NATIONAL FORENSIC LEAGUE
Policy Debate – 2013-2014 – Update – 10/1/13
Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic
engagement toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
***CHINA DISAD*** ....................................................................................................................................... 4
1NC – China Disad (1/2) ..................................................................................................................................... 5
1NC – China Disad (2/3) ..................................................................................................................................... 6
1NC – China Disad (3/3) ..................................................................................................................................... 7
2NC – Uniqueness (1/3) ......................................................................................................................................8
2NC – Uniqueness (2/3) ..................................................................................................................................... 9
2NC – Uniqueness (3/3) ................................................................................................................................... 10
2NC – Uniqueness – US vs. China ....................................................................................................................11
2NC – Link – Generic Engagement .................................................................................................................. 12
2NC – Link – Cuba Embargo (1/2) .................................................................................................................. 13
2NC – Link – Cuba Embargo (2/2) .................................................................................................................. 14
2NC – Link – Venezuela Oil (1/3) .................................................................................................................... 15
2NC – Link – Venezuela Oil (2/3) .................................................................................................................... 16
2NC – Link – Venezuela Oil (3/3) .................................................................................................................... 17
2NC – Link – Mexico Relations ........................................................................................................................ 18
2NC – Link – AT: Engagement Now ................................................................................................................ 19
2NC – Internal Link (1/2) ................................................................................................................................ 20
2NC – Internal Link (2/2)................................................................................................................................. 21
2NC – Latin America K2 China Influence........................................................................................................ 22
2NC – Impact – Energy Security (1/5) ............................................................................................................. 23
2NC – Impact – Energy Security (2/5) ............................................................................................................24
2NC – Impact – Energy Security (3/5) ............................................................................................................ 25
2NC – Impact – Energy Security (4/5) ............................................................................................................26
2NC – Impact – Energy Security (5/5) ............................................................................................................ 27
2NC – Impact – North Korea (1/2) ..................................................................................................................28
2NC – Impact – North Korea (2/2) ..................................................................................................................29
2NC – Impact – Taiwan ................................................................................................................................... 30
2NC – AT: China Influence Resilient ............................................................................................................... 31
***AFF ANSWERS TO CHINA DISAD*** ................................................................................................ 32
2AC – Non-Unique ............................................................................................................................................ 33
1AR – Non-Unique (1/2) ................................................................................................................................... 34
1AR – Non-Unique (2/2) .................................................................................................................................. 35
2AC – No Trade-Off (1/2) ................................................................................................................................. 36
2AC – No Trade-Off (2/2) ................................................................................................................................. 37
1AR – No Trade-Off ...........................................................................................................................................38
2AC – Link Turn ................................................................................................................................................ 39
2AC – Alt Causes .............................................................................................................................................. 40
2AC – Chinese Soft Power Fails ........................................................................................................................ 41
2AC – US Influence Resilient ...........................................................................................................................42
***OIL PRICES DISADVANTAGE*** ....................................................................................................... 43
1NC – Oil Prices Disad (1/3) .............................................................................................................................44
1NC – Oil Prices Disad (2/3) ............................................................................................................................. 45
1NC – Oil Prices Disad (3/3) .............................................................................................................................46
1NC – Link – Cuba ............................................................................................................................................ 47
2NC – Link – Cuba (1/2) .................................................................................................................................. 48
2NC – Link – Cuba (2/2) ..................................................................................................................................49
1NC – Link – Mexico .........................................................................................................................................50
2NC – Link – Mexico (1/2) ............................................................................................................................... 51
2NC – Link – Mexico (2/2) ............................................................................................................................... 52
1NC – Link – Venezuela .................................................................................................................................... 53
2NC – Link – Venezuela (1/3) .......................................................................................................................... 54
2NC – Link – Venezuela (2/3) .......................................................................................................................... 55
2NC – Link – Venezuela (3/3) .......................................................................................................................... 56
2NC – Link Extension – AT: Won’t Affect Other Prices ................................................................................. 57
2NC – Link Extension – AT: Other Countries Affect Prices ...........................................................................58
2NC – Uniqueness – Prices High (2/2) ........................................................................................................... 59
2NC – Uniqueness – Prices High (2/2) .......................................................................................................... 60
2NC – Uniqueness – AT: Price Drops .............................................................................................................. 61
2NC – Uniqueness – AT: Syria .........................................................................................................................62
2NC – Russia Economy Impact – $100 Brink ................................................................................................. 63
2NC – Russia Economy Impact – High Prices Key .........................................................................................64
2NC – Russia Economy Impact – Russia Prices High .................................................................................... 65
2NC – Russia Economy Impact – AT: Russia Econ Low Now .......................................................................66
2NC – Russia Economy Impact – AT: Alt Causes to Economy ...................................................................... 67
2NC – Russia Economy Impact – AT: Dutch Disease .................................................................................... 68
1NC – Russia Modernization Impact (1/2) ......................................................................................................69
1NC – Russia Modernization Impact (2/2) ...................................................................................................... 70
2NC – Russia Modernization Impact – High Prices Key ................................................................................ 71
2NC – Russia Modernization Impact – Accidents .......................................................................................... 72
2NC – AT: Japan Economy Turn (1/2) ............................................................................................................ 73
2NC – AT: Japan Economy Turn (2/2) ............................................................................................................ 74
***AFF ANSWERS TO OIL PRICES DISAD*** ...................................................................................... 75
2AC – Non-Unique – Prices Low Now ............................................................................................................. 76
1AR – Non-Unique – Prices Low ...................................................................................................................... 77
2AC – Non-Unique – US Shale ......................................................................................................................... 78
1AR – Non-Unique – US Shale ......................................................................................................................... 79
2AC – No Link – Cuba ..................................................................................................................................... 80
1AR – No Link – Cuba ....................................................................................................................................... 81
2AC – AT: Russia Economy Impact – Low Prices Good .................................................................................82
2AC – AT: Russia Economy Impact – Dutch Disease .....................................................................................83
2AC – AT: Russia Economy Impact – Dutch Disease .................................................................................... 84
2AC – Impact Turn – Japan Economy (1/2) ...................................................................................................85
2AC – Impact Turn – Japan Economy (2/2) .................................................................................................. 86
***VENEZUELA – AFF UPDATES*** ....................................................................................................... 87
OIL DEPENDENCE ADV UPDATES ....................................................................................................... 88
2AC – Oil Dependence Bad – NATO Russia War (1/2).................................................................................. 89
2AC – Oil Dependence Bad – NATO Russia War (2/2) ................................................................................. 90
2AC – Oil Dependence Bad – Europe Relations (1/2) .................................................................................... 91
2AC – Oil Dependence Bad – Europe Relations (2/2) ....................................................................................92
2AC – Oil Dependence Bad – AT: Saudi Relations ......................................................................................... 93
2
***VENEZUELA – NEG UPDATES*** ......................................................................................................94
OIL DEPENDENCE ADV UPDATES ........................................................................................................ 95
1NC – Oil Dependence Good – Africa Investment ..........................................................................................96
2NC – Oil Dependence Good – Africa Investment .......................................................................................... 97
1NC – Oil Dependence Good – Canada Shift (1/3)......................................................................................... 98
1NC – Oil Dependence Good – Canada Shift (2/3) .........................................................................................99
1NC – Oil Dependence Good – Canada Shift (3/3) .......................................................................................100
2NC – Oil Dependence Good – Canada Shift – Unimak Bad (1/2) .............................................................. 101
2NC – Oil Dependence Good – Canada Shift – Unimak Bad (2/2) ............................................................. 102
2NC – Oil Dependence Good – Canada Shift – China Impact (1/2) ............................................................ 103
2NC – Oil Dependence Good – Canada Shift – China Impact (2/2)............................................................ 104
1NC – Oil Dependence Good – Saudi Relations (1/2) ................................................................................... 105
1NC – Oil Dependence Good – Saudi Relations (2/2) .................................................................................. 106
2NC – Oil Dependence Good – Saudi Relations – Stop Prolif ..................................................................... 107
2NC – Oil Dependence Good – AT: Europe Relations .................................................................................. 108
3
***CHINA DISAD***
4
1NC – China Disad (1/2)
a) Uniqueness --- China’s influence in North American trade is expanding
Shaiken et al. 13 [Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley. And
Enrique Peters – Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami. And Adrian
Hearn – Centro de Estudios China-Mexixo at Universidad NacionalAutonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico
Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8]
This paper highlights the reality that China has indeed integrated itself into North America in a process beginning
in 2001 with China’s adherence to the World Trade Organization. Before 2001, both Mexico and the U.S.
were increasing and deepening trade relations and regional specializations within the parameters of NAFTA. Since 2001,
however, this process has reversed as a result of China’s massive trade volume with both
the U.S. and Mexico. The analysis presented herein shows that China’s rapidly developing trade relationship with
both Mexico and the U.S. has had significant effects on each country’s respective trade dynamics .
For instance, today China is the second largest trading partner for both Mexico and the
United States, falling behind only the total intra-NAFTA trade volume. As we have seen from our
examination of the top twenty products imported by Mexico from the U.S. and China, the structure of trade in the
region is shifting significantly : for Mexico, its export share in the U.S. market has fallen
sharply, contrary to the trade growth of Asia, and particularly of China. As discussed previously, from 20002011 both the U.S. and Mexico endured substantial losses in their respective export markets in the
NAFTA region, particularly in regards to the manufacturing sector and in products such as telecommunications
equipment, electric power machinery, passenger motor vehicles, and clothing accessories and garments, among many others.
NAFTA, since its origins, has passed through two distinct phases. During the first phase (1994-2000), the region was deeply
integrated as a result of trade, investment, and rules of origin in specific industrial sectors such as autoparts-automobiles (AA) and
yarn-textile-garments (YTG). In this first phase, NAFTA evolved in accordance with some of the predictions and estimations that we
discuss in the literature survey. The region as a whole grew in terms of GDP, trade, investment, employment, and wages, among
other variables, while intra-industry trade increased substantially. While some of the “gaps” between the U.S. and
Mexico were slowly closing, however, this was only true for a small portion of Mexico’s highly
polarized socioeconomic and territorial structure. In other words, even in Mexican sectors
highly integrated with NAFTA , the integration process did not allow for the promotion of
backward and forward linkages in Mexico. In the second phase (2000-…), NAFTA has shown a
deterioration of this process of integration in terms of investment and intra-industrial trade,
among other variables. During this time period, both Mexico and the United States have been on the losing end
of competitions with third-party countries, a topic only discussed somewhat in debates on NAFTA (see the survey in
part two of this paper).
5
1NC – China Disad (2/3)
b) Link --- Increased economic engagement wrecks China’s expansion in Latin
America --- US influence is key
Shaiken et al.13 [Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley. And
Enrique Peters – Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami. And Adrian
Hearn – Centro de Estudios China-Mexixo at Universidad NacionalAutonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico
Relations, 2013. Pg 88-9]
The dominant strategies of each of the parties and how these strategies evolve over time: Mexico’s regional and global
position is being shaped by an increasing accent on diplomatic and trade diversification. The
decline in US influence and the expected reforms in the Mexican energy sector mayopen more room for
Mexicoto adjust to a growth strategyless dependent on the United States . China’s rising role
as a regional and global power and the new economic scenario marked by higher wages and growing
concentration in industrial commodities and products are likely to affect the pace of
change according to which China’s “going out” strategy will develop in the near future. If Mexico and China reorient
their strategies, it is likely that t here will be an adjustment in the triangle’s dynamic , which
may result in a closer relationship between these two countries.
6
1NC – China Disad (3/3)
c) Impact --- Chinese international influence is an existential impact – it controls
every scenario for extinction
Zhang 12 [Prof of Diplomacy and IR at the Geneva School of Diplomacy. “The Rise of China’s
Political Softpower” 9/4/12 http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/201209/04/content_26421330.htm ]
As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive
both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including
widespread poverty, international conflict, the clash of civilizations and
environmental protection. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively
address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in
conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated global economic order
has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32
times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries
nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a
new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled
it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experiencewould indeed be
helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model
of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of
terrorism threatens global security . In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most
precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international
cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. The clash of
civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying. "In a world, which
is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet
promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash
of Civilizations?".China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to
respect other nations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser thanthat of
Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China.
China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its
"self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people
are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the
emission of greenhouse gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong
awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles.
Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental
ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being
perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes
stronger. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and
creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China
model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of
China is the rise of China's political soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with
challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As the China
model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.
7
2NC – Uniqueness (1/3)
Chinese engagement is outpacing the US
Goodman 5-29
[Joshua. Latin America Desk for Bloomberg BusinessWeek. “Biden Circles Xi as U.S. Duels China for Latin America Ties” 5/29/13
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-29/biden-circles-xi-as-u-s-duels-china-for-latin-america-influence.html]
The competition between the world’s two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on
display this week as U.S. Vice President Joe Biden arrives in Rio de Janeiro today near the end of a three-nation tour of the region
with Chinese President Xi Jinping close behind. The dueling visits -- Biden departs Brazil May 31, the same day Xi arrives in
Trinidad & Tobago to begin his first tour of the region since China’s political transition ended in March -- underscore how
Latin America’s natural resources and rising middle class are making itan increasingly
attractive trade partner for the world’s top two economies . Competing with China’s
checkbook isn’t easy for the U.S. Seeking South American soy, copper and iron ore, China boosted imports from
Latin America 20-fold, to $86 billion in 2011 from $3.9 billion in 2000, according to calculations by the
Inter-American Development Bank. By contrast, the U.S. policy of pursuing free-trade accords has been
controversial, said Kevin Gallagher, a Boston University economist. “If I’m a Latin American leader, I’m very happy because I
now have more chips to play with,” said Gallagher, author of the 2010 book “The Dragon in the Room,” about China’s inroads in the
region. “The onus is on the U.S. to come up with a more flexible, attractive offer but that’s not so
easy because it doesn’t have the deep pockets like it used to.”
Chinese influence is outpacing the US
Menedez 5-10
[Fernando. “The East is rising, in Latin America” 5/10/13
http://www.thecommentator.com/article/3488/the_east_is_rising_in_latin_america]
Trade with China has also increased dramatically over the last decade. For example, China now
accounts for 19 percent of Brazil’s total trade as compared with 2.8 percent in 2001. Similarly, China accounts for nearly 20
percent of Chile’s total trade in contrast to 5.6 percent a decade ago. China has also concluded free-trade
agreements with both Chile and Peru opening up those markets to Chinese manufactured goods.
By 2014, China will overtake the European Union as Latin America’s second largest trading
partner after the United States. While it still has some way to go in potentially overtaking the United
States as the leading trade partner, it is, nevertheless, probable . Most recently, Brazil and China signed an
agreement to pay for $30 billion in trade per year using local currencies and thus dropping the
dollar.There is also general speculation concerning a new renminbi-based currency, which, if it does
not replace the dollar or the euro, may well become a significant alternative foreign currency backed by commodities and natural
resources. Some even speak of a renminbi trading bloc. All of these moves demonstrate the power of China’s
purse, which the US is increasingly unable to match. The speed and extent of China’s
growth in Latin America also raises concerns about its geopolitical and military policy objectives
in the Americas. Many Chinese firms, especially in telecommunications, have longstanding ties to the People’s Liberation
Army, and that should raise red flags.
8
2NC – Uniqueness (2/3)
China’s pursuing increased influence in Latin America
Goodman 5-29
[Joshua. Latin America Desk for Bloomberg BusinessWeek. “Biden Circles Xi as U.S. Duels China for Latin America Ties” 5/29/13
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-29/biden-circles-xi-as-u-s-duels-china-for-latin-america-influence.html]
For Xi, his week-long tour of Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico precedes a visit to California for his first face-to-face
talks with Obama since taking office. The
trip to Latin America and the Caribbean, coming so early in
Xi’s presidency, reflects the rising confidence of the Chinese leadership as it pursues
its strategic interests with little concern for U.S. reaction, said Evan Ellis, a professor at the
National Defense University in Washington. China in recent years has ousted the U.S. to become the top
trade partner for Brazil and Chile. “In the past Chinese presidents were very deferential to the
U.S., always making reference to Washington’s backyard,” said Ellis, the author of dozens of papers and a book about China’s
penetration of Latin America. “You don’t hear any of that from Xi’s team, though you don’t find any threatening
rhetoric either.”
Chinese influence in Latin American trade’s high now
Shaiken et al ‘13
[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley. And Enrique Peters – Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn – Centro de Estudios China-Mexixo at Universidad NacionalAutonoma de Mexico.
China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8]
Economic ties between China and Mexico have greatly improved, given that Mexico is one of
the largest Latin American countries. From 2000 to 2009, China went from being the 19th largest
importer of Mexican goods to the 7th, while going from 7th place to 2nd in terms of exports to
Mexico (ECLAC 2011). By 2011, total trade between China and Mexico has increased significantly,
and bilateral trade volume has reached 42.1 billion USD – a 19% increase compared to the previous year
(MOFCOM 2011). Most importantly, China has become the third largest export destination of Mexican
goods. Chinese imports from Mexico increased from 0.09% in 1993 to 1.35% in 2010. In dollar amounts, Chinese imports
from Mexico increased from 44.8 million USD in 1993 to 3.7 billion in 2010 (Hernández Hernández
2012:65). During the one-year period from 2010 to 2011, Chinese imports from Mexico increased 54.8%, while
Mexican imports from China grew 16% (see Table 1).
9
2NC – Uniqueness (3/3)
It’s high and growing
Ellis ‘11
[R. Evan. Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense
University. “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study” Joint Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011.
http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html]
Although the presence of Chinese corporations and workers in Latin America pales by comparison
to that of the United States, it is growing and exerting an increasing weight in select countries.
Particularly in states such as Ecuador and Venezuela, Chinese corporations are becoming increasingly critical
for the functioning of the extractive industries that generate significant portions of the state's
revenue. In Ecuador, Chinese petroleum and service companies directly operate seven oil blocks,
are a partner in others through consortiums, and account for almost 40 percent of nonstate oil
production, while China Railway Road and Tongling are ramping up for a $3 billion project in the recently opened Ecuadorian
mining sector. In Venezuela, Chinese companies are one of the key actors maintaining oil production in
the mature oilfields of Maracaibo and Anzoátegui, a vital current revenue stream for the Chávez regime. In the
Orinoco belt in the south of Venezuela, Chinese investment, technology, and manpower, including Chinese-made drilling rigs, are a
key to the development of that nation's future oil potential, while a May 2010 agreement makes Chinese companies key players in
the extraction of Venezuelan iron, gold, bauxite, and coal.7 Although Chinese companies have yet to attain the
level of "key employers" or have a major role in many Latin American communities, they play a growing role
in strategically important sectors in many Latin American countries . For example, in
telecommunications, the Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE are increasingly important product, service, and infrastructure
providers,8 and in logistics, companies such as China Shipping, China Overseas Shipping, and Hutchison Whampoa play
increasingly vital roles in Latin America's foreign trade.
10
2NC – Uniqueness – US vs. China
China’s outpacing US engagement
Padgett 5-13
[Timothy. Latin America Reporter for TIME. “The Obama Administration Looks to Latin America After Years of Neglect” TIME,
5/13/13 http://world.time.com/2013/05/13/has-washington-finally-discovered-latin-america/#ixzz2UhOE2vcE
On the other hand, Latin America can also be excused if it’s a little irked — if it’s asking the U.S., Why did you
wait so long to make this outreach, if you really are making a genuine outreach? Washington
feels more urgency to
look south at the moment largely because of China’s increasing incursion into the hemisphere: annual
China–Latin America trade exceeds $200 billion today compared with less than $10 billion in 2000. U.S.–Latin
America trade may be robust. But this month Sabatini’s publication, Americas Quarterly, lays out striking evidence
of U.S. decline: in 1995, for example, the U.S. sent Brazil, Latin America’s largest economy and now the world’s sixth
largest, more than a fifth of that country’s imports; by 2011 it was 15%, the same share sent from
China. Ditto with regard to Brazil’s exports: in 1995 the U.S. bought 21%, but just 10% in 2011, while for China it was 17%. China,
as a result, surpassed the U.S. as Brazil’s top trading partner in 2009. What’s more, business with the Americas as a share of total
U.S. trade has actually dropped over the past decade. The investment tally is even more striking: in 1995, the
U.S. accounted for 37% of Brazil’s foreign direct investment vs. 10% in 2011 — less than
China’s . Granted, it’s good for Latin America to be less dependent on the U.S. But it’s hardly unreasonable to
conclude that Washington wouldn’t be facing this China syndrome in its own hemisphere if it
had simply taken “high-level engagement on Latin America” more seriously a decade or more ago. Or
even four years ago, when Obama took office pledging a more benign U.S. foreign policy toward the region and then used that, say
critics, as an excuse for benign neglect.
11
2NC – Link – Generic Engagement
Economic engagement pushes out China
Dowd ‘12
[Alan. Senior Analyst at the American Security Council. “Countering China's Reach in Latin America” 2012.
http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas ]
Second, the U.S. must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must reengage
in
its own neighborhood economically, politically and militarily . That means no more
allowing trade deals—and the partners counting on them—to languish. Plans for a hemispheric free trade zone have
faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years, before President
Obama finally signed them into law in 2011. Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy . The Wall
Street Journal reports that due to political wrangling in Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western
Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay,
Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty.Reengagement means reversing plans to
slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has “a deep respect for U.S.
military power.” We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But
with the United States in the midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long
that reservoir of respect will last. Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties . A good
model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is
reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it’s time to do the same
in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countries—from Mexico and Panama to
Colombia and Chile—border the Pacific. Given Beijing’s actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin
American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the
Asia-Pacific region.
12
2NC – Link – Cuba Embargo (1/2)
U.S. is losing influence to China because of the Cuban embargo – 2012 summit
proves
Cawthorne and Ellsworth, 12 (Andrew, British journalist who has worked for Reuters since 1992 on various
assignments in Latin America, Africa, Europe and the Middle East, Brian, Personal Property lawyer at Alston and Bird LLP, “Latin
America rebels against Obama over Cuba,” Reuters, Sun Apr 15, 2012 10:13pm, Online,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/16/us-americas-summit-idUSBRE83D0E220120416)
Unprecedented Latin American opposition to US sanctions on Cuba left President Barack Obama
isolated at a summit on Sunday and illustrated Washington's declining influence in a region being
aggressively courted by China. Unlike the rock-star status he enjoyed at the 2009 Summit of the Americas after taking
office, Obama has had a bruising time at the two-day meeting in Colombia of some 30 heads of state. Brazil and others have
bashed Obama over US monetary policy and he has been on the defensive over Cuba and calls to legalize drugs. Due to the
hostile US and Canadian line on communist-run Cuba, the heads of state failed to produce a final declaration as the summit fizzled
out on Sunday afternoon. “There was no declaration because there was no consensus,” said Colombian President Juan Manuel
Santos. He bristled at suggestions the summit had been a failure, however, saying the exchange of different views was a sign of
democratic health. For the first time, conservative-led US allies like Mexico and Colombia are throwing their weight behind the
traditional demand of leftist governments that Cuba be invited to the next Summit of the Americas. Cuba was kicked out of the
Organization of American States (OAS) a few years after Fidel Castro's 1959 revolution and has been kept out of its summits due
mainly to US opposition. But Latin American leaders are increasingly militant in opposing both Cuba's exclusion
and the 50-year-old US trade embargo on the Caribbean island. “The
isolation, the embargo, the indifference, looking
the other way, have been ineffective,” Santos said. “I hope Cuba is at the next summit in three years.” Santos, a major
US ally in the region who has relied on Washington for financial and military help to fight guerrillas and drug traffickers, has become
vocal about Cuba's inclusion even though he also advocates for democratic reform by Havana. In an ironic twist to the debate, US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went dancing in the early hours of Sunday at a Cartagena bar called Cafe Havana, where Cuban
music is played. Argentine President Cristina Fernandez, who has insisted without success that Washington recognize its claim to
the Falkland Islands controlled by Britain, was one of several presidents who left the summit well before its official closure. She
missed a verbal gaffe by Obama, who referred to the “Maldives” instead of the “Malvinas” when using the name Latin Americans give
to the disputed islands. The leftist ALBA bloc of nations -- including Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua and some Caribbean
nations - said they will not attend future summits without Cuba's presence. “It's not a favor anyone would be doing to
Cuba. It's a right they've had taken away from them,” Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega said from Managua.
Lifting the embargo puts the U.S. back in the lead
Goodman, 13 (Josh, Professor of Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, “Obama Can Bend Cuba
Embargo to Help Open Economy, Groups Say,” Bloomberg Business News, Feb 20, 2013 6:21, Online,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-20/obama-should-bend-cuba-embargo-to-buoy-free-markets-reports-say.html)
Now, in a second term, and with private business expanding in Cuba, Obama has a freer hand to do more,
said Sabatini. An exception to the embargo allowing U.S. businesses and consumers to trade with non-state enterprises in Cuba
would be small in scale though help empower a growing, viable constituency for change on the island, he said. Since his brother
Fidel started handing over power in 2006, Castro has relaxed state control of the economy in the biggest economic overhaul since
the 1959 revolution. To provide jobs for the 1 million state workers being laid off, the government began allowing the buying and
selling of homes and the creation of farming co-operatives and other private businesses. The latest sign of change are new rules that
took effect in January allowing most Cubans to bypass requirements they obtain an exit visa or invitation from abroad to leave the
island. Castro in December said that he hopes that productivity gains will boost economic growth this year to at least 3.7 percent.
Gross domestic product expanded 3.1 percent in 2012. The Washington-based Cuba Study Group urges Obama to gain even
more leverage by getting Congress to repeal the so-called Helms-Burton act of 1996 and other legislation that
conditions the easing of sanctions on regime change. Any move to ease the five-decade-old embargo would
probably encounter anti-Castro resistance in Florida, one of the biggest prizes in recent presidential elections, and opposition from
key lawmakers including Senator Robert Menendez, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A bill
introduced by Representative Jose Serrano, a New York Democrat, in the 112th Congress to dismantle the web of
legislation governing relations with Cuba since as early as the 1960s received no co-sponsors.
13
2NC – Link – Cuba Embargo (2/2)
Ending the Embargo lets the U.S. compete with China – lowering restrictions isn’t
enough
Goodes, 9 (Jeff, Lt. Col. in the U.S. military, military fellows program, “Marine colonel: Drop the Cuba embargo,” Friday,
October 23, 2009, Foreign Policy, Online,
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/23/marine_colonel_drop_the_cuba_embargo)
The Obama administration's decision to extend the U.S. economic trade embargo
on Cuba for an additional
year is detrimental to our national and regional security and further emboldens our economic, military, and infrastructure
rivals. What is most perplexing is the fact that earlier this summer the Obama administration decided to relax some of the
regulations regarding personal travel and personal money transfers from Cuban-Americans to their relatives in Cuba, as well as
telecommunication exchanges between private U.S. and state-run Cuban companies: all are steps in the right direction for
U.S. interests - but are not enough. While these relaxed restrictions are certainly a step forward in normalizing relations,
these steps do not outweigh the heavy diplomatic, information, and economic influence of Brazil, Venezuela,
Nicaragua, China, Russia, India, and Iran, all of whom support the Cuban government and all of whom seek to be peer
competitors with the United States.
14
2NC – Link – Venezuela Oil (1/3)
Chavez’s oil policies are continuing, shying away from the US in favor of China
Wallis 13 (Daniel Wallis, Senior Correspondent for Reuters. Daniel used to work for The Times newspaper and PA News
agency in London before joining Reuters in 2003. Since then he has reported on political, general and economic news from across
east Africa, Iraq and Latin America. “Venezuela's post-Chavez oil policy to focus on China, Russia” Reuters, Mar 15, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/15/venezuela-election-oil-idUSL1N0C69N220130315)
Venezuela's post-Chavez oil policy will increasingly focus on deals with China and Russia if acting
President Nicolas Maduro wins an April 14 election to continue his late boss's socialist programs. During his 14 years in power, Hugo
Chavez nationalized most of the OPEC nation's oil industry with the aim of putting its crude reserves - the biggest in the world - at
the service of his power base, Venezuela's poor majority. Turning away from the United States, the traditional top buyer of
Venezuelan oil, Chavez also sharply increased fuel sales to China and turned Beijing into his government's biggest source of foreign
funding. "We are not going to change one iota of the fundamental themes of President Chavez's
policies," Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez said in a recent interview with a local TV station. "We have a very
important strategic relationship with China, which we're going to continue deepening and
cultivating. It's the same with our cooperation with Russia ... Chavez's policies are more alive than ever, and
we will push ahead with them." Maduro, the late president's preferred successor, faces Henrique Capriles, governor of
Miranda state, in the forthcoming election. The vote was called after Chavez's death last week following a two-year battle with cancer.
If Maduro wins, he can be expected to increase oil sales to political allies at the expense of the
United States, while taking on more debt from those partners. Venezuela is sending China about 430,000 barrels per day (bpd)
of crude and products, up from just a few thousand bpd in 2005, in repayment of loans totaling $36 billion. The biggest Chinese
energy company, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), is a key part of Venezuela's efforts to tap its enormous
Orinoco extra heavy crude belt, one of the planet's largest hydrocarbon reserves. CNPC has
joined with state oil
company PDVSA in a joint venture in the Orinoco called Petrourica that is expected to begin producing within
weeks. A PDVSA project with a Russian consortium, Petromiranda, began pumping there last year.
China benefits from Latin American regimes opposed to the US such as Venezuela
Ellis 10 (R. Evan Ellis is an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the
National Defense University. “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”, August 9, 2010,
http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html)
The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of
which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the
PRC leadership see the
country's sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an
actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from
supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China's attainment of observer status in the OAS
in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions,
and to keep them from being used "against" Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of
access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move
Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been
disadvantaged. Finally, the PRC benefits from the challenges posed to the dominance of the United States in
the region by regimes such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and its trade and investment with those regimes help
to keep them economically viable. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the PRC is careful to avoid association with the anti-U.S.
rhetoric and projects of those regimes, which could damage its more strategically important relationship with the United States.
