Výzkumný projekt
Research project
SOCIÁLNÍ TRENDY
SOCIAL TRENDS
je podporován grantem od Grantové agentury
České republiky
receives a core support from the Grant Agency
of the Czech Republic
The Crystallization of Political Attitudes
and Political Spectrum in the Czech Republic
Petr Matějů
Klára Vlachová
Working papers of the research project “Social Trends”
9/1997
All correspondence should be addressed to Petr Matějů, Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1,
tel. 22 22 06 78 nebo 22 22 00 99 l. 234 nebo 233, fax: 22 22 16 58, e-mail: mateju@mbox.cesnet.cz., Klára
Vlachová, Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, tel. 22 22 00 99 l. 232, fax: 22 22 16 58, e-mail:
vlachova@soc.cas.cz. This research was carried out under the grant "Social Trends" from the Grant Agency of the
Czech Republic (grant no. 403/96/K120). Work on this article was also supported by a grant from the project Social
Costs of Economic Transformation in Central Eastern Europe (SOCO), coordinated by IWM Vienna and largely
sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the Austrian Chancellor's programme for cooperation with the countries of
central and eastern Europe. The authors would like to thank Blanka Řeháková for her valuable methodological
advice. They would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments, which helped them to avoid a
number of potential misunderstandings.
CONTENTS
1. REFLECTIONS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LEFT-RIGHT AXIS OF THE CZECH POLITICAL
SPECTRUM ...................................................................................................................................................... 3
2. STRATEGIES OF ANALYSIS, DATA AND VARIABLES ............................................................................. 7
3. RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................................ 9
3.1. Development and Crystallization of the Left-Right Axis of the Political Spectrum ..................................... 9
3.2. Is the Political Space Defined by Politically Relevant Attitudes and Values One-Dimensional? ............ 19
3.3. Political Values of Voters for the Main Political Parties .......................................................................... 22
4. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................. 25
5. BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................................. 29
APPENDIX ........................................................................................................................................................... 31
A. QUESTIONS ON DECLARED POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS .................................................................... 31
B. DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES EQUAL AND MERIT ........................................................................ 31
C. DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLE STAT ..................................................................................................... 32
D. SELECTED CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE VARIABLES EQUAL, MERIT, STAT AND DECLARED
POSITION ON THE LEFT-RIGHT SCALE (POLOR).................................................................................. 33
E. DEFINITION OF THE VALUE BASED (INDIRECTLY MEASURED) DIMENSIONS OF THE
POLITICAL SPECTRUM (VARIABLES LR, LA) ........................................................................................ 33
ISBN 80-85950-35-9
2
1. Reflections on the Significance of the Left-Right Axis of the Czech Political Spectrum
Even though the changes in the number and profiles of political parties on the Czech political
scene that occurred between the 1992 and 1996 parliamentary elections indicated that the role of
economic and traditional class interests has been on the rise, doubts have been frequently
expressed as to whether it is in fact sensible to assume the existence of a traditional left-right
political axis in the Czech political space. One of the main arguments raised to support this view
was that in a society in which for forty years there was no plural political system or democratic
political contest and during which time it was not appropriate to talk of the values of the left and
the right, people today do not really know what these concepts mean (Hudeček 1992).
Secondly, mainly among journalists, there has been the argument that, in a society without a
strong socio-economic dimension of stratification system, groups with economic and social
interests oriented specifically to left and right cannot emerge in a short period; political parties
then cannot cling too closely to either left or right values. A third argument is that in western
democracies, which serve as a model for post-communist development, the importance of the
socio-economic dimension of political position in forming the backbone of the traditional leftright political axis is declining (see, for example, Manza, Hout and Brooks 1995). In those
countries, post-materialist values are becoming increasingly important, and a so-called ”new left”
has emerged, winning support from middle and upper classes. The question remains whether it is
possible to extend this argument to the post-communist countries and conclude that the left-right
axis of the political spectrum in the Czech Republic has been undergoing the same kind of postmaterialist transformation.
The hypothesis of the minor importance of the socio-economic left-right dimension of the
Czech political space has not yet been empirically corroborated. On the contrary, a number of
works (Kitschelt 1992, Brokl 1996) have demonstrated the existence of this dimension in the
field of party politics and in that of voter identification (Šimoník 1996, Vlachová 1997). Some
authors even insist that it is of primary importance and that it represents the basic structural
conflict (Kitschelt 1994).
Also, the 1996 parliamentary elections provided clear proof of the importance of the left-right
dimension in the Czech Republic. The left-wing ČSSD and the right-wing ODS became the main
representatives of the left and right and thus became the two main gravitational poles of the
political party system. The two parties offered very different platforms concentrating on
3
macroeconomic issues, and their role in representing the interests of different social classes was
much clearer than in the past (Matějů and Řeháková 1997a, 1997b). The clear polarization of
parties undoubtedly sprang from a deeper polarization of society based on politically relevant
issues that are quite clear even in everyday political rhetoric. There has even been discussion of
how far the party system in the Czech Republic has moved towards polarized pluralism (Novák
1963, Krause 1996).
The polarization of the political system is partly dependent on the positions of the political
actors (e.g. parties and voters) on the dominant structural dimensions, most often on the left-right
axis (Sani and Sartori 1983). Political polarization corresponds to the degree to which the values
of political actors in society differ, although a society need not necessarily be polarized on the
left-right dimension. However, Kitschelt (1992) sees the basic structural cleavages of postcommunist society as lying along two axes: the left-right axis and that of libertarianismauthoritarianism. The first of these represents the conflict between politics and the market,
between provision and rights, while the second represents that between freedom and the lack
thereof (one pole is defined as anarchism and syndicalism, the other as authoritarianism and
traditionalism).1 Kitschelt (1992) put forward two hypotheses in this respect:
1. Western European party systems at the end of the 20th century are structured along an axis
stretching from opponents of the market together with non-economic liberals, to
supporters of the market and authoritarians. The corresponding axis for central and eastern
Europe party systems, however, has at one end authoritarians and opponents of the market,
and at the other, liberals and supporters of the market.
2. In the countries of central and eastern Europe the distribution of voters along these axes
will depend on the level of industrialization. In countries where economic development is
relatively advanced, as in the Czech Republic, many political parties (and so voters) will
be concentrated at the market-liberal end of the scale (Kitschelt 1992: 20).
The polarization of political positions and orientations along the dominant dimension leads to
tensions and contributes to political conflict. Sani and Sartori (1983) write that the polarization
of the general public is the first sign of tension (or of the absence of tension) in democracies, and
1
A similar structure for the political system was proposed by Eysenck (1968), who added a vertical axis measuring
political attitudes to the traditional left-right axis. One border is the authoritarian approach to politics, the other is
the democratic one. This structure was expected to reveal the differences between left and right-wing extremism.
4
political elites are shaped by the degree of polarization they see among the people. In political
systems that are in the process of transformation, however, this can be expected to function in the
opposite direction, particularly in the advertisements which create the image of political parties.
