Science, Respect for Nature, and Human Welfare
Hugh Lacey
Swarthmore College (USA)/Universidade de São Paulo (Brazil)1
How should scientific research be conducted so as to ensure that nature is respected, its regenerative powers not further undermined and restored wherever possible, and the well being of
everyone everywhere enhanced?
This question often provokes the response: If one is committed to the values of respecting nature and enhancing human well being, shouldn’t one be questioning the uses to which
scientific knowledge is actually put, and the interests they serve, rather than the conduct of scientific research? For, does not scientific knowledge belong to the shared patrimony of humanity, not specifically to the service of interests shaped by particular values? Obviously there are
important ethically relevant questions about the uses of scientific knoweldge. As the argument
unfolds, nevertheless, it will become clear why the question about the conduct of research is of
fundamental importance. Then, after addressing this question, I will briefly consider two other
questions: How might research, conducted in this way, have impact on – and depend on –
strengthening democratic values and practices? And, what is thereby implied for the responsibilities of scientists today?
1.Context
1.1 Scientific knowledge as belonging to the shared patrimony of humankind?
I do not disregard the ideal that scientific knowledge be considered part of the common
patrimony of humankind. An enormous stock of reliable knowledge and understanding of phenomena of the world has been gained in modern science, and much of it has been used to inform countless applications in technology, medicine and other areas. These applications, which
are widely valued positively, have contributed greatly to fundamentally transform the world we
live in, as a consequence of enhancing human powers to act and to solve problems that hitherto
had remained intractable.
The context in which my questions are posed is that this ideal is apparently being rendered obselete by leading tendencies in the conduct of scientific research today. These tendencies link research closely with technoscientific innovation, so much so that, for many, science
has become identified with technoscience (see §3.1), This, in turn, has enabled the growth of
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science in the private interest (Krimsky 2003), research funded by, oriented to and conducted in
partnership with commercial interests, supplemented by public sources that require scientific
research to be integrated with national economic development priorities and thus to emphasize
technoscientific innovations (and such related matters as obtaining patents to discoveries) that
fit with these priorities.
These tendencies reinforce certain features of modern scientific developments, which,
in virtue of having made possible the technoscientific progress that today is integral to economic growth, have contributed causally to the current environmental crisis with its often devastating social aspects. But they have not, at the same time, produced knowledge that would be adequate deal with this crisis; moreover, the benefits of technoscientific progress have not been
distributed evenly among rich and poor – worse, under prevailing socioeconomic conditions,
many poor people have suffered greatly, materially and socially, as a consequence of this progress. This has weakened key democratic values – in particular respect for human rights and the
capacity of citizens to assume active, responsible, participatory roles in shaping the practices
that address their basic necessities (Shrader–Frechette 2007).
1.2 Objectivity, neutrality and autonomy
The ideal that scientific knowledge is part of the shared patrimony of humankind has
been central to the self-understanding of the modern scientific tradition and, socially, it has
been accorded widespread credibility. The sources of that credibility, however, are being weakened with the rise of science in the private interest (see §5). I take these sources to be rooted in
what have seemed to be convincing claims, first, that the practices of scientific research, the
activities by means of which scientific knowledge and understanding are gained and applied,
embody certain values – objectivity, neutrality and autonomy – and, second, that it is proper to
appraise the conduct of science in terms of how well it embodies these values and that, most of
the time, it is in indeed appraised in these terms.
I will now offer brief analyses of these values. (See Lacey 1999; 2005a; 2008a for detailed discussion). First, objectivity: a hypothesis becomes accepted as scientific knowledge, or
a theory as well confirmed, only when it is judged to be well supported by available empirical
evidence in the light of strict cognitive criteria that do not reflect particular ethical or social
values, and only after it has been tested in the course of an appropriate rigorous program of empirical (often experimental) research that also thoroughly tests competing hypotheses.
Secondly, neutrality: every viable ethical/social value outlook gives rise to practices
that can be informed by some items of the stock of objectively established scientific
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knowledge; and, in principle, scientific results (considered as a whole) do not support some
viable value outlooks at the expense of others, or private interests or the interests of power at
the expense of public interests, either by way of their logical implications or of their consequences on application. Note that I interpret neutrality in terms of inclusivity and evenhandedness, not of detachment, and as applying to scientific results considered as a totality, not to each
scientific result considered in isolation. Neutrality, combined with objectivity, provides the key
to endorsing the view that scientific knowledge belongs to the common patrimony of humanity.
The third value is autonomy: scientific practices and institutions are (should be) free
from external interference and the disproportionate influence of any particular value (ethical,
political, ideological, religious, economic, metaphysical, etc) outlook. Specifically: (1) Issues
concerning proper scientific methodology and the (objective) criteria for the evaluation of scientific knowledge lie outside of the purview of ethical (political, religious etc) judgments, personal interests (for wealth, fame, etc) and preferences, and considerations pertaining to applicability and commerce. They should be resolved in the course of deliberation on the aims of scientific activity and the characteristics of the objects of investigation – and scientists themselves
should have the ‘final say’. (2) Individual scientists should have autonomy to choose their own
research agendas – from a set of options framed by priorities determined by scientific institutions, but within a context where the priorities of research, for the scientific enterprise as a
whole, are not shaped disproportionately by a particular value outlook. (3) Scientific institutions should be constituted so as to resist external interference with pursuing the aims of science, in particular the aim of consolidating more theories, of more domains of phenomena, that
enable objectivity and neutrality to be more fully expressed. This includes interference from
goverments or corporations to limit public access to scientific results in certain areas. Autonomy is held a values of scientific practices and institutions for the sake of furthering objectivity
and neutrality.2
1.3 The authority of science
Is it still pertinent today to appraise the conduct of science in terms of how well it embodies objectivity, neutrality and autonomy? Or, in view of the tendencies referred to in §1.1,
has scientific knowledge now become largely at the service of special powerful interests, reflective of the values of capital and the market, with not so much conscious concern for respecting
nature and with universal human well-being, or democratic values such as human rights and the
active, responsible, deliberative participation of citizens in the activities that are engaged in for
meeting their needs? These questions begin to point to why I wish to question the conduct of
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scientific reseach , and not just to look at the uses to which scientific knowledge is put.
Let me elaborate a little more. Science has gained enormous prestige and authority in
the contemporary world. Great hopes are shared that it will continue to provide new knowledge
to underlie new technological and medical innovations. Today, confidence in other kinds of authority has dramatically declined. Religious authority more and more is dismissed as a relic of
the unenlightened past and its fundamentalist forms ridiculed when they take issue with theories considered well confirmed by mainstream scientists. And political authority is widely seen
as the repository of special interests doing what they want to do for the sake of their own power
and influence, playing loose with the truth when that is expedient. In contrast, scientific authority is widely seen as something that can be counted on; if scientific evidence, as certified by
scientific authorities, supports a claim, then that’s the closest we can get to reliable knowledge.