15
2NC – Link – Venezuela Oil (2/3)
China is increasing competition against the US in Latin American – specifically in
Venezuelan oil
Bajpaee 5 (Chietigj Bajpaee, Master’s degree in International Relations at the London School
of Economics and completed his Undergraduate studies in Economics and Political Science at
Wesleyan University and the University of Oxford. Chietigj has been awarded the Joint King’sNational University of Singapore PhD studentship to fund his doctoral studies. “CHINESE
ENERGY STRATEGY IN LATIN AMERICA”, The Jamestown Foundation, June 21, 2005,
http://www.jamestown.org/latinamerica/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3870&tx_ttnews
%5BbackPid%5D=239&no_cache=1#.Uebqy41OSSq)
Latin America is fast emerging as the major stage of competition for oil and gas resources among the global powers. The region,
which has traditionally come under the U.S. “sphere of influence,” caught the attention of China following the
significant growth potential of its energy resources. Latin America is estimated to hold 13.5 percent of the world’s
proven oil reserves but accounts for only 6 percent of total output. Although China has tapped energy resources in
Venezuela, Columbia, Ecuador and Peru, and has begun to tap Argentina and Bolivia, there still exists significant
room for expansion, especially given that China still depends on the Middle East for 60 percent of its oil imports and wishes
to further diversify. China’s domestic energy needs and regional developments in the Asia Pacific region are
likely to fuel Beijing’s desire to access Latin American energy resources. China, which has been a net oil
importer since 1993, is the world's number two oil consumer after the U.S., importing one third of its crude oil consumption. In the
presence of sporadic power shortages, growing car ownership, cross-country air travel, and the importance of energy to maintain
China’s burgeoning growth rates, pressure is mounting on China to access energy resources on the world stage. Furthermore,
China’s limited progress in accessing local energy resources due to poor relations with neighboring states (witness the Sino-Japanese
dispute over the energy-rich East China Sea, the disputed status of the Spratly and Paracel islands and growing political instabilities
in Central Asia) have forced China to search for energy further afield. However, China's growing presence on the
international energy stage could ultimately bring it into confrontation with the world's largest energy
consumer, the U.S. Nowhere is the Sino-U.S. energy competition more evident than in the United
States’ backyard. The competition for energy resources in Latin America is unlikely to be confined to the economic sphere as
seen by developments in other regions where China is attempting to access energy resources. For example, China’s military
cooperation with Myanmar, Sudan and the Central Asian republics cannot be separated from its attempts to access energy resources
in these states. While not a zero-sum game, growing interlinkages and interdependence between China and Latin America
is likely to come at the cost of the United States’ relations with its neighbors, which will only
undermine U.S. ability to access the region’s energy resources. This will force the U.S. to rely on energy
resources from more remote and less stable regions, such as West Africa, the Caspian and the Middle East. Entering the U.S. “Sphere
of Influence” As the world’s number five crude exporter with the largest proven oil reserves in the Western hemisphere,
Venezuela is emerging as a major prize in the competition for energy resources in Latin America. While
Venezuela sells 60 percent of its crude oil exports to the U.S. and is the United States’ fourth largest oil supplier,
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is attempting to reduce his country’s dependence on the U.S.
market. President Chavez has stated that "We have been producing and exporting oil for more than
100 years but they have been years of dependence on the United States. Now we are free and we make our
resources available to the great country of China." [1] Easier said than done, as China’s refineries will have to be
refitted to process Venezuela’s heavy crude oil. Furthermore, transporting energy resources from Venezuela and Argentina is
particularly difficult given that both states are on South America’s Atlantic coast although there have been discussions to overcome
this by constructing a pipeline from the Atlantic to the Pacific through Panama. [2] Nevertheless, China has made
significant inroads in accessing Venezuela’s energy resources. During Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's
visit to Beijing in December and Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong's visit to Venezuela in January 2005, China committed to
develop Venezuela’s energy infrastructure by investing $350 million in 15 oil fields, $60 million in a gas project as well as upgrading
the country’s railway and refinery infrastructure. In exchange, China will get 100,000 barrels of oil a day, 3 million tones of fuel oil a
year and 1.8 million tones of Orimulsion, an alternative boiler fuel from Venezuela. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)
has also been given significant oil and gas development opportunities in Venezuela including the fields at Zumano in eastern
Venezuela, which has an estimated 400 million barrels of oil.
16
2NC – Link – Venezuela Oil (3/3)
LA countries exporting oil to China over US – gain leverage
Bajpaee 5 (Chietigj Bajpaee, Master’s degree in International Relations at the London School
of Economics and completed his Undergraduate studies in Economics and Political Science at
Wesleyan University and the University of Oxford. Chietigj has been awarded the Joint King’sNational University of Singapore PhD studentship to fund his doctoral studies. “CHINESE
ENERGY STRATEGY IN LATIN AMERICA”, The Jamestown Foundation, June 21, 2005,
http://www.jamestown.org/latinamerica/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3870&tx_ttnews
%5BbackPid%5D=239&no_cache=1#.Uebqy41OSSq)
China's growing energy interests in the Americas have been accompanied by a growing involvement
in the region's security. In October, in its first military deployment to Latin America, China sent a UN peacekeeping
contingent to Haiti comprising 140 Chinese policemen with plans to deploy an additional 125 personnel. Ironically, Haiti is one of
only 25 states that recognize Taiwan rather than China. Recently, the issue of extending the mandate of the 6,000-strong UN
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which is due to expire in June, has come under pressure from Sino-Taiwanese frictions.
While UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the interim government of Haiti have asked that the mandate be extended by one year
in order to oversee the municipal, legislative and Presidential elections to be held later this year, China is pushing for only a six
month extension due to a scheduled visit by interim Haitian President Alexendre Boniface to Taiwan in July. While having to accept
the humiliation of aiding a state that engages in relations with Taiwan’s “secessionist” forces, China has garnered the
goodwill of Latin American states, which will come in handy when negotiating energy and other
deals. The U.S. is looking on with caution as China encroaches upon a region that has
traditionally been a major supplier of energy resources. Venezuela and Canada together provide the U.S. with a
third of its energy imports. For every barrel of oil that China purchases from Latin America there is
potentially one less barrel available for the U.S. Furthermore, as the American states reduce
their reliance on the U.S. oil market, they will have greater political leverage over the U.S. on
contentious issues such as Canadian trade disputes with the U.S. over lumber and beef, and tensions over human
rights abuses in Venezuela.
Venezuela hopes to increase oil exports to China, tradeoffs with US imports
Ratliff 6 (William Ratliff, research fellow and curator of Americas Collection at Stanford
University's Hoover Institution, specializing in Latin America, China, and U.S. foreign policy.
“Pragmatism Over Ideology: China’s Relations with Venezuela”, The Jamestown Foundation,
March 15, 2006,
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=31481&t
x_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=196&no_cache=1#.Uebtgo1OSSo
Chavez seeks a special relationship so that China can replace the United States as Venezuela’s chief
foreign client, Burgos adds, enabling him to toss the U.S. out of Venezuela in the context of his
continent-wide “Bolivarian revolution.” At present, the United States imports about 15% of its foreign oil from
Venezuela. Late in 2005, Chavez noted that so long as the United States does not try to invade Venezuela and overthrow him, oil will
continue to flow north (ABC Nightline, September 16). In the end, however, this self-styled successor to Fidel Castro seems to think
Venezuela must break all economic dependence on the United States, and even a Fudan (Shanghai) University specialist sees Chavez
using oil as “a diplomatic weapon” (China Daily, November 22). In early February 2006 Rafael Ramirez, the president of
Venezuela’s state-run oil company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), reviewed Venezuela’s oil-related
relations with
China in a Caracas interview, saying “we are hoping to send 300,000 bpd to [China] very soon” (Xinhua, February 9). This
would be double the current amount, most of which goes into asphalt. (Much of what China buys now is orimulsion, a lowgrade, dirty fuel oil made by PDVSA from the heavy oil of the Orinoco Tarbelt.) Venezuela’s ultimate goal is to provide
15-20% of China’s oil import needs. Much of that might have to come from what the United
States now receives, for Chinese and foreign sources fear that production is falling, not rising, in Venezuela.
17
2NC – Link – Mexico Relations
Improved US-Mexico relations crowd out China
Fischer ‘12
[Howard. Analyst for Capitol Media. “Fox says US-Mexico ties deter China's influence” 9/14/12
http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/fox-says-us-mexico-ties-deter-china-s-influence/article_b8fd3834-acdc-5b33-b1fbd983fdf8d2de.html]
Former Mexican President Vicente Fox said the United States has to bolster ties with Mexico - including
recognizing the benefits of migrant labor - or
get used to the idea of China setting the international
agenda on its own terms . "The threat is this so-called power shift from the West to the
East ," he told a press conference Thursday at an economic development event organized by the city of Peoria. "Those nations
on the East are getting ready and prepared to lead," Fox explained, saying there are forecasts showing
the Chinese economy will be larger than that of the United States within a dozen years. "And that
means a very important question to all of us: Under what principles are those leading nations (going to) be
exercising their leadership?" Fox said. His point: The U.S. would be better off dealing with Mexico and
other Latin American countries than perhaps those with different worldviews. "We have our values in the
West that we share," Fox said. "So we all on this continent, especially North America, must get ready to meet that challenge."
That means bolstering the economies of the United States and Mexico , he said. If the
West wants to keep its edge, Fox said, there needs to be a recognition that Mexicans in the United
States, legally or not, contribute to the economy of both countries.And that, he said, will require
resolving the issue of who can come to this country and under what circumstances. "It has to be based on
humanism, on compassion, on love, on friendship, on neighborhood and on partnership that we have together," Fox said.
"Otherwise, we will keep losing the jobs to the East." Fox, who served as president from 2000 to 2006, insisted he is
not in favor of "open borders." "But I am in favor of the use of our talent, our wisdom, our intelligence," Fox said. And that requires
finally filling the vacuum of what kind of laws on immigration are necessary. In his speech, Fox did not address Arizona's approval of
SB 1070 two years ago in an effort to give state and local police more power to detain and arrest suspected illegal immigrants. But in
response to a question afterward, he said Arizona and other states have waded into the fray with their own laws out of frustration
with the lack of action in Washington. "At the very end, migration is a national issue," Fox said. With immigration reform stalled in
Congress, "state governments and state legislatures have been forced to get involved." Fox said that what's needed now is for
lawmakers in Washington to come up with at least a framework for reform. "We need to know what the playground is and what the
rules of the game are," he said, calling on leaders to "put aside xenophobia, put aside all of our complaints that we might have, and
sit down and discuss the differences." Fox said it also needs to be recognized that this is not just a one-way
relationship, saying Mexico buys $250 billion of U.S. products every year, meaning "millions of
jobs" to this country's economy.
18
2NC – Link – AT: Engagement Now
US engagement is decreasing
Priest 5-1
[Dana. Latin American Reporter for the Washington Post. “U.S. role to decrease as Mexico’s drug-war strategy shifts” The
Washington Post, 5/1/13 ln]
For the past seven years, Mexico and the United States have forged an unparalleled alliance against
that
hard-earned cooperation may be in jeopardy . President Obama heads off Thursday on a three-day visit to
Mexico’s drug cartels, one based on sharing sensitive intelligence, U.S. training and joint operational planning. But much of
Mexico to cement relations with the newly elected president, Enrique Peña Nieto, with vows of neighborly kinship and future
cooperation. Obama’s visit comes as the fight over border security and immigration overhaul has
begun to consume Congress. The December inauguration of Peña Nietobrought the nationalistic Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) back to power after 13 years, and with it a whiff of resentment over the deep U.S.
involvement in Mexico’s fight against narco-traffickers. The new administration has shifted
priorities away from the U.S.-backed strategy of arresting kingpins, which sparked an unprecedented level
of violence among the cartels, and toward an emphasis on prevention and keeping Mexico’s streets safe and calm, Mexican
authorities said.
19
2NC – Internal Link (1/2)
US-China interests in Latin America are competitive and trade off
Johnson ‘5
[Stephen. Senior Latin American Policy Analyst at Heritage. “Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America” 10/24/5
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growing-influence-in-latin-america]
The United States and China have competing inter-ests in Latin America . Washington
would like to see its hemispheric neighbors develop into stable, demo-cratic, prosperous trade
partners that embrace the rule of law. Beijing sees the region as a source of raw materials, a market for
manufactured goods, and a platform for power projection. U.S. interests probably coincide more with Latin
American needs. In con-trast, China represents an opportunity to temper American dominance with
broader alliances. Regrettably, Chinese aid and commodity imports may buy time for state industries,
powerful presi-dents, and influential oligarchs. Most of all, such commerce could delay needed reforms and
indus-trialization that might lift Latin America's near majority underclass out of poverty. America's strength is
competition, and it should influence the rules of the game in that direction. As a good neighbor and in its
own and Latin America's interests, the United States should: Accelerate free trade agreements. Free trade
agreements have been the hallmark of U.S. pol-icies toward the region since the 1990s. As an inducement,
America should drop its agricul-tural and steel subsidies that dissuade potential partners and cost taxpayers money. Improved
U.S. trade relations with Andean neighbors (and eventually Southern Cone countries) will open market
access for both U.S. and Latin American enterprises and provide an outlet for industrial growth.
Adopt more comprehensive relationships. Single-issue diplomacy that emphasizes U.S. interests, such as
counternarcotics, leaves vacu-ums in other areas such as security assistance and trade capacity development that other
powers can fill. Plan Colombia is working because the United States is helping Colombia to combat terrorism, expand public safety
zones, strengthen institutions, reactivate the economy, and promote rural peace.[11] Cut red tape on assistance. This policy
should be followed to the greatest extent possible. Per-formance requirements are blunt instruments that do not cover every
situation. Constraints such as annual certifications on counternarcot-ics cooperation and Article 98 letters that with-hold security
assistance occasionally backfire by withdrawing support for allies in areas of mutual interest. If Congress considers such restrictions
absolutely necessary, it should tai-lor them to suspend only economic aid that is not crucial to immediate U.S. interests. Press
harder for reforms and use public diplomacy. Once Latin America had elected leaders and fledgling markets in the
1990s, U.S. support for democracy and economic reforms declined. Although each country is responsible for solving its own
problems, exter-nal pressure can encourage progress. U.S. pub-lic diplomacy, which is mostly reactive toward Latin
America, should
be strengthened and more supportive of U.S. development goals. The United States has
Choice goes hand-in-hand with
competition , because these keep markets vibrant and govern-ments accountable. In a globalized world,
democ-racies have relations with whom they wish and nation-competitors such as China cannot
be blocked from visiting the Western Hemisphere. However, the United States can best look after
its regional interests by cultivating closer political and security ties with neighbors, advancing
free trade, and encouraging respect for the rule of law and lib-eral economic principles among all
become the greatest power in the world based on its tradition of free choice.
players- including China.
20
2NC – Internal Link (2/2)
The internal link is empirically true – American inaction drives Chinese market
expansion
Johnson ‘5
[Stephen. Senior Latin American Policy Analyst at Heritage. “Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America” 10/24/5
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growing-influence-in-latin-america]
In the Western Hemisphere, the Chinese are taking advantage of failures of half-hearted
mar-ket reforms and Washington's unwillingness to pursue neighborhood relations with much
enthu-siasm. National Defense University professor Cyn-thia A. Watson notes, "[T]he 1990s turned into a period of
severe disappointment as free markets led to rampant corruption and unfulfilled expec-tations
in Latin America while Washington became the world's superpower rather than a part-ner for
the region."[3]
21
2NC – Latin America K2 China Influence
China’s influence in Latin America is key to their soft power
Malik, 06 – PhD in International Relations (Mohan, "China's Growing Involvement in Latin
America," 6/12, http://uyghuramerican.org/old/articles/300/1/info@uyghuramerican.org)
China's forays into Latin America are part of its grand strategy to acquire "comprehensive
national power" to become a "global great power that is second to none." Aiming to secure access to the continent's vast natural
resources and markets, China is forging deep economic, political and military ties with most of the Latin
American and Caribbean countries. There is more to China's Latin American activism than just fuel for
an economic juggernaut. China now provides a major source of leverage against the United
States for some Latin American and Caribbean countries. As in many other parts of the developing world, China is
redrawing geopolitical alliances in ways that help propel China's rise as a global superpower.
Beijing's courtship of Latin American countries to support its plan to subdue Taiwan and enlist them to join a countervailing
coalition against U.S. global power under the rubric of strengthening economic interdependence and globalization has begun to
attract attention in Washington. Nonetheless, Beijing's relations with the region are neither too cozy nor frictionless. For Latin
America and the Caribbean countries, China is an enviable competitor and rival, potential investor, customer, economic partner, a
great power friend and counterweight to the United States, and, above all, a global power, much like the United States, that needs to
be handled with care. As in Asia and Africa, China is rapidly expanding its economic and diplomatic
presence in Latin America -- a region the United States has long considered inside its sphere of influence. China's
interest in Latin America is driven by its desire to secure reliable sources of energy and raw
materials for its continued economic expansion, compete with Taiwan for diplomatic
recognition, pursue defense and intelligence opportunities to define limits to U.S. power in its
own backyard, and to showcase China's emergence as a truly global great power at par with the
United States. In Latin America, China is viewed differently in different countries. Some Latin American countries see China's
staggering economic development as a panacea or bonanza (Argentina, Peru, and Chile view China as an insatiable buyer of
commodities and an engine of their economic growth); others see it as a threat (Mexico, Brazil, and the Central American republics
fear losing jobs and investment); and a third group of countries consider China their ideological ally (Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela).
While China's growing presence and interests have changed the regional dynamics, it still cannot replace the United States as a
primary benefactor of Latin America. Chinese investment in the region is US$8 billion, compared with $300 billion by U.S.
companies, and U.S.-Latin America trade is ten times greater than China-Latin America trade. Nonetheless, China is the new kid on
the block that everyone wants to be friendly with, and Beijing cannot resist the temptation to exploit
resentment of Washington's domineering presence in the region to its own advantage. For
Washington, China's forays into the region have significant political, security and economic
implications because Beijing's grand strategy has made Latin America and Africa a frontline in
its pursuit of global influence . China's Grand Strategy: Placing Latin America in the Proper Context China's
activities in Latin America are part and parcel of its long-term grand strategy. The key elements of Beijing's grand strategy can be
identified as follows: Focus on "comprehensive national power" essential to achieving the status of a "global great power that is
second to none" by 2049; Seek energy security and gain access to natural resources, raw materials and overseas markets to sustain
China's economic expansion; Pursue the "three Ms": military build-up (including military presence along the vital sea lanes of
communication and maritime chokepoints), multilateralism, and multipolarity so as to counter the containment of China's regional
and global aspirations by the United States and its friends and allies; Build a network of Beijing's friends and allies
through China's "soft power" and diplomatic charm offensive, trade and economic dependencies
via closer economic integration (free trade agreements), and mutual security pacts, intelligence cooperation and arms
sales.
22
2NC – Impact – Energy Security (1/5)
Chinese influence in Latin America’s key to their energy security
Xiaoxia 5-6
[Wang. Staff Writer for the Economic Observer. “In America's Backyard: China's Rising Influence In Latin America” The Economic
Observer, 5/6/13 http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latinamerica/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/ ]
Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving
force.In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and
become the world's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends
on imports , which increases the instability of its energy security. Diversification is
inevitable . In this context, Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity naturally
became a destination for China. China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play
the simple role of consumer. It must also help solidify the important links of the petroleum
industry supply chain. Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in
Latin American countries, and China’s investment and trade in the Latin American countries are
also focused on its energy sector. In the opinion of many European and American scholars, China's current practice isn’t
much different from that of Western colonizers of the last century. These scholars believe that China doesn’t care about local human
rights or the state of democracy when dealing with countries. All China is interested in is establishing long-term,
stable economic relations. This realistic path is exactly opposite to that of America's newfound idealism. Thus China
has become a close collaborator of certain Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, that are in
sharp conflict with the United States. The global financial crisis of 2008 was a chance for China
to become an increasingly important player in Latin American. As Europe and the United States were caught
in a financial quagmire, China, with nearly $3 trillion of foreign exchange reserves as backing, embarked on "funds-forassets" transactions with Latin American countries. So what does China want exactly in entering Latin American?
Is it to obtain a stable supply of energy and resources, and thus inadvertently acquire political influence? Or the other way round?
Presumably most U.S. foreign policy-makers are well aware of the answer. China's involvement in the Latin
American continentdoesn’t constitute a threat to the United States, but brings
benefits . It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela,
Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in
South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also
safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood -- and to a certain
extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S .
23
2NC – Impact – Energy Security (2/5)
Chinese energy insecurity sparks Asian war
Clement ‘12
[Nicholas, China and India Vie for Energy Security, May 25, http://www.2point6billion.com/news/2012/05/25/china-and-indiavie-for-energy-security-11177.html]
The competitive relationship between China and India has become a defining feature of the
strategic environment across emerging Asia. While both nations are currently not in direct conflict, there are several areas of
strategic interest which could potentially be clashing points in the future. Energy security is one
such point; and while escalation between China and India is unlikely, it is important to note that the energy policies of each nation are largely
based on geopolitical considerations. First, it is important to recognize that energy cooperation between China and India over the past decade has been
increasing. In January 2006, for example, both nations signed a memorandum of cooperation in the field of oil and natural gas which encouraged
collaboration between their enterprises, including joint exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources. Escalations in global energy prices and
political uncertainties in the Middle East, however, have resulted in both countries looking for long-term arrangements. As
China and India
are increasingly forced to rely on the global oil market to meet their energy demands, they are
more susceptible to supply disruptions and price fluctuations. In response, both countries have partly
followed geopolitical energy policies, based on notions of traditional security. Ultimately, what we see is the
arrival of military and political planning in trying to solve the issue of natural resource shortages . Energy security is of utmost
strategic importance to China and India if they hope to continue to expand their economies. Rapid
growth rates in both countries have grown in tandem with increased demand for energy. By 2020, it is estimated that China and India combined will
account for roughly one-third of the world’s GDP and, as such, will require vast amounts of energy to fuel their economies. As such, the
competition for energy resources such as oil and natural gas will only become fiercer.An
important aspect of energy security is maritime control in the Asia-Pacific oceans. The sea lines of
communication that run through Asia effectively act as the vital arteries for both countries. Maritime security is thus of major
national interest for both China and India, and is directly linked to their energy security.Recent
military modernization within China has been focused towards upgrading its naval
capabilities,and ultimately moving towards creating a strong and powerful blue-water navy.
India’s drive for maritime dominance has resulted in its naval budget increasing from US$1.3 billion in
2001 to US$3.5 billion in 2006, with plans to further increase naval spending 40 percent by 2014. China’s thirst for oil has doubled over the last decade,
and is only predicted to rise. Similarly, India relies on the energy shipped through maritime regions to fund its own industrialization. India
continues to state its maritime goals in pure geopolitical terms, even explicitly acknowledging in their 2004
Maritime Doctrine that “control of the choke points would be useful as a bargaining chip in the international power game, where the currency of
military power remains a stark reality.” Thus
it is clear that energy security has been directly translated into a
national security issue, which has both political and military implications. The geopolitical rivalry in
Myanmar between China and India provides great insight into their adversarial energy relationship. In Myanmar, both Chinese and Indian geopolitical
and geoeconomic interests collide, and as such, may become a point of contention between China and India. Myanmar holds vast strategic importance
for both China and India due to its location and abundance of natural resources. It has vast reserves of natural gas, so for both China and India it is
presented as a source of energy free from the geopolitical risks of the Middle East. There has thus been major competition between China and India for
access to the market. India has signed a US$40 billion deal with Myanmar for the transfer of natural gas, and has also had frequent discussions about
building a pipeline from Myanmar to India. However, China has increasingly gained the most from Myanmar’s available resources. In 2005, for
example, Myanmar reneged on a deal with India, and instead signed a 30-year contract with China for the sale of 6.5 trillion cubic liters of natural gas.
For China, Myanmar is also important as it provides a land route to the Indian Ocean that vital resources could be shipped through in place of the Strait
of Malacca. The
potential for the Malacca Strait to be blockaded by a rival is of great concern to
China, since as much as 85 percent of China’s oil is shipped through the region. For India, Myanmar is also of a strategic
importance due to its location. China is already on friendly terms with Pakistan and has been
expanding its presence in the Indian Ocean, thus giving India a feeling of Chinese encirclement.
India’s interest in Myanmar directly relates to the growing presence and influence of China in the region. China’s “string of pearls” strategy refers to
attempts to negotiate basing rights along the sea route linking the Middle East with China, including creating strong diplomatic ties with important
states in the region. Not only does this contain India’s naval projection of power, it also directly threatens India’s energy access and the regional balance
of power. While military confrontation between China and India remains unlikely, it is important to recognize that China and India’s energy policies
revolve around traditional ideas of security, which highlight military and political balancing. Their energy policies are largely based on geopolitical and
security considerations, and not just with regards to the global oil market. As such, it
is critical for there to be ongoing
diplomatic engagement between China and India to avoid unnecessary or accidental escalation.
24
2NC – Impact – Energy Security (3/5)
China-India war causes extinction
Kahn ‘9
[Jer. “Why India fears China” Newsweek, 10/19/9 lexis]
On June 21, two Chinese military helicopters swooped low over Demchok, a tiny Indian hamlet high in the Hima-layas along the
northwestern border with China. The helicopters dropped canned food over a barren expanse and then returned to bases in China.
India's military scrambled helicopters to the scene but did not seem unduly alarmed. This sort of Cold War cat-and-mouse game has
played out on the 4,057-kilometer India-China border for decades. But the incident fed a media frenzy about "the Chinese dragon."
Beginning in August, stories about new Chinese incursions into India have dominated the 24-hour
TV news networks and the newspaper headlines. China
claims some 90,000 square kilometers of Indian
territory. And most of those claims are tangled up with Tibet. Large swaths of India's northern mountains were once part of Tibet.
Other stretches belonged to semi-independent kingdoms that paid fealty to Lhasa. Because Beijing now claims Tibet as
part of China, it has by extension sought to claim parts of India that it sees as historically
Tibetan, aclaim that has become increasingly flammable in recent months. Ever since the anti-Chinese unrest
in Tibet last year, progress toward settling the border dispute has stalled, and the situation has taken a dangerous turn. The
emergence of videos showing Tibetans beating up Han Chinese shopkeepers in Lhasa and other Tibetan cities created immense
domestic pressure on Beijing to crack down. The Communist Party leadership worries that agitation by Tibetans will only encourage
unrest by the country's other ethnic minorities, such as Uighurs in Xinjiang or ethnic Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, threatening
China's integrity as a nation. Susan Shirk, a former Clinton-administration official and expert on China, says that "in the past,
Taiwan was the 'core issue of sovereignty,' as they call it, and Tibet was not very salient to the public." Now, says Shirk, Tibet is
considered a "core issue of national sovereignty" on par with Taiwan. The implications for India's security--and the world's--are
ominous. It turns what was once an obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky
peaks hardly worth fighting over into a flash point that could
spark a war between two nuclear-armed
neighbors. And that makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more
than just the two parties involved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought
to take notice--a conflict involving India and China could result in a nuclear exchange. And it
could suck the West in--either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, or as a
mediator trying to separate the two sides.
25
2NC – Impact – Energy Security (4/5)
South China Sea conflict also goes nuclear
Wesley ‘12
[Michael Wesley, Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and an Adjunct Professor at Griffith University and The
University of Sydney, former Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, former Professor of International
Relations and Director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University, and Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the
University of New South Wales, July 2012, “What’s at stake in the South China Sea?”
http://lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/wesley_whats_at_stake_snapshot11.pdf]
The South China Sea is enclosed by the west coast of mainland Southeast Asia, Borneo and the Philippine archipelago. Rich in
hydrocarbons and fish stocks, it is traversed by over one-third of global shipping. Its waters and seabed
are subject to six opposing territorial claims – by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the
Philippines – but these confrontations are generally not regarded as seriously as the Taiwan Straits and the Korean peninsula standoffs. But
the South China Sea is more unpredictable, and certainly warrants much closer and more sustained
attention by strategists and policy-makers. It is in the South China Sea that the components of Asia’s
changing power dynamics are most concentrated and on display: China’s growing strategic heft
and paranoid sense of entitlement; its Southeast Asian neighbours’ hopes and misgivings about China’s regional dominance;
and the United States’ compulsion to meet China’s strategic challenge. The South China Sea is a
tangle of competing and mutually complicating claims over territory, resources and navigation
rights. Geopolitically, it is like the Bermuda triangle, reversing expected alignments and suspending normal rules of the game. It pits Asia’s two most
significant Communist countries, China and Vietnam, against each other, unites usually bitter enemies China and Taiwan, and is drawing the United
States back to a partnership with Vietnam a generation after the fall of Saigon. The
South China Sea is the flashpoint in the
Pacific where conflict is most likely to break out through miscalculation. It is a
crowded maritime environment contested by some inexperienced maritime forces with
underdeveloped naval doctrine, among whom there are no established and accepted rules for
managing maritime incidents. And the combination of the claimant states’ power asymmetries,
overlapping prerogatives, and growing nationalism mean that incidents, once they occur, are likely to
escalate. There are four reasons why finding solutions to the South China Sea disputes should be given the highest priority by strategic policymakers. 1. For China it’s about security – and respect The South China Sea symbolises Beijing’s larger maritime
dilemma. The country’s major population and productive centres cluster along China’s coastline, and are therefore vulnerable to major attack
from the sea. Naval strategists see China as hemmed in along its sea coast by a chain of states or territories hostile to Beijing: Japan, Korea, the Ryuku
Islands, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The
overriding goal of Chinese naval strategy is to establish dominance
over the waters within this ‘first island chain’. At the southern end of the first island chain, the South China Sea is
crucial to China’s commercial shipping, energy flows, and the access of its Hainan island-based submarines to the Pacific. But
the South China Sea’s southern and western access points – the Sunda, Lombok, Luzon and Malacca Straits – are
controlled by allies or partners of the United States. The best way to offset this vulnerability is to
control the South China Sea itself – and thereby loosen the American position in Southeast Asia.
