The Private Life of Chairman Mao – Li Zhisui
Pages 488-503 (268-265 in sourcebook)
Compiled by Cherry Miao
1 The doctor laments Mao’s growing distrust of him
o Mao interpreted not just opposition but also neutrality as suspicious
2 Doctor is excluded from a trip for the first time ever
o Suspects that this is due to Jiang Qing since Lin Biao is not savvy enough
o Mao was headed to Wuhan to mediate between opposing factions
3 With Mao gone, Jiang Qing was in control of Beijing  complete disorder at
Zhongnanhai, Mao’s retreat
o Students camped out outside of the compound to protest Liu Shaoqi and Wang
Dongxing’s troops were not active
o Cultural Revolution Small Group (CRSG) had announced struggle sessions to
general public
Liu Shaoqi is “struggled against” while troops refuse to intervene
Deng Xiaoping and Tao Zhu are also struggled against, but not as
violently
4 Impossible to report CRSG to Mao because they were increasingly powerful
o Wang Dongxing’s hands were also tied b/c Mao suspected him of ties w/ Liu
Shaoqi  could not appear to be allying w/ Liu
5 Doctor is flown out to Shanghai, where he finds Mao under very heavy guard
o Tells Mao about situation in Beijing, and Mao’s silence indicates discontent: Mao
later complains that the CRSG doesn’t listen to him
o Mao then goes to Wuhan, where his mediating skills are needed
CRSG had sent Wang Li to negotiate with Chen Zaidao, the leader of a
rebel faction, but Wang had been captured  Zhou sent to negotiate
Wang’s release
Mao welcomes arrival of people who swam to meet him on his island
retreat in Wuhan: indicates that he trusts in the respect the Chinese people
have for him
o Mao is sent back to Shanghai out of fears for his safety: Zhou stays to negotiate
and gets Wang released
6 When Mao returns to Wuhan, he does so in a celebratory style
o He tells the doctor that he thinks that the CRSG was at fault and that were no
counterrevolutionaries within the Wuhan factions
7 During Mao’s absence from Beijing, leftists continue to have control
o Jiang Qing, Wang Li, and Guan Feng organize the May 16 Rebels and attack
Marshal Chen Yi
Due to this, Mao has Wang Li and Guan Feng purged
o However, base of CRSG power laid with Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, and Jiang
Qing
Mao was clearly displeased w/ Jiang but did not stop her
8 Jiang Qing begins to attack the doctor
o Doctor’s wife had substantial ties to the west  Jiang orders investigation of her
and doctor
Case is turned over to Wang Dongxing, who assures Jiang that the doctor
is fine
o Calls on the doctor for dentistry services
Jiang and Wang are each other’s primary targets  Wang urges doctor to
perform services, although doctor suspects a trap
Upon treatment, Jiang accuses Dr. Li of poisoning her
 Mao is sent for and Wang Dongxing advises the doctor to hide out
under the protection of his troops
 Jiang sends the medicine for analysis by Ye Qun, Lin Biao’s wife,
and the medicine came from a garrison under Wang Dongxing’s
control  everyone was involved
o When Ye Qun reports nothing was wrong, Jiang is furious:
first signs of strain between Jiang and Lin
o Zhou Enlai is brought in and speaks to Mao about the
matter
o Mao says that doctor is not a counterrevolutionary, but does not actively protect
him: CRSG is still growing in power
9 Li is still in hiding when Mao announces that he wants Tsinghua and Beida under his
control and taken over by worker teams
o Students set up barricades to prevent entrance of workers and then launch an
attack
o Mao shows concern for Dr. Li’s wellbeing and invites the doctor to sit in on a
meeting with the leaders of the student groups at the Beijing colleges
Dr. Li’s presence at the meeting would indicate to CRSG that he was still
not to be attacked
10 Meeting with student leaders is not successful: student groups refuse to unite  Mao
decides that his faith in students had been misplaced
o Mao orders that students be sent down to the countryside so they could learn from
the peasants
o Sends mangoes to factories in Beijing: indicates that he is shifting focus and
support to workers
Let me know if you need any clarification or have questions. Feel free to email me at
cmiao@fas.
Miscellany of Mao Tse-Tung Thought pg. 469-478
-Dialogue with Red Guard Leaders (July 1698)
-People Present: Nie Yuan Zi (big character poster), Chairman Mao Ze Dong, Madame Jiang
Qing, Lin Biao, (Kuai Da Fu is missing/unwilling to come)
-Basically the Chairman wants to know what is going on with the Red Guards, why they are
in-fighting, he scolds them for missing the point and wasting their time/resources
-he identifies himself as the “black hand” who sent in the workers to suppress the
red guards
-tells the red guards that their numbers are so insignificant when compared to the
numbers and ability of the PLA
-tells leaders that they are not struggling nor criticizing nor transforming
-guards are only wasting time by engaging in armed struggle
-Mao tells Nie Yuan Zi to release those who are against her faction and tells her that it is better if
her faction leaves town so the fighting stops (basically Mao says the people/workers are getting
sick of you, you are no longer effective)
“We want cultural struggle, no armed struggle”
-Mao stresses unity of the red guards above all, then Lin Biao outlines 4 plans (which apparently
are ways in which the red guards could be improved)
1. Military Control
2. One divides into two
3. Follow steps of struggle-criticism-quit
4. Fight on big scale
-Mao then gives views on education---feels that 6-10 years of schooling is enough, all basic
courses are repetitious, much more can be learned out in the real world as a soldier or worker
-“no need to study literature, just go work and write novels about being a worker”
-Mao stresses the need for practicality and application in education, not the
useless philosophy
-Mao then uses himself, Stalin/Lenin/Engels, Lin Biao, Jiang Qing all as
examples of people who have succeeded without many years of schooling
-Mao expounds on how he doesn’t think law is very important either
-let people decide and cases are settled much more quickly
MacFarquhar 217-220 The Purge of Yang Chengwu and the suppression of the Red Guards
The purge of Yang Chengwu is highly important as it was one of the key determinants of a
domino-effect that ultimately caused Mao to disband the Red Guard
In March 1968, Mao decides to purge Yang Chengwu, who is acting Chief-of-Staff of the PLA at
this time
WHY Was Yang Purged? :
Yang’s purge was prototypical: caused by the division between radicals and conservatives in the
countryside, the conflict between Zhou Enlai and the Radical CRG and the tensions between
different field army factions of the PLA
Yang had gone with Mao to Wuhan, and had supported the conservative faction there and in
Shanxi and Hebei provinces as well.
Yang (and Fu Chongbi) took Zhou Enlai’s side in his disputes against the CRG and radical mass
movements
Yang sent soldiers to arrest Qi Benyu (radical) and to search the houses of the CRG
Yang served in a field army (the 5th division) that was in conflict with Lin Biao (the 4th division)
How Was Yang Purged? :
He was accused of supporting a second February Adverse Current, which was meant to protect
conservative forces
With Yang removed, Lin Biao was able to control the day-to-day actions of the armed forces
Yang’s removal was used to drum up support for greater radical mass organizations in the
countryside
Why Was Yang’s Purge Important? :
The increase in protest and factionalization caused by Yang’s purge (and other factors) fueled the
growing divide between the Red Guard radcial v. conservative “gangs”
This is when the movements in the countryside really began to fall apart – when the red guard
began to fight itself in a gang-like style and were killing each other with antiaircraft weapons and
other stole weapons that were swiped from trains on their way to help in Vietnam.
Due to this increase in faction violence (also, violence against civilians and especially anyone
deemed an intellectual, capitalist-roader or enemy of the party, which could have been anyone at
this point because the revolution was totally out of control) bodies began to float down river and
were discovered on the bays of Hong Kong, where the western media picked up on it.
It was the extreme violence at Qinghua university that finally caused Mao to disband the
RedGuard.
Mao called the student leaders of the RG in BJ, and told Kuai Dafu that he was the “black hand”
suppressing the RG. This happened July 28, 1968
By the end of 1970 Mao sends millions of young people to the countryside, and to the far reaches
of China. Few return.
Mao starts the CR on a new course, suggesting that “The Working Class must exercise
leadership in everything”
Final Summary:
Yang’s purge was representative of how and why so many honest party members were purged,
due to political factionalization, inter-army conflict and support of the “wrong” groups in the
countryside
Yang’s purge stirred greater violence and factionalization in the countryside, which increased
the already-ridiculous level of RG terror throughout the country. The dead are so many, that the
West takes notice
Mao feels like the violence has become chaotic and meaningless, and so he disbands the Red
Guard, and sends over 5 million students to the countryside by 1970
Zhang, Yusheng
A True Account of Maojiawan
Summary pages 11-41
Zhang’s work as secretary
August 1966 – Zhang was appointed Lin Biao’s secretary.
He felt he was under qualified for the position (or at least he was being modest).
His appointment came as a complete surprise to him.
The qualifications for choosing a secretary for Lin Biao included, among other things, having
previously served in Lin Biao’s army, no connections to high-ranking cadres in Beijing, good
education but not high-ranking cadre, and good family background (worker-peasant-soldier)
Zhang started as Lin Biao’s secretary at the peak of the Cultural Revolution (CR)
One of his main jobs was to summarize the hundreds of documents Lin Biao received each day.
Description of Lin Biao’s eccentric behavior
Zhang describes Lin Biao’s frail physical and mental health. E.g. He hated being exposed to
wind or light. He complained that many things made him “perspire”. Once when Zhang
addressed him, he lit several matches in a row and smelled them. When he addressed large
crowds, he needed to be given injections (of what is unknown). After he stumbled over his
words in a speech, his wife threatened Zhang that if it happened again he’d be blamed for
“political destruction” by giving Lin Biao too many sleeping pills (which he never gave him).
He might have been addicted to morphine after taking it for battle wounds in the past.
Lin Biao’s family life
Zhang talks about how he was put in charge of helping to find spouses for Lin Biao’s son and
daughter.
His wife, Ye Qun, wanted to build a library. She especially liked books with conspiratorial
plots.
Ye Qun herself had a few enemies, especially Lu Dingyi and his wife Yan Weibing, who had
insulted her.
The Red Guard movement in the military colleges
We usually hear about the colleges and universities being active in the Red Guard movement, but
the military colleges were also active. Lin Biao supported the revolutionary students at the
military schools, but told them not to make violence like the Red Guards at universities, because
they should be model students.
However, the revolutionary military students did cause some trouble for the military
commanders, though not nearly to the extent that university students attacked their professors.
Zhang believes that Mao approved the “Eight point order” to give the military more authority
(and punishing anyone who attacked the military) because: It would allow the military to control
chaos at the local level. Even if the situation became extremely chaotic, it would mean the
eventual control of that chaos could be more sweeping.
Mao said those who attack military leaders should be criticized and educated rather than
punished or attacked.
Lin Biao was reticent on many political matters (perhaps this is how he survived
politically?)
There was a conference where Marshal Ye and others denounced Jiang Qing and others, saying
that they were claiming to speak for Mao. Lin Biao didn’t go to the conference, and he didn’t
express much of an opinion on it.
There were several confrontations between the activists and troops where the crackdown was
fierce, several activists killed. Lin Biao also didn’t seem to show much of an opinion.
Tension within the Politburo
In the Politburo, there was discontent that the revolution was focusing too much on “the masses”
and not about the current leaders, that people like Kaui Dafu were using talk of “the masses” to
throw out senior Party officials and gain power for themselves. Chen Boda and Jiang Qing were
also blamed by name.
Lin Biao and the Wuhan Incident
Wuhan Incident: The “One Million Heroes”, a conservative group, assaulted and kidnapped
Wang Li and Xie Fuzhi, members of the cultural revolution group, in Wuhan. Mao was also in
Wuhan at the time, suggesting they were also after Mao. Zhou Enlai went to Wuhan himself to
remove Mao from the area.
Ye Qun (Lin Biao’s wife) was much more vocal in denouncing the One Million Heroes than Lin
Biao was.
With Lin Biao’s support, the leftists became even more vicious after the Wuhan Incident. There
was also a great deal of political pressure on the conservative faction in other areas besides
Wuhan.
The slogan “Pull Out a Small Handful in the Army” was popular among the radical leftists
Lin Biao’s speech about the CR
On August 9 Lin Biao gave a speech where he said the victory of the CR depended on two
things: (1) “the grand breadth of spirit and great reputation of Chairman Mao”, (2) The existence
of the PLA
Mao eventually showed his denouncement of the radical left by having Wang Li, Guan Feng,
and Qi Benyu arrested.
FC48 Final Reading Summary
Zhang Yunshen, “A True Account of Maojiawan” pg. 42-74
Lusi Fang
Lin Biao’s Plots against other senior leaders:
1 Plot against Marshall He Long
o On August 25, 1966, Big Character posters were put up to attach Marshall He
Long, the chief of the headquarters
o Song was in charge of collecting “black materials’ against He Long.
o Lin Biao and Ye Qun seemed confident that He Long was plotting a power
seizure
o Lin Biao accused He Long of being overly ambitious. All were shocked by these
accusations.
o He Long met with Lin Biao. Mao’s orders were “First Criticize, Second
Protect.”