Scientific authority needs to be well exercised if it is to maintain the prestige that it has gained
and to justify the confidence placed in it, and to preserve the ideal of scientific knowledge as
belonging to the patrimony of humankind; and its being well exercised – I suggest – requires
being properly attentive to the values of objectivity, autonomy and neutrality.
I speak of objectivity, autonomy and neutrality as values – aspirations or ideals to be
further realized in scientific practices, ideals for appraising the conduct and results of scientific
practices, which are often closely approximated, but also not infrequently departed from. Results published in scientific journals, and accepted by regulatory authorities, do not always accord with objectivity and, e.g., drugs may be released for the market without having been submitted to testing (both for their efficacy and their potential risks) properly guided by the norms
of objectivity (see the series of articles in The New York Times, ‘The Evidence Gap’, the latest
of which is Berenson, 2008). Autonomy has always been a tenuous matter, for science needs
outside support at the same time that it wants to reject outside interference, so that – especially
concerning research priorities and accessibility to scientific knowledge, autonomy has often
been subordinated to outside interests, whether they be of the military to ‘classify’ certain information, or corporations to keep it ‘confidential’ for the sake of protecting their ‘intellectual
property’. And, science’s causal contribution to the environmental crisis and its priorities
skewed away from the needs of the poor point to limitations of neutrality, accentuated by the
entrenchment of science in the private interest. However, these phenomena show only that neutrality is not well manifested in currently-practiced science, not that – in principle – it cannot
serve as a regulative ideal of scientific practices. It just shows that science does not always live
up to its ideals – what person or institution does? It would be premature to conclude from this,
as some ‘postmodernist’ critics of science do, that the values represent only illusory ideals
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drawing attention away from the reality that scientific practices are linked with special interests.
1.4 The scientific ethos
Lapses from ideals need not indicate lack of commitment to them, if efforts are made to
understand why they occur and steps are taken to avoid them. Often it is said that the steps
should include the cultivation by individual scientists of the the scientific ethos, a set of personal virtues, including honesty, disinterestedness, forthrightness in recognizing the achievements
of others and opening one’s own contribution to their critical scrutiny, and courage to seek for
the fullest array of empirical evidence and to follow it wherever it may lead, accepting theories
and knowledge claims only when they are in accordance with objectivity (Merton, 1957; Mariconda & Lacey, 2001). To be sure, appeal to the scientific ethos has often been dismissed as
naïve, and the sources of objectivity and neutrality are held to be located, not in the virtues cultivated by individual scientists, but in the structured practices of scientific institutions, which
enable solid manifestations of these values to emerge from the clashing interplay of individual
scientists responding to their own self-interests. Be that as it may, today the scientific ethos has
fallen upon hard times as, increasingly, certain types of scientific knowledge are closed to public access and private-interest research often rejects open criticism and public accountability.
2. The responsibilities of scientists
The scientific tradition has often endorsed a myopic view of the responsibility of scientists that
sees the environmental and social crises, and the inequity in distribution of scientific-derived
benefits, as lying outside of their responsibility, qua scientists, and only being part of their responsibility, qua citizens. The crises and inequity, it says, are consequences of how scientific
knowledge is used, not of how research is conducted.3 Moreover, concerning applied science, it
sees the scientist’s sole responsibility, qua scientist, as providing objective knowledge that may
inform applications. How the knowledge is actually used, since outside of their power, is outside of their responsibilities, qua scientists, including when it is not put to use evenhandedly
across value outlooks, e.g., when it is used to serve the interests of big corporations or the military, at the expense, e.g., of a sustainable environment or the interests of poor peoples and their
movements (or of the bearers of other values in play in a democratic society). This viewpoint
fails to recognize that scientists (and their institutions and organizations) should be the ones
primarily responsible for determining the priorities of scientific research. It is part of their responsibility, I suggest, to make sure that, when scientific knowledge is applied, all knowledge
relevant to an application is generated and considered; and, when it is not, to insist on the need
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for more research – or (at least) not to lend the authority of science to proposals about which
objectively confirmed judgments cannot be made in the light of available evidence (see §5.1).
Two kinds of questions are involved when applying scientific knowledge (Lacey
2005a; 2006a; 2008b,c,d): efficacy – will it work? And legitimacy – is it legitimate to apply it in
the conditions of proposed application? Deliberations about legitimacy involve ethical value
judgments. They also need the input of knowledge, concerning (e.g.) harmful side-effects, equitable sharing of benefits, and comparison with alternative methods for reaching comparable
ends. Scientific institutions, however, have lagged in efforts to investigate these matters, and
prioritized questions of efficacy. Although understanding the environmental crisis must take
into account the economic interests associated with technoscientific innovation (and their role
in the uses of technoscientific knowledge), it is incomplete unless it also recognizes as a factor
that scientific knowledge, which could inform questions about legitimacy, is underdeveloped.
This is not just a matter of the uses to which scientific knowledge has been put. Scientists do
have responsibility for this knowledge being underdeveloped. Thus, in failing to exercise proper responsibility for the research priorities adopted, they share responsibility for the fact that the
conduct and outcomes of scientific research actually serve very well the values of capital and
the market, but not so well those of environmental sustainability and social justice (Lacey,
2008c). The question, posed at the outset of the article, is a response to this departure from neutrality that marks the conduct of present-day science.
Before attempting to answer that question, we need to consider another one: Why have
scientists (and their institutions and organizations) tended to prioritize investigations pertaining
to efficacy more than legitimacy? It is not because risks, alternative practices, etc (ecological
and social phenomena) are outside of the purview of scientific inquiry. The scientific tradition
has long claimed that all phenomena are within its purview – and, while priorities have to be
chosen, the tradition maintains that the choices made overall should be in accordance with autonomy, and so lead to strengthening the manifestation of the value of neutrality. One answer
might be simply that scientists have been coopted to serve predominnt economic interests. No
doubt this is true in some cases. Generally, however, there is a more fundamental consideration
involved, one having to do with scientific methodology. Throughout the modern scientific tradition, one kind of methodological approach has been followed virtually exclusively (and this has
reinforced the myopic view of the responsibilities of scientists), one properly used in research
that pursues technoscientific innovations, but not adequate for investigating key issues connected with legitimacy, such as risks and certain types of alternatives. Although the tradition insists
that, in principle, no phenomena lie outside of the compass of scientific investigation, in fact –
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we will see – many of the phenomena pertinent to issues about legitimacy lie outside of what
can be grasped under this methodological limitation. Decisions about research priorities, and
commitment to the view that the limited methodological approach is somehow essential to science, go hand in hand.
