R.F., 3/1/06
SOURCES OF INFORMATION
ON
DEFENSE ACQUISITION
Contents
Pages
1. Documents dated 1945-1958
1
2. Documents dated 1959-1968
2-5
3. Documents dates 1969-1980
6-19
4. Documents dates 1981-1990
20-59
5. Documents dates 1991-2005
60-84
6. C-17 Documents
85-87
1945 to 1958
R. Fox, 3/1/06
Section I
SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON DEFENSE ACQUISITION
arranged by the years covered in DAHP VOLUME I – 1945 to 1958
1958, July 17 and 18, "Study of the Armed Services Procurement Regulations and
Departmental Implementation Thereto," Hearings before the Subcommittee for
Special Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of
Representatives (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). [The hearings
contain testimony from representatives of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Only pp.
123-149 and 269-277 and 285-301 and 335-401 are retained (Shannon Brown may have the
full transcript). These pages contain statements from the Commandant of the U.S. Army
Logistics Management Center, Ft. Lee, VA; and the Chief of Procurement Policy
Division, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel, Headquarters, USAF. Their
testimony indicates that the Advanced Air Force Pricing School instructors consisted
of staff from Harbridge House, Inc in Boston, MA, faculty from the Harvard Business
School, and faculty from the School of Business Administration, University of
California at Los Angeles. (44 pages)]
1
1959 to 1968
R.F., 3/1/06
Section II
SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON DEFENSE ACQUISITION
arranged by the years covered in DAHP VOLUME II – 1959 to 1968
1959, October 14, "Predictability of the Costs, Time, and Success of Development,"
A. W. Marshall and W. H. Meckling, Economics Division, The RAND Corporation
Report #P-1821. [In this paper, Marshall and Meckling from RAND Corporation
present the results of some recent research into the extent and nature of the uncertainty
in new developments. The proposition that development of new products or processes
is an uncertain business is generally accepted without serious dispute. But when it
comes to translating that generality into uncertainties associated with particular current
development proposals; or when it comes to discussing the implications of uncertainty
for the way development projects should be managed, the apparent agreement in point
of view is often quickly dissipated. To a large extent the differences which arise do so
over the question of the "extent" of the uncertainty in development – over questions
such as, "Are estimates of cost of production likely to be off by 25 percent or by 300
percent. (24 pages)]
*1961, "The Budget Business," Directorate of Budget, Comptroller, Headquarters, USAF.
[The document presents a clear description of the DoD budget process from the
perspective of the Air Force Directorate of Budget, complete with an index; prepared
for a non-technical audience. (43 pages)]
1962, Planning and Forecasting in the Defense Industries, J. A. Stockfisch, editor
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc). [The document contains 13
articles, with the following eight most closely related to defense acquisition: The
Scope and Nature of the Defense Sector of the U.S. Economy; Defense Budgets and
the Federal Budgetary Process; Aspects of Corporate Planning in the Defense
Industry; The Impact of Military Procurement on American Industry; Some Emerging
Developments in the Airframe Industry; Interaction of the Defense Program and the
Electronics Industry; How to Forecast Defense Expenditures; National Security
Expenditures, 1960-1970. (292 pages)]
1962, "The PERT/COST System, Volume One: System Design," prepared by Management
Systems Corporation, R. Fox project manager, under contract with the U.S. Navy
Special Projects Office (Polaris). [The report describes the design of the PERT/COST
System for schedule and cost planning and control of large engineering development
programs. (119 pages)]
*1962, The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis, Merton J. Peck and
Frederic M. Scherer, Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business
Administration, Harvard University. [A pioneer study of defense acquisition dealing
2
1959 to 1968
R.F., 3/1/06
with (1) The Nature of the Acquisition Process; (2) The Structure and Dynamics of the
Weapons Industry; and (3) The Execution of Weapons Programs. (736 pages)]
1962, September 4-7, Science, Technology, and Management, edited by Fremont E. Kast
and James E. Rosenzweig. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc). [The
book contains the Proceedings of the National Advanced-Technology Management
Conference in Seattle, Washington. The conference report includes the remarks of
twenty-three speakers including: Wernher von Braun; Edward Teller; General Bernard
Shriever, USAF; Simon Ramo; Vice Admiral W. D. Raborn, Jr, USN; Assistant
Secretary of Defense Charles Hitch; DDR&E Harold Brown; and General F. S.