2 Opposition to Yang Chengwu
o Early 1968, there were indications of opposition against Yang Chengwu when Lin
Biao did not promote people that Yang proposed
o Yang’s crimes were: 1. “opposing Chairman Mao” 2. opposing Lin Biao; and 3.
opposing Wu Faxian;
o Ye Qun said the Chairman wanted to add three points to Lin Biao’s speech: 1.
oppose sectarianism; 2. oppose two faced actions; and 3. explain “relativity and
aboslutivity” from a philosophical POV
o While criticizing Yang, LB repeatedly praised Jiang Qing
o Decision of CC: remove Yang as acting chief-of-staff and appoint Huang
Yongsheng; accuse Yu Lijin as a “traitor” and arrest him; removal of Fu Chongbi
as commander of Beijing Military Region and appoint Wen Yucheng
3 Lin’s attitude toward the “February Adverse Current”
o Maojiawan and Diaoyutai collaborated to criticize the February Adverse Current
o Mao said not to name people specifically, criticize older comrades first but then
protect them, and appoint them as representatives to the 9th Party Congress on
condition that they keep in line
4 Conflict between Maojiawan and Diaoyutai
o Conflict over Huang Yongsheng’s visit abroad
LB supported Huang
JQ disliked Huang
At the end Huang got to go to Albania at Mao’s approval
o Wen Yucheng’s failure to be elected to the politburo
Maojiawen had promoted Wen, but suspected him due to rumors and
assumptions, and did not put him on the nominee list to the politburo even
though he was Presidium of the 9th Party Congress and a member of the
Central CR Group
Wen tried to please both sides
Lin realized too late that Wen was loyal to him
o Both sides understood that they could only maneuver within the limits set by Mao
o Everything was going smoothly for Maojiawen at the end of the 1960s
o LB suggested that Mao become President
o Both sides pretended to like each other. JQ paid respect to LB in publishing her
photograph right before the Sept. 13, 1971 incident where LB was killed
Lin Biao’s Efforts to Enhance China’s Military Capability
1 Hydrogen Bomb
o LB was not so enthusiastic at the success of China’s Hydrogen Bomb
2 Other military projects
o LB had a pet project to “Build up mountains” (dui shan). It was a construction
project that attempted to trap the enemy between two artificial mountains, but it
was a failure
3 “Order #1” (Oct. 1969)
o LB issued six orders to prepare for a possible attack from the Soviet under the
guise of on meeting in Beijing regarding border disputes
o Secretary suggested that 1. we get Mao’s approval first and 2. conditions around
nuclear division be specified to prevent an all out war, which Ye Qun took as her
own and gave to LB
LB’s attitude toward MZD and ZEL
4 Lin’s attitude toward MZD
o LB and YQ worshiped Mao
o LB said he had learned everything from Mao
o Whenever Lin went to Tiananmen, he would time it so that he would arrive just
on time, right after Mao
o Lin always carried Mao’s Quotations at rallies
o LB first used the word “qing” meaning please, but changed it to “cheng”, which
was used in feudal times when a subordinate submitted something to a superior
5 Lin’s effort to “promote” the Chairman
o Lin issued an order to ban all promotions of himself and have all propaganda
promote Mao. This included removing banners praising himself.
6 Conflict between Maojiawan and Mao
o A guard from Mao’s security, Han Qingyu, was sent to guard Maojiawan, which
made both sides very uncomfrotbale
o LB and YQ’s dairies indicate that they actually disagreed with Mao quite often,
but followed closely for their personal careers
o YQ because very modest and did not want a position in the politburo because JQ
was not going to be nominated and YQ didn’t feel her position to be secure
o YQ asked Lin Liguo to help her but in the end he did not follow her plan
7 LB’s attitude toward ZEL
o ZEL came up with the “Three Supports and Two Militairies” proposal and called
a meeting to have it approved
o LB felt like he wasn’t consulted first and was made a mere figurehead
o ZEL apologized and LB was going to return a letter but YQ told him to just call
8 LB’s reaction to the famous “open letter”
o An open letter was published that first praised the Party but then opposed the CR,
criticized the CRSG, LB, and Mao
o Only ZEL was openly praised
o The letter’s author was found out and arrested
Anatomy of an Inquisition: Cleansing the Class Ranks, 1968-1971: Part One
Andrew G. Walder
16 In 1968 there were massive hunts for “traitors” in China
o Chen Boda initiated the hunt in eastern Hebei, seizing and interrogating nearly
85,000 veteran party members
o Kang Sheng and Xie Fuzhi declared Zhao Jianmin, the party secretary of Yunnan,
was a secret agent
o In the end, over 340,000 people were seized and tortured to confess and implicate
others and 16,222 were murdered in the process
17 Pressure was put on everyone to name spies and to provide evidence of other people’s
crimes
18 Shan Kuizhang, a leader of the Changchun Optical Equipment Research Insistute decided
that the party’s policy was to struggle against intellectuals
19 The “cleanse the class ranks” campaign was most intensely prosecuted in remote rural
areas
20 Official investigators who compiled all the victims data in an effort to rehabilitate victims
were essentially unanimous in their judgment: the “crimes” of the traitors were all
imaginary
21 A Gap in Cultural Revolution Scholarship
o The purges and hunts were conducted mostly by authorities who held power
tenuously and mostly didn’t hold party or administrative positions
Had a resemblance to the persecution campaigns from the 1930s and on
o
Most scholarly accounts of the CR end with the suppression of RG in 1968 and
1969
The scholars found the most interesting things of the CR to be how the RG
and rebel organizations emerged so rapidly and grew so large
 CR was a window on the underlying social cleavages, identities
and dissatisfactions
 Factional cleavages in schools and workplaces were essentially a
measure of expression of underlying social cleavages
However, political movements of the CR didn’t end in 1968
 Four post-1968 “campaigns”
o “cleansing of the class ranks”
o “strike one, oppose three”
o campaign to oppose “May 16 elements”
o class relabelling campaign
o Mass organizations and factionalism as an expression of underlying group
interests and social divisions illuminates the social origins of the 66-67
movements, yet that doesn’t explain mass persecution of suspected enemies and
the political pogroms
22 Origins of the Cleansing Campaign
o If looking at the campaign from a functional perspective, it was a nationwide
effort to suppress factional struggles, restore political order and rebuild the
administration of party, government, schools and workplaces after the factional
warfare of the earlier struggles
High level cadres were suspected of traitorous activities against Mao and
socialism
 However, these cadres must have followers, so these persecutions
could be from the requests for local authorities to investigate
people implicated in a higher level case
Another route for the spread of the activities is from an official campaign
launched to create temporary leadership groups and stop factional violence
 Campaign first officially enunciated in a Renmin ribao editorial on
Jan. 1st, 1968 and further emphasized by a document issued in June
1968 by the CRG
 the CRG used a cleansing campaign at the Xinhua Printing Plant in
Beijing which united warring factions under a “great alliance”
against hidden enemies
o The plant had cadres who had served under the Japanese,
nationalists and Communists and “remnants of Nationalist
reactionaries” still occupied important posts
o The campaign at the plant set off a chain reaction of
factional struggles in which many cadres were purged
without substantial evidence
 The document sent a message that hidden enemies were burrowed
within revolutionary ranks and that there should be principled
restraint so it doesn’t go too far, but it was very ambivalent as to
what this meant. Also, those who were accused were presumed
guilty
23 Conduct of the Cleansing Campaign
o The cleansing campaign was intended by Beijing to restore order, defuse factional
conflict and build up destroyed administrative structures
In some areas, there was a very focused and highly organized search for a
small number of hidden enemies, which officials claim is what they
intended
However, in most areas it turned into a massive pogrom against people of
exploiting class background or a campaign of retribution and murder
against factional rivals
The campaign ended up going in directions unforeseen by the initiators
o In summer ’68, the local power holders who were responsible for cleansing the
local class ranks were varied since some provinces hadn’t consolidated control yet
Thus, many grass roots leadership committees were formed but included
members who were political enemies and received vague instructions
o The orders for the campaign were very vague and ambiguous as to who was the
real enemy
o People who had suspicious backgrounds were tortured and forced to make
confessions, which would cause more people to be suspected
24 Varieties of Victims
o Due to the broad and vague base of potential enemies, local campaigns escalated
to extraordinary proportions and it became unpredictable as to who would be
attacked
o Although a large proportion of the abused had backgrounds that had led them to
be attacked earlier, fake and imaginary accusations were made to many cadres
who had served the party well
o Categories of those that were attacked:
Underground Conspiratorial Organizations – former Nationalists who
stayed after 1949 and underground communist party members in cities
during the war
Local Nationalist Spy Networks – organizations that contained many
people who had former connections to the Nationalists, as well as
enterprises that had been established by the Nationalists
 Traitorous Guerilla Veterans and Underground Party Operatives – leaders
who formerly were part of the party’s underground networks in Nationalist
or Japanese held areas
Suspicious Overseas Ties – people who had relatives and who dealt with
overseas Chinese affairs
Settling Factional Scores – Factional conflicts
Settling Personal Scores – Personal grudges were used to implicate
people. Some of these grudges had their origins in earlier stages of the CR
Silencing Potential Accusers – People who were targeted for having
information about someone in authority that could prove politically
threatening
Those Who Spoke Up – People who openly criticized the thinking and
methods of radical Maoist leaders (Not only national, but local authorities)
Random Victims – people who were targeted by sheer chance
Anatomy of an Inquisition: Cleansing the Class Ranks, 1968-1971 (Andrew G. Walder)
Summarized by jeanyang@fas
(pp. 13-26—second half)
This article is about some of the brutality during the Cultural Revolution and gives lots of cases.
It also discusses the differences in violence between the Shanghai, Guandong/Guanxi, and Inner
Mongolia regions.
Those Who Spoke Up – speaking against the masses would make you a victim
1 After Deng Xiaoping’s ascendance to power in 1978, many people criticized Maoist
radical leaders  arrested and in many cases killed
2 Questioning of local leaders was also suicide
3 Cases
o Ma Mianzheng put up wallposter criticizing local power holders  he was shot
o Youth Ding Xiaozu criticized Mao worship campaigns  she and her
schoolmates were arrested and sentenced to long prison terms.
o High school teacher Cui Zhenlin wrote wallposters criticizing injustice of army
supporting one faction and opposing another  he was arrested and tortured by
his work unit and may have been murdered
o Zhang Zhixin, cadre who worked in provincial gov’t offices, became
disenchanted w/ factional struggles after her brother had been beaten for
accidentally cutting a corner off a Mao portrait, etc. She spoke out against Jiang
Qing and Lin Biao  was imprisoned and tortured and was shot after 5 years,
after having her throat cut to prevent her from shouting revolutionary slogans.
Random Victims - some people targeted b/c of misunderstandings, gossip, jealousy
4 Xu family – (false) rumor that daughter Xu Lianrong had affair with her fiance’s
brother—speculation that father had encouraged affair to buy political protection for
family. Xu father tortured, daughter forced to admit to affair. Family of 7 hung
themselves from rafters—during autopsy, Xu Lianrong was discovered to be a virgin
5 Medical staff in Suzhou launched blood drive—later accused of sucking blood of masses
for personal profit
6 Housewife caught using newspaper w/ Mao’s portrait for housecleaning was attacked
7 Xiao Jingyue who made comment about smoke from a kiln, saying “it would be better if
the wind shifted to the west,” was put under mass surveillance for 3 years
Variations across regions (SUMMARY OF REST)
8 Campaigns officially authorized and mandated from Beijing, although officials vague
about what punishments should be inflicted, how many people should be attacked, etc.
9 In Shanghai, campaign smaller in scope, more directed and monitored by city gov’t, and
involved less physical torture
10 In Guangzhou and Guangxi, cleansing was large, violent, and initially focused on recent
factional rivals
11 In Inner Mongolia, went on for 2 years despite early end of factional struggles
12 In many outlying rural regions, campaign escalated to “extraordinary heights”
Shanghai: Limited Traitor Hunt and Leadership Rectification
13 Shanghai different from other regions b/c from early stage of CR (2/1967), had municipal
leadership backed by Central Cultural Revolution Group (which included Zhang Chunqio
and Yao Wenyuan)
14 Factional rivalries only occurred in isolated “troubled” work units
15 City admin reformed as network of revolutionary committees composed of
“revolutionary cadres,” leading members of the rebel alliance “Workers Headquarters,”
and beginning 1967, members of armed forces; leader of Workers’ Headquarters Wang
Hongwen helped restore order and suppress rebel factions
16 Shanghai campaign serious but had none of tendencies of escalation and mass retribution
17 Distinctive feature—cleansing campaign served as instrument to rectify and discipline
revolutionary committees, part of city’s effort to consolidate gov’t disciplines
18 City authorities issued directives guiding campaign to make it less ferocious—campaign
should be conducted publicly w/ emphasis on verbal criticsm in mass meetings, strictly
forbidden to obtain confession by pressure, enemies should be treated leniently, etc.
19 Despite directives, first months of cleansing campaign were violent and vindictive in
work units where factional rivalries continued, and campaign moved to torture and
denunciations by end of 1968
20 One of primary tasks of workers propaganda teams was to reign in on excessive
persecutions
21 Strong element of political theater; individuals targeted from crimes occurring decades
before—Shanghai gov’t sanctioned focus on people with suspicious historical
associations before 1949
o One “secret” agent uncovered was an old worker and activist, targeted b/c
appeared anxious in early stages of campaign—discovered that he attended
Nationalist party meetings on occasion. His family members were called to
criticize him and urge him to confess.
22 Pattern: limited number of targets, public struggle and accusation sessions, small number
of “enemies” identified for activities before 1949.
o Rebels who seized power in Shanghai No. 1 Medical College prosecuted
cleansing campaign by isolating targets and extracting confessions through
torture. Those found guilty were tortured and denounced.
o Scope of campaign greatest at Shanghai institute of finance—199 of 1000 faculty
targeted, organized into “study groups” for political study and forced to confess;
those who confessed were treated leniently, but those who refused were put under
severe psychological pressure
o Shanghai Seafood Company targeted vice-president Huang, discovered he had
joined Nationalist party in 1926 instead of 1924 as he claimed—they discovered
he had a bourgeois past and targeted his ex-wife, former concubine, mother and
stepfather as exploiters.
Guangdong and Guangxi: Factional Vendetta
23 Neither province had an established revolutionary committee supported by Beijing
authorities; factional struggles still raged when there was call to cleanse
24 Guangdong – those who had been attacked by Red Flag faction came into power and
used new power to get revenge
o Army heavily favored East Wind over Red Flag alliance
o Province’s revolutionary committee issued document urging local leaders to seize
and defend still-contested power.
o Many cadres previously attacked by Red Flag faction were restored to power as
members of local revolutionary committees, cadres who had joined RF faction
were removed, and people could do to RF members as they wished—many
arrested, often shot
o New authorities set up “mass dictatorship exhibitions” portraying torture
instruments; pushed false charges the RF organized to undermine socialism
25 Guangxi - factional battles raged into 1968; local power seizures  campaigns of
vengeance against opposing factor; many people beaten and killed
Inner Mongolia: Protracted Progrom
26 New revolutionary committee formed in November 1967; by spring 1968, campaign to
uproot and eliminate influence of former first party secrety Ulanfu
27 New provincial leadership in hands of Gao Jinming, who criticized Ulanfu. New
revolutionary committee built conspiracy case against Ulanfu, fabricating imaginary
“New Inner Mongolian People’s Party,” and underground conspiracy. 130,000 people
were targeted in these witch hunts.
28 Gao Jinming was purged by Teng Haiqing for “right wing tendencies,” and progrom
intensified afterward—additional 250,000 conspirators targeted.
29 Search for traitors continued after instructions to halt campaign in May 1969.
Outlying Rural Regions: Unlimited Local Escalation
30 Escalations especially in western provinces where stable provincial revolutionary
committee not established until mid-end 1968
31 In Shanxi, CR affected countryside to extent previously unimagined
o Qianyang County established own revolutionary committee, “mass dictatorship
headquarters,” and initiated cleansing of class ranks. 2,766 people placed under
suspicion and interrogated; 44 committed suicide.
Explaining the Cleansing Campaign
32 Cleansing campaign product of short-lived political circumstances—“authority figures in
state structures that hold power tenuously; the consequences of their losing power are
grave; and their actions are not effectively monitored or constrained by superiors.”
33 People in power did not get specific instructions; they were just told to be harsh, and they
also knew that their predecessors had been victimized for not being harsh
enough—caused insecurity among local authorities
34 Authority figures from city in Shanghai did not experience as much insecurity as their
counterparts elsewhere, and if people showed tendencies to torture, they became
victims—this is why Shanghai was different (rules and limits established)
35 People act differently when their livelihoods and lives are at risk, and people act
differently when their actions can have large consequences
36 “Insecurity of authorities, the collapse of institutional constraints, and the high cost of
loss explain a great deal about why the entire Cultural Revolution, not just the cleansing
campaign, took the form that it did.”
Name: Alexander Arapoglou
Course: FC 48
Final Study Guide Assignment
Summary of MacFarquhar, Roderick, The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng, Second
Edition, pp. 248-254
Pages 248-254 is the beginning of Chapter 4: The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism,
1969-82
1 CR’s goal: “to shape the future of China”/to answer the question: “After Mao, what?”
2 CR’s method: “to change the nature of the Chinese people”
3 Mao wanted to make sure that his “vision” was protected and passed down
o The main threat to his vision were the so-called “revisionists”
Revisionists were alleged to be people using familiar, “old ideas” to
essentially sneak capitalist ways back into the lives of unknowing,
uncorrupt Chinese people
o Mao attacked them:
Through ideology: “education, literature, the arts”
In order to: “train and bring up millions of successors who will carry on
the cause of the proletarian revolution” (actual text from CCP polemic
against revisionism, as cited in MacFarquhar, 248)
4 One question remained post-revisionism: Which Maoist institution would run the country
and implement the Mao vision? Two possibilities:
o The Party: It had been “demoralized and decimated”
o The Army: It had “equally revolutionary credentials, which had emerged after
three years of CR as the master of the country?”
5 The answer: gradual but steady militarization of Chinese political elite
o Began in earnest with Lin Biao’s (a former military comrade of Mao) becoming
Defense Minister in Peng Duhai’s place when the latter general criticized Mao’s
GLF in 1959. Biao was already one of the most prominent military
men-turned-politicians since his rise to the Politburo in 1956.
o CCP’s Ninth Congress in 1969 “a triumph for Lin Biao individually and for the
PLA institutionally.”
Biao was officially confirmed as Mao’s successor by writing in the Party
constitution.
PLA’s presence on the Central Committee rose from 19% to 45%
o This rise of the military was “in some ways a logical culmination of the Chinese
revolution and indeed conformed to a pattern familiar from Chinese history.
“Whenever political control broke down ... force was met with force, and a
process of militarization of the upper levels of the polity took place.”
o There had been an old Chinese precedent for militarization in the face of
instability since the fall of the Qing dynasty in the early 19th century.
A recent precedent had been Mao’s realization in 1927 that the
Communists would need their own military arm if they were to beat the
Nationalists to power in the Civil War. In Mao’s famous words,
“Political power grew out of the barrel of the gun.”
Thus, the PLA has been born: “not just another warlord army, but a
revolutionary force led by the CCP in the service of a cause delineated by
it.”
o Mao ensured that the army was controlled by politics by retaining his
chairmanship of the CC’s Military Affairs Commission (MAC) from 1935 until
his death more than four decades later.
6 “All his life, [Mao] had insisted on the primacy of the Party over the army; after his
death, the prospect was that the army would dominate the Party.”
Teiwes, The Tragedy of Lin Biao pg 134-160
Lushan Plenum March-September 1970
· Lin Biao's power
· Lin was #2 to Mao during this period
· widely consider the turning point for Lin Biao
· debate over whether Lin was trying to get more power
· NO: heavy public duties of the job (not Lin's style), Lin was promoting Mao
like any inferior would.
· Mao had ambiguous attitude towards Lin
· Mao's hesitation was perhaps due to uncertainty as to whether he could prevail
against Lin's military support.”
· Attack on Chen Boda
· Mao launched it
· Chen Boda had thought he had Mao's full confidence before this
· New Constitution
· Mao initiated this movement
· insisted the issue be top priority at the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) meeting
for later in the year
· two versions of the constitution were circulated – one with state chairmanship, one without
· Issue of State Chairmanship
· Lin and Mao kept a back and forth going about who should serve as the chairman
· Did Mao really want it?
· Did Mao want the honor of being able to reject it?
· Could Lin go wrong by insisting that Mao take it?
· Debate over who and when the issue kept being raised.
· Apparently, at one point, Lin tried to convince Mao to take it to satisfy the
“psychology of the people.”
· people split into two factions: Lin Biao and Jiang Qing cliques.
· Issue of Mao Zedong Thought
· on August – Wu Faxian proposed adding “Mao Zedong thought is the guiding
principle for all work of the entire country.”
· LuShan Plenum (August 23 · Politburo Standing committee meeting on the afternoon of 22nd
·
·
·
·
·
- day before Lushan
plenum began
· Mao called for “a plenum of unity and victory, not a divisive and failed gathering.”
· Mao got angry when Lin and Chen Boda brought up chairman issue again
Lin's speech – August 23
· debate over whether it was planned/unannounced – did Mao know?
· Debate over whether Lin was trying to gain more power for himself. (Teiwes says
no....)
· praised Mao's leadership for an hour – this angered Mao
· Leaders of North China group affected by Lin's speech
· Chen Boda took this example, began praising Mao excessively, too
· Chen Yi – began citing historical fats to demonstrate Mao's genius
· decided to place the State Chairmanship issue back on agenda
Role of YeQun
· complicating things for Lin
· tried to mobilize support forces on the 23rd to support the new Mao Zedong Thought,
urged people not to criticize kang sheng or Jiang Qing
Zhang Chunqiao
· Chen Boda started accusing zhang of being disloyal to Mao
Jiang Qing
· met with Mao on morning of August 25 (brought Zhang Chunqiao and Yao
Wenyuan)
· She complained about the attacks to Mao, and he supported her
Timeline
· August 22
· PSC meeting before the opening of the Lushan Plenum
· August 23
· Opening of Lushan Plenum
· Lin Biao's speech
· Ye Qun mobilizing support for new Mao Zedong Thought addition to
constitution
· August 25 –
· Jiang Qing meets with Mao
· Mao ended up calling a Politburo Standing Committee meeting
· Mao criticized Chen Boda
· suspended group discussions of Lin's speech
· withdrew the North China group's bulletin from circulation
· August 26-27
· Zhou Enlai and kang Sheng met with people to discuss their errors
· Mao met with people, including Lin Biao
· August 31
· Chen Boda viciously attacked
· September 2
· Lin Biao leads meeting in which participants must explain and confess their
mistaken statements during the plenum
· September 5
· Ye Qun calls on Jiang Qing to smooth over the tensions of past two weeks
· Jiang accepts Ye's apologies, tones down the importance of the events saying
it was just a “squabble among intellectuals.”
· Jiang pledges to stand by Lin Biao more closely
· September 6
· Plenum concludes
· Mao urges people to read more Marxist-Leninist books
· Mao emphasized Party unity
· Why did Mao behave this way?
· Threatened by Lin's military power
· unhappy with people who violated his call for unity
· disrupted an agenda to discuss national economy and war preparation
· angry at those who were strategizing behind others' backs to make moves for
political power
· Teiwes' Take
· Lushan Plenum began as a feud between Ye Qun and Zhang Chunqiao
· Lushan Plenum was in reality a “microcosm of all the passions which had divided
the elite since the onset of the Cultural Revolution”
· struggle for power reflected a much larger debate about the Cultural
Revolution as a whole
· chen Yi's fervent support for Mao was a tactic for political survival
· supported Mao in response to Chen Boda's attack of Zhang Chunqiao
· attacking Zhang Chunqiao was same as attacking Cultural Revolution (small)
Group – and this was the same as attacking the CR, which was the same as
attacking Mao.
· Mao equated an attack on Zhang as an attack on himself
· Very unclear what Lin's political position was with Mao at the end of the Plenum
· Ye Qun should bear a large part of the blame for Lin's involvement in this
Debate over Lin's Power Struggle
· Pro-Maoists' official line -· after unsuccessful attempt to seize power peacefully at Lushan Plenum, Lin moved
to using force
· Lin started organizing a military Coup to overthrow Mao
· Western scholars seriously question that Lin was involved in plotting a coup
· Timeline
· Close of Lushan Plenum
· lin and his followers did self-criticism – these self-criticism did not satisfy Mao
(this happened again in January 1971, Mao still unsatisfied)
· November 1970
· central organization and propaganda group set up under Kang Sheng, with
involvement from Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao
· significant because now the CRG clique had an organizational body at its
command
· November 1970 – April 1971
· attacks against “sham Marxis” Chen Boda heated up
· changes in the military lessened the power of Lin Biao's group
· December – January 1971
· North China conference – convened by Zhou Enlai to criticize Chen Boda,
aremoved leaders of Beijing Military Region (Li Xuesheng and Zheng
Weishan) --- weakened the power/position of Lin Biao's group
· August – September 1971
· Mao toured the south alerting local leaders to his dissatisfaction with Lin Biao
and followers
· He characterized the Lushan plenum as a “struggle of two headquarters” and
implicitly grouped Lin Biao with Gaog Gang, Peng Duhuai and Liu Shaoqi
· He named Lin and accused him for lusting after State Chairmanship
· North China bulletin supporting Lin's Lushan speech was labeled
“Counterrevolutionary.”
· September 13
· Lin Biao's death by plane crash
· Teiwes' Take
· no one knew what Mao wanted – very ambiguous signs
· no one knew that Lin was in real political trouble (if he was) – kept very quiet – no
signs of vicious power struggle or bitter conflict
· Lin was very politically passive after the Lushan Plenum – hardly any political
activity at all – avoided most interactions
· Lin claimed to be in bad-health, which is uncharacteristic for someone vying for
political power or successorship
· Lin was probably not aware of, let alone directing a coup or assassination plot
against Mao
· the four top generals in Lin's group did not appear to be mobilized in this effort
either – shows lack of broad organization by Lin
· Lin was resigned to his fate – losing political power. He did not do much to stop it.
(May Day, 1971 – showed up late for the celebration at Tiananmen to Mao's
displeasure)
· Mao's tour of the South in August – September 1971 was to warn local leaders of his
increasing distrust of Lin. He knew this would get back to Lin directly.
The Private Life of Chairman Mao – Li Zhisui (pp. 533-46)
By August 1971, Mao’s distrust of Lin Biao was reaching the breaking point. Xie
Jingyi, a deputy director of the revolutionary committee, had told Mao about an organization that
Lin Biao’s son, Lin Liguo, had set up in the air force. It had many units, code-named “the joint
fleet,” the “Shanghai small group,” and the “instruction guidance brigade,” the underground
groups were conspiring to take power from Mao.
Mao really thought that the loyalty of the regional and provincial-level military
commanders still rested with him and his message to all the groups was the same: At the Lushan
conference, someone had been in a big hurry to take over as chairman of the republic. That
person was trying to split the party and grab power for himself. Mao never attacked Lin Biao by
name, but the object of his accusations was unmistakable.
Mao was suspicious, too, of the power Ye Qun had over her husband. He felt that a
person should depend on himself to do his work and realized that this was not only a power
struggle, but an attempt to do away with Mao’s leadership and tear the party asunder. He held
Lin Biao responsible, but was still willing to compromise, to rely on “education” rather than
force to reunite the party.