Influential elites in China view the South China Sea as ‘blue territory’ – that is, as much a part of China’s sovereign territory as Tibet, Xinjiang or
Taiwan. To this line of thinking, any surrender of its claims in the South China Sea would signal a weakening of its rights to Tibet, Xinjiang or Taiwan –
and is therefore unthinkable. China’s 1992 Territorial Law classified the South China Sea as China’s internal waters, meaning foreign naval vessels and
aircraft must first gain Beijing’s permission before transiting, submarines must surface, and that China retains the right to evict other countries’
shipping at any time. Beijing’s willingness to enforce this law has been growing apace with its naval power in the western Pacific. In recent weeks,
Beijing has placed the Spratly and Paracel Islands and the Macclesfield Bank under prefectural-level administration, established a 45-member
legislature to administer the 1100 people who live on the islands, and approved the deployment of a People’s Liberation Army garrison to the islands. 2.
Southeast Asia – avoiding the bad old days If
unaddressed, the dynamics in the South China Sea could return
Southeast Asia to the bad old days of inter-state divisions, domestic instability and
competitive great-power interventions. On no other issue have the disagreements and
rivalries between ASEAN
26
2NC – Impact – Energy Security (5/5)
<<<CONTINUED --- NO TEXT REMOVED>>>
member states been so sustained and obvious. The Philippines and Vietnam demand that the organisation supports them in
standing up to Beijing. On the other side are Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, with no direct stake in the conflict and which refuse to endorse the
Philippines’ and Vietnam’s confrontational stance. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are concerned about the dispute, but believe that avoiding
confrontation with China will improve the prospects for productive negotiations. The
stand-off over the South China Sea
exposes the hollowness of Asian institutions’ reliance on the principle of unanimity – which means that any
member’s objection can keep an issue, no matter how pressing, off the agenda. Beijing’s refusal to discuss the South China Sea in any regional meeting,
and its implicit threat to withdraw from any organisation that doesn’t respect this wish, shows Southeast Asia’s confidence that it could ‘socialise’ China
by welcoming it into regional institutions was misplaced. Asian institutions allow Beijing to make apparent concessions, such as its 2002 agreement
with ASEAN to a Declaration of Conduct on the South China Sea, without actually surrendering any part of its position. As China and the United States
increase the stakes in the South China Sea, ASEAN’s cardinal principle of neutrality is threatened . The Philippines,
Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia are tightening their strategic relationships with the United States, just as Cambodia, Laos and Thailand
deepen their links to China. And there are signs that the disputes have become entangled in domestic politics in the Philippines and Vietnam, making their stances even more uncompromising. In
Manila, following allegations that Beijing used corrupt payments to soften the former Arroyo administration’s stance on the South China Sea, the current Aquino administration and its Parliamentary opposition
are vying for the most uncompromising policies on the issue. To counter rumours circulating around Hanoi that Beijing has ‘bought’ the Vietnam’s senior leadership, the Vietnamese government has passed a law
claiming sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands. 3. For the United States it’s about Credibility – within limits It is in the South China Sea that Southeast Asia’s anxieties about China overlap with
American anxieties about Beijing’s naval buildup. Over the past two years, the United States has taken an active interest and position in what had formerly been a dispute between China and the other claimants.
For the
United States, what’s at stake in the South China Sea is the viability of its entire presence in the
western Pacific. The US Navy’s access to the South China Sea is contested by Beijing. China claims it
This means there are now in effect two layers to this dispute: a basic stand-off between the territorial claimants; and an overarching strategic contest between Beijing and Washington.
will respect the freedom of passage of ships and aircraft through the area, on the condition that they are en route to another destination, and do not
conduct military exercises or collect intelligence or militarily useful data. Washington
is adamant that the South China
Sea’s sea lanes are international waters, and are therefore subject to freedom of navigation, which in
international law allows the conduct of military exercises and the collection of intelligence and militarily useful data. If Washington
surrenders its ability to navigate the South China Sea on its own terms, it will lose a major
foothold in the western Pacific. The South China Sea in effect pits a Chinese expansive claim (sovereignty based on historical usage)
against an American expansive claim, that freedom of navigation allows the collection of intelligence and military data. The American claim is contested
in other waters by Malaysia, Indonesia and India, though supported by other regional countries. China accuses the US of ‘hyping’ the freedom of
navigation question, arguing that it hides an intention to use the issue to build a coalition against China. For the Southeast Asian states contesting
China’s South China Sea claims, the United States’ presence and interest in the issue is a prerequisite for their position. Washington is acutely
aware that it needs to be seen as a reliable ally anpd partner in the Pacific. It realises that its arms-length response to
the Asian Financial Crisis eroded its position in Asia and set China on its path towards building soft power in the region. For Southeast Asians worried
that Washington’s attention or will to stay in the region may erode, there is virtue in keeping the South China Sea on the agenda. But
Washington can’t give its allies and partners a blank cheque which allows them to confront, and
even provoke, China from the comfort of the assumption that the United States will back them up. And some in Southeast Asia are
watching Washington’s moves very closely, sensitive that any concession could signal its
acceptance of China’s claims in the South China Sea. 4. Solutions are Part of the Problem Either multilateral
mediation or international law is most often used to resolve disputes of this sort – but in the
South China Sea they act to exacerbate the situation. Beijing refuses to discuss the dispute in any
multilateral context, fearing that it will facilitate the formation of a front against China. The Southeast Asian claimants,
however, are adamant that they must deal with China as a coalition, with Manila particularly insistent that ASEAN
must negotiate a common position before negotiating with China. The result is a stand-off: the Philippines insists that ASEAN must find a
common position before negotiating with China, while China will only negotiate if ASEAN abandons the search for a common position.
International law also intensifies the dispute. TheUnited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea does not
recognise China’s historical claims, and therefore cannot serve as the basis for an adjudication of the dispute. Worse, because
international law relies on unbroken longevity of claims as the basis for adjudication, none of
the parties to the South China Sea dispute can allow others’ claims to pass uncontested, in case
this is taken as evidence of its relinquishing of its claim. The result is a steady drum beat of
hydrocarbon prospecting, fishing, the occupation of islets, and maritime clashes. Policy Implications There is a great deal
at stake in the South China Sea. The dynamics of this issue will impact on China’s evolving international personality, the response of
its neighbours to its rising power, and the longevity of the United States’ position in the western Pacific. With the growth of trade and investment
around Asia’s IndoPacific coast, the South China Sea will become ever more crowded with shipping and commerce
27
2NC – Impact – North Korea (1/2)
Chinese soft power is key to prevent North Korean proliferation and conflict
Pei 3 (Minxin, The Financial Times, 3/12/03, “A Docile China is Bad for Global Peace”, Carnegie Endowment,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2003/03/12/docile-china-is-bad-for-global-peace/2vyo, acc. 7/19/13)
This question may strike many in Beijing as absurd. Keeping a low international profile, maintaining
a stable
relationship with the US and capitalising on globalisation to spur economic growth have served
the country well. Why change? Indeed, few would dispute that, on balance, Beijing's foreign policy
has demonstrated increasing maturity and sophistication. Yet, China's handling of the crises in
Iraq and North Korea also shows the risks and costs of passivity. It is time the leadership reevaluated the geopolitical assumptions underlying Chinese foreign policy. In the crises in Iraq
and North Korea, the desire to keep a low profile has led China to adopt a more ambiguous
stance and lose whatever influence it may have had in shaping their resolution. Unlike Russia, which
has taken a more proactive approach, China has been missing in action. Its position on the use of force
against Iraq is unclear. Its declared goal of keeping nuclear weapons out of the Korean peninsula
has not been accompanied by visible diplomatic measures. Inaction becomes harder to defend
when one considers what is at stake for China. Its immediate economic interests in Iraq are
modest. But because of its growing dependence on Middle Eastern oil, which accounts for 60 per cent of
imports, it may better serve its interests by getting more actively involved and taking a clear stand.
Quiescence risks marginalisation. In dealing with an unfolding nuclear confrontation in North
Korea, Beijing's inaction has disappointed its friends and irked Washington. Although it does not have
to toe the US line toward Pyongyang, China needs to come up with an alternative to Washington's policy of
no negotiation. If it allows the crisis to spiral out of control, it could be dragged into a nuclear
maelstrom with devastating consequences for peace and prosperity in the region. In a world
where the threats from rogue states and international terrorism are at least as dangerous as
rivalry among major powers, Beijing can better defend its interests by modifying its diplomatic
strategy. While it should continue a policy of co-operation with the US, it must use its growing
influence to assume a more active role in the international community. This may require Beijing to break
some old habits, such as its aversion to substantial participation in peacekeeping missions, reluctance to increase its financial
contributions to the United Nations, and abdication of any leadership role in multilateral organisations. Chinese leadership
will be necessary above all in reshaping its own volatile neighbourhood. To be sure, its initiative to
establish a free-trade zone with the Association of South-East Asian Nations is a good start. But Beijing can do much more
to allay the fears of its neighbours about China's growing power. This may require it to adopt a
new two-pronged regional strategy. First, China should use its clout to push for regional
integration and co-operation. On the top of this agenda should be expanded regional free trade.
Despite Tokyo's lukewarm response to Beijing's proposal for a Japan-China-Asean free trade agreement, China should continue to
push this initiative. Second, Beijing needs to mend its frayed ties with Tokyo, where sinophobia is at a feverish level. To reassure
Japan, China must be more transparent about its military modernisation, stop using Japan's war guilt as a diplomatic tool, and start
treating it as a full co-equal partner in maintaining peace and prosperity in East Asia. A genuine Sino-Japanese reconciliation is the
requisite for regional collective security. No doubt, this may seem an ambitious agenda for China's new foreign policy team. It also
goes against ingrained thinking in Beijing's diplomatic strategy. But if Chinese leaders do not seize the current
opportunity to reshape their regional environment, others will do it for them - and not
necessarily to their liking.
28
2NC – Impact – North Korea (2/2)
North Korean conflict escalates and goes nuclear
Hayes & Hamel-Green, 10 – Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development,
AND Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act Victoria University (1/5/10, Executive Dean at
Victoria, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,”
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)
The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple, interconnected global challenges facing
Korea and Northeast Asia are
instances where risks of nuclear proliferation and actual nuclear use arguably have increased in
recent years. This negative trend is a product of continued US nuclear threat projection against the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this
humanity, not least of which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
region, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, the breakdown in the Chinese-hosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns over
China’s increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about whether US extended deterrence (“nuclear
The consequences of failing to address the
proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic
issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is
the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely
accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are
umbrella”) afforded under bilateral security treaties can be relied upon for protection.
well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close
to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million.
Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust
of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear
war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited
nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range
The studies indicate that the soot from the
fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3
In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at
any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in
rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in
grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people
will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere
would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences.
Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects,
superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions.
The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food
insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially
100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).
the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non
There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global
security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including
possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and
aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation
proliferation and disarmament regimes.
issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.
29
2NC – Impact – Taiwan
Chinese influence in Latin America quells tensions over Taiwan
Ellis ‘11
[R. Evan. Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense
University. “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study” Joint Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011.
http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html]
Diplomatic Recognition of Taiwan. For the PRC, the government of Taiwan represents an important issue of
political legitimacy and internal security. Currently, 12 of the 23 nations in the world that
diplomatically recognize the government of Taiwan are found in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Although the People's Republic of China does not publicly threaten to block investment in or loans to countries that do not recognize
the PRC, China repeatedly emphasizes the issue in its public diplomacy in the region, and makes such
investments and market access difficult for those countries that do not recognize it, while
simultaneously nurturing expectations regarding the opportunities that diplomatically recognizing
the PRC could bring. When Costa Rica changed its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the
PRC in May 2007, for example, it received an aid package that included an $83 million soccer stadium,
the purchase of $300 million in government bonds, various highway, public works, and aid
projects, and a $1 billion joint venture to expand the country's petroleum refinery, as well as PRC aid in facilitating
access to Chinese markets by traditional Costa Rican products such as coffee. In part, such Chinese generosity was
directed toward the other countries in the region that still recognized Taiwan in order to
demonstrate the types of benefits that could be made available if they too were to change their
diplomatic posture.13 Although the PRC and Taiwan have informally agreed to refrain from the
use of economic incentives to competitively "bid" for diplomatic recognition, since Costa Rica's switch,
the allure of the PRC has prompted declarations of interest in changing diplomatic posture by
Panamanian president Richard Martenelli, Paraguayan president Fernando Lugo, and Salvadoran president MaricioFuenes—
although all did so prior to assuming office.
War in Taiwan draws in the US and causes extinction
Hunkovic ‘9
[Lee. Prof Military Studies @ American Military University. “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict – Possible Futures of a Confrontation
between China, Taiwan, and the United States of America” www.lampmethod.com, 2009]
A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a
nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could
be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and
GreatBritain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that
participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant
members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then
plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as
the Pacific and even into India, which could inturn create an international standoff and deployment of
military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale
conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it.
However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual
outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.
30
2NC – AT: China Influence Resilient
It could go either way – it has a tenuous foothold in the region
Ellis ‘11
[R. Evan. Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense
University. “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study” Joint Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011.
http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html]
Affinity for Chinese Culture. The PRC has actively promoted Chinese culture and language throughout
the world, including through such landmark events as the 2008 Olympics in Beijing and 2010 World Expo in Shanghai, visited
by an estimated 5 million foreign tourists,12 as well as establishing more than 282 Confucius institutes worldwide, including 20 in
Latin America. Cultural exchanges are a featured part of China's dealings with Latin America,
consistent with the "nonthreatening" character that Beijing wishes to emphasize in these interactions.
Despite PRC "marketing efforts," by contrast to the global impact of U.S. culture, Chinese culture is arguably one of
the PRC's weakest levers of soft power in Latin America, with interest in Chinese culture arguably reflecting,
more than driving, China's influence in the region. Although some Chinese culture is reaching the Latin
American mainstream, perceptions of it in Latin America are generally limited and superficial,
sometimes based on media reports or experiences with ethnic Chinese living in those countries. Such perceptions are often
mixed, including respect for the Chinese work ethic, a sense of mystery regarding Chinese
culture, and often a sense of mistrust arising from the perceived differentness of that culture and
commercial competition from Chinese products.
31
***AFF ANSWERS TO CHINA DISAD***
32
2AC – Non-Unique
Non-unique – China’s trade with Latin America is a quarter of the U.S.’s and not
with topic countries
O'Neil, 12 (Shannon K., Senior fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign
Relations, a nonpartisan foreign-policy think tank and membership organization, “China’s
Economic Role in Latin America,” Council of Foreign Relations, October 26, 2012, Online,
http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2012/10/26/chinas-economic-role-in-latin-america/)
There is much talk of China’s escalating economic influence in Latin America. But it’s worth
looking at what has (and hasn’t) actually happened in the three main ways that China interacts with the region’s
economies: trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and loans (from state-owned banks). Trade is the most visible and important
connection. Over the last several years, goods flowing back and forth have increased some 30 percent per year, bringing
today’s total to roughly US$250 billion. This trade
leans in China’s favor, with a deficit (nearly all with Mexico) of nearly
billion [dollars]. While sizable numbers, this is still just a quarter of Latin America’s trade with the
United States. And it appears to be leveling off, suggesting that China won’t overtake the United States
as the region’s primary trading partner anytime soon. This trade is also quite concentrated. Exports to China come
primarily from Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Argentina, and are mainly raw materials (copper, iron ore, lead, tin, soya, and
US$100
sugar). Of the goods China sends east nearly half go to Mexico—a mix of consumer goods and capital goods (equipment for
production). Trade with China has expanded dramatically over the past decade. But it is worth remembering that it both started
from a low base and is unevenly distributed—affecting a few countries significantly and others very little.
33
1AR – Non-Unique (1/2)
Non-unique – Despite gains in China/Latin America trade, the U.S. is still far more
involved in regional trade
Mallén, 13 (two BAs from Universidad Complutense de Madrid, in Media & Film Studies and
Modern Languages, and an MA in International Reporting from CUNY Graduate School of
Journalism, “Latin America Increases Relations With China: What Does That Mean For The
US?,” International Business Times, June 28 2013 9:53 PM, Online,
http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-china-what-does-mean-us-1317981)
Between 2000 and 2009, China increased its two-way trade with Latin America by 660 percent, from
$13 billion at the beginning of the 21st century to more than $120 billion nine years later. Latin American exports to China reached
$41.3 billion, almost 7 percent of the region's total exports. China’s share of the region’s trade was less than 10 percent in 2000; by
2009, the number had jumped to 12 percent. As impressive as that growth is, the numbers still pale in
comparison to the U.S.' stats in its commercial relationship with Latin America. The U.S. still holds more than
half of the total trade, adding up to $560 billion [dollars] in 2008. Notably, though, America’s trade
participation in Latin America has remained static, while China is closing the gap more and more each year -- having already
surpassed the U.S. in some countries, including powerhouse Brazil.
Obama’s recent tour proves non-unique – the U.S. isn’t done yet
American University, 13 (Jun 10, 2013, “U.S.-China: Competing over Central America and
the Caribbean?,” Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University, Online,
http://aulablog.net/2013/06/10/u-s-china-competing-over-central-america-and-thecaribbean/)
The recent visits to Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean by Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President
Obama (and Vice President Biden to Trinidad and Tobago) suggest a handoff from Washington to Beijing of
the role as the region’s sugar-daddy, but not a strategic shift in influence. The presidents’ visits were similar
in their innocuous itineraries. Both got pompous welcomes; met with “real” citizens (Xi ate empanaditas de chiverre with a coffee
farmer); and praised the bilateral relationships. Both held sub-regional summits – Obama in San José and Xi in Port of
Spain. Both repackaged ongoing or recently negotiated projects as new “accords.” Obama pledged another
$150 million [dollars] a year for funding the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), part of the
strategy started under President Bush to counter the drug trade and related threats. Xi got headlines in Costa Rica for providing
more than $1.5 billion for refinery and road projects and to purchase replacement taxis and buses from Chinese manufacturers.
Significantly, China is also building Costa Rica’s new National Police Academy – the sort of project Washington used to thrive on.
34
1AR – Non-Unique (2/2)
US perception in LA higher than China now – perceived as better for engagement
Dyer 13 (Zachary The University of Texas at Austin M.A., Latin American Studies, Energy
Policy Activities and Societies: Institute for Latin American Studies Student Association,
President (2011) “U.S. image remains favorable across Latin America” Tico Times Thursday,
http://www.ticotimes.net/More-news/News-Briefs/U.S.-image-remains-favorable-acrossLatin-America_Thursday-July-18-2013)
The United States' public image greatly improved in Brazil and Mexico in the last year, and many
surveyed said that U.S. ties were still more important than those with China. US-Chinese influence Latin
American respondents said that the United States exerted greater influence over their countries than the Chinese but viewed Chinese
acts more positively. Courtesy Pew Research Center Recent allegations that the United States National Security
Agency may
have been spying on several Latin American countries has done little to improve the
U.S.’s image abroad, but a new report from the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project shows that Uncle Sam has
retained a favorable public image across the region. U.S. public image is especially strong in El Salvador (79
percent), Brazil (73 percent), Chile (68 percent) and Mexico (66 percent). Brazilians and Mexicans in particular saw a notable spike
in their favorable view of the United States. Argentina remains the Latin American country with the lowest approval of the U.S.,
coming in at 41 percent. The report noted, however, that while a majority of Argentines surveyed did not have a favorable view of the
superpower, the 41 percent is a large improvement over the 16 percent approval rating recorded in 2007. Costa Rica was not
surveyed for this report. Young college-educated people in particular reported a favorable view of the U.S. In Argentina, for example,
people aged 18-29 had a 49 percent favorable impression of the U.S. versus only 32 percent approval for people older than 50. Latin
America is no longer the United States’ backyard, but the U.S. remains more influential than China in the region.
All countries surveyed except Venezuela opined that the United States had a “great deal” or
“fair” amount of influence over their country and their economy compared to China. While the U.S.
may have more impact, respondents said that China’s influence was seen more positively than the United States. Venezuela,
Argentina, Chile and Bolivia were among those that saw Chinese influence in a rosy light. During Chinese President Xi Jingping’s
visit to Costa Rica in June, both countries’ leaders signed nearly $2 billion in trade and infrastructure projects, including the scuttled
Moín refinery expansion project. Since Costa Rica switched its recognition to mainland China over Taiwan in 2007, the world’s
second-largest economy has gifted the country a new $100 million stadium and $25 million towards the construction of a National
Police academy. Popularity contests aside, most Latin Americans surveyed said that the U.S. was the more
important country to have strong ties with. Research for the 2013 Spring Pew Global Attitudes Survey was based on
telephone and face-to-face interviews under the supervision of the Princeton Survey Research Associates International. Click here
for a full breakdown of method by country.
35
2AC – No Trade-Off (1/2)
The relationship is trilateral and US engagement helps China
Shaiken et al ‘13
[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley. And Enrique Peters – Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn – Centro de Estudios China-Mexixo at Universidad NacionalAutonoma de Mexico.
China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 32-33]
If one simply looks at China’s trade surplus with the United States and Mexico, one would
assume that China plays a very influential role in the triangular relations between these three nations.
However, as the Chinese saying goes, there is no diplomacy for a weak country, implying that developing
nations inherently assume a submissive role in relations with economic superpowers. In this sense
then, economic power becomes the most important factor in the context of international
diplomatic relations. Applied to the framework of the trilateral relationship between China, the United States, and Mexico,
this theory clearly assumes the existence of one key player . There is no doubt that the United
States is a superpower, not only among these three countries, but also in the world. Although the International Monetary
Fund predicts that China will surpass the U.S. in 2016 to become the world’s largest economy, the fact
remains that China is still a developing country and only one of the regional powers in Asia,
unlike the United States, which is a leading global superpower. The economic performance of the United
States remains very impressive. Even though the economy of the U.S. was significantly affected by the
international financial crisis, and is still in the process of recovering from an economic recession, the United States
finds itself even now in a “unipolar moment” of unchallenged superiority. Therefore, although
China is referred to as the second largest economy in the world, such accolades would be dampened if
China’s situation were viewed comparatively, as a whole, with the United States. It is clear that China’s
economic status has been increasing in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), which is the correct unit of measurement when
examining the cost of living. However, “the traditional measure of GDP, calculated in dollars at current exchange rates, [indicates]
that the U.S. economy remains nearly six times the size of China’s” (Stallings 2008:241). Furthermore, it is widely known
that competitiveness indicates the level of a country’s productivity. According to a report by the World
Economic Forum, the U.S. is ranked much higher than both China and Mexico (China: 26th and Mexico:
58th), even though “the U.S. continues its decline for the third year in a row, falling one more
place to fifth position” (WEF 2011). All of the above-mentioned data indicates that the United States
continues to be a prevailing superpower in the world – a particularly relevant fact for
both China and Mexico. As for these two nations, both are developing countries, both are listed among the middle-income
countries, and their economic performance and GDP per capita are much lower than that of the U.S. However, when we compare
China and Mexico to each other, we see that both countries are in the process of modernization, although comparatively speaking,
Mexico’s per capita GDP is 2.3 times higher than that of China. As the most powerful country in the triangular relationship, the
United States has become the most important trade partner for both China and Mexico, as well as a key player in other facets of their
relationship: (1). For China, the United States is its most important economic partner, a status which
is supported by the fact that the U.S. is the second largest export destination for China’s
manufacturing products, following only behind Asia as a whole. What is more, China is the most significant
shareholder of U.S. stock, and both countries enjoy a close, mutually beneficial relationship in
terms of their economies, their militaries, and their cultural and interpersonal exchange. To a
certain extent, China and the U.S. are mutually dependent on each other. However, it is worth
noting that the United States holds the upper hand in terms of the bilateral relationship between
the two nations. Superficially speaking, China’s swift economic growth has greatly strengthened its
economy, hence the reason it has been regarded as “world-class economic power” (Smith 2008:215). However, the
“commodity boom” is unlikely to last forever (He 2012:31). China’s “manufacturing road” to
modernity has become rocky and uncertain for a number of reason:
36
2AC – No Trade-Off (2/2)
***Continued No Text Deleted***
The first is related to increasing labor costs in China, not only compared to what they were before, but also in
terms of neighboring countries such as Vietnam and India. According to AlixPartner Consultancy, compensation costs in East Asia –
a region that includes China but excludes Japan – rose from 32% of U.S. wages in 2002 to 43% in 2007. And since wages have been
increasing at a rate of 8% to 9% a year, taxes have been increasing as well. East Asia’s overall costs have doubtlessly escalated even
more during the last two years (Devonshire-Ellis 2011). The effects of wage increase in China have been
exemplified by American companies like Adidas leaving China in response to escalated labor
costs. What this ultimately means for China is a gradual loss of its comparative advantage as the
lowest-cost producer in the manufacturing sector – a status that it has maintained for decades. Secondly,
United States-based multinational companies (MNCs) are crucial in determining the structure of
the global production system, labor mobilization, and international trade flow. China, as the final
assembler of goods produced by the MNCs, has enticed such companies with low costs of labor. This has incentivized
many MNCs in the manufacturing sector to build accessory plants in China, which now account for over 60% of China’s exports.2
Consequently, MNCs receive a large percentage of these export profits, calling into question the true trade surplus that China has
with the U.S. and Mexico. In other words, the United States, as a primary base for MNC-operations, will be
a determining factor regarding China’s future economic performance if China continues to
follow its manufacturing road. Last but not least, China is currently facing numerous domestic
problems, such as: (1) a rich government with poor citizens, suggesting that the benefits of economic growth
have not been enjoyed by a significant portion of the population; (2) rampant social inequality; and (3) inefficiency
of state-owned enterprises, incomplete economic reform, and a semi-market and semicommand economic system. Chinese economist Wu Jinglian has argued that China’s future will be decided based on
whether the country advances to a law-based market economy or reverts back to a command economy and state capitalism (Wu
2012). The aforementioned factors have impeded China’s economic development, supporting the contention that “China’s economic
clout and status should not be exaggerated” (Roett and Paz 2008:9). In short, it is necessary for China to explore a
new model of development - that is, from an export-driven model to one based on innovation in order to sustain its economic growth.
37
1AR – No Trade-Off
US-China influence isn’t zero-sum
Xiaoxia 5-6
[Wang. Staff Writer for the Economic Observer. “In America's Backyard: China's Rising Influence In Latin America” The Economic
Observer, 5/6/13 http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latinamerica/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/ ]
For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a
multiple choice of mutual benefit s and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American
economy’s new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse
influence that the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.
No trade-off – the plan facilitates a trilateral relationship – that’s key
Shaiken et al ‘13
[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley. And Enrique Peters – Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn – Centro de Estudios China-Mexixo at Universidad NacionalAutonoma de Mexico.
China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8]
The analysis of Ping Wang highlights that
in the Mexico-US-China triangular trade relationship, the
United States is the key player . While China’s presence has increased,the United States
remains a critical influence on both Mexico and China. Furthermore, the author suggests that China’s rise
and emergence in terms of trade and investments in LAC, and specifically in regards to this
triangular relationship, will slow increasingly in the future, considering its specialization in industrial
commodities and products, rising wages in China, and the high number of multinational corporations involved in Chinese exports.
For Ping Wang, the politically and historically subordinated role of Mexico with the United States, in
contrast to China’s increasing regional and global status, is a basis for understanding future
scenarios in which the Mexico-United States relationship is more stable in comparison to that of
China and the United States (where the US, for example, views China as a threat).
38
2AC – Link Turn
Chinese soft-power benefits from US economic engagement – multiple warrants
Ellis 12 (Dr. R. Evan Ellis holds a Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative
politics and is an Associate Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies. “The United States, Latin America and China: A “Triangular Relationship”?”
Inter-American Dialogue, May 2012,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf)
In economic terms, the attractiveness of the US market and trade agreements between the United States and
Latin American countries condition where in the region Chinese investors calculate it profitable
to go. Chinese auto companies and other manufacturers investing in the Mexican maquiladora sector, for example, have been
motivated in part by interest in exporting Chinese firms’ products to the US market under provisions of NAFTA.22 The
possibility of countries in Latin America serving as export platforms for Chinese goods into the
United States has also been mentioned in the context of the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement and in the
process of negotiating and securing approval for the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).23 In a more diffuse
fashion, because of the close economic relationship between the United States and Latin America, US consumption and
business activity that indirectly benefits Latin America enables the region to purchase Chinese
products. At the level of the commercial enterprise, exports to the United States from the region may include goods sourced in
China by Latin American manufacturers. At the personal level, some of the corporate earnings and salaries from these companies
naturally go to the purchase of goods from the PRC, among other sources. Beyond corporations, although not traditionally
considered in such terms, a portion of the approximately $50 billion in remittances sent annually to families in Latin America by
immigrants living in the United States24 ultimately enables the purchase of Chinese goods in the region. The ability of the United
States to serve as a market and a source of investment for Latin America has influenced the region’s
receptivity toward the PRC. The initial openness of the region to promises of investment and trade by Chinese President
Hu Jintao came just after Latin America reached a historic low with regard to flows of investment from the United States and other
sources.25 The 2007-2009 global financial crisis, which significantly impaired US purchases of Latin American
exports and US credit to the region, strengthened
the perceived importance of the PRC for Latin American
governments, and Chinese commodity purchases and investments emerged as one of the key factors helping these governments
weather the crisis. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, while the PRC has occupied an important symbolic role as the largest and most
visible source of new capital and markets, it has not been the only player to which Latin America has looked as the region seeks to
engage globally. Attention also has been given to India and other emerging markets of Asia, as well as
traditional players, such as the European Union, and
actors such as Russia and Iran.