Besson, US Army. (368 pages)]
1963, Project Management, John Stanley Baumgartner, (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D.
Irwin, Inc). [The book contains a basic description of project management techniques.
Topics discussed in the book include: The Project Manager; Planning; The Elements
of Control; Subcontracts; Building the Project Team; Fiscal management and Cost
Control; and The Project Manager and the Customer. (185 pages)]
1963, September, "The Control of Schedules and Costs in Major Weapon and Space
Programs," J. Ronald Fox, The Armed Forces Comptroller Journal, Volume VIII—
No. 3, pp. 3-13. [The article describes objectives and uses of the PERT COST system
from the standpoint of financial management of defense acquisition programs.
(11 pages)]
1963, October, "Common Problems Associated with the Implementation and Operation
of the PERT Cost System," J. Ronald Fox for the Special Projects Office,
Department of the Navy. [The document describes key features of the PERT Cost
System, PERT Cost implementation problems, and PERT Cost operational problems.
(43 pages)]
*1964, The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic Incentives, Frederic M. Scherer,
Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard
University. [This is a path-breaking study of defense acquisition, (The book is the
second volume of the Weapons Acquisition Research Project at Harvard. The volume
includes three sections: I. Competitive Incentives; II. Contractual Incentives; and III.
Incentives and Government Policy. (447 pages)]
1964, Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces, Irving Brinton
Holley, Jr. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History). [An
interesting, well researched history of buying aircraft during the years prior to 1947.
(641 pages)]
*1965, Decision-Making for Defense, Charles J. Hitch (Los Angeles, CA: University of
California Press). [The book contains four Gaither Memorial Lectures established by
RAND Corporation. The lectures are arranged by the Graduate School of Business
3
1959 to 1968
R.F., 3/1/06
Administration and the Center for Research in Management Science at the University
of California, Berkeley. The four lectures in this series are entitled: I. 1789-1960; II.
Planning—Programming—Budgeting; III. Cost-Effectiveness; and IV. Retrospect and
Prospect. (83 pages)]
1965, Program Budgeting, David Novick, Editor (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press). [This book contains a collection of 12 articles organized in three groupings:
Part I—Government Decision Making and the Program Budget; Part II—Actual and
Potential Applications of the Program Budget Idea; and Part III—Implementation
and Operation. At the time of publication, David Novick was head of the Cost
Analysis Department at RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, CA. (380 pages)]
*1965, May 13.
"Problem Areas in Air Force Weapons Systems Management." R. Fox
report to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force. [The report describes specific
acquisition management problems and recommendations pertaining to contract
changes, personnel turnover in program offices, qualifications of program office
personnel, cost estimating, cost control, controlling indirect costs, increasing
contractor costs, funds control, unclear program requirements, and special study
requests imposed on program offices. (60 pages)]
1966, "TFX (A), (B), (C), (D) and F-111 Chronology," Leon Booth, Robert Chepolis, and
George Howard (all Air Force captains), Harvard Business School technical note and
cases. [The cases and notes on the F-111 acquisition program vary in length from 2 to
13 pages.]
*1967, "The F-237 Program," Lt. Colonel Richard Lorette, USAF, Harvard Business
School case. [The case is a composite of interviews with program officers from a
variety of DoD development and production programs. It, therefore, does not present
the experience of any single program but reflects typical problems arising in aerospace
and defense acquisition programs. (14 pages)]
1968, Systems Analysis and Project Management, David I. Cleland and William R. King
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company). [The book contains five sections: I. Basic
Systems Concepts; II. Systems Approaches in Planning and Implementation; III.
