wanted Diem to form a capatilistic and democratic government but Diem and his
brother did not trust capitalism and rejected Western models of development. They were
more concerned with protecting their own power, which meant a more authoritarian
government. Diem and Nhu knew they needed American support but were afraid of
becoming too dependent on them and giving them to much power over them.
January 26, 1960 at the town of Trang Sup, VC troops attacked the headquarters of the
ARVN’s 32nd regiment killing or wounding 66 South Vietnamese troops. Diem and his
American advisors were surprised by the size of the attack. General Williams lectured
Diem that he needs to begin to recognize the chain of command and top favoritism in his
army or more debacles such as what happened at the 32nd regiment will continue to
happen.
Nov. 11, 1960 a group of elite paratroopers attempted a rebellion on Diem and his family
at the presidential palace in order to force reforms on Diem. Diem had been saved by
other ARVN forces that he called in but the coup attempt displayed the weakness of his
government.
A New War
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In the late 1950’s the National liberation Front spread rapidly, gaining supporters in both
the urban and rural areas. The members of this group despised the oppression and
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corruption of Diem’s rule as well as his dependence on the US. In contrast they found
Ho’s leadership genuine and found him to be a charismatic figure worth following.
The strongest NLF support was among the peasantry who lived in the Mekong river
delta. They were referred to by one communist organizer as “a mound of straw, ready to
be ignited.”
NLF organizers used the discontent of the peasants to stage murders of local officials
and intimidations of local officials.
The NLF had to transform the peasantry into hardened soldiers.
However, by the end of 1960 the escalation of violence by the Viet Cong composed of
peasantry showed that a new war had begun inn Vietnam.
Week 4
ôThe Truman Doctrineö (address to Congress, March 12, 1947)
(at www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/20th.htm)
- Pertains to Greece and Turkey
- Greece asked US for economic aid
- Describes poverty in Greece (result of German destruction until 1940)
- States that both Britain and US have been providing financial aid to Greece, but that
the country needs more help and that Britain can no longer support it
- Goes on to say that Turkey also needs US and British aid (which it had already been
receiving); also claims that such aid is key in the ôpreservation of order in the Middle
Eastö
- Applies domino theory (though not outright stating it) to Middle East, esp. Greece and
Turkey
- Asks Congress for $400,000,000 to aid Greece and Turkey. States that US spent
$341,000,000,000 on WWII, and that money he is asking for from Congress would be
just as well spent (and is a significantly smaller figure than that spent on WWII)
- Argues that providing these two countries with material aid and training personnel to
set up viable democracies is crucial to preventing the spread of communism and
widening the sphere of democracy in the world
NSC 68, parts I (Background à) through IV (The Underlying Conflict à),
(at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68/nsc68-1.htm)
I. Background:
- Describes the two world wars and power vacuum resulting
- Power transferred to US and USSR (after defeat of Germany, Japan; ôdecline
of British and French Empiresö)
- New nuclear threat; threat of rise of communism
II. Fundamental Purpose of US
- Quotes US Constitution and Declaration of Independence, emphasizing
importance of liberty of the individual and democracy
III. Fundamental Designs of the Kremlin
- Elucidates USSRÆs hope to spread communism, especially in Asia
- Suggests that if the USSR were to achieve its goals, US would be seriously
threatened as a world power and US principles (freedom, democracy) would be
seriously challenged worldwide
IV. Underlying Conflict (US v. USSR)
A. Nature of Conflict
- Emphasizes difference in ôvalue systemö bt/w US and USSR
- Reiterates nuclear threat
B. Objectives
- ôMake ourselves strong,ö create ôpolitical and economic system in the free
world,ö bring about change in USSR
C. Means
ôCompulsion is the negation of freedom, except when it is used to enforce the
rights common to all.ö Therefore, war = ôlast resortö
- Resolution to spread and teach democracy by example, use war only if
necessary
George C. Herring and Richard Immerman, ôEisenhower, Dulles, and
Dienbienphu: æThe day We DidnÆt Go to WarÆ Revisited,ö Journal of American
History, vol. 71 (1984), pp. 343-363: HOLLIS e-journals.
- Discusses US role at Dien Bien Phu (1954)
- Eisenhower originally agreed to air stike to aid France, then changed mind
tried to form coalition opposing communism, but Britain did not join
- At secret meeting, Congress agreed to aid French only if Britain helped
- Secretary of State Dulles and Chairman of JCS Radford agreed to air strike, even
atomic strike, but then ôrenegedö
- Since 1950, US had helped France in Vietnam both militarily and economically;
however, argued that France should give up on colonial interests and solely
- 1953, Navarre set up at Dien Bien Phu, surrounded by Viet Minh
- Fear of Chinese aid to Viet Minh
- French Chief of Staff Ely went to Washington, informed officials that there was 50-50
chance of success at DBP, requested American planes and volunteers
- Dulles agreed to help only if US had bigger role and if chances of victory were higher
- Radford (Asia-firster) and Ely make plan VULTURE (night air strikes on DBP)
- Radford had trouble getting presidential and congressional support; Dulles and Vice
President Nixon hesitant
- Eisenhower and Dulles formed ôUnited Actionö (coalition opposing communism
composed of US, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Philippines,
Associated States of Indochina); had a hard time getting congressional support
- Could anger right wing Republicans and Democrats by losing more land to
communists, but also ran risk of starting ôanother Koreaö
oppose
- Eisenhower and Dulles appealed to Congress for permission to use sea and air force
- Dulles traveled to get support from Britain
- Nixon mistakenly declared in public that US would send men to Vietnam
- Britain (Foreign Secretary Eden, Prime Minister Churchill) refuse to help US.
- Conclusion:
- Argues against the claim that US did not support France at DBP because it did not
have BritainÆs support (according to Washington PostÆs Chalmers Roberts)
- Suggests that US decision to intervene was due in large part to difference in approach
to Vietnam between France and US
- Suggests that Eisenhower was not fully committed to providing aid to French, but
United Action suggests that he was willing to consider it
Week 5
Edwin W. Moise, Land Reform and Land Reform Errors in North Vietnam, Pacific Affairs, v. 49
(1976), pp. 70-92. Week 5.
Edwin Moise is able to give positive account of the land reform process in North Vietnam due to
its success relative to similar periods in other newly communist countries. Moise characterizes
the reform period as both a social revolution and a national revolution, but states, “Economically,
the land reform had succeeded” (85). He points out that although excesses on the part of the
cadres and the cot can became unreasonably harsh, the real Party policies were fair and merely
misapplied. Although there were many executions, if there had truly been a bloodbath in the
North, the South would have heard about it much earlier. Moise also points out that when the
Party realized things were getting out of hand, they fairly rectified the situation, reclassified
those who had been unfairly labeled “landlord”, and reconciled the bases of Party support.
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On the surface it was a program to abolish landlordism and place the land in the hands of
peasant smallholders. Considered simply in this light, the land reform was quite successful.
The laws governing land reform tended to become more moderate from one wave to the next,
but their actual implementation became more radical, and “leftist” excesses were most
widespread during waves four and five.
The landlords were left with less land than anyone else in the village, and were often
deprived of their homes.
New people, especially the poor peasant cot can (backbone elements) trained during the land
reform, were given many important party positions.
Land reform lasted roughly from December 1953 to July 1956.
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If there had been a bloodbath, Saigon would have known about it, for during the first half of
the land reform, the DRV had been allowing large numbers of refugees to go to the South.
Most of North Vietnam did not undergo land reform until wave five, and by that time the
land reform had become more radical.
It seems reasonable to estimate that the total number of people executed during the land
reform was probably in the vicinity of 5,000, and almost certainly between 3,000 and 15,000,
and that the slaughter of tens of thousands of innocent victims, often described in antiCommunist propaganda, never took place.
The land reform did commit serious excesses of other types.
Poor peasants who refused to treat people as enemies were likely to get attacked themselves.
The poor peasants (about half the rural population) formed only 3.7 percent of the Party
membership.
The land reform cadres chose cot can, who were supposed to replace the people who had
been purged, mostly from among poor peasants and agricultural laborers who had not been
leaders in the resistance. The cadres were working against a tight schedule, and had to train
the cot can rather hastily.
Many people were denounced for things they had never done.
[These errors] occurred at least to some extent in most villages, and were really serious in
many.
The great majority of those unjustly attacked lived through the experience.
The government and the Party recognized their mistakes quickly, admitted them in public,
and corrected them to the extent possible.
In late 1956 and 1957, over 50 percent of those who had been classified as landlords were
reclassified.
Economically, the land reform had succeeded. It had given land to those peasants who had
lacked it.
The land reform was accomplished without disrupting the postwar reconstruction of the
North Vietnamese economy.
Intellectual Dissent: The Nhan Van Giai Pham Period from Kim N.B. Ninh, A World
Transformed: The Politics of Culture in Revolutionary Vietnam, 1945-1975. (Michigan, 2002),
pp. 121-163. Week 5.
Kim N.B. Ninh, on the other hand, is able to give such a negative account of the land reform
process in North Vietnam because she is concerned with changes in the intellectual climate of
the period. Ninh claims that although there were supposedly instances of rectification of error by
the Party, the “culture of land reform” was one of totalitarian, unchecked power by Party
authorities over policies implemented for the sake of “reform”. By focusing on the lack of
cultural and intellectual freedoms, Ninh presents a country where, “Barely two years after the
establishment of a new socialist state, virtually every aspect of daily life was under its control”
(144). In addition to the loss of life, North Vietnam became a world where everything centered
on furthering the government’s political notions.
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The twin processes of land reform and organizational rectification wreaked havoc not only
on old structures in the village but on the Party apparatus.
[There was an] inherent conflict between the government’s vision and the intellectual’s
expectations of the new state and society.
Thac mac: the world of subterfuge-speak, misgivings or discomfort without specifying the
source of concern, indirect expression of opinion indicating the oppressive nature of state
power.
Lap truong: any official line requiring support.
Each village in northern Vietnam during this phase of land reform became a war zone.
Private space was violently invaded and severely restricted.
One can sense the helplessness of the individual against the all-encompassing march of state
policy.
The absolute power that a land reform team, particularly the team leader, possessed led to
violence and opportunism.
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The “east-big” (an to) idea accused any intellectual unable to respond to the demand for
propaganda works of condescending to the masses.
Many intellectuals had joined the army as a symbol of their solidarity. Control over its
intellectuals was rigid.
Among those who voiced their disappointment, Tran Dan was one of the most vehement.
As the range of intellectual topics had been increasingly curtailed, the works themselves
became one-dimensional propaganda pieces for government campaigns and policies. All
vestiges of individuality disappeared.
By the end of 1955, the intellectual community was swirling with discontent.
In August 1956, there was a review of the Party’s position on the relationship between
politics and art and an examination of the way in which the intellectual structure had been
controlled.
Nhan Van and Giai Pham became the dominant forums in which a substantial number of
intellectuals came together to present their views, which often differed from those of the
state-sanctioned frame of reference.
The culture of land reform, once established, had become institutionalized despite the
rectification of errors. Governance by decrees and policies without an established legal
system, the excessive concentration of power, the single-minded interpretation of society
through a class agenda, etc.
Vietnamese intellectuals were pulled into a confrontation from which there could emerge
only one winner, the Party. The zeal to move rapidly toward socialism and the intense effort
to maintain vigilance against the enemy generated an environment in which politics riled
supreme.
Week 5
“Memories of Communist Hanoi: 1945-1966,” from James Freeman, Hearts
of Sorrow, pp. 157-168.
This reading details the effective measures that the Communists used to “reeducate” Hanoi
citizens. The narrator, a North Vietnamese Chinese-Vietnamese elder first explains why he and
other elders were forced to confess to imaginary crimes of capitalism. The narrator also reports
how people were coerced in elections to vote for pre-selected candidates.
“Liberation” and reeducation
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This anecdote describes the period of time surrounding the Communist rise to power.
Communists rose to power in 1945. Before the Communists, the Japanese and then the
French were in control
Before 1945, there was a terrible famine
o Japanese enforced martial order
o People blamed the famine on the Japanese and the French
o Many people lost their lives to starvation. Approximately 2 million died
 City people had money and usually survived
 Rural dwellers, mainly villagers, starved
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Communists came to power through the August Revolution of 1945
o The Communists did not say that they were Communists. Rather, they said they were
patriots helping to gain independence. They hid their identity to gain the support of
the people
o In this way they topple the pro-Japanese government
o They chose the right time for an uprising, using the power of the people
War of resistance against the French begins in 1946. Lasts until 1954. French control Hanoi.
Viet Minh control the countryside
Hanoi comes under Viet Minh control in 1954. This is the beginning of the reeducation
process
o The Communist view is that urban dwellers were being liberated by peasants
o The view of urban dwellers was that they were not Capitalists but were eeking out
small and simple lives
o Communists wanted to introduce a life-style totally different than the status quo
o The Communist strategy was to turn people into a means of attaining Communist
objectives. People lost most of their freedoms and became servants of the Party
ideology. People were not even allowed their own ideas
Land reform 1953-1956, even though the north had not yet been liberated from the French in
1953
o Major propaganda campaign through the press and the radio and also through
speeches, conversations etc.
o Land reform was best for the peasants
o The land reform really worked. The narrator speaks of having his thoughts changed
 Developed a fear of being called “reactionary”
Struggle against Capitalism 1957-1959
o Time of the workers, who, according to the Communists, would take power and be
the leaders
o Communists said that Capitalism had no place in Vietnam
 Wrote a new history that showed how Capitalism had been unproductive for
40 years
o Property was confiscated
o Reading books was a sign that one was a “progressive” element
o Because of his intellectual bent, the narrator was turned into a discussion leader for
Communist reeducation. He had to play the puppet for Communist ideology
Reeducation
o Attend classes in the morning and afternoon
o Took notes
o Learned about the new society, the truth of Communism
o Most students were capitalists and entrepreneurs
o Students were forced to confess how they exploited people. Families were split and
inconsistencies between different family members were used to weaken family bonds
that would have encouraged resistance to Communism
o Fear was a large element of reeducation
o Students were forced to admit their guilt, even if there was none. Forced confessions
then led to the confiscation of property and the strengthening of the Communist
juggernaut. Peasants benefited from this
This reading documents the oppressive nature of Communist reeducation and demonstrates the
North Vietnamese opposition voice against Communism.
Censorship and control in North Vietnam
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Communist North Vietnam was a world of censorship and control
o People are supposed to idolize political leaders because political leaders are supposed
to represent the party of the proleteriat
o Party decides everything. The government carries out the wish of the Party. There is
no space for discussion. Discussion only happens when something has already been
decided
Elections were rigged
o Each person was kept track of by party members so it would hard to avoid voting
o Group leaders gave everyone a list of seven names from which they had to choose
five
o “Elections are based on a climate of fear”
Newspapers were rigged
o Propaganda through mass media
o Belonged to the Party, not to individuals
o Despite the mandate of “freedom of speech, with no censorship” in the constitution,
editors were already censoring their publications. Office of Propaganda and
Education watched every word, so editors were paralyzed to do anything that would
vaguely contradict the Party
o One paper, New Times, was allowed to contradict the Party, but this was allowed only
to give the false impression that the North Vietnamese press was free
o Criticism was allowed but only as long as it was not directed at the Party
Communists used plainclothes to infiltrate villages at the level of individual people.
Controlling individual down to the words they used was the strategy of the Communists
This reading documents the oppressive nature of Communist rule.
Graham Greene, The Quiet American (2002 edition, text issued by Miramax
films to accompany the film, starring Michael Caine)
The Quiet American is a story set in 1950s French-controlled colonial Vietnam. The narrator,
Fowler, is a British reporter. The other main characters are Pyle, the “quiet American,” and
Phuong, a Vietnamese woman who is the third figure in a love triangle. I summarize the plot and
then identify themes of the novel relevant to our course.
In the opening of the novella, we meet Fowler and Phuong, who are both waiting to meet Pyle.
Pyle does not appear. Phuong acts as Fowler’s mistress, though we also learn that she is to marry
Pyle. Phuong and Fowler are ordered to report to the French police in the middle of the night, at
which Fowler learns that Pyle is dead. The French question Fowler, suspecting his involvement
in the killing, but they and we learn nothing. Fowler tells Phuong later that Pyle is dead and
Phuong returns to be Fowler’s mistress.
We move backward in time to when Fowler first meets Pyle. In Fowler’s weathered and cynical
eyes, Pyle is an idealist whose ideas about Vietnam are based not on reality, but in books written
by people with no firsthand contact with the situation on the ground. Fowler somehow finds
himself responsible for Pyle’s introduction to the darker side of Vietnam. Pyle also meets
Fowler’s mistress, Phuong.
While tracking a French mission in Phat Diem, Fowler witnesses devastating scenes of death.
Unexpectedly, Pyle appears while Fowler is in the north; like a little boyy, Pyle announces that
he has fallen in love Phuong and proposes to marry her if she chooses to leave Fowler. However,
when Fowler returns to Saigon, Phuong chooses not to leave Fowler.