On September 12, 1971, Wang Dongxing received a phone call from Zhang Hong, the
deputy commander of the Central Garrison Corps. The call was from Lin Biao’s daughter, Lin
Liheng that said that Ye Qun (Lin Biao’s wife) and Lin Liguo (Lin Baio’s brother in law) had
kidnapped Lin Biao and were forcing him to flee. Wang Dongxing made an urgent phone call
to Zhou Enlai and he told Mao. Meanwhile, Ye Qun had called Zhou directly to say that Lin
Biao needed a plane but that none was available. Zhou knew of a plane but suspected that Ye
Qun’s call was a scheme to cover up the impending flight. Wang Dongxing had Mao and Zhou
go to the Great Hall of the People where they could hide from a military coup that they thought
was about to occur.
On September 13, 1971, Lin Biao had taken off in a plane. Zhou Enlai suggested to
Mao that they order a missile attack against the plane, but Mao refused. There was no need to
shoot. We soon learned that the plane had taken off in such haste that it had not been properly
fueled, had no landing gear, and it crashed. Wang Dongxing and Zhou Enlai were ecstatic over
Lin Biao’s death and Zhou was in charge of the investigation that followed. With the
revelations of Lin’s conspiracy, those who had once been close to him maneuvered to distance
themselves from their relationship. No one wanted to be accused of having sided with Lin Biao
or been part of his plot.
Zhou Enlai had been closer to Lin than he wanted now to admit. Zhou had continued
reporting directly to Lin Biao even as the strains between Mao and Lin had grown, and on
matters that Mao had specifically asked to be kept secret. When it was explained to Zhou how
wary Mao was of Lin Biao, Zhou hesitated at first, but then agreed. No one wanted to admit to
having had close relations with the man who had become a traitor. Thus, photographs found at
Lin Biao’s house during the investigation of Jiang Qing with the Lin family and Zhou Enlai with
Lin Biao and his wife. These photographs were all returned to their rightful owners and were
destroyed.
Mao stayed hidden in the Great Hall of the People for more than a week; he and Zhou
Enlai wanted to make sure that the potential military coup had been destroyed and all of Lin
Biao’s closed associates were all arrested before Mao returned.
The Lin Biao affair came to be known as the 9-13 incident, after the date in September
when he died, and months went by before Zhou’s investigation was complete. According to the
report, Lin Biao, his wife, and their son, had begun planning a coup as early as March 1971,
calling it the 5-7-1 project. In Chinese, “armed uprising” is pronounced the same as 5-7-1.
Their goal was to apprehend, and possibly to assassinate, Mao and to seize power themselves.
The Chairman had long been suspicious of Lin Biao, and he had been warned of a conspiracy.
Lin Biao and his military commander friends had many plans to assassinate Mao: (1) they could
bomb Mao’s special train (2) they could shoot Mao (3) blow up oil facilities where Mao’s train
was going to stop, or (4) plant a bomb under a railroad bridge.
However, assassinating Mao was never going to be easy. His plans were always secret,
and changed so quickly and often that even his closed personnel were kept off guard. Lin
Biao’s plans never stood a chance and Lin knew he had to take flight when he learned he had lost
his war with Mao (this was when Mao returned to Beijing). Lin Biao’s own death, once his plot
against Mao had failed, was certain. In the end, Lin Biao ran out of time.
In late 1971, when the Lin Biao affair was made public, the whole country was shocked.
People within the highest reaches of the party were stunned. The CR was vicious and
vindictive, and many people had died. But nothing had prepared me for the extent of Lin Baio’s
disloyalty or the drama of his final flight.
After Lin Biao’s death, Mao’s health took a turn for the worse. He took to his bed and
lay there all day, saying and doing little. While he was in bed, Mao always thought through a
new political strategy; this time, he was ready for a reconciliation: he wanted the men he had
purged to return.
Chen Yi’s funeral was the first hint that Moa was planning to rehabilitate the men he had
overthrown. In February 1967, a letter was written regarding Chen Yi and his actions before the
CR. Mao called several members of the CCRG together and agreed with the accusations against
Chen Yi and others of trying to revive the monarchy and reverse the course of the CR. Their
attempt to stop the CR became known as the February Adverse Current. A new wave of
purges began and Chen Yi was forced from Office. When Chen Yi died in early 1972, he was
still in disgrace. At his funeral, Mao did not refer to any of Chen’s mistakes in his eulogy and
thus, had just rehabilitated his old friend. At the funeral, Mao began talking about the February
Adverse Current, saying that he had come to regard the “adverse current” as an attempt by Chen
Yi and other faithful veteran leaders to oppose Lin Biao, Chen Boda and others – the fallen
radicals of the CR. The “adverse current” in face was positive.
Lui Ruiqing was the next to come back and Mao said that Lin Biao also falsely accused
him. Mao never admitted that the CR had been a mistake. But Lin Biao’s disloyalty convinced
him that he needed to change his strategy. He put Zhou Enlai in charge of rehabilitating many
of the leaders who had been overthrown.
The Fall of Lin Biao
Cultural Revolution transition in 1969 – three arenas: reconstruction of the Party, rebuilding of
the state structure, foreign affairs
Reconstruction of the Party: leaders wanted to rebuild it from bottom up (counties,
provinces, etc), but this proved difficult to do. Troubles were exacerbated by the fact
that disruptive rebels were brought in at the cost of old officials. Problem for
Lin Biao:
failed to accept the order to reestablish a civilian Party to control the
army and the
nation—he wanted to dominate the state himself
Rebuilding the state structure:
Mao wanted to abolish head of state (Liu Shaoqi had occupied it), but Lin Biao urged
him to maintain the position. Mao did not want the position itself, but Lin was insecure,
and sought further support in his bid to be Mao’s successor (Lin wanted the position, and
Chen Boda supported his push to maintain the position’s existence). Yet, in spite of
Lin’s maneuvering, Mao prevented the movement succeeding, and he effectively
thwarted Lin’s pursuit of state chairmanship.
Foreign Policy:
Because of border tensions with the Soviet Union, China initiated diplomatic relations
with the US (as leverage). Whether or not it is really the case, Mao painted Lin Biao as
a major isolationist, which further hurt his chances of succeeding Mao, should outside
forces play any role in the succession decision.
As Lin Biao was obviously grappling for position, Mao began criticizing him and his allies
(Chen Boda, etc). Tensions then escalated, as Lin’s supporters began plotting an assassination
of Mao. Mao was able to thwart their early attempts, and on September 13, 1971, an
information leak from Lin Biao’s daughter, Lin Liheng, allowed Mao to avert a plot against him.
Lin was mysteriously killed in a plane crash in Mongolia (having already been chased by Mao’s
supporters), and with his death, a major threat to Mao evaporated.
Impact
Lin’s death allowed Mao and Zhou Enlai to purge the Politburo of his supporters/conspirators.
Many high-ranked officials were purged, and disillusionment with the make-up of the upper
echelons of government ensued as the specter of conspiracy hung over the government.
1
2
Chapter 8 – Youths Who Sought the Truth
o Faithful and unyielding; facing death calmly. Three “chief criminals”, Wu shusen,
Wu Shuzhang, and Lu Zhili, of the “Self-Study University of Communism” bravely
prepare for their execution, lamenting they can not live life, but not fearing death.
o Taking up arms to scatter the clouds. The Wu brothers, Lu, Chen Tongming, and
Zhang Weizhi first published a newsletter, then founded the Self-Study University of
Communism to study Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. Some members
accused Jiang Qing and Lin Biao of being Fascist dictators, not communist leaders
developing a classless society.
o Upholding the truth, ready to shed their blood. Following their arrests, members of
the university maintained their innocence, saying it would be proved later in history,
which it was.
o A great example for later generations. Chen Tongming maintained his innocence
while serving a life sentence. He redirected family assistance to fellow university
members, and was finally exonerated after the Gang of Four fell, with the sentence
publicly reversed.
Chapter 9 – They Fell Before the Gun Barrels of the Cultural Revolution
o This chapter tells the story of several revolutionaries who dared to question the
authorities.
o Xi Yuanhua learned to resist the authorities when he was outraged at the “Elimination
of Counterrevolutionaries” campaign of 1955. After settling into a comfortable life,
he wrote 9 letters and made 177 copies in 1963 asking Mao to set prestige aside and
help the people by pushing for economic and scientific progress. He was arrested a
month later. He spent 7 years in prison, being interrogated and tortured, but always
maintained his position. He was executed during the Yi Da San Fan campaign by Lin
Biao and the Gang of Four.
o Ding Zuxiao. Ding was infuriated by the personality cult rituals the “Three Loyalties”
campaign by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four. She challenged the campaign in a
handbill, and was arrested, and later executed.
o Li Zhengsheng. He wrote a handbill opposing the Cultural Revolution, claiming it
was not an anti-revisionist campaign, as it was advertised as. He was arrested and
executed.
o Mao Yingxing. She spoke out against unsupported accusations of people being
traitors and spies, was accused of being one herself, and was executed.
3
4
5
6
Chapter 10 – An Eight-Year-Old Girl Put Through a Mock Execution
o The girl’s father was a middle ranking cadre in the municipal party office. When the
Cultural Revolution began, he picked the weaker group, and was subjected to
accusations of being a counter-revolutionary. A slogan painted on a wall by a child
saying “Down with Chairman Mao” was accused of being written by his daughter.
She was interrogated, refused to admit writing it, beaten, imprisoned, and subjected to
a mock execution. She was scarred for life, and ridiculed by everyone until the
downfall of the Gang of Four.
Chapter 11 – How was Teacher Jia Chenghou Framed and Executed?
o Jia offended his principle when at school during the beginning of the Cultural
Revolution and suggested a girl with bad morals not be admitted to the CCP. The two
conspired to frame him for raping and molesting 7 and 9 girls, respectively. With no
proof, and even some accusations repealed, the case went through, and Jia was
executed.
Chapter 12 – Picking Up Waste Paper to Save Her Husband
o A teacher known for story-telling is accused of being a counter-revolutionary because
he told a story where Mao hid in a ditch to avoid KMT soldiers. He had read the story
in a book, but did not remember which, and was accused of having made it up. He
was sentenced to eight years in prison. His illiterate wife spent 7 years looking for the
story. She burned to death one night with their son because all the papers she had
collected looking for evidence. The man pled his case to the author, who happened to
know the book that had the original story. His case was exonerated, and she became
known for reversing cases, despite this having been only chance that she knew the
story.
Chapter 13 – The “Cultural Revolution” Has Been Underway for Two Thousand Years
o This chapter tells the story of a man from a small village in China who was labeled as
a spy when 14 years old for suggesting that the leader of the village “practice what he
preached” in terms of not drinking and smoking. He was persecuted for 15 years.
After being cleared on this charge, he was again caught up in another struggle
between two officials. He was re-accused of being a spy, and beaten and tortured, not
because of any proof, but because simply to implicate another person as part of a
conspiracy. In reflection, he argues that the Cultural Revolution is really just the latest
iteration of generational struggles between historically opposed groups, or of petty
arguments that, after politicization, become formal criminal charges.
Macfarquhar: 278-288
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GANG OF FOUR
The Succession Problem
1 Mao used to have a “two front system”—where he let his officials (in 1950s) gain experience
and exposure while he monitored them behind the scenes—in order to lay a road for
succession, but after Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao, he realized that none of this “pupils” were fit
to take over his post.
2 Problem: “After Mao, who?” or rather “After Mao, what?”
3
4
Three groups arose: radicals, survivors, beneficiaries from whom Mao could choose
Radicals:
o Ultra-leftist coalition that was at the core of the Cultural Revolution Group
o Kang Sheng, Jaing Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao wenyuan, Xie Fuzhi
5 Survivors:
o Senior officials who have always been loyal to Mao despite their opposition against CR
o Premier Zhou Enlai, Vice Premier Li Xiannian, Dong Biw, Zhu De, Liu Bocheng,
Ye Jianying
o After the Lin Biao affair—Mao needed to strengthen his support base with these
senior cadres who were loyal to him—recalled those who had fallen under the
“February Adverse Current”—blamed the purge on Lin Biao
o These include: Chen Yi (former Foreign Minister) and Deng Xiaoping
6 Beneficiaries:
o New leaders who came to power b/c of purges of senior officials or b/c of their own
abilities in the CR (1960s and 1970s)
o Xu Shiyou, Chen Xilian, Li Desheng, Wang Dongxing
7 Problem: Mao could not find a successor from either of the three groups!
8 Survivors: did not trust to have his radical program under the survivors (Zhou Enlai was
about to die soon)
9 Radicals: Mao wanted them to carry on his work with the CR—but he knows that PLA
would not accept as them as leaders b/c they caused too much turbulence and violence and
disorder (no Jiang Qing or Zhang Chunqiao)
10 Beneficiaries: too young to gain broad-base support
11 So Mao catapulted a junior radical—Wang Hongwen onto the number 3 in the party (after
Mao and Zhou)
12 Wang Hongwen
o Leader of Shanghai’s January Revolution (good leader and a leftist)
o Represented the workers and the youth
o Wanted to use him to rekindle the spirit of the youth, which died b/c of the fall of the
Red Guard Movement
o Later b/c close to the Gang of Four—b/c of this and of his inexperience as compared
to the survivors—he would not last as the next successor
Zhou Enlai’s anti-leftist Offense
1 The fall of Lin Biao removed a major obstacle for the radicals in winning the succession, but
Lin’s action also tarnished the reputation of the radicals
2 Zhou took advantage of this vulnerable point to restore order by stabilizing the
administration and encouraging production
3 Restoration of the educational standards and scientific research
4 These movements met leftist resistance (who were still backed by Mao)—but stabilization
did take place until 1972 when Mao thought this anti-leftist tide went too far and the radicals
were able to resume their power in the party
The Tenth Party Congress
1 The reaffirmed the concept of the CR and said that “revolutions like this have to take place
many times in the future!” (……umm….)