Systems Analysis; IV. Project Management; and V. Organizational Support for
Systems-Oriented Management. (315 pages)]
1968, July. "A Reappraisal of Incentive Contracting Experience," by Irving N. Fisher, A
Rand Corporation Report prepared for the United States Air Force Project Rand. [The
report is excellent. It includes a powerful critique of incentive contracts describing
how the average negotiated profit rate goes up as the risk born by a contractor
increases. That is, profit increases successively for CPFF, FPR, and FPI contracts as
the risk is shifted more to the contractor. The report is based on an analysis of 948 Air
Force contracts. (50 pages)]
4
1959 to 1968
R.F., 3/1/06
*1968, July, "Improving the Effectiveness of Incentive Contracting," I. N. Fisher, Rand
Report P-3870, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. [The report
includes five sections: (1) Introduction; (2) Mechanics of Incentive Contracts; (3)
Increasing the Effectiveness of Incentive Contracts; (4) Conclusions; and (5)
Appendix—Rationale for Higher Target Costs with Incentive Contracts. The report
contains the persuasive conclusion that it is unlikely that incentive contracts have had
any real effect on costs or efficiency. (16 pages)]
5
1969 to 1980
R.F., 3/1/06
Section III
SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON DEFENSE ACQUISITION
arranged by the years covered in DAHP VOLUME III – 1969 to 1980
1969, July 31, "Final Report on Systems Acquisition, Defense Science Board Task Force
on Research and Development Management, Office of the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering, U.S. Department of Defense. [The report presents a
condensation of the views of the task force on "Key Issues" afflicting the DoD process
of weapon system acquisition. There is strong agreement on one aspect of the "Key
Issues" confronting DoD in their management practices; namely, that DoD surely
needs new policy guidance. The present management policy is too complex and
cumbersome, resulting in a less than satisfactory military posture. It has proven to be
relatively inflexible in light of rapidly changing threats to U.S. security. This rigidity
has occurred because of over-centralization within DoD as a matter of policy. "It is
time that DoD got lean and hard at the top and through middle management with
experienced and professionally oriented people who need policy and objectives for
guidance and not procedures." The report contains nine generic recommendations
dealing with various aspects of defense acquisition: (1) Generation of Requirements;
(2) Systems-Oriented Advance Development; (3) Contract Definition Phase; (4)
Procurement Practices for System Development; (5) Overemphasis on Procedure and
Documentation; (6) DoD Management Effectiveness; (7) DoD Organizational
Alignment; (8) Fiscal Planning; and (9) Congressional Understanding. (RF Comment:
While the affiliation of the members of the Task Force is not identified, the nature of
the recommendations leads one to suspect that the report was heavily influenced by
the military services wanting to have more control over weapons acquisition decisions,
and by industry representatives disapproving of competitive price pressures and
documentation requirements, and favoring decentralized decision making resulting in
more control over acquisition within each military service vs. at the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.) (114 pages)]
*1970, Aerospace Facts and Figures, Compiled by the Office of Public Affairs, Carlyle H.
Jones and the officers of Aviation Week and Space Technology, Aerospace Industries
Association of America, Inc. [A comprehensive collection of data and analyses
relating to U.S. Aerospace and Defense activities. (144 pages)]
*1970, "The Air Force Budget," Edmund W. Edmunds, Jr., Colonel, U.S. Air Force
(Washington, DC: Contract Management Institute). [The document contains a brief
but reasonably comprehensive description of the Air Force Budget Process. (72 pages)
See also 1961 "The Budget Business" in this index.]
6
1969 to 1980
R.F., 3/1/06
*1970, Spring, "There's So Much to be Done," R. Fox, Armed Forces Comptroller
Journal, Volume 16, No. 2, pp. 29-34. [The article discusses Defense acquisition;
Basic Requirements for Management Systems, In-depth Planning and Cost
Estimating; the Army Improvement Program; Letter Contracts; Should Cost Analysis;
Progress Reporting, and Performance Measurement. (6 pages)]
1970, April 22, "Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations," U.S. Senate
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). [Assistant Secretary Fox and
General Kornet discuss the Army's Program for Procurement of Equipment and
Missiles for FY 72. (180 pages)]
1970, May 20, 21, and 23, "The Acquisition of Weapon Systems," Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee,
Congress of the United States, Senator William Proxmire, Chairman (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). [Witnesses included: F. Trowbridge vom
Baur—former General Counsel, Department of the Navy; Elmer B. Staats—
Comptroller General of the United States; Robert N. Anthony—Ross Walker
Professor of Mmanagement Control, Harvard University; J. Ronald Fox—Assistant
Secretary of the Army; Philip W. Whittaker—Assistant Secretary of the Air Force;
and Frank Sanders—Assistant Secretary of the Navy. The discussion deals with
problems of cost growth in defense acquisition. (568 pages)]
1970, July 1, Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of
Defense, by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, Chairman
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). [The Blue Ribbon Defense
Panel was appointed by the President and the Secretary of Defense in July 1969 to
examine: (a) The organization and management of DOD including the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Defense Agencies and the Military Services; (b) The Defense research and
development efforts from the standpoints of mission fulfillments, costs, organization,
time and interrelation with the scientific and industrial community; (c) The Defense
procurement policies and practices, particularly as they relate to costs, time and
quality; and (d) Such other matters as the Secretary of Defense may submit to it from
time to time. (Melvin Laird was the Secretary of Defense). The report contains six
chapters: (1) Organization; (2) Management of Materiel Resources; (3) Management
and Procedures; (4) Management of Personnel Resources; (5) Other Management
Considerations; and (6) Conflicts of Interest. (237 pages)]
*1970, July 1, "Appendix E of the Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense
on the Department of Defense (Fitzhugh Report), by the Blue Ribbon Defense
Panel. [The report is organized under three primary headings: I. Major Weapon
Systems Acquisition Process; II. Program Management; III. Management Systems.