Pyle and Fowler meet on a trip to Tanyin. On the way back, there car runs out of gas, and they
take refuge with guards of a warring faction. Viets ambush the post. While Pyle and Fowler
manage to escape, Fowler’s leg is broken. Pyle saves Fowler’s life. However, when Fowler
returns to Phuong, he tangles himself in a net of deception, when he lies to Phuong about
divorcing his wife so that he can marry Phuong. Phuong leaves Fowler for Pyle. Fowler claims to
need Phuong just for her body, to have someone to not be lonely. Pyle wants Phuong to give her
a family, give her a better life, etc.
In the meantime, Fowler uncover a plot involving Pyle and Pyle’s naïve dreams of helping the
people in Vietnam. Pursuing an unfeasible ideology, Pyle attempts to improve the political
situation between the Communists, the warring factions and the southern government by
inserting a third party. With the aid of mountain rebels, Pyle starts disrupting life in Saigon with
plastic explosive bombing. He believes that this activity will help the Vietnamese people, though
it is never very clear how this will help French or American interests.
When civilians are killed in a mistaken bombing on the part of Pyle, and when Fowler sees
civilians needlessly killed, he can no longer actively avoid choosing sides. He goes to the
Communists and reports Pyle’s activities, which he suspects are part of the O.S.S., a precursor if
the C.I.A. Pyle is then killed.
At the end of the novella, Phuong has returned to Fowler and Fowler gets his divorce, but he
feels uncertain about whether or not his choice effectively to order Pyle’s death was the right
choice.
Themes of The Quiet American
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The role of the Americans in Vietnam: was Pyle just a naïve and ignorant intervener? How
does his role reflect the role that the US actually played in Vietnam?
The dynamic between Fowler/Pyle and Phuong. Beyond the contrast of Fowler’s cynicism
and cold pragmatism, how do their ways of treating Phuong reflect broader conceptions of
how foreign nations “acted on” Vietnam?
Week 6
No Other Road to Take by Nguyen thi Dinh
The memoir begins with Dinh’s initial exposure to the terrible behavior of landlords in
South Vietnam and her initial exposure to the revolution.. Her brother and father often had
visitors and meetings in their home, and Dinh helped cook for the men in the meetings. Dinh
had great respect for her brother and father, and after seeing her brother repeatedly tortured in
prison, she joins the revolution. Initially, her tasks are small, and she successfully distributes
leaflets to people on her way to the market. Dinh refuses to marry anyone because she wants to
focus on working for the revolution, and upon hearing this, an intellectual (Bich) asks her to
marry.
After Dinh gives birth to a baby boy, South Vietnamese authorities arrest Bich and bring
him to a detention camp where he will die. After his arrest, Dinh leaves her child behind with
her family to focus her work on the revolution. She is subsequently arrested, and deported to a
camp. In the camp, the prisoners are subject to serious abuse by the authorities. After she is
allowed to leave the camp, Dinh gains contact with the resurging Viet Minh in 1944. In 1945
and 1946, Dinh was elected to the Executive Committee of the Woman’s Association, through
which she helped organize support for the troops in combat. During this time, she goes to Hanoi,
meets Ho Chi Minh, and embarks on a dangerous mission transporting weapons from the North
to the South via sea. From 1950-1952, Dinh writes about the strong attempt by the French to
assert their control, and she describes this period as the most difficult of the nine years of
resistance. In response, the revolutionary leadership had to spread out to avoid capture, and Dinh
is almost captured and raped by French soldiers. In 1954, there is the cease fire bringing an end
to the Indochina War. Dinh sends her son On to the North, but she and her second husband stay
in the south.
Following the Geneva Conference, the heavy repression is now a result of Diem’s
policies. The government policies include searching out communists and spreading propaganda
supporting the regime. Additionally, the government allowed the corrupt landlords to return and
reclaim their land. Peasants then had to pay “missed” rent and struggled under the government.
In late 1959, and into 1960, the government attempts to set up agrovilles, but it creates a lot of
resentment throughout the population because peasants are forced to do most of the work without
pay. The leadership in the North decides to endorse the use of armed resistance as a supplement
to political resistance, and Dinh helps organize the resistance in Ben Tre.
This is a second summary written by a friend a couple years ago…..
Written in November of 1965, this text is a form of Communist propaganda. In it, Dinh tells the
story of her involvement in both the anti-French movement in her teens, and then in leading the
1960 uprising against Diem in the province of Ben Tre. She gears her writing towards the people
in the North who have access to books, and one of her main arguments is that reunification must
come before socialism.
Born in 1920, Dinh became involved in the anti-French movement in her early teens. She was
born into a peasant family, and she would often times help row a sampan into town in order to
help earn money. Throughout her writing, Dinh portrays the landlords as very oppressive, and
she talks about how much the Communists “loved the poor.” She is very much inspired by her
own older brother who gets her to distribute pamphlets for the anti-French cause.
In 1938, Dinh marries a man named Bich, who is another revolutionary. The two of them have a
son who they name On, but then Bich is arrested. Shortly after Bich’s arrest, Dinh also gets sent
to a work camp controlled by the French, where she remains for three years. In 1943, she
becomes ill, so they put her under house arrest, and at this point she finds out that Bich has died.
She laments her status as a widow at the age of 23, and she vows to always fight to avenge her
husband’s death.
She continues to be active in the revolutionary cause, and in 1946 she has the privilege of
meeting Uncle Ho. She describes him as a very warm and friendly man, and she informs him of
the great need for weapons in the province of Ben Tre. She later risks her life to transport
weapons to this province.
Throughout her writing, she states that the “American-Diem gang” were killing “patriotic
people,” and she reiterates her own devotion to patriotism and “the indomitable spirit of a
revolutionary.” She describes Diem’s land reform policy as devastating to the villagers, and she
calls his 10/59 decree “an extremely fascist law.” This was a law that, according to Dinh, would
allow Diem’s regime to send anyone who “entertained thoughts of opposition” to the guillotine.
As January of 1960 drew nearer, Dinh and her compatriots geared up for revolution. Their main
demands were: 1) to end forced labor, 2) to receive compensation for damaged property and lost
income, and 3) to be able to return to their old homes and farm in order to earn a living. Dinh
helped get many women involved in the revolution, and in her writing, she glorifies their
participation, saying “At the height of the ‘concerted uprising’ in Ben Tre province, the
successful struggle of the women…initiated a new form of struggle by the masses which proved
to be very effective.” She writes that the Americans and Diem were so intimidated by this new
force that they gave them a special name: “the long-haired troops.”
After the 1960 uprising in Ben Tre successfully drove out Diem’s soldiers, Dinh describes the
feelings of liberation, as people could now “laugh, sing and live” as they had before. She ends
her memoir saying that she would continue fighting against Diem’s regime, since there was
simply “no other road to take.” She urges her readers to continue fighting to liberate the South so
that “the whole country could soon be reunited.”
Chapter 9 in McMahon’s Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War
Ho Chi Minh’s Appeal After the Geneva Agreements
Calls for a cease-fire, strengthening of peace, holding of elections, attaining of independence,
strengthening of relations with Cambodia and Laos, the Soviet Union and China.
Trung Nhu Tang on the Origins of the National Liberation Front (1957-1959),
Says that Diem didn’t develop social and economic reforms to help the population. Instead, he
made enemies that began to coalesce into the NLF. If Diem had proven to be a competent ruler,
Tang believes that the people would have rallied around him.
Manifesto of the National Liberation Front, 1960,
Praises the struggle against the French and the Geneva agreement, but denounces Diem as an
American puppet. NLF will fight to overthrow Diem, establish democracy, build a national
culture, and defend world peace
A Vietcong Recruit Explains Why He Joined the Revolution (1961)
Recruit joins the revolution because a VM cadre approached him and explained that he was
being exploited by the landlords. The recruit agrees, and decides to join.
A South Vietnamese Peasant Girl Becomes a Vietcong Supporter (c. 1961)
When republicans were searching for VC members, they took out much of their frustration on
the villagers, creating significant resentment. Basically, the constant presence and contact and
propaganda converted many to the VC cause.
Vo Nguyen Giap on People’s War, 1961,
War with the French showed that an insufficiently equipped people’s army fighting for a just
cause can, with proper strategies, defeat an aggressive imperialistic army. Tbe successful, it’s
necessary to organize and arm all the people of North Vietnam. Goals of the war were to
overthrow imperialism (French with support of US) and defeat the feudal landlord class.
Winning the war would take a long time, with many small battles over time. Using guerrilla
tactics would capitalize on the heroism of the individual and would overcome technological
deficiencies.
Nguyen Chi Thanh on Communist Strategy, 1963
The problems in the US’s plans to turn Vietnam into a democratic nation were: Sharp social
differences between US imperialism and NVN socialism and a world that is not suitable for
imperialism. The US did the wrong thing by invading another nation, so it met the resistance of
the whole Vietnamese people. Also, the US forces are not invincible. Compared to other
imperialistic nations they are stronger, but compared to a revolutionary movement, they are
weak.
Ho Vows to “Fight Until Complete Victory,” 1966,
Radio speech by Ho Chi Minh in which he reports on the successes of the war. He shows hope
and optimism. He states that the US could send in 1 millions troops and drop a million more
bombs, but they will not break our iron will for national salvation. Nothing is more precious
than independence and freedom. Ho wonders how Pres. Johnson can claim that the Vietnamese
are at fault for not entering peace talks, because the US sent troops into Vietnam to massacre the
Vietnamese people. Ho claims that if the US leaves there will be peace. The Vietnamese
cherish real peace, not American peace.
Week 7: Charles Neu, America’s Lost War, Chapter 3: 48-70
 JFK and the World
 JFK eager to still “drifting” nation to action
 Pursued number of ambitious programs such as the Space Program and Peace
Corps.
 Kennedy and crew (McGeorge Bundy, McNamara, Rusk) were young, confident
and newly focused on non-Western world.
 Challenge in Southeast Asia
 First year crises in Bay of Pigs invasion and Berlin confrontation and success in
Laos where sought diplomatic solution. Latter made taking firm stand in Vietnam
more important to show resolve.
 Kennedy responds increasing support of Diem regime.
 Fall of 1961 Kennedy confused as to state of affairs in Vietnam and sends factfinding mission of Taylor and Rostow who stress importance of conflict in
Vietnam and urge expanded aid to S. Viet. Forces.
 Kennedy takes moderate road, refusing Taylor and Rostow and refusing
to negotiate with enemy and ups advisors and military equipment to
ARVN.
 Seeming progress in South Vietnam
 As 1962 progressed, JFK and advisors more optimistic about war with McNamara
reporting progress after a brief visit in May.
 Optimism also related to launch of strategic hamlet program in early1962, which
in theory was to protect peasants from the demands of NLF, but in reality never
functioned as such and alienated population from GNV.
 Head of MACV, Paul D. Harkins predicts war success in about a yea and
McNamara more conservative with “safe bet” of three years.
 Some high-level Vietnam visitors such as Mike Mansfield offer pessimistic
reports of progress and status of Vietnam.
 The New Advisory War
 ARVN had much American provided technology to used against VietCong,
though, sometimes not practical/effective as North fighting different type of war.
 Leadership issues within ARVN; South Vietnamese commanders with little
interest in war other than promotion.
 Battle of Ap Bac
 January 2, 1963: VC humbles South Vietnamese army against staggering odds,
killing 80 ARVN, wounding 100 ARVN, and killing 3 American advisors.
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Revealed ARVN leadership shortcomings and lack of communication as
problem between South Vietnamese and Americans.
Illusion of Victory
 Americans maintain overly optimistic view of progress and anticipated
withdrawal by 1965.
 Large discrepancies between American and North Vietnamese views of how war
going and where headed.
The Challenge to Diem
 Peasants, urbanites, and ARVN officers all becoming discontent with Diem’s
corruption and repression.
 Optimism in Washington re: Diem challenged both internally and externally by
“young, energetic” American journalists in Vietnam.
 Doubts reinforced with Buddhist crisis in the spring of 1963.
Reassessment in Washington
 Differing opinions re: Diem persist throughout 1963, but with arrival of Henry
Cabot Lodge, Jr., a vacillating Kennedy moves toward supporting a coup.
 JFK sends more fact-finding missions to South Vietnam, which come back
optimistic and sure of American success as demonstrated by withdrawal of 1000
troops by the end of 1963.
The Fall of Diem
 Threatened by Americans with selective economic sanctions and general
coolness, Diem and Nhu faked plot against the regime by neutralist forces within
the military and reached out to leaders in Hanoi.
 Coup unfolds November 1, with ARVN troops assaulting the presidential palace.
Diem and Nhu fled but surrendered in Chinese section of Saigon the next morning
and were promptly assassinated.
Reactions to the Coup
 Diem corrupt, bad leader but also patriot and nationalist and perhaps senseless for
US to overthrow without great prospect.
 Kennedy now worries about being drawn into an open-ended war and orders more
visits and fact-finding missions.
 Had he lived, likely JFK would’ve maintained middle of the road approach.
Week 7: Robert J. McMahon, Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, Chapter 5
“John F. Kennedy and Vietnam: Incremental Escalation”
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JFK pursued a more activist foreign policy than Republican predecessor
Sought to avoid Cold War defeats and was even more resolve in this approach after a
negotiated settlement in Laos in 1961.
Maxwell Taylor recommends the dispatch of US forces, 1961
 Introduction of forces carries risks such as increased tensions and heightened risk
for a major war in Asia, but also (and more convincingly) demonstrates US
resolve.
 Don’t need a ton of force but presence enough to raise morale, conduct logistical
operations, conduct combat operations in self-defense, emergency reserve backup
to ARVN, and act as advance party of additional forces as may be introduced.
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 Ultimate recommendation is to not exceed 8000 troops.
Dean Rusk and Robert S. McNamara’s alternative plan, 1961
 Must put GVN in position to win war for self and should be prepared to introduce
US forces if necessary to prevent fall of Saigon to communism.
 Two part deployment needed: modest sized units for direct support and larger
units with actual direct military mission.
 Needed troops about 205,000 men in addition to local forces and SEATO forces
which may be engaged.
 Urge commitment to do it at almost whatever financial and troop cost.
An early US Army advisor remembers his experiences (1962-1963), 1981
 No one initially knew what was going on in Vietnam—“rumors of some place
with combat pay.”
 American contingent sparse at first but with Buddhist demonstrations in 1963
American realized they were supporting “police state.”
Mike Mansfield questions American policy, 1962
 Diem really capable leader? Diffusion of political power, democracy necessary
for any success in Vietnam.
 Emphatically does not recommend massive American commitment of troops—
primary responsibility falls on Vietnamese people.
John F. Kennedy criticizes the South Vietnamese government, 1963
 Walter Cronkite interview: JFK calls for Diem to get back in touch with his
people or risk failure in war efforts.
Kennedy reaffirms the domino theory, 1963
 Interview with Huntley and Brinkley: “China is so large, looms so high just
beyond the frontiers, that if South Viet-Nam went”…
 CIA coordinates with State Department and the Defense Department—does not
make its own policy as charged.
 Don’t want to exercise complete control/too much influence in South Vietnam as
they have their own interests, etc.; US “can’t make everyone in our image.”
Henry Cabot Lodge discusses coup prospects, 1963
 Gen. Don and Conein: former “seriously attempting to effect change in the
government”
 US shouldn’t thwart because 1) next government couldn’t be worse than present
and 2) “unwise in the long range for us to pour cold water on attempts at a coup”
 Gen. Don intends no religious discrimination
McGeorge Bundy expresses reservations, 1963
 Coup may induce prolonged fighting
 Don’s lack of experience/willingness in military planning
 Take care to prevent coup from endangering US nationals
 Need post-coup recommendations
Diem’s final appeal for US help, 1963
 Lodge ambiguous about US intentions and Diem seems to sense the end is near.
Essay by Michael H. Hunt of UNC “The Perils of Interventionism”
 Negative assessment of JFK as a person and leader who was “emotionally
immature” and had a “shallow understanding of foreign policy.”
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Kennedy crew driven by Cold War imperatives and eager, but sometimes JFK
moved at a slow pace as in SE Asia
Kennedy confused by greatly conflicting reports given to him about state of
Vietnam
Implications and consequences of foreign policy choices unpredictable and
“potentially unpalatable.”
While Rostow argued to send troops to Laos, JFK ultimately opted for negotiated
settlement.
Initially, decided to stand firm with Diem to prevent communist domination of
SV, taking the middle of the road and quietly approving additional troops.
Kennedy troubled by “war that offered no easy answers and seemed to require
ever-higher levels of U. S. involvement.” Eventually accepted McNamara-Rusk
recommendations and sent operational units to SV.
Perfunctory approval of coup deepens concern and uncertainty.
Kennedy perhaps rethinking Vietnam policy, considering withdrawal with
announcement of slow withdrawal of few troops?
o If happened would’ve been arduous and dangerous.
o Would again mean “quitting” vs. Communism and abandoning
people vowed to protect.