2 They presented a new constitution which took away Lin Biao’s name and added elements
3
4
that criticized revisionism, emphasized the need to train revolutionary successors, supremacy
of party leadership, especially over the PLA (party holds the gun)
New leaders chosen here also reflect the resurgence of radicals
Politburo Standing Committee:
o Radicals: Mao, Wang Hongwen, Kang Sheng, Zhang Chunqiao
o Survivors: Zhu De, Dong Bisu
o Beneficiaries: Li Desheng
o Moderates (effective ones): Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying
“Pi Lin, Pi Kong”
 Campaign that means “criticize Lin, criticize Confucius”; headed by Jiang Qing—in coalition
with students from Qing Hua and Beijing University (called Beida-Qinghua Two Schools Big
Criticism Group—Liang Xiao (or Two Schools))—to criticize Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai
 They wanted to rid the supporters of Lin Biao in the Party and in the PLA
 Analogy of Confucius and Zhou came from the Duke of Zhou, who allegedly followed the
Confucian Analects and wanted to “restore old families”—which refers to Zhou Enlais’
rehabilitation of many senior cadres in the early 1970s.
 Confucians were also against the Legalists (who worked for Qin Shihuangdi—Mao’s
historical allegory)—legalists were known for their stern discipline and harsh
punishments—resembling the class struggles of the Cultural Revolution.
 Campaign highlighted the struggle in the party to either go forward or turn back the wheel of
history—class struggle over rehabilitation
 Jiang Qing aimed this campaign at the party and the military and wrote articles on this topic
to be circulated in the People’s Daily—campaign mainly to undermine Zhou Enlai
 Zhou Enlai—by this time was weakening physically anyway…but the death of Zhou Enlai
posed Mao a major political problem and he’s later restoration of Deng Xiaoping to replace
Zhou Enlai certainly did not fare well with the radicals at all!
Goodman 77-82
The 1970s were a turbulent time in Chinese history, marked by intense
factionalism. Deng Xiaoping was aided in this environment by his past
relationships with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and his many colleagues and
subordinates during the Sino-Japanese War and War of Liberation.
For example, in October 1969, purged leaders were dispersed to other
parts of the country in order to minimize the risk of a Soviet attack
taking out the entire leadership. Although Deng was theoretically
under house arrest and working in a tractor factory in Xinjian County,
Jiangxi Province, he was respected by the local population and taken
care of quite well. A special path was laid out for Deng to go to work
so he wouldn't have to walk on the public highway. This occurred party
because the party secretary in charge of the factory where Deng worked
had served under him during the war.
After the death of Lin Biao in 1971, various party leaders such as
Wang Dongxing, Wang Zhen, and Wang Jiaxiang lobbied to get Deng back
into power. Deng's comeback can be attributed partly to the fact that
thanks that after the purges, there was no one competent or
experienced enough to lead the country yet. Also, ironically, after
the purges, the people who rose to higher leadership ranks were people
loyal to Deng, especially in the PLA. Lin Biao, focused on purging
Peng Dehuai and He Long, had left the Deng loyalists relatively
intact. With the added push from Zhou Enlai and the prestige of
formerly being in Mao's "personal loyalty group," Deng was able to
come back to power and push for modernization.
Rebecca Gong
rgong@fas.harvard.edu
Mac 278-292: Rise and fall of the Gang of Four
1 What to do about Mao’s succession? Who and What?
2 Three groups
o Radicals: Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Kang Sheng
(failing health), Xie Fuzhi (died in 1972)
o Survivors: Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannan, Zhu De, Ye Jianying (others
loyal to Mao), Deng Xiaoping
o Beneficiaries: military figures (Xu Shiyou, Chen Xilian, Li Desheng,
Wang Dongxing, Ji Dengkui)
3 Successor couldn’t be Zhou (leftist program)
4 Old CRG too violent, PLA unlikely to accept
5 Mao chose Wang Hongwen
o Youth & worker (symbol of CR): age 36, worker in Shanghai’s
January Revolution
o Supported Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan
o Couldn’t be blamed for havoc in ’67-68
o Made #3 in the party, after Mao & Zhou
6 Inducted into Politburo with Hua Guofeng (Hunan first secretary) & Wu De
(Beijing first secretary)
Zhou Enlai’s Offensive
1 1972: Zhou’s year. Launched campaign to stabilize administration and
encourage production.
2 Agriculture: ordered imitation of Dazhai brigade only where local
circumstances permitted
3 Restored education and science
4 But Mao still backed the leftist radicals
Tenth Party Congress
1 24-28 August 1973 Tenth Party Congress
2 Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan in charge of preparing
documents
3 Lin Biao’s name excised, but leftist confirmation of CR kept
4 PSC enlarged from five to nine:
o Supporters of CR: Mao, Wang Hongwen (3rd), Kang Sheng (4th),
Zhang Chunqiao
o Old Mao supporters: Zhu De, Dong Biwu
o Radical supporter: Li Desheng
o Only moderates: Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying
5 Newbies to Politburo (beneficiaries and supporters of CR): Hua Guofeng,
Wu De, Chen Yonggu
Pi Lin, Pi Kong
1 “Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize Confucius”: Liang Xiao criticism group
(Qinghua & Beida led by Jiang Qing and Wang Hongwen)
2 Traveled far and wide criticizing those who wanted to “turn back the wheel
of history”  allusions to Duke of Zhou (ZEL’s namesake)
The Return of Deng Xiaoping
1 Zhou had been stabilizing force  now sick with terminal cancer
2 Wang Hongwen cat’s paw of Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao
3 Rift with Jiangqing: romantic? Fake security to enemies?
4 Deng Xiaoping petitioned twice to be let back; December 1973, officially
took over MAC and PLA chief of staff. Vice-chair in PSC.
5 Balanced by Zhang Chunqiao (Gang of Four) as director of PLA General
Political Dept, and second-ranking vice-premier
Mac 292-296: Deng Xiaoping’s Year in Charge
1 Deng pursues more moderate policies, supported by ZEL
2 ZEL’s speech to the Fourth NPC on “four modernizations”: agriculture,
industry, defense, and science/tech
3 Deng accused Gang of Four with “eleventh line struggle” (divisions
between parties, like with Liu and Lin).
o Wang Hongwen self-criticized, the others didn’t
4 Army reform: attacked size, budget, inefficiency, factionalism, conceit, and
inertia of PLA
5 Arrested troublemakers in Hangzhou using PLA (what Wang Hongwen
couldn’t do)
6 Stressed support of agriculture, foreign tech, industrial research, material
incentives, higher education, expert leadership
o Used Mao’s quote on revolution not ensuring good production
7 Jiang Qing’s model: Dazhai brigade in agriculture (commune)  GLF of
1958, egalitarianism & class struggle
8 Deng’s model: material incentives for peasants, 1960’s
Mao’s Behavior
1 Very contradictory: backed Deng’s measures, but also allowed Gang of
Four to propagate leftist views
2 Zhang Chunqiao & Yao Wenyuan wrote on class struggle, proletarian
dictatorship, danger of revisionism
3 Genuine conflict within Mao? Increased infirmity (Parkinson’s, stroke)?
4 Possibly just buying time with Deng (against ZEL?). Still believed in ideals,
unlikely he thought Deng could keep them.
Christina Claudio
Jonathan Unger, Education Under Mao pp. 139-170
Back to School 1968-1970
1 Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao became Mao’s new representatives in educational
affairs and tried to devise a new system.
2 Before the Cultural Revolution the main concern of the educational leadership had been
to develop an advanced industrial infrastructure.
3 However, the Maoists saw less of a need to use the system to help prepare and sort a
corps of highly trained personnel. They wanted to orient the system towards a
development strategy that relied on a larger workforce with less technically educated
youth.
4 Knowledge and education was geared not towards theory but toward the practical and
easily practiced.
5 These radicals wanted as little industrial modernization as possible, mainly to prevent the
rise of a new technocratic bourgeoisie.
6 The new education center also focused on character building through the emersion of
young people in Mao Thought.
o Therefore the new curriculum was to include greater labor and political content
while reducing the academic part.
o The main goal was to make education an egalitarian leveler among youths. They
curbed personal ambition, leveled personal aspirations, and eliminated the
competitive educational ladder.
o By cutting off the roots of upward mobility they could reorient youthful minds
away from the need to succeed.
7 The radicals assigned graduates directly to jobs without taking into account their
academic records when deciding job destinations.
The Maoist Administrative Reforms:
1 The goal was to revamp the organizational framework and the loci of decision-making in
the school system.
2 The system was to be placed in the hands of the “reds” instead of the professional
educators and administrators.
3 “Branch Dictates” was an organizational form in which the ministries hold the
decision-making power and directives come down from the chain of command.
4 “The Area Dictates” was a competing organizational form in which a local district’s
Party committee holds authority over the different activities in its boundaries. This
eventually collapsed from within.
5 The radicals tried to place primary and secondary schools under the jurisdiction of nearby
factories. But many were not able to handle the responsibility so they tried sharing the
jurisdiction with other factories. However the downside was that factory managers did
not want and were not capable of running the schools. The Cultural Revolution was
fresh in their minds and they had learned that educational issues were politically
explosive. No one wanted to be held accountable for making a mistake or the target of
possible student uprisings (i.e. Red Guards again).
The Initial Handicaps facing Reform:
1 Due to these untested ideas being pushed into the schools, the schools were plunged
into chaos from 1968-1970.
2 Some reasons for the chaos was:
o The political fears of the school administrators. There was still residual fear
of being brandished a traitor from the Cultural Revolution.
o There was no unified leadership at the basic levels
o The destruction of the middle levels of the education bureaucracies meant that
the groups needed to structure and organize Maoist education reforms were
absent.
3 Additionally, the Cultural Revolution had promoted the rise of peer pressure groups
by keeping classes together for several years. Now, they had to weaken the
peer-group influence and the young people’s organizational links. This factionalism
didn’t die until the 1970s.
o It didn’t help that they were encouraged by teachers who lacked the will to
discipline these students. The teachers were too afraid and took the
politically safest course.
o The result of their class line policies was that children of the revolutionary
cadres asserted renewed claims to the innate superiority. They were beyond
the control of their teachers.
Neighborhood Schools in an Overcrowded System:
4 All the incoming students of 1968 had been assigned to neighborhood schools, which
were similar to kids being put in schools based on their district.
5 Therefore, the quality of the school and teachers was determined by the nature of the
residential area. The richer areas got better schooling.
6
The purpose of this was to reduce the educational competitiveness associated with the
need to get into a good school. They aimed to rid children of the selfish desire to do
better in classes than their peers.
7 The biggest problem faced was the growing influx of students. The baby boom of
the early 1950s created too large of a youth population for the fragile school system
to handle.
8 This led to a shortage of teachers needed. But instead of filling these posts with
qualified teachers, under Maoist policy, they were not selected on the basis of
expertise. So the kids got inadequate teachers who were often illiterate themselves.
9 The idea of erecting rural branch schools was good in that it would lessen the
overflow of kids while giving them with a place to do their politically requisite labor.
10 They also created more problems. Branch schools took up agricultural land needed
by the peasants, diverted funds from urban schools that were still overflowing and so
this project was finally abandoned.
School Days 1968-1970:
1 Basically kids had no incentive to work or complete class work. Their futures would not
be determined by their class work or academic performance.
Down to the Countryside
2 The kids who were sent down to the countryside were not wanted or needed by the
peasantry. Villages acquired more youths than they needed and the additional kids only
meant that the peasants would have more mouths to feed from limited harvests.
3 Also, local youths competed with the city kids for job posts. The young people sent in
from the city were politically inferior to the peasantry, who were considered the true
revolutionaries.
4 More and more parents refused to let their kids go to the countryside. Word of rapes and
news of poverty took away the glorification of going to the countryside.
5 In 1970 Mao issued a nine-point directive to fix these problems. Youths were to be
given the monthly rations due to them, get equal pay for equal work, receive adequate
healthcare, and anyone who forced themselves on the urban girls would be severely
punished.
6 There were some possibilities of being recalled from the countryside. Factory posts,
openings at universities, and positions in the PLA. But these were quickly taken by the
kids of officials and party members who were brought back faster than anyone else.
Middle class kids had no chance of selection.
Job Allocations, 1968-1975:
1 High school administrators had to decide where each graduate would go: commune or
state farm.
2 The key question was who would be rusticated (sent to the countryside). It was always
the bad or middle class kids.
3 Policies mandated that if one half of someone’s brothers and sisters were still at an urban
residence, then the kid had to go. Therefore first borns usually were sent down—this
included oldest sons…leaving younger children to take their place as head of the family.
It messed with the structure of Chinese family life.
4 Parents began finding loopholes to prevent their children from leaving…some retired
early and claimed they needed their kids to work and care for them.
5 So new mobilization methods were created to put the burden of convincing young people
to sign up for rustification on the father’s place of work (where the family was most
vulnerable politically).
6 Soon individual cities acknowledged the failure of these reforms and called back all the
kids from the countryside. The program had proven to be too costly in urban discontent
and the villages were refusing to accommodate any more people.
7 Eventually a new policy was made—kids would go to the countryside for 2-3 years.
When they came back, another group would leave thereby opening up job opportunities.
This was originated in Guangdong and soon followed by other cities. The national
government finally admitted in 1978 that the previous program had backfired.