Heading #1 is subdivided into four sections: A. Acquisition Strategies; B. Decision
Process; C. Requirements; and D. Source Selection. (50 pages)]
7
1969 to 1980
R.F., 3/1/06
1970, August, Effectiveness of Contract Incentives, William B. Williams, J. Michael
Cummins, and Shirley H. Carter, PRO Project 70-2 (Fort Lee, VA: U.S. Army
Logistics Management Center). [The report consists of a statistical analysis of 742
Department of the Army contracts completed during FY 59-60. Only fixed-price
incentive (FPI), cost-plus-incentive fee (CPIF), cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF), and fixedprice redeterminable (FPR) contracts whose final costs exceeded $1,000,000 were
included in the study. The report concludes that cost overruns are found on all
contract types included in this study, but are very small relative to the total cost
growth found on Army contracts. No significant difference is found between the
average cost overruns for different contract types. This indicates that the type contract
has no significant effect on cost overruns. These findings are further substantiated
through analysis of an additional sample of ten individual contractors and their
incentive contracts. The report also concludes that there is no evidence of reduction in
final cost through increased efficiency of contractors. Yet, this is specifically what the
incentive share is designed to encourage. On the contrary, the evidence favors the
interpretation that contractors use contract modifications to offset the greater risks of
incentives. This study is similar to a study by Irving N. Fisher, "A Reappraisal of
Incentive Contracting Experience," RM-5700-PR, Rand Corporation, 1968.
(48 pages)]
*1970, August 13, "Action Required to Improve Department of Defense Career
Program For Procurement Personnel," GAO Report B-164682. [Chapters in the
report deal with: (1) Establishment of DoD-wide Career Program for Procurement
Personnel; (2) Career Program Needs to Reflect Changing Character and Structure of
Procurement; (3) Career Program Elements, Evaluation of Effectiveness, and
Suggested Corrective Actions; (4) Management of the Civilian Career Program; (5)
Raising the Status of the Procurement Career Field; (6) Role of Military Officers in
Procurement; and (7) Conclusions and Recommendation. (62 pages)]
1970, September 22, 23, 24, 29, and 30, "Policy Changes in Weapon System
Procurement," Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government
Operations, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office). [The Hearings include testimony of Vice Adm. Vincent P. dePoix—
Dep. Dir. Of Defense R&E; Hon. J. Ronald Fox—Asst. Sec. of Army; Hon. Chet
Holified—Representative from California; Hon. Robert C. Moot—Asst. Sec. of
Defense (Comptroller); Hon. David Packard—Deputy Secretary of Defense; Hon.
Frank P. Sanders—Asst. Sec. of Navy; Capt Merrill H. Sappington—Program
Manager Surface Missiles Systems; Hon. Philip N. Whittaker—Asst. Sec. of Air
Force. The discussion deals with ways to improve the defense acquisition process.
(339 pages)]
1970, October 12 to 19, "Notes taken during visits to eight European defense firms,
including notes from a visit with representative of the UK Ministry of
Technology," R. Fox. [The notes describe ways in which selected European
industrial firms manage major acquisition programs. (34 pages)]
8
1969 to 1980
R.F., 3/1/06
1971, Managing Large Systems: Organizations for the Future, Leonard R. Sayles and
Margaret K. Chandler (New York: Harper & Row). [An excellent, practical
discussion of managing large systems. Fifteen chapters include: The Planning
Function for New Technologies; Scientists in Planning; Inducing Excellence: The
Self-Forcing, Self-Enforcing System; Building the Project Organization; The Project
Manager: Organizational Metronome; and Motivating Systems Responsibility.