Essay by David Kaiser, Army War College: “Kennedy’s prudent and cautious policy”
 Kennedy rightly questioned how much support war would receive from variety of
sources and wondered whether Indochina really the place to fight Communism.
 Saigon nor the US knew how to deal with a guerilla war, so Kennedy right to
avoid over-commitment or becoming trapped in an extended war.
 Coup should be blamed on Diem and Nhu not Americans.
 Kennedy continued to believe until the end the assurances of his advisors that the
war was going well. Can we criticize his policy if he truly believed all was well
and proceeding as planned?
Week 7: “Intelligence and Vietnam: The Top Secret 1969 State Department Study”
This reading is a collection of declassified Bureau of Intelligence and Research documents
which stood out as tenaciously pessimistic with regards to US involvement in Vietnam. Their
primary points of concern which warn against escalation are: the question of the viability of
successive Saigon regimes; the Pentagon’s statistical underestimation of enemy strength; the
ultimate ineffectiveness of bombing in the North; the persistence of the North Vietnamese and the
Vietcong; and the danger of Chinese intervention.
PART I: The Problem Confronted: January 1961-February 1962
Events during the last two years of the Eisenhower administration gave rise to concerns
regarding the stability of South Vietnam under Diem. Viet Cong activity and inroads into areas
previously under government control grew substantially. Evidence of growing discontent with
the Diem regime in civilian and military circles. However within the US government there was
no agreement upon the nature or causes of the threat let alone what to do about it.
All discussion within the government addressed issues of military strategy. The military felt as
thought the main danger was in overt attack from the north and that conventional forces suited to
defend against such would be sufficient to address the insurgency.
There was also a school of observers that recognized the chief problem as being internal security,
and imagined a counterinsurgency plan which was more political than military in nature. This
plan had been submitted to Diem in February 1961, and basically involved “preoccupation” of
vulnerable territories.
US, under Eisenhower, made clear its support for the Diem government, but conditioned that
commitment on good political/military performance. The level of US commitment was thus
questionable/ambivalent.
The major questions as Kennedy admin took office were thus: Militarily, what were the nature
and extent of Viet Cong capabilities; and what were the assets and tactics necessary to defeat
them? Politically, what were the possibilities for improving South Vietnamese support of the
present Diem government? And what should be the role of US support in all of this?
The Kennedy administration, when in office, reaffirmed commitment to Diem; indicated his
consideration of committing US forces if necessary (May 1961). President Johnson had a visit to
S. Vietnam in that same month, which resulted in additional military and economic aid.
PART II: Looking for Progress: February 1962-May 1963
In November 1961 Kennedy pledges an increase in military aid to S. Vietnam. In Jan 1962, a
joint US-GVN program to improve living standards in the south is announced. Hamlet relocation
project begins. INR analysis of these programs were greatly pessimistic, despite optimistic US
public assessments.
US confidence in Diem also deteriorating. INR judged that while Communists could not
overthrow GVN of seize power in the wake of a non-Communist coups; the Diem regime
seemed incapable of halting the deterioration in security brought about by the accelerating
communist insurgency.
INR also noted that the Diem regime and its advisers persisted in greatly overemphasizing the
military aspects of the war. Furthermore, INR took note of a seeming breakdown between US
advisors and the actions carried out by the Diem regime. INR developed the view that the
conditions of the war required a small-scale, unconventional effort and that the large scale
conventional units supported by air power which were in current operation were inadequate.
While it supported the underlying idea of the Hamlet program, it expressed explicit doubts about
its efficacy in practice. INR also expressed doubts concerning the validity underlying certain
figures and statistics which were basic to estimates of a favorable trend in the US-GVN effort.
INR recognized the importance of US influence as a factor in the short-term political stability of
S. Vietnam, but also saw the increasing tensions between Diem government and US advisorship
as undermining that connection. IN anticipation of a possible non-communist coup against Diem,
INR suggested that the US position in that circumstance be made clear.
PART III: Trouble with Diem: May-November 1963
Events during this period dramatically switched the focus of attention from military to political
affairs in South Vietnam. On May GVN suppressed a Buddhist demonstration in Hue over
religious rights under the regime; which sparked a rash of larger Buddhist dissent and
demonstrations; in which several Buddhists immolated themselves in public.
This was a further source of tension between the US and the GVN, as the US could neither
support religious intolerance, and it recognized the heightened political instability coming out of
the event. Following the incident, the US suspended its commodity import program. Kennedy
held press interviews in which he expressed increasing concern over the situation, finally noting
that there was an urgent need for change in GVN policy and personnel.
On Nov 1, 1963, a successful coup was staged against the Diem regime, in the course of which
Diem and his brother were killed. The outcome was the provisional Minh government.
INR analysis in this period emphasized the importance of coming to an agreement with the
newly activist Buddhist, for the sake of the political stability of S. Vietnam. When Diem’s
regime failed to do this, INR was in favor of change, but was convinced that a coup could only
come from within the government.
Week 7: John Prados, “JFK and the Diem Coup”
This reading is a collection of declassified materials which document a taped meeting showing
that US officials, including JFK, supported the Coup against Diem, though vastly overestimated
their ability to control the South Vietnamese generals who ran it.
In the wake of the coup against Diem and the assassination of the Saigon leader and his brother,
many observers have wrestled with the question of President Kennedy's involvement in the
murders.
When the coup did begin the security precautions taken by the South Vietnamese generals
included giving the U.S. embassy only four minutes warning, and then cutting off telephone
service to the American military advisory group. Washington's information was partial as a
result, and continued so through November 2, the day Diem died.
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recounts that Kennedy was meeting with his senior
advisers about Vietnam on the morning of November 2 (see Document 25) when NSC staff aide
Michael V. Forrestal entered the Cabinet Room holding a cable (Document 24 provides the same
information) reporting the death. Both McNamara and historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., a
participant as White House historian, record that President Kennedy blanched at the news and
was shocked at the murder of Diem. Historian Howard Jones notes that CIA director John
McCone and his subordinates were amazed that Kennedy should be shocked at the deaths, given
how unpredictable were coups d'etat.
Records of the Kennedy national security meetings show that none of JFK's conversations about
a coup in Saigon featured consideration of what might physically happen to Ngo Dinh Diem or
Ngo Dinh Nhu. The audio record of the October 29th meeting also reveals no discussion of this
issue. That meeting, the last held at the White House to consider a coup before this actually took
place, would have been the key moment for such a conversation. The conclusion of the Church
Committee agrees that Washington gave no consideration to killing Diem.
The weight of evidence therefore supports the view that President Kennedy did not conspire in
the death of Diem. However, there is also the exceedingly strange transcript of Diem's final
phone conversation with Ambassador Lodge on the afternoon of the coup (Document 23), which
carries the distinct impression that Diem is being abandoned by the U.S. Whether this represents
Lodge's contribution, or JFK's wishes, is not apparent from the evidence available today.
A second charge has to do with Kennedy administration denials that it had had anything to do
with the coup itself. The documentary record is replete with evidence that President Kennedy
and his advisers, both individually and collectively, had a considerable role in the coup overall,
by giving initial support to Saigon military officers uncertain what the U.S. response might be,
by withdrawing U.S. aid from Diem himself, and by publicly pressuring the Saigon government
in a way that made clear to South Vietnamese that Diem was isolated from his American ally.
In addition, at several of his meetings (Documents 7, 19, 22) Kennedy had CIA briefings and led
discussions based on the estimated balance between pro- and anti-coup forces in Saigon that
leave no doubt the United States had a detailed interest in the outcome of a coup against Ngo
Dinh Diem. The CIA also provided $42,000 in immediate support money to the plotters the
morning of the coup, carried by Lucien Conein, an act prefigured in administration planning
Document 17).
The ultimate effect of United States participation in the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem was to
commit Washington to Saigon even more deeply. Having had a hand in the coup America had
more responsibility for the South Vietnamese governments that followed Diem. That these
military juntas were ineffectual in prosecuting the Vietnam war then required successively
greater levels of involvement from the American side. The weakness of the Saigon government
thus became a factor in U.S. escalations of the Vietnam war, leading to the major ground war
that the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson opened in 1965.
Week 8 Neu, America’s Lost War Ch.4: 1963-1965
DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
*Military junta that recently overthrew Diem was less competent than US expected*
1. they had no plan to get more support from SVN people, were more concerned in
administrative positions, etc.
2. they wanted to taper off war, while US wanted to escalate
a. junta was even willing to negotiate with NLF by having “friendly competition
for political power”
 US wasn’t having that, so they orchestrated another coup by General Khanh in ‘64
however, new Khanh regime also was “more absorbed in political maneuvering than in running
their nation”—didn’t work on strategies of how to unite people, or on how they should continue
with war
 US administration began to contemplate Americanization of the War: Rusk said “Somehow,
we must change the pace at which these people move and I suspect that this can only be done
with a pervasive intrusion of Americans into their affairs.”(74)
GULF OF TONKIN
-Two US ships were stationed in the Gulf of Tonkin; flawed radar indicated that they were under
attack
-In response, LBJ ordered air attacks against NVN and proposed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution to
Congress; Congress passed it, with only two votes against it, giving LBJ blanket military
authority to protect US forces in Southeast Asia (SEA) from future attacks and to “assist any
member of SEATO that asked for help to defend its freedom.” (80)
-At the time, LBJ didn’t see the resolution as an opportunity to full out escalate the war in
Vietnam, but rather as assurance of US public’s support of US presence in SEA and in SVN
Meanwhile:
-DRV agrees to commit troops to help NLF, with support from PRC and Soviet Union
-LBJ elected in 1964 on the platform of avoiding deeper American military involvement
in Vietnam—one of his slogans, “We seek no wider war” (81)
VIET CONG UPS THE ANTE
-In Dec. 1964, Viet Cong launch offensives that “destroy many of ARVN’s elite battalions.”(82),
thoroughly shaking the ARVN and the GVN—“the Saigon government, close to panic, prepared
to evacuate it s five northern provinces. Without massive American intervention in 1965, The
Republic of Vietnam would never have lived to see 1966.” (82)
-US responds with escalation: LBJ authorizes operation Rolling Thunder, continuous bombing of
NVN, and sends in US troops—Khanh only found out US troops were coming two days before
they arrived, and only learned about the US plans of “Americanization” of the war the day the
troops arrived
Then,
-Westmoreland requests 44 more battalions LBJ administration faced with the conflict of
whether to further escalate in order to win the war, or whether to stop and admit defeat; some
(especially Ball) say to pull out, some (led by McNamara) say to go in very aggressively
-LBJ agrees to a middle course: sends in 125000 US soldiers, with more to follow
-US army take up control of war strategy, leaving SVN to step aside, hoping that the Americans
know what they’re doing
BATTLE OF IA DRANG
-First large battle after Americanization, lasted for nearly a month—both sides suffered high
losses, but the NVA more than the US troops—death ratio of 12 NVA to 1 US
-Made it clear that it would be a long war
-For Westmoreland, these were good results—b/c he planned to lead a war of attrition—the war
would be bloody, but communists would suffer more than allied forces
-For NVN, the battle was a learning opportunity, they still sought to learn how to best fight
Americans; they planned, like Westmoreland, to engage in a war of attrition—to “wear down the
American army and exhaust the patience of the American people”
-A stalemate then was inevitable, since both NVN and US planned to increase forces and assaults
on the enemy in order to wear them down
Week 8 Neu, America’s Lost War Ch. 5: 1965-1967
-At beginning of 1966, US public was mostly in agreement w/ war, but as more American troops
died in combat, more people began to evidence discontent—both w/in US gov’t (RFK, Senator
Fulbright), and among students
STRATEGY OF ATTRITION
-LBJ administration approves Westmoreland’s strategy of attrition, with LBJ hoping that the war
won’t last for too long
-But Westmoreland’s strategy and US military technology and structure didn’t fit well with the
nature of the Vietnam War
 measure of progress, enemy body count, was hard to attain
guerilla warfare-- didn’t know where enemy was
AMERICA’S ENEMY
-NVA has their strength and weaknesses:
weakness: better on the defensive than offensive
 one of their chief strengths was indoctrination and maintaining morale
A War without a Front
-War proved difficult b/c US’s enemy was resilient, “By American standards NVA units took
staggering casualties, but time after time they were able to withdraw and rebuild their
strength.”(108)
-For US soldiers, daily pattern was one of haphazard contact with the enemy, and daily contact
with booby traps, etc.
-Also, ARVN units were by and large unwilling to fight—one US soldier recalls wondering
“Whose war was this, anyway?”(109)
-In addition, “combat had a circular quality: UST troops would often patrol the same territory,
engaging in fleeting contacts with the enemy, or take an objective only to abandon it.” So after
beating the VC out of an area, they would continually have to go back to reclaim it from the VC
again b/c GVN “could not establish control in newly cleared areas”(109,110)
Confusion and Disillusionment
-For US soldiers, b/c they aren’t seen as liberators by the local people, as they thought they
would be, they grew confused and disillusioned
-Plus they feel their day to day combat efforts are futile
SEEKING A STEADY COURSE
-In the midst of GVN drama and increasing disaffection of American public, LBJ increases
number of troops and bombing in NVN in hopes of tiring enemy faster
SEARCH AND DESTROY
-CAPS units offer an alternative military strategy—US troops team up with Popular Forces
(local Republican Vietnamese troops) to protect hamlets from NLF—in order to overcome
barriers and encourage positive relations between Americans and the people they’re supposedly
liberating, with the further prospect of getting intelligence from villagers on NLF operations
bases and plans
-Westmoreland rejects CAPS idea as an overall strategy, saying “the essence of the problem in
Vietnam is military”(115)
HOPES FOR VICTORY
-LBJ continues to get positive reports from Us officials in Saigon, and continues to escalate,
but anti-war movement is gaining momentum, LBJ is losing US public support, and some in the
administration begin to doubt war progress
PROSPECTS FOR 1967
-Westmoreland gives a sobering report of war progress; enemy is suffering, but is not gone yet;
he estimates they’ll need at least three more years till the end of the war with “an ‘optimum
force’ of 670,000.
DOUBTS AND DIVISIONS
-Mounting anti-war sentiment; MLK speaks out publicly vs. war
-LBJ administration decides that they are winning the war, slowly, but steadily and give
westmoreland more troops to end the war
THE ORDER OF BATTLE CONTROVERSY
-a CIA analyst researches structure of NLF and discovers that previous estimates of NLF
members/ militarily were grossly low—e.g in one province, there were 50,244 soldiers while US
military estimated there were only 4,668
-So Westmoreland’s calculations that the enemy will soon lose more troops than can be replaced
might be entirely off, meaning that the war might last for much longer than Westmoreland
thought, but the White House sides w/ Westy’s estimates
ILLUSIONS OF VICTORY
-LBJ’s public support dwindles 2/3 of Americans disapprove of way he’s handling war
-LBJ seeks out negotiations, but Hanoi refuses to budge on its demands
-Meanwhile American combat deaths mount, as does the anti-war movement
-Westmoreland steps in, coming to US and speaks on TV saying that in 2 years, the enemy will
be weak enough that the SVN can take over the war, which helps to appease the public
WEEK 8
McMahon Chapter 6: Fear, Ambition, and Politics by Robert Dallek
General summary: LBJ was worried that Vietnam would mess up his domestic agenda; he was
competitive and wanted to win, which eventually tipped the scale in his deliberations about
whether or not to escalate the American involvement
-Taylor, Rusk, McCone, Wheeler were in favor of staying in Vietnam and not pulling out
or decreasing involvement
-Sen. Mike Mansfield wanted to pull out and said it was a quagmire; Johnson agreed with
assessment of situation but said US is doing what it must
-Generally, the hawks outweighed the doves among advisors
-Many compared him to Kennedy in order to pressure him into “having enough guts” to
be strong militarily
-Believed in combating Communist threat
-Plan originally required as prerequisite a stable government in Saigon or recognition of
sovereignty by NV; this changed to assuming those would happen only if plan were enacted first
-Johnson oscillated between viewpoints, and his advisors were not in agreement
-Didn’t want to encourage public debate about it so as not to distract from domestic
reform agenda
-Ended up increasing troop levels by 50% in middle of June 1964
McMahon Chapter 6: Choosing War by Fredrik Logevall- included in sourcebook, refer to
summary there
McMahon Chapter 7: A Critical Appraisal of American Strategy by Harry G. Summers,
Jr.