39
2AC – Alt Causes
Multiple barriers to Chinese influence in Latin America and challengers to
American control are inevitable
Ellis 11 [R. Evan. Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies at the National Defense University. “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A
Case Study” Joint Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011. http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-softpower-latin-america.html]
The growth and exercise of soft power by the People's Republic of China have limits that are
important to recognize. As with the sources of Chinese soft power, those limits are not the same as the limits to U.S. soft power. Limits
to Chinese soft power in Latin America principally arise from the significant gap between the two
cultures, the associated difficulty in learning each other's culture and language, a lack of
understanding of each side by the other, and a pervasive sense of mistrust of the Chinese within
Latin America generally.The cultural gap between China and Latin America touches upon many areas, from
differing consumer preferences limiting the appeal of Latin American exports such as coffee and beef, to different attitudes toward
authority in business and administrative dealings, which contribute to labor problems and other
difficulties where the PRC has operated in Latin America. One of the most significant barriers
between the PRC and Latin America is language. Whereas a relatively significant portion of Latin Americans have some
ability in English, very few speak or read Chinese, and even fewer Chinese can communicate in Spanish,
although the number is growing.16 Although Chinese-language programs are proliferating in Latin America, the difficulty of and time required for
learning Mandarin and the Chinese character set are a powerful impediment to the growth of ties between the two cultures. Compounding
the language barrier is a relative lack of Chinese knowledge regarding Latin America. Apart from major
governmental institutes—such as the China Academy of Social Sciences, which currently has the world's largest Latin America studies program—and
truly multinational Chinese corporations—such as Hong Kong–based Hutchison Whampoa, China Shipping, China Overseas Shipping, Huawei, and
ZTE—the
general knowledge of the region among Chinese businesspeople and government
functionaries is limited, restricting the ability of the PRC to develop broad and sophisticated
programs to advance its objectives in the region. Perhaps most importantly, despite the best efforts of Chinese
businesspeople and politicians to reach out to Latin America, they are too frequently perceived as "not one of us"—a
reality reflected even in Chinese communities, which often remain only partly integrated, despite
deep historical roots in many Latin American cities such as Lima and Guayaquil. Such distance often translates into a
persistent mistrust , even where both sides perceive benefits from cooperation. Latin
American businesspeople commonly express misgivings, suggesting that the Chinese are
aggressive and manipulative in business dealings, or conceal hidden agendas behind their expressions of friendship and
goodwill. Chinese companies in Latin America are often seen as poor corporate citizens , reserving the best
jobs and subcontracts for their own nationals, treating workers harshly, and maintaining poor relations with the local community. In the arena of
China–Latin America military exchanges, it is interesting to note that Latin American military officers participating in such programs are often jokingly
stigmatized by their colleagues in ways that officers participating in exchange programs in the United States are not. Finally, Chinese
influence is diluted by increasing interactions between Latin America and other
extraregional actors , such as India, Russia, Iran, and others. Although the PRC is arguably the most
significant new suitor of the region, it is not the only alternative . For Nicaragua and populist regimes in the Andean region,
Russia provides important alternatives with respect to arms purchases and energy sector
investments. An $18 billion commitment by a Russian consortium to develop the Junin-6 oilfield in Orinoco, for example, may have helped to
accelerate China's subsequent commitment to invest $16.3 billion in Junin-4. In addition to Russia, India is increasingly engaging in
commercial opportunities, particularly in high technology, services, and commodity sector investments, while
challenging the PRC monopoly over "south-south" developing country partnerships in the region. When China cut off purchases of
Argentine soy oil, for example, it was India that picked up the slack .
40
2AC – Chinese Soft Power Fails
China doesn’t understand soft power well enough to use it effectively – its social
not governmental
Nye 13 JOSEPH S. NYE Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University “What China and Russia Don't Get About Soft Power” Foreign Policy APRIL 29, 2013
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_abou
t_soft_power?page=0,1
In his new book, China Goes Global, George Washington University's David Shambaugh shows how China has spent
billions of dollars on a charm offensive to increase its soft power. Chinese aid programs to Africa and Latin
America are not limited by the institutional or human rights concerns that constrain Western aid. The Chinese style
emphasizes high-profile gestures. But for all its efforts, China has earned a limited return on its
investment. Polls show that opinions of China's influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but predominantly
negative in the United States, Europe, as well as India, Japan and South Korea. Even China's soft-power triumphs, such
as the 2008 Beijing Olympics, have quickly turned stale. Not long after the last international athletes had departed,
China's domestic crackdown on human rights activists undercut its soft power gains. Again in 2009,
the Shanghai Expo was a great success, but it was followed by the jailing of Nobel Peace Laureate Liu Xiaobo and screens were
dominated by scenes of an empty chair at the Oslo ceremonies. Putin might likewise count on a soft power boost from the Sochi
Olympics, but if he continues to repress dissent, he, too, is likely to step on his own message. China and Russia make the
mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power. In today's world, information
is not scarce but attention is, and attention depends on credibility. Government propaganda is rarely credible. The
best propaganda is not propaganda. For all the efforts to turn Xinhua and China Central Television into competitors to CNN and the
BBC, there is little international audience for brittle propaganda. As the Economist noted about China, "the party has not bought
into Mr. Nye's view that soft power springs largely from individuals, the private sector, and civil society. So the government has
taken to promoting ancient cultural icons whom it thinks might have global appeal." But soft power doesn't work that
way. As Pang Zhongying of Renmin University put it, it highlights "a poverty of thought" among Chinese leaders. The development
of soft power need not be a zero-sum game. All countries can gain from finding each other attractive. But for China and
Russia to succeed, they will need to match words and deeds in their policies, be self-critical, and unleash the full
talents of their civil societies. Unfortunately, that is not about to happen soon.
41
2AC – US Influence Resilient
US influence in Latin America’s resilient and the thesis of the DA is wrong
Duddy&Mora 5-1
[Patrick – US Ambassador to Venezuela until 2010 and Senior Lecturer at Duke. And Frank – Director of Latin American Center at
Florida Intl University and former Assistant Secretary of Defense – Western Hemisphere (09-13). “Latin America: Is U.S. influence
waning?” 5/1/13 http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-us-influence.html#storylink=cpy]
As MoisesNaim notes in his recent book, The End of Power, there has been an important change in power
distribution in the world away from states toward an expanding and increasingly mobile set of
actors that are dramatically shaping the nature and scope of global relationships . In Latin America,
many of the most substantive and dynamic forms of engagement are occurring ina web of crossnational relationships involving small and large companies, people-to-people
contact through student exchanges and social media, travel and migration . Trade
and investment remain the most enduring and measurable dimensions of U.S. relations with the
region. It is certainly the case that our economic interests alone would justify more U.S. attention to the region . Many
observerswho worry about declining U.S. influence in this area point to the rise of trade with China and
the presence of European companies and investors. While it is true that other countries are important to the
economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, it is also still true that the United States is by far the
largest and most important economic partner of the region and trade is growing
even with those countries with which we do not have free trade agreements. An area of immense importance to
regional economies that we often overlook is the exponential growth in travel, tourism and
migration. It is commonplace to note the enormous presence of foreign students in the United States but in 2011, according to
the Institute of International Education, after Europe, Latin America was the second most popular destination for U.S. university
students. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. tourists travel every year to Latin America and the Caribbean helping to support thousands
of jobs. From 2006-2011 U.S. non-government organizations,such as churches, think tanks and
universities increased the number of partnerships with their regional cohorts by a factor of four.
Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean from the United States totaled $64 billion in
2012. Particularly for the smaller economies of Central America and the Caribbean these flows can sometimes constitute more
than 10 percent of gross domestic product. Finally, one should not underestimate the resiliency of U.S. soft
power in the region. The power of national reputation, popular culture,values and institutions
continues to contribute to U.S. influence in ways that are difficult to measure and
impossible to quantify . Example: Despite 14 years of strident anti-American rhetoric during the Chávez government,
tens of thousand of Venezuelans apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visas every year, including many thousands of Chávez loyalists. Does
this mean we can feel comfortable relegating U.S. relations with the hemisphere to the second or third tier of our international
concerns? Certainly not. We have real and proliferating interests in the region. As the president and his team
head to Mexico and Costa Rica, it is important to recognize the importance of our ties to the region. We
have many
individual national partners in the Americas. We don’t need a new template for relations with
the hemisphere as a whole or another grand U.S.-Latin America strategy. A greater commitment
to work more intensely with the individual countries on the issues most relevant to them would
be appropriate. The United States still has the economic and cultural heft in the region to
play a fundamental role and to advance its own interests.
42
***OIL PRICES DISADVANTAGE***
43
1NC – Oil Prices Disad (1/3)
A) Uniqueness --- current oil prices are high and remain at over $100 --- perceived
instability in the Middle East and supply shortages hedge against US shale and
natural gas from affecting price
Galani 9/6/13 (Una Galani, contributor at Trade Arabia, “Middle East Turmoil Helps Opec
Revenues,” September 6, 2013, http://www.tradearabia.com/news/REAL_242295.html)
Turmoil in the Mena region has been awful for the people of the region. The same cannot be said for
Opec, the oil group. The long list of crises - violence in Iraq, fear of sectarian spillover from the Syrian
conflict, oil worker strikes in Libya and sanctions against Iran - has conspired to keep crude
prices high. The oil world is changing, and the group is losing out. Opec's latest Monthly Oil Market Report projects
an increase in global demand in 2014 of more than 1 million barrels per day to 90.75 million bpd, but the supply
needed from Opec is expected to fall by more than 260,000 bpd to 29.65 million. The group pumped 30.32 million
bpd in August, a survey by Reuters shows. The big winners are Canada and the United States, where fracking has
increased production sharply. It is easy to imagine an oil glut, and much lower prices than the
current $115 per barrel for Brent crude. However, unplanned disruptions within Opec have helped
keep up prices without any substantial cuts from other member nations. Almost 2.2 million bpd were kept out of
the market in August, according to the US Energy Information Administration. That's the highest level of Opec
outages since the EIA started tracking them in 2009.
B) Link --- <<<INSERT SPECIFIC LINK ABOUT THE AFFIRMATIVE>>>
44
1NC – Oil Prices Disad (2/3)
C) Impact --- high oil prices key to the Russian economy
Schuman 12 (Michael Schuman, Asia and Economics Correspondent – TIME, B.A. in Asian
History and Political Science – University of Pennsylvania, M.A. in International Affairs –
Columbia University, “Why Vladimir Putin Needs Higher Oil Prices”, Time, 7-5,
http://business.time.com/2012/07/05/why-vladimir-putin-needs-higher-oil-prices/)
But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on
oil, but runs on oil priced extremely high. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia –
both for the strength of its economic performance , and possibly, the strength of Putin himself. Despite the fact
that Russia has been labeled one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and
India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an
expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China’s excessive dependence on investment,
Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia
is little more than an oil state in disguise. The country is the
largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia’s dependence on crude
has been increasing . About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia’s exports; in
recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal
government’s revenues. What’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia relies heavily
not just on oil, but high oil prices. Oil lubricates the Russian economy by making possible the increases in
government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up
from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending
requirements today than he did just a few years ago. Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government
budget balanced at an oil price of $55 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to $120. Oil prices today have
fallen far below that, with Brent near $100 and U.S. crude less than $90. The farther oil prices fall, the more
pressure is placed on Putin’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population
through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation’s presidency in March, and
protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy, or his ability to use government
resources to firm up his popularity.
45
1NC – Oil Prices Disad (3/3)
Russian economic decline causes nuclear war
Filger 09 (Sheldon Filger, Correspondent – Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces
Disastrous Free Fall Contraction”, http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356)
In Russia , historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely
encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its
political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably
alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at
great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and
file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity
ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to
deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian
economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond
the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension
that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower
status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and
capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister
Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a
virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's
national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the
world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded
that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political
instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear
desperate personnel would illicitly sell
nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to
deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the
financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.
arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that
46
1NC – Link – Cuba
Massive drilling in Cuba is feasible but the embargo is the only barrier --- the plan
enables Cuba to flood the oil market and drop prices
Miroff 09 (Nick Miroff, staff writer, Washington Post, “Cuba's Undersea Oil Could Help Thaw
Trade With U.S.”, 5/16/2009, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/05/15/AR2009051503416.html)
Deep in the Gulf of Mexico, an end to the 1962 U.S. trade embargo against Cuba may be lying
untapped, buried under layers of rock, seawater and bitter relations. Oil, up to 20 billion barrels of it, sits
off Cuba's northwest coast in territorial waters, according to the Cuban government -- enough to turn the island into the Qatar of the
Caribbean. At a minimum, estimates by the U.S. Geological Survey place Cuba's potential deep-
water reserves at 4.6 billion barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, stores that
would rank the island among the region's top producers. Drilling operations by foreign companies in Cuban
waters are still in the exploratory stage, and significant obstacles -- technological and political -- stand between a U.S.-Cuba
rapprochement eased by oil. But as the Obama administration gestures toward improved relations with
the Castro government, the national security, energy and economic benefits of Cuban crude may
make it a powerful incentive for change. Limited commercial ties between U.S. businesses and the island's
communist government have been quietly expanding this decade as Cuban purchases of U.S. goods -- mostly food -- have increased
from $7 million in 2001 to $718 million in 2008, according to census data. Thawing relations could eventually open up U.S.
investment in mining, agriculture, tourism and other sectors of Cuba's tattered economy. But the prospect of major offshore reserves
that would be off-limits to U.S. companies and consumers has some Cuba experts arguing that 21st-century energy needs should
prevail over 20th-century Cold War politics. "The implications of this have the potential to be a sea change, literally and figuratively,
for the Cubans," said Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, a political scientist at the University of Nebraska-Omaha who studies Cuba's
energy sector. At a House subcommittee hearing last month on U.S.-Cuba policy, former oil executive Jorge Piñón told lawmakers
that the United States has a strategic interest in helping Cuba tap its potentially vast hydrocarbon stores and that U.S. companies
should receive special permission to do so. "American
oil and oil equipment and service companies have
the capital, technology and operational know-how to explore, produce and refine in a
safe and responsible manner Cuba's potential oil and natural gas reserves. Yet they remain on
the sidelines because of our almost five-decade-old unilateral political and
economic embargo ," said Piñón, a member of a Brookings Institution advisory group on Cuba policy reform. Cuba has
said it welcomes U.S. investment, but American companies remain largely silent on the issue, at least in public,
bound by trade sanctions that were established under the Kennedy administration. When Cuban oil officials and U.S.
companies attended a joint energy conference at an American-owned hotel in Mexico in 2006, the Bush administration forced the
facility to expel the Cuban delegation, attempting to thwart any potential for partnership. "Until trade barriers are removed, Chevron
is unable to do business in Cuba," said Chevron spokesman Kurt Glaubitz. "Companies like us would have to see a change in U.S.
policy before we evaluate whether there's interest." Robert Dodge, a spokesman for the American Petroleum Institute, said his
organization is not lobbying for access to Cuba, and Texas congressional representatives with ties to the oil industry said they are
focused on opening U.S. territorial waters to drilling. But observers of U.S.-Cuba relations say American companies haven't been
sitting on their hands and remain in conversations with Cuban counterparts. At the 2006 Mexico energy conference,
U.S. oil companies "all had plans to move forward as soon as the U.S. government
gives them the go-ahead," said Benjamin-Alvarado, who attended the conference.
47
2NC – Link – Cuba (1/2)
Lifting the embargo would instigate oil trade --- over 20 billion barrels waiting to
be tapped by American drilling
Telegraph 11 (“US could lift Cuba embargo after oil discovery”, Telegraph, May 29, 2011,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/centralamericaandthecaribbean/cuba/8544870/
US-could-lift-Cuba-embargo-after-oil-discovery.html)
The five decade-long United States embargo against Cuba could finally be lifted after the
discovery of an enormous oil field in Cuban waters. The world's longest-running embargo has endured in
part because there was little the US wanted to buy from its impoverished neighbour. But the
discovery of between five and 20 billion barrels of oil in the deep waters off Cuba's north
coast, only 60 miles away from Florida, has made American businessmen and politicians consider lifting
the embargo. Repsol, the Spanish oil firm, will start exploratory drilling within months. If it strikes a large deposit, the trade
embargo could be significantly revised or removed, according to Professor Mark Jones, an expert on Latin America at the Rice
University of Texas. "The greater the drilling and production, the greater the pressure will be to
engage in a complete overhaul of the trade embargo, either getting rid of it altogether or watering it down
substantially," he said. "I think it is fairly realistic, since the embargo is an anachronism of the Cold War sustained only by a
misguided fear of a backlash from anti-Castro Cuban Americans." Opponents of the US embargo argue that it has failed to drive
Fidel and Raul Castro from power and that if Cuba becomes rich from its oil, regime change is even less likely. They also argue that
warmer relations between the two countries could help stave off an environmental crisis if there is a spill from the field. Jorge Pinon,
visiting research fellow with Florida International University's Cuban Research Insitute, warned: "The US embargo means Repsol
can't pick up the phone to Washington. Any equipment to help in a problem would have to come from the UK or Norway or
somewhere else." Repsol will drill at least one and possibly as many as five wells in waters of similar depth to those where an
explosion on BP's Deepwater Horizon rig caused eleven deaths and led to an environmental catastrophe. In the event of a further
disaster, as much as 90 per cent of any spill could end up in US waters. "If there is any leverage that could push the Obama
administration or the US Congress to push for change it would be from an environmental standpoint." said John Kavulich, senior
policy adviser at the US-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. He argued the US could treat Cuban oil in the same way it treats oil
from Venezuela: "We don't like them but we like their product and we are going to buy it". The current embargo expires this
September. However, Prof Jones suggested that it is unlikely that Barack Obama will move to lift it w the conclusion of his next run
for President.
The embargo is the most significant factor in preventing an increase in Cuban oil
production
Reuters 13 (Reuters, "Cuban oil hopes sputter as Russian give up for now on well,” May 29,
2013, www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/29/cuba-oil-idUSL2N0EA00W20130529)
A number of factors are working against Cuba's oil hopes, among them the political and logistical difficulties
imposed by the long-standing U.S. trade embargo against the island. The embargo makes it difficult to
find rigs that do not violate its limitations on the use of U.S. technology in Cuba and, according to
experts, adds an estimated 20 percent to costs because everything in the project has to be shipped
in from distant, non-U.S. sources.
48
2NC – Link – Cuba (2/2)
Cuba’s oil potential is enormous --- it could reach over four million tons
Garcia 07 (Hugo Garcia, journalist for Juventud Rebelde, Juventud Rebeldge, 12/27/07, "Cuba
Pumping Over 28 Million Barrels of Oil Annually", www.juventudrebelde.co.cu/cuba/2007-1227/cuba-pumping-over-28-million-barrels-of-oil-annually/)
Cárdenas.— Cuba’s volume of oil and natural gas production will reach four million tons —28.8 million
barrels— this year for just the third time in its history. “This has been a good year for the Cuban oil industry,” said Carlos Lage
Dávila, secretary of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, at a ceremony marking the one millionth ton of oil
produced by the Matanzas Central Oil Drilling and Extraction Company (EPEP-C). Lage noted that the last time production
reached this mark was in 2003, and stated that in order to maintain and increase production, the drilling
of a large number of new wells is needed —as well as a little bit of luck— given the natural depletion of existing wells.
Accompanied by Basic Industry Minister Yadira García, and Pedro Betancourt, the first secretary of the provincial party organization,
Lage said, “the country has already fulfilled its hydrocarbon production plan, with gas production plan having been exceeded and the
crude oil production expected to be met by December 30. However, as the gas production projections were surpassed by 11 percent,
depletion of wells leads to higher oil
prices and said that given the current world market —with oil prices above $90 a barrel— the
decision was made to secure new drilling rigs and give priority to this sector of economy to
stem declining production rates. “We have already started to see the fruits of this policy and decision made by
the annual plan has already been met.” The national official explained that
comrade Fidel Castro, which are now more clear and evident than ever,” he said. Among the year’s highlights is an increase in crude
production along with the utilization of 97 percent of the associated gas produced, which virtually eliminates environmental
contamination from associated gas released into the air.
49
1NC – Link – Mexico
U.S.-Mexican economic engagement will massively expand oil supply --- it will
drop prices
Collins 13 (Jennifer Collins, newsgroup focusing on international commodities trading, “As
Obama visits Mexico, the slippery topic of oil comes up”, Marketplace, May 2, 2013,
http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world/obama-visits-mexico-slippery-topic-oil-comes)
President Barack Obama is in Mexico today, meeting with that country’s leader Enrique Peña Nieto.
They’ll be talking immigration, border security and trade. But analysts say their conversation will likely turn to one
touchy topic: Oil and gas reserves in Mexico. Twenty years after the North American Free Trade
Agreement, Mexico’s oil reserves have remained closed to U.S. investment, but that may soon be
changing. There’s pretty much one brand of gasoline you’ll see in Mexico: Pemex, the state fuel
monopoly. But Pemex is in trouble. Mexico’s oil production has been dropping, and in less than 10 years, the country could
be importing more oil than it exports. Analysts say the fossil fuel reserves are there. Mexico remains one of the world’s
top 10 oil producers. There could also be tens of billions of barrels in untapped deep-sea oil reservoirs. The country has, ”The
proven fourth largest shale gas reserves in the world,” said Michael Shifter is president of Inter-American Dialogue. Shifter said
Pemex lacks the technology to tap those reserves. International companies have the expertise, but Mexico’s constitution prohibits
joint ventures in the sector. Shifter said reforms maybe on the way. ”I think if there are joint ventures, U.S. companies would be very
attracted to the opportunities in Mexico,” he said. Arturo Sarukhán, who was Mexican ambassador to the U.S. until January, said he
expects Mexico to introduce oil and gas reforms in July or August this year. ”This is a big strategic game changer,” said Sarukhán,
who is now the chairman of Global Solutions, a consultancy within the Podesta Company. He said those joint ventures could change
the oil and gas game globally. ”By bringing Mexico’s energy assets to the table, overnight Canada, Mexico and
the United States become the largest producer of oil on the face of the earth, far outstripping
Saudi Arabia ,” he said. That should ensure that oil and gas keep flowing for years to come.
50
2NC – Link – Mexico (1/2)
Mexico is the barometer of global oil prices --- the plan’s investment triggers a
massive link to the disad
MM 12 ("Oil Prices Promise to Head Higher As Mexican Production Dwindles", Money
Morning, moneymorning.com/2012/08/24/oil-prices-promise-to-head-higher-as-mexicanproduction-dwindles)
Mexico is currently ranked No. 7 on the list of the world's top oil producers, so less Mexican oil
production would also mean higher oil prices worldwide. The loss of Mexico's 1 million barrels a day in
exports over an extended period would be a greater blow than the total lost due to sanctions on Iran. While the effects of Mexico's
lagging oil production are clear, the causes are more complex. The root of the problem is years of neglect and a government-enforced
monopoly. Nationalized in 1938, Mexico's oil industry has prohibited oil behemoths like Exxon Mobil (NYSE: XOM), BP (NYSE
ADR: BP) and others from taking any sizable stake in the country's oil operations. If it allowed more investments from
international oil companies, Mexico could revive production, industry analysts say. But that won't be easy.
Petroleos Mexicancos, PEMEX, has sole control of the Mexican oil industry and doles out over 32% of its revenue to Mexico's
government. But while the Mexican government likes the oil revenue, it has failed to re-invest enough money back into the industry.
Mexican lawmakers have long resisted providing PEMEX with the funds needed to find new sources of crude. Of late, PEMEX has
moved to relax its oil monopoly, allowing foreign firms to bid for PEMEX contracts. Aspokesperson for PEMEX said these new
efforts, in addition to the current doubling of its budget, would allow the company to quickly boost production. But PEMEX's
director of operations Carlos Morales told Reuters the company is
extremely cautious and prudent when
calculating the prices it is willing to pay firms to develop oil field as agreed on in new contracts. "We can't leave
money on the table. We also can't set very low prices... because we may be left without any offers , just like
what happened with [oil field] Arenque." The inability to auction off the Arenque oil field raises the question of just how committed
PEMEX is to expanding private sector involvement. As long as PEMEX drags its feet, Mexican oil production will keep slipping. "The
next government may want an opening, but PEMEX loves being a monopoly," Miriam Grunstein, an energy researcher with Mexico's
CIDE Institute, told Reuters. But because oil is so vital to the Mexican economy, both PEMEX and the Mexican government may
eventually be forced to adjust their thinking. "The fact that Mexico's production is rapidly declining could potentially cause a
financial crisis not only for PEMEX but for the government," Enrique Sira of energy consulting form IHS told the NYT. "As you lose
Mexican oil, you lose critical supply. It's not about energy security but national security, because our neighbor's economic and
political well-being is largely linked to its capacity to produce and export oil," Jeremy M. Martin, director of the energy program at
the University of California, San Diego told The New York Times.
The export growth provided by the plan is key to spur oil production in Mexico
WTO 13 (Weekly Tanker Opinion, Poten & Partners, "Will Mexico Join North American
Production Boon?" April 19, 2013,
www.poten.com/Document.aspx?id=24492&filename=Will%20Mexico%20Join%20North%20
American%20Production%20Boon?.pdf)
Declining production, coupled with low levels of investment in domestic refineries and crude exploration
have diminished Mexico’s role as a major crude oil producer and exporter. Mexico’s domestic crude
oil production and export volume have fallen by nearly 1 million barrels per day (mbpd) since 2006. At
the same time, steady economic growth has increased domestic demand for refined products, so import volumes have increased by
nearly 400 thousand barrels per day (kbpd) since 2009. A new president gives some observers hope that the
country can reverse these negative trends and generate crude oil production and export growth,
while also reducing refined product imports.
51
2NC – Link – Mexico (2/2)
The plan creates a vacuum of regional demand for outside oil --- it will drop prices
Ahdoot et. al 01 (Jason D. Ahdoot, Attorney at the Law Offices of Jason D. Ahdoot, Masters in
Public Policy from Pepperdine University School of Law, David Vela, Charity Morsey,
"Alleviating U.S. Dependence on OPEC", Pepperdine University School of Public Policy, April
2001, publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/master-public-policy/content/capstones/opec.pdf)
If the U.S. invests more money in countries that have proven reserves, it may be able to lessen
dependence on oil from OPEC and safeguard itself from an oil shortage at a time of crisis or economic disruption. The
U.S. could invest in domestic production capacity, as well as production and refining facilities abroad. Currently,
non-OPEC production is concentrated in seven countries including Canada, UK Mexico, Norway, China, Russia and the US.
Currently, the Bush administration has called for an expansion in imports of petroleum from Mexico. The administration calls for
more privatization of the oil reserves in Mexico and more investment by U.S. oil producing companies. This makes sense because
aside from the fact that Mexico is one of our closest neighbors, we have a bilateral trade pact that would facilitate the export of oil,
creating a relatively safe investment opportunity. In a recent study, the British Petroleum Statistical Review, Mexico has 28.4 million
barrels of proven oil reserves as of 1999. Contracts with Mexico for the importation of oil to the U.S. have been on the rise since
1994.37 This capacity has been furthered with the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA
has pierced through many jurisdictional barriers, allowing Americans to enjoy the importation of Mexican petroleum. Because
Mexico has large proven reserves, and the U.S. has such a high demand for petroleum, we should be
able to facilitate a mutually beneficial relationship. In Mexico, privatization of the nationalized petroleum industry may be a
challenge, but the current administration has promised to help Americans with their energy crisis. PEMEX has long been the
existing monopoly, and the Mexican Constitution stipulates that natural resources such as oil and gas must remain nationalized. In
hopes of liberalizing a sector of this monopoly and amending the constitution, newly elected Mexican President V. Fox has appointed
four of Mexico’s wealthiest businessmen to the PEMEX board. The U.S. government in this instance can opt to invest in Mexico’s
energy sector via NAFTA negotiations. If so, NAFTA will be renegotiated in the year 2007. This could serve as an
opportunity for the US to propose plans for a more integrated energy trade and regional self-sufficiency
strategy. The precursors for establishing a regional trade agreement with Mexico already exist within the political and
economic framework of the Mexico-U.S. NAFTA partnership. These policies are a benchmark
for the development of “geographical linkages for self-sustenance.” An investment in Mexico would
mitigate the impact of aggressive policies by the Middle East and its destabilizing surprises.
52
1NC – Link – Venezuela
Venezuelan supply is a key global indicator --- plan’s investment has global oil
ramifications for prices
GAO 06 (U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Energy Security: Issues Related to Potential
Reductions in Venezuelan Oil Production”, United States Government Accountability Office,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06668.pdf, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06668.pdf)
The United States imports about 13 million barrels of crude oil and refined petroleum products each day, or about 65 percent of its
total daily consumption. Venezuela is the world’s eighth largest crude oil exporter and supplies about
1.5 million barrels per day of crude oil and refined petroleum products, such as gasoline and fuel
oil, to the U.S. market, comprising about 11 percent of current U.S. imports. In addition, Venezuela
ranks among the top 10 countries in the world in the size of its proven oil reserves—oil that has been proven to exist in the ground
and could be produced. Venezuela is also one of the founders and an influential member of the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), whose 11 members control over three-quarters of the world’s total oil reserves and can greatly affect
world oil prices. Consequently, Venezuela
is a key player in the future energy security of the United
States and the world. Most of Venezuela’s crude oil that is not consumed domestically in
Venezuela is exported to the United States . The United States is a natural market for Venezuelan oil because it is so
close—about 5 days by tanker to the U.S. Gulf Coast compared to about 30 to 40 days for supplies coming from the Middle East.
Moreover, Venezuela’s national oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), wholly owns five refineries in the United States
and partly owns four other refineries in the United States and U.S. Virgin Islands, either through partnerships with U.S. companies
or through PDVSA’s U.S. subsidiary, CITGO, Inc. These refineries are unusual in their capacity to refine large volumes of the heavy,
sour (high- sulfur) crude oil that constitute a large part of Venezuela’s oil exports. Political strife within Venezuela and
political tension between Venezuela and the United States have caused concern about the
stability of Venezuelan oil production and exports to the United States. The election of Hugo Chavez as
President of Venezuela in 1998 signaled a major change in how the Venezuelan government views the country’s oil industry. For
example, the government took steps to shift managerial authority for Venezuela’s oil resources from PDVSA to the Venezuelan
Ministry of Energy and Petroleum. The government also changed the way it deals with foreign companies—it raised the maximum
royalty rates paid by foreign oil companies from 16-2/3 to 30 percent, established a new “extraction tax,” raised income taxes for
those companies, and instituted provisions requiring joint ownership structures with majority shares for PDVSA. Opposition to the
new government culminated in a general strike that lasted from December 2, 2002, until February 2, 2003, and virtually shut down
the oil sector of the economy. This strike temporarily decreased world oil supplies by about 2.3 million barrels per day, or about 3.0
percent of total world daily oil supply, and reduced oil exports to the United States by about 1.2 million barrels per day—equivalent
to about 11 percent of total U.S. oil imports at the time. More recently, in April 2006, Venezuela seized two oil fields operated by two
foreign oil companies because the companies did not comply with new rules unilaterally imposed by the Venezuelan government.