Regardless of what cleavage is dominant in a particular society, the average voters in western
democracies are generally able to place both themselves and the main political players in the
party system on the left-right scale (e.g. Barnes 1971). This positioning is also similar to that by
experts on the party system. While analyses show that almost all voters in western European
countries can place themselves on the left-right continuum, there is still the question of whether
voters conceive the left-right space in the same way as do the political elite and political
scientists when dealing with the axes of the political spectrum (Sani and Sartori 1983).
How 'left' the left actually is in each country and how 'right' the right is, is, of course, another
question (Sani and Sartori 1983). Even though the traditional left-right dimension of the political
spectrum has weakened in developed countries, political scientists still identify it as the natural
axis of the political system and as an important variable in explaining political behavior. It is
closely associated with attitudes toward social equality and inequality, is clearly linked to
questions of social justice, market distribution and redistribution, provides a good indication of
attitudes to trade unions, etc. In real politics this dimension takes the form of conflicts over taxes,
over the state budget (the debate over the just distribution of the national wealth) and the
economy (quotas, import restrictions, subsidies), and over microeconomic measures (special
protection under the law) to maintain or eliminate inequality. The left-right dimension is,
however, often associated with things that go beyond the primary socio-economic values and
positions. A whole range of other politically relevant attitudes can change significantly,
depending on a person’s position on the scale from left to right. This is primarily because left and
right-wing political values are closely linked with left or right-wing parties, and the ideological
agendas of most parties can be expected to include matters outside the socio-economic sphere,
although these latter form the main axis along which the parties' profiles are shaped.
In political systems that are structured around the left-right axis of the political spectrum,
self-placement of potential voters on this axis does not usually pose a problem. In Great Britain,
for example, the political system grew out of the left-right dimension and has two relatively well
defined poles (see, e.g. Richardson 1991, Evans, Heath and Lalljee 1996). The dominant leftright axis creates a space in which Labor and Conservative can exist as the dominant parties,
5
while the weaker axis of libertarianism-authoritarianism is demonstrated by the existence of the
Liberal Democrat Party. Looking at the Czech political system as a space formed by the main
political parties, here too it is possible to talk of the dominant role of the left-right dimension.
The liberal-authoritarian axis has been identified in the Czech Republic (Hudeček 1992, Brokl
1996), but it is weaker and less well defined (e.g. Kitschelt 1994). Our aim here is to show
whether this is the case in the political space of voters. Our questions in this study are, however,
rather broader.
The first objective is to test the assumption that the concepts of left and right are important
not only for the political elite and for experts on the political system, but also for ordinary
people. It is important to assess whether most people are willing and able to place themselves on
the left-right axis (declared political orientation). It is equally important to ask whether people's
declared political orientations are stable over time or whether they have changed in the course of
the transformation. Another important question is whether the left-right dimension of political
identification is gradually taking on its traditional socio-economic content. As the dimension
linked with socio-economic matters is of primary importance here (the acceptable degree of
income inequality, the choice between egalitarian and meritocratic principles of distributive
justice, the role of the state, the market and socialism, etc.), there is a need for a thorough
analysis of the hypothesis that the association between these attitudes and declared position on
the left-right political axis is growing stronger. In other words, we will be asking whether behind
the stability of declared political orientation we can find the gradual crystallization of the
traditional content of the right-left axis of the political spectrum.
In addition to questions about the development or crystallization of subjective (declared) leftright political orientation, it is of value to ask whether, in addition to the objective left-right value
dimension which is expected to represent the main structural cleavage, a second important
dimension of the political spectrum is taking shape in the form of libertarianismauthoritarianism,2 which undoubtedly exists in western democracies.
The last but by no means least important question can be phrased as follows: "Is position on
the left-right dimension as measured indirectly (on the basis of values and politically relevant
2
In countries where left and right values exist, there may or may not be strong libertarian-authoritarian values, and
vice versa. In Britain, for example, the libertarian-authoritarian axis is relatively unimportant (Evans, Heath and
6
attitudes), basically in accordance with declared position on this axis?" Our assumption is that
this is not in fact the case, since many individuals who identify themselves with the right as the
dominant ideology are in fact rather closer to the left, or at least to the "left of center." The same
inconsistency can equally well exist in the opposite direction. Thus, to what extent the declared
right is in fact right, and how far declared left-wing orientation is indeed left, in terms of
ingrained values and political attitudes, is undoubtedly a legitimate question which is worth
answering.
2. Strategies of Analysis, Data and Variables
A declared left or right-wing orientation in politics is most often measured through questions
about whether the respondent ranks himself or herself as definitely left-wing, leaning towards the
left, center, leaning towards the right or definitely right-wing (verbal strategy), or by asking
respondents to place themselves on a five, seven or ten point "visual" left-right scale.3 Even
though this is a very common method of assessing the position of individuals on the left-right
axis of the political spectrum, it is by no means ideal as a means of measurement, particularly
because it presumes that the person has a certain level of political knowledge and is able to
operate with abstract political concepts. If people are relatively uninformed about political issues,
the results of this direct (declarative) method of measurement will not be highly reliable.
Problems may also arise if the respondent is fully capable of operating with abstract political
concepts, as there is a danger that he or she will not be able to express the complexity of the
multi-dimensional subject of left-right political orientation in terms of position on a single scale.
In order to compare the results obtained from using different types of scales, we included in
the ISSP-1996 survey (The Role of the Government) two different types of question: one which
used a verbally defined five-point scale, and a second which used a "visual" ten-point scale4.
The second method of measuring a person's position on the left-right political spectrum
comes from the assumption that the political left and right can be defined indirectly in terms of
Lalljee 1996). In Slovakia, on the other hand, the political system is clearly forming along axes other than the leftright one (Krause 1996).
3
The disadvantage of the verbal scale is that clearly conceived extremes (such as extreme right or left, definite right
or left, etc.) can lead some respondents to place themselves in the more neutral centre. This problem is partly
resolved by the visual scale with undefined points. A ten point scale is more likely to lightly reduce people's
tendency to place themselves in the centre of the scale than are scales with uneven numbers of points (because on a
scale from 1 to 10 the centre is not represented by a single value).
7
values and politically relevant attitudes. Using a battery of questions closely correlated with
political left or right-wing orientation, rather than a single question, is a strategy that is known to
reduce the possibility of personally biased interpretation of any one question and makes the
measurement more reliable. A recent analysis shows that in the case of developed industrial
countries, an individual's position on the left-right political axis can generally be successfully
measured by a battery of statements relating to common political values (Evans, Heath and
Lalljee 1996). This battery was shown to give a more reliable measure of political stance than do
individual questions which may be affected by passing moods and political situations that can
change over time. In order to test the presence of two differing dimensions of the political
spectrum (left-right and authoritarian-libertarian), a very similar battery of questions representing
both dimensions was developed and tested. One part concentrated on attitude towards economic
and social inequality, and the problems of exploitation and the role of the state in the distributive
process (the left-right dimension); a second part dealt with questions of personal freedom,
tolerance and the relation to "traditional" values (the libertarian -authoritarian dimension).