(332 pages]
*1971, March 18, "Acquisition of Major Weapon Systems," GAO Report B-163058. [The
report contains separate sections dealing with the Army, Navy, and Air Force: Army:
A-X, DRAGON; the Armored Reconnaissance SCOUT Vehicle; and the Heavy Lift
Helicopter (HLH). Navy: Harpoon missile; LAMPS program; AEGIS program; DD963 destroyer; and F-14 aircraft program. Air Force: AWACS program; Short Range
Attack Missile (SRAM) program; C-5A Aircraft program; A-7D aircraft; A-7E
aircraft; and the F-15 aircraft. The report also contains observations on system cost
experience throughout DoD and presents an analysis of growth in program cost
estimates above planning estimates, as of June 30, 1970. The report concludes with
general observations and recommendations. (82 pages)]
1971, May 12, "1972 U.S. Army Appropriations: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations," U.S. House of Representatives (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office). [Assistant Secretary Fox and Major General Kornet
discuss the Army's Program for Procurement of Equipment and Missiles. (332 pages)]
*1971, May-June, "Funds Control Versus Costs Control," R. Fox, Army Logistician
Journal, pp. 4-39. [The article describes the differences between funds control and
cost control and points out that most military project managers have not been trained
to use basic techniques of cost control in managing large acquisition programs.
(36 pages)]
*1971, June, "System Acquisition Strategies," Robert Perry, Giles K. Smith, Alvin J.
Harman, and Susan Henrichsen, R-733-PR/ARPA, prepared for United States Air
Force Project RAND and Advanced Research Projects Agency, Santa Monica:
RAND. [The report contains a review and summary of some of the research and
findings of the RAND System Acquisition Study in 1969 and 1970 and a statement of
policy implications. Much of the detailed work performed by various members of this
group has been separately reported to both DDR&E and the Air Force. Three reports
had been published by 1971: (1) R. L. Perry, D. DiSalvo, G.R. Hall, A.J. Harman,
G.S. Levenson, G. K. Smith and J.P. Stucker, System Acquisition Experience, RM6072-PR, November 1969; (2) Alvin J. Harman, assisted by Susan Henrichsen, A
Methodology for Cost Factor Comparison and Prediction, RM-6269-ARPA, August
1970; and (3) Arthur J. Alexander, R&D in Soviet Aviation, R-589-PR, November
1970.
Notwithstanding determined efforts during the 1960s to improve the outcome
of major system acquisition programs by altering contractual approaches and by
9
1969 to 1980
R.F., 3/1/06
introducing a variety of management reforms, typical programs continued to exhibit
an average cost growth of about 40 percent (after correcting for quantity changes and
for inflation), a schedule slip of about 15 percent, and final system performance that
was likely to deviate by 30 or 40 percent from the original specification. Such
findings have been reported in earlier studies. During the present study, an
examination of the basic factors contributing to cost growth suggested two avenues for
improvement: (1) the cost estimation process could be improved so that cost
predictions made early in a program would more nearly correspond to the cost actually
experienced; (2) More fundamental improvements seem likely to be achieved through
some basic changes in the acquisition process. (55 pages)] [R.Fox comment: The fact
that the average cost growth (adjusted for changes in quantity and inflation) is 40%, and
technical performance fell short by 30 or 40 percent, leads to the conclusion that actual cost
growth, even adjusting the original estimate upward for inflation, is somewhere in the vicinity
of 70 to 80 percent.]