Instability in Venezuela’s oil sector exists in a broader context of a tightening global oil supply
and demand balance .
53
2NC – Link – Venezuela (1/3)
The plan’s effects of increasing Venezuelan oil production would lower oil prices
Philip 10 (George Philip, Professor of Comparative and Latin American politics at the London
School of Economics, "Oil and Twenty-First Century Socialism in Latin America: Venezuela and
Ecuador", London School of Economics, Latin America and International Affairs Program,
www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SU005/philip.pdf)
At the same time, both countries face specific domestic and external challenges in their oil sectors . The
Venezuelan and Ecuadorian economies depend heavily on oil and gas exports, which provide the material foundations
for both their foreign and domestic radicalism. In terms of export income, Venezuela and Ecuador are the most oil
dependent countries in the region, with the corollary that they are the least dependent on the performance of their nonoil economies. Worryingly, though, Venezuelan oil and gas exports are currently in decline, partly as the result of
long term trends and partly because of Chavez’s style of government. Ecuadorian oil exports are not really in decline in the same way
but they are likely to grow only slowly while domestic consumption may grow faster. Some 40 percent of Ecuadorian oil is now
consumed domestically and the figure for Venezuela is nearly 30 percent. domestic prices are very low in both cases and some oil
listed under ‘domestic consumption’ may well have been smuggled to Colombia, whose oil consumption appears suspiciously low,
International oil prices have risen significantly in the past decade, which has more than
offset –for now at least – the consequences of stagnant or falling production. These issues point to a important and
growing area of vulnerability in both countries.
and also to Guyana.
Venezuela cuts its oil production in order to keep oil prices high --- plan reverses
this
Philip 10 (George Philip, Professor of Comparative and Latin American politics at the London
School of Economics, "Oil and Twenty-First Century Socialism in Latin America: Venezuela and
Ecuador", London School of Economics, Latin America and International Affairs Program,
www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SU005/philip.pdf)
A further factor holding back production in Venezuela has been OPEC-mandated restrictions. These impact to some extent on
Ecuador but matter much more in the case of Venezuela. They can of course be seen as part of a potentially
worthwhile trade off between lower production and higher prices. There has indeed been a
considerable increase in international oil price levels since the beginning of the 1970s when
Venezuelan oil production peaked. Several Venezuelan governments, including Chavez, have played an
active part in achieving this by helping to engineer international production cuts at critical
times. However if currently high international prices are not sustained, Venezuela seems acutely vulnerable.
54
2NC – Link – Venezuela (2/3)
The magnitude of the link is huge --- it would affect the global supply without
changing demand which sinks prices
GCA 13 ("Effects of Hugo Chavez's Death on Global Oil Markets", April 19, 2013, Global
Conflict Analysis, globalconflictanalysis.com/2013/04/effects-of-hugo-chavezs-death-onglobal-oil-markets)
This is the case because despite the fact that Chavez has passed away, Chavismo is still alive; therefore, many analysts
believe that his policy of depending on oil revenues to foster social programs at home and abroad will
continue, leading to a continuation of a decrease in Venezuela’s oil production. If this is case – as
is expected – global oil supply would decrease and oil prices would increase because demand would
not change . This decline could have a negative impact on American and Western economies, since there would be less supply.
This is a great opportunity for Mexico to step up its production and fill in the vacuum left by PDVSA’s decline because the US and
other Western nations will need to import oil, and since the US is currently seeking to become energy independent in a North
American context, Mexico must capitalize on Venezuela’s continuous expected decline. However, this potential opportunity for
Pemex and the Mexican oil and gas industry depends on the political future of Venezuela – which is expected to hold elections in the
next 30 days. Whatever the outcome, if the newly elected Venezuelan president decides to open up the market and
allow the return of foreign companies such as Exxon-Mobil and ConocoPhillips, the
potential for oil production
increase would rise, leading to a higher global oil supply and lower oil prices . This could have
a potential negative effect on Mexico’s oil exports since potential oil companies could start focusing on Venezuela, even though
PDVSA is not going to be turned around overnight and many energy analysts believe the political transition will most probably lead
to similar style of government.
Venezuela production spikes uniquely create Saudi Arabian oil flooding incentives
--- it will collapse prices
Morse and Richard 02 (Edward and James, Executive adviser at Hess energy trading
company, former deputy assistant secretary of state for international energy policy and portfolio
manager at Firebird Management, an investment fund active in eastern Europe, Russia, and
Central Asia. “The battle for energy dominance”, foreign affairs 81.2)
Then, in the 1990s, OPEC member Venezuela challenged Saudi Arabia by deciding to maximize its
production. Although Venezuela had an OPEC quota of 2.3 mbd, Caracas embarked on an ambitious policy designed to
eventually triple its production capacity. Caracas knew it could not do this on its own, so it reopened its nationalized
resource sector to foreign investment. By the winter of 1996-97, Caracas was producing 3 mbd, knocking
Saudi Arabia from its position as number one supplier to the U nited S tates. In response, Riyadh first tried
reasoning with Caracas. When diplomacy failed, Saudi Arabia raised its production by close to 1 mbd and
induced the oil price collapse of 1998 . Riyadh's actions were tough but effective. By engineering a price
drop, it had to withstand a painful drop in income -- but it achieved its main goals. Saudi Arabia
reasserted its OPEC leadership, reestablished itself as the prime supplier of oil to the United States, and induced non-OPEC
producers Mexico and Norway to support OPEC's revenue-maximizing goals.
55
2NC – Link – Venezuela (3/3)
Empirical support proves the link
New York Times 13 ("Dwindling Production Has Led to Lesser Role for Venezuela as Major
Oil Power", March 8, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/03/09/world/americas/venezuelas-roleas-oil-power-diminished.htm)
HOUSTON — President Hugo Chávez relished using Venezuela’s oil wealth to project power internationally,
nudging OPEC to raise oil prices when he could, showering allies like Cuba and Nicaragua with subsidized oil
shipments, and mocking the United States while selling it his crude. But Mr. Chávez’s death on Tuesday has had surprisingly little
impact on global oil markets, highlighting how Venezuela’s dwindling crude production and exports have undercut its global power
in recent years. International oil prices have barely moved since Mr. Chávez died. OPEC has decided to
increase shipments to the United States and Europe this month, using oil from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Oil
company
executives, long frustrated by Mr. Chávez’s nationalizations, are voicing only tepid hopes that they could possibly
return in full force to what was once one of their crown jewels. Venezuela’s annual oil production
has declined since Mr. Chávez took office in 1999 by roughly a quarter, and oil exports have dropped by nearly a half, a major
economic threat to a country that depends on oil for 95 percent of its exports and 45 percent of its federal budget revenues.
“Venezuela’s clout on OPEC and on world oil prices has been greatly diminished because of
its
inability to exploit its enormous resources,” said Michael Lynch, president of Strategic Energy and Economic
Research, a consultancy. “In the 1990s, their production was booming and they could thumb their nose
at Saudi Arabia and get away with it, but now they have become OPEC’s poor cousin.” In a fundamental geopolitical turn,
Venezuela now relies far more on the U nited S tates than the United States relies on Venezuela. Venezuela depends
on the United States to buy 40 percent of its exports because Gulf of Mexico refineries were designed to process low-quality
Venezuelan and Mexican crudes that most refineries around the world cannot easily handle. But in recent years, the United States
has been replacing its imports of Latin American crudes with oil from Canadian oil sands fields, which is similarly heavy. American
imports of Venezuelan oil have declined to just under a million barrels a day, from 1.7 million barrels a day in 1997, according to the
Energy Department. And while Venezuelan exports of oil are in decline, its dependency on American refineries for refined petroleum
products has grown to nearly 200,000 barrels a day because of several recent Venezuelan refinery accidents. Experts expect
Venezuela to send barrels no longer needed in the United States to China, as payments in kind under oil-for-loans contracts.
Venezuela’s broken refinery sector has left shortages of gasoline and diesel in parts of Latin America, opening the door for valuable
markets to American refiners. Over his 14 years in power, Mr. Chávez relied heavily on oil revenues to finance his social programs.
Energy experts say his gasoline subsidies doubled domestic consumption, cutting deeply into exports, but that his hostility to foreign
investment and mismanagement of the state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela were the primary reasons for the steep decline in
production. A strike and the firing of management talent and 20,000 workers at the oil company in 2002 led to a steep decline in the
company, which has been underscored by the refinery accidents. “Venezuela is a fraction of what it used to be,” said Sadad Ibrahim
al-Husseini, a former head of Saudi Aramco’s exploration and production division, “and that’s really because Venezuela’s
technocrats have scattered over the world and are no longer active in Venezuela.” Mr. Chávez further overhauled oil exploration and
production with a nationalization program in 2006 that ordered a renegotiation of contracts with foreign companies, mandating that
Venezuela’s oil company get a minimum 60 percent share in all production projects. Sixteen foreign companies, including Royal
Dutch Shell and Chevron, went along with the new rules, while Exxon Mobil, Conoco Philips and other companies resisted, and their
holdings were nationalized. Venezuela has huge reserves, including its Orinoco heavy oil belt, which the United States
Geological Survey estimates to have 513 billion barrels of recoverable oil — enough potentially to
make Venezuela one of the top three world producers. But foreign oil companies have been wary of investing.
Jose Valera, a Houston energy lawyer, said that if Nicolás Maduro, Mr. Chávez’s vice president until he was sworn in as president on
Friday, or another member of the Mr. Chávez’s movement was elected president in a special election “it is reasonable to expect
continuity of a substantial portion of the policies.” But as for Venezuela’s economy, he argued, “the situation right now is not
sustainable and it’s only a matter of time before some significant changes will have to be instituted.”
56
2NC – Link Extension – AT: Won’t Affect Other Prices
Oil market is fungible --- the plan affects every other aspect of the oil market
Hill (Patrice Hill, Chief Economic Correspondent at Washington Times, degree from Oberlin
College, “Major changes from oil revolution”, Washington Times, February 3, 2013,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/4/sea-changes-from-oil-revolution/)
The U.S. military presence in the Middle East has had some undesirable side effects, such as stoking the indignation of militant
Muslims in the region in a way that has helped feed support for the al Qaeda terrorist network — one of whose prime goals is to get
the U.S. out of Muslim holy lands in Saudi Arabia and Iraq. James Jeffrey, former U.S. ambassador to Iraq, said the U.S. will have to
maintain its presence in the Persian Gulf despite the budgetary pressures. “The region keeps erupting into one kind or another of
“Oil is fungible. There is one
international oil market. [If] prices go up because of shortages in one area, they are going to go
up in every other area, even in the United States, even if we import from safer areas or
produce it ourselves. “Even more importantly, at the very core of America’s security relationship
since World War II has been guaranteeing supplies of oil and gas to our friends and allies. Even
if we are independent in energy, most of our friends in East Asia and certainly in Europe, and
elsewhere in the world are not.” Mr. Kingston sees another major question arising from the changing oil dynamics: “Why
violence or instability. So we have to be present,” he said on Platt’s Energy Week.
does the U.S. need to hold so much oil in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve if its import dependence is plummeting?” he asked.
President George W. Bush undertook to fill the reserve to a record 727 million barrels, often at prices of more than $100 per barrel.
Yet the oil has rarely been used, even though the U.S. from time to time has been threatened with oil shutdowns because of wars and
embargoes in countries such as Iraq, Libya, Venezuela and Iran. The reserve contains enough crude to cover 90 days of imports at
the current, reduced rate of consumption, Mr. Kingston said. Oil analysts expect that political leaders will be tempted to sell some of
the oil in the reserve in the future either for political or budgetary reasons, to help at least temporarily reduce the budget deficit.
57
2NC – Link Extension – AT: Other Countries Affect Prices
US oil is the critical factor in determining global prices --- it’s the biggest link
Jaffe 08 – Wallace S. Wilson Fellow for Energy Studies at the James A. Baker III Institute for
Public Policy at Rice University, Amy Myers Jaffe, Wallace S. Wilson Fellow for Energy Studies
at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, 4/5-08 (“The Impending
Oil Shock: An Exchange,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 50:4, 61-82,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396330802329048)
Given the large scale of US purchases, incremental US acquisitions of oil affect its
overall international market price. Stated another way, the cost of each marginal barrel is higher than the price
paid for that barrel, since this additional purchase affects the costs of all oil consumed. From the perspective of the United States,
this constitutes an externality.6 On the other hand, the fact that the United States faces a rising supply curve for oil gives it
monopsony power. To the extent that America, or a group of consuming countries on a comparable scale, takes
concrete actions to reduce the size of its purchases, it can lower the market price of oil. This can
happen by accident (as, in the past, through economic recessions) or by sound public policy, which is the preferable path and the one
Elhefnawy advocates.
58
2NC – Uniqueness – Prices High (2/2)
Oil prices will keep rising --- we control a confluence of factors that generate
momentum
Daily Finance 7/29/13 (“Oil Prices Heading Higher! Try This Approach,” July 29, 2013,
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2013/07/28/oil-prices-heading-higher-try-this-approach/)
The bad news, which I had to relay to my dad, is that prices aren't likely to go down again anytime soon . Worse
yet, drivers probably should get ready for higher gas prices. Last week's $0.12 jump could only be the beginning
because a confluence of factors driving supply and demand are likely to push prices higher .
While that's not what drivers want to hear, I do have a solution to help take away a little bit of the pain at the pump. What's driving
prices higher? Before I give you my solution, let's take a deeper look at the problem. The average retail price of gas is made up of four
components. By far, the biggest contributor to the price of gas is oil, which is two-thirds the price of gas. The price of oil is
driven by both global and regional market conditions. Globally, unrest in Egypt has been a big factor in oil's recent rise.
Believe it or not, Egypt is a big deal in the global oil market as it's the largest non-OPEC oil producer in Africa. In fact, U.S. oil and
gas producer Apache is actually Egypt's top oil producer, creating over 363,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day. The concern is that
this oil production, as well as oil being transported through the important Suez Canal, could potentially be shut off if unrest in the
country turns into an all-out civil war. The global oil markets are simply factoring this potential disruption into
the price of oil.
Prices are high and rising --- Egypt and the Suez Canal
CNN 7/5/13 (Aaron Smith, “Oil prices at 2013 high above $103 a barrel”, CNN Money,
http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/05/investing/oil-prices-egypt/index.html)
Oil prices reached their highest point in more than a year Friday, driven by anxiety over a military coup in
Egypt. U.S. oil futures for the August contract rose $1.98, or nearly 2%, to settle at $103.22 a barrel. That's the highest
closing price since May 2, 2012, when oil settled at $105.22 per barrel. The Egyptian army seized control of
the government Wednesday amid violent protests, deposing the country's first democratically elected president, Mohamed
Morsy of the Muslim Brotherhood. On Friday, the African Union announced that it was suspending Egypt.
Egypt produces a negligible amount of oil. But the Suez Canal , which passes through the north African nation, is a major
thoroughfare for oil shipping that links the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. "I think most folks
don't believe that violence in Egypt is going to cause a shutdown of the Suez Canal," said Tom Kloza, chief oil analyst for
military coups make traders nervous about energy supply , prompting
them to buy oil and drive up prices . Related: Beware dire predictions on Obama's war on coal Oil was on the rise even
Gasbuddy.com. But he also said that
before the Egyptian coup. Oil prices have climbed more than 8% in the last month, driven by economic growth. Brent crude, the
benchmark for oil prices in Europe, rose $1.67, or 1.6%, to $107.43 a barrel.
59
2NC – Uniqueness – Prices High (2/2)
Low U.S. inventory, increasing demand, and regional instability and driving up
prices
Gazette 7/16/13 (Citing the EIA, “Crude oil prices hit three-month high”, The Gazette,
7/16/2013, http://thegazette.com/2013/07/16/crude-oil-prices-hit-three-month-high/)
Brent crude oil rose towards $110 per barrel on Tuesday, reaching a three-month high, due to lower
U.S. inventories, firm demand and concern that turmoil in Egypt could disrupt supply. Brent crude
gained 21 cents to $109.30 a barrel by 1400 GMT. U.S. oil added 33 cents to $106.65. It touched its highest since March last year of
$107.45 on July 11. Brent oil, the European benchmark, has risen 7.2 percent so far this month and is on track for its biggest
monthly gain since August, lifted
by sharply falling U.S. crude oil stocks, an improving economic
outlook and supply disruption. U.S. crude is up 10.8 percent, its biggest rise since October 2011.
“Global demand has picked up strongly. There are huge supply problems at a time when
refineries are increasing output,” Amrita Sen, an analyst at Energy Aspects, said. She pointed to production disruption in
Libya, which has been hit by protests, and in Nigeria, which has been affected by oil theft leading to its
lowest output in years . Investors are also watching developments in Egypt, where seven people were killed and
more than 260 wounded when supporters of Mohamed Mursi clashed with the deposed president’s opponents and security forces
through the night.
60
2NC – Uniqueness – AT: Price Drops
Even if prices are decreasing slightly, it will not trigger the link and will still
remain above $100
Prime-Tass Business Newswire 13 (Prime-Tass English-language Business Newswire,
“Russia's Econ Min: Oil prices to stay above $100\bbl in 2013”, February 26, 2013)
The Economic Development Ministry expects the price of Brent oil to ease but remain above U.S.
$100 per barrel in 2013, Deputy Minister Andrei Klepach said late on Monday. "Generally, the balance shows a decline. But
we are unlikely to see a sharp decrease. Oil prices are likely to decline slightly, but to stay
above $100 per barrel," Klepach said. The ministry's 2013 forecast for the price of Urals crude, Russia's main export item,
stands at $97 per barrel, but it has not ruled out that the price may rise above $100. In 2012, the average price of the Urals blend
amounted rose 1.15% to $110.52 per barrel. Klepach said that the current level of oil prices of around $115 per
barrel of Brent mix is above the ministry's expectations, he said.
61
2NC – Uniqueness – AT: Syria
Oil prices are at a six-month high --- any resulting price drop will only be a few
dollars per barrel which won’t trigger the link and is already priced in --- Syria’s
impact on oil prices is marginal
Gross 9/6/13 (Jenny Gross, Wall Street Journal, “Some Bet Oil Prices Will Fall if a U.S. Strike
on Syria Is Quick,” September 6, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324123004579056931141640124.html)
The price of Brent crude oil last week hit a six-month high, topping $117 a barrel, as the prospect of a
Western military intervention in Syria rattled investors. This was up nearly $18 since the end of
June. On Thursday, ICE Brent for October delivery gained 35 cents a barrel, or 0.3%, to $115.26. "If this is a very quick thing and
we lob a few Tomahawk missiles and destroy a few runways and nothing happens from there, then prices will
easily come down $4 or $5," said Tariq Zahir, managing member of Tyche Capital Advisors LLC. "I do think it's
basically priced in." Mr. Zahir, whose firm—a commodity-trading adviser based in New York—has about $3 million of
assets under management, is selling front-month oil contracts and buying later-month contracts because he thinks oil prices for
Syria's impact on prices may be particularly overstated because
it produces only a small amount of oil. The country's output was 50,000 barrels a day in July, compared with about
350,000 a day before the civil war that began in March 2011, according to the International Energy Agency, based in Paris. Saudi
Arabia, by comparison, produces 9.8 million barrels of oil a day.
immediate delivery aren't likely to rise.
62
2NC – Russia Economy Impact – $100 Brink
Any sustained drop below $100 per barrel causes Russian collapse --- that’s the key
benchmark and is the key threshold
Whitmore 13 (Brian Whitmore, Senior Russia Correspondent – Radio Free Europe, “After The
Storm: Trends To Watch In Russia In 2013”, Radio Free Europe, 1-2, The Power Vertical)
It began with a roar and it ended with a whimper. As 2012 wound down in Russia, the soaring expectations for change that
accompanied the civic awakening and mass protests at the year’s dawn had clearly faded. But the social, economic, and political
forces that spawned them will continue to shape the landscape well into the new year. A fledgling middle class remains
hungry for political change, splits still plague the ruling elite over the way forward, and a fractious opposition movement
continues to struggle to find its voice. With the Kremlin unable to decisively squelch the mounting dissent
and the opposition unable to topple President Vladimir Putin, Russia has entered an uneasy holding
pattern that has the feel of an interlude between two epochs. "I don't think we are at the end of the Putin era,
but we are at the beginning of the end," says longtime Russia-watcher Edward Lucas, international editor of the British weekly "The
Economist" and author of the recently published book "Deception." With economic headwinds on the horizon,
generational conflict
brewing, and new political forces developing, Russian society is changing -- and
changing rapidly. But the political system remains ossified . So what can we expect in 2013? Below are several trends
and issues to keep an eye on in the coming year. The Oil Curse: Energy Prices And The Creaking Welfare State If 2012 was all about
politics, 2013
will also be about economics. The Russian economy, the cliche goes, rests on two pillars -oil and gas. And both will come under increasing pressure as the year unfolds. World oil prices, currently hovering
between $90 and $100 per barrel , are expected to be volatile for the foreseeable future. And any sharp drop could
prove catastrophic for the Russian economy. Energy experts and economists say Russia's budget will
only stay balanced if oil prices remain between $100 and $110 per barrel. Five years ago, the figure needed
for a balanced budget was $50 to $55.
63
2NC – Russia Economy Impact – High Prices Key
Oil profits are the lynchpin of the economy --- they control the vast portion of
export growth
Aron 13 (Leon Aron, Resident Scholar and Director of Russian Studies – American Enterprise
Institute, Ph.D. – Columbia University, “The political economy of Russian oil and gas”,
American Enterprise Institute, 5-29, http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defensepolicy/regional/europe/the-political-economy-of-russian-oil-and-gas/)
From less than 50 percent in the mid-1990s,[14] the share of commodities in Russian exports has grown to
70 percent today, with oil accounting for more than half of the export income.[15] Representing up
to 30 percent of the country’s GDP and half of its GDP growth since 2000,[16] hydrocarbons provided at
least half of the state’s budget revenues last year.[17] Five years ago, Russia needed oil prices of $50 to
$55 a barrel to balance its budget, but Alexei Kudrin, former first deputy prime minister and finance minister, estimated
the breakeven price at $117 per barrel last year.[18] Russia’s dependence on energy exports—
and, consequently, its economy’s vulnerability to commodity price fluctuation—was highlighted by the
2009 world financial crisis. As oil plunged from $147 to $34 per barrel, the resource-based economy contracted by
almost 8 percent—the largest drop among the G20 top industrial nations. Russia has begun to exhibit the signs of what economists call the “Dutch disease,” when
overreliance on commodity exports depresses other sectors of the economy by starving them of investments and modernization while the increasing value of the national currency makes exports of other goods and
services more expensive and thus less competitive in world markets. Industrial stagnation has even spread to the military-industrial complex, which, like in Soviet times, continues to be the state’s favorite sector
and enjoys its continuous and very generous support. Despite this, according to a recent survey, only 20 percent of the Russian defense enterprise qualified as “modern.”[19] As in virtually every other petro-gas
state, the rise of the Russian one has been attended by corruption likely unprecedented even in the country’s far-from-pristine history. Venality and extortion have come close to subverting or even paralyzing
governance, social institutions, justice, and entrepreneurial activity. In Transparency International’s 2012 Corruption Perception Index, Russia was 133rd among 176 countries, worse than Belarus, Vietnam, and
Yet the most dangerous political legacy of the Russian petro-gas
state is the centrality of oil and gas revenues, which amounted to $215 billion last year,[21] to the loyalty
Sierra Leone and on par with Honduras, Iran, and Kazakhstan.[20]
of two groups that are essential for the regime’s survival: the lower-income and elite segments. Trillion-ruble transfers help to
maintain social peace in what is known as “Russia-2”[22]—poorer regions, especially the volatile and increasingly violent Muslim
North Caucasus, small towns and rural areas, and the rusting “monotowns” (one-company towns) of Stalinist industrialization.[23]
Price drop would shock the economy --- currently too dependent on oil to survive
RIA Novosti 13 (“$60 Oil Price Will Eat up Russia’s Oil Fund – Survey,” January 29, 2013,
http://en.rian.ru/business/20130129/179108381.html)
MOSCOW, January 29 (RIA Novosti) – Russia’s Oil Wealth Fund will be totally consumed if world oil prices plunge to
$60 per barrel and stay at that level for a year, experts from the Russian School of Economics (VSE) said on Tuesday. That
scenario presents “a shock not only for the budget system but also for the economy as a whole,”
experts from the Higher School of Economics' Development Center said in their stress-test survey. The stark warning echoes the
Precarious Stability scenario outlined by former Russian Finance Minister Kudrin at the World Economic Forum at Davos last week,
which predicted an oil price plunge to $60 per barrel, forcing the Russian government to preserve social stability at the expense of
economic development. Last week's Davos forum was presented with three broadly pessimistic scenarios for Russia’s economic
development, based on a poll of over 350 Russian and foreign economists and decision-makers who warned that the Russian
economy remained acutely vulnerable to world energy prices and could become more risky
for investment. World prices for benchmark Brent crude have been hovering at about $110 per barrel in
recent months, a level Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said was optimal for both oil consumers and producers. Kudrin warned on
Monday that the eurozone sovereign debt crisis was continuing and the global crisis could worsen as soon as the end of this year,
which would certainly cause a
plunge in demand for oil and hence oil prices. That could undermine the
Russian economy, which continues to depend heavily on raw material exports. The Russian
2013 budget is based on an oil price of $97 per barrel. Aside from Oil Wealth Fund depletion, “Russia’s GDP
would contract by 5.9 percent compared with 2012 while budget revenues [would fall] by 3 trillion rubles ($100 billion)
or 23 percent,” the VSE Development Center survey said. “The budget deficit would widen to 3.5 trillion rubles (6.4 percent of GDP)
and the ruble’s average yearly rate would fall to 35.5 rubles to the dollar in 2013.”
64
2NC – Russia Economy Impact – Russia Prices High
Status quo Russia prices are high --- we control the uniqueness debate
Zaramenskikh 7/29/13 (Ludmila Zaramenskikh, Correspondent – Reuters, “Russia domestic
crude rally surges on, prices at record high”, Reuters, July 29, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/29/russia-oil-domestic-idUSL6N0FZ22G20130729)
MOSCOW, July 29 (Reuters) - Domestic crude oil prices in Russia, the world's top producer, surged by over 14
percent to an all-time high last week due to cuts in volumes usually supplied to the spot market by TNKBP, acquired by Rosneft, and higher international oil prices, traders said. The spot market, with capacity of around 3.5 million
tonnes (25.7 million barrels) of crude per month - almost a fifth of all oil consumed in Russia - first felt the shock of the $55
billion TNK-BP buyout in June, when prices surged almost 25 percent . Crude in the domestic spot market is bought
mostly by refineries which do not have any, or enough, production of their own. Traders said the quotes for spot delivery in
August on the Russian market reached an all-time high after some previous non-binding supply
agreements with TNK-BP were scrapped and Rosneft's offers, which traditionally make up a third of the total volume on
the market, dried up. The companies are not obliged to supply volumes to the spot market but they sell some barrels domestically,
on top of their long-term agreements. The shortages on the domestic spot market and in Europe have started to appear as Rosneft
started to boost oil flows to China after securing a $270 billion deal earlier this year to more than double the supplies. Rosneft
declined immediate comments on its strategy to supply the domestic oil market. The rise followed an increase in the
price of Brent, which last week traded in the range of $106.5-$108.5 per barrel, up from $99.7-103.4 a month earlier. An
expected increase in the export duty next month also underpinned the rally. Prices for delivery in August at West
Siberian metering points jumped to 14,050 - 14,500 roubles ($430-$440) per tonne from 12,500 - 13,100 roubles in July. This is
more than the exporting netback via Baltic Sea port Primorsk - the price excluding transportation costs and export duty - for Urals of
13,150-13,700 roubles, according to Reuters calculations. Higher domestic prices may have contributed to thin Russian export
volumes, which in turn supported the prices of Russia's Urals blend on international markets.
65
2NC – Russia Economy Impact – AT: Russia Econ Low Now
Despite potential for weakness, the economy will remain stable --- high oil prices
are key
VOR 13 (Voice of Russia, Citing Dmitry Sorokin, Professor – Russian Financial University, and
Vladimir Sokolov, Associate Professor – Moscow High Economics School, “Russia’s economy
stable and growing”, 1-9, http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_01_09/Russia-s-economy-stable-andgrowing/)
"True, the backdrop of global economic instability and the Eurozone’s debt crisis make Russian economic
figures look really good . Spurred by fears over Syria, the oil price is soaring, making for a reduction
of Russia’s deficit and adding strength to the Russian rouble." Even based on a lower oil price, this year’s
deficit was expected to amount to just 1.5% of the GDP. We have an opinion from Professor Dmitry Sorokin of the Russian
government’s Financial University: "Our deficit figure is way lower than those in the United States and the leading
European economies. Combined with our vast financial reserves, this should allow us to somewhat ease
our monetary policy and raise the deficit ceiling in order to stimulate investment. At least so says the Russian Economy
Ministry." The reserves mentioned by Dr Sorokin amount to half a trillion US dollars, which is more than has been
amassed by all the other post-Soviet states combined. Greater spending is indeed an option. Associate Professor Vladimir Sokolov
lectures at Moscow’s High Economic School: "Russia’s plans to sharply step up its expenditure on defence by no means threaten its
innovation programmes. In the US, for instance, defence spending usually drives innovation in many areas. I believe Russia is no
different in this respect." In 2012, Russia’s inflation was kept to a moderate 6.6%. The year 2013 should bring an
even lower inflation figure. Officials also speak about a reverse of the capital flight.