3. Research strategies
To get at what is involved it is helpful to think of a methodological approach as defined by the
adoption of what I have called a strategy (for elaboration of the ideas introduced in this and the
next paragraph, see Lacey 1999, 2005a, 2008a,b), whose principal roles, in summary, are: to
constrain the kinds of hypotheses that may be entertained in a research project, specifying the
kinds of possibilities that may be explored and conceptual resources that may be deployed; and
to provide criteria for selecting the kinds of empirical data that acceptable theories should fit.
The approach, privileged throughout modern science (end of §2), I call the decontextualized approach. It incorporates strategies under which admissible theories are constrained so
that they can represent phenomena and encapsulate their possibilities in terms that reflect their
lawfulness, thus in terms of their being generable from underlying structures and their components, process and interactions, and the laws that govern them. Representing phenomena in this
way decontextualizes them, by dissociating them from any place they may have in relation to
social arrangements, human lives and experience, from any link with human agency, value and
sensory qualities, and from whatever possibilities they may gain in virtue of their places in particular social, human and ecological contexts. Complementing these constraints on admissible
theories, empirical data are selected, and reported using descriptive categories that are generally
quantitative, and applicable in virtue of measurement, instrumental and experimental operations.
3.1 Scientific research, technoscience, methodological pluralism
I take scientific research to be systematic empirical inquiry, held to the commonly accepted standards for empirical testing (objectivity), conducted under strategies that are apt for
gaining knowledge and understanding of the kind of objects being investigated. This does not
imply that the decontextualized approach is essential for scientific research. It is consistent with
methodological pluralism, that adequate research on some objects has to be conducted under
strategies that are not reducible to those that fit into the decontextualized approach.
Adopting the decontextualized approach, of course, does enable a great deal of scientific knowledge to be obtained – of appropriate objects, those that can be grasped in terms of
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the generative power of their underlying structure, process, interaction and law, including the
knowledge that underlies technoscientific innovations and explains the technical efficacy of
their operations. But there is no good reason to hold that all objects can be grasped in this way.
In order to gain systematic, empirically-based knowledge of some objects (e.g. phenomena of
human agency and social history) approaches that cannot be reduced to those that fit into the
decontextualized approach may have to be used. Moreover, such approaches can be successfully used to gain results that accord with objectivity. In addition to results of the human and social
sciences (Lacey & Schwartz 1996), in several publications (Lacey 2005a; 2006a) I have used
the case of agroecology (see below, §4.2, 4.3) to illustrate this fact. Therefore, not only does the
aim of science not imply adopting the decontextualized approach, but also it may be well
served by research conducted using different methodologies.
Technoscience refers to the complex intertwining of science and technology common
today that, where it occurs, renders any distinction of the two largely arbitrary. It incorporates
research practices conducted within the decontextualized approach that either directly aim for
innovative applications or keep the horizon of technological innovation in view and often produce results that inform innovations and explain their efficacy, and/or whose conduct is dependent on deploying advanced technoscientific products (instruments, experimental apparatus). In the latter case, while the research may aim to gain understanding of certain phenomena (usually products of experimental interventions) without heed to potential applications, fulfilling its aim depends on the successful pursuit of technoscientific aims. Technoscience often
advances by innovating (creating new instruments and modes of interacting with objects that
hitherto had eluded our capacity to act upon or even to observe) for the sake of conducting
more technoscientific reseach and, in doing so, it may come to investigate phenomena or objects that are brought into being by the operation of technoscientific products. Technoscience
aims to augment our power to observe (measure) and intervene in the world - expanding our
powers into more domains, the very small, the molecular biological, to overcome communication barriers, to go to new places -- it seeks to understand simultaneously what is intervened
upon and the instruments of intervention.
Science is not reducible to technoscience, for the latter does not encompass all the
strategies under which objectively confirmed knowledge may be obtained – in particular, those
that permit empirical investigation that integrally takes into account the ecological, experiential,
social and cultural dimensions of phenomena and practices. Without methodological pluralism
science cannot hope to deal with all the issues, which are open to empirical inquiry, pertinent to
deliberations about the legitimacy of technoscientific innovations.
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4. Technoscientific innovation: the case of transgenics
I have said that giving priority to research pertaining to technoscientific innovation, and attending less to its environmental and social impact, is fundamentally connected with according a
privileged place to the decontextualized approach in scientific research. To illustrate this, I will
discuss a particular case, the research and development of transgenic plants (GMOs) for use as
agricultural crops (I summarize in §4 a detailed argument made in Lacey (2005a, Part II; 2006a;
for a generalization of these remarks that applies to technoscience in general, see Lacey 2008c).
Research on transgenics is conducted under molecular biological and biotechnologicaal
strategies that fit into the decontextualized approach. It (for the most part exemplifying science
in the private interest) has produced numerous objective results, e.g., about efficacious methods
to produce and use soybean plants resistant to the herbicide glyphosate. Being efficacious, however, does not imply that transgenics should be used, or that their widespread use is legitimate,
or that a central role should be given them in national and international agricultural policies –
for they may have little ethical and social value, where interests connected with certain forms of
farming (e.g., agroecological and organic) are prominent (see below §4.3). What role transgenics should or can legitimately play in future agriculture, and in what countries and environments, cannot be adequately addressed without being informed by investigations pertaining to
the following questions pertaining to alternatives and risks. (Other relevant questions include
those about benefits, and who reaps them and under what conditions.)
4.1 Alternatives
What agricultural methods,4 and in what combinations and with what variations, could
be sustainable and sufficiently productive, when accompanied by viable distribution methods,
to meet the food and nutritional needs of the whole world’s population for the foreseeable future? Elaborating: Are there alternatives (appropriately varied and combined) with productive
capacity at least as great as that of transgenics methods? Are there alternatives that can meet
food and nutrition needs in contexts (e.g., small farms in impoverished regions) where transgenics methods may have little applicability? Do transgenics methods themselves really have
the potential to play a major role – sustainably – in meeting the worlds food and nutrition
needs? What evidence supports the proposed answers?
Transgenics were introduced, not in response to a scientific consensus, reached after
addressing these questions, that they were needed, but because of the interests of agribusiness
and benefits that its clients valued. Instead, the research initially addressed questions such as:
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What traits can be engineered into plants? Which ones can be commercially exploited? And
later, responsing to concerns about neutrality, when taken up by research institutes with ‘humanitarian’ goals: How can the results of transgenics research be used to deal with the problems
of small-scale farmers (e.g., production in poor agroecosystems) and their communities (e.g.,
hunger and malnutrition) in impoverished countries? They simply took for granted that transgenics, being exemplary technoscientific innovations, would have a significant role in dealing
with these problems, although the expectation that such humanitarian goals can be satisfied using transgenics has no basis in sound empirical or theoretical studies. Furthermore, when considering the legitimacy of using transgenics, these questions are not appropriate substitutes for
those in the previous paragraph, either for scientific research or deliberations about public policy.