Unger – Education Under Mao
pg. 171-205
Beverlie Ting
Troubled Schools, 1970-1976
1 Backlast of the “last sibling” rustication policy was profound
2 Initially, people though that if educational system could be divorced from competition for
careers and if the threat of selection examinations were removed, students would be
better able to learn for intrinsic reasons (general love of learning)
3 In reality, students in Canton and other cities were very unmotivated to learn, since they
knew that they were fated to work in the countryside – academics would be of no use to
them; only route to prestigious jobs were through familial connections, so sons and
daughters of cadres etc. tended to be a bit more attentive in school
4 People wanted to be blue-collar workers, since that was a better option than being sent to
the countryside and becoming a peasant – workers had secure incomes which did not
change whether or not they became skilled
5 Schools were supposed to be about 70% classroom work and 30% labor time (time spent
doing hands on work in a factory), but factories gradually became very crowded, and
skilled workers grew to resent unskilled and undisciplined young people swarming
through their workshops
6 New focus on ‘industrial knowledge’ course was a problem: tried to integrate science and
math lessons with discussions on production techniques but this just confused students
and they eventually went back to basics and taught math and sciences separately
7 Students saw little reason to learn English if they were going to be sent to farms
8 Cultural Revolution had discouraged expertise and academic achievement in the schools;
did not want students to become ‘bourgeouis experts’
9 Teachers also tended to shy away from lectures on politics to avoid any chance of error
10 Class became less important in schools since students could no longer secure upward
mobility through schools and job assignments were no longer related to family origins
11 Began to use peer-group techniques against delinquents; used peeres to criticize their
ideology that ‘studying is useless,’ but didn’t always work
The Fight Over Education
1 Party radicals tried to devalue the university diploma – saw diploma as a way of
2
3
4
5
6
perpetuating advantaged statuses (experts)
In order to prevent graduates from universities thinking of themselves as anything but
skilled workers, radicals made reforms:
1) obligatory period of several years of work between secondary school and higher
education
2) abolition of entrance exams and introduction of new selection criteria
3) revamped, shortened, “proletarianized” university curriculum
The Work Interval: originally a Russian idea put forth by Khrushchev
Vocational Schooling: Vocational schools no longer operated alongside the regular
senior high school system; Mao had created “July 21st” universities (after the date in 1968
when Mao had directed that workers and peasants should receive priority in university
education) – these were factory training programs; when a factory needed manpower,
they selected young employees who had already had a few years of work experience;
these young employees would attend a technical school and then return to the factory
(practice while they learn)
University Enrollment Procedures: thought sciences should downplay theory and stress
the tangibly practical; 1) applicant applies 2) mass recommends (or local political
leadership recommends) 3) leadership approves 4) the college enrollment office reviews;
urban universities tended to enroll rusticated urban youths, rather than peasants; absence
of entrance exams allowed for much corruption and many children of Party officials
abused this
Should China use higher schooling as a redistributive/egalitarian mechanism or more as a
development tool?
Debates between “Radical” and “Moderate” leaders
1 Chinese Revolution in 1949 based on two goals: 1) economic development 2) to improve
opportunities for the majority of ‘have-nots’
2 In general, in 1970s, examinations had been downplayed, but gradually began a special
six-month “refresher’ course in 1973 for entrants who had ‘forgotten’ many things while
out of school and increased university education from 2-3 years to 3 _ years
3 Moderates became worried that downplay of theory by radicals would hinder China’s
ability to understand and adapt major foreign technical developments and that China
would not have enough competent technicians or practitioners of applied science
4 Zhou Rongxin (Secretary General of State Council during CR) had originally advocated
access to education be determined by class-line standards but now he was advocating that
academic criteria count more heavily in determining enrollment
5 Basically, the education system of the pre-Cultural Revolution days was restored –
education reform went in a complete circle.
Macfarquhar 296-305
January 8, 1976- death of Zhou Enlai
he had been the symbol of rationality and restraint, even in a weakened state towards the end of
his life.
Mao reshapes current campaign into a drive to “criticize Deng and repulse the right-deviationist
wind to reverse the verdicts”
Obvious question arises- who will replace Zhou as premier? Deng was an obvious candidatefigure of moderation like Zhou.
For unknown reasons, Mao chose Hua Guofeng
This enraged the Gang of 4, especially Zhang Chunqiao who apparently wanted the position for
himself. Caused G of 4 to make a strategic error- instead of collaborating with potential allies,
they went all out for power.
G of 4 openly attacks Zhou in the media, also control the media. This causes student-led protests
against the G of 4.
The Tiananmen incident, 1976
Laying of wreaths to commemorate Zhou Enlai in defiance of the orders of city authorities
April 5- police called into action and citizens in square arrested. At night, members of the militia,
the public security forces, and the Beijing garrison troops began beating people.
April 7- Mao elevates Hua Guofeng to the premiership and first deputy chairmanship
immediately. Says to Hua “with you in charge, I’m at ease”
March 25, 1976: Wenhui Bao, one of the 2 mass circulation daily newspapers in Shanghai (a
leftist base city) published an article saying Zhou Enlai was a “capitalist roader.” Popular
reaction was anger: In Shanghai, people surrounded Wenhui Bao offices; in Nanjing,
demonstrations (was 1st city where it occurred)
-Nanjing is special: has been capital before; Zhou Enlai once negotiated with Nationalists
there to prevent civil war
-Nanjing U had wall posters go up criticizing Wenhui Bao and some alleged conspirators
who they said were Kruschev-like (ie traitors) and were trying to seize power
-wreaths dedicated to Zhou went up all around the city
-demonstrations with ppl chanting slogans angst ppl who attacked Zhou; demonstration
procession led to Yuhuatai hillside just outside city where a monument to civil war
revolutionary soldiers lies and left wreaths for Zhou
-Mar 30, 1976: army officer became famous by pasting wall poster denouncing Zhang Chunqiao
by name up
-Students wrote news of the Nanjing demonstrations on railway cars so the news would spread
through China despite censorship in the press by Gang of Four
Qing Ming Festival: Used as occasion to demonstrate loyalty to Zhou and hostility to lefitists in
14 provinces and 2 cities with province level status.
-Mar 30: 1st wreaths laid for Zhou Enlai in Tiananmen Square in Peking
-many more wreaths laid over next few days by thousands of people, despite official instructions
not to march into square
-author says these actions were a “counter-movement to the nihilism and violence of the Cultural
Revolution”
-other people commemorated:
~Chen Yi: former foreign minister; had denounced excesses of Cultural Revolution to
Mao’s face
~He Long: veteran marshal who was a great guerilla fighter and was widely believed to
have attempted military opposition to the Cultural Revolution
~Yang Kaihui: Mao’s first love – was an indirect attack/insult to Jiang Qing
-Poems and inscriptions were not just defenses of Zhou or attacks on Jiang Qing, but also
implicitly defying Mao, who people knew had initiated the Cultural Revolution. Also, he
dissociated himself from Deng Xiaoping and didn’t dissociate himself from Jiang Qing et al.
-But they tried to focus on the Gang of Four b/c they thought Mao would turn against
them if political balance turned against Gang of Four and b/c they knew Mao was still to
some extent untouchable.
-Many puns and tricks of Chinese language used to denounce Gang of Four
eg people talked about demons (yao in Chinese) to denounce Yao Wenyuan etc
-Praise for the Four Modernizations given.
-people from all levels of society, from high officials to poor peasants were there
Roger Garside
Coming Alive: China after Mao
“The Decisive Battle”
Pages 126-141
-Zhou’s funeral
-Crowds of people acting out of conviction, not a planned, ritualized memorial
-Streams of thought and emotions expressing many thoughts that had been
underground for years, surfacing in Tiananmen Square. Garside calls it a
“Liberation of the Chinese Spirit
-ANGER- at destruction of Zhou’s legacy- REVOLT against Mao for destructing
that legacy- APPREHENSION for the future of Chin- DEFIANCE of those that
would punish the demonstrators
-Also, affection, joy, delight, pride- shedding the old demigod Mao
Garside then reflects on a poem that sums up feelings of the time
“Cherish the Memory of Premier Zhou at Qing Ming”
-Basically attacks Mao, threatens that followers of Zhou can retreat to hills
and raise a new guerrilla army to restore Marxism-Leninism
-Essential Message of funeral- Mandate of Heaven had been removed from Mao
-Government’s Reaction to Demonstrations
-April 5th- Decision not made publicly- wreaths and posters cleared from square, arrests
made
-During April 5th, masses go back to square where guards now surround statue
-Situation not defused by explaining why normal practices of Qing Ming not
being followed.
-Masses force police out of square (let go unharmed), start chanting on Zhou’s,
and student’s behalves
-When negotiations not held, crowd turns to violence, burn vehicles, youth start
storming government’s command post- Burn the “Internationale” building
-6:30 pm the mayor of Peking, Wu De appeals to masses to disperse, most do
-9:35- Workers Militia march out of Imperial City with staves march into square, block
exits and surround remaining people. Brutally beat them and bring them back into the
imperial city and into prison
-Irony of Tiananmen Square during Qing Ming
-reversal for Mao, had been a place where he had been revered and followed
before, now being attacked
-People have a new HOPE for the future, the “Spirit of Tiananmen”
-April 7th- Politburo meets to discuss problem at hand
-strip Deng Xiaoping of his offices, Hua Guofeng made First Vice-Chairman of party,
condemn Tiananmen demonstrations- basically calling millions of people in the capital
counter-revolutionaries
-counterdemonstrations performed by masses, hailing Mao, but hearts not in these
demonstrations
-Press claims Tiananmen incident masterminded by Deng, give no proof
-Witch-hunt takes place for protestors from square, masses stand together
in solidarity just as party now standing together
-Mao physically weakened by Qing Ming incident
-says infamous “With you at charge I am at ease” line to Hua- a miscommunication
according to Garside
-Jiang Qing and radicals ecstatic with Deng’s dismissal, stand more in spotlight now
-Nature- signaling collapse of a regime
-January- Zhou dies
-February- anti-Deng campaign begins
-March- shower of meteorites in northeast, sign of collapsing dynasty
-April- Qing Ming demonstrations, Mao’s physical decline
-May-June- bas weather affecting the harvest
-early July- death of Marshal Zhu De
-late July- Tangshan earthquake, ½ million victims, foreshadow end of dynasty
-Unrest, economic groups trying to smother the government, railway workers in particular
-Peasants broke up collective landholdings to engage in individual farming
-Crime rates rise steeply
-Military barracks attacked
-government holdings seized
-September 9th, Mao dies, not same stunned grief as had existed when Zhou died
-From imprisonment Deng calls out to his allies, calling them back to action, they respond (but
how is not covered in this article)
Li Zhisui
The Private Life of Chairman Mao
Pg. 3-30
The Death of Mao
This reading provides a firsthand account of the death of Mao from the perspective of
Mao’s personal physician. Mao had suffered his second heart attack in June of 1976, and was
visibly weakened by the eve of his death, ultimately caused by Lou Gehrig’s disease. The
Chinese population did not know Mao was ill, and loyal leaders, including Hua Guofeng, stood
watch over Mao around the clock. Hua Guofong was exceptionally loyal to Mao, and allowed
new procedures to be tried on himself before the chairman. When it became clear that Mao’s
heart was failing quickly, Jiang Qing, who was torn between her own reliance on Mao’s power
and the idea that she could gain power after his death, was summoned to Mao’s bedside. Mao’s
nurse, Zhang Yufeng, was very close to the chairman, and everyone except Dr. Li himself had to
go through her to speak with Mao. Mao officially died at 12:10 AM on September 9, 1976. Dr.
Li expected to be charged with Mao’s murder, as many doctors of powerful leaders were, and he
had in fact been against his initial appointment as Mao’s physician. The Politburo wanted to have
Mao’s body preserved for two weeks to pay their respects, then ultimately permanently, but this
was easier said than done. The body was temporarily injected with a large volume of
formaldehyde, but this caused swelling, and physicians caused bruises on Mao’s body in an
attempt to reduce the swelling. The project of permanently preserving Mao’s body was
conducted in secrecy, the May 19 underground project, without any help from outsiders with
more experience in preserving bodies. An additional wax dummy was fabricated. The body was
put on display during a period of mourning in Tiananmen. Dr Li, however, was then asked to
present a report to the Politburo on the cause of Mao’s death. Although he thought he had been
exonerated, he was now being questioned again, specifically regarding the bruises that Mao’s
body had incurred during the temporary preservation process, which could possibly indicate
poisoning. Although Dr. Li was never formally accused of causing Mao’s death, the power
struggle that occurred afterwards prevented any real resolution to the case.
Suo Guoxin: “Seventy-Eight Days in Nineteen Sixty-Seven” (pages 18-34)
*This is basically a narrative story describing in vivid detail the days following the death of
Chairman Mao in 1976 (and not 1967 as the title suggests), and the power struggle that
ensued.
After introducing the death of Mao, the author immediately jumps to Mao’s funeral, where seeds
of conflict and power struggle are already beginning between Marshall Ye Jianying and Mao’s
widow Jiang Qing to fill the power void left by Mao’s death.
The author then describes Jiang Qing’s efforts at gaining support by entertaining about a dozen
or so guests. They reminisce about many topics: the author believes that during all this, Jiang
is merely putting on a show to gain support. She is successful in this particular regard, as
several of her guests proclaim that she should be the new Chairman.
Meanwhile, we then jump to a meeting with Ye Jiangying, Li Xiannian, Wang Dongxing, and
Chen Xilian. They decide that Jiang has forced their hand, and call for her immediate arrest (as
well as her allies Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan.