After a preliminary analysis of reliability, the following statements were selected to define the
above two axes of the political space in the Czech Republic:
a) statements dealing with socio-economic matters which are closely related to the left-right axis
 The government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well
off (REDIS)
 Big business benefits at the expense of workers (BUSIN)
 Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth (SHARE)
 There is one law for the rich and one for the poor (RIGHT)
 The management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance
(MANAG)
 The government should be responsible for reducing differences between the rich and the
poor (REDINQ)
b) statements closely related to the libertarian-authoritarian axis:
 People should be allowed to organize protest meetings against the government
(PROTMEET)
 People should be allowed to organize protest marches and demonstrations (PROTMAR)
4
See Appendix for wordings of the two questions.
8
 Young people today do not have enough respect for traditional values (TRADVAL)
 For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence (DEATH)
 Schools should teach children to obey authority (AUTHOR)
 Laws should always be obeyed even if a particular law is wrong (OBEYLAW)
 Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards (CENZOR)
 People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences (SENTEN)5
The data analyzed here were taken from the 1991 and 1995 Social Justice surveys and the
ISSP-1996 project (The Role of the Government).6
3. Results of the Analysis
3.1. Development and Crystallization of the Left-Right Axis of the Political Spectrum
When people's willingness and ability to place themselves on the left-right political spectrum is
considered, the Czech Republic is in no way an exception among European countries unwillingness or inability to place oneself on one of the verbal or visual scales varies from 5% of
respondents in the case of the visual scale, to 10% for the verbal one.7 It seems, therefore, that
despite any doubts about the existence of this dimension of political space in the Czech
Republic, the left-right axis is an acceptable way of understanding and organizing people's
views of their political orientation and that of other players on the political scene. The
overwhelming majority of people in the Czech Republic can say whether they are
supporters of the left, the center or the right. This corresponds with result obtained by
other authors (see, for example Šimoník 1996).
The simple ability to place oneself on a scale does not, however, signify any real
understanding of the political issues which traditionally divide the left and the right. According
5
Agreement with the statements was measured on the five-point Likert Scale (graduated from agreement to
disagreement with each statement). For the analyses, the scales were modified so that agreement with the statement
in question always indicated position on the left-right axis (a higher value indicated a position "further to the right")
and on the authoritarian-liberal axis (a higher value indicates a more "authoritarian" stance).
6
The "Social Justice" survey was first carried out in thirteen countries in 1991, and then repeated in 1995-1996 in
five of the countries which took part in the 1991 survey - Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary
and Russia. In the Czech Republic both the 1991 and 1995 surveys were based on two stage stratified random
sampling. Both surveys were carried out by STEM. The survey "The Role of the Government" was carried out in 17
countries in 1996 as part of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The data collection was carried out
by STEM on a sample of 1100 randomly selected respondents (two stage stratified random sampling).
7
These results also bear out the hypothesis that people are more open to the visual scale, as it doesn’t show the
labels which may give some respondents problems in answering questions directly to the interviewer.
9
to Krejčí (1994), people are able to identify with either the left or the right without needing to
define these concepts in value terms.8 The situation is much the same in western democracies,
even though the categories of left - center - right are basic political concepts there. To some
extent, however, they may be labels which help voters interpret and evaluate the various political
parties and events. It could also be said that for many people the images of the left, right and
center are more a question of feelings and of a certain political instinct, and the result of the
propaganda of political parties, than of a clear picture of what these political orientations mean in
terms of values or political aims. Nevertheless, one can assume that the tendency towards a
certain political ”label” is reasonably correlated with the political values linked with it in theory,
particularly ideas on social and economic inequality, the principles of distributive justice, the
extent of state and private property, the degree of government intervention in socio-economic
processes, etc.9
The distributions of people’s self-placement on the left-right axis show that the declared
political orientations in the Czech Republic have been unusually stable since 1991. At the
same time, this distribution does not greatly differ from that in other European countries. As to
the basic characteristics of the distribution, Figure 1 shows that declared position on the left-right
axis is a unimodal distribution with a slight tendency towards to the right-hand pole of the
spectrum. When the ten-point visual scale is used, the median has remained at 6.0 since 1991
with the mode stable at 5.0. This is fairly typical for selected European countries, with Great
Britain and the Netherlands in particular showing a similar distribution. In other countries people
showed a stronger tendency to place themselves on the center of the spectrum.
8
Evans, Heath and Lalljee (1996) investigated the way in which people define left and right values. 39% of the
respondents were not able to define these concepts, while 59% were able to give an answer. Some responses were:
the left favours the workers (the poor and ordinary working people) against the middle classes (the rich and big
business); the left means communism, marxism, socialism, the Labour Party; the left is against conservatism,
fascism, etc.
9
A comparison of the five-point verbal scale from 1 (definitely left) to 5 (definitely right) with a five-point visual
scale obtained by combining categories 1+2, 3+4, 5+6, 7+8, 9+10, shows that people are more ready to place
themselves on a visual rather than a verbal scale. Only 5% of respondents refused to consider the visual scale, while
10% refused to use the verbal scale. No other systematic differences were found resulting from using various types
of questions or scales. The hypothesis that the visual scale without a clear centre leads to a weakening of "centrally"
oriented voters was definitely not proven. In both cases, the number of respondents identifying with the political
centre was the same (61%). Voters therefore tend to place themselves on the left-right scale in much the same way
on both the five-point verbal scale and the ten-point visual scale.
10
Figure 1
Declared left-right political orientation.
Self-positioning on a visual ten-point scale
Czech Republic
25
1991
1995
1996
3
4
20
15
10
5
0
Left
2
5
6
7
8
9
Right
Declared political orientation
apol_a.prs
Source: Social Justice 1991, 1995 (SoÚ, STEM).
ISSP 1996 (SoÚ, STEM)
West Germany
East Germany
%
%
40
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
0
Left
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
Right
Left
lr-wg_a.prs
2
3
Great Britain
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
Right
Left
lr-gb_a.prs
2
3
4
Netherlands
8
9
Right
5
6
7
8
9
Right
7
8
9
Right
Poland
%
40
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
0
7
lr-hun_a.prs
%
Left
6
%
40
0
5
Hungary
%
Left
4
lr-eg_a.prs
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
Right
Left
lr-hol_a.prs
lr-pol_a.prs
11
2
3
4
5
6
Although the distribution of people on the left-right dimension of the political spectrum has
remained stable, the development of voting preferences and political attitudes shows that there
has been a clear change in the content of this dimension. In the introduction we suggested that
the political stance on important socio-economic issues is crystallizing and that this is giving the
declared left-right political orientation its traditional content. The extent to which this is indeed
the case is another question which remains to be answered.
The crystallization of the content of the left-right dimension of political orientation can be
traced by the changing associations between positions which traditionally have a close
connection with the left-right political orientation, and people's self-positioning in this
dimension. These positions clearly include tolerance towards income inequality, beliefs about
distributive justice, opinions on the role of the state (the welfare state) and, of course, attitudes
towards the market economy and socialism.