4.2 Risks
What are the potential risks incurred by the various alternatives? What are the direct
risks to human health and the environment connected with chemical, biochemical and physical
mechanisms, that can be quantified and their probabilities estimated, the ones that can be investigated in standard ‘risk assessments’, empirical analyses conducted within the decontextualized approach, which are usually of short duration? There may be risks (connected with these
mechanisms), however, that will only become apparent in the long term – potential harmful
effects to human health, to the environment, to the maintenance of biodiversity, and to the
preservation, regeneration and creation of sustainable, productive agro-ecosystems. Also, what
are the indirect risks that arise because of socioeconomic mechanisms: e.g., in the case of the
widespread use of transgenics, long-term environmental risks that arise because most transgenics are not only biological objects, but also commodities, intricately entangled in issues of intellectual property rights, or risks to social arrangements that arise from the actual context of their
use, including risks of undermining alternative forms of farming, and (hence) risks occasioned
because extensively using transgenics serves to bring the world’s food supply increasingly under the control of a few corporations, with potential consequences like those manifest in the
current worldwide food crisis.
There is general agreement that transgenics varieties should not be released for commercial use unless they has passed sufficient risk assessment tests. My immediate issue, however, is not the extent and reliability of tests for direct risks, but their adequacy even if exhaustively carried out – for the ‘should’ question also needs the input of assessments of indirect
risks. Here important methodological issues arise for, in order to investigate indirect risks, con-
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ceptual resources are needed that are not available to standard risk assessments, which are conducted within the decontextualized approach. Transgenics are biological objects, open to (e.g.)
genomic and molecular biological investigation conducted under strategies that fit into the decontextualized approach. They are also socioeconomic objects, those actually in use mostly
commodities or otherwise enmeshed in intellectual property rights claims, and most of them
would not exist if they were not such objects. (Remember, transgenic seeds that grow into
plants resistant to glyphosate are marketed as “RoundUp Ready”.) Risks may be occasioned by
using transgenics in virtue of their biological properties and in virtue of their being socioeconomic objects. All are pertinent to the ‘should’ question, and all raise questions for scientific
investigation (§3.1).
However, as indicated above (in §3), it has been common throughout the modern scientific tradition effectively to identify scientific research with research conducted within the decontextualized approach. But, when that identification is made, there is no ‘scientific’ reason to
think that science could provide understanding of all the phenomena pertinent to the ‘should’
question, for indirect risks cannot be investigated when one dissociates from ecological and
social context. Moreover, it tends to obscure that there are forms of systematic empirical inquiry, not encompassed by the decontextualized approach, that can produce results that satisfy
the norms of objectivity – in agroecology, e.g., in which agroecosystems are investigated with
respect to how they fare in the light of the desiderata: productivity, sustainability (ecological
integrity and preservation of biodiversity), social health, and strengthening of local people’s
agency – with a view to discovering the conditions under which the desiderata may or may not
be actualized in appropriate balance.5 The multi- and inter-disciplinary research strategies of
agroecology are well suited for investigating the indirect risks and long-term uncertainties of
transgenics, qua components of agroecological systems that also contain capital-intensive enterprises and the international market system.
4.3 ‘No risks’ and ‘no alternatives’
Proponents of using transgenics regularly affirm, ‘the transgenics that have been marketed, having passed sufficient risk assessment tests, provided that they are used according to
well designed and enforced regulations, pose no serious risks in use’. I’ll abbreviate this, ‘no
risk’. It often obtains backing from the authority of science (see §5.1). But ‘no risk’ is not well
supported by scientific evidence, for indirect risks have been largely ignored in research that
has been conducted – and scientific support for it does not follow simply from lack of strong
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scientific support for ‘there are risks’ for, if such support is lacking, it might be due to the failure to have conducted adequate research.
Also, it is important to recognize that ‘no risk’ gains its full force only when paired
with ‘no alternatives’, i.e., ‘there are no alternative forms of farming that could displace the
anticipated major role for transgenics in meeting the world’s food and nutrition needs.’ If ‘no
alternatives’ is true, then ethically – since it is clearly unacceptable to risk putting the world’s
food supply at risk – there should be greater tolerance for the less momentous risks that may be
occasioned by using transgenics. Issues about risks and alternatives are, thus, intricately interlinked. Moreover, as in the case of ‘no risk’, the absence of evidence for alternatives is evidence for ‘no alternatives’ only if the relevant investigation has been conducted. I believe that a
compelling case has been made for the significant productive potential of agroecology. Yet,
those who affirm ‘no alternatives’ seldom attempt to rebut the empirical record and theoretical
arguments about agroecology. If they refer to it at all, they tend to be content to point to its current marginal role in producing for the market of foodstuffs and its ‘pre-scientific’ origins, ignoring that it does contribute to meeting the food and nutrition needs of many who are bypassed
by capital-intensive methods of agricultural production and distribution. Without devoting significant resources to research in agroecology, and expanding its use, we cannot find out definitively what its potential might be, and – given its promise of benefits for the poor and lack of
many of the alleged risks of transgenics – it is worth finding this out. (Agroecology provides an
example of the conduct of research that is directly responsive to the values of respecting nature
and promoting human welfare.) Moreover, unless there is reason to endorse that, if comparable
resources were put into research and development of agroecology (and other alternatives ) it
could not match the productive potential of using transgenics, it should be treated as a relevant
alternative in the ‘should’ argument. Unless research and development of agroecology is vastly
increased, claims of ‘no alternatives’, and hence of ‘no risk’, will continue to lack adequate evidential support, and the authority of science will be misused when it is put behind them.
Despite this, it is unsurprising that so little attention is paid to (and resources provided
for) research and development of agroecology. In the scientific mainstream, the grip of the view
that scientific research requires adoption of the decontextulaized approach is very strong, and
this suggests that agroecological research (as well as research on indirect risks) is devoid of
scientific credentials, not ‘real science’, often said to be little more than ideologically-laden
opinion or wishful thinking; and certainly it does not build so much on the ‘scientific capital’
(Bordieu 2004) that is accumulated and passed on in most university science departments. This
attitude gains reinforcement from the growth of science in the private interest. The institutions
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of capital and the market have an interest in the legitimacy of implementing such technoscientific innovations as transgenics, and thus in the public acceptance of ‘no risk’ and ‘no alternatives’. Scientific evidence accruing against these propositions would not serve their interests,
and agroecology does not rest easily with the projects of large-scale agribusiness; and so a view
of science that does not recognize the scientific credentials of research that might (not necessarily will) produce that evidence serves them just fine. The decontextualized approach provides the methodologies for science in the private-interest. Its role, however, can extend beyond
doing this (and traditionally has done so6), but not so far as to encompass investigation of phenomena – e.g., indirect risks and alternatives – where context is integral to the phenomena. Today, however, the view that the decontextualized approach is integral to science reinforces, and
is reinforced by, dominant economic interests. Together, by hindering the recognition of the
scientific credentials of relevant research, they put crucial types of challenges to ‘no risk’ and
‘no alternatives’ effectively outside of the purview of scientific research. Nevertheless, this research is appropriate and necessary to grasp the key phenomena in question, indirect risks and
agricultural alternatives.