Says a different strategy could have brought victory; there was no formal declaration of war so
the American public had to outward sign declaring their support for the war, which caused some
dissent as to legality of actions. US underestimated their opponent and relied on strategic
offensive instead of strategic defensive. “Our political policy was to contain the expansion of
communist power, but we did not wish to risk a world war by using military means to destroy the
source of that power.” We should have taken the offensive along the DMZ across Laos to isolate
battlefield and expanded the Naval blockade- this would have avoided invading NV and getting
Chinese invovled
McMahon Chapter 7: A Different Kind of War by George C. Herring
Says a different strategy would not have brought victory, but is critical of US conduct and
problems inherent in fighting a limited war. Problems: There was no real strategy, the different
military branches did not work together and were therefore badly coordinated, idea of limited
war made them want to deter aggression to avoid a major war, Johnson’s desire to avoid dissent
stifled debate that could have produced a strategy and led him to choose military leaders who
would not “rock the boat,” this led to a lack of discussion either in the military or in the public;
Vietnam was also unique in its terrain and climate, the unconventional warfare, lack of a stable
government to support, fanatical enemy, peace objectives weren’t coordinated with military
objectives. All in all, “American policymakers thus took on in Vietnam a problem that was in all
likelihood beyond their control.”
WEEK 8
Robert J. McMahon, Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War,
chapters 6 and 7
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1964-1968, vol. III: Vietnam, June-December 1965, documents 26-35, 38-48,
66-73, and 93-97
McMahon, Chapter 6: Lyndon B. Johnson’s Decisions for War
Document 1 “Reassesment of US Policy in South Vietnam, 1964”
-from Sec. of Def. McNamara to LBJ
-approved by LBJ the next day as NSA Memorandum 288
I. Objectives
a. independent, non-Communist South Vietnam
b. if communist, domino theory will occur
c. US involvement in SV is regarded as a test case to see if we can stop
Communism
II. Present Policy
a. SV- defeat VC, generally not against NV
b. Laos- still within 1962 Geneva Accords
c. Cambodia- trying to make them stay neutral
III. Present Situation in SV
Generally doesn’t need supplementation, policy of reducing US personnel when
they can use SV; Should still let it be known that we are there if necessary.
Situation is getting worse, with VC in control of ~40% of land, desertion rates
are up and morale is down
IV. RecommendationsShow support by: increasing forces by 50,000, upping money, improving supplies
(planes, etc), fly over borders, make a plan for “border control actions” to be
ready with 72 hours notice
Document 2: LBJ and Richard Russell talk about Vietnam, 1964
-LBJ just weighing options; wants to get out but feels bound by treaty, doesn’t think
Americans care about Vietnam, make political issue over relatively few deaths, doesn’t
want China to get involved, “got to move in or move out,” Russell wants to put someone
in power there that wants US out, ends unresolved
Document 3: Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 1964
-authorized President to use whatever force necessary in Vietnam because it is “vital to
our national interests”, passed Senate 98-2
Document 4: LBJ Explains Why Americans Fight in Vietnam, 1965
- to secure our own freedom, NV has tried to conquer SV, China’s helping, wants
Congress to approve $1 bill. “investment,” promise of hope for Vietnam, for security
-Speech given by LBJ at Johns Hopkins
Document 5: McNamara Recommends Escalation, 1965
Either cut losses, keep status quo, or escalate- chose third option ; expand military power
there; look toward talks with Hanoi and Beijing, try to keep Moscow out; public should
support it; USSR could increase participation, China probably won’t, NV will once it
start losing, VC will continue guerilla warfare but less powerful; will help militarily, hurt
politically, if it succeeds it could bring NV to negotiating table.
Document 6: [Undersecretary of State] George Ball Dissents, 1965
SV are losing already, we can’t win no matter how much we put into it- it will end up as
either a protracted stalemate or cutting losses, so we should act now so we don’t have
even more casualties, we should compromise; don’t add more troops than already
allocated, negotiate with Hanoi and go through their Paris representative
Document 7: Johnson Recalls His Decision to Commit Troops (1965), 1971 (in memoir)
Shares concerns with Ball but worried about results of his plan- it didn’t account fully for
global repercussions, instead would move diplomatically towards settlement but would
increase military support; walking away would cause chaos domestically; China and
USSR will take advantage of weakness and fill “vacuum of power”
Document 8: Philip Caputo Remembers His Idealism (1965), 1977 (in soldier’s memoir)
Kennedy’s challenge inspired him, shaped by WW2, image was proven wrong
McMahon, Chapter 7: US Military Strategy
Document 1: McNamara Urges Add’l Troop Deployments, 1965
-admits deployment might not guarantee victory, very little change politically, only
militarily; NV is trying to infiltrate SV with a build-up, so we need to match it with
increased troop deployments
Document 2: Kennan Criticizes American Military Commitment, 1966
-author of containment doctrine, sees no reason to be involved in Vietnam except that we
already are entangled, thinks communist state in SV would be independent of China and
USSR, thinks unlikely the assumption that if we try hard enough the other side will
capitulate, could risk Japan liking us less
Document 3 : Westmoreland Reviews Military Operations in SV, 1966
Objectives: build up forces, gain trust, extend deployments, disrupt enemy, secure SV;
Need to: restrict access to SV by NV, launch offensive operations
Document 4 : CIA’s Assessment of Bombing Campaign, 1967
Operation Rolling Thunder has hindered NV, but able to recuperate other than power
systems; little lasting effect
Document 5 : McNamara on the Improved Military Outlook, 1967
Military commanders think situation is improving, reopened transportation lines in SV,
night vision has helped, progress in pacification is slow, need to use existing personnel
better, we have no 1.3 million men there
Document 6 : Westmoreland Reflects on War of Attrition, 1977
General strategies: 1)bolster SV with advisors 2)escalate pressure to get NV to halt 3)first
commitment of ground troops with bombing of NV 4)protection of areas by US but
fighting left to SV 5)gradual buildup of forces, emphasizing pacification to bring enemy
to conference table 6)maximum expansion to pacify SV and build strong nation with aim
to eventually withdraw. We needed to progress through all six
Sourcebook: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1964-1968, vol. III: Vietnam, June-December 1965, documents 26-35, 38-48,
66-73, and 93-97
26. Ball- cutting our losses in SV: we won’t win, the longer we wait, the more people die, so we
should just get out soon and we need a plan to do so; no more land forces b/c there is no
legitimate government in SV needing our help- we won’t keep helping unless they make a viable
government that represents all people; will either improve government or make them form a new
one; we should fight the Cold War somewhere where we can win
27. Memorandum from BundyLBJ 1965 Analyzes VC morale and motivation; hard core cadrefought against French, nationalist; younger generation- against US, patriotic appeals, lack of
opportunity; conditions are bad for both so defections occur but not b/c of ideological reasons;
they are afraid of artillery fire; need to aid defectors
28. Telegram JCSWestmoreland 1965 We should augment forces, deploy certain battalions
29. Telegram Embassy in VietnamDept. of State Ky wants more ground forces, Westmoreland
and Generals should decide if its necessary
30. Telegram NSC StaffBundy Meet in neutral capital city with NLF and DRV, agree to meet
and willingness to talk; tell Moscow we don’t want Vietnam to be Communist, but we don’t
want to fight with them, willing to let them save face and play peacemaker; pause air strikes in
NV
31. Telegram WestmorelandJCS tactical discussion
32. Telegram Embassy in VietnamDept. of State Ky seems legitimate about getting support of
country, VC keeps attacking and disrupting communication, need to work on economic
restructuring
33. Memorandum from BundyLBJ 1965 if France:Vietnam::US:Vietnam works? Difference in
colonial/non-colonial aim, France was more committed with % of $; difference in political
factions within country; France was politically unstable and war was really unpopular and
therefore lacked will to continue>> different than US; generally not a good analogy
34. CIA Memorandum comments on McNamara’s suggested expansion- they are losing now,
proposal is too broad, political gestures are good but previous efforts have failed, could work but
not likely
35. Memorandum from BundyMcNamara raises objections to McNamara’s plan, says there
needs to be an upper limit and more analysis
38. Memorandum from McNamaraLBJ re-states plan for expansion and supports it as
necessary
39. Paper by Rusk we need to deny VC a victory, basically agrees with McNamara
40. Paper by Ball Restates document 26, analyzes possible outcomes
41. Memorandum by Bundy proposes ‘midway’ course of action’- prepare to deploy additional
troops and make plans for negotiations but don’t commit, basically prepare but wait to strike
completely
42. Memorandum from BundyLBJ wants to keep dissention in inner circle
43. Memorandum from BundyLBJ McNamara will be willing to scale down, Rusk agrees with
McNamara, Ball doesn’t, listen to all of them and consider points of each carefully
44. Editorial Note describes LBJ saying US should initiate talks, military look at what’s
necessary, diplomats see what talks can be arranged
44. Memorandum from CIA Deputy Dir.Bundy yes, we should talk to NLF
46. Telegram Dept. of State Vietnam Embassy ditto, but should be careful of leaks, and be
aware of their perception of situation
47. Telegram Dept. of State Vietnam Embassy think NV would be willing to talk, reviews
position of each side
48. Memorandum from BundyLBJ S. Vietnamese like US troops and view them as necessary
66. Memorandum from Ambassador LodgeLBJ agree with McNamara
67. Memorandum from McNamaraLBJ repeats proposal already given
70. Memorandum from BundyLBJ debate over who should be sent to Saigon as underambassadors, suggests Sullivan and Meloy under Lodge
The following documents only repeat points already discussed in previous documents
71. Notes of Meeting debates different proposals, rehashing of #43
72. Memorandum for the Record notes of meeting
73. Memorandum NSC StaffBundy
93. Summary Notes NSC mtg.
94. Memorandum mtg. w/Joint Congressional Leadership
95. Memorandum from BundyLBJ
96. Memorandum from Senator MansfieldLBJ says to be mindful of international reaction,
should not bomb NV, should get out, country only supports LBJ because he is President, should
go through international channels to negotiate
97. Editorial Note LBJ announced in press conference he would escalate troops and would be
ready for discussions with all sides; his decision was later implemented
Week 9: Neu, Chapter 6. Tet and Beyond, 1968
Origins of the Tet Offensive
Summer of 1967 – Hanoi leaders were worried about the course of the war. The mounting
intensity had strained the resources of the VC and the NVA, resulted in a decline in morale. With
the death of COSVN director General Nguyen Chi Thanh in July, the balance of forces in Hanoi
shifted to a new strategy – a general offensive that, if successful, would crush the South
Vietnamese gov’t and force the US to withdraw. Even if the offensive fell short of its maximum
goals it was reasoned that it would weaken the US position and push the war into a new, more
vulnerable phase. The offensive had two phases – first, a series of NVA attacks along the South
Vietnamese border to draw American forces away from the urban areas, and second, an assault
on South Vietnamese cities and key facilities within them.
The Siege of Khe Sanh
On January 21, 10 days before Tet, the NVA opened fire on the US base at Khe Sanh in the
northwest corner of South Vietnam. The motives of Giap in laying siege to Khe Sanh remain
difficult to determine – it may have been part of the plan to draw attention away from the cities
in the South or he may actually have hoped to overrun the base.
The Shock of Tet
Communist leaders made some serious miscalculations – they were unable to coordinate
successfully, and premature assaults put US and ARVN commanders on the alert, they
underestimated the firepower and mobility of US troops and misjudged the morale of ARVN,
and finally they misjudged the mood of the urban masses, who they had expected to rise up in
revolt against the US. Of the 80,000 NVA and VC troops involved, 30,000 were killed, wounded
or captured. In most areas the fighting lasted only a few days but in some places like Saigon and
Hue it dragged on for weeks. American commanders had not anticipated the scope and intensity
of Tet – despite evidence that Communist forces were gathering for an attack, it seemed
inconceivable that the enemy would launch an assault that was doomed to failure. The fighting
was bloody and actions on both sides revealed more than ever the brutality of the war – having
been lulled by optimistic assessments of the war, Americans were shocked that the allegedly
defeated enemy had attacked seemingly anywhere it wished to in South Vietnam.
The US Military’s Response
Tet Offensive seriously damaged Westmoreland’s reputatuion. From Westmoreland’s
perspective however the military situation in Vietnam was hopeful. The US had successfully
defended Khe Sanh, killing about 10,000 North Vietnamese while sustaining only 650 casualties.
As the assault on the cities wound down, Westmoreland realized the extent of the enemy’s
catastrophe and hoped to seize the initiative and launch a series of offensives. In March 1968 he
requested an additional 206,000 troops.
Reassessment in Washington
The press portrayed Westmoreland’s request as a desperate measure in a failing war effort rather
than a plan for offensive operations, contributing to public anger and disillusionment. In midMarch, the Johnson administration faced a serious economic crisis, and Johnson’s public
approval was at an all-time low. After a meeting with his top advisors, Johnson announced his
plan to take steps to limit the war in Vietnam. He announced a unilateral halt to the bombing of
North Vietnam, in the hope that this would induce the north Vietnamese to begin negotiations.
The Tet Offensive and the reaction to it had finally forced him to rethink his politics.
The War at Home
Johnson announced on March 31 that he would not run for reelection – stunned the American
people and threw the McCarthy and Kennedy campaigns into disarray. After the assassination of
Robert Kennedy in June, McCarthy withdrew and Humphrey emerged as the democratic frontrunner.
The Bloodiest Year
Both Westmoreland and his Communist adversaries believed that the Tet offensive has seriously
weakened the other side. On March 23, Johnson announced that Westmoreland would step down
as commander, to be replaced by General Creighton Abrams. Abrams de-emphasized the body
count and big-unit operations, seeking instead to protect the population, capture enemy supplies,
and interdict infiltration along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. As many of the Viet Cong’s most
experienced soldiers had died during Tet and morale was at an all-time low, leaders in Hanoi
were put on the defensive. After another failed offensive in August, many NVA and VC units
withdrew to remote bases where they could reorganize and replace their losses.
Washington’s Calculations
Talks with the government in Hanoi, which began in mid0May, were quickly deadlocked – the
North Vietnamese wanted a complete end to bombing and complete US withdrawal, while
Johnson was unwilling to compromise his goal of an independent South Vietnam. In late July,
after visiting South Vietnam, Clifford gave a pessimistic report on the conditions in South
Vietnam – he doubted that the South Vietnamese army could take over the conflict and urged the
president to make a strong effort to settle the conflict in the next six months. Johnson was
angered with his inability to find a way out of the war – he was unwilling to make concessions,
but neither was he in a mood for heroic measures when American casualties remained high and
prospects for victory seemed bleak.
The Fall Campaign
While the Democrats were fiercely divided, Republicans united behind their recently chosen
candidate, Richard Nixon. After Tet, Nixon had moderated his position on Vietnam and now
called for “a progressive de-Americanization of the war… neither peace at any price nor a
camouflaged surrender.” Nixon won a narrow victory by less than one percentage point, in part
because voters were looking for a candidate who seemed likely to end the war in Vietnam – they
were looking for a change from the policies of the past, to which Humphries remained tied.
Week 9: McMahon, Chapter 10. The Tet Offensive
Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk Assess the Tet Offensive, 1968
McNamara: “The North Vietnamese and the Vietcong have not accomplished either one of their
main objectives: to ignite a general uprising or to force a diversion of the troops which the South
Vietnamese and the US have moves into the northern areas of South Vietnam, anticipating a
major Vietcong and North Vietnamese offensive in that area.”
Rusk: “I think there is a psychological factor here we won’t be able to assess until a week or two
after the event, and I might say also that we know there is going to be some hard fighting ahead.”
Robert F. Kennedy Calls Vietnam an Unwinnable War, 1968
“A total military victory is not within sight or around the corner… the pursuit of such a victory is
not necessary to our national interest, and is even damaging that interest.”
“The best way to save our most precious stake in Vietnam – the lives our soldiers – is to stop
enlargement of the war, and the best way to end casualties is to end the war.”
Walter Cronkite Criticizes a Policy "Mired in Stalemate," 1968
“To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of the evidence, the optimists
who have been wrong in the past. To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to
unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet
unsatisfactory, conclusion.”
“It is increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way out then will be to negotiate,
not as victors, but as an honorable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy, and
did the best they could.”
Earle G. Wheeler's Report on Military Prospects After Tet, 1968
“Enemy losses have been heavy; he has failed to achieve his prime objectives… however, his
determination appears to be unshaken.”
“The initial attack succeeded in a dozen places, and defeat in those places was only averted by
the timely reaction of US forces. In short, it was a very near thing”
“General Westmoreland has asked for a 3-division-15 tactical fighter squadron force. This force
would provide him with a theater reserve and an offensive capability which he does not now
have.”
A Communist Party Evaluation, 1968
“Great and unprecedented successes recorded in all fields during the first-month phase of the
General Offensive and General Uprising.”
“The puppet troop proselyting failed to create a military revolt movement in which the troops
would arise and return to the people’s side.”
“The replenishment of troops and development of political forces of the infrastructure has been
slow and has not net the requirements of continuous offensives.”
A U.S. Air Force Nurse Remembers the Tet Offensive (1968), 1987
“The first two days of the Tet offensive, we worked something like thirty hours without sleep…
You constantly had something or other going – you didn’t have time to stand around and wait for
the next rocket attack. You just kept working as long as you could.”
Robert Komer Recalls Tet's Impact (1968), 1987
“I always felt the Tet Offensive was a desperate gamble on the part of Hanoi.”
“It cost them enormously… the enemy had sacrificed the core of his guerilla movement… But it
also fatally weakened us at the center of out political structure.”