*1971, June 11, "Report of the Industry Advisory Council (IAC) Subcommittee to
Consider Defense Industry Contract Financing and Profit Policy." Office of the
Secretary of Defense. [Report to the Secretary of Defense on profit policy and
contract financing by a committee of the DoD Industry Advisory Council. Committee
members included the president or chairman of Arthur Anderson, Wells Fargo Bank,
Emerson Electric, Grumman Aerospace, LTV., First National City Bank and five
assistant secretaries of the military services. Army Assistant Secretary R. Fox served
as chairman of the Committee. (180+ pages)]
1971 - 1972, Aerospace Facts and Figures, Compiled by the Office of Public Affairs,
Carlyle H. Jones and the officers of Aviation Week and Space Technology by the
Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc. [A comprehensive collection of
data and analyses relating to U.S. Aerospace and Defense activities. (132 pages)]
*1972, The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in
Government, Harvey M. Sapolsky (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press). [A report on the Fleet Ballistic Missile Program, including Polaris, Poseidon,
and the initial research on the Trident Program. The report examines the history of the
Polaris program and discusses lessons the history may hold for the development of
future naval weapons. Chapters include: Promoting and Protecting the Program; The
Structure of Organizational Relationships; PERT and the Myth of Managerial
Effectiveness; The Synchronization of Progress in Several Technologies; The Costs of
Polaris; The FBM in a Changing Environment; and Success and Its Secrets.
(261 pages)]
*1973, March 26, "Cost Growth in Major Weapon Systems," GAO Report B-163057.
[The report addresses the causes of cost growth and offers a series of
recommendations to ease them. (10 pages)]
10
1969 to 1980
R.F., 3/1/06
1973, May 9, "The Operations and Activities of the Renegotiation Board," GAO Report
B-163520, [The report includes sections on filings by contractors on renegotiable
sales; accounting analysis and screening functions; exemptions; excessive profit
determinations; collection of excessive profits; profile on firms making excessive
profits; and recommendations of the Procurement Commission. (60 pages)]
*1973, May 15, "Assessment of Navy Should-Cost Studies," GAO report B159896.
[The
report describes a GAO assessment of the Navy's use of should-cost studies to
evaluate the efficiency and economy of contractors' operations. The should-cost
approach attempts to determine, on the basis of industrial engineering and financial
management principles, the amount that weapons systems or products should cost,
given attainable efficiency and economy of operations. (12 pages)]
1973, June 26, "Industrial Management Reviews of Defense Contractors' Operations,"
GAO Report B-159896. [The report summarizes the results of GAO management
reviews of operations at the plants of three aircraft engine manufacturers performing a
substantial amount of work for the Department of Defense. (11 pages)]
**1974 Arming America: How the U.S. Buys Weapons, Professor J. Ronald Fox (Boston:
Division of Research, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration.
Distributed by Harvard University Press). [Chapters of the book include: An
Overview of the acquisition of a major weapon system; The Defense Market; Defense
Contractors; The Pentagon; Planning; Congress; Estimating Costs; Program
Management; Types of Contracts; The Source Selection Process; Defense Marketing,
Defense Industry Profits; Indirect Costs in the Defense Industry; Negotiating
Contracts; Program Control; and Conclusions and Recommendations. (484 pages)]
1976, "The C-5A (A)," Kathleen Heintz, Research Assistant, under the supervision of
Professor Laurence E. Lynn, Jr, Harvard Kennedy School of Government Case Study.
[The case contains sections on Planning Pre-McNamara; The Problems Identified;
Defense Planning Under McNamara; Airlift and Sealift; Expansion of Airlift
Capability: System Analysis: The CX-4/C-5A in Context; A C-5A Decision; The
Linear Programming Model; and Appendix: Historical Role of the Secretary.
(28 pages)]
1976, "The C-5A (B)," Kathleen Heintz, Research Assistant, under the supervision of
Professor Laurence E. Lynn, Jr, Harvard Kennedy School of Government Case Study.