66
2NC – Russia Economy Impact – AT: Alt Causes to Economy
Oil is the key internal link --- it’s all that stands in the way of a total economy
collapse --- nothing else gets the job done
Burke 12 (Justin Burke, Eurasianet's Managing Editor, “Russia: Putinism and the Russian
Economy” March 1, 2012, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65070)
During his first go-round as president, Putin spoke repeatedly of a need to transform Russia’s economy. In a May 2006 speech to the
Federation Council, for example, he said his administration was already taking “concrete steps to change the structure of our
economy, and turn it into an economy of [technological] innovation.” And on May 8, 2008, the day he stepped down from the
presidency and returned to the post of prime minister, he announced the government’s “number one priority” was economic
diversification via the “development of innovative industries.” If figures compiled by Russia’s Federal Service for State Statistics
(FSSS) are to be believed, Putin’s quest to create a knowledge-based, high-tech economy has been a dismal failure. Import-
export data for the past 12 years shows that Russia’s role in the global economy remains that of
raw materials supplier, and that the high price of oil & natural gas is all that stands in the way of
Russia becoming a fiscal train wreck. When it comes to the state budget, the stability of Russia’s
finances is dependent on an increase in the cost of energy. The Kremlin thus stands to benefit economically
from increased tension between the West and Iran. Prior to the global financial crisis, Russia could balance its books with an oil
price of about $90 per barrel, former Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said last September. Now, according to the Finance
Ministry, the Russian budget needs an oil price of $117 per barrel this year to remain in good shape.
67
2NC – Russia Economy Impact – AT: Dutch Disease
High oil prices solve Dutch disease --- creates resiliency but we need to maintain
high prices first
Grinkevich 12 (Vlad Grinkevich, Economic Commentator – RIA Novosti, “High Oil Prices
Open “Window of Opportunity” for Russian Economy”, RIA Novosti, January 27, 2013,
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20120127/170994608.html)
Speaking at a news conference at RIA Novosti on Thursday, Odd Per Brekk, senior resident representative of the IMF office in
Russia, said that high
oil prices have opened a “window of opportunity” for Russia to take
measures to strengthen and protect its economy. To take full advantage of this opportunity, the Russian
government must undertake a complete economic transformation – keeping inflation at 3%-5%, cutting budget
expenses, improving the financial sector, creating an attractive investment climate and eventually reducing the dependence
of its economy on the export of raw materials. In other words, Moscow must pursue comprehensive
economic modernization, funded by its oil and gas revenues.
68
1NC – Russia Modernization Impact (1/2)
High oil prices are key to successful Russian military modernization
Bennett 12 – graduate of the University of Chicago and Emory School of Law (John Bennett,
“Oil Prices Fueling Russia's Disruption of U.S. Foreign Policy” April 04, 2012
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/04/03/oil-prices-fueling-russias-disruption-ofus-foreign-policy)
"Putin still aspires for Russia to be a superpower," says Steven Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine.
"There are only two ways for Russia to achieve that: nuclear weapons, and oil and natural gas
sales." The price of a barrel of oil was nearly $105 at midday Tuesday, steadily climbing from a 52-week low of $76.35 per barrel in
October. Oil prices began to rise in late 2010, peaking at $113 per barrel in May 2011, before dipping last summer and then rising
again. Russia is the world's second-largest oil exporter at 5 million barrels a day, and its the ninth-leading natural gas exporter at
38.2 billion cubic meters a year, according to the CIA World Factbook. Russia rakes in nearly $500 billion annually in exports, with
the CIA listing petroleum and natural gas as its top two commodities. Frances Burwell, vice president of the Atlantic Council, says
Russia's oil revenues "give it a comfort zone" from which its leaders feel they have the global
cache to make things tough for Washington. Burwell says she "places more weight" for Russia's recent global
muscularity on "Putin's re-emergence." The Russian once-and-soon-again president "clearly sees playing
the national card as the strong guy internationally benefits him," she says. But, make no mistake, bloated
national coffers from high oil and gas prices underwrite Putin's muscle-flexing, experts
say. Putin made a number of big domestic promises during the presidential race, including plans
to usher in sweeping pension and wage hikes. He also put forth "a rather ambitious military
modernization program," Pifer says. "If oil prices remain high, he might be able to do all of
those things," Pifer says. "If prices come down, however, Putin will have some very tough decisions
to make at home ... between guns versus butter." Should oil and gas prices tumble, experts
say Putin would likely pick butter. "In 2007 when oil was doing well, Putin [as president] could have
modernized the Russian military," says Pifer. Instead, Putin made a number of economic moves, such
as the creation of a rainy day fund that was used during the recent global financial crisis," Pifer notes. What's more, Putin returns to
power with his sharp eyes locked on his opposition, which is composed of the country's urban, middle-class populations. Experts
agree that Putin would be hard-pressed to break his pension and wage promises in favor of a few
more missiles. But even an economically weaker Russia would likely pick its spots to block Washington's desires. "They have a
very sovereigntist, non-interventionalist view of world affairs," Burwell says. That means Moscow fundamentally
opposes Western efforts to boss around the world's strongmen, with which Russian leaders have much in
common. "The Russian also have real hard-core, national, commercial and other interests in both
Iran and Syria that cannot simply be ignored," Burwell says.
69
1NC – Russia Modernization Impact (2/2)
Modernization is key to avoid nuclear reliance --- lowers the threshold for nuclear
war and leads to preemptive nuclear strikes
Renz and Thornton 12 (Bettina Renz, Rod Thornton, lecturers on international security in
the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Nottingham, “Russian Military Modernization
Cause, Course, and Consequences” Problems of Post-Communism Volume 59, Number 1 /
January / February 2012, pgs. 44-45)
The perceived weakness of this triad means that the Kremlin was pleased with the START agreement of March 2010. The treaty
limits favor Moscow in that it does not have to cut any of its own nuclear warheads or delivery
systems—the numbers of ICBMs and warheads in its own triad are actually below the negotiated caps. Only the United States has
had to bring its numbers down.58 Normally, in the arranging of such international security treaties, negotiating from a position of
military weakness—as Russia was—is not conducive to the ability to drive a hard bargain. Moscow has been lucky, however, in that
Washington seems not to be too interested in the shape of Russia’s current and future nuclear arsenal. Rather, in terms of perceived
security threats, Washington has its eye more on the terrorist ball than on the Russian one. Additionally, under STA RT,
Russia does not have to reduce the number of its tactical nuclear weapons. It has more of these than the
United States. These are prized and important assets to Moscow, and they have become even more
prized and important as Russia’s conventional military has become weaker. They are seen more
and more as the fallback option if Russia one day faces some sort of defeat in a conventional
conflict—against the likes of Georgia or China. In the largest Russian military exercise held since the end of
the cold war—conducted recently in the Russian Far East— tactical nuclear weapons (i.e., mines) were
notionally “exploded” as part of the exercise play.59 This fact alone seems to confirm that Russia’s
conventional military weakness has led to a reduction in its nuclear-use threshold.
Conclusion The current modernization in the Russian military is long overdue. Because it is long overdue, it has to be completed in a rushed, haphazard fashion and against
a backdrop of a military–industrial complex unable to fulfill its role in the process. Traditionally, military modernization is not achieved lightly, given the bureaucratic inertia
and cultural norms that are always present. When, as in the current situation in Russia, such barriers to change are aided and abetted by any number of additional problems (not
to mention the rampant corruption that is endemic across all levels of Russian state institutions, including the military), then it must be expected that Russia’s armed forces will
be striving for some time to become truly “modern.”60 In essence, what should have been accomplished as an evolution over many years, and should have begun during the
Yeltsin era, is now being attempted as a revolution in the post–Georgian war era. As with any revolutionary change, a good deal of disruption and disaffection has been created.
Moreover, the
current Russian military is a weakened military. The psychology of the
tsarist/Soviet/Russian military has always been that numbers counted, that mass would prevail. Numbers
inspired confidence, and numbers could deter. But the current Russian military is losing numbers while not
making up for them by creating smaller, more professional forces equipped with the requisite technologies. Quality is not replacing
quantity. The military is in a state of flux. Russian politicians and military figures both
now lack a genuine confidence in the armed forces’ ability to deter. This can have two
consequences. Either Russia takes large steps to avoid the possibility of military confrontation by stressing diplomatic solutions to
possible threat scenarios (as the tsarist government did in 1914), or it goes the opposite way, fearing that if any state is
threatening military action against Russia then the hair trigger comes into operation (Israeli-style).
That is, the mentality of the first, preemptive strike becomes paramount—taking advantage of
surprise—and using what assets Russia now has. The alternative is to take the risk of waiting to
be attacked and maybe “losing.” What is clear is that, with its armed forces currently weakened by the process of change,
the sense of vulnerability generated has led Russia, in classic confirmation of the security
dilemma concept, to magnify the threats it faces, or thinks it faces. Conscious of its vulnerability to threats,
real or imagined, Moscow may begin to look more and more toward the inflexible tool of its tactical
nuclear weapons as its principal defense mechanism. While no one really supposes that such weapons
will be used in any confrontation with the West, the same cannot be said of any possible conflict with the Chinese. Ironically,
Beijing’s military still relies on mass. The best modern military counter to mass is to employ either PGMs or tactical nuclear weapons.
The Russian military has hardly any of the former but plenty of the latter. Hair triggers and tactical nuclear weapons are not
comfortable bedfellows.
70
2NC – Russia Modernization Impact – High Prices Key
High oil prices are critical to Putin’s political stability --- price drops make support
vulnerable to collapse
Judah 13 (Ben Judah, Fellow – European Stability Initiative, Moscow Correspondent –
Reuters, Russian Politics Research Fellow – European Council on Foreign Relations, B.A. in
Modern History and Politics – Oxford University, “Five Traps for Putin,” Legatum Institute,
March, http://www.li.com/docs/default-source/publications/five-traps-for-putin---ben-judahmarch-2013-(legatum-institute).pdf)
More recently, Putin has abandoned carefully balanced budgets, largely for political reasons. Although currency reserves remain
high—Russia has the third largest reserves in the world—and government borrowing is still relatively low, state spending has
been rising steadily since the 2009 crisis, and now accounts for 41 percent of GDP.41 Between 2007 and 2010,
funding for the Russian provinces increased by $58 billion, rising from 5.7 percent to 9.2 percent of GDP.42 Again in 2010,
pensions were hiked 50 percent. The following year pensions were raised by 10 percent again with a 6.5 percent across
the board increase in public sector wages.43 The
Kremlin has also announced a ten-year, $613 billion spending
programme for the military, a policy largely designed to maintain employment in Russia’s many singleindustry military production towns.44 During the 2012 campaign, Putin doubled military and police salaries and
promised $160 billion worth of giveaways.45 As a result, the Kremlin now must rely on a much
higher oil price in order to balance its budget. In 2007, $40 a barrel would have sufficed.46 By 2012, more
than $110 was required.47 Should the price of oil now fall for any substantial length of time, Russia could be
forced to return to large scale borrowing , even cut benefits or implement some form of austerity, thus
undermining support for the regime in the provinces and among low-wage earners. It is ironic, but Putin’s
support now depends upon the one thing he cannot control: the price of oil. This economic populism
looks particularly reckless in the light of Russia’s unreformed pension system, its slowing growth and its
shrinking trade surplus. If no alterations are made, government expenditure on pensions alone will rise from 9 percent of GDP to 14
percent of GDP by 2030.48 Adding further uncertainty is the fact that Russia is slowly running out of cheap oil. Its current reserves
are of declining quality and its huge potential fields lie in extremely difficult terrain in Eastern Siberia or under the Arctic Ocean.
Similar problems are looming in the gas sector as LNG and shale gas pose long-term problems for Gazprom’s business model. Russia
is set to stay an energy superpower, but the best years of the “double boom”—high oil production and high oil prices—are over. At
the a VTB bank investor conference in 2012 there was much talk about Russian growth slowing, perhaps as low as an annual 2
percent. As a result of these changes, economic policy, once a source of stability and consensus, has increasingly
divided the Russian political and business elite. Not since the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky in 2003 have there
been such vocal disagreements. Alexey Kudrin, the former finance minister, has publicly warned that unless the Kremlin
reigns in spending it will be exposed to dangerous economic shocks. Igor Sechin, chief executive of the state
energy giant Rosneft, has also gone out of his way to obstruct Medvedev’s ambitious privatization agenda. Other leading officials
have been openly at odds with one another as well. These bitter disputes are corroding Putin’s once unchallenged role as arbiter in
chief. Not only is the Russian economy vulnerable to an economic crisis thanks to state spending, in other words,
but the Russian president is vulnerable too.
71
2NC – Russia Modernization Impact – Accidents
Military modernization is critical to avoid accidental use of nuclear weapons
Mosher 03 (David Mosher, Senior Policy Analyst in Nuclear Weapons Policy – RAND,
“Excessive Force”, RAND Corporation, Fall, http://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/randreview/issues/fall2003/force.html)
Russian strategic nuclear forces remain the only current threat to the national existence of the
United States. Although the risk of deliberate attack from Russia has sharply fallen since the end of the Cold War, the risk of
an accidental or unauthorized use of Russian nuclear forces has arguably risen . For example,
Russia’s early-warning system has severely deteriorated, as has the country’s ability to keep its
mobile (and thus survivable) nuclear forces deployed. There are additional concerns about the state of
Russia’s command-and-control system and the rise of separatist violence. None of the nuclear arms control treaties
after the Cold War have dealt with the issue of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Instead, these treaties have
concentrated on reducing the total number of nuclear warheads each side wields. While these reductions are extremely
important for improving the overall U.S.-Russian relationship, they do
little to ease the risks of an accidental or
unauthorized nuclear launch. This is because those risks stem from the nuclear postures and underlying nuclear doctrines
of each nation, which remain firmly rooted in the hostile relationship forged during the Cold War.
Russian accidental launch risks extinction
Mintz 01 (Morton Mintz, Former Chair – Fund for Investigative Journalism and Reporter –
Washington Post, “Two Minutes to Launch”, The American Prospect,
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=two_minutes_to_launch)
Hair-trigger alert means this: The missiles carrying those warheads are armed and fueled at all times. Two thousand or so of these
warheads are on the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) targeted by Russia at the United States; 1,800 are on the ICBMs
targeted by the United States at Russia; and approximately 1,000 are on the submarine-based missiles targeted by the two nations at
each other. These missiles would launch on receipt of three computer-delivered messages. Launch crews--on duty every second of
every day--are under orders to send the messages on receipt of a single computer-delivered command. In no more than two
minutes, if all went according to plan, Russia or the United States could launch missiles at predetermined
targets: Washington or New York; Moscow or St. Petersburg. The early-warning systems on which the launch
crews rely would detect the other side's missiles within tens of seconds, causing the intended--or
accidental--enemy to mount retaliatory strikes. "Within a half-hour, there could be a
nuclear war that would extinguish all of us ," explains Bruce Blair. "It would be, basically, a nuclear war by
checklist, by rote."
72
2NC – AT: Japan Economy Turn (1/2)
Japan’s economy is resilient --- no external shocks
New York Times 08 (“Bank Chief Says Japan’s Economy Resilient,” The New York Times,
February 22, 2008 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/business/22rtyen-web.html)
He said there was no change to the bank’s basic monetary policy stance, which is to adjust rates by
closely examining upside and downside risks. Market adjustments amid repricing of risks would
take time, making it unavoidable for banks to incur losses, Mr. Fukui said. At a financial committee in
parliament’s lower house, Mr. Fukui said that Japan’s economy had become more resilient to
external shocks, but that “downside risks to the global economy are heightening and their impact on Japan’s economy
remains uncertain. “We will fully examine not just our main economic scenario” but the risks to the country in guiding monetary
policy, said Mr. Fukui, whose term expires next month. The Bank of Japan has long said it will raise rates gradually, as its current
policy rate of 0.5 percent is so low it could lead to overheating in the economy in the long term. But shaky global markets, concern
over slowing American growth and growing pessimism over Japan’s economic outlook have kept the bank from raising rates for a
year. A recovery in share prices since late January has led investors to cut back expectations of a rate cut this year. Mr. Fukui
said Japan’s growth was slowing partly because of a slump in domestic housing investment. But it has become more
resilient to external shocks than in the past and a positive cycle of output, incomes and spending
remains intact, he said. “It is highly likely that the Japanese economy will continue to expand
moderately,” he said.
Export growth and corporate capital check decline --- oil prices aren’t key
Mochizuki 10 (Takashi Mochizuki, Dow Jones reporter and economic writer, “Update: Japan
Lifts Economic View as Export-Driven Recovery Continues,” The Wall Street Journal, June 18,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100618702784.html?mod=WSJ_latestheadlines)
TOKYO (Dow Jones)--The Japanese government Friday upgraded its assessment of the economy, saying
it "has been picking up" as a result of recovering capital investment and strong exports. The
government also said in its monthly economic report for June that "the foundation for a self-sustaining recovery is
being laid." It was the first time for the government to raise its economic view since March. Last month, it said the economy was
picking up but lacks autonomous growth factors. "The gradual economic recovery trend is intact," Economy
Minister Satoshi Arai said at a press conference after the release of the monthly economic report. "A self-sustaining
recovery is coming into sight." Steady overseas demand for Japanese exports and rebounding
corporate capital spending helped the economy grow at a 5.0% annualized pace in the first quarter. New Prime
Minister Naoto Kan has called for policies to encourage strong economic growth and fiscal health in
the world's second largest economy. The ruling Democratic Party of Japan, which Kan leads, aims for average real
growth of over 2% in the decade ahead.
73
2NC – AT: Japan Economy Turn (2/2)
Japanese economy is structurally resilient --- firms can outpace external shocks
Drysdale and Gower 98 (Peter Drysdale, Professor of economics and executor director of
Australia-Japan Research Center, Luke Gower, Kiyoshi Kojima Fellow and Associate director of
Australia-Japan Research Center, “The Japanese Economy,” pg. 194, Part 1, Volume IV)
These points may be most important in interpreting the results of this study. In particular, the question of how the Japanese
economy has succeeded in minimizing the external disturbances of the oil crises of 1973and 1979 in such a short period of time
without substantially raising the unemployment rate is still a controversial issue. In the present framework of analysis,
groupings of firms serve to mitigate external shocks to those firms which would otherwise suffer
more seriously, and in a way contribute to the stability of the Japanese economy as a whole.
From this perspective the Japanese economy can be regarded as more resilient to external
shocks than other industrial economies, all other things being equal. The relatively high capacity of the Japanese
economy for adjustment to changed market conditions may thus be closely related to the
industrial organization in Japan as characterized by group formation.
74
***AFF ANSWERS TO OIL PRICES DISAD***
75
2AC – Non-Unique – Prices Low Now
Market already reacting to Syria and assumes a strike --- it will drop prices
Gross 9/6/13 (Jenny Gross, Wall Street Journal, “Some Bet Oil Prices Will Fall if a U.S. Strike
on Syria Is Quick,” September 6, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324123004579056931141640124.html)
Another reason some investors expect a drop in oil prices is because markets tend to factor in
geopolitical concerns before any event. Brent net long positions—bets that prices will rise—rose to a record high in the
week ended Aug. 27, according to IntercontinentalExchange Inc. The rise means there is potentially a greater risk of a
price correction if money managers run for the exit at the same time. To be sure, there is a risk that
military intervention could inflame tensions in the region, which may lead to disruption in oil markets. Major oil producers such as
Saudi Arabia are nearby, while an intervention in Syria could serve as a catalyst for escalation of the sectarian conflict in Iraq, a key
concern for oil traders. It is also possible the U.S. won't intervene at all. "The
markets will always run ahead of
specific events, but the big issue is the fact that there is so little spare production capacity for crude oil anywhere in the world,"
said David Donora, head of commodities at Threadneedle Investments. "What spare capacity there is does reside within OPEC and is
right in the middle of where these destabilizations are taking place."
76
1AR – Non-Unique – Prices Low
Global price drop is inevitable because of expanded drilling and alternative energy
--- it will trigger the link
Conerly 13 (Bill Conerly, Ph.D. in economics from Duke University, former Senior Vice
President at First Interstate Bank, contributer to Forbes, Forbes, “Oil Price Forecast for 20132014: Falling Prices,” May 1, 2013, www.forbes.com/sites/billconerly/2013/05/01/oil-priceforecast-for-2013-2014-falling-prices)
Oil prices are headed down , and I mean down at least $20 a barrel. The key reason is that prices have been high.
It’s not a paradox, but a result of the long time lags in oil production. Oil prices were fairly stable from 1986 through 2001, averaging
just $20 per barrel. Then prices started rising, spiking to $134 just as the recession began. The price of oil has been above $80 for
the past two and a half years. With rising prices has come a dramatic increase in exploration activity. During the era of low prices,
the number of drilling rigs in operation around the world was 1,900 on average; now we are at nearly double that pace, and we have
been for nearly three years. Drilling activity results in oil production, lasting for many years after the drilling is over.
Take a look at the accompanying chart of drilling rigs and total production. Drilling jumped up after the oil price hikes of 1973 and
1979. By 1986, increased oil production brought prices crashing down. Oil exploration quickly followed suit. Production, however,
continued to grow long after new drilling declined. When drilling was high, much of the activity was exploratory—trying to find the
oil. When prices fell, the riskiest drilling made no sense. What was left was in-fill. The oil field had been identified, and further wells
were needed to best utilize the resource. These wells are fairly low risk, with high rewards compared to the cost of the drilling rig. As
a result, even low levels of drilling activity led to substantial increases in global production. Today
we’ve had moderately
strong drilling activity for several years. New fields have been identified and delineated. Now
we’ll see fairly mild drilling activity but continually increasing production. In the past year production
has been soft, barely growing, but that’s a reflection of weak demand. In the short run, production can be dialed back to save more
oil for the future. In the long run, though, production capacity rules the roost. What of demand? Demand should grow a little slower
than the global economy. Unless the world starts to boom—an unlikely scenario, given problems in Europe and the United States—
production capacity will grow faster than demand, pulling prices down. What of peak oil worries? The concept is often sound when
looking at one well—but even a single well will sometimes be re-worked to increase its output. For the world as a whole, the peak oil
theory fails to consider that higher prices lead to greater exploration for new oil fields, greater in-fill drilling of established fields,
better care of older wells, and development of new technology for all of these functions. The world’s oil production will
peak when the cost of finding new oil rises and the development of alternative energy makes the
value of oil decline. Over the coming few years, look for oil prices to decline at least below $80 a
barrel and quite possibly more.
77
2AC – Non-Unique – US Shale
US domestic production from shale is booming --- it triggers the link and will
collapse prices
Bloomberg 13 (Moming Zhou, “Crude Output Exceeds Imports for First Time in 16 Years”,
Jun 5, 2013 5:32 PM ET, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-05/crude-output-exceedsimports-for-first-time-in-16-years.html)
U.S. domestic crude-oil production exceeded imports last week for the first time in 16 years, a
government report showed. Output was 32,000 barrels a day higher than imports in the seven days ended May
31, according to weekly data today from the Energy Information Administration, the Energy Department’s statistical arm.
Production had been lower than international purchases since January 1997. A combination of horizontal drilling
and
hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, has unlocked supplies trapped in shale formations in states
including North Dakota, Oklahoma and Texas. The surge in oil and gas production helped the U.S. meet 88
percent of its own energy needs in February, the highest monthly rate since April 1986, EIA data
show. Crude inventories climbed to the highest level in 82 years in the week ended May 24. “It will help U.S.
energy independence and help our trade balance quite a bit,” said Michael Lynch, president of Strategic Energy &
Economic Research in Winchester, Massachusetts. “You have to wonder if you are going to see downward
pressure on prices.” The U.S. pumped 7.3 million barrels a day of oil last week, up 8,000 barrels from the prior week,
the EIA said in its Weekly Petroleum Status Report. Imports fell 549,000 barrels a day last week to 7.27 million.
78
1AR – Non-Unique – US Shale
Production has already outpaced consumption --- should have triggered the link
Wilmoth 13 (Adam Wilmoth, the Oklahoman, “Wilmoth: U.S. oil production outpaces imports
for first time in 16 years”, June 7, 2013, http://newsok.com/wilmoth-u.s.-oil-productionoutpaces-imports-for-first-time-in-16-years/article/3842585)
The United States took another big step toward energy independence last week. For the week ending
May 31, the country produced 32,000 more barrels of oil a day than it imported, marking the first
time since January 1997 that domestic production outpaced imports. The report from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration showed that producers in the United States recovered 7.3 million barrels of oil per
day last week, up 8,000 barrels per day. At the same time, oil imports dropped 549,000 barrels per
day to 7.27 million. After climbing for decades, oil imports have dropped more than 72 percent since
2005 as domestic producers have combined horizontal drilling with hydraulic fracturing to extract
oil from shale and other dense rocks. Domestic oil production is up 46 percent from 2008.
Even if the neg is right that increased demand exists, shale production will meet
that
Xu and Bell 13 (Conglin Xu, Senior Editor-Economics, Laura Bell, Statistics Editor, Oil and
Gas Journal, “Global, US oil use to climb in 2013 as economies continue to struggle”,
07/01/2013, http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-111/issue-7/special-report-midyearforecast/global-us-oil-use-to-climb-in-2013-as-economies.html)
Demand for oil and gas in the US will climb this year, bolstered by improving economic
conditions. US crude oil and lease condensate production is expected to rise 13.8% to 7.4 million b/d in
2013. The rise in production will more than offset the increase in demand, pushing
imports down. Worldwide oil demand will grow 0.9%, and global oil supply will climb 0.8%. Demand from China will post the
largest increase. North American members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—Canada, Mexico,
and the US—will contribute most of the output growth. Oil supply from members of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries will slip to an average 37.3 million b/d this year from 37.6 million b/d last year.
The magnitude of our uniqueness argument is huge --- shale potential is enormous
Xu and Bell 13 (Conglin Xu, Senior Editor-Economics, Laura Bell, Statistics Editor, Oil and
Gas Journal, “Global, US oil use to climb in 2013 as economies continue to struggle”,
07/01/2013, http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-111/issue-7/special-report-midyearforecast/global-us-oil-use-to-climb-in-2013-as-economies.html)
OGJ expects US production of crude oil and lease condensate to rise 13.8% to 7.4 million b/d in
2013 from 6.5 million b/d last year. In the first 6 months of this year, production increased
14.5% from a year earlier to 7.17 million b/d. Production increases in states such as North Dakota, Texas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma
offset declines in Alaska, where output fell to 540,000 b/d from 556,000 b/d in the first half of 2012. Output from tight oil plays,
mainly the Permian basin, Eagle Ford, and Bakken shale, is expected to account for most of the annual increase. EIA, in its latest
Short-Term Energy Outlook, predicted that oil
production from the US Gulf of Mexico will increase by
130,000 b/d during 2013 and that production from the non-Gulf Lower 48 will increase by
810,000 b/d. The forecast for Gulf of Mexico production growth was trimmed due to maintenance at the BP-operated
Pascagoula gas processing plant during May and early June. Alaska oil production is forecast to decrease by 30,000 b/d in 2013,
according to EIA. Annual maintenance on the Trans-Alaskan pipeline system reduced Alaskan North Slope supply. Natural gas
liquids production will be up 2.1% this year, averaging 2.45 million, according to OGJ.
79
2AC – No Link – Cuba
No link --- cuban oil is inaccessible with current technology
Daily Kos 13 (“Big Oil abandoning Cuban coastal oil blocks” June 5, 2013,
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/06/05/1213863/-Big-Oil-abandoning-Cuban-coastal-oilblocks)
Russia's oil giant, Zarubezhneft, has finally joined 6 other foreign oil companies in abandoning their plans to drill
off of Cuba's northern coast. Zarubezhneft was the last to pull out of the island nation's only active drilling
project dashing it's quest for black gold. One problem the companies have encountered is very hard rock,
which quickly wears down drilling bits and is so dense that oil does not easily flow through it.
Though there is oil it cannot with current technology be produced.
80
1AR – No Link – Cuba
There’s no enough oil potential to trigger the link and their drilling link is
inevitable whether it’s in Cuba or Africa
Krauss and Cave 12 (Clifford Krauss, National Business Correspondent, Damien Cave,
Foreign Correspondent “Cuba’s Prospects for an Oil-Fueled Economic Jolt Falter With
Departure of Rig,” New York Times, November 9, 2012)
The potential for Cuba’s oil reserves, like nearly everything involving Cuba, has been a matter of
dispute. Cuban officials had predicted that oil companies would find 20 billion barrels of oil
reserves off its northern coast. The United States Geological Survey has estimated Cuban oil
reserves at 5 billion barrels, one quarter of the Cuban estimate. The best-case scenario for
production, according to some oil experts, would be for Cuba to eventually become a mediumsize producer like Ecuador. But as the three dry holes showed, far more exploration effort would
be needed, and that presents a challenge for a country with limited resources and the hurdle of American sanctions. There
are many offshore areas that are competing with Cuba for the attention of oil companies,
particularly off the coasts of South America and East and West Africa. In Cuba’s case, the American
embargo makes it far more difficult for companies seeking to explore Cuban waters. The Scarabeo 9, the rig set to depart, is the only
one available that is capable of drilling in deep waters and complies with the embargo. To get it built, Repsol, the Spanish oil giant,
was forced to contract an Italian operator to build a rig in China to drill exploration wells. Cuban officials have also run into
environmental concerns in the United States. The prospect of drilling only 50 miles from the Florida Keys had worried ocean
scientists, who warned that if the kind of blowout that occurred on the BP rig in 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico was repeated in Cuban
waters, it could send oil spewing onto Florida coastlines in as little as three days. If the oil reached the Gulf Stream, the powerful
current that passes through the area, oil could flow up the coast to Miami and beyond. Still, Cuba has been bullish about oil since
plans for the rig’s arrival were first made several years ago. Cuba produces a small amount of oil and relies on Venezuela to provide
around 115,000 barrels a day at highly subsidized rates, in exchange for the services of Cuban doctors and other professionals.