“It was the Tet shock to the American psyche that made me first think we might lose.”
“Westmoreland’s conditional requisition, which is based on A. calling up the reserves and B.
letting him use these troops to go into the sanctuaries, none of that is ever mentioned by Wheeler
to either the president or to McNamara.”
“Wheeler’s the evil genius of the Vietnam war in my judgement.”
Clark M. Clifford Remembers His Post-Tet Questions (1968), 1969
“’Will 200,000 more men do the job?’ I found no assurance that they would.”
“’Can the enemy respond with a buildup of his own?’ He could and probably would.”
“’What are the estimated costs of the latest requests?’ First calculations were on the order of $2
billion for the remaining four months of that fiscal year, and an increase of $10 to $12 billion for
the year beginning July 1, 1968.”
“’What is the best estimate as to how long this course of action will take?’ There was no
agreement on an answer.”
“I was convinced that the military course we were pursuing was not only endless, but hopeless.”
Johnson Calls for Negotiations, 1968
“Tonight I renew the offer… to stop the bombardment of North Vietnam. We ask that talks begin
promptly, and that they be talks on the substance of peace.”
“I have ordered our aircraft and our naval vessels to make no attacks on North Vietnam, except
in the area north of the demilitarized zone where the continuing enemy buildup directly threatens
Allied forward positions.”
“One day, my fellow citizens, there will be peace in Southeast Asia.”
A Cripplng Defeat for the United States, Robert Buzzanco
Robert Buzzanco seeks to puncture what he calls the “myth of Tet.” Rather than a severe military
defeat for the North Vietnamese and Vietcong, as it is commonly portrayed, the Tet Offensive in
reality constituted a crippling strategic and political defeat for the US and its South Vietnamese
allies. The Pentagon, Buzzanco asserts, clearly understood at the time the catastrophic
consequences of the Tet attacks for the US.
Tet and the Media, William Hammond
William Hammond explores the nature and influence of the media’s coverage of US policy in the
immediate aftermath of the offensive. The consistently gloomy reports emanating from the
media about US prospects in Vietnam following Tet, according to Hammond, helped shape
American decision-making. Negative stories in the press and on television reinforced doubts
about US policy within the Johnson administration itself, and ultimately contributed to LBJ’s
decision in March 1968 to opt for a partial bombing halt and to pursue negotiations with North
Vietnam.
Week 9
Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence
This articles gives a history of Beijing’s aiding with Hanoi and provides an analysis of its
motives for doing so.
China’s Role in Vietnam 1954-63
-
-
Helped Ho Chi Minh with Anti-French War resulting in 1954 Geneva Accords
Giap takes several trips of China to “reach agreement on principal issues” in 1955
24 December 1955, Chinese Military Advisory Group is withdrawn from Vietnam and
replaced by a smaller one
Troung Chinh, VWP Secretary was accused of imposing China’s land reform model to
Vietnam, which caused major problems and lead to Chinh’s dismissal.
Hanoi had serious food supply problems because of its failure to unite Vietnam so it still
relied on Chinese ideas for improving production.
1958 – China sought to promote a “national and democratic revolution”
Kennedy’s increase in size of MAAG in Spring 1961 and replacement of MAAG with
MACV in 1962 aroused Chinese concern
Two schools of thought in Chinese FP: 1) adopt policy of peace and don’t give foreign
aid that China can’t afford  Wang Jiaxiang // 2) Militant Line choosing confrontation
with US  Mao (Mao’s policy won)
1963- PRC and DRV agree that if US forces cross 17th parallel China would send combat
troop into North Vietnam
Between 1956-73 China provides 270,00 guns and 10,000 pieces of artillery
China’s Reaction to US escalation
-
-
PRC trains North Vietnamese pilots in response to Gulf of Tonkin Incident and
subsequent bombings
2 April 1965 Pakistani President presents 4 point message to US on behalf of Beijing: 1)
China will not provoke war 2) China will not stand for US imperialism 3) War means war
including nukes 4) No boundaries of war – China will not sit here and wait to die
DRV secures Chinese troops to rebuild infrastructure destroyed by US bombings in 1965
June 1965 China agrees to match the support the US gives to SVN with its own
assistance to NVN
-
320,000 troops from Beijing ended up in Hanoi between 1965-73
The chance of Chinese intervention as in Korea shaped LBJ’s gradual approach
Explaining PRC support for DRV
Sense of Insecurity:
- Mao was very concerned with prospect of war with US
- Launched 3rd front project in 1964 to invest heavily in remote SW China to create an
industrial base to serve as a strategic reserve in case of war with US
- Mao believed that PRC needed to defend against paratrooper invasion in interior
- April 9, Mao rescinds 6 point directive ordering Chinese Air force not to attack US
airplanes in Chinese airspace
Commitment to National Liberation Movements
- desire to form broad international front against US and USSR
- Wanted to create intermediate zones of developed and developing countries to exist
between superpowers
- For Mao the Vietnam conflict was part of a broader challenge to imperialism across Asia,
Africa and Latin America
- Worked closely with 3 national liberation heroes (Castrom HCM and Ben Bella
[Algeria])
Criticism of Soviet Revisionism
- Post Khrushchev meetings went badly
- Brezhnev was pro-intervention in DRV creating tension in China as PRC felt like it was
DRV’s main supporter – now Hanoi could play them off against each other.
Domestic Need to Transform Chinese State and Society
- Mao wanted to prevent Sec of State Dulles’ appraisal of peaceful evolution in socialist
world
- Problem of succession preoccupied Mao
- Used US threat to intensify anti-imperialist feeling and mobilize population against
revisionist giving rise to the Cultural Revolution.
Sino-Soviet Discord
- Efforts to court DRV caused tension
- Shared common ideological outlook (PRC, DRV, USSR)
- 1968 Beijing and Hanoi’s strategic interests differ: Beijing sees US as counterbalance to
USSR
- PRC never acknowledged its sizable force in DRV and LBJ’s gradual approach was
justified
Changes in Mao Zedong’s attitude to Indochina War 1949-73
-
-
-
Mao’s revolutionary theory of armed struggle to sieze power and class struggle complete
the PRC worldview
After CCP won in China is sought to help communist parties elsewhere in Asia achieve
the same goal  Vietnam (mainly ideological/ not geopolitical)
CCP military units in S China instructed to aid Ho Chi Minh as much as possible, which
wasn’t much and HCM was angry but CCP was also angry as HCM had disguised his
ideology in 1945 to try to get independence from France
Mao felt military victory in Vietnam was crucial despite USSR banner of peace in
Indochina  bickering at Geneva, 1954
Mao began to give support to PAVN for Dienbenphu campaign before Geneva Conf but
backed off when Dulles threatened to intervene if USSR/PRC sought to impose their
political systems in SE Asia
China became a key-player in making HCM sign the Geneva Agreement, because of
China’s new desire for peaceful reunification
From Preferring Peaceful Coexistence to Advocating Cold War Coexistence
- Mao believed Geneva concessions were temporary and tactical as PRC had not been
consolidated and DRV couldn’t achieve complete victory
- China’s own domestic needs undermined Mao vision for revolution in the early years building national power was highest priority  3rd force/5yr plan
- Formation of SEATO was aimed at China, but Mao didn’t change his attitude, still
focused on peaceful coexistence (Zhou Enlai promised China would not export
revolution – even to Burma where it was gaining strength)
- Mao used peace offensive to try to win over SEATO countries like Thailand and
Malaysia
- Even though Mao emphasized compromise and peace, he hadn’t changed his views on
revolution and war.
- Mao reemphasized ware and revolution after Khrushchev denounced Stalin claiming that
capitalism could develop socialism through “peaceful transition”
- Sino Soviet Dispute intensifies by end of 1950s – Mao most angered about USSR
unwillingness to continue the (violent) revolution, which Mao viewed as key to the
success of China
- Mao declares that cold war coexistence replaces peaceful coexistence after guerilla wars
in Algeria, Philippines, Paraguay and Cuba.
- Wang Jiaxing ideas rejected by Mao (explained in prev article)
- CCP claimed that China occupied centre of world revolution  open break in sino soviet
dispute, which became issue of whether to continue the revolution
- Implications for DRV as they need the support of both PRC and USSR!!
- Mao wanted VWP on their side
From Opposing US-DRV Peace Talks to Aligning with US against Moscow
- VWP wanted USSR/PRC harmony to further its goal of national reunification as it would
jeopardize support for stuggle against US
- DRV felt if it allied with China it would be in a bad position w.r.t. US thus was inclined
to try to make USSR and PRC both cooperate
-
-
Kruschev’s willingness to cooperate with the US (Cuban missile crisis) and he refused to
publicly support armed struggle in South Vietnam  DRV resenetment against USSR
VWP increasingly relied on PRC support to match US escalation
Dec 1964 agreement to send 300,000 troops to DRV so PAVN could focus on war in
South against US  official start of direct PRC involvement
Brezhnev replaces Khrushchev leading to change in USSR stance which would provide
all support necessary to DRV publicly
1965 - PRC allows USSR aid to be transported through China to DRV
Dilemma – wants to support Hanoi but doesn’t want USSR weapons in its territory –
compromising national security – a key theme for mao
CCP had concluded that USSR was opposed to revolution ideologically it had suspicions
about why it supported DRV
Disputes of transport of weapons through PRC increased
PRC sought to smash DRV-US peacetalks (brought about by Rolling Thunder’s effects
on DRV) by sending troops to restore DRV infrastructure
Mao believed that USSR and US would launch a joint attack on PRC
1966 – CCP And Japanese Communism Party (JCP) agree on condemnation of
revisionism
Mao claims USSR is using its assistance to DRV to hide its betrayal of the Vietnamese
people
DRV did not agree with Mao’s argument that one must oppose both imperialism and
revisionism – DRV wanted to impose imperialism but was happy to support USSR
revisionism as it gained support from them
Mao saw Vietnam war as way to expose “Deception of soviet revisionism” but found it
hard to force other communist parties to separate themselves from USSR
Mao happy with unrest in Burma and Thailand and now publicly supported their
communist parties
Sought to align with US to resist USSR
In 1971-72 met with Kissenger to urge US withdrawal from Vietnam
Mao lauded DRV-US peace talks but this didn’t improve relations with DRV because of
revisionism disputes
Conclusion
1st stage – 1949-53  supported Vietnamese resistance against France (ideological beliefs
dominant)
2nd Stage – 1954-57  endorsed peace and democracy and favored end of armed struggle in
Vietnam
3rd Stage – 1958-69  supported DRV’s anti-American war and opposed peace talks between
Hanoi and Washington (Change caused by development of nationalist sentiment of humiliation)
4th Stage – 1970-73  approved DRV-US peace talks as buffer against USSR
-
Mao maintained his revolutionary impulse that allowed him to sieze power
Willing to place support of revolution above nat’l sec, and economic development
showed his commitment to revolution
-
Only didn’t support war when he was forced to face the realities of power politics in
1954-57 and after Sino Soviet Border war in 1969 which threatened the survival of his
regime
Week X (4/12 and 4/14)
America’s Lost War, Charles Neu
Chapter 7 and 8
Chapter 7: Nixon’s War 69-70 p. 155
New Administration Takes Hold
 Nixon enters the White House and there is great mistrust of him and his inability to lead
nations, to deal w domestic and foreign policy
 But, he was a shrewd, intelligent, and experienced man.
 He wanted to be remember for foreign policy success  needed a strong national
security adviser.
o Selected Kissinger, a man known for his suspicion of people and inst; he loved
secrecy
 Nixon wanted a more pragmatic approach to the Cold War; wanted to create linkages
with Communist ctrys
June 25, 1969
 Nixon Doctrine emerges  Am wild rely on more allies in fighting Communism; Am
wld no longer try to do everything, to try to save the whole world alone (this rhetoric
differed v much from the grand language of JFK)
p. 157
Vietnam Dilemma
 Nixon promised peace w honor, but peace wasn’t really his intention
o Didn’t want to lose
o He misunderstd the war. Thought it was all abt Communist aggression and didn’t
realize the indigenous aspect of the struggle
 The number one chllge of his presidency was Vietnam: he proposed Viet’tion, to wdraw
Am troops and expand the role of the SVA.
 He proposed bold diplomacy to the northern leaders  wanted to make them think he
was a madman willing to do anything. Nixon was filled w gr optimism abt his ability to
end war in 1yr
p. 158
No Quick Exit
 Pple were v divided in Washington over how well the war was really going. But everyone
agreed the Thieu cld not handle the Communists without US aid
 In March, Nixon started bombing enemy bases in Cambodia  meant to be a sign of
Am’s seriousness to the north
 Antiwar campaigns on Am’s campuses increased
o Spring 69: hard for Nixon to visit many colleges

Thieu was worried abt Viet’tion; Kissinger was also worried abt it bc he feared Hanoi
wld never agree to negotiate if Am troops were wdrawing and no longer a threat.
o Nixon somehow calculated that a combination of threats, intl isolation, Viet’tion
wld force Hanoi into negotiations.
p.162
Threats and Maneuvers
 In July, Nixon felt v pressured for time and to do smthg  Congress wld reconvene in
Sept, and college students wld also be back.
 Needed to increase pressure on the north; decided to use more force
 Duck Hook was going to be extensive attack on the north  it eventually did not happen
bc protests in Am became so strong.
o Oct 15: Vietnam moratorium: protests had now moved from just college
campuses to the mainstream. Nixon stunned.
 Nov 3: Nixon gave speech abt “silent majority” that he hoped existed. “we cannot lose;
let us unite for peace”
o But then My Lai happened, Life magazine printed the photos, and the extent of
the ugliness of this war was exposed and confirmed.
 In 69, 115,500 troops were wdrawn.
o It was sig achievmt, but the quick exit plan had clearly failed.
o Still, Nixon was somehow optimistic that in 70, his approach to ending the war
wld succeed.  but Nixon contd to misunderstd the will of NV leaders and their
sense of sacred duty to win their cause.
p. 165
One War
 Abrams in SV was charged with trying to shift the war focus: away from destroying the
enemy and to preparing ARVN for taking over combat.
 Many pblms w shifting more responsibility to ARVN:
o Thieu and Diem had both relied on patronage in army to build support  many
commanders were inept, but their loyalty was more impt than their competence.
Thieu refused to remove the incompetent ones bc he feared losing all his support
in the ARVN
o ARVN relied heavily on Am mil training and logistical support; it cld not manage
without Am equipment; ARVN commanders didn’t really know how to lead lg
scale operations.
o Desertion rate was v high in ARVN; fighters not getting paid or food  lack of
will to fight
p. 168
Enemy regroups
 For Communist revolutionaries, Tet Offensive was miscalculation.  Life for the Viet
Cong fighter became harder after the Offensive; American damage was getting more
intense
 Balance between southern and northern soldiers fighting in SV changed. By 1969, more
NVA soldiers in VC units. But Communists forces were not doing v. well in SV anyway;
decided to regroup.



June 1969: NLF and other neutralists in SV formed Provisional Revolutionary
Government (PRG) for time when there were serious negotiations; the group would
represent “legitimate interests” of SV’ese.
HCM died Sept 2, 1969. Little change in NV’s policies. Le Duan leader of DRV; Pham
Van Dong remained premier.
Growing tensions between southern and northern comrades  southern revolutionaries
concerned about their autonomy upon victory.
p. 171
The Cambodian incursion
 Jan 1970: Nixon sent team to assess progress of Vietnamization in SV. Mixed report,
although it was clear that the enemy was showing no signs of giving up, and SV leaders
were pessimistic, fearing Am retreat.
 Sec Def Laird and Sec St Rogers wanted more disengagemt; Kissinger worried that troop
wdrawals would leave no incentive for Hanoi to negotiate. Nixon still somehow
optimistic that w/ threats, mil moves, pwr diplomacy, and Vietnamization, Hanoi would
yield. Nixon expected war to end in late 70 or early 71.
 Feb-Apr 1970: Kissinger held secret talks with Le Duct Tho, top negotiator for NV.
Neither side willing to budge.
 Nixon contd to nurture heroic fantasies about ending the war firmly and decisively.
 Late Apr: Nixon reported to US that Viet’tion was working v. well; 150,000 more troops
to wdraw in 1970.  still, many more troops remained. Nixon’s optimism unfounded and
delusional.
 Spring of 1970: Nixon turned to Cambodia, where NVA troops had long been stationed,
w Prince Sihanouk trying to stay uninvolved and accepting this presence. P. Sihanouk
overthrown by Cambodian mil, and Gen Lon Nol chllgd NVA in Cambodia. NVA
responded with push westwards.
o Nixon wanted big offensive in Cambodia to defeat NVA there.
o April 70: Nixon announced Cambodian invasion to Am w/ sweeping grand
rhetoric about pwrful, brave Am doing what was right, preventing totalitarianism
in this free world, and defeating the enemy.
o But Cambodian invasion sparked great protests. Student strikes on 350 campuses
 Kent St (May 4, 1970) four students killed; Jackson St (May, 70) two more
students killed.
o Am’s approval of war and Nixon’s handling of it plummeting.