In 1991, wage and income differentiation was still quite low. This, together with the strong
market euphoria, led to a relatively widespread belief that income differences should increase.
The number of people tending towards the idea of inequality has, however, fallen since then:
from 19% in 1991 to only 5% in 1995. As Figure 2 shows, in 1991 support for the growth of
inequality was smallest among those who placed themselves in the political center, and it
increased towards the poles of the spectrum.10 While in 1995 support for increased inequality
was low overall, it was a far clearer element in defining right-wing orientation (between 1991
and 1995, the correlation coefficient Gamma between variables showing opinions as to existing
inequality and subjective political orientation rose from 0.13 to 0.329).11 This elementary
comparison shows that the differentiated drop in support for increased inequality is one of
the issues which undoubtedly contributed to the crystallization of the content of the leftright axis of political attitudes.
10
In an attempt to eliminate the effects of the limited number of cases, particularly on the poles of the political
spectrum, the ten-point scale has been replaced by a five-point scale, obtained by combining categories, in this and
in subsequent Figures.
11
The question asked in the survey: ”What do you think about salary differences in the Czech Republic today? Are
the differences too big, quite big, acceptable, quite small or too small?”
12
Figure 2
Perception of income inequality according to declared left-right political orientation.
The percentage of persons convinced that income differences are small (in %)
1995
1991
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Left
2
3
4
Right
Source: Social Justice 1991, 1995 (SoÚ, STEM)
asmall_a.prs
Figure 3
Ratio between the fair incomes for a company director and an unskilled worker
according to declared left-right political orientation
8
1991
1995
7
6
F ratio
1991: 2.36
1995: 2.91
5
4
3
2
Left
2
3
4
Declared political orientation
arat5_a.prs
Source: Social Justice 1991, 1995 (SoÚ, STEM)
13
Right
Figure 4
Leanings towards the egalitarian principle of distributive justice (variable EQUAL)
according to declared left-right political orientation
1
1991
F ratio
1991: 11.7
1995: 22.7
1995
0,8
0,6
0,4
0,2
0
-0,2
-0,4
Left
2
3
4
Right
Declared political orientation
aeq5_a.prs
Source: Social Justice 1991, 1995 (SoÚ, STEM)
Verbal expression of attitudes toward existing inequality should be complemented by views
on changes in acceptable income differences between the top and bottom of the social ladder, for
example, between the director of a large company on the one hand and an unskilled worker on
the other. This tension was measured by the average ratio between the "fair" salaries for the
director and the worker, i.e. between the salaries which the respondents themselves suggested for
these occupations.12 It should be said at the outset that the range between acceptable incomes
rose from 3.7 to 5.6 (i.e. in 1991 a "fair" income for a director was given as 3.7 times that of an
unskilled worker, while in 1995 it was 5.6 times).13 From the point of view of the content of the
left-right axis of the political spectrum, however, it is more important to discover whether the
acceptable income difference is more closely linked to declared position on the left-right
spectrum (Figure 3). Both the actual and regression curves in Figure 3 show that while in 1991
there was almost no relationship between acceptable income differences and declared political
orientation (beta coefficient was -0.009), in 1995 the differences clearly grew from left to right
The question: ”What do you think the gross monthly salary for people in these occupations should be (regardless
of what they actually earn)? Skilled factory worker. Director of a large company.” (among other occupations)
12
14
(the regression coefficient was 0.478). This shows that people oriented towards the political right
were becoming more open to the idea of greater differences between occupations at the top and
the bottom of the social hierarchy. Thus both the structured change in attitudes towards
income inequality in general and the structured change in acceptable income differences
contributed to the gradual crystallization of the traditional content of the left-right
dimension of the political spectrum.
Figure 5
Leaning towards meritocratic principle of distributive justice (variable MERIT) according to
declared left-right political orientation
1
0,5
1991
F ratio
1991: 17.6
1995: 27.8
1995
0
-0,5
-1
-1,5
Left
2
3
4
Right
Declared political orientation
ain5_a.prs
Source: Social Justice 1991, 1995 (SoÚ, STEM)
Just as attitudes to income inequalities change along the axis of declared political orientation,
beliefs about distributive justice also change from left to right. In accordance with the
confirmatory factor analysis carried out elsewhere (Matějů 1997b), the variables representing
norms of distributive justice were constructed from a battery of questions assessing people’s
inclination towards various norms of distributive justice.14 The analysis of the association
between declared left-right orientation and the tendency towards egalitarian norm of distributive
justice (EQUAL) confirmed that this association has gradually grown stronger (the value of the
For a more detailed analysis of tolerance of income inequalities, see B. Řeháková (Řeháková 1997).
The theoretical analysis of norms of distributive justice and their application has been dealt with elsewhere
(Matějů 1997). The results of the factor analysis which was used to define the variables for the present analysis are
given in the appendix.
13
14
15
F-ratio expressing the relation between two variables rose from 11.7 in 1991 to 22.7 in 1995).
Figure 4 shows that while the tendency towards this norm grew stronger at the left end of the
spectrum, it weakened towards the right end.
Figure 6
Leaning towards the demand for a strong state (variable STAT) according to declared left-right
political orientation
0,8
1991
1995
F ratio
1991: 11.0
1995: 17.9
0,6
0,4
0,2
0
-0,2
-0,4
-0,6
Left
2
3
4
Right
Declared political orientation
asta5_at.prs
Source: Social Justice 1991, 1995 (SoÚ, STEM)
Somewhat different development was found in the meritocratic norm of distributive justice
(MERIT, Figure 5). The inclination towards this norm grew weaker towards both the left and the
right, but more markedly so towards the left end. This indicates that the relation between
declared political orientation and inclination towards the meritocratic principle of distributive
justice has also grown stronger (the value of F rose from 17.6 in 1991 to 27.8 in 1995).
The results of the regression analysis lead to similar conclusions. They also show, however,
that the process of formation of consistent left-wing attitudes contributed more to the
strengthening relation between declared political orientation and the tendency towards different
norms of distributive justice than did the crystallization of right-wing ”ideology.” The change
towards the left end of the spectrum is greater than on the right. The regression analysis also bore
out the conclusions about the more pronounced change in the case of egalitarianism (the
regression coefficient grew from -0.237 in 1991 to -0.334 in 1995) than for the equity principle
(a rise from 0.300 to 0.359). Here, too, it is clear that the crystallization of egalitarian distributive
justice norm on the left has been stronger than the formation of meritocratic norms of distributive
16
justice on the right. It is possible to draw an interim conclusion that the continuing
differentiation of inclinations towards different norms of distributive justice has been
nother important process contributing to formation of the traditional meaning of the leftright political cleavage.
Figure 7
View of the market according to declared left-right political orientation.
Percentage of individuals who think that the market economy is essential to our economic
development of the country .
Percentage of responses "strongly agree" and "somewhat to agree".