[The case contains section on: The Pre-Contract Phase; Total Package Procurement;
The Contract Competition; Source Selection; The Contract; Development and
Construction; 1966-1967: Technical Problems; 1968: Overrun in the Making; The
Fourth Squadron; Congressional Reaction; 1969 and Thereafter; The End of
Optimism; The Lockheed Loan; Postscript; and The Cover-up controversy. The case
ends with a 12- page retrospective on Total Package Procurement, written by former
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Robert Charles—originator of the Total Package
Procurement concept. (46 pages)]
11
1969 to 1980
R.F., 3/1/06
1976, November 1, "How Pentagon Will Spend a Record $112 Billion," U.S. News &
World Report, pp. 43,44. [The article provides an analysis of the $112 billion, largest
defense budget in history. It identifies categories of defense spending and describes
the increasing cost of weapon systems. (2 pages)]
1976, December 7, "Profit '76 Summary Report," James W. Stansberry, Brigadier General,
USAF, Director, Profit '76, Office of the Secretary of Defense. [A study of the level
of investment and profitability of defense contractors relative to their commercial
counterparts. The report also proposes changes needed in DoD profit policy. (271
pages)]
1977, February 16, "Status of the B-1 Aircraft Program," (Unclassified Digest only), GAO
Document Resume, PSAD-77-35. [Flight testing of the B-1 aircraft has proceeded
reasonably well and has disclosed no major problems which would dictate a delay in
production. Testing has disclosed a number of areas requiring improvement. Major
concerns over the program involve continuing increases in program costs and the pace
of development of avionics subsystems. (5 pages)]
1977, March 1, "Status of the F-18 Naval Strike Fighter Program," B-163058, GAO
Document Resume, PSAD-77-24. [GAO finds that the F-18 development program
appears to be on schedule. However, program changes could occur because (1) letter
contracts with McDonnell-Douglas and General Electric were not definitized as
planned due to cost problems; (2) cost could increase $86 to $196 million if electronic
countermeasures are replaced by new systems; (3) program cost could increase if the
Navy decides to develop a reconnaissance version of the F-18; and (4) procurement
costs may be reduced if a land version of the F-18 is developed for sale to foreign
governments. (183 pages)]
1977, March 8, "Status of the Trident Submarine and Missile Programs," GAO Report
PSAD-77-34. [The report contains a review of the Trident Submarine and Missile
program's cost, schedule and technical performance. A particular concern was to
determine whether the submarine and missile will be operational in September 1979,
as planned. (19 pages)]
1977, May-June, "Let's Change the Way the Pentagon Does Business," Jacques S.
Gansler, Harvard Business Review, pp. 109-118. [The article deals with the need for
government and business to create a base of defense industries that are efficient,
flexible, and capable of responding quickly to increased demands. It reports that the
defense industrial base currently suffers from excess capacity in some areas and
insufficient capacity in others. (10 pages)]
1978, April 7, "The Navy's TRIDENT Fleet – Some Success But Several Major
Problems," GAO Report PSAD-78-31. [The Trident program faces serious schedule
delays because of low productivity, a shortage of skilled workers, and late receipt of
materials. The continuing cash drain at Electric Boat may become a more serious
12
1969 to 1980
R.F., 3/1/06
overriding problem. At the time of this review, the Navy was reporting a cost estimate
of $22.2 billion for a 13-ship program. As of December 31, 1977, the Navy reported a
14-ship program at a cost of $25.1 billion. (32 pages)]
*1979, February 20, "Observations on Office of Management and Budget Circular
A-109—Major System Acquisition by the Department of Defense," GAO Report
PSAD-79-9. [The report discusses GAO observations on DoD's implementation of
Management and Budget Circular A-109 to encourage adoption of recommendations
contained in the report of the Commission on Government Procurement published in
December 1972. GAO points out that the primary objective of A-109 will not be
achieved until the Office of the Secretary of Defense shows more aggressiveness in
defining DoD missions and clearly delineating the roles of the services. Essentially,
each service has been defining its own missions and responsibilities and analyzing its
mission needs accordingly. As a consequence there is no assurance that the highest
priority needs from an overall agency viewpoint are being addressed. In a number of
instances it has taken as long as 5 months for the Office of the Secretary of Defense to
review and approve statements of need submitted by the services. (32 pages)]
1979, April 25, "Digests of Major Weapon System Reports Issued January and
February, 1979," GAO Report PSAD79-64. [The report contains unclassified digests
of nineteen major weapon system reports issued during January and February 1979
and a listing of major acquisition reports issued from July 1978 through March 1979.
The weapon system programs include:
Air Force KC-10A Advance Tanker/Cargo Aircraft;
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System;
Navy AV-8B Advanced Harrier Aircraft;
Air Force Advanced Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Weapon System;
Navy Trident and SSN-688 Submarine Construction;
Air-, Sea-, and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles;
Army General Support Rocket System;
Navy Surveillance Towed Array Sensor;
Army ROLAND Missile; the Air Force Precision Location Strike System;
Army Copperhead & Navy's 5-inch and 8-inch Guided Projectile;
Army Advanced Attack Helicopter and Hellfire Missile;
Navy Torpedo Development and Improvement;
Navy Wide Aperture Array Sonar;
Army Standoff Target Acquisition System;
Navy F-18 Naval Strike Fighter Weapon System;
Air Force Maverick/Close Air Support Weapons Systems;
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System; and
Navy F-14A/Phoenix Weapon System. (81 pages)]
*1979, May 31, "Recommendations of the Commission on Government Procurement: A
Final Assessment," GAO-PSAD-79-80. [The report contains GAO's assessment of
13
1969 to 1980
R.F., 3/1/06
the results of the Commission on Government Procurement, established by Congress.