The next section describes in some detail the actual arrests of these four, and on October 21 the
Xinhua News Agency releases the news that the Central Committee has smashed the attempt of
the “Gang of Four” to seize power.
Schoenals, China’s Cultural Revolution
68. Go on Red! Stop on Green! Yu Xiaoming
-Absurdities during the CR.
- Later half of 1966, red guards had problem with colors of the traffic lights, red, the color of the
revolution shouldn’t mean stop. They raised the problem in the name of the revolution, but Zhou
Enlai was able to prevent a disaster by making the case that red ensures the safety of
revolutionary activities by being the color for the stop light.
69. All Because of On Practice, Zhao Yiming
During CR, one could not read Mao’s On Practice, because it was for the leaders. One could get
into trouble even by applying Mao’s theory that anything could be divided into two (“One
divides into two” from On Practice) in arguments. Almost anything could be considered
reactionary and anti-Mao. Even those who are extremely loyal to Mao could be questioned and
forced to admit their mistakes.
70. Still Grieving, Citizens of Chongqing
70 An ordinary worker who was not involved in politics and faction struggles was dragged
away from home and beaten to death by a faction of Red Guards because of rumors that
he belonged to another faction.
71 A coal mine worker joined the faction that backed the military, was killed in a fight
between factions. His widow now questions the meaning of the Cultural Revolution and
thinks that her husband died for nothing.
72 A construction worker was shot by a seventeen years old student as target while
practicing how to use a rifle. His family was never compensated and the killer never
punished despite repeated appeals by the daughter.
73 A middle school student got shot in an armed struggle. His brother buried him but never
got the money to put up a tomb stone. In the same struggle a dozen other people had died.
74 Mother of a red guard was killed by a stray bullet, he suddenly realized how utterly
meaningless factionalism was, and withdrew from politics.
71. Walls, Zhang Zhiyang
Life in prison during the cultural revolution, the author seems to be highly educated, knows
German well. He lived in a solitary cell, with very bad conditions, was only allowed to be
outdoors an hour each day. Was beaten for no reason by the guards. He remains silent most of
the time and meditates about life and philosophy. He refuses to give in. His persistence and
willpower saved him from going mad.
72. Letter to Chen Yun, Deng Xiapping, and Hu Yaobane, Wang Li
Letter Wang Li wrote in 1984 to ask the Party to reconsider his expulsion from the party. He
admitted to theoretical mistakes made during the CR, and asked to remain a negative example for
other party members, and sum up the bitter experiences of the CRin which he tool part. He also
applauded the new party line and policies.
The Mandarin and the Cadre—by Lucian Pye
I.
II.
III.
Why is there no clear, definitive accounting of the Cultural Revolution
a. Too multidimensional in scope to be defined by one theory
b. Current authorities also find it easy to blame the CR on past leadership, and will
often suggest that another CR could happen if it wasn’t for their current
leadership
Analysis of the Chinese mass psyche
c. During CR, most intellectuals and analysts did not doubt or criticize Mao’s absurd
plans for technological and economic improvement
i. We see now that his tactics was not working to favor peasants and reduce
inequalities in Chinese society
d. Also, most Chinese are afraid to face the psychological roots of the CR
i. In other countries, governments have inflicted terrible things upon its
people. In China, the leadership mostly stood aside and let the people rip
into each other
e. Furthermore, it is hard to get realistic analysis because the Chinese has a practice
of painting the past in the darkest terms possible so as to make the present more
glowing
Why did the CR happen?
f. The Central government issued a statement called “On Questions of Party
History” in 1981
i. Pointed to Mao as instigator of CR and actually said that he did not do
what was best for the people. However, still pretty gentle since they said
his merits outweighed his mistakes
g. While there are lots of material about the causes of the CR, many writers fall into
the trap of taking verbatim what the leadership says, and fail to realize that in
politics, words are usually used to mask the true motive.
h. The Chinese also hate to look introspectively at the fact that something
fundamentally cultural might have been the cause of the CR, instead of the
mistakes of a few individuals.
i. They’ve learned to associate country with state, and therefore in their
adamant “patriotism,” they’ve learned that criticism of the state is same as
IV.
V.
treason against the country.
i. Also, the reason that Mao was able to ignite so much fury among the people with
just a few casual comments probably testifies to the extreme repression of
aggression in Chinese culture.
i. Furthermore, what used to be, in Confucian times, the ideals of morality
which stems from narcissism (wanting to be more moral than others, and
shaming others with your superior standards into being moral as well), has
turned into moral indignation, which means thoughts like if I am moral
and suffer restrictions, then everyone else must suffer them as well.
ii.
The moral indignation built up tremendous frustration against
authority once violence started, it spread unchecked.
iii.
Another source of frustration came from the fact that people were
not being evaluated on performance but also on background (six black
background of landlord, rich peasant, counterrevolutionary, bad elements,
rightists and capitalists; the five red caterories of workers, poor peasants,
soldiers, revolutionary cadres and revolutionary martyrs).
Personal experiences
j. Much of the personal accounts are rather clichéd, and stick to blaming ‘Lin Biao
and the Gang of Four’
k. Surprisingly, a large number of people came out still believing in the party and
convinced that the CR was a mere mistake of individuals
The Astonishing Revival of Institutions
l. Most institutions are in shambles, and cities are run by revolutionary committees
consisting of the three-in-one combination: PLA, veteran cadres and revolutionary
masses
i. However, it is astonishing to note the rapidity with which the Chinese
economic, social and political structure recovered once the “left” was
defeated.
ii.
The elite quickly rearranged themselves, and the people who just a
few years ago were enemies, were able to separate their emotions from
actions by containing personal feelings and behaving according to
established community norms.
Final Assessment
The CR made the bureaucrats realize that China’s traditional policies were flawed, and that it
jarred their traditional sense of racial superiority. The Chinese are still confused about choosing
racial patriotism versus being willing to adapt to modernization. But, it is due to the scarring
effects of the CR that China was able to deviate so much from the Soviet Socialism and the early
communism of China. It has adopted bold modernizing policies since Post-Mao era.
In summary, the CR leaves two legacies at the national level. One, the current reforms and the
open door policies could never have come about except for the trauma of that event, yet at the
same time, anxieties instilled by the experience of near anarchy may make it impossible to
realize fully the potential of those reforms, or to allow greater political and cultural freedoms.
At the personal level, the survivors, because they feel emboldened by having survived, are not
much more confidant about deviating from the orthodox communist model. They are also much
more self-seeking than before, and are devoted to personal lives.
Barme
Shades of Mao
This article is a compilation of several essays, critiques, and interviews concerning Mao and the
CR
A memoir/article called “survivor’s critique” of Mao’s phenomena by Li Jie
1 Mao’s legacy is an historical, cultural, psychological, political, economic, literary, and
philosophical phenomena
2 China’s politics and Chinese family are symmetric with the father rules with iron fist and
the mother rules with kindness: Mao is the father and Zhou is the mother. Equates to
Chinese people rejection of father (Mao) and love for mother (Zhou)
3 The CR meant that the Chinese could only think with Mao Zedong Thought which
prevented them from having their own intellectual processes.
4 The CR and the allegiance to Mao represents a collapse of rationalism
5 By the 1980s the Chinese people had lost their icon and psychological lynchpin which
caused a great search for a new spiritual goal in this “moral vacuum”.
6 Article argues that “Mao created the conditions for modernism and postmodernism in
China”
7 China’s Maoist era will draw to a close when the Chinese people stand up for their right
to “live as human beings”
Critiques of Li Jie’s work
8 Critics claim that Li’s article is an expression of political disgruntlement rather than
academic work
9 Li’s article attacks Mao, the Party, the people, and socialism which is a threat to Mao’s
legacy
10 Li’s article is a consequence of an intelligentsia craze that spread through universities in
1979
11 Conclusion is that “western remedies cannot provide cures for China’s ills”
Interview with Comrade Deng Liqun
12 1989 was year of anti-communism around the globe but China experienced a MaoCraze
13 MaoCraze is a period of intellectual searching and discovery to re-acquaint with Mao’s
teaching
14 MaoCraze is due to the fact that younger generations do not have personal experience
with Mao or revolutionary legacy
15 MaoCraze reflects Chinese society because Mao Zedong Thought originated in China.
The study of Mao and his thought is permanent element of Chinese history and society
Interview with HeXin
16 Mao is China’s greatest strategist and think and politician
17 MZT is clear, uniquely Chinese, and practicable
18 Mao’s errors are primarly economic because his theories were rudimentary
19 China’s modernization will begin with Mao
20 MaoCraze is because Chinese are re-discovering patriotism
Interview with Gu Yue
21 MaoCraze has begun people are interested in a spiritual civilization which means turning
back to the life of Mao
22 Some say MaoCraze can be interpreted as a mass dissatisfaction with DXP’s policies
which emphasize capitalistic materialism and profit-motive
23 Others believe that DXP’s policies are in keeping with MZT because relations with the
US and Japan were initiated by Mao and initiated by Zhou
24 No films in China have dealt directly with the CR; Films do not depict either Lin Biao or
Lui Shaoqi; all films are approved of by the Steering Committee on Major Revolutionary
Historical Themes
25 Mao is human, has made errors that the Chinese people must accept
26 China may go the way the Soviet Union did (i.e. denounce Stalin and Lenin) if Chinese
do not hold onto DXP’s “Four Basic Principles”: 1. Support The CP 2. Support
Marxism-Leninism and MZT 3. support the dictatorship of the Proletariat 4. support
the socialist path
27
FC48 Study Guide – BarmÈ, Geremie (ed) “Shades of Mao” pp 75-104
pp 75-76: Latter half of “In a Glass Darkly: An Interview with Gu Yue”
1 Gu Yue was the top actor who made a career from portraying Mao in films
2 People involved in making/examining/funding films about Party leaders
o Li Ruihuan – Politburo leader in charge of ideological matters
o Ding Qiao – chair of “the Steering Committee on Major Revolutionary Historical
Themes,” former gov minister in charge of cinema
o Wang Renzhi – head of Ministry of Propaganda
o Ai Zhisheng – head of Ministry of Film and Television
3 Funding for revolutionary epics based on box office projections, depends on film
4 Gu Yue believes Mao films, despite being so political, offer an accurate portrayal of
historical events and could appeal to an international audience
5 Gu Yue feels financially disadvantaged compared to other famous mainland actors
because his haggling over wages would damage Mao’s image; he makes about 300 yuan
per month, which is still more than most people in China
pp 77-79: Draco Volans est in Coelo (Can the dargan ever be bound?) (Sept 9, 1991)
5 Preface to Mao Zedong’s “Military Philosophy and Contemporary Business Warfare,”
bad prose full of clichÈs, typical of popular writing in China at the time
6 Strategies from warfare can be applied to businesses
7 Mao Zedong’s Military Philosophy was brilliant and won the war against Chiang
Kai-Shek’s stronger and better equipped army in 3 years; Mao Thought is also much
more accessible than classical Chinese works
8 Unfortunately Mao’s quotes were vulgarized in the 1960s and 70s, so in the 80s people
came to believe Mao Thought was no longer valid for China’s economy (open door and
reform policies)
9 Mao Thought says all problems should be analyzed in concrete terms and a solution
should be found in a practical and realistic manner; there are limitless possibilities for
application of Mao’s military philosophy in economic realm  must free ourselves from
shadow of Cultural Revolution in order to perceive the true value of Mao Thought
pp 80-85: Let the Red Sun Shine In (Jan 20, 1992)
10 “The Red Sun” was a rearrangement and recording of Cultural Revolution songs released
on cassette tape in winter 1991-92; immediately became nationwide best-seller; new
versions of songs are “limp, mushy, and kitsch” compared to near-ecstatic quality of
original songs
11 This article is a discussion of the significance of “The Red Sun” craze by Shanghai
cultural critics:
o Xu Jilin: researcher in the Cultural Institute of Huadong Chemical Industries
Institute
o He Ping: Editor, The Shanghai Cultural Almanac
o Yan Bofei: Researcher in the Philosophy Institute of the Shanghai Academy of
Social Sciences
o Yang Jianguo: Reporter, Shanghai Culture and Arts News
12 The China Record Company (who produced the tape) thought they would be able to sell
300,000 copies in early January, but by Jan 20 they though it was possible that they might
sell one million copies
13 “The Red Sun” became a full-blown craze, popular with people of all ages from all walks
of life
14 element of nostalgia – many people grew up with the songs of the Cultural Revolution,
the most exciting period of their lives; songs bring back lost youth
15 Original pure, religious hymns have been secularized, have lost their ideological content
value, and psychological thrust  integrated into pop culture
16 Songs no longer trigger bitter memories, but can still remind people of good parts of the
past: sense of simplicity and purity, piety, belief that great goodness was possible and
people were good, throwing oneself into things and finding a meaning in life (all things
lacking today)
17 Popularity of The Red Sun shows not only a waning of the power of ideology but also a
sense of crisis – people no longer have safety net of any belief system
18 Also reflects paucity of contemporary pop music in mainland China – easier to adapt
historical music such as The Red Sun or adopt pop music from overseas (Hong Kong and
Taiwan)
pp 86-90: A Place in the Pantheon: Mao and Folk Religion (end of 1992)
19 The “Red Sun Phenomenon” or the “Mao Becomes a God Phenomenon” – from late
1991, China experienced a re-deification of Mao that started in the South and spread to
the North
20 New cult of Mao is different from the past because it is a popular deification instead of a
politically orchestrated one
21 New deification occurred via traditional folk religion – people sought Mao-God’s
22
23
24
25
protection when building houses, doing business, driving cars; old ladies placed Mao’s