5. The ‘commercial-scientific ‘ethos’
Science in the private interest’ (§1.1) is fundamentally shaped by the mutually reinforcing interplay of the view that science is identical to technoscience (or, at least, that the decontextualized approach is essential to science), and the deep embodiment in social institutions of the values of capital and the market; and its goal is market-oriented technoscientific innovation or,
perhaps, ‘the commodification of knowledge for profit’ (Krimsky 2003: p. xiii). Its rapid
growth, brought about because increasingly scientific research is dependent on the private sector for its funding, is nurturing among professional scientists and their institutions a new ethos
(Krimsky 2003; Garcia 2007) that I will call the commercial-scientific ethos.
It is rooted in considering the value of science principally in terms of its capacity to
generate technoscientific innovations that contribute to economic growth and other economic
objectives of national or international bodies. (These include dealing with problems relating to
health, hunger, etc.) Where it is influential, objects of research are treated, or chosen, in the
light of the strictures of a methodology (the decontextualized approach), rather than methodologies being designed so as to be adequate for grasping the phenomena to be investigated. And it
is taken for granted that ‘science’ (i.e., science using decontextualized methodologies) can deal
adequately with any questions regarding efficacy and legitimacy that are open to empirical investigation – e.g., that ‘scientific’ investigation of risks is exhausted by ‘risk assessments’
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(§4.2). However, it could not be a ‘scientific’ conclusion that these matters can be dealt with in
this way. Throughout the scientific tradition, the link of science with materialist metaphysics
(that all phenomena can be articulated and explained within the decontextualized approach)
implicitly grounded the conclusion. For those who embrace the commercial-scientific ethos, the
ground, again implicit, is rather that only ‘scientific’ research (so defined) serves the interests of
capital and the market.7 Commercial interests influence strongly what is considered to be proper methodology, and objects of research are chosen often largely for commercial reasons (cf.
Krimsky 2003: 78).
5.1 Features of the commercial-scientific ethos
I will now attempt to identify some of the features of the commercial-scientific ethos.
Clearly my formulations are open to refinement, criticism, additions, and further discussion.
1. The value of gaining understanding of phenomena of the world is subordinated to expanding our knowledge of what we can do, of how we can expand our powers to exercise
control over objects, especially insofar as they can contribute to economic growth and
other interests of leading commercial bodies.
2. An interconnected set of ethical stances is taken for granted.
(a)The implementation of technoscientific innovations, prima facie, is considered to be
legitimate, i.e., normally (subject to rebuttal) it is without any ethical impediments. Research appears to be overshadowed by an unstated, taken for granted, ethical principle
somewhat like this: ‘Normally, unless currently available risk assessments confirm that
there are serious risks, it is legitimate to implement – without delay – efficacious applications of objectively confirmed technoscientific knowledge, and even to tolerate a measure
of social and environmental disruption for its sake’. I will call this the principle of the legitimacy of technoscientific innovations.
(b)It is virtually an ethical imperative to prioritize (decontextualized) scientific ‘solutions’ for the big problems of the world, e.g., malnutrition in poor countries and intractable diseases – and for any harmfuls effects of technoscientific innovations (e.g., environmental damage) that may occur.
(c)It tends to be seen as an ethical failing to cast doubt on the potential or the legitimacy
of research and development that may lead to such ‘solutions’.
I have never seen a principle of this kind explicitly stated by proponents of science in
the private interest. Nevertheless, that it is in play implicitly serves to explain, among other
things, the normal casual disregard of risks (insofar as they cannot be dealt with in risk assessments) and alternative practices; the assertion that regulation of technoscientific innovation
should be ‘science-based’, and should only be introduced when positive evidence is at hand that
1
harm is being caused; and, more generally, prioritizing research that can lead to technoscientific
innovation.
Concerning the claim that risk analysis should be ‘science-based’, it is important to
recognize, of course, that scientific inquiry (guided by the norms of objectivity) is essential to
risk appraisal. But this should not disguise the fact that risk analysis necessarily involves value
judgments at a number of levels. ‘Risk’ is a value-contested term that has no place in theories
and knowledge claims investigated within the decontextualized approach. What are investigated
in risk assessments are potential effects that have previously been labelled ‘risks’. Value judgments are involved in (1) this labelling; (2) deciding which of these potential effects should be
submitted to risk assessments; (3) determining what stance to adopt towards possibly unforeseen, unforeseeable or currently unquantifiable, and possibly irreversible effects; (4) defining
what standards should be adopted in error analysis (Lacey, 2005b and references there). The
claim, ‘there are no serious risks’, is always implicated in value judgments of at least these four
kinds.
Furthermore, combined with the ethical imperative, the principle legitimates (in research aiming to find such solutions) dissociating from the socioeconomic causal nexus of the
problem, and not taking into account research and development on alternatives, e.g., agroecology, which locate solutions within the socioeconomic causal nexus of the problem. These are
considered irrelevant, not ‘scientific’, because they do not meet the strictures of the decontextualized approach.
3. Research is conducted, dissociating from the fact that objects of ‘scientific’ research
may also be socioeconomic objects that, qua such, may have biological and physical effects. Qua objects of research, it is irrelevant that they may also be enmeshed in claims of
intellectual property and, prima facie, no ethical impropriety is involved in patenting discoveries or promoting them in business endeavors.
4. Scientific and commercial objectives are intermeshed, and the implicit conflict of interest, thereby created, is seen as something to be managed well, not necessarily to be
avoided.
These items lie behind the increasingly common phenomenon of research priorities being chosen in the light of expected opportunities for taking out patents or for being able to profit from
one’s research, and of university research institutes promoting the ‘virtues’ of business knowhow, grantsmanship, and publicity skills – ‘the successful scientist today is the person who can
make contributions to the advancement of knowledge while concomitantly participating in the
conversion of new knowledge into marketable products’ (Krimsky, 2003: 1–2).8 Nevertheless,
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when an object is intellectual property, its use is curtailed and knowledge about it is held ‘confidential’ and effectively privatized, so that the neutrality (as well as autonomy) of science is
put into question, and scientists can be tempted to be complicit in permitting commercial to
trump scientific interests, especially when the promise of future discoveries is heralded (for the
sake of cultivating funding sources), and when issues of risks and alternatives are discussed.