100
%
80
60
40
20
1991
0
Left
trh.prs
2
3
1995
4
Right
Source: Social Justice 1991, 1995 (SoÚ, STEM)
The formation of attitudes towards inequality and distributive principles on the left end of the
spectrum led us to the hypothesis that these attitudes also affect the different views of the role of
the state, which is known to be closely connected with left-right political orientation in western
democracies. The results of the analysis of the relationship between declared political orientation
and leanings towards a strong state given in Figure 6 show that this relationship is becoming
stronger (the F-ratio has risen from 11.0 to 17.9).15 This is also indicated by the results of the
regression analysis (the regression coefficient rose from -0.209 to -0.284). In this case, however,
the inclination towards a paternalistic state remained stable on the left but weakened on the right15
Information about the definition of variables used in the analysis of the tendency towards the strong state and the
welfare state is given in the Appendix.
17
hand end of the political spectrum. Thus, it is possible to draw another conclusion that beliefs as
to whether or not the state should guarantee a certain standard of living, fix an upper limit
for incomes, and guarantee work for everyone also contributed to the crystallization of the
left-right axis of the political spectrum.
Figure 8
View of socialism according to declared left-right political orientation.
Percentage of individuals who are in favor of socialism.
Percentage of responses "very much in favor” and "somewhat in favor".
100
%
1991
1995
80
60
40
20
0
Left
soc.prs
2
3
4
Right
Source: Social Justice 1991, 1995 (SoÚ, STEM)
The enthusiasm for the market economy declined hand in hand with the left's move back
towards traditional left ideas and values, i.e to egalitarianism and state provision for all. Even if
the majority of people still support the market economy, there has been a move away from
uncritical support towards a rather more reserved and probably more realistic position. At the
same time, the support for the market economy or socialism has become a real issue of political
orientation. The results presented in Figures 7 and 8 show that it was primarily people who
identified with the left who stopped accepting the liberal market economy as the basic
assumption for development leading to prosperity, and that the left-wing showed a growing
willingness to accept socialism as a model of socio-economic organization.16 In the center of the
16
Variables MARKET and SOCIAL analyzed here were already items used in factor analysis defining the norms of
distributive justice. Since they represent the expressed form of the basic political conflict between left and right, we
analyze them also independently.
18
declared left-right dimension the number of clear supporters of socialism stabilized, and the level
of unambiguous support for the market fell slightly. At the right end of the spectrum, the
numbers of supporters of the liberal market economy and of opponents of socialism remained
stable. The correlation coefficient Gamma for the association between political orientation and
attitude to the market economy rose slightly from 0.40 to 0.43 and for the attitude to socialism
from -0.54 to -0.68.
3.2. Is the Political Space Defined by Politically Relevant Attitudes and Values
One-Dimensional?
The above analysis was directed at the question of whether the declared left-right dimension of
political allegiance has been gradually ”filled” by traditional (socio-economic) attitudes. It is also
necessary to ask whether the left-right dimension is the only axis along which politically relevant
values and attitudes are organized among the Czech population. In other words, we should
consider whether, alongside that left-right dimension which is founded on values and attitudes
and which is assumed to represent the main structural cleavage in society, another important
dimension of the political spectrum is forming: the libertarianism-authoritarianism axis whose
existence has been shown in developed countries. Although some political scientists maintain
that this second dimension already clearly structures the political space as defined by political
parties (Brokl 1996), there is still the question of whether this also applies to the political space
as defined by the voters' politically relevant attitudes and values.
The existence of an indirectly measurable dimension of politically relevant attitudes (based
on values) was tested using a factor analysis which extracts the continuous left-right value scale
and the value scale of the libertarianism-authoritarianism axis. The technical details of the
extraction of factors and the main results of the factor analysis are shown in the appendix. It is
worth noting not only the factor loadings indicating the content of this dimension, but also the
proportion the variance separate factors (dimensions) explain.
As to the results of the factor analysis, it should be stressed that the factor representing
position on the left-right spectrum (LR) is more sharply defined than that representing an
individual's position on the libertarianism-authoritarianism axis (LA), which ultimately shows
the proportion of the explained variance. The former factor (LR) explains almost 30% of the
variance, the latter (LA) only 17%. This result shows that although the left-right axis is dominant
19
in organizing the values and attitudes of Czech voters, the libertarianism-authoritarianism axis
also has some role. For the left-right axis, the dominant elements are those indicating a sense of
exploitation and the existence of a conflict between "capitalists" and "workers" (BUSIN,
SHARE), and also other elements represent traditional issues dividing the left and the right
(REDIS, MANAG). As supposed, the libertarianism-authoritarianism axis is organized first
around items representing the demand for stronger informal authority (AUTHOR), and secondly
by the demand for a stronger reaction to breaches of the law (SENTEN). The high correlation of
the factor with the item representing an inclination towards traditional values (TRADVAL)
shows that authoritarianism, as represented by this dimension, is not so distant from
conservatism. However, taking into account the considerable discontinuity of historical, political,
and moral values in post-communist societies, it may be better to approach this dimension with a
certain care. The analysis does, however, confirm that the space defined by voters' politically
relevant values and attitudes in the Czech Republic is organized along two axes: the
traditionally defined left-right axis, which is decisive, and a second axis representing an
inclination to authoritarianism, which political scientists have identified even more clearly
in developed countries.
In the introduction we asked whether the position on an indirectly measured left-right
dimension (based on values) is basically in accordance with declared position on the left-right
axis. The assumption was that many people who identify themselves with the right are in fact
closer to the left of center or to the left. This hypothesis can be tested by comparing the
distributions of two variables: declared position on the left-right political spectrum and the
position on the value-based left-right scale.17
Figure 9
Comparison of declared and value-based left-right political orientation
17
Two variables were compared: declared position on the left-right political spectrum as originally measured on a
scale of 1 to 10, which was transferred on to a scale of 1-100 with position on an additional scale RIGHTOR, which
corresponds to the LR factor.
20
30
%
value based orientation
declared orientation
25
20
15
10
5
0
Left
2
3
4
5
6
7
polor2_a.prs
8
9
Right
Source: ISSP 1996 (SoÚ, STEM)
Figure 9 shows the results of the comparison of the distribution of the two variables and
confirms that there is a clear shift of value based political orientation compared with declared
orientation. It also reveals an interesting paradox: in terms of declared political orientation,
the Czech population is slightly inclined to the right, while in terms of politically relevant
attitudes and values, the tendency is just opposite: inclination to the left. This result reveals
the existence of deeply rooted left-wing attitudes even among those who identify themselves
with the right. This difference may result from other, probably less economic, values to which
the right today is open, while the left is not. At the same time it can be seen as a latent source of
conflicts inside the government coalition.
The analysis of mean differences between declared political orientation and value-based
political orientation shows that voters for the SPR-RSČ (Republicans) lean furthest away from
their value political orientation (3.15), followed by supporters of the KDU-ČSL (Christian
Democrats - 3.00), ODS (Civic Democratic Party - 2.25), ČSSD (Social Democrats - 2.08) and
ODA (Civic Democratic Alliance - 1.47). The closest agreement between declared and value
based political orientations was among voters for the Communists (-0.16). While supporters of
the SPR-RSČ, KDU-ČSL, ODS, ČSSD and ODA saw themselves as further to the right than
their attitudes showed them to be, communist voters declared themselves to be on average further
to the left than their value-oriented political orientation showed.