image over stoves and in niches built for statues of Buddha, burned incense to him
Chinese history had always linked politics with religion (behavior of rulers linked with
behavior of gods); after the communist takeover in 1949, folk religion suppressed  only
sanctioned outlet for popular religious sentiment was to worship Mao
Harsh rulers and tyrants in China (Chi You, Qin Shihuang, etc) were traditionally treated
with awe and commemorated in special temples with religious observances by later
generations
Worship of Mao stemmed from the people’s ancient shamanistic belief that divine power
could exorcise malevolent forces all around them: during the Cultural Revolution, people
thought the world was full of evils such as imperialism and Revisionism, and they lived
in constant fear of the suffering that would come about with the “restoration of
capitalism”  Mao’s omnipotence and omnipresence was a “Spiritual Atom Bomb” that
could dispel all evils, leading to hysterical popular adoration and worship
Because Mao was the all-powerful figure for so long, he was the obvious choice for
popular adulation during the recent religious revival in China
pp 91-95: The Imprisoned Hearth: Consuming Mao (April 1994)
26 Political Pop is a genre of art that combines the commercial dimension of Western Pop
with the political icons of socialisim; produced works rich in a particular style of humor
and absurdity
27 Started by Czech and Soviet artists in late 1970s and early 80s, combined Western
images like Coca-Cola with communist icons (Lenin, Stalin, hammer and sickle) 
purpose was to desecrate political leaders
28 Political Pop appeared in China in the late 1980s, early 90s  part of mass revival of
MaoCraze sweeping the nation (immense popularity of re-released Cultural Revolution
songs, books about Mao, Mao badges)
29 System of beliefs represented by Mao was swept away by commercialism: Mao was
transformed from the solemn and awe-inspiring god into a Pop icon (Mao’s aura of
sanctity was dissolved by commercialization and popularization)
30 Mao is a dated icon of the militaristic phase of Chinese socialism that can now be safely
reinvented for popular and elite consumption (would be dangerous if same thing were
done to current leaders)
31 Political Pop was a reaction to earlier trends: art of 1980s was product of China’s open
door (impact of Western thought) and collapse of Revolutionary Realist culture of Maoist
era, artists thought of themselves as revolutionaries united by desire to overthrow
aesthetic conventions of Chinese art  became interested in use of salvaged/found
objects; Pop was a continuation of Dada art and product of a highly commercialized
environment
32 Shooting incident at 1989 “Modern Art Exhibition” in Beijing revealed political
sensitivity of contemporary Chinese art, led to closure of exhibition and marked end of
1980s art  artists faced collapse of values in early 1990s, turned to deconstructionist
projects of Political Pop, reprised political images in a new, unorthodox fashion deeply
influenced by American Pop, especially Andy Warhol
33 Examples: Mao juxtaposed with Whitney Houston, characters from Revolutionary Model
Operas inserted into video game scenario
34 While American Pop converted vulgar icons into something more highbrow, Political
Pop in China vulgarizes the sacrosanct, reflecting a general decay of values and a
confusion of cultural memories
pp 96-97: MaoSpeak (1989)
(excerpt from the satirical novel Don’t Treat Me As a Human Being by Wang Shuo)
35 “MaoSpeak” was popularized as the political and social lingua franca from the 1940s;
Wang Shuo uses this language in his late 1980s satirical studies of life in Beijing under
the terminal phase of socialism
36 Wang and his generation has real nostalgia for the Cultural Revolution, which meant
“sexual liberation, no school, and the joys of gang warfare”
37 Except is a “letter of appreciation” to the Party leadership written by the citizens of Tanzi
Alley, read out as a tearful incantation by the mother of Tang Yuanbao, the novel’s
picaresque hero; the letter is an extreme parody of Chinese political and commercial
language
38 The letter is recited to a Party official named “Fatty” - the language is effusive and
ridiculous:
o “You have righted the wrong and crushed the bad in one fell swoop. Respected
wise dear teacher leader helmsman pathfinder vanguard pioneer designer bright
light torch devil-deflecting mirror dog-beating stick dad mum granddad grandma
old ancestor primal ape Supreme Deity Jade Emperor Guanyin Boddhisattva
commander-in-chief”
39 The mother eventually passes out from singing Fatty’s praises, so the recitation is taken
up by a neighbor who also passes out, etc – Fatty eventually cuts the praises off, saying
that even if all the inhabitants of Tanzi Alley died of exhaustion extolling his virtues he
still wouldn’t be impressed
pp 98-99: Who’s Responsible? (November 1993)
40 This is reportedly the first article the author Wei Jingsheng had published in the Hong
Kong press following his release from jail in 1993
41 Directly accuses Mao of being an “outstanding tyrant” responsible for 100 million people
starving to death, a similar number forced to become beggars, and another 100 million
subjected political persecution that included years of spiritual and physical anguish
42 Mao should be held chiefly responsible for the extreme poverty and backwardness of the
Chinese for four decades; Mao’s “henchmen” are also guilty
43 The masses should also be held accountable because “to an extent the viciousness of the
rulers is the result of the weakness and compliance of the masses”
44 Calls upon the Chinese to learn to fight back, defend their own rights, and never forget
this “lesson written in blood”
pp 100: In the Footstepf of the Great (October 13, 1993)
45 This article is from the Beijing Evening News and appeared shortly before Mao’s
centenary. It is about how revolutionary tourism is used by some schools as a method of
inculcating love for Mao among his revolutionary successors.
46 Revolutionary tourism has been common since the founding of the PRC, when Red
Guards roamed the country in search of the political shrines of Party history
47 In commemoration of Mao’s 100th birthday, hundreds of students of Xiaomachang
Primary School went in search of Mao Zedong’s footsteps in the Xuanwu District, where
Mao worked and lived in his youth
48 Students visited places where Mao had attended the wake of his first wife’s father, where
he had organized a meeting denouncing a warlord, where he made dumplings with his
teacher, etc
pp 101: Sparing Mao a Thought (December 26, 1993)
49 This editorial was published in the People’s Daily on the centenary of Mao’s birth. It
focuses on Mao Zedong Thought.
50 States that Mao’s greatest contribution was Mao Zedong Thought, which was a melding
of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism with practical realities of the Chinese
revolution. It was achieved through a long period of struggle and has been “a source of
endless ideological strength in the work of both revolution and construction”
51 Deng Xiaoping has “set a shining example for us in how to sustain and develop Mao
Zedong Thought” by coupling the open door and reform policies with socialist
modernization. Deng’s theory of Chinese Marxism – “building socialism with Chinese
characteristics is a powerful weapon that can guide us to create a prosperous and
powerful nation”
pp 102: The Last Ten-Thousand Words (December 27, 1993)
52 This is an excerpt from the official eulogy for Mao’s centenary delivered by the Party
General Secretary Jiang Zemin, published in the People’s Daily.
53 Mao’s achievements are of primary importance and his errors in his latter years were
secondary, the errors of a Great Revolutionary. It was Mao Zedong Thought that made
the Chinese revolution successful, and we should continue to maintain and develop MZD
Thought
54 MZD Thought changes with the times – Deng’s theory of socialism with Chinese
characteristics enriches MZD Thought and allows it to rise to even greater heights
55 We must pursue the Party line without wavering for a century, earnestly studying MZD
Thought and applying Deng’s theory in order to build a “rich, democratic, and civilized
modern, socialist country”
pp 103-104: The Specter of Mao Zedong (late 1994)
56 This is an excerpt from an essay about Mao and China’s post-Deng scenario by Liu
Xiaobo, a social and political critic and one of China’s most outspoken dissidents.
57 The specter of Mao affects the attitude of Maoists in the Party leadership and also has a
mass following among the people – these two groups are united by Mao in opposition to
Deng Xiaoping’s open door and reform policies
58 Mao is a symbol used by the masses to express frustrations with present policy (Deng’s),
and we are witnessing the combination of nationalist currents of thought with nostalgia
for a Maoist past
59 Absurdity: Mao is much admired and deeply missed even though he murdered tens of
millions of people and turned hundred of millions into pliant slaves; on the other hand,
the new leadership has rehabilitated countless numbers of the unjustly condemned and
has given China unprecedented wealth, but they are the object of mass dissatisfaction
60 Deng is responsible – he maintained Mao’s political system, was unable to alter
authoritarian rule fundamentally, failed to shed light completely on disasters caused by
Mao, and kept Mao as the chief icon of the Party
61 After Deng, the banner of Mao will have to be unfurled again to stabilize China, meaning
that China will fall back into the vicious cycle of history
Gebre-E Gebre
The End of the Chinese Revolution
By Roderick MacFarquhar
When Deng Xiaoping suppressed the Beijing Spring last month (1989), he thought he
was putting down a new CR. As the leading living victim of the CR, Deng could not tolerate
chaos or revival of mob rule but what he failed to understand was that the Tiananmen Square
1989 was virtually different.
The Tiananmen incident was different from that of CR in the following ways:
1 During the CR, the Red Guards were conjured up by the revolutionary incitement of
Chairman Mao but the 1989 demonstrations were genuine grass-roots protest skillfully
organized by student activists.
2 The Red Guards worshiped Mao; the pre-democracy protestors worshiped nobody
although they looked up to Hu Yaobang.
3 The Red Guards rallied to Mao’s drumbeat. The Tiananmen students called for universal
freedom.
4 The CR was fueled by hate and was violent whereas the 1989 would-be-democrats
demanded the resignations of Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng, but showed pacifist attitude
to even the troops sent to suppress them.
Both the protesters and repressors of the 1989 acted within the dark penumbra of the CR.
Deng and his colleagues were obsessed by the memory of disorder and destructions of the CR.
A lot of top officials had suffered during the 10 years of CR – head-of-state Liu Shaoqi died in
anonymity after long period of medical neglect, others were persecuted to death or forced to
commit suicide. The Chinese chroniclers of the CR claim that 100m people were affect by it;
foreign scholars estimated up to half a million.
The CR was also an institutional trauma for Chinese Communist party. Mao had simply wanted
to get rid himself of some senior colleagues and to transform the rest into born-again
revolutionaries. The erosion of Party authority had its corollary in an invigoration of
people-power.
At first people spoke and acted because Mao had licensed and encouraged (“to rebel is
justified”) think them. However, eventually, they began to act autonomously before the chairman
finally in 1968 decided to consign the Red Guards to the countryside.
The Cultural Revolution redefined the rotations between subsequent generations of
students and state.
On April 5, 1976 there was a truly spontaneous combustion if the Tiananmen Square
when students and citizens exploded in wrath over the removal of posters they had brought to
mourn recently deceased Premier Zhou Enlai. The demonstration was met with severe force.
The implicit targets of the demonstration were the Gang of Four and Mao but the Deng
Xiaoping was their implicit hero.
Deng benefited from spontaneous mass action. Most protestors wanted a more relaxed
political atmosphere, and saw Deng’s return (1978) to power as the way to ensure this.
Nevertheless, the democracy wall was short-lived: a few out-spoken activists like Wei
Jingsheng were later sentenced to long periods in jail.
Every time Deng had to choose between democracy and power, he chose power. Guns
and tanks weren’t required to deal with the young people who put up posters in 1978.
The military establishment has always wielded more political clout in china. Mao
struggled hard, not fully successfully, to ensure the party command the gun. One of Deng’s
greatest achievements was cutting the army to reasonable size. But he failed to impose full
civilian control on the party’s Military Affairs Commission. Yet the economic reform programs
which he masterminded beginning in 1979 demanded a more flexible political structure.
Deng’s marginal interest in Marxist-Leninist - Mao Zedong Thoughts weakened the
ideology of the party. From “serve the people” there was a shift to “to get rich is glorious”.
The thin line between indulging in personal corruption and taking shortcuts on behalf of a
collective unit became blurred. Gradually, corruption became a major problem and a few
courageous journalists like Liu Binyan - now in the USA – became national heroes for
muckraking exposes.
Although he talked about democratization, Deng took no decisive institutional steps to
alter the formal relationships between state and society. Lawyers were trained but mainly to
cut better deals with foreign firms, not to risk their careers fighting for the little man against the
state.
Deng allowed some relaxation of political controls because he knew it was necessary for
the economic reform program. This encouraged intellectuals and students to speak out with
increasing boldness but they felt frustrated because their voices were falling of deaf hears.
When demonstrations started mid-April, there was no Chinese leader to whom the students
could turn and no institution to go through which could channel their frustrations.
Deng had watched Poland and Hungary struggle through their reforms and did not rule
out similar urban unrest in China. He started taking precautions as early as 1983; reestablishment
of 400,000man national force unit.
During his 6 year tenure as party boss, Hu Yaobang – most committed reformer – had
pleased intellectuals with his tolerance of dissent, but he never articulated a broad-based program
of democratization. His successor Zhao also failed to achieve this.
Deng was in bad health condition and as the critical seventieth anniversary of patriotic
movement (May 4) the leadership worried about civil disorder. Students were planning their own
celebration when Hu Yaobang had his heart attack at Politburo meeting. His death on April 15
sparked the prairie fire of the student mass movement culmination in the now infamous
Tiananmen massacre.
Divided at the top, the Chinese Communist party could no longer cope with the
multiple pressures upon it and finally cracked. Since the massacre vigorous attempts are
being made to bring senior opponents into line.
The crisis brought by the events of June 3 and 4 was deep. Deng Xiaoping and Yang
Shangkun destroyed the last shreds of legitimacy possessed by the Communist party. It is the
first time the regime has turned its gun on peacefully demonstrating people in Beijing with the
world and the rest of China watching. The repression may cowed the people but the offense will
never be forgiven.