81
2AC – AT: Russia Economy Impact – Low Prices Good
Low oil prices are good—they force Russia to enforce economic reforms
RTT News 12 (RTT News, "Low Oil Prices Key to Russia's Growth: Capital Economics", March
7, 2012, www.rttnews.com/1835939/low-oil-prices-key-to-russia-s-growth-capitaleconomics.aspx)
Lower oil prices can boost Russia's growth in a meaningful way in the coming years, as the
revenue from oil exports has been allowing the government to abstain from engaging in policy
reforms, Capital Economics Emerging Markets Economist Liza Ermolenko said Tuesday. The firm estimates that if oil prices
drop to around $85 per barrel by the year-end as expected, it would improve Russia's medium
term growth outlook. The consequent fall in export revenues may result in the budget deficit
widening to 4.5 percent of GDP and the current account balance slipping to a deficit of 1 percent of
GDP this year from last year's 5 percent surplus. Under such circumstances, the government would be forced to take
up reforms aimed at wider economic growth, Ermolenko wrote. Russia's growth has been hampered
during the past decade as benefits of higher oil prices made governments hesitant to engage in political
and economic reforms. Such benefits also created an illusion of good government policies, and
concealed shortfalls in Russia's growth model and its ailing public finances. In the 1970s, when benefits of a sharp
increase in oil prices prevented the government from taking up reforms performance of all sectors other than the oil industry, most
importantly agriculture, steadily deteriorated throughout the decade. Ermolenko observed that all major economic
reforms in the past took place when oil price was hovering around $30 per barrel, but the
government's appetite for reform usually receded when the price rose again. High oil prices
have held back any meaningful change in policy and dashed the hopes for a shift to
a new investment-led growth model, the economist added.
82
2AC – AT: Russia Economy Impact – Dutch Disease
Russia is extremely vulnerable to Dutch disease --- makes economy collapse
inevitable
Buckley 12 (Neil Buckley, staff writer for the Financial Times, “Economy: Oil Dependence
Remains a Fundamental Difference,” Financial Times, June 20, 2012,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/438712b2-b497-11e1-bb2e00144feabdc0.html#axzz1ypkFB0pH)
Moscow’s dollar-denominated stock market index is down more than 20 per cent since this year’s mid-March peak, while the rouble
has fallen 13 per cent against the dollar. Is Russia’s economy again headed for a fall? Investors might be forgiven for fearing it is
2008 all over again. That year, the stock market began a seven-month, 80 per cent decline from peak to trough, as oil and
commodity prices slumped, followed by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September. Russia’s economy went on to shrink by 7.8
per cent in 2009, the deepest recession of any G20 country. The recent market slides reflect a 20 per cent decline in Brent crude
prices since March, which reached $100 a barrel by early June, and intensifying concerns that Greece could crash out of the
eurozone, dealing a Lehman-style shock to the global economy. But many analysts say the recent falls are an overreaction typical of
Russian markets. The country is in many ways less vulnerable to external shocks than it was four years ago, even though it has
become ever more dependent on oil prices. Charles Robertson, global chief economist at Renaissance Capital, the Moscow-based
investment bank, says: “In 2008, markets priced Russia as if it was going to offer a repeat of 1998,” referring to the 1990s default on
domestic debt. “Now, the markets are pricing Russia like it’s going to be 2008 again.” The foreign debt of banks and companies is
much lower than it was four years ago, making the economy less susceptible to a sudden halt to financing and the macroeconomic
position also looks robust. Russia has foreign exchange reserves of $500bn, a current account surplus last year of more than 5 per
cent of gross domestic product, and public debt below 10 per cent of GDP. Growth was a respectable 4.3 per cent in both 2010 and
2011, and the International Monetary Fund is forecasting 4 per cent growth this year and next. Russia can, of course, never be
immune. Sberbank, the country’s biggest bank, warned last month that, if Greece withdrew from the euro in the final quarter of 2012
in an “unregulated” way, Russia’s GDP would contract 2.1 per cent next year. Renaissance Capital says an “orderly” Greek exit would
prompt a modest slowdown in Russia’s growth to 2 per cent this year and 2.9 per cent next; a disorderly exit would cause a mild
2013 recession of 0.2 per cent. If Spain also left the euro, Renaissance forecast that Russian output would decline 2.7 per cent this
year and 5 per cent in 2013. What is notable about all those forecasts is that they are less severe than Russia’s 2009 recession. But
some analysts are more cautious. Russia’s Higher School of Economics warns that if a global slowdown reduced oil prices even to
$80 a barrel, the government would quickly burn through its $60bn rainy-day reserve fund to meet its budget obligations. Oil
dependency is seen as Russia’s biggest weakness. This year’s budget needs an oil price of more
than $120 a barrel to balance, lifting the non-oil deficit, the shortfall excluding oil and gas revenues, to 12.5 per
cent of GDP. It was below 5 per cent before 2008. Returning president Vladimir Putin, made some costly election
promises which totalled about Rbs10tn ($309bn) by 2018, even excluding ambitious military spending increases, notes Sergei
Aleksashenko, a former deputy central bank governor, now director of macroeconomic studies at the Higher School. Oil prices would
need to grow by $10 to $15 a year, he adds, otherwise the
“budget will not be affordable”, forcing Russia to
increase borrowing or reduce spending. Economists have also warned that, with budgetary
spending becoming a bigger contributor to growth, and that, in its turn, increasingly funded by oil and gas revenues, Russia is
drawing too heavily on its energy wealth. That drives up prices and costs, crowds out
private sector investment and makes manufacturing uncompetitive, all classic symptoms of the
so-called Dutch disease. This hinders what should be its main policy aim: diversifying the economy away
from reliance on extractive industries. Most observers agree the only way to do that is through structural reforms
aimed at increasing competitiveness and stimulating the private sector, small businesses, and technology. Mr Putin has repeatedly
said he understands this. But the market believes that, since his return as president, the signals he has given over his commitment to
reforms have been distinctly mixed. However, Anders Aaslund, a Swedish economist who advised on Russia’s 1990s reforms and has
often been a Putin critic, believes the recent signals have been more positive than investors give credit for. He expects Mr Putin to be
hawkish in domestic politics and foreign policy, but to make real efforts on economic reforms. “This is where Putin thinks that he
can deliver something, where he can give ground to the liberal groups,” says Mr Aaslund. He highlights an April speech by Mr Putin
which set concrete targets – including improving Russia’s 120th position in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index by 100
places by 2018. Mr Aaslund adds that the newly-appointed government, headed by prime minister Dmitry Medvedev, contains more
liberal reformers, with greater room for manoeuvre, than is commonly supposed. But the Higher School’s Mr Aleksashenko remains
sceptical, warning that Mr Putin tends to ignore the most fundamental problems. “In his articles and speeches, there was not one
word about independent courts, about rule of law, about prevention of corruption,” he says. “Without these pillars, I don’t believe
structural reform is possible.”
83
2AC – AT: Russia Economy Impact – Dutch Disease
84
2AC – Impact Turn – Japan Economy (1/2)
High oil prices will collapse the Japanese economy --- low prices are key to growth
Korhonen and Ledyaeya 09 (Iikka Korhonen – received his doctoral degree from Helsinki
School of Economics and Business Administration, majoring in economics, Bank of Finland
Institute for Economies in Transition, Svetlana Ledyaeva – Centre for Markets in Transition,
Helsinki School of Economics, “Trade linkages and macroeconomic effects of the price of oil,”
November 14, 2009)
In our sample, the largest negative direct effects of a positive oil price shock are found for Japan,
China, USA and Finland. The result for Japan is somewhat unexpected, as recent findings by Blanchard and Galí (2007),
Kilian (2008) and Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez (2004) are the reverse, i.e. they conclude that Japan has fared relatively well in
the face of recent exogenous oil price shocks. However, in our study, we separate the effects of positive and
negative oil price effects and control for the latter. In the studies mentioned above, the positive
and negative oil price shocks are not separated or are not controlled for negative shocks. Moreover,
the effect of a negative oil price shock (as measured by the sum of oil shock coefficients; see Appendix D) for Japan
is highly significant and positive, while the effect of a positive oil price shock is negative and
significant (albeit smaller in absolute size). When we estimate the symmetric specification (in which the measure of oil price
shock is just the log- difference), the total effect is positive, although not statistically significant. In the specification in which we
control only for the positive oil price shock, using the Hamilton measure, the effect is negative but small and statistically
insignificant. These differences in model specification partly explain the deviation of our results for Japan from those of other
studies.
Causes escalatory Asian instability, collapses the alliance, and leads to China war
Envall 10 (David Envall, Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of International Relations,
MacArthur Foundation Asian Security Initiative, “Implications for Asia in Japan’s Economic
Decline,” East Asia Forum, August 11, 2010,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/08/11/implications-for-asia-in-japans-economic-decline/)
‘To lose one decade may be a misfortune…’ ran a recent article in The Economist, the unstated quip being that the next one was
lost due to carelessness. Another ‘lost decade’ would further justify such dark humour and would also present the Asian
region with a significant security challenge. Japan’s economic decline is well established. That country’s
stock market, which was just below 40,000 points in 1989, finished 2009 at just over 10,500. Yet Japan’s underlying economic
problems are wider and more complex. They range from low growth and deflation to expanding public debt and rising inequality.
And the global financial crisis has further exacerbated matters. What makes Japan’s economic woes a regional security challenge is
the important role of the US-Japan alliance in maintaining regional stability. If the alliance were weaker, it would have serious
implications for regional stability. As a Japanese analyst recently observed, a US downgrading of the alliance or withdrawal from the
region could well lead to faster Japanese military growth (notwithstanding its current economic
lethargy),
heightened regional threat perceptions and a greater scope for global insecurity. Alliance troubles would
make it harder if not impossible for the US to pursue its ‘double assurance’ strategy of instilling confidence in strategic partners and
competitors alike. How could Japan’s
fiscal weakness potentially undermine the alliance ? Worsening economic
troubles would add greater constraints to the already considerable political and cultural restrictions on Japan’s
ability to contribute to the alliance and thus negatively affect America’s confidence in Japan as an
ally. Declining military spending over the past seven years illustrates Japan’s predicament, and the trend, in light of the country’s
public debt, could well continue. Shifting greater amounts of the total bill for ongoing agreements to the US, as a recent report on the
Economic weakness together with export
also influence Japan to mismanage its current hedging strategy in dealing with
alliance’s future postulates, ‘would undoubtedly put strain on the alliance’.
dependency could
China and the US. Japanese leaders describe its current approach as pursuing a more autonomous foreign policy, but the rise of
China has provoked Japan to respond to the resulting geostrategic pressures in Asia. This ‘return to Asia’ policy might resolve some
of Japan’s problems associated with its dark history, but there is no guarantee that any such policy would be more repentant than
chauvinistic.
85
2AC – Impact Turn – Japan Economy (2/2)
Sino-Japanese conflict will escalate
Malik 10 (Ahmad Rashid Malik, Japan Foundation Fellow and author of an important volume
on Pakistan-Japan relations, “Sino-Japanese Balance Must Be Maintained,” October 9, 2010,
PanOrient News, http://www.panorientnews.com/en/news.php?k=484)
Sino-Japanese relations revolve around acute sensitivities. A tempest in a teacup can easily turn
into a political typhoon. Both Japan and China are powerful countries. Their relationship is an ancient relationship, but
it is often held together by a very weak thread that can be broken at any time on any issue. This creates many challenges,
not only for Japan and China, but also for the many nations which maintain important relations with both of them. A SinoJapanese rivalry that gets out of hand would present a formidable destabilizing element that would
confuse the policies of many nearby nations. In spite of the great need for a constructive Sino-Japanese relationship, these nations
have a tendency to clash even on rather marginal issues. In regard to the
highly emotional, territorial issue presented
Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands dispute, international law in fact provides more questions than answers. More assertive
military policies by either side could easily trigger a large-scale conflict that would benefit no nation.
by the
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87
OIL DEPENDENCE ADV UPDATES
88
2AC – Oil Dependence Bad – NATO Russia War (1/2)
Oil dependence makes Georgia accession into NATO inevitable – that causes war
with Russia
Glaser 11 (Professor of Political Science and International Relations Elliot School of
International Affairs The George Washington University, “ Reframing Energy Security: How Oil
Dependence Influences U.S. National Security,” August 2011,
http://depts.washington.edu/polsadvc/Blog%20Links/Glaser_-_EnergySecurity-AUGUST2011.docx)
An alliance formed to protect access to energy can draw a state into a conflict that it would otherwise have avoided. Expanding
NATO to include Georgia runs this risk, including increasing the probability of a
conflict between NATO and Russia. The United States’ interest in including Georgia partially
reflects its desire to maintain secure access to oil and gas resources that need to transit the Caspian
Sea region. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States initially showed little interest in the Caspian region,
but started to pay greater attention as the extent of the region’s energy resources became clearer. Relatively quickly, the United
States came to see the Caspian region playing an important role in helping diversify the sources of U.S. energy, reducing western
reliance on the Persian Gulf. A key component of U.S. strategy focused on development of pipelines that
could transport oil and gas from the region’s landlocked countries, while not crossing Russian territory. The United States
became the leading proponent of a pipeline that ran from Baku to the Turkish city of Ceyhan by way of the Georgian capital, Tbilisi.
The United States did not invest directly in these energy projects, but did devote diplomatic and institutional financial resources to
help accomplish them. In addition, the United States made broader investments in the stability and security of the
region, providing economic and military assistance, with Georgia being the largest recipient of these forms of U.S.
aid. As a continuation of these policies, energy considerations have influenced what is likely to be among the most
potentially consequential decision the United States is going to make concerning the security of the region—including
Georgia in NATO. The debate over NATO expansion has been divisive from the outset and proponents have advanced a
variety of arguments, including the value of spreading democracy, contributing to domestic stability and hedging against a resurgent
Russia. In addition, however, energy
considerations are a significant factor in the case that is now
being made for bringing Georgia into the alliance, as evidenced by the following quote from Ronald Asmus,
who has been an influential and long-standing supporter of NATO expansion: many Europeans do not feel the same historical or
moral commitment to them or see a compelling strategic need to integrate them. Thus, in addition to moral and political arguments,
the United States and Europe need to articulate a strong strategic rationale for anchoring them to the West. That argument is
straightforward. The challenge of securing Europe's eastern border from the Baltics to the Black Sea has been replaced by the need
to extend peace and stability along the southern rim of the Euro-Atlantic community -- from the Balkans across the Black Sea and
further into Eurasia, a region that connects Europe, Russia, and the Middle East and involves core security interests, including a
critical energy corridor. Working to consolidate democratic change and build stability in this area is as important for Western
security today as consolidating democracy in central and eastern Europe was in the 1990s. NATO agreed in 2008 that Georgia would
become a member of the alliance and reconfirmed this decision 2010. Without entering into the entire debate over NATO expansion,
a strong case can be made that including
Georgia in NATO would likely increase the probability of war
between the United States and Russia. Russia and Georgia fought a short war in August of 2008, Russia has recognized
the separatist Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, and Russia continues to play an active role
in these provinces. Including Georgia in NATO would likely contribute to deterring Russia from launching another war against part
of Georgia. At the same time, however, if deterrence fails, NATO’s security commitment would greatly increase
the probability of its actually fighting against Russia. Among other factors, the prospects for
deterrence are reduced by the complications created by Russia’s recognition of the provinces and
the West’s rejection of this new status. Fully analyzing the decision to include Georgia in NATO is beyond this article’s
scope. My point here is more limited: the value that the United States places on Caspian energy is
contributing to a policy that would increase the probability of conflict with Russia.
If war were to occur, it is unlikely that it would result directly over energy, but energy would have contributed significantly to
defining the context in which this conflict occurred.
89
2AC – Oil Dependence Bad – NATO Russia War (2/2)
War with Russia is an existential risk
Corcoran 9 – PhD, Senior Fellow @ Global Security Ed, Ph.D., serves as a Senior Fellow on
national security issues at GlobalSecurity.org., Frmr. Strategic Analyst at the US Army War
College where he chaired studies for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Operations and member of
the National Advisory Board for the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues, we win the
qualification game, April 21, http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/090421301-strategicnuclear-targets.htm
That brings us to Russia, our former main adversary, now a competitive partner and still a potential future adversary, particularly as
relations have gradually soured in recent years. Russia is the only other nation with a formidable arsenal of some three thousand
strategic weapons. Our opposing arsenals were built up in the period when Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) was the underlying
strategic concept -- each side deterred from striking the other by the prospect of assured retaliatory destruction. The situation
became even madder as both sides worked to develop a capability to destroy the other's strike force with a crippling first strike. This
resulted in further large increases in the sizes of the arsenals, as well as early warning systems and hairtrigger launch-on-warning alert procedures. The final result was an overall system in which each side
could destroy the other in a matter of minutes. And it also raised another chilling specter, Nuclear
Winter, in which the atmospheric dust raised from a major nuclear exchange would block sunlight for an
extended period and essentially destroy human civilization globally. The collapse of the Soviet Union
collapsed this threat, but did not eliminate it. US and Russian nuclear forces remained frozen in adversarial
positions. The May 2002 Moscow Treaty began to address this legacy and is leading to a reduction in strategic nuclear forces down
to levels of about two thousand on each side by 2012. These levels are still sufficient to destroy not only both nations
but also human civilization . It is hard to even construct scenarios where the use of even a few strategic nuclear weapons
does not risk a total escalation. Strikes on Russian warning facilities or strike forces would almost certainly bring a wave of
retaliatory strikes. Strikes on hardened command centers would be of questionable effectiveness and also risk total escalation. In
addition, successful elimination of Russian leaders could greatly complicate any efforts to stop escalation short of a total nuclear
exchange.
90
2AC – Oil Dependence Bad – Europe Relations (1/2)
Oil dependence triggers transatlantic conflict of interest – decks relations
Luft 07 (Gal Luft, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security,
“Dependence on Middle East Energy and its Impact on Global Security,” Institute for the
Analysis of Global Security, most recent cited date – 2007,
http://www.iags.org/luft_dependence_on_middle_east_energy.pdf)
While both American and Europeans agree that stability in the Middle East is a prerequisite to global energy security, they
somewhat differ on how to achieve it. As mentioned before, the U.S. advocates an energy policy which includes the use of
military force to pacify volatile energy producing regions and secure energy supply lines. The European response to the
energy challenge is less muscular. By and large, Europeans are reluctant to use military force, preferring to see market forces
and economic interdependencies as the main guarantor of energy security. Some Europeans even see the U.S.
militarization of energy security and its military presence in the Middle East as a disruptive factor which
only builds tension and undermines energy security. Such an approach is not well received
among Americans who believe that left to their own devices aggressive Persian Gulf dictators are
likely to bully their neighbors, attempt to take over their energy resources and disrupt the flow of oil in the Strait of
Hormuz. Saddam Hussein’s unprovoked attacks on Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990 are a testimony that this concern is not baseless.
Which is why American administrations are willing to spend annually tens of billions of dollars in order to maintain the military
capabilities necessary to protect Persian Gulf oil while Europe, a major consumer of Persian Gulf oil, have contributed very little to
the security effort. One
manifestation of the transatlantic disagreement regarding the effectiveness of the use
of force is the debate on what should be the role of NATO in energy security. After years of deliberations
within the alliance, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer declared recently that “energy Security is a NATO-relevant
subject,” and the Alliance finally embraced in its 2007 Riga Summit energy security as one of its core issues. But what should be
NATO’s exact role and mission in addressing the growing challenge is far from being in consensus. While the U.S. prefers
that the Alliance commit itself to preparing a range of options for jointly deterring the use of energy as a
weapon and responding if such an event occurs, most EU members are reluctant to expand the Alliance’s
responsibilities, expressing concern that an increased role for NATO on energy security would send the wrong signal to Russia.
91
2AC – Oil Dependence Bad – Europe Relations (2/2)
This solves global conflict and a host of transnational threats
Stivachtis 10 (Dr. Yannis A., Director of International Studies Program – Virginia Polytechnic
Institute, Professor of Political Science – Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and Ph.D. in Politics and
International Relations – Lancaster University, “The Imperative for Transatlantic Cooperation”,
Research Institute for European and American Studies, http://www.rieas.gr/researchareas/global-issues/transatlantic-studies/78.html)
There is no doubt that US-European relations are in a period of transition , and that the stresses and strains of
globalization are increasing both the number and the seriousness of the challenges that confront
transatlantic relations. The events of 9/11 and the Iraq War have added significantly to these stresses and strains. At the same time,
international
terrorism , the nuclearization of North Korea and especially Iran, the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD), the transformation of Russia into a stable and cooperative member of the international community,
China , the political and economic transformation and integration of the Caucasian and Central
Asian states, the integration and stabili zation of the Balkan countries , the promotion of peace and stability in
the Middle East, poverty, climate change, AIDS and other emergent problems and situations require
further cooperation among countries at the regional, global and institutional levels. Therefore, cooperation between
the U.S. and Europe is more imperative than ever to deal effectively with these problems. It is fair to say that the
the growing power of
challenges of crafting a new relationship between the U.S. and the EU as well as between the U.S. and NATO are more regional than
global, but the implications of success or failure will be global . The transatlantic relationship is still in crisis, despite
efforts to improve it since the Iraq War. This is not to say that differences between the two sides of the Atlantic did not exist before
the war. Actually, post-1945 relations between Europe and the U.S. were fraught with disagreements and never free of crisis since
the Suez crisis of 1956. Moreover, despite trans-Atlantic proclamations of solidarity in the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. and Europe
parted ways on issues from global warming and biotechnology to peacekeeping and national missile defense. Questions such as, the
future role of NATO and its relationship to the common European Security and Defense policy (ESDP), or what constitutes terrorism
and what the rights of captured suspected terrorists are, have been added to the list of US-European disagreements. There are two
reasons for concern regarding the transatlantic rift. First, if European leaders conclude that Europe must become counterweight to
the U.S., rather than a partner, it will be difficult to engage in the kind of open search for a common ground than an elective
partnership requires. Second, there is a risk that public opinion in both the U.S. and Europe will make it difficult even for leaders
who want to forge a new relationship to make the necessary accommodations. If both sides would actively work to heal the breach, a
new opportunity could be created. A vibrant transatlantic partnership remains a real possibility, but only
if both sides make the necessary political commitment. There are strong reasons to believe that the security
challenges facing the U.S. and Europe are more shared than divergent. The most dramatic case is terrorism. Closely related is the
common interest in halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the nuclearization of Iran and North Korea. This
commonality of threats is clearly perceived by publics on both sides of the Atlantic.
92
2AC – Oil Dependence Bad – AT: Saudi Relations
Oil dependence fuels regional arms racing --- specifically Saudi Arabia --- turns
their offense
Luft 07 (Gal Luft, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security,
“Dependence on Middle East Energy and its Impact on Global Security,” Institute for the
Analysis of Global Security, most recent cited date – 2007,
http://www.iags.org/luft_dependence_on_middle_east_energy.pdf)
Despite the high visibility of the Arab-Israeli conflict, historically, wars among Muslim countries in the Middle East have caused far
bigger losses in terms of both blood and treasure. Such conflicts have been a destabilizing factor for the global energy market.
Both the Iran-Iraq War and the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait caused
energy crises which were followed by
recessions. In such a combustible environment feeble and insecure regimes flush with petrodollars feel
the need to arm themselves to the teeth, fueling a regional arms race which only
contributes to the general sense of insecurity. This problem is now being exacerbated by the
deepening rift between Sunnis and Shiites as it expresses itself in Iraq. While Sunnis constitute the lion share of the
Muslim world as a whole, in the Persian Gulf, Shiites comprise a 70-percent majority. This means that the divide between Sunnis
and Shiites will inescapably affect the oil market. Increasing sectarian violence and inability to reach an acceptable wealth sharing
compromise is taking a heavy toll on the Iraqi oil industry with profound implications for the global oil market. Four years after the
U.S.-led invasion, Iraq has not been able to match its pre-war crude production level of 2.5 million barrels per day. Due to non-stop
sabotage taking place in the north, Iraq was barely able to produce 2.1 million barrels per day in 2006. Perhaps
the biggest
casualty of a spillover of Muslim sectarianism would be Saudi Arabia. The eastern province of Saudi Arabia is home to
most of the Kingdom’s giant oil fields and export terminals. It is also the home of the bitter Saudi Shiite minority. Shiites make up
roughly 15 percent of Saudi Arabia’s population of 25 million. They are treated as second-class citizens and they harbor strong
antagonism against the Kingdom’s Wahhabi establishment which considers them heretics. Should an Iranian inspired Shiite revolt
break out, the damage to the Saudi oil industry and the world economy at large could be incalculable.
93
***VENEZUELA – NEG UPDATES***
94
OIL DEPENDENCE ADV UPDATES
95
1NC – Oil Dependence Good – Africa Investment
Energy dependence is critical to African development --- that’s key to the regional
economy
Abraham 02 (Spencer Abraham, Secretary, US Department of Energy, “Oil Diplomacy: Facts
and Myths Behind Foreign Oil Dependency,” Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, June 20, 2002,
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa80291.000/hfa80291_0.htm)
I have just returned from co-hosting the U.S.-African Energy Ministerial held in Morocco, attended by some 40 African
energy ministers. President Bush highlighted the importance of this meeting and the U.S.-African Energy Ministerial process
in the NEP. At that meeting, we met with government and industry to discuss ways to improve energy
trade and facilitate energy sector development to better serve U.S. and African economic growth
and development. Energy from Africa plays an increasingly important role in our energy
security (accounting for nearly 15 percent of America's oil imports) and is a key engine for economic
development in Africa. We are very pleased with the resolve of African nations to facilitate
private sector investment in the development of energy resources and to streamline regulations so that
resources can be developed most efficiently. In Morocco, the U.S and African countries reaffirmed a commitment to good
governance and stable regulatory structures and discussed additional steps to encourage private investment in the energy sector.
Solves regional stability
Swiss Confederation 09 (Swiss Confederation, Federal Department of Economic Affairs
FDEA, Swiss Economic Development Cooperation, “South Africa: Country Strategy 2009–
2012,” July 2009, pdf)
The reduction in economic disparities can be addressed by solutions that create bridges between the two South
African economies, placing a particular emphasis on the country’s most disadvantaged populations and regions;
Consolidation of the South African economy is crucial to preserve national
cohesion and reinforce regional stability and its positive impact on economic development in southern
Africa; South Africa continues to follow a prudent and reasonable macroeconomic policy and remains committed
within a process of reform that seeks an open and inclusive market economy; South Africa is
Switzerland’s main economic partner on the African continent, which offers substantial potential for strengthening economic and
commercial relations between the two countries.
Nuclear war
Lancaster, 2k — associate professor and director of the Master’s of Science in Foreign Service
program at Georgetown University (Carol, Redesigning Foreign Aid, October 2000)
The most basic challenge facing the United States today is helping to preserve peace. The end of the Cold War eliminated a potential threat to American security, but it did not
Nine of those intrastate conflicts
were in sub-Saharan Africa, where poor governance has aggravated ethnic and social tensions. The
eliminate conflict. In 1998 alone there were 27 significant conflicts in the world, 25 of which involved violence within states.
ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been particularly nightmarish, combining intrastate and interstate conflict
with another troubling element: military intervention driven by the commercial motives of several neighboring states. Such
motives could fuel future conflicts in other weak states with valuable resources . Meanwhile, a number of
other wars -- in Colombia, the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Angola, Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi -- have reflected historic
enmities or poorly resolved hostilities of the past. Intrastate conflicts are likely to continue in weakly integrated, poorly governed
states, destroying lives and property, creating large numbers of refugees and displaced persons, and threatening regional security.
The two interstate clashes in 1998 -- between India and Pakistan and Eritrea and Ethiopia -- involved disputes over land and other
natural resources. Such contests show no sign of disappearing. Indeed, with the spread of weapons of
mass destruction, these wars could prove more dangerous than ever.
96
2NC – Oil Dependence Good – Africa Investment
Oil dependence is the key driver of US investment in African development
ASRP 09 (African Security Research Project, “U.S. Military Involvement in Nigeria,”
Concerned African Scholars, September 2009, http://concernedafricascholars.org/africansecurity-research-project/?p=83)
In light of Africa’s unique ability to increase its oil output in the years ahead, the Cheney report
highlighted Africa’s potential to supply an ever-increasing share of America’s energy needs. “West
Africa is expected to be one of the fastest-growing sources of oil and natural gas for the American market,” the report states.
Moreover, “African oil tends to be of high quality and low in sulfur, making it suitable for stringent refined product requirements.”
Particular mention is made of the oil potential of Nigeria and Angola. Nigeria’s 2001 production is estimated at 2.1 million
bbl/d in the report, and that country is said to harbor “ambitious production goals as high as 5 million barrels of oil per day over the
coming decades.” Angola is also described as a “major source of growth,” with the potential “to double its exports over the next ten
years.” On this basis, the Cheney report calls for vigorous action by the United States to promote
increased oil output in Africa and to channel these additional supplies to markets in the United States. To
accomplish this, American oil companies are encouraged to increase their investments in Africa and African
countries are encouraged to welcome and facilitate such investment.