5. The autonomy of individual scientists is prized, where it is understood to be the absence of external constraints on the choices of scientists to do whatever research (within
the decontextualized approach) they want to do, under whatever auspices they choose and
under whatever conditions they choose to accept (consistent with the law). Scientific institutions should be constituted so as to enhance funding resources for (decontextualized)
research, for strengthening the influence of science in society (e.g., finding more places
for the employment of highly trained scientists), and to resist external interference to scientists being able to conduct research (and teach) autonomously in this way.
Traditionally, autonomy was seen primarily as a value of scientific practices and institutions, that they be free of external interference and the dominance of any particular value outlook, pertaining to individual scientists principally as participants in autonomous scientific
practices. (Autonomy was held as a value for the sake of the furtherance of objectivity and neutrality, §1.1.) Modern individualist autonomony is different. It legitimates individual choices to
engage in research under corporate auspices, even if this involves corporate-determined research priorities and other restrictions (e.g., agreements about ‘confidentiality’ of empirical
data), i.e., extra-scientific interference with research. This autonomy, thus, is not for the sake of
neutrality, but for the self interest of scientists, allied with the interests that prioritize economic
growth. Science in the private interest expects this autonomy to be recognized in scientific institutions and universities that educate scientists, as well as by public funding bodies – so that
scientists are free to do just as they would like, if funding is available (competively) for them to
do so. The desired autonomy, however, is to do whatever ‘scientific’ (decontextulaized) research one wants to do, free from (unwanted) ethical constraints from society; it does not extend to doing research under strategies that do not fit into the decontextualized approach (for
that is ‘not science’), or even to some research on topics of ‘public interest’ (e.g., effects of pollution of specific industrial sites – Shrader-Frechette, 2007) that can be researched within the
decontextualized approach. Autonomous individuals (in this sense of ‘autonomy’) can bring it
about that scientific practices become subject to external interference; they are not autonomous
in the traditional sense, since the general agenda that frames research is shaped by outside values, those of capital and the market. This conclusion remains intact, even if it is true that today
funding for scientific research would be seriously affected negatively if the science-commerce
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alliance were not cultivated. Linked with this, we increasingly find the mentality coming to the
fore, not of humility in face of the vast unknown combined with confident resolve to encroach
into it, but the arrogance associated with wealth and power, going breathlessly ahead unimpeded by precaution and modesty, and preparedness to do research wherever the money and influence may be.
5.2 Consequences of the commercial-scientific ethos
Here are some of the consequences of the influence of the commercial-scientific ethos.
In the first place, the objectivity of science is compromised. Krimsky demonstrates, in connection with some research conducted within the decontextualized approach that ‘... commercial
links in biomedical sciences have been predatory and destructive of scientific objectivity and
openness’ (Krimsky, 2003: x). Standards of evidence are weakened, evidence is ignored, and
outright fraud may occur, for the sake of commercial gain.9
In the second place, limiting scientific research to the constraints of the decontextualized approach further compromises objectivity, even when there may be no explicit conflict of
interest, and discredits the authority of science. Scientific authorities sometimes put their
weight behind dubious claims that cannot be adequately addressed within the limitations of the
decontextualized approach – especially when it speaks about technoscientific innovation: its
risks, its promises, and alternatives to it. When they say that there is no scientific evidence that
supports ‘there are serious risks’ , e.g., they equivocate on the use of ‘scientific’ (ignoring
methodological pluralism), and mislead by insinuating that compelling scientific evidence supports ‘no risk’. When they say, e.g., that we are on the verge of solving the nutritional problems
of the poor in developing countries, it counts on its audience to assume that there is strong supporting evidence, although statements like this are not grounded on a analysis of the social
causes of the problem, and only express confidence in the possibilities of technoscientific innovation (or are part of rhetorical moves made in the quest for funding of research). And when
they affirm ‘no alternatives’, they comes perilously close to identifying this claim with ‘no alternatives within the trajectory of capital and the market’ (Lacey, 2005a: Section 10.6; 2006:
Section 5.6). In these situations, the discourse of science becomes hard to distinguish from the
rhetoric of advertising or political campaigning, responsive to standards of effectiveness in
convincing the public, not to the ideal of objectivity.
Third, important questions of social significance are not posed. When considering a
technoscientific innovation, the question, “Which alternative, all things considered, is the best
alternative?”, (a generalization of the question about transgenics posed at the beginning of §4.1,
1
see Lacey 2008c), is not posed and developed, with variations depending on how “best” may be
thought of differently in the context of different locations and value perspectives. Today, with
the reduction of science to technoscience, the only alternatives entertained tend to be those that
could possibly be realized within the trajectory of currently dominant interests of capital and
the market. The question just stated is not a primary focus of scientific inquiry, but one subordinated to questions like: “What are the technoscientific options available, and which ones best
serves the interests of capital and the market?” and, afterwards (when taken up by institutions
with ‘humanitarian’ goals), “How can the chosen option be used to deal with problems in impoverished countries?” as if answers to the initial question are side-effects to answers to the
latter questions. But since answers to the latter questions do not provide answers to the initial
question (as exemplified in the transgenics case), because answering it depends on conducting
research under a variety of strategies not all of which fit into the decontextualized approach,
this means that it is not properly addressed. Then, threats to the world’s future food supplies,
e.g., could remain unknown (since not investigated) and not dealt with, and crucial possibilities
of great value to the poor and marginalized now are ignored. The current worldwide food crisis
should be thought about in this context. More generally, questions important for dealing with
issues of legitimacy are downplayed (since ‘not genuinely scientific’), with the result that applications are often implemented although their alleged legitimacy is based on inadequately
investigated presuppositions.
Fourth, neutrality and autonomy cease to be able to function as regulatory ideals, because the scientific results that are properly accepted (those that inform efficacy), despite their
accord with objectivity, on application serve commercial interests especially well, often to the
detriment of less-powerful interests; and, as discussed earlier, this is fostered by the trend of
both research priorities and the methodologies privileged in research to become subordinated to
commercial interests.
Fifth, institutions of scientific research (including leading universities) have significantly reduced their funding and support for projects that address many matters of significance for
the general public, especially social and environmental problems, and they tend to think of scientific practices and results themselves in commercialized terms, with profound implications
for the evaluation of scientific performance in many universities (Oliveira, 2009).