21
These results correspond with findings from surveys carried out before the 1992 and 1996
parliamentary elections. These findings prove that there has been a clear crystallization of
attitudes among Czechs along the left-right axis and the process of linking perceptions of
economic and social problems with politics (see e.g. Večerník 1996c). The internal inconsistency
of political attitudes was greatest in 1990, but the situation has gradually changed ever since. The
marked conflict between rather left-wing socio-economic attitudes and right-wing voting was a
product of euphoria and liberal expectations in 1992. The political program of the right included
privatization, restitution, economic growth, a rising standard of living, etc., while the left
represented by Communist still bore the stigma of 1948-1989, and social democrats did not have
a great deal to offer. As reforms progressed and society became increasingly stratified, differing
economic interests began to shape both right-wing and left-wing political orientations, just as in
developed democracies. Both elections and subsequent developments in voting preferences in the
first half of 1997 have shown that this conflict between political "thinking" and actual voting
behavior is lessening, partly due to voters changing their positions and partly due to the changing
images of political parties.
3.3. Political Values of Voters for the Main Political Parties
The last issue which has to be examined on the basis of the analysis is the attitudes and values of
people voting for the main political parties. This is important both in itself and because it often
arises in debates in the media, although arguments used in these debates are only rarely based on
serious analyses of voters' values and attitudes.
With respect to the position of voters for the main political parties on the axis of declared
political orientation, the picture is largely the same as that provided by public opinion surveys.
Moving from left to right, the voters fall into the following order:18 KSČM (17.8), ČSSD (43.0),
SPR-RSČ (58.4), KDU-ČSL (65.8), ODA (67.7), ODS (75.7). Voters for parties not represented
in parliament fall between ČSSD and SPR-RSČ at a value of 51.4. The actual center of this scale
falls virtually on the center of the axis - the median of the ten-point scale is 6 and the mean is
6.03 (a mean of 55.3 on the hundred-point scale). Tests of the significance of differences
between voters for the various parties (by the Scheffe test) only showed statistically significant
18
The values given are those for the variable POLOR (on the declared scale of 1-10), transformed to a scale of 1-100
for purposes of comparison with other scales.
22
differences among four groups: voters of ODS, voters of ODA/KDU-ČSL/SPR-RSČ, voters of
ČSSD, and finally KSČM voters.
Figure 10
Position of voters for the parliamentary parties in the political space defined by the two main
axes organising voters' politically relevant values
The dimensions are represented by the variables LR and LA (factors scores)
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
KSČM
0.2
Authoritarianism Libertarianisms
17% of explained
variance
SPR-RSČ
ČSSD
KDU-ČSL
0
ODS
-0.2
ODA
-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
-1
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Left - Right
osystr_a.prs
30% of explained variance
Source: ISSP 1996 (SoÚ, STEM)
A different picture emerges from the analysis of the typical positioning of voters on the value
based (indirectly measured) scale of left-right political orientation. On this objective scale the
voters of the six parties represented in parliament fall into virtually the same order as on the
declared left-right scale, but they are much closer together: KSČM (24.0), ČSSD (24.0), SPRRSČ (27.7), KDU-ČSL (35.5), ODS (51.6), ODA (52.4). Voters for parties not represented in
parliament fell between the KDU-ČSL and ODS (31.3). Compared with the scale of declared
political orientations, the actual center of the scale is shifted further to the left: median lies at the
value of 4, with the mean of the scale at 3.92. The results of the Scheffe test show that only ODS
and ODA voters (between whom there is no statistically significant difference) differ from voters
23
for other parties, which - using the commonly accepted level of statistical significance (a= 0.05) do not differ from one another.
On the libertarianism-authoritarianism scale, ODA voters proved the most liberal, followed
by voters for ODS, KDU-ČSL, parties outside parliament, SPR-RSČ and ČSSD in that order,
with KSČM voters being the closest to authoritarian values. The center of the liberalauthoritarian dimension lay close to the authoritarian end (the median lay at 8 on the ten-point
scale with the mean at 7.34, or 68.3 on the hundred-point scale). The test of the significance of
differences between voters for different parties showed that leanings towards either liberal or
authoritarian values divided voters into two groups, those for ODA and ODS on the one hand,
and those for other parties on the other.
The typical position of voters for parliamentary parties in the two-dimensional space defined
by the dominant political orientations, as shown in Figure 10, provides considerable support for
the intuitive understanding of the profiles of voters for these parties. First and foremost, it
clarifies the nature of the so-called right-wing extremists - voters for the SPR-RSČ. This party is
undoubtedly close to the right-wing ideological extreme of fascism, but both its voters' values
and their declared political orientations place them rather in the center of the left-right scale.
When taken together with their authoritarian tendencies, it shows them to be extremists of the
center, of the type discussed by Lipset (1981)19. This extremism of the center is linked primarily
with small business people, for whom the shift towards extremist movements and parties of the
center is a reaction to the development of modern capitalism, to increased competition due to the
reduced importance of state borders, and to the development of international trade. This leads
them to demand a fixed order and strong laws aimed primarily against nationalities, ethnic
groups or races, etc. Many of these features can also be seen in Czech extremists of the center.
The political elites of the centrist extremists breach law and order, call for the Czech Republic to
isolate itself, reject conciliation with Germany, indulge in populist public appearances, and
appeal in their platform to owners of small businesses.
19
Lipset wrote that the commonly used way of categorising players on the political scene in terms of the left-right
dimension simplifies political reality. Both democratic and extremist parties, groups and ideologies can, according
to Lipset, be classified independently in this dimension in the same way. Extremism is therefore classified as
follows: of the left - communism, of the centre - fascism, of the right - conservative extremism. Fascism is classified
as central (a classic fascism) and left-wing (e.g. Peronism).
24
The distribution of voters in the political space created by the two axes corresponds to the
politically relevant values dividing the voters for the Czech political parties. The liberalconservative Civic parties lie in the quadrant of economic20 and non-economic liberalism, while
voters for the left-wing parties - the ČSSD and KSČM, together with the SPR-RSČ - are in the
area of (left-wing) economic paternalism and authoritarian non-economic values. Voters for the
Christian Democratic party, like their party in the actual political scene, are consistently in the
center of this space.