 By the end of 1970, Nixon’s dilemma in V. had gotten worse. With smllr no. of forces in
SV, Nixon had less leverage against Hanoi, and Hanoi seemed unthreatened by Am
diplomacy. All Nixon cld hope for was to strengthen SV forces enough to keep the north
at bay.
p. 175
A Changing War
 A new phase of the war: although there were still 385,000 Am troops in SV, their role
had chgd. The focus was pushing Viet’tion, reducing number of Am troops consistently,
lower Am casualties. Focus was no longer mil victory—ARVN units assumed more
responsibilities in the field.


New mood of Am troops—more rebellious, more adamant abt not dying needlessly. 
decrease in offensive operations and obvious decision by Am leaders not to seek a mil
victory led to decline in troop morale and discipline.
o Racism, drug use, corruption, crime, fragging, desertion, etc all increased.
Although Am troops were pulling out, there was one impvt: in the countryside.
Significantly, the Mekong Delta was more peaceful than it had been in years.
p. 176
Hau Nghia Province
 Impoverished, densely populated area northwest of Saigon, bordering Cambodia. Had
been a transit place for NVA and VA en route to Cambodia and SV. It was a v. contested
region during the early part of war, by 1965, govt authority had collapsed.  ARVN
troops prevented total takeover, and Am troops eventually arrived to help prevent its fall.
 Although HN Province did not fall to the VC, the Am’s were also unable to totally pacify
the VC mil units. Phoenix pgm, designed to root out insurgents in the shadow govt, failed
to succeed bc govt officials were too scared of NLF assassination squads to aggressively
root out NLF members.
o This type of pblm was typical of the weak govt in Saigon. Govt officials there
were not willing to risk v. much for their cause, while the Communist
revolutionaries seemed much more committed to their cause.
p. 178
The Endless War
 Fall of 1970: seemed like no end was in sight. Troops had been reduced by almost onehalf, but dissatisfaction with the war was growing with no sign of letting up.
 Nixon’s popularity dropped to below 50%; he had to continue w/drawing troops to satisfy
domestic pressure.
 He realized that he needed to figure out a way to wdraw and save face, but also to support
the Thieu govt for long enough to make its continuance plausible.  Nixon’s ability to
achieve what he needed in V rode on the success of Viet’tion.
Chapter 8: From Lam Son 719 to the Paris Peace Accords, 1971-73
p. 181
Lam Son 719
 An attack on enemy supplies and installations in Laos had long been wanted. It was
finally going to happen in 1971, but US advisers cld not accompany the ARVN troops bc
in Dec 1970, Congress had passed the Cooper-Church Amendmt, prohibiting US troops
from entering Laos or Cambodia.
 ARVN carried out the attack, and it turned out to be a major failure of planning and
execution. ARVN troops eventually retreated, defeated and demoralized, while Am
public saw images of retreating ARVN troops on TV. Nixon, meanwhile, proclaimed the
mission a successful test of ARVN troops and Viet’tion. He was obviously blind.
p.184
Pressure to End the War






Increased protest against the war, now from senators, Vietnam Vets, as well as college
students.
Nixon still claiming that “Viet’tion had succeeded”
Impvd US relations with China and the Soviet Union, re: interncontinental ballistic
missile launch sites.  Nixon and Kissinger hoped these two powers might pressure
Hanoi to make some concessions.
No luck, as Kissinger tried to negotiate with Hanoi in May 1971, and Hanoi wld not
budge.
Nixon started reaching out more to China—impving relations with China, once the great
enemy that partially motivated the importance of the Vietnam War, suggested to Am that
the war was no longer about global relations, but much more a matter of a local struggle.
June 13: Pentagon Papers published by Daniel Ellsberg, a Defense Dept analyst who
leaked them to the NY Times.  Nixon shocked and outraged.  ordered group to stop
the leakage.
p. 186
The View from Saigon
 By the end of 1971, only 180,000 Am troops were left. Morale of these troops was super
low, and they were pretty ineffective. Plans to expand and impve the SVA had been
carried out  some people were optimistic abt the success of this Viet’tion of the war,
others were far more critical.
 As Am presence in SV decreased, the resentment and open criticism of Ams in SV
increased.
 Thieu contd to rule the ctry w patronage politics.
p. 188
Hanoi’s Calculations
 Hanoi decided that it was better to attack in 72 than 72
 Hanoi was leaning less on China for assistance and war materials (as relationships had
soured) and was depending more and more on Soviet aid.  Am talks with China and
SU made Hanoi nervous.
 Leaders of Hanoi wanted to end the war with one decisive blow, to show Soviet and
China NV’s strength, to show Viet’tion’s failure.
p. 190
Nixon’s Maneuvers
 Nixon planned and announced trips to China and SU in 1971 for 72. despite diplomatic
successes, he had his own political future to worry about—critics of the war were
suspicious that the “success” of Viet’tion was at the cost of leaving SV and the Thieu
govt out to dry. Nixon claimed that this wld not be the case.
p. 191
The Easter Offensive
 March 30, 72: NV launched the Easter Offensive—massive invasion in SV  fighting
lasted until June; many, many deaths.




Once again, Allied intelligence had been unable to predict exact nature and timing of
these attacks from the north.  fierce fighting tested the limits of ARVN troops and
leaders. Many were on the brink of total collapse; it was only when Thieu finally agreed
to replace some incompetent field commanders that the South seemed capable of
defending itself.
had it not been for US air power and advisers, it seemed clear that ARVN units would
have been completely defeated.
Also, the NVA made some mistakes in deployment of forces  suffered maj casualties
for that.
Still, NVA gained ground, experience, and put into question the “success” of Viet’tion
p. 194
Nixon’s Response
 Nixon’s response was belligerent and aggressive. He was depressed at the idea of losing
the VW and wldn’t really stand for it. He wanted all out effort from US to bomb NV, at
least as much was politically possible. He announced decision to bomb mine waters off
NV’ese ports and to bomb its rail and road links with China.
 Republicans seemed to support Nixon’s hard stance, his refusal to lost the war, remove
Thieu, or abandon the ARVN.
 Democratic critics—particularly Sen McGovern—called his actions reckless and
unnecessary.
p. 195
After the Battle
 Early summer of 72, Gen Abrams and Amb Bunker contd to be hopeful abt the war. Both
seemed convinced that Viet’tion had worked and SV cld now defend itself.
 The mood in SV was more subdued—troops realized they had just barely escaped defeat
 Hanoi also felt defeated. Easter Offensive had failed to shut down ARVN completely
China and Soviet Union less anxious to see the war prolonged. Encouraged Hanoi to wait
out Am’s departure (thus agreeing to Thieu’s retention) and then work to win SV when
the Am had left.
p. 196
Politics and Diplomacy
 Nixon was concerned about his chance for reelection, but then the Democrats ended up
electing Sen McGovern as the pty nominee. McGovern was the extreme left of the pty’s
wing, and Nixon was happy to be able to attack that extremism.
o Most Americans seemed to still favor Nixon’s position to wdraw from Vietnam
while still supporting the Thieu govt
 Republican Natl Convention in Aug: Nixon had strong support; pty seemed unified.
p. 198
The Election of 72
 Nixon leading McGovern by a lot in the polls.




Kissinger’s secret talks with Hanoi contd, and in Oct, he was ready to sign a deal with the
north; Thieu had not yet been informed of the details.  this was Thieu’s greatest fear,
that the US wld cut a deal with the north and then abandon the south.
Thieu, upon seeing the draft treaty finally, demanded many changes  Kissinger did not
want to give in, and he wanted to go ahead and sign without Theiu’s consent. But Nixon
was more ambivalent.
Kissinger reported “peace is at hand” and everyone was happy – but then some of the war
critics looked more closely at the potential deal and wondered how it differed from
anything that cld have been put together four yrs ago.
Nixon won most lopsided victory in Am history in 72 elections
p. 202
Peace at Last
 Le Duc Tho wld not accept the changes proposed by Thieu; Thieu wld also not give in.
Nixon decided to use bombs to pressure the north to giving in (when it was really the
South that was the obstacle to signing this treaty)
 Operation Line Backer II, the Christmas Bombings, began. No one—from Ams to other
intl pwrs—cld understand why Am was bombing the hell out of the north; no one
supported it, except maybe a few Republicans at home.
o But Nixon was vicious and relentless. The bombs destroyed much of the north’s
defense and ec.
 Peace talks resumed  Kissinger and Le Duc Tho ready to sign an agmt that looked a lot
like the one they had agreed on before the bombings started.
o Thieu was still reluctant, but finally, in the 11th hr of Jan 22, he conceded to the
terms.
o Paris Peace Accords signed Jan 27, 1973  cease fire  this was supposed to be
Nixon’s finest moment, but he felt apprehension abt the triumpj
o Thieu felt even more apprehensive  it was a v. shaky peace, and the north cld
resume its battle at any time, at which pt Nixon and Kissinger wld probably want
to use air pwr again.
Week 10: McMahon Chapters 12, 13
Ch. 12, Document 1: Henry Kissinger suggests that the conflict in Vietnam was not the cause of
difficulties but rather a symptom. That is, America was trying to come to terms that it was
becoming like other nations: it had vast power but it was also limited. Nixon inherited a war
that was already well progressed and had to deal with both the left who wanted us out and the
rest of the country who knew that our credibility as a nation depended on how we withdrew.
Like the French in Algeria, we could not immediately withdraw. We first had to escalate in
order to begin Vietnamization.
Document 2: National Security Study Memorandum No. 1: there are two groups (“A” and “B”)
who disagree on the viability of the GVN. Group A generally believed and emphasized
improvements in the GVN and RVNAF (armed forces), whereas B underlined the growing
strength of the NLF. Their conclusions were: 1) Negotiating Environment – Hanoi is not in
Paris because they are weak. They are there because they know they have the advantage and can
win a favorable withdrawal by the United States. Beginning to downgrade “domino theory”. 2)
The Enemy – General consensus is that the North’s manpower is more than enough to balance
the current attrition rate and that they basically controlled the body count on both sides. 3) The
South Vietnamese Armed Forces – The consensus was that the RVNAF was improving and that
they would eventually be able to handle the VC and NVA on their own. 4) Pacification –
Disagreement on how effective the pacification is going. Group A thinks that GVN controls a
large majority of the population, whereas Group “B” believes that the VC had influence over a
majority. 5) The Political Scene – Consensus is that the GVN is stronger now than it has been in
previous years, but it is still weak and we are not doing enough to help strengthen it. 6) U.S.
Military Operations – There was agreement that Hanoi was alive only because of military aid
from Soviets and Chinese. There was disagreement, however in whether or not unlimited
bombing would eventually choke off Hanoi.
Document 3: A guerilla (NLF) leader remembers 1969 as the worst year, but also found hope in
the determination of the peasants. He also found new courage in the fact that the USA was
beginning to decrease troops, and would have to withdraw soon.
Document 4: Nixon explains to the American public why we are still in Vietnam, why we got
involved in Vietnam, and why we cannot immediately withdraw. He claims that he could have
taken the easy way out, withdrawing the troops immediately, calling it “Johnson’s War”, and
wiping his hands clean of the entire conflict. However, he says that immediate withdrawal
would have been a huge mistake because it would jeopardize the credibility of the United States
on an international level. He introduces his plan for “Vietnamization” and tries to push for
Americans to be “united for peace” and “united against defeat”.
Document 5: Nixon explains the need for the “invasion” of Cambodia. USA has respected
Cambodia’s neutrality, N. Vietnam has not. Nixon reaffirms that this is not an invasion, but
rather more of a liberation in order to extricate Communist forces in Cambodia.
Document 6: Kissinger reveals to the American public that we will not force S. Vietnam to
adopt a particular government. We would like to leave this up to them. At the same time, we
will prevent N. Vietnam from imposing its will upon the GVN. We will not withdraw unless the
people of S. Vietnam can have their voices be heard.
Document 7: PRG wants immediate withdrawal of all American troops and cessation of
Vietnamization. They are determined to show that the NLF is a legitimate political force in S.
Vietnam, just like the GVN.
Nixon’s Flawed Search for Peace: Melvin Small argues in this essay against what Nixon told the
American public in Document 4. He argues that Nixon never really had his own ideas about
bringing peace to the conflict in Vietnam; he simply adopted the idea of Vietnamization from the
Johnson administration and did not withdraw troops as quickly as he could, resulting in many
American troops’ lives and many more Vietnamese lives. He argues that Nixon, contrary to
what he told the public, was extremely concerned with reelection.
A Better War: Lewis Sorley first argues that not very much attention has been given to the
period after Tet in former accounts of the conflict in Vietnam. He also argues that by 1971 we
had “won” the war, and by withdrawing after this, the war was no longer won. He argues that
pacification had been extremely effective up to this point and that with more aid, S. Vietnam
could have taken over the war, given a little bit longer time to prepare them. However, budget
constraints and the complaints of the American public were what (regrettably) truncated the war.
Ch. 13, Document 1: The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) explains in ’65 why it is in
opposition to the war. They feel as if it is generally immoral and against the idea of a truly
decent and democratic nation. They feel like people would choose peaceful activities over being
drafted.
Document 2: Carl Oglesby speaks in Washington, and argues that there might be two kinds of
liberals, since Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy were all liberals yet all pushed for war. He
argues that one kind is authentically humanist and one is not so human at all. He also argues that
what is happening in Vietnam is, in fact, a revolution, and that our forefathers would side with
the Vietnamese and would argue against our involvement.
Document 3: MLK Jr. expresses his opposition to the war. He argues that the Poverty Program,
which had been helping poor blacks, was now being disintegrated because of increased interest
in and devotion to the war. He wondered how he could support the war when blacks at home
still didn’t have the same rights as whites, even though they were supposed to fight with them for
a common cause. His devotion to ministry also led him to oppose the war. If Jesus died for his
enemies, he argued, how could he be against those engaged in a revolution, of which only about
25% was “Communist”?
Document 4: Women Strike for Peace decides to help and support draft-dodgers.
Document 5: Antidraft Resistance argues that individuals have beliefs, be they personal or
religious, which are in direct conflict with having a direct association with the war in Vietnam.
They argue that it is unconstitutional and in violation of international agreements, and therefore
decide to aid draft dodgers.
Document 6: James Fallows, a former Harvard undergrad, describes how he and his friends
avoided being drafted. He was met with a wave of relief, but then realized that the boys from
Chelsea and other Boston suburbs, barely out of high school, would be the ones to go through the
draft lines like cattle and would not object to being drafted. He said that he and his friends felt a
sense of shame that none wanted to speak of since they knew what kind of boys would be killed.
Document 7: a Vietnam vet came home and was met at a bar with disgust from a family of four.
He was proud of his service and did not let it get to him at the time, but it now angers him that
the mother could have said to him what she did.
Document 8: Todd Gitlin recalls that as the war lost support in the late sixties, so did the antiwar
movement. He says that many had to imagine that someone was fighting the war for noble
causes, and it clearly was not the United States. Therefore, the protesters were not concerned
necessarily with how best to end the war, but rather about whom they felt the warmest. This
happened to fall on the Mao’s and Castro’s of the world rather than the United States.
Document 9: John Kerry, after returning from service in Vietnam, expresses his discontent with
the war in Vietnam. He states that the war has brought out nothing but the worst in America’s
soldiers, and that it is disgusting to think that many still held the idealistic image of liberationminded soldiers. He found that most of the South Vietnamese were generally apathetic to the
war effort, and typically just wished to go about their business without being bombed and
flanked by helicopters.
The Antiwar Movement and American Society: Two authors track the antiwar movement from
the fifties to the seventies. They track it as it gained strength exponentially with the escalation of
troops in the late sixties. They argue that the reason why the antiwar movement was so ardent
and so widely hated by others was that its constituents were extremely idealistic. They say that
the antiwar movement did not force the United States to quit the war, but rather that the
movement forced it to allow for differing opinion on the matter.
Women and Antiwar Activism: Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones argues that women were even bigger
advocates of protesting the war than were men. Also argues that women had a tougher time than
did blacks in terms of having their voice heard. Women supported the war at first, but this
support quickly waned. Various theories as to why women are generally more opposed to war
than are men, including the innate differences (nurturing tendency), that men are the exception
from the generally peaceful norm, and that war just fosters patriarchy.
Movement Myths: Adam Garfinkle argues that the antiwar movement achieved the opposite of
what its intentions were: it actually prolonged the war rather than ending it sooner by often tying
the administration’s hands behind its back. He also argues that the movement had a greater
impact on the United States than it did on the conflict in Vietnam. He argues that the movement
should be seen as well-intentioned, but generally ineffective.
The Kissinger Telcons:
1: Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird is concerned as to what to do about the My Lai story, and
when a witness is found to have numerous incriminating photographs, he is inclined to sweep it
“under the rug.” Kissinger tells him this cannot be done, and Laird does not dissent.
2: Nixon orders massive attacks on North Vietnamese forces for the next day. The discussion
brings up the issue of whether or not the Cold War U.S. Air Force was ready to handle
conventional bombing operations instead of large-scale nuclear warfare.
3. Kissinger talks with Alexander Haig about what Nixon had just told him. They both realize
that what Nixon has suggested is logistically impossible, so it shows that Kissinger had to, from
time to time, decipher Nixon’s preposterous orders to find out if there was any “rational kernel”
in it, and how to follow up on it.
4. Two weeks after the spring offensive, Nixon ordered massive bombing of Hanoi and
Haiphong, but worried that the bombing would jeopardize an upcoming Moscow summit.
However, instead of “yelling and screaming” about the bombing, the Soviets decided rather to
cultivate their relationship with the USA.
5. In a condescending meeting with the Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. (Anatoli Dobrynin),
Kissinger described N. Vietnam as coming to Moscow “crying on [their] shoulder”. Dobrynin
joked with Kissinger but did not know that the Americans were bombing Hanoi and Haiphong at
the time.
6. During the Christmas bombing, instead of hitting enemy targets in Hanoi, U.S. bombs hit a
hospital, killing 30 people. Kissinger speaks with S.o.D. Laird in order to try to put a “positive”
spin on the bombing of military targets.
7. McNamara expresses his support for Kissinger and reassured him that “not everybody is as
critical as some of those damn columnists.”
8. New York Times reporter reminds Kissinger that his telephone conversations may have been
wiretapped because someone in the White House thought he was leaking stories to the press.
The story eventually ran in the Times.
--Older Telecons:
1. Nixon and Kissinger talk about a “back channel” to Moscow  SoD Laird wanted to “get
out” of Vietnam and would “pay a big price” to do so.
3. Kissinger advises Nixon to let Laird handle the My Lai massacre.
Bulletin: The Cold War in Asia, by Ilya Gaiduk (Sourcebook)
Prior to 1964, relations between the USSR and North Vietnam had been cooling due to
the USSR's more moderate position on relations with the United States, which had come after the
Cuban Missile Crisis. Soviet leaders wished to avoid an all out nuclear war against the United
States, and thus eased their attitudes about US aggression in Vietnam. During this period, the
DRV attempted to improve relations with Communist China, which further cooled SovietVietnamese relations. However, with the removal of Khrushchev and installation of Brezhnev,
the USSR changed its policy on Vietnam and took a more pro-active stance in favor of the DRV.
Part of this can be attributed to the election of LBJ whose more right-wing politics gave room for
the Soviets to be more active, whereas previously Kennedy's more moderate policies had left
American-Soviet reconciliation a greater possibility.
With this new attitude in mind, the USSR began to publicly denounce the "imperialist"
efforts of the USA in Vietnam and greatly increase its military and economic aid to Vietnam, up
to 1.8 billion rubles in 1968. With this change in Soviet policy, the DRV attempted to line itself
more in the middle between the USSR and PRC, without relying heavily on either. However, the
DRV took the Soviet aid almost selfishly, using Soviet commercial ships as shields and
stationing them near guns to possibly influence American planes not to bomb those areas with
Soviet ships. Often the DRV would take the aid, while at the same time not heeding the counsel
of Soviet advisors. With the DRV moving closer to the USSR, the PRC (which did not want an
end to military hostilities) tried to disrupt Soviet railway aid shipments to the DRV. While US
involvement in Vietnam gave the Soviets a rich subject for propaganda, they also feared having
to enter a war with the US if the American used nuclear weapons on the DRV or further
expanded the war.
By taking a more pro-active stance in Vietnam, the Soviets could use Vietnam as a live
battlefield testing ground for their new military hardware. Also, they could obtain and analyze
American hardware through the Vietnamese. However, the downside of this action was the hit
the Soviets would take in terms of their economic aid to Vietnam. Although assistance was
down to 316 million rubles by 1970, the USSR was growing more and more concerned with the
possibility of the DRV’s breaking away. Therefore, the USSR sought a peaceful political
solution and since the US had no bargaining power, it had to go through the USSR. The US had
to convince the USSR that it had no real interest in the DRV and that the US would be forced
into rapprochement with PRC if the Soviets would not deal with them. The one reason why the
USSR was reluctant to deal with the US was that it seemed as if the real influence was not
coming from the Politburo or the Foreign Ministry – it was coming from the Soviet Embassy in
Hanoi.
The USSR would not act as a formal mediator for the US, but instead told the Americans
that it would act as a “postman” and a “night watchman”. The USSR strongly advocated a
cessation of all bombing of the DRV, and at the same time advised the DRV that 1968 would be
the most favorable year to commence negotiations. When Nixon entered office, he was
convinced, like his predecessors, that the USSR had supreme negotiating power over Hanoi.
Gaiduk argues that despite the loss of lives and the entire debacle of the conflict in Vietnam, the
negotiations and talks between the powers eventually allowed for the U.S.-Soviet détente of the
early-mid-70s.
Week 11
Summary:
1). James Freeman, Hearts of Sorrow pp169-195
2). McMahon Ch8 Americans in Combat
Freeman:
Ch 16 (169-179):
 Testimony from a Vietnamese civil servant.
 Diem Years: he was chief of a district and saw that the political situation was “not quiet.”
In the South, Diem was confronted with rival political parties, the vegetarian Cao Dai, the
Hoa Hao Buddhists, and the criminal Binh Xuyen, run by gangster Bay Vien.
 Eg. Witnessed someone in a jeep with his chest blown away.
 Eg2. Government officials refused to rebuild a bridge blown up by Viet Minh as Viet
Minh would do it again if they rebuild it. So villagers had to do it on their own but the
Viet Minh influenced the youths of saying that if they did rebuild it, the military of the
South will use it. Later, youths were threatened to rebuild it.
 Corruption in the South diminished its ability to resist Communists. VC very good sweet
to villagers – they do housework for them. Together, making the South very unpopular
among villagers and VC popular.
 A cadre who worked for him was killed ‘coz he reported a corruption case.
 For years he worked for Americans to collect opinions from villages and resolve their
problems. 3 alleged communists tried to kill him, but failed.
 Tet Years: Communists cheated people in the North telling them that their family needed
them, telling them that their family would like to join them in liberation. And people
believed it and they were equipped with weapons to come to the South etc. That’s the
origin of Tet according to the Author.
 Run for an election but failed to make it. People elected were mostly Catholic. Implying
that abilities were not that much of a concern for people.
Ch17: (181-188)
 Narrator: North Chinese-Vietnamese elder lived in Hanoi
 Hanoi always had food shortages. Black market sells food in triple amount of $.
 Communists have perfect propaganda making people believe that they were
fighting for a just cause.
 Thought that militarily American could win the war but not the heart of people
after the Christmas bombing.
 Propaganda said that Americans caused every fault. Eg Construction projects.
 Hanoi was evacuated during Xmas bombing in 1972. People scared but so used to
bombings. They had so many shelters built for that. Whenever people killed,
Hanoi spread propaganda. B-52’s were scary. Jet bombings were not that big of a
threat.
 90% of the North Vietnamese were poorly educated. They just followed the
propaganda. The US failed to understand them and hence couldn’t win the war.
They couldn’t fight the war head-on; they were trained to fight guerrilla warfare.
 Life After the war: Most important Day the National day, September 2nd. People
had to march to the streets and demonstrated. They needed to chants communists
slogans. Hanoi wanted to make civilians hated against the U.S.. Later years, even
the North people became so sick of communism that they would skipped the
demonstration etc.
Ch19: (189-195):
 Narrator: South Vietnamese elderly rural woman.
 Her family was divided. Some worked for the north, some south. But most
of them have miserable lives despite which sides they were helping. Eg.
Her fourth brother got three sons. All killed. And later the Viet Minh also
killed her bother.
 Relatives did not love each other anymore due to the war. They betrayed
even their relatives. Author ‘s main idea, the war separated family.
Provided numerous examples from her family. Eg. Family members lived
in the city were assumed to be associated with the French. Some joined the
VC to survive as the French would kill villagers.
Mchahon Ch8:
 Two testimonies about My Lai massacres: confirmed that it was a
madly murder of civilians. 100-400 civilians were killed.
 It was rare that VC wanted to fight a set-piece of war. They usually
evaded.
 My Lai explained by two theory: 1) racist theory against Asian.2)
frontier-heritage theory in which soliders just broke down due to
no churches, emotional problems, uncertainty of war, drug
problems, racial conflicts.
 Search and destroy never worked well as many US soldiers were
killed by bb traps / ambushes.
 Inadequacy of the south: Ky was just a joke. His idol was Hitler.
Wrongly focused on body counts (i.e. leading to the massacre of
civilians). Often body counts were exaggerated.
 Soldiers unprepared for war. Probs: “fragging” = killing of own
soldiers. Sedition, high desertion rate because of low morale.
 It was a working class battle. 80% soldiers were from working
class. People had low education level. 2 Harvard students from
class 70 went to Vietnam. Many rich kids found excuses to avoid
the draft. The selective draft system draft by lottery. But the
problem was that these rich kids can still avoid drafting by
pretending to be physically unsuitable.
Week XI, Tim O’Brien, Going After Cacciato
At the center of "Going After Cacciato" is Paul Berlin, a grunt in Vietman, not exactly
horrified, nor contemplative, nor heroic. He could be, and probably was, any normal
chap from any normal small American town. Berlin, if anything, is passive, not really a
protagonist, but the departure point of our observation, a portal to the war. And it is
from his patrol at an "observation post" that we witness many different slices or
episodes of Berlin's experience. What is and isn't "real" in this experience is not quite
clear, something the novel itself points out. Only "possibilties" exist. These
possibilities make up, among other things, a trek on foot to Paris 8,000 miles away in
pursuit of an AWOL comrade named Cacciato. This takes them through India,
Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, among other places. Our understanding of Berlin emerges
as he is postioned in contrast to his fellow squad members. These include the
cocksure Oscar Johnson; Sidney Martin the man of order, rules and will power;
Lieutenant Corson, the sympathetic martyr; and Sankin Aung Wan, a source of
comfort, confidence, and a possible love interest. Along the way they, their search
becomes a lot wider than for Cacciato.
O'Brien has a way of "painting the picture" for the reader. For instance, six pages
consist of detail about a quiet forest. O'Brien likes to forshadow, and use flash backs
as his literary devices.
Berlin, tired of the war, wants to escape using his imagination. Him and the others,
including Sarkin Aung Wan (Vietnamese "girlfriend"), like the idea of walking to Paris.
Through many trials and tribulations (inprisonment by the government because of no
passports, ambushes, etc.), the team trecks on. Many times Cacciato is almost
caught, but he sets numerous booby-traps to escape his hunters.
The story is a war-fiction. It takes place in three parts: first is the war itself, the
second is in Paris, and the third at the Observation Post.
This novel is kind of like the 6th Sense in that it has a major surprise ending.
All of a sudden you realize that most of the story was Paul Berlin's
imagination.
Cacciato was really reported MIA, but MOST of the adventures, like in Afghanistan and Paris,
are all false. Notice how throughout, the narrator gives clues like, "And for Paul Berlin, the
dreamer, it's all real." (pg. 292) ...implying that he's dreaming the whole thing.
At the very end, Berlin accidentally shoots his rifle, in reality, and this coincides with his dream
of walking into Cacciato's hotel room, and he wakes up.
Week 12
Chapter 11-The Ally: South Vietnam
Documents 1-Ngo Dinh Diem Requests Additional U.S. Aid 1957
- Three years into Diem’s term as President of Vietnam, Eisenhower asks him to delineate
principal problems Diem is facing.
- Problems of setting up internal security and defense had been addressed thanks to
American economic aid.
- Problems facing Vietnam:
- South Vietnam has to defend itself from Vietminh offensive (400 thousand men) and
the threat of Red China.
- However, Diem believed that South Vietnam could fend off the enemy by outlasting their
unstable economy.
- Diem mentioned his gratitutde for the “magnitude of American aid” and also expressed
the Vietnam’s need to continue receiving economic aid if South Vietnam is going to
become a viable state.
Document 2- Tran Van Don on the Need For Reforms After the Coup Against Diem (1963),
1978
- After the coup General Big Minh was chosen to the head of Miliary Revolutionary
Council and Nguyen Ngoc Tho (former vice president) became appointed prime minister.
Tho was to provide a smooth transition from the old regime to the new one.
- New gov’t wanted to cleanse army of corruption, return freedom of speech and religion
to its people, abolish harsh labor caused by hamlet program.
- Tho’s gov’t was having difficulties w/o American Aid (had been suspended months
before the coup), people did not reach agreements.
- Tran Van Don submitted a plan to combat NLF by winnig the support of the population
(especially in the rural areas) and then destroying the enemy militarily. Pressured gov’t
officials to give up their luxuries to get more in touch with the people.
Document 3- Nguyen Cao Ky on the Battle of Hearts and Minds 1976
- Communism was not appealing to Vietnamese because Vietnamese were poor, like most
Americans believed.
- Ky, as Prime Minister, launched a program in South Vietnam of “social justice” by
giving Vietnamese what they worked for.
- Ky recognized that the North was exploiting the wide-spread corruption in the party to
gain support of peasants.
- He wanted to use “freedom” as leverage for peasant support and mimic American
Democratic policy .
He saw South Vietnamese gov’t as failures because they failed to unite the Vietnamse or
just the South Vietnamese.
- Criticized American involvement in the war and government since it tended to pick
leaders whot were “most ocmplian rather than the most gifted.”
- South Vietnam would have survived if America had kept up their economic aid but had
not meddled so much in the war.
Document 4- Nguyen Van Thieu’s Address to the National Assembly, 1969.
- Six steps to have peace in Vietnam
1. Northern Communist aggression should stop
2. Should demoblilize its troops and cadres from Republic of Vietnam
3. Territorial boundaries between North and South should nto be violated.
4. RVN adopts a policy of National Reconciliation, granting pardon to anyone who was
fighting against them and then renounces Communism.
5. Reunification should be the democratic choice of all the people in South Vietnam.
6. Thieu wanted international support if Communism aggression were to resurface
Document 5: An American Serviceman’s Viet of the South Vietnamese., 1987
- Cultural insensitivity (displacing rice farmers from their own lands) triggered Vietnamese
hatred and mistrust on Americans when many of Americnas saw themselves as liberators
or heroes.
- American soldiers did not have confidence in their Southern Vietnamese ally soldiers.
One reason was because they could easily turn from being an ally to being the enemy.
South Vietnamese were also seen as bad fighters.
Essay 1. A Doomed Dependency
- US impact on Vietnam in the late 1960s was “decisive and irreversible.”
- US had hit Vietnams with “greatest flood of firepower” causing many deaths, injuries,
and destruction of homes.
- To prevent Southern peasants to be influenced by VC propaganda, US pushed for
program that would displace peasants from their homes in to refugee camps or urban
settings.
- Forced urbaniztion was just one more of “cultural assault” the Vietnamse had to endure.
- Students and intelligentsia in the RVN became sympathetic to the NLF cause.
- South Vietnam became completely dependent on America economically, structurally, and
militarily.
- The RVN government had become increasingly corrupt even after Diem’s regime.
Officials were after their own personal interests.
- Nguyen Van Thieu became President after Diem and showed ability in unifying different
part of South Vietnamese society to improve the state’s condition.
- However, corruption plagued the government. State officials were unqualified but were
extremely loyal to Thieu.
- Corruption also cuased a ever-growing economic gap between the Vietnamese elite and
the Vietnamese peasant. This caused peasants to be skeptical of the government and trust
on the NLF.
- Without American aid the Thieu gov’t would not be able to function.
- Chinese investors who were the primary supporters for Thieu’s government were
reluctant to completely invest their trust in Thieu’s gov’t because they knew that generals
were transient and state politically unstable.
-
America’s economy had become increasingly weak because of the aid that it was giving
South Vietnam. Therefore, they decided to stop and withdraw. However, this left South
Vietnam “structurally very wear and vulnerable” in every aspect.
Essay 2 A Viable State
- Bui Diem accepts that Southern Vietnamese officials should take some of the blame for
South Vietnam’s fall.
- However, he then indicates that South Vietnam was a victim of French colonialism,
Vietnam’s Communists, and American intervention.
- Vietnam’s nationalists were forced to choose and compromise their beliefs to alighn
themselves with a specific cause.
- American intervention was the most damaging but it was not intended to be harmful.
- Bui believes that despite the rampant corruption in the gov’t South Vietnam it would
have still been viable since it had some “good people.”
- Bui welcomes the aid but he did not think, American intervention was effective.
- First, Americans had condescending attitudes toward Veitnam .So, the “came in and took
over.” This move of course led to Americans taking in all of the military burden instead
of allowing immediate Vietnamization of the war.
- That would have also decreased the American casualties and could have also saved a lot
of years of fighting in Vietnamese soil.
- Bui Diem thought that in the year of 65-67 South Vietnam was progressing politically
beucase it had held elections during the war. Howevever, the results were affected by the
fact that America wanted a “stable” government as opposed to an effective one. This
policy allowed for corruption in the government as long as stability was accomplished
(especially in Thieu’s gov’t.)
- 69- Nixon and Kissinger were already engineering ways in which to leave the conflict.
- Although American soldiers fought hard for South Vietnam, American Congress was not
as supportive of their South Vietnamese Ally.
- Bui Diem blames the loss of the war on the premature American withdrawal and on the
betrayal of the American Congress. Congress was pressured by the American public to
leave Vietnam.
-
Chapter 14
Document1
- Nixon reassures Thieu of his future as President of Vietnam.
- He also is urging Thieu to not have second thoughts about going to the Peace meeting in
Paris, because that move will be taken as a sign of hostility and as a sign of a divided
front between the US and South Vietnam.
- Also, Nixon assures Thieu that North Vietnam tries to violate peace agreement, the US
will step in defense.
Document 2- Paris Accords of 1973
- Chapter 1
- All countries should respect the independence of Vietnam as they are specified in the
Geneva Accords (partitioned by the 17th parallel)
- Chapter 2
- Ceasefire on January 27, 1973.
- US will stay out of the internal affairs of South Vietnam ( resembles PRG demand)
- Chapter 3
- Must return POWs to the respective sides.
- Must also help each other obtaining information on MIA
- Chapter 4
- US and the DRVN have to respect the rights of the South Vietnamese people to choose
their own government.
- These articles on the democratic liberties are very vague and do not provide a way in
which they would be applied in the new government,
- Chapter 5
- Reunification should happen slowly, peacefully, and without the interference of any
foreign force.
- Did not allow North or South Vietnam to join any military alliance of bloc with any other
countries.
Document 3
- Henry Kissinger (1973) is asking Congress to provide the South Vietnamese government
with more aid.
- He wants aid because South Vietnam is in dire need of it since the economic aid has
slowly been decreasing since 1973.
- North Vietnam is better equipped and with a higher morale because of their recent
victories over South Vietnam.
- He believes that America has a moral obligation to help South Vietnam to uphold
America’s credibility and honor.
Document 4
- James R. Schlesinger Jr Recalls the Collapse of South Vietnam 1987.
- First sign of defeat was when America would not respond to series of attacks made at the
end of 1974 and beginning of 1975.
- This was the cause of the Congressional restraints established in 1973.
- General Fred Wayand came back from Southeast Asia and reported that 650 million
dollars were needed to fight back. Vietnam was a lost hope at that point.
Document 5
South Vietnamese Pilot Reflects on His Country’s Defeat in 1990
- By 1975, there was no fuel, plane parts, or bullets.
- However, American presence was felt because the generals and top officials were
Americans.
- Soldiers deserted Vietnam knowing that they would have to live under Communism.
- Some took refuge in Hong Kong.
Document 6
A South Vietnamese Civilian Remembers His Last Days in Saigon 1990
- Some people were trying to escape to America days before the Communists took Saigon.
Document 7
A North Vietnamese Commander Celebrates the “Great Spring Victory” in 1977.
- Bragged about the monumental aid given by the US but all in vain because the
Communists ended up winning in the end.
- Owed Northern soldiers’ spirits of determination to the ideology of Communism and
nationalism.
- Ho Chi Minh was also a source of inspiration.
- South Vietnamese people responded well to Communist call.
Document 8
Nixon blames Congress for the Fall of South Vietnam
- Congress forced Thieu to fight a war with firepower reduced by 60 percent and his
mobility reduced by half because there was no fuel, planes, or vehicles.
Essay 1 –The Betrayal of South Vietnam
- Paris accords forced ceasefire on both sides.
- They also forced US out of Vietnam 60 days after the day the 1973 accords were signed.
- However, peace was not reached after the papers were signed because the Vietcong
launched an attack against South Vietnam.
- Thieu recognized that Communists would use American withdrawal as a sign to attack
and he was ready to defend his South Vietnam by threatening to kill if the Vietcong try to
attack.
- People were intensely divided in their support for the GVN or the VC.
- Thieu was against Article 1 because it did not clearly give Saigon sovereignty over South
Vietnam. He also wanted the 17 parallel to be recognized as a legitimate political
boundary . Article 1 to him sounded too much like the NLF’s Ten Points in May 1969.
- Thieu felt as if the Paris accords had given North Vietnam “favorable conditions” to take
over South Vietnam.
- The striking similarities between the Ten Points and the Paris Accords leads Kolko to
believe that many died for no reason.
- Vice Pres Ky thought that the Accords were the end of the war for America but not for
Hanoi.
- Concessions made by Americans were more significant because they were more
concerned about getting their troops, and their POWs than about ensuring South
Vietnamese independence.
- America could not provide a reasonable chance for South Vietnam to survive because
that would violate the Peace Accords of 1973.
- Nixon had trusted that Americans would rally behind the South Vietnamese gov’t trying
to fend off Communists, however, the American public was too weary of war.
- Kissinger wanted to bomb once more to discourage North Vietnam for a little bit longer
so that the Nixon Kissinger team would not be blamed for the South falling. He was sure
the need to bomb because he was sure that the Peace Accords would not guarantee peace.
- However, the American public was not going to support the government violating the
Peace Accords even if it was as a response to the North Vietnamese violating the Peace
Accords first.
Essay 2 The North Vietnamese-NLF Triumph
- The Saigon Revolution was actually made possible by DRV forces.
- After Peace Accords North and South Vietnam had to decide the future fate of the
government and schedule elections.
- South Vietnam wanted early elections because it wanted to take advantage of the fact that
DRV forces were being removed from the South and also did not wan to give the South
time to organize.
- The NLF presented their plan: a list of political considerations had to be made agreed by
both sides and only then could elections proceed.
- Each side rejected each other’s proposal.
-
-
-
-
-
Lao Dong’s Defensive posture said that Hanoi was skeptical of the South allowing fair
elections and so wanted for cadres to maintain peace and to continue the revolution in the
South .
Lao Dong officials met again in mid-April and decided that the North must build its
military forces and use force to make the US “de-escalate.”
Le Duan was for the use of force because he felt that the South was ready to revolt. While
Chinh felt that the Party should concentrate their efforts on developing economic policy
in the North because America could bomb at any time.
Finally the Lao Dong officials reached the conclusion that the revolution shall continue in
the South with NLF help calling it Resolution 21.
Saigon used this as proof that the North was blatantly rejecting the Peace Accords and
therefore Theiu was to be justified in attacking the North. However, he also hoped that
the US was going to step in but Congressional constraints prohibited America to
intervene.
Saigon was left without aid and left to fend for itself.
Spring of 194- Thieu launched the “rice war” which basically starved out the North by
not allowing the North to buy or receive rice from the South .
This “war” ultimately backfired because it caused starvation in the South as well.
Thieu gained many enemies including criticism from the US because of the war and his
corrupt government. The US saw what it had done and wanted to restore confidence in
Thieu but by then the damage had been done.
April 19- Gave south ultimatum to either get rid of Thieu or North would have to take
over the South by force.
Harshest Incarceration
This article is about a SVN official who was sent to the reeducation camps after the
communist takeover; really, though, he was just basically a political prisoner doing manual
labor with little food and under harsh conditions.
They were crowded into small cells- with 80 to 90 people living in a 6x12 m
room. The prisoners were made to farm eight hours/day year round.
They had to use manure--fresh human and cow feces as fertilizer--and were
forced to carry it with their bare hands. If they had challenged their
supervising officer, they would be prevented from washing their hands for
up to a week. So day in day out they would handle this manure, not
washing their hands or bodies, mind you, and have to eat with their
hands, etc. But they didn't get sick!
The food they were given wasn't enough. The author lost almost half
his body weight in the two years that he was there. Since they were
malnourished, they often tried to steal some of the crop they were
harvesting. To deter this, the prison guards had the peanuts sprayed with
DDT. The prisoners were so desperate that they would eat the peanuts raw
with the DDT still on it. Again, amazingly, they didn't get sick. In
fact, the authors said that the DDT actually helped them by killing their
intestinal worms, thereby decreasing their hunger.
Their water was also contaminated--with the same water where they would
urinate and defecate.
The author also describes solitary confinement cells where prisoners would
be kept as punishment. It was a small room, with no windows or light.
The prisoner would have one leg chained and would only receive half their
food rations. Usually the prisoner would be kept there for ten days. But
there were two catholic priests who were kept there for more than two
years; when the author was released in one of the amnesty periods, they
were still there; they had not been let out at all.
They also had weekly self-criticism meetings; which really demoralized the
author. Because he was fifty-two years old he did not reach his farming
quota as fast as the other prisoners did, but they would all criticize
him, saying that he ate the same amount as them, but was unable to work
on their level. This kind of pointed out to me one of the ways the
communist party had set up the imprisonment to break the prisoners: turning them on
one another with repetitive criticism.
The author attempted suicide twice by overdosing on anti-malarial drugs
that he had hid in his cell, but he just ended up sick both times.
The author got an ulcer, and an unlicensed communist official did a
surgery on him, which was unsanitary. Basically he had constant diarrhea
for a period of weeks, and was on the verge of death from dehydration,
when they released him on the amnesty program.
His fellow prisoners were still left there.
McMahon Ch. 1 Week 13
The Wages of War, Michael H. Hunt
Vietnam
-The Vietnam War exacted a heavy toll on Vietnamese society with many casualties, refugees,
and damage to the environment.
-The unification with North Vietnam was rocky. Many were moved to reeducation camps,
unemployment increased, rice production fell because of the collectivized system.
-Vietnam increasingly became dependent on Soviet aid.
-When Nguyen Van Linh replaced Le Duan in 1986 things changed for the better. There was a
new economic policy and foreign policy.
America
-Relatively, Americans did not suffer that many losses in terms of casualties. However, the
damage may have been more psychic than physical. There were many different interpretations of
the war.
-Hawks blamed LBJ, his team of advisors, and poor support from public.
-Doves interpreted it as Cold War arrogance. US was world police. Lesson was to approach
intervention warily.
-Military drew lessons to fight where goals were clear, public support assured, power
overwhelming, and victory certain.
Conclusion
-Hunt concludes that Americans were caught up in the Cold War and blindly went into Vietnam.
The will of the Vietnamese people far exceeded their own and they ultimately prevailed.
The Necessary War, Michael Lind
-The Vietnam War as a proxy war between the US and the Soviets and China.
-For radical left, war was a symbol of depravity and “capitalist imperialism.” For realists of left,
war was tragic and unnecessary mistake. Conservatives argued that U.S. could have won had it
not been for the limited nature of the war.
-U.S. fought the war because of “geopolitics,” and forfeited the war because of domestic
policitcs.
-Geopolitics was it was trying to prevent the domino effect from occurring in SE Asia
-Domestic politics, Lind argues, was that preexisting regional, ethnic, and racial division
in American attitudes about foreign policy were exposed through this war.
-There was a tradeoff, in fighting the Vietnam war, between global credibility and domestic
consensus.
-Lind’s central argument is that it was necessary to escalate the war in the mid 60s to preserve
credibility of US as a superpower. Necessary to forfeit the war after ’68 to preserve American
favor for the Cold War on other fronts.
Indochina was important because a general war between the superpowers could not be risked, so
proxy wars took on major importance. Indochina was especially important because it was
peripheral (very far from both Soviets and US).
-South Vietnamese lost. North Vietnamese won. Vietnamese people as a whole were losers.
France, China, and US were losers. Clear winner was Soviet Union.
-Vietnam didn’t win, US lost because of limitations of war.
-If US didn’t show its might as a great power, industrial economies such as West Germany and
Japan would be more inclined to appease the communist powers.
A Grand Delusion, Robert Mann
-Vietnam experience continues to impact our political institutions. Influenced presidential
elections, congressional elections, etc.
-Vietnam War changed American’s view of public institutions; they found that presidents had
routinely lied to them.
-American’s accepted myths and illusions about Vietnam-domino theory, success of policies in
Indochina, Ngo Dinh Diem, true nature of the conflict, Gulf of Tonkin incident, bombing as a
solution, Nixon’s claim to end the war with honor.
-War was a grand and tragic delusion.
McMahon Ch 15 Week 13
Documents
1. Gerald R. Ford on the Lessons of Vietnam, 1975
-Multilateralism is important
-Countries must fight their own battles, we can give them aid, but not personnel
-We are in a better position to judge how to handle ourselves militarily.
2. Jimmy Carter Sees a “Profound Moral Crisis,” 1977
-We had adopted the tactics of our adversaries. Now we have found our own principles once
again and regained our confidence.
-Vietnam produced moral crisis in that the world lost faith in the US.
3. Richard M. Nixon Reads Vietnam’s Lessons, 1985
-Justifies fighting Vietnam war through atrocities that occurred after in Vietnam and Cambodia.
-Strategic interests and idealism was at stake in Vietnam.
-Did too little to save South Vietnam.
4. Ronald Reagan Calls Vietnam a Noble and Just Cause, 1988
-Gentle heroes of Vietnam; champions of a noble cause
-Much cause for our fighting
-Greatly stylizes depiction of people fighting in Vietnam; perhaps because he made this speech
on Veterans’ Day
5. Bill Clinton Announces the Normalization of Diplomatic Relations with Vietnam, 1995
-Trade embargo lifted on Vietnam because of cooperation to secure remains of lost Americans
and determine fate of those who have not been found
-Glorifies Vietnam and our motives there. We fought for freedom and independence of the
Vietnamese people.
6. An American Veteran Helps to Dedicate the Vietnam War Memorial (1982), 1985
-Veteran describes his emotions at unveiling of Vietnam War memorial
7. An African-American Draftee Reflects on the War’s Impact, 1984
-Psychological problems after the war for a veteran.
8. A Former Army Nurse Considers the War’s Impact, 1987
-Memoirs of a nurse and coming back and integrating into society.
The Impact of Vietnam on America’s World Role, Paul Kennedy
-Fought by an open society: television and press coverage, Pentagon Papers.
-First war that US had undoubtedly lost.
-Profound influence on personal and psychological levels.
-Superior military hardware does not mean superior military effectiveness. A major disadvantage
to the US was the limited nature of the war.
-Much more willpower on part of North Vietnamese than South Vietnamese or Americans
-Shock to American hubris which may have caused it to reassess itself.
The War’s Tragic Legacy, Marilyn B. Young
-Axioms of America brought into question- axiom that America is on the side of freedom and
justice. That U.S. always did the right thing.
-America has developed Vietnam syndrome: reluctance to send American troop abroad,
questioning of interventionist appeals.
-Those who fought in the war were disproportionately poor, badly educated, and black. It was a
teen aged army.
-Project 100,000 enlisted those who were previously considered ineligible for military service
because of their low test scores.
-No effort to help prepare soldiers to make transition from war to peace.
-Especially difficult for veterans to integrate back into society.
-Difficult to get a job
-Post traumatic stress disorder was particularly prevalent.
-Woman veterans had even tougher time because at first they were not acknowledged to
be veterans
-Maya Ying Lin designed the Vietnam memorial: two black granite walls bearing the names of
those Americans who had died
Competing Memories, Arnold R. Isaacs
-There was much controversy over the memorial. As a concession, a naturalistic statue
representing 3 GIs along with an American flag was placed.
-War still divides us: those who supported it, those who didn’t; those who served and those who
didn’t
-All wars bring waste, degradation, and cruelty
-Even if Vietnam had not gone to war, many of the radical things that happened would still have:
racial tensions, women would have assumed new roles, immigrants, globalization.
-Vietnam had a shattering effect on the national spirit. At first people imagined it in line with
WWII.
Image and Reality, Week 13
-Vietnam may have a long and powerful impact on the conduct of American foreign policy.
-Lessons of history are neither self-evident nor simple
-Lessons of the past are relevant to thinking and actions of both publics and foreign-policy
officials.
-Towards the end of the war, many more people felt that the U.S. should withdraw from Vietnam
compared to the beginning of the war.
-After the war, people agreed that the US had failed to achieve its goal, but had differing
interpretations of why that failure occurred. The most important consideration in this survey
were that Americans underestimated the dedication of the North Vietnamese, Soviets provided
aid to North Vietnam, the regime in Saigon lacked popular support. America’s goals were
unrealistic, US fought with a no win approach, US had no clear goals, US was ignorant of
Vietnamese culture.
-The lessons that people thought were most important were that if there is foreign intervention it
should be done in a short period of time, Soviet is expansionist rather than defensive in foreign
policy goals, and a nation will pay a heavy price if it honors alliance commitments selectively.
-Two distinct belief systems on the Vietnam War. Military officers and business executives form
one belief system. They were stronger advocates of military victory in Vietnam, likely to ascribe
failure of war to the way it was conducted, attach greater significance to domestic dissidents,
mass media.
Educators and leaders in electronic and printed media subscribe to another belief system. They
were more likely to support complete withdrawal from the war, more likely to trace failure to
unrealistic goals, lack of knowledge of Vietnam.