5.3 The commercial-scientific ethos and the modern scientific tradition
Not all components of the commercial-scientific ethos are new. Its emergence can be
seen as an outgrowth of tendencies always present in the modern scientific tradition. As I have
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already said, this tradition has tended to conduct research virtually exclusively within the decontextualized approach, and for many it is part of the nature of science to adopt the decontextualized approach. One does not need the new ethos for this. This approach has been preferred
because (I have argued in several writings Lacey, 1999, 2005a, 2008a,b) it bears mutually reinforcing relations with widely held values about the control of natural objects, especially the
value of expanding human capacity to exercise such control so that it penetrates into ever more
domains of human and social life. Today, commercial interests have become the main purveyor
of these values, values of technological progress (Lacey, 2008c), so that they tend to be interpreted in the light of their contribution to furthering the values of capital and the market. There
is no doubt that, fueled by the commercial-scientific ethos, there has been many discoveries
made by research conducted within the decontextualized approach, leading to countless technoscientific innovations. Moreover, this does not mean that research relevant to questions of legitimacy, which needs to be conducted under other strategies, is altogether ignored – e.g., lately
we are becoming aware of the vast body of knowledge available about global warming. But this
kind of research tends to be conducted after the fact, when a problem (caused by technoscientific innovations made under modern socioeconomic conditions) can no longer be ignored. It is
not forward looking.
So long as research on risks and alternatives is considered in scientific institutions only
marginally and conducted mainly when it cannot be avoided, the outcomes of research will
serve especially well commercial interests, often (but not always) at the expense of other interests. The commercial-scientific ethos does not consistently contribute to further the values of
objectivity, autonomy and neutrality, and often it undermines them.
Perhaps these three values should be considered outmoded? But then the authority of
science should not command universal respect. I do not think that it is an adequate to urge that
all pay heed to the traditional scientific ethos. The conditions for doing that have been eroded
and, in any case, it does not provide the direction needed to combat the predominance of the
commercial-scientific ethos for, where it is in play, neutrality tends to be thought of in terms of
detachment, rather that affirmatively in terms of inclusion and evenhandedness. To combat the
role that the values of capital and the market have assumed in scientific practices, the active
role of competing values needs to be included, for a detached attitude – not attending to how
scientific results are applied and whose interests they serve, and to how the conditions for research are provided, can easily provide a cloak to cover up shared values. (Then, one needs to
add to the virtues usually listed in the scientific ethos, the virtue of tolerance for the play of a
multiplicity of values and solidarity with the excluded.) Hence, I suggest that commitment to-
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day to objectivity, neutrality and autoomy requires taking seriously the question posed at the
outset of this article: ‘How should scientific research be conducted so as to ensure that nature is
respected, its regenerative powers not further undermined and restored wherever possible, and
the well being of everyone everywhere enhanced?’ Taking it seriously offers the possibility of
countering the influence of commercial interests – not that commercial interests can be excluded from science, but so that they should be put into balance with competing interests. Perhaps,
then, scientific research could proceed – in a balanced way worked out in the course of democratic dialogue involving scientists and representatives of the value outlooks that are viable in
the contemporary world – in the quest to gain understanding of significant phenomena of the
world we live in, as well as to discover novel ways to exercise control over natural objects and
to meet the needs of the world’s poor. My initial question cannot be taken seriously unless research approaches that do not fit into the decontextualized approach, like those deployed in
agroecology, are supported. While compatible with upholding a certain privilege for the decontextualized approach, a pluralism of methodological approaches would be required.
6. Challenging the commercial-scientific ethos
This brings us to the other questions that I raised at the outset. The second question is: ‘How
might research, conducted in this way [i.e., in response to the first question], have impact on –
and depend on – strengthening democratic values and practices?’ Among democratic values and
practices, I focus particularly on respect for human rights, and the capacity of citizens to assume active, responsible, participatory roles in shaping the practices that address their basic
necessities. This is a big question with complex ramifications. In this article I will only make
two comments.
6.1 Two components of the challenge
First, conducting such research depends on opposing the principle of legitimation of
technoscientific innovation (§5.1) that it part of the commercial-scientific ethos, and adopting
instead the Precautionary Principle, which proposes delays in the implementation of technoscientific innovations pending adequate research being conducted on the full array of risks (including indirect ones) and alternatives (COMEST; Lacey, 2006b). The Precautionary Principle
is inseparable from the general ethical stance that it is irresponsible to engage in the kind of
research that leads to technoscientific innovations, unless commensurate systematic and
rigorous research is also conducted on the long-term, often worldwide, ecological and social
consequences (risks) of implementing them (accompanied by long-term systematic monitoring
1
of the consequences), taking into account the socio-economic conditions of the planned
implementations, and unless adequate research, which takes into account the full array of
alternatives that might be considered valuable to the citizens of a society, pertinent to appraising
the general social value (benefits) of the implementations is conducted (Lacey, 2008c). The
Precautionary Principle poses no threats to objectivity, and it is more in line with the ideals of
neutrality and autonomy; and it is soundly rooted in democratic values and practices (Lacey,
2006b).
Second, research needs to be conducted in this way so that citizens can strive to protect
their human rights that are threatened by the harmful side-effects of technoscientific innovation
(Shrader-Frechette, 2007), and the persisting effects of earlier innovations, and reclaim their
own agency, and assume active, responsible, deliberative roles in the activities that deal with
their needs – in agriculture, e.g., it will give salience to research in agroecology.
6.2 Democratic values, technoscientific progress, and the responsibilities of scientists
The third question I posed at the outset, ‘What is thereby implied for the responsibilities of scientists today?’ may now be expanded as follows: What responsibilities do scientists
incur in the face of present-day science, by increasingly serving technoscientific progress oriented by the interests of capital and the market, becoming an accomplice in economic practices
that weaken democratic values?
My answer is that, first and foremost, their responsibility, qua scientists, is to act – as
worked out collectively in their institutions and organizations – according to the traditional regulative ideals of objectivity, neutrality and autonomy. I have maintained that exercising this responsibility today, when private-interest science is increasingly dominant, is furthered by adopting the Precautionary Principle and the ethical and social values embodied in it, and participatory democracy is usually listed among them. Scientists can exercise well their responsibilities,
qua democratic citizens, by first exercising well their responsibilities, qua scientists, and that is
furthered today by holding ethical and social values that contest those that are served by private-interest science, in which (when dealing with issues of legitimacy) the traditional values of
science are subordinated to the values of capital and the market. When scientists do not exercise
their responsibilities well, as they do not in private-interest science, there can be no sound objection in principle, based on the ‘autonomy’ of science, to citizens demanding roles in directing, monitoring and evaluating scientific projects, and determining the priorities for publicly
funded research, for democratic purposes.
1
Scientists cannot exercise their responsibilities unless appropriate social conditions are
available for them to do so, and the instituions of science today do not provide them. Hence,
exercising their responsibilities, qua scientists, involves participating in efforts to establish
these conditions. Such efforts would involve a very complex dialectic, that would require – cooperatively, simultaneously and in interaction – expanding successful achievements on each of
the following matters (and, no doubt, others):
1. Gaining space in current institutions (especially universities since they are not – yet! – totally
dominated by commercially related interests) in order to successfully conduct research in which
these responsibilities are recognized, no doubt now on a small scale, but in as many areas as
possible. (Agroecology is an example; other examples need to be identified for research in
medicine, energy, computers and information, communication, biotechnology, etc; and longterm research on environmental problems, global warming, etc) .
2. Steps towards strengthening autonomy (in the traditional, not the individualist sense) in research institutions. This means freeing them from the disproportionate influence of the values of
capital and the market in setting the priorities of scientific research and determining appropriate
methodologies, and from the interference derived from holding these values in the conduct of
science (e.g., via legal imposition of regimes of intellectual property rights). These steps are
proposed in order that research be conducted not only rigorously in the light of the ideal of objectivity, but also to strengthen neutrality by greater inclusion (and funding for the work) of investigators who do not embrace the commercial-scientific ethos and who pursue investigation
that can inform the interests nurtured by values that compete with those of capital and the market. Taking the steps would contribute to making results of scientific research available to serve
a growing array of interests and, for the sake of moving towards evenhandedness, it would give
priority to the interests of the poor and marginalized, and other interests (like redressing global
warming) that pertain to the viability of future human life.
3. More widespread adoption of the Precautionary Principle in research institutions, and incorporation of it in public science policies, so that technoscientific innovation becomes more subordinated to the values expressed in it, and the kinds of research on risks and alternatives,
which its use shows to be needed, are conducted more extensively.
4. The growth of – and active collaboration among – movements that aspire to democratic values, including the protection of human rights (the full range of economic/social/cultural as well
as civil/political rights recognized in the UN Declaration of Human Rights) and to strengthening of local people’s agency, enabling them to engage successfully in activities they have devised to embody these values more fully in their locales. (In this context I suggest paying special attention to the value of local and national food self-reliance.)
5. The expansion and improvement of practices that are informed by knowledge gained in the
research (referred to in item 1), so that interests from all value outlooks viably held in contemporary society are able to benefit from the input of scientific knowledge.
6. The growth of movements, institutions and programs in which researchers, practitioners and
citizens collaborate, including programs for educating citizens to be able to be intelligent participants in deliberations on science policy matters, and others for scientists to learn from citizens
1
what they consider the principal problems and interests that need to be addressed, how they
experience the problems and perceive the causal networks that bring about and maintain them.
7. Universities (and other educational institutions) developing appropriate forms of scientific
education, and designing and implementing schedules and conditions of work for their personnel (teachers, researchers, students), that are in tune with scientists exercising their responsibilities.
8. Development and enactment of appropriate public policies that reflect democratic values.
(Again, importance of food self-reliance.)
To some extent each of these matters can begin to be addressed independently of the
others, but fuller development would depend on interaction among them and, in the long run,
unless all of them are developed, each one of them will be curtailed. The conditions for scientists to exercise their responsibilities cannot be put in place without an extended struggle. I take
these eight matters to define points of entry into that struggle that can be pursued immediately.
Unless they are pursued, answers to the questions posed at the outset of this article will have no
impact of the conduct of scientific activities.
Article to be published in Portuguese in Scientiae Studia (São Paulo) in 2009.
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1
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Notes
1
Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania, USA and Pesquisador
Colaborador Estrangeiro no Projeto Temático: "Génese e significado da tecnciência: relações entre ciência, tecnologia e sociedade", Universidade de São Paulo, Brazil.
2
With respect to to ethical issues that may arise in connection with the use of specific experimental methods, I think that the autonomy of science should be qualified to admit subordination to judgments that are outcomes of appropriately structured democratic deliberations.
3
Scientists, qua scientists, generally acknowledge the responsibility to defend objectivity from
certain types of outside threats – acting against scientific fraud and experimental practices that grossly
violate common ethical norms, like the human rights of experimental subjects (Lacey 2008d), and against
attempts to supplement the criteria for appraising scientific judgments by political or religious imperatives (e.g., the Bush goverment’s interference with evidence about the human causes of global warming,
or religious-based criteria to challenge the theory of evolution).
1
E.g., ‘conventional’, transgenic, organic, agroecological, biodynamic, subsistence, etc. My argument depends on there being, not a single alternative, but a multiplicity of complementary locallyspecific alternatives – including agroecology (see below §4.2, 4.3) and the ‘system of rice intensification’
(Broad 2008) – that simultaneously are (a) highly productive of nutritious foodstuffs, environmentally
sustainable and protective of biodiversity, (b) more in tune with, and strengthening of, communities of
rural people and the variations of their aspirations with place and culture, (c) able to play an integral role
in producing the food necessary to feed the world’s growing population, and (d) particularly well suited
to ensure that rural populations in ‘developing’ countries are well fed and nourished.
Note that agroecology, and other alternatives, may deploy various biotechnological innovations.
My argument is not against technoscientific innovation per se, but about how to determine the legitimacy
of implementing and seaching for these innovations. It subordinates the value of technoscientific innovation to (e.g.) the values incorporated into the Precautionary Principle (§6.1).
5
For detailed accounts of agroecology, see Lacey (2005a: Ch. 10; 2006a: Ch. 5). In these works
numerous references – notably Altieri (1995) and EMBRAPA (2006) – are provided, including about
who the practioners of agroecology are, the evidence for its productive potential, and its special suitability for farming practices in poor regions of the world.
6
Since Bacon, Galileo and Descartes, gaining scientific knowledge has been seen as a source for
increasing human powers to exercise control (domination) over natural objects. However, perhaps the
most celebrated scientific achievements have little to do with the possibilities of practical control, and
have often dealt with phenomena that are clearly outside of human control (evolution of species, astronomical phenomena). With the growth of private interest science, however, the goal of technoscientific
innovation tends to frame the pursuit of scientific understanding.
7
Keep in mind, also, that there are strong connections between science in the private interest and
militarily related research.
8
This is reflected in the content of scientific journals. E.g., in Nature Biotechnology, a journal
that I consult regularly, significant attention is paid, not only to scientific research studies, but also to the
commercial prospects of biotechnological innovations. Occasionally, however, the journal does take an
editorial stand criticizing the priorities chosen in the light of corporate interests (Nature Biotechnology,
2004, 2008).
9
Carroll (2007–2008) in a series of contributions to the blog, ‘Health Care Renewal’, has documented, with case studies from psychopharmacology, some of the mechanisms – connected with interpretations of evidence, public presentations of results, and publication practices that include failures to
disclose conflicts of interest – whereby conflict of interest leads to scientific conduct that compromises
objectivity.
4
1