The connection between voters and their position in the political space confirms the relation
between the left-right dimension and libertarianism-authoritarianism. It is clear that Kitschelt's
hypothesis - that in the Czech Republic the values of economic liberalism go hand in hand with
those of non-economic liberalism, and those of economic paternalism with authoritarianism - is
valid both for the voters and for the parties. Lipset (1981) says that non-economic liberalism
which consists in the defense of civic freedoms and internationalism is not purely left-wing. The
left is more authoritarian, more extreme, less inclined towards democracy, more xenophobic and
less tolerant of deviations, while according to Lipset, conservatives are more liberal in these
respects. In view of the period in which Lipset was studying the political scene, it can be
assumed that he was talking of the old left and right. The definitions of the left and right in
western countries today have been modified. It is now the left that is seen as liberal,
cosmopolitan, inclined towards civic society, multi-culturalism, and so on. The new left is
opposed to the market, but in non-economic matters it is liberal, while the new right defends the
market but is authoritarian. Regardless of the values that the western left and right proclaim
today, the Czech left and right are closer to the old left and right. Kitschelt's hypothesis that the
Czech Republic will have more political parties and voters in the space of economic and noneconomic liberalism can be said to have been partly proven. Even if this area includes only voters
for the two Civic parties, while the others are situated more towards economic anti-liberalism
and authoritarianism, the former are by no means insignificant in numbers.
4. Conclusion
In a democracy, political values vary according to a person’s position on the left-right scale. In
the Czech Republic in 1995, politically relevant values and attitudes were more closely related to
20
Economic liberalism is here used as a synonym for right-wing orientation.
25
the declared position on the left-right dimension than was so in 1991. It shows that the content of
the left-right political orientations has been taking shape even though the distribution of voters
on the subjective left-right dimension remained stable.
The difference between declared political orientation and that based on socio-economic values
is undoubtedly influenced by a whole range of non-economic values linked with the political left
and right in this country, many of which were not included in our analysis. Nevertheless,
comparing the declared left-right political orientation with the value-based left-right political
orientations, we find that the latter are situated more towards the left, showing that a significant
part of the society that declares liberalism has not in fact internalized the values of economic
liberalism. Even among people declaring right-wing political orientation there is a strong
inclination towards state paternalism, redistribution, etc. Though at the outset of the
transformation the liberal model of the economy was apparently accepted, the spirit of liberal
society has not prevailed and that of the paternalist society is still secure.
The difference between the deeply rooted objective values and the superficial subjective
values is explained by the process of changing socio-economic values, which is under way at
present. In the euphoria of the immediate post-revolutionary period people welcomed right-wing
ideas and the ideas of economic liberalism, even though their deeply rooted political orientations
were in fact more towards the left. An important role was played by the small income and
property inequality inherited from the 1980's, the coming restitution, privatization, rhetoric about
the success of the market, expectations of economic growth, the flood of western goods,
expectations of high incomes, and experience of collective action. At the beginning of the 1990's
there were only slight differences between the opinions of the right and the left, and it was
difficult to identify variation in opinions along the left-right dimension. The situation gradually
changed, however. As major reforms were introduced and gradually implemented, and the
society approached a calmer state with the everyday problems of a democratic capitalist country,
many people who originally declared right-wing orientations moved more towards the left.
Emphasis shifted from common values and goals towards the economically and socially based
class interests (Matějů and Řeháková 1997). Left-wing voters began to move more and more
away from those on the right, and the contrast was greatest between voters for the Civic parties
and those for the left wing. Crystallization of value based left-wing orientations seems to be
faster than the same process on the right side of the spectrum, which prepares the way for a
victory of the left.
26
The libertarianism-authoritarianism axis of the political space is weaker among the voters than
the left-right axis, even though it has a certain significance for the political elite (Brokl 1996).
The relative unimportance of the libertarianism-authoritarianism dimension and the lack of
evidence as to other structural cleavages in Czech society raise the question of whether there are
in fact any political issues or structural cleavages which may link the left and right and blunt the
political conflict. The fact that this dimension, and perhaps even other structural cleavages, does
not bring the left and right closer together can be seen in the severity of the political conflict in
everyday life.
The joined analyses of the value-based left-right dimension and of libertarianismauthoritarianism showed that the biggest difference lay between the supporters of the two liberalconservative parties (ODS and ODA) and the supporters of the other parliamentary parties. These
results showed that the Czech political field is becoming well structured in terms of both socioeconomic and non-economic values (civic freedom). The main cleavage seems to be, however,
one-dimensional, because what is basically a two-dimensional political space is being
transformed into a significant one-dimensional political conflict. The one-dimensional nature of
such a conflict generally leads to a difficult political struggle for voters because the results of
elections in a society with polarized values are often very frustrating for those whose
representatives are the losers. Frustration with election results is often linked with perception of
the winning opponents as a threat - the non-economic program accompanying an unacceptable
economic program cannot be satisfying, and vice versa.
There is no empirical evidence about the degree to which political parties are conscious of the
polarization of values in the society, but the means and strategies of the political competition
show that many politicians are in fact aware of this and base their propaganda on it, which in turn
intensifies the feelings in the society. The marked polarization of society became evident in both
parliamentary elections held in 1996, where the public leaned towards the two poles of the ČSSD
and ODS, which embody the two opposing ideologies and approaches to political problems21.
21
The sharp contrast between these political opponents became acute in discussions on the budget, on economic and
social policy (budget deficit, cuts, selective subsidies, import taxes, benefits, state housing construction), foreign
trade (protectionism or not), law and order (attack on economic crime and the definition of business risk), entry to
NATO (entry or not, referendum), the rights of the individual (property rights, restitution of church property), etc.
27
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29
Appendix
A. Questions on declared political orientations
a) The wording of the question that used a verbally defined five point scale:
The terms "left" and "right" are often used in politics. Where would you place yourself? (show
card). The categories on the show-card: 1=Extreme left, 2= Left, 3=Centre, 4=Right, 5=Extreme
right
b) The wording of the question that used a visual ten-point scale:
And now could you try and show your position by putting a cross on the following scale.
LEFT
RIGHT
B. Definition of the variables EQUAL and MERIT
The variables representing norms of distributive justice were extracted by factor analysis. The
same battery of variables that was analyzed elsewhere by confirmatory factor analysis (Kluegel
and Matějů 1995, Matějů 1997a,c) was used here to be analyzed by the exploratory method of
factor analysis. Only two variables were added: SOCIAL and MARKET.
The results of factor analysis are shown in Table B1. Although for the analysis of the
development of relationship between norms of distributive justice and declared political
orientation between 1991 and 1995 it is better to use variables defined in the same way (the
requirement of the same protocols of measurement), the table shows both the results of the
analysis for each year separately, and the results of the analysis performed on pooled 1991 and
1995 data. The results are interesting from the point of view of the questions discussed in this
article. The factor analysis confirms the conclusion reached by Matějů (1997a,c), i.e. that the
beliefs about distributive justice cannot be arranged on a single continuum moving from
egalitarian to meritocratic principles. Egalitarian and meritocratic principles represent two
specific, though interrelated, norms of distributive justice.
Comparison of the factor structures for 1991 and 1995 reveal interesting differences. The
comparison on the explained variances shows that the egalitarian principle (EQUAL) is much
more crystallized in a compact distributive ideology than is the meritocratic principle (MERIT).
The overall variance explained by both factors (41%) has not changed between 1991 and 1995.
While the proportion of the variance explained by the factor EQUAL increased, that of the factor
MERIT fell. What actually happened is clear from the factor structures: egalitarians leaned
significantly away from the principles of justice typical of meritocrats (WORK, KEARN) and
also from the market (MARKET). The process was similar for the dimension MERIT, although
less pronounced. For the sake of comparability for some tests, both samples were reduced to the
same size - 792 respondents.
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Table B1
Factor Analyses of the Norms of Distributive Justice
Principal Component Method, Oblique Factor Rotation (OBLIMIN)
Variable
Factors for 1991
EQUAL
MERIT
Factors for 1995
EQUAL
MERIT
Factors for both years
EQUAL
MERIT
EQSHR
WNEED
PAYFAM
SOCIAL
0.634
0.555
0.640
0.366
-0.189
0.121
-0.103
-0.466
0.697
0.529
0.656
0.566
-0.013
0.248
0.149
-0.289
0.657
0.559
0.667
0.408
-0.161
0.122
-0.023
-0.460
WORKH
KEARN
PASSW
MARKET
0.520
-0.070
0.108
-0.281
0.590
0.645
0.623
0.516
0.190
-0.353
0.020
-0.461
0.685
0.551
0.624
0.302
0.430
-0.142
0.118
-0.278
0.617
0.636
0.598
0.494
Variance (%)
20.2
N(1991) = N(1995) = 792
21.2
24.1
17.7
20.6
20.5
Variables used for the analysis:
EQSHR
The fairest way of distributing wealth and income would be to give everyone
equal share.
WNEED
The most important thing is that people get what they need, even if this
means allocating money from those who have earned more than they need.
PAYFM
The size of the family which the employee supports. (Degree of agreement
with this alternative in answering the question ”How much influence should
each of these factors have in determining the level of pay for an employee?”)
SOCIAL
People have different views about socialism. Based on your experience in
COUNTRY of socialism, would you say that you are very much in favor,
somewhat in favor, neither for nor against, somewhat against, or totally
against socialism?
WORKH
People who work hard deserve to earn more than those who do not.
KEARN
People are entitled to keep what they have earned - even if this means some
people will be wealthier than others.
PASSW
People are entitled to pass on their wealth to their children.
MARKET
A free market economy is essential to our economic development.
For variable PAYFAM the following four point scale was used: 1=a great deal, 2=some, 3=not
much, 4=none. Variables EQSHR, WNEED, WORKH, KEARN, PASSW, and MARKET were
measured on this five point scale: 1=strongly agree, 2=somewhat agree, 3=neither agree nor
disagree, 4=somewhat disagree, 5=strongly disagree. Variable SOCIAL was measured on the
following five point scale: 1=very much in favor of socialism, 2=somewhat in favor socialism,
31
3=neither for nor against, 4=somewhat against, 5=totally against. For the purpose of analysis, the
original scales for MARKET and SOCIAL were reversed so that a higher value indicated a
leaning towards market economy and socialism.
C. Definition of the variable STAT
Table C1
Factor Analysis of Demands for the Role of the State
Principal Component Method
Factor for
1991
Factor for
1995
Factor for both
years
STLIV
LIMIT
EMPLO
0.692
0.693
0.779
0.714
0.703
0.784
0.704
0.698
0.782
Variance (%)
52.3
54.0
53.4
Variables used for analysis:
STLIV
The government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living.
LIMIT
The government should place an upper limit on the amount of money any one
person can make.
EMPLO
The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one.
A five-point scale was used (1=strongly agree, 2=somewhat agree, 3=neither agree nor disagree,
4=somewhat disagree, 5=strongly disagree).
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D. Selected correlations between the variables EQUAL, MERIT, STAT and declared
position on the left-right scale (POLOR)
Table D1
Correlation between the Factors EQUAL, MERIT and STAT and Declared Political Orientation
(POLOR)
Correlations
1991
r
INEQ * POLOR
INCRAT * POLOR
ROVNO * MERIT
ROVNO * POLOR
MERIT * POLOR
STATE * ROVNO
STATE * MERIT
STATE * POLOR
0.103
0.002
-0.088
-0.247
0.302
0.516
-0.198
-0.216
1995
r
p
0.007
0.970
0.018
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.252
0.091
-0.146
-0.338
0.359
0.554
-0.256
-0.290
p
0.000
0.020
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
E. Definition of the value based (indirectly measured) dimensions of the political spectrum
(variables LR, LA)
REDIS
The government should redistribute income from the better off to those who
are less well off.
BUSIN
Big business benefits at the expense of workers.
SHARE
Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth.
RIGHT
There is one law for the rich and one for the poor.
MANAG
The management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the
chance.
REDING
The government should be responsible for reducing differences between the
rich and the poor.
PROTMEET
People should be allowed to organize protest meetings against the
government.
PROTMAR
People should be allowed to organize protest marches and demonstrations.
TRADVAL
Young people today do not have enough respect for traditional values.
DEATH
For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence.
AUTHOR
Schools should teach children to obey authority.
OBELAW
Laws should always be obeyed even if a particular law is wrong.
CENZOR
Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards.
SENTEN
People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences.
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A four-point scale was used: 1=strongly agree, 2=somewhat agree, 3=somewhat disagree,
4=strongly disagree. For the analyses, some scales were modified so that agreement with the
statement in question always indicated a position on the left-right axis (a higher value indicated a
position "further to the right") and on the authoritarian-liberal axis (a higher value indicates a
more "authoritarian" stance).
All the above variables entered in the factor analysis. Initial results show that the items
OBEYLAW and CENZOR, PROTMEET and PROTMAR form independent factors. As the
fourth extracted factor had the eigenvalue 1.00, the factor analysis was repeated by setting the
minimum eigenvalue for the extraction of factors at 1.1. This minimum eigenvalue was intended
to eliminate weak factors. In the second analysis three factors were extracted. The items
PROTMEET and PROTMAR formed an independent factor and did not have a statistically
significant correlation with the first and second extracted factors, which represented the left-right
and libertarianism-authoritarianism dimensions. All variables except REDINQ, PROTMEET and
PROTMAR were used in the third analysis. REDINQ was left in the set of variables creating the
scale STAT. The third factor analysis showed that the analyzed items form two political
dimensions relating to socio-economic values and the order of values in society (Table E4). One
of these dimensions can be termed LR (left-right) and the second LA (libertarianismauthoritarianism).
Table E1
Factor Analysis of Political Values, Resulting Matrix.
Principal Component Method, VARIMAX Rotation
Variable
Factors
LR
REDIS
BUSIN
SHARE
RIGHT
MANAG
LA
0.670
0.837
0.825
0.759
0.731
0.106
0.123
0.155
-0.024
0.129
TRADVAL
DEATH
AUTHOR
OBEYLAW
CENZOR
SENTEN
0.220
0.371
0.130
-0.159
0.290
0.249
0.534
0.424
0.688
0.515
0.390
0.622
Variance (%)
29.5
16.5
34
The Crystallization of Political Attitudes
and Political Spectrum in the Czech Republic
Petr Matějů
Klára Vlachová
Working papers of the research project „Social Trends„
WPST 9/1997
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