97
1NC – Oil Dependence Good – Canada Shift (1/3)
Reducing dependence will force Canada to jump ship to Asia --- right now, they’re
wholly dependent on US consumption
Edmonton Journal 12 (Edmonton Journal, “Growing U.S. Energy Output a Threat to
Canada,” January 20, 2012, http://blogs.edmontonjournal.com/2012/01/20/growing-u-senergy-output-a-threat-to-canada/)
The shrinking U.S. market for foreign sources of energy has long been apparent on the natural gas side, where domestic
U.S. shale gas production has soared, and natural gas prices have plunged to decade lows, leaving Alberta producers in an
increasingly desperate situation. Now, producers who have long viewed the U.S. oil market as virtually insatiable are waking up to
the fact that the U.S. may not need foreign oil as much as once thought. And that may one of the reasons ( besides rabid
opposition by environmental groups, who are among Obama’s core supporters) why the U.S. State Department has felt no urgency to
approve Keystone XL. It’s a far different story in Asia, of course, where demand for energy of all kinds will continue to soar,
according to BP’s 20-year forecast. (Which explains why Enbridge’s proposed Northern Gateway pipeline to the West Coast is now
viewed by the Harper government as an essential piece of national energy infrastructure.) “By 2030 China and India will be the
world’s largest and 3rd largest economies and energy consumers, jointly accounting for about 35 per cent of global population, GDP
(Gross Domestic Product) and energy demand,” the report says. “Rapid economic development means industrialisation,
urbanisation, and motorisation. Over the next 20 years China and India combined (will) account for all the net increase in global
coal demand, 94 per cent of net oil demand growth, 30 per cent of gas and 48 per cent of the net growth in non-fossil fuels.” No,
that’s not a typo. Let me repeat that: over the next 20 years, BP says China and India will account for 94 per cent of the net
97 per cent of Canada’s crude oil exports go to
the U.S. Virtually no Canadian crude makes its way to any other markets, including China or India. Now
that’s what you call a mismatch between supply and demand. Put differently, unless Canada as a country can get its act
together and find a way to export crude to Asian markets in significant volumes, this country is
likely to lose a key source of national wealth generation for generations to come. Let’s hope taxpayers
worldwide increase in oil demand. At the moment, about
in all 10 provinces — not just Alberta — can understand what that means.
98
1NC – Oil Dependence Good – Canada Shift (2/3)
Canadian shift to Asia will go through the Unimak pass – this will devastate the
regional environment decimating plankton, sea lions, and sea otter populations
Byers 12 (Michael Byers, professor at the University of British Columbia, and Canada Research
Chair in Global Politics and International Law, “Canada’s Oil-Sands Bonanza Could Mean
Disaster for Alaska’s Coastline,” The Seattle Times, May 17, 2012,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2018232475_guest18byers.html)
Twenty-three years after the Exxon Valdez spilled more than half a million barrels of oil into Prince William Sound, another threat
looms over Alaska's remote and beautiful coastline — in the form of heavy oil exports from Canada to China. Since the Earth is a
sphere, the shortest shipping route from Western Canada to China passes through the Aleutian Islands
at a narrow strait called Unimak Pass. Two pipeline companies want to dilute tar-like bitumen from the Alberta oil sands with
natural gas condensate so that it can be pumped west to the coast of British Columbia. The first plan — a new pipeline called
"Northern Gateway" — would carry 525,000 barrels per day to a terminal just south of the Alaska Panhandle, where it would be
loaded onto supertankers that would sail westward toward Unimak Pass. The second plan involves tripling the capacity of an
existing pipeline to Vancouver so it can carry 850,000 barrels per day, and adding compressor stations so it can handle the diluted
but still heavy bitumen. The oil from this "Trans Mountain Pipeline" would also be shipped through Unimak Pass. Unimak Pass is
just 10 miles wide. Five thousand ships already use it each year, most of them large container and bulk-cargo vessels. The tidal
mixing of cold nutrient-rich waters in and around Unimak Pass supports
massive amounts of plankton, the
basis of a rich food chain. The area is part of the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge, which is home to 40 million
to a wealth of marine mammals, including endangered Steller sea lions,
northern fur seals, sea otters and numerous species of whales. This ecosystem has considerable economical
value. The Bering Sea just north of Unimak Pass supports the largest commercial fishery in the United States, worth $1 billion
annually. Severe weather and sea conditions are common in Unimak Pass, along with powerful
tidal flows. In December 2004, the Selendang Ayu, a 738-foot-long Malaysian cargo ship, had just cleared the pass when it lost
seabirds. It's also home
power in a storm. The vessel was blown aground and broke apart, spilling 335,000 gallons of fuel oil. Almost none of the oil was
recovered due to the remote location, bad weather and the near-complete absence of oil-spill-cleanup equipment and personnel in
the Aleutians. Complicating matters, the U.S. State Department has long accepted that Unimak Pass
is an "international strait" that foreign vessels can enter without permission or regulatory restriction. As a result,
there are no shipping lanes, or notification or pilotage requirements. There are a few steps the federal
government could take. It could station a large rescue tug and several oil-spill-cleanup vessels at nearby Dutch Harbor. It could ask
the International Maritime Organization to designate Unimak Pass as a "particularly sensitive sea area," which would enable the U.S.
to require advance notification of passage and adherence to vessel traffic separation rules. It could seek to persuade shipping
companies to voluntarily route oil tankers well south of the Aleutians, though this would increase both distance and cost. In the end,
however, none of these steps is likely to prevent hundreds of oil tankers from transiting Unimak
Pass each year. For the root of the problem is not the tankers, but Canada's disregard for the
environmental impacts of developing and selling its oil sands to China — impacts that
include the near- inevitability of another Exxon Valdez-type spill in U.S. waters, this time in Unimak
Pass.
99
1NC – Oil Dependence Good – Canada Shift (3/3)
Sea lions and sea otters are keystone species – loss causes massive ocean
biodiversity collapse
Carnegie Mellon 03 (2003, http://telstar.ote.cmu.edu/environ/m3/s5/02biodiversity.shtml)
There are certain species whose role in maintaining the balance of an ecosystem is so significant
that they are known as the "keystone species." A keystone is the stone at the summit of an arch that supports all the
other stones and keeps the entire arch from collapsing. Therefore, the keystone species in an ecosystem is a species that supports
many other species in that ecosystem. The
noticeable change or degradation
removal of the keystone species would result in quick and
of an ecosystem. The sea otter has been referred to as a
keystone species in western Alaskan coastal ecosystems by the US Department of the Interior and the US Geological
of a decline in the population of Steller sea lions and harbor seals in Alaskan waters, killer
whales have been feeding on sea otters. The sea otter is considered keystone because it feeds on
sea urchins, who in turn feed on kelp. Without the sea otter, sea urchin populations would rise,
leading to probable destruction of the kelp forests, disrupting large portions of that
coastal community. Without the otters to keep the sea urchin population in check, the habitat of the entire community
Survey. Because
would be altered significantly.
Extinction – this is a moral side constraint
Craig 03 — Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law (Robin Kundis, 34
McGeorge L. Rev. 155)
Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For
example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations,
services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. n856 Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. n857
More
generally, "ocean
ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements
that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur,
as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." n858 In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human
degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life.
Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current
evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its
biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." n859 Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on
their biodiversity. [*265] Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component
species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that
produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that many otherwise
insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system. n860 Thus, maintaining and
restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine
ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine
wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical
arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual
effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to
the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the
NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be
preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world.
We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much:
if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of
the biosphere with us.
The Black Sea is almost dead, n863 its once-complex and productive ecosystem almost entirely replaced by a monoculture of comb jellies, "starving out fish and
dolphins, emptying fishermen's nets, and converting the web of life into brainless, wraith-like blobs of jelly." n864 More importantly, the Black Sea is not necessarily unique. The Black Sea is a microcosm of what
is happening to the ocean systems at large. The stresses piled up: overfishing, oil spills, industrial discharges, nutrient pollution, wetlands destruction, the introduction of an alien species. The sea weakened, slowly
at first, then collapsed with [*266] shocking suddenness. The lessons of this tragedy should not be lost to the rest of us, because much of what happened here is being repeated all over the world. The ecological
stresses imposed on the Black Sea were not unique to communism. Nor, sadly, was the failure of governments to respond to the emerging crisis. n865 Oxygen-starved "dead zones" appear with increasing
Ethics as well as enlightened self-interest thus
suggest that the United States should protect fully-functioning marine ecosystems wherever possible
frequency off the coasts of major cities and major rivers, forcing marine animals to flee and killing all that cannot. n866
- even if a few fishers go out of business as a result.
100
2NC – Oil Dependence Good – Canada Shift – Unimak Bad (1/2)
Unimak is too congested and too narrow – high-risk oil transport guarantees spills
that crush the Alaskan environment as well
Boswell 12 (Randy Boswell, “Canada Cruising for a Major Oil Spill Crisis in the Arctic,
Academics Warn,” May 8, 2012,
http://www.canada.com/news/Canada+cruising+major+spill+crisis+Arctic+academic+warns/
6646337/story.html)
One of Canada's top experts on Arctic issues is warning of the " near-inevitability " of an Exxon Valdez-scale oil spill at a
fragile choke point in Alaskan waters if Canada ends up shipping oil sands fuel to China via pipeline terminals on the British
Columbia coast. Michael Byers, a UBC professor and Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law, argues that
Canada's "disregard for the environmental impacts of developing and selling its oil sands to China" could
eventually expose the narrow, already-congested Unimak Pass in the Aleutian Islands — a key
maritime gateway between Asia and North America — to an ecological disaster. Byers'
warning — published Friday in the Seattle Times under the headline "Canada's oil-sands bonanza could mean
disaster for Alaska's coastline " — follows comments at a Congressional hearing last week by the commandant of
the U.S. Coast Guard, Adm. Robert Papp, that the strategic importance of the Unimak Pass and nearby Bering Strait have long been
overlooked by the U.S. government, and that protection of the two passageways has become an urgent priority for his agency. The
likelihood that China and other Asian countries could become major buyers of Canadian bitumen has increased significantly in
recent months because of unanticipated obstacles in securing U.S. approvals for the TransCanada's Keystone XL pipeline,
intended to run between Alberta's oilsands and American petroleum refineries on the Gulf Coast. "Twenty-three years after the
Exxon Valdez spilled more than half a million barrels of oil into Prince William Sound, another threat looms over Alaska's remote
and beautiful coastline — in the form of heavy oil exports from Canada to China," Byers states in the U.S. article. He goes on to
explain that whether fuel from Alberta's oilsands is transported via the planned Northern Gateway outlet at Kitimat, B.C., or from
the Vancouver terminus of the Trans-Mountain Pipeline, the most direct route to China would be through the
Unimak Pass — a heavily used shipping lane that connects the North Pacific Ocean and the Bering Sea
through sometimes treacherous waters. While other critics have highlighted potential risks posed to by increased
tanker traffic along B.C.'s coastline, Byers argues that Alaska could be at greater risk of environmental
damage once "hundreds of oil tankers" begin moving annually through the Unimak Pass en route to China
from Canada.
This will smother the Alaskan salmon
Cornwall 04 – Seattle Times Staff Reporter (Warren, “Effects of Oil Spill in Alaska could
Linger in Remote Bay”, 12/14/04;
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2002118774_oilspill14m.html)
The most vulnerable birds include crested auklets, murres, cormorants, bald eagles, ravens and several sea ducks, including eiders,
mergansers, black and surf scoters, and harlequins, said Greg Siekaniec, manager for the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife
Refuge, which includes Unalaska Island. Salmon present another concern because they spawn into streams that
flow from nearby lakes into the bays. No salmon are spawning now. But if oil reaches the salmon eggs, it
could taint them with toxins or smother them, said Mark Carls, a fishery biologist at the Auke Bay
Laboratory.
101
2NC – Oil Dependence Good – Canada Shift – Unimak Bad (2/2)
That magnifies our impact – they’re also a keystone species
Helfield and Naiman 06 – Researchers at College of Forest Resources, University of
Washington (James M. and Robert J., “Keystone Interactions: Salmon and Bear in Riparian
Forests of Alaska,” 2006,
http://myweb.wwu.edu/~helfiej/publications_pdfs/Helfield_Naiman_2006.pdf)
The term ‘‘keystone species’’ is used to describe organisms that exert a disproportionately
important influence on the ecosystems in which they live. Analogous concepts such as ‘‘keystone mutualism’’
and ‘‘mobile links’’ illustrate how, in many cases, the interactions of two or more species produce an effect
greater than that of any one species individually. Because of their role in transporting nutrients from the ocean to
river and riparian ecosystems, Pacific salmon (Oncorhynchus spp.) and brown bear (Ursus arctos) have
been described as keystone species and mobile links, although few data are available to quantify the
importance of this interaction relative to other nutrient vectors. Application of a mass balance model to data from a southwestern
Alaskan stream suggests that nitrogen (N) influx to the riparian forest is significantly increased in the presence of both salmon and
bear, but not by either species individually. The interactions of salmon and bear may provide up to 24% of
riparian N budgets, but this percentage varies in time and space according to variations in salmon escapement, channel
morphology and watershed vegetation characteristics, suggesting interdependence and functional redundancy among N sources.
These findings illustrate the complexity of interspecific interactions, the importance of linkages
across ecosystem boundaries and the necessity of examining the processes and interactions that
shape ecological communities, rather than their specific component parts.
102
2NC – Oil Dependence Good – Canada Shift – China Impact (1/2)
Sino-Canadian shift shatters already turbulent US-Sino relations and makes
warming inevitable
Tu 12 (Kevin Jianjun – senior associate in the Carnegie Energy and Climate Program, China
should be cautious about the Canadian Oil Sands, Phoenix News Group, February 10, 2012,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/10/china-should-be-cautious-about-canadian-oilsands)
First, Canadian oil sands exports to China could further strain the already turbulent Sino-U.S.
relationship. In 2012, a presidential election year, the Obama administration rejected TransCanada’s application to build the
Keystone XL pipeline. The move stemmed from strong Democratic and environmentalist opposition to the deal—Obama would have risked losing the pro-environment
electorate if he approved the plan. Yet, the Democratic Party has been unable to reach a consensus on this contentious issue, and the U.S. State Department has agreed to allow
TransCanada to reapply for a Keystone XL permit once an alternative route that avoids particularly environmentally sensitive sites is selected. By comparison, almost all
congressional Republicans strongly support the Keystone XL pipeline. Arguing that turning down the pipeline will harm U.S. energy security, kill U.S. jobs, and unnecessarily
benefit China, they have vigorously attacked Obama’s decision. Any renewed support for the Northern Gateway pipeline by Chinese national oil companies would shift the focus
of the Keystone XL debate within the United States from the environment to national security—a prevailing fear, especially among congressional Republicans, is that without
Keystone, China will beat the United States to Canada’s rich oil reserves. A desire to shift the debate to national security in the United States may even be driving the Canadian
Second, large-scale Chinese imports of output from Canadian
oil sands would come with a high price tag for China’s future international climate negotiations.
government’s public support of the Northern Gateway pipeline.
According to the revised national Energy Balance Table, China surpassed the United States to become the world’s largest carbon
emitter as early as 2006. In 2009, emissions from Chinese coal combustion alone exceeded total U.S. carbon dioxide emissions.
According to the International Energy Agency, China is expected to account for 42 percent of global incremental carbon emissions
by 2035. Nevertheless, under the 2011 Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, China has already said it will join a
legally binding international climate treaty that will be agreed upon by 2015 and will come into force by
2020. As a result, during future international climate negotiations, China is expected to face
increasingly higher pressure from the international community to retard its spiking carbon
emissions. According to the Canadian Industrial Energy End-Use Data and Analysis Center, carbon-emission
intensities of upstream oil sands production are generally one to four times higher than conventional
oil extraction. Although recent “well-to-wheels” studies have found that the life-cycle emissions of oil-sands-based products are only 5 to 15 percent higher than those
of conventional oil products, such analyses likely overlook the substantial carbon-emissions potential that is embedded in the large amount of carbon-intensive oil sands
byproducts, such as petroleum coke. According to Environment Canada, oil sands development and the transportation sector are the primary drivers underlying the growth of
Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions. In order to allow room for the emissions that would result from oil sands development, and to save $14 billion in penalties for not achieving
its Kyoto targets, the Canadian government withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol right after the Durban climate conference, without adequate consideration of the criticism it
Large-scale Chinese imports of Canadian oil sands output
would correspond to de facto support of Canada’s environmentally irresponsible
climate policy. Not surprisingly, Chinese imports from Canada’s oil sands would not only be criticized by
the international environmental community but would also make the work of China’s climate negotiation
delegation much more difficult in the future. Finally, strong opposition to the Northern Gateway pipeline from environmental
would receive from the international community.
organizations and Canada’s indigenous community is another important issue that China should not ignore. As early as 2005, PetroChina, the listed arm of China’s largest
national oil company, signed a cooperation agreement with Enbridge to support the Northern Gateway pipeline. However, after Stephen Harper came into power in 2006, SinoCanadian relations soon deteriorated. Citing a lack of support from the Canadian federal government, PetroChina withdrew from the pipeline project in 2007 but forgot to
mention the other serious impediment to the deal—strong opposition from both environmental organizations and indigenous communities along the pipeline route. Although
the Canadian government now seems to be supportive of the pipeline, it will still be unable to address environmental concerns and the indigenous community’s opposition to
pipeline construction in the near future. Consequently, Enbridge’s application for the pipeline is expected to be a prolonged process, which will inevitably increase the financial
risks of the project. To enhance China’s energy security, Chinese national oil companies have significantly expanded their overseas presence in recent years. But, due to the
monopoly status they have long enjoyed domestically, these companies often evaluate overseas projects primarily on the basis of energy security and corporate bottom line.
Importing
output from Canadian oil sands is likewise complicated. Chinese leaders should prohibit national
oil companies’ involvement in the Northern Gateway pipeline, at least during a U.S. presidential election year, or they
risk stirring up a national security debate in the United States and inflaming Sino-U.S. relations. After the conclusion of
However, many other factors are at play, and such practices have made securing a return on some Chinese overseas investments problematic at most.
the Chinese political power transition by the end of 2012, the new Chinese leadership should not only fundamentally reform China’s
energy-oversight mechanism, which has so far failed to adequately regulate Chinese national oil companies, but also significantly
improve intergovernmental coordination. This would lead Chinese national oil companies to, in addition to focusing on national
energy security and their corporate bottom line, take other important factors such as Sino-U.S. relations, environmental governance,
and the host country’s internal politics into consideration when they make future overseas investment decisions.
103
2NC – Oil Dependence Good – Canada Shift – China Impact (2/2)
Solves nuclear war
Conable and Lampton 93 (Barber B., President Emeritus – World Bank and David,
President – National Committee, “China: The Coming Power”, Foreign Affairs, December /
January, Lexis)
Regionally American interests are both numerous and important. The two most protracted, economically distracting and politically
explosive American military commitments in the post-World War II era were Korea and Vietnam. In both cases China figured
prominently. The lesson is that regional stability requires workable U.S.-China relations. Competition between
Beijing and Washington takes the form of exploiting indigenous regional conflicts by both powers, resulting in local problems that
expand to suck both countries into a self-defeating vortex. The most serious threats to American security and economic
interests in Asia include
armed conflict with nuclear potential between the two Koreas and between
India and Pakistan; a deterioration of relations between Beijing and Taipei that could lead to economic or military
conflict; a re-ignition of the Cambodian conflict; and a botched transition to Beijing's sovereignty in Hong Kong in
1997. None of these problems can be handled effectively without substantial Sino-American
cooperation. Constructive relations with Beijing will not assure P.R.C. cooperation in all cases; needlessly bad
relations will nearly ensure conflict. The Republic of Korea's formal diplomatic recognition of Beijing last August,
at the expense of Taipei, is just one indication of the increasing importance the region attaches to building positive ties to the P.R.C.
104
1NC – Oil Dependence Good – Saudi Relations (1/2)
US oil dependence is the lynchpin of US-Saudi relations
Moorse 09 (Edward L. Moorse, Managing Director of Louis Capital Markets. He was Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for International Energy Policy in 1979-81, “Low and Behold Making
the Most of Cheap Oil,” 88 Foreign Aff, 36 2009,
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora88&div=72&g_sent=1&collection=
journals)
The U.S.-Saudi energy dialogue, which Washington has neglected for years, needs to be reinvigorated. Now that Saudi
Arabia has a huge spare production capacity and thus the tools to advance Washington's economic and
political goals, it should be easier to establish between the two governments better and higher-level
communications about the oil market and the global political economy. Such a dialogue cannot take place at the level of
energy ministers. It requires the kind of political attention that can come only from the Department of State or the White House.
Saudi Arabia appears to want to keep oil prices between $40 and $75 a barrel in order to promote global economic growth and limit
the revenues of rival producers while nonetheless adequately funding its own budget. Washington's relations with Riyadh involve
other difficult diplomatic issues, such as the creation of a Palestinian state and how to secure participatory governance in Iraq after
the withdrawal of U.S. troops. With its spare production capacity, which is unlikely to disappear anytime soon, Riyadh has earned
itself special standing with Washington. Neither China nor any other country can do as much as Saudi
Arabia can to bring change to the global energy sector. Thus, aggressively seeking to end oil
imports to the United States from the Middle East-a policy articulated by Obama during and after his election campaign-is
not the way to harvest the potential fruits of U.S.-Saudi relations. Other critical areas
will also require coordinated government action. The G-8 (the group of highly industrialized states) appears to be
working on one of these areas: it is looking for ways to tame financial flows into energy markets and limit
price volatility by promoting greater transparency and greater controls over swaps and derivatives. Financial reform
in the United States is already heading in this direction. The United States should also use international institutions to promote
transparency and better governance in energy-producing countries that have been weakened by lower oil prices-such as Nigeria and
many sub-Saharan African states. Transparency in markets must also be encouraged in China, as a lack of basic data about the oil
market there-are China's oil imports put into storage or consumed?-places undue pressure on world prices. The opportunities
presented by lower oil prices should not detract from the important goals of reducing global greenhouse gas emissions, enhancing
the United States' energy security, and building a new generation of energy-efficient nonhydrocarbon fuel sources. But they should
not be overlooked; it would be dangerous to ignore oil and "old energy." However laudable it might be to
pursue clean energy, energy efficiency, and alternatives to oil and coal, oil will continue to be a critical
factor in the world's economic stability and security. Defanging those that use oil as a weapon, prolonging moderate
prices, and anticipating supply disruptions require an activist and global approach to energy, not a parochial
and national one. It is time for Obama to publicly recognize that bringing energy independence to the United States is an
impossible task and that pursuing more modest goals is a better way to ensure the country's energy security.
Break in relations leads to Saudi prolif
McDowell 03 (Steven , Lt, US navy, “Is Saudi Arabia a Nuclear Threat?” Naval Postgrad Thesis,
November http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/McDowell03.pdf)
This thesis examines the potential for the Saudis to replace their aging missile force with a nuclear-tipped inventory. The United
States has provided for the external security of the oil Kingdom through informal security agreements, but a
deterioration in U.S.-Saudi relations may compel the Saudis to acquire nuclear weapons in
order to deter the ballistic missile and WMD capabilities of its regional adversaries. Saudi Arabia has been a key pillar
of the U.S. strategy in the Persian Gulf, however, a nuclear Saudi Arabia would undermine the efforts of the
NPT and could potentially destabilize the Persian Gulf by initiating a new arms race in the
region.
105
1NC – Oil Dependence Good – Saudi Relations (2/2)
Saudi prolif leads to nuclear war
Edelman 11 — Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (Eric, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The
Limits of Containment”, Foreign Affairs, 2011, proquest)
There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did,
proliferation could accelerate throughout the region . Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological
rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian
coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is
already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to
nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by
exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing
proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic
missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the CSS-2s,
which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons,
Pakistan could sell operational
nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material,
nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This "Islamabad option" could develop in one of several different ways.
and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan
provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In
other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi
Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to
both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the npt since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might
be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops.
Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host
of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded
by the Saudi
government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing . It would increase
nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia?
Regardless of India's reaction, any decision
the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the
remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its
particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the npt. N-PLAYER COMPETITION Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear
weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would
unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the
interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a
bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other.
Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power
and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging
nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the
costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange . For nuclear-armed states, the
bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation
that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging
nuclear powers might not
invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine based
nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic
missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to "launch on warning " of an attack or even,
during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lowerlevel commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not
integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without
sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed
incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which
nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a
significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear
war . Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as
permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a
significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear
arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft.
106
2NC – Oil Dependence Good – Saudi Relations – Stop Prolif
Relations are key to stop Saudi prolif
a) Assuages defense concerns
McDowell 03 (Steven , Lt, US navy, “Is Saudi Arabia a Nuclear Threat?” Naval Postgrad Thesis,
November http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/McDowell03.pdf)
Saudi Arabia, with its vast oil reserves and seemingly endless financial resources may become the next country to purchase nuclear
weapons. It is situated in the Persian Gulf, a region that as of 1998 contained the most active efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and
the highest rate of weapons proliferation in the world.1 Among the major proliferating Gulf States are Iran and Iraq, two states that
have posed considerable threats to the Saudi regime. The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United
States has provided the Saudis with a level of protection that is unprecedented on a Saudi scale,
but is the informal security umbrella provided by the United States enough to keep the oil rich state from acquiring its own means of
deterring foreign missile threats. I contend that the Iranian Revolution and the overthrow of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of
Iran, coupled with the extensive use of ballistic missiles during the Iran-Iraq War posed a tremendous threat to the Saudi regime
and compelled it to purchase a ballistic missile capability. China is currently in the process of replacing its aging CSS-2 liquid-fueled
ballistic missile inventory with a modern, solid-fueled ballistic missile capability.2 I argue that Iran pose a great enough
danger that would compel the Saudi regime to replace its CSS-2 ballistic missile force with a modern,
nuclear tipped missile capability. Notwithstanding the removal of Saudi threats in the Gulf region, the United
States may prove to be the deciding factor in the regime’s decision to join the nuclear club. This
thesis analyzes the Saudi CSS-2 missile purchase and the current external threats posed against the Saudi regime vis a vis the U.S.Saudi relationship. I contend that the Saudi regime will decide to replace its aging ballistic missile force by purchasing a modern
ballistic missile from one of two possible sources.
b) Critical to diplomatic resolutions
McDowell 03 (Steven , Lt, US navy, “Is Saudi Arabia a Nuclear Threat?” Naval Postgrad Thesis,
November http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/McDowell03.pdf)
In the Middle East, the acquisition of ballistic missiles and WMD by one state has often been perceived as a reduction in security of
other Gulf states. Due to its location, historical disputes, and the conventional and unconventional capabilities of its regional
adversaries, Saudi Arabia still faces adversaries who compel it to replace its CSS-2 missiles, possibly with a nuclear capability. As a
result, the Saudis must monitor the capabilities of its Gulf neighbors despite the status of their relations. The Middle East is all too
familiar with revolutions and military coups, which have on several occasions successfully facilitated changes in leadership.
Consequentially, instability in any Gulf state causes apprehensions in Saudi Arabia. Saudi potential adversaries possess strong
military forces, larger populations, and in some cases advanced WMD programs. The perceived value of WMD along with the
concerted efforts to conceal them in the Gulf states will continue to distress the Saudi regime until such missiles are totally removed
from all parts of the region. Further complicating the Saudi security dilemma is the continuation of various regional disputes. Saudi
border disputes with Yemen show no signs of disappearing and Saudi relations with Iran, while cordial on the surface, could face
diverging interests over the price of oil in the future. This may lead to hostilities between the two states. The future of Iraq still
remains unclear; however, its previous efforts to acquire WMD coupled with a yet ‘unassembled’ Iraqi government will remain
under the watchful eye of the Saudis. Until the Israeli-Palestinian crisis is resolved, Israel with its advanced WMD programs will
continue to unease the Saudis. Despite the large U.S. military presence in the Gulf region, shifting U.S. strategic
priorities will continue to weaken its security commitments and cause the Saudi regime to reevaluate its relationship with the United States. Due to periodic instabilities in the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia
may feel that a nuclear capability is warranted in order to deter potential threats. However, the
United States will continue to push for diplomatic resolutions in the region, which may satisfy
Saudi security concerns. A deterioration in U.S.-Saudi relations would ultimately
increase the value of a Saudi nuclear capability.
107
2NC – Oil Dependence Good – AT: Europe Relations
Dialogue and recent convergence of interests solves
Luft 07 (Gal Luft, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security,
“Dependence on Middle East Energy and its Impact on Global Security,” Institute for the
Analysis of Global Security, most recent cited date – 2007,
http://www.iags.org/luft_dependence_on_middle_east_energy.pdf)
Despite above differences between Europe and U.S., in recent months we have witnessed an
increased convergence in trans-Atlantic dialogue on energy security. This has much to do with the soaring
oil prices and the decline in Norwegian oil production which makes Europe increasingly dependent for its oil on the Middle East.
Hence, there
is a clear understanding on both sides of the Atlantic that due to the global and strategic nature
our ability to manage and conserve finite resources, diversifying energy portfolios, protecting
energy facilities and building sufficient mechanism to deal with inevitable disruptions are in the best interest of
all parties. A transatlantic consensus exists for better management of strategic petroleum
reserves and for strengthened energy dialogue with emerging energy consumers in the developing world, primarily
of the challenge, improving
China and India, with possible future inclusion of those two emerging Asian giants in the International Energy Agency regime.
There is also a growing consensus on the need for diplomatic and economic support for ways to
curb the Middle East’s influence by developing alternative supply sources and alternative energy routes from Central
Asia and Africa. But since oil is a fungible commodity which is traded in the global market, diversifying away from the Middle East to
other suppliers would be, at best, a stop gap solution. As long as the world’s transportation system depends on oil to the degree that
it does today, dependence on the Middle East will grow and so will the economic and security burden associated with such
dependency. The key should be to reduce demand for oil period, and since two thirds of the world’s oil is used for transportation this
means reducing oil use through increased fuel efficiency and through a shift from a petroleum dependent transportation system to
one that relies on next-generation fuels, meaning non-oil based transportation fuels such as methanol, ethanol, biodiesel, electricity
and others derived from abundant domestic energy resources such as coal, nuclear power, biomass, and municipal waste. Yet, the
challenge ahead is how to reconcile environmental and security considerations. Both Europe and the U.S. are well endowed with coal,
yet both are reluctant to expand its role in their energy portfolio and convert coal to liquid fuels. Though nuclear energy is a near
zero emissions energy source, in both Europe and the U.S. the nuclear industry is suffering from stagnation. Germany announced
that it will phase out nuclear power by 2020. In the U.S. not one nuclear reactor has been built for three decades and political
agreement on what to do with nuclear waste is not on the horizon. This policy will have to be reviewed as electricity begins to play a
bigger role in the transportation sector.
108