The report focuses primarily on
Streamlining regulations;
Professionalizing the workforce;
Cross-servicing agency contracts;
Improving climate for federally sponsored research and development;
Deciding Government-wide patent policy;
Reforming major system acquisition;
Shift in commercial products buying policy;
Making architect-engineering services more competitive; and
Reforming Federal assistance. (117 pages)]
1979, June 25 and 26, "Inaccuracy of Department of Defense Weapons Acquisition Cost
Estimates," Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Government
Operations, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office). [The hearings include testimony and analysis dealing with
observations about cost estimating, with examples from specific acquisition programs.
(167 pages)]
1979, July, "A Review of Cost Estimation in New Technologies: Implications for Energy
Process Plants," Edward W. Merrow, Stephen W. Chapel, and Christopher Worthing.
A RAND Report # R-2481-DOE. [The report contains cost estimating data and
observations on a variety of energy and defense acquisition programs. It is an
interesting, well researched document on cost estimating. (117 pages)]
1979 August 3, "Acquisition of Major Weapon Systems, Lessons from Rand Research,"
Michael D. Rich., Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation. [The report contains four
sections of Power Point slides consisting of charts, graphs, and outlines relating to
major weapon systems. The four sections are: (1) Where We Stand Today; (2)
Selected "Process" Issues; (3) Selected "External" Issues; and (4) Conclusions. (33
pages)]
1979, October 2, "Two Contracts for Nuclear Attack Submarines Modified by Public
Law 85-804—Status as of December 23, 1978," Digest, Table of contents, and
Introduction only to GAO Report PSAD-79-107. [Public Law 85-804 allows the
President to authorize any Government agency or department exercising functions in
connection with national defense to modify contracts and make advance payments,
regardless of other laws that relate to making, performing, amending, or modifying
contracts, whenever he deems that such action would facilitate national defense.
(17 pages)]
*1979, November 8, "Impediments to Reducing the Costs of Weapon Systems," GAO
Report PSAD-80-6. [The report presents GAO views and conclusions formed through
frequent evaluations of the major weapons acquisition process over many years. It
addresses the difficult problems connected with the process and their relationship to
weapon systems costs, discusses the Department of Defense's attempts to deal with
14
1969 to 1980
R.F., 3/1/06
some of them, and recommends action by the Congress and the Secretary of Defense
to relieve them. Chapters deal with "The Environment of Defense Production;"
"Productivity and factors that influence its growth;" "DoD Efforts to Reduce Costs;"
and "Contractor Independent Research and Development."
(44 pages)]
1979, November 9, "Department of Defense Statement on the Effect of OMB Circular A109 on Major Systems Acquisition and the Use of Competitive Procurement,"
Dale W. Church—office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Policy.
Statement to a Subcommittee (Task Force) on Government Efficiency of the
Committee on Budget of the U.S. House of Representatives. [The statement describes
OMB Circular A-109 and discusses eight topics: (1) Integration of Research,
Development, and Acquisition; (2) Business Aspects of System Acquisition; (3) The
Acquisition Process; (4) Problems in Implementation; (5) Benefits from implementing
A-109; (6) Analysis of Competition for DoD Purchases; (7) Management Actions to
Reemphasize the Need for Competition; and (8) Other Concepts/Techniques that can
Enhance Competition. (19 pages)]
*1980, January, A Guide to Resources and Sources of Information for Acquisition
Research, Robert F. Trimble, Director, Contract and Systems Acquisition
(Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense) (Research and
Engineering) [The guide was developed by the Army Procurement Research Office,
Fort Lee, Virginia. It replaces Department of Defense Procurement Research Guides,
PRG 1, "Resources for Performing Procurement Research," and PRG 2, "Sources of
Information for Procurement Research." The current Guide is a valuable source of
information for acquisition research. Page one of the Guide contains a useful
definition of acquisition and a discