Chris Zimmerman
HIST 304
Prof. Waters
Research Paper
4/26/09
Triremes – Greece’s Saviors
Greek naval warfare is an interesting subject even after the thousands of years that have passed. I will look at the ships (particularly the trireme), naval tactics, and some of the battles that took place in the Persian Wars. With the combination of triremes and superb tactics, the Greeks were victorious during these wars, or more precisely, they avoided defeat and being conquered by the Persian Empire. Without their navy and skilled sailors, the Greeks could never have survived Xerxes’ invasion.
To understand naval warfare of the time, we must first look at the ships themselves. The trireme was the premier naval vessel of its time for warfare upon the seas. It replaced the penteconter (50 oared ship) and triaconter (30 oared ship) as the desired ship. The first triremes had probably been built in Corinth during the seventh century B.C. (Pomeroy 217). However, the trireme’s dominance certainly did not happen overnight. In ancient Attic black-figure pots circa 550-530 B.C., we see penteconters, as well as an Attic black-figure triaconter by the Antimenes painter from circa 520 B.C.
(Morrison 27). During the Persian Wars, both sides still had penteconters and triaconters in service, partially because triremes were more expensive to build. By the fifth century
B.C., the trireme had established itself as the forerunner of warships (Pomeroy 217).
The trireme gets its name from the Greek word triereis, which means “three fitted.” This refers to the boat having three decks of rowers stacked on top of each other.
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The trireme crew worked in teams of three rowers for each section. In the classical form of the ship, only the uppermost rowers were above deck, while the other two decks of rowers were enclosed. The top section of rowers were responsible for guiding the other two rowers in each team of three to make sure they rowed with the most efficient cadence
(Strassler 826).
Triremes were long, slender vessels about 120 feet long by 15 feet wide. The average trireme had 170 oars. These were most likely the standard dimensions of the craft, as a longer ship would be heavier, harder to maneuver, and more of a liability to being rammed itself. A smaller vessel with less oars would lack the sufficient speed and power necessary to penetrate another ship’s hull (Strassler 826). The trireme also had two sails on it, but rowing was the primary method of movement, especially in battle since winds could not be relied upon.
The crew of the trireme may have varied somewhat if the ship happened to be carrying extra hoplites, but the Decree of Themistocles laid out the standard for trireme crews of the time of the Persian Wars (Crawford 225). The average number of crew consisted of 200 men, mainly of oarsmen, since most triremes had 170 oars. Each trireme had a trierarch , or master/captain in charge of the boat. The trierarch had a crew of officers assisting him which likely consisted of a helmsman, bow officer, boatswain, etc. (Morrison 122). Each trireme had an eighteen-man crew of marines consisting of fourteen hoplites and four archers to fight from the deck (Plutarch 95). These soldiers were mainly there to fight in the case that the ram would get stuck in an enemy’s vessel and the trireme was unable to pull back out. Also, triremes could be built with bigger
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decks to accommodate greater troop numbers for more traditional naval warfare – as troop carriers for hand-to-hand/missile combat.
One of the most distinctive features of the trireme is the ram or beak at the bow of the ship. The ram was wooden with a sheath of bronze around it, focusing into three cutting blades at the end that was partially submerged in the water (Morrison 129). With this ram, the trireme was able to puncture an enemy ship’s hull and send water gushing in. The technique of ramming was a new innovation with the trireme. Previously, warships existed primarily to transport troops to land or to fight an enemy vessel from the deck with missiles and hand to hand combat and/or board the opposing vessel. These older techniques were still in use during the Persian Wars, but naval warfare in the fifth century had evolved to make ramming a tactic necessary for success in battle (Pomeroy
217). The trireme was perfectly suited for this.
Ramming was the desired outcome when attacking an enemy vessel and one can only imagine the difficulty of having to hit another vessel in the open seas while ordering teams of rowers, as a slight error in judgment can make the difference between hitting an enemy ship’s flank or leaving your own exposed to attack (Rodgers 9). The main targets of ramming were the flanks of the ship or the oars themselves – if a ship lost oars on one side of the ship, it would lose almost all of its maneuverability and only be able to turn in circles until spare oars could be brought in (if they had extras onboard).
The Greeks had two main fleet maneuvers for which to use with the trireme’s ram
– the diekplous and the periplous . The diekplous was a “charge through” where squadrons (or individual ships) in line ahead formation (straight vertical line) would plow through an enemy’s line abreast formation (horizontal line, showing broadsides to the
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point of enemy vessels’ advancement) or could perform a sharp turn and rake the enemy’s oars, with the intent of disabling the enemy fleet (Morrison 43). Often following a diekplous maneuver, the Greeks would perform a quick turn about called anastrophe , to quickly ram the enemy vessel (or vessels) before the enemy could turn about themselves (Rodgers 10). This tactic was particularly useful because of the superior maneuvering capabilities and speed of the trireme compared to its slower, older predecessors. The other main fleet maneuver of the day was the periplous , or encirclement, which required precise movement or a superior-sized force to place ships on either side of an enemy’s line to surround it. These tactics would play a large role in securing Greek victories in the Aegean Sea.
Now that we have an idea what the ships were like and some of the naval tactics, we can look at the naval battles of Xerxes’ invasion with a little more understanding. In
484 B.C. Xerxes had made his decision to respect the wishes of his father, Darius, to invade Greece and he set about building a fleet with which to invade. The mighty
Persian Empire had ports from Egypt to the Black Sea to construct their ships at. Word of this fleet buildup made it back to Greece, as they were a sea-going people, especially the Athenians, Aeginetans, and any other polis located on an island. It was about this time that the Athenians discovered a huge lode of silver at their mines in Laurium. At first, they were spreading the wealth among the citizens, but at the urgings of
Themistocles, warning Athenians about the Persians and reminding them about their constant warfare with their rival Aegina, he helped convince the people that a navy needed to be built (Pomeroy 216). This is one of the instances that made his foresight legendary. So, the people of Athens set about building a fleet of 200 triremes which
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would benefit not only Athens, but all of Greece in the future. As Pomeroy succinctly puts it, “…the fleet that would save Greece was built.” (216).
Herodotus estimates that Xerxes’ fleet consisted of 1207 triremes (over 1300, by other sources), which may or may not have been very similar to Greeks’ triremes, since many were constructed by the seafaring Phoenicians. It is entirely possible that the
Persian triremes were bigger to accommodate larger numbers of troops. Persian ships were thought to average an extra 30 soldiers on board, to either enforce the will of the trierarch and/or to prevent the crew from rebelling or deserting (Morrison 107). Aristotle in his Politics spoke of the Persians as “controlling the ship.” ( Politics 7.5.7, quoted in
Morrison 110). Or a simpler reason for the greater troop numbers aboard would be that they preferred to fight in the more classical type of naval combat as opposed to relying mainly on the ram.
A possible reason for the incredible successes the Greeks had against overwhelming odds is that the Greeks were well-trained with their triremes and were adept oarsmen (mainly due to the fact that many of the poleis were dependent or affluent on the seas – such as Athens, Aegina, and Samos, in particular). Combine that with the fact that the Greek ships tended to be manned by a minimal number of crew (only the minimal number of hoplites and archers on deck) may be what helped the Greek ships to have an edge. Skilled leaders such as Themistocles and knowledge and use of the terrain to their advantage factors in as well. And one must not forget there is certainly something to be said about their motivation – they were a people fighting for their very survival and freedom.
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All of the aforementioned variables played a role in the three key naval battles of
Xerxes’ invasion – Artemisium, Salamis, and Mycale. A main reason why the naval victories were of utmost importance to the Greeks is that the Persians were relying on their navy to bring in food from the Black Sea region to support their gargantuan-sized army. Simple logistics made a sustained stay in Greek territory untenable without control of the seas. If the Persians had control of the seas, it probably would have simply been a matter of time before they were able to overcome the Greeks, heavy infantry or not. But, as it played out, the three naval victories established Greek superiority on the waves and prevented the subjugation of all of Greece. Key to the success of the Greeks was their trireme.
The Battle of Artemisium took place in 480 B.C. The Greek fleet numbered at about 271 triremes (127 of which the Athenians supplied) under the command of
Eurybiades (advised by Themistocles) (Herodotus VIII.2). The Persians had sent 200 of their ships around behind the Greeks through the Euripos to trap them and ensure a battle would take place. The remaining Persian fleet facing the Greeks still vastly outnumbered them. The Greeks decided to give battle late in the day and opened with a diekplous maneuver at the Persian fleet. The Persian fleet then maneuvered encircle the smaller
Greek force. The Greeks then demonstrated their seamanship by quickly forming a tight circle, prows facing out towards the enemy (Strassler 830). The battle was still undecided at nightfall. During that evening, a storm raged and sent the 200 Persian ships that were sailing through the Euripos into the rocks and destroyed them. The two sides engaged repeatedly over the next two days, each side having successes and losses. Both sides lost many ships, but the Persians took the most losses (Hdt. VIII.16). On the Greek
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side, the Athenians suffered the most losses and had half of their ships disabled in battle
(Hdt. VIII.18). The Greeks then decided to escape back to the inner waters of mainland
Hellas. Overall, this battle would be likely be called inconclusive, but I would think of it as a Greek victory because not being annihilated by an overwhelming force surely counts as a victory in some way.
After the Greek fleet left Artemisium, they went to Salamis, where many of the people of Attica were evacuating to as the Persian army advanced. The rest of the fleet at
Troezen joined up with the fleet at Salamis. As Herodotus puts it, “So now there were assembled far more ships than had fought at Artemisium, and from many more cities.”
(Hdt. VIII. 42). According to Herodotus, the number of ships the Greek city-states had mustered was 380 (Hdt. VIII.82). Aeschylus, who fought in this battle, estimated that the number of Greek triremes was 310 (Rodgers 80). Whichever number was correct, the
Greeks were heavily outnumbered nonetheless, as the Persian force is estimated at about
800 strong (Rodgers 81).
The Greek commanders held a council and most thought that they should sail to the Isthmus of Corinth to give battle to the enemy there. Themistocles knew that if the
Greek fleet should depart from Salamis, they would be giving up the superior terrain of the narrow strait at Salamis and their advantage, for in the narrow strait, the Persians could not bring all of their ships to bear and thus lose an advantage of superior numbers, whereas a battle on the open seas would allow the Persians to bring all of their ships to the battle at once, and thus likely spell certain doom for the smaller Greek fleet. As
Pomeroy puts it, in the narrow strait, “…the heavier and less maneuverable Greek ships could worst the more numerous Persian vessels with their more experienced crews.”
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(220). Themistocles knew that if the Greek fleet did not give battle at Salamis, they would lose Salamis, Megara, and Aegina (Hdt. VIII.60). He also knew that a victory at
Salamis would stop the Persian advance, thus further highlighting how important the battle would be. Through further wily diplomacy with his Greek allies, as well as a trick message sent to Xerxes to entice him to attack at Salamis, Themistocles forced the battle to take place at Salamis, where the conditions favored the Greeks.
Xerxes deployed his fleet and surrounded the Greek fleet at Salamis, trapping them there. As the Greeks moved offshore, they were attacked by the Persians and battle began. The Greeks with their heavier triremes, experienced crews, and talented commanders inflicted heavy losses on the Persian side. According to Herodotus, most of
Xerxes’ ships were disabled by the end of the day, since “…the Hellenes fought the naval battle in disciplined order and remained in their ranks, while the barbarians failed to hold their positions and made no moves that might have followed a sensible plan…” (Hdt.
VIII.886).
Of the three key naval battles, the Battle of Salamis was arguably the most important, because of the scope of the battle and the decisiveness of the outcome. After this battle, the Persians found their fleet on the run, as the Greeks became the aggressors.
Should the combined Greek naval forces had been defeated at Salamis, it would have broken the backs of the Greeks and prevented them passage to the seas. Also, without a navy to protect them, it would only have been a matter of time until the Persians had overrun the Greek armies, heavily armored hoplites or not.
The Battle of Mycale in 479 B.C. was not a naval battle, per se because it was not fought on the water, but it was between the Greek troops from their navy against the
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Persians’ naval troops (as well as a large contingent of Xerxes’ land forces in Ionia).
When the Persian navy heard that the Greek navy was approaching, they headed for Ionia and decided not to engage the Greeks at sea because they thought they were not a match for them (Hdt. IX.96). The Persians then beached their ships and built a palisade wall around them for protection and took shelter there with the 60,000 troops Xerxes left stationed in Ionia (Hdt. IX.96). The Greek naval commanders decided to attack the
Persians at Mycale. The Greeks beached their ships and unloaded their troops. The
Athenians and other Hellenes advanced along the beach towards the enemy and the
Lacedaemonians moved to flank the enemy through the hills. The battle was fierce as the
Athenians assaulted the Persian camp. They breached the palisade and the Persians fought back, while the Persian allies fled (Hdt. IX.102). Then, the Lacedaemonians showed up and helped finish off the enemy (Hdt. IX.103).
The Battle of Mycale is significant in that not only was it a Greek victory, but the
Greeks were able to destroy the Persian navy while it was beached. It was also a key battle because the both the Persians and the Greeks knew this battle was important because the victor would control the islands as well as the Hellespont (Hdt. IX.101).
After their victory at Mycale, the Greeks had superiority of the seas and no longer had to fear the Persian navy in the Aegean.
With their triremes, the Greeks were able to defeat the Persians in three key naval battles using superior tactics, knowledge of the terrain and seas, skilled crews, and cunning leaders. These naval victories are what truly secured victory (or prevented defeat) for the Greeks against their Persian invaders. Without these victories, or
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specifically, without their triremes (thanks to Themistocles’ foresight), the Greeks would not have survived the Persian onslaught.
Works Cited
Chatterton, E. Keble.
Battles by Sea . Yorkshire: Scolar Press Limited, 1975.
Crawford, M. and D. Whitehead. Archaic and Classical Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983.
Herodotus . The Landmark Herodotus.
Edited by Robert Strassler. New York: Pantheon
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Morrison, J.S., J.F. Coates, and N.B. Rankov.
The Athenian Trireme . Cambridge:
Cambridge University.
Pemsel, Helmut. Atlas of Naval Warfare . Trans. Major i.G. D. G. Smith. London:
Arms and Armor Press, 1977.
Plutarch. Greek Lives . Trans. R. Waterfield. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Pomeroy, Sarah, et al. Ancient Greece: A Political, Social, and Cultural History, 2 nd
Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Rodgers, William Ledyard.
Greek and Roman Naval Warfare . Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1937.
Starr, Chester.
The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History . New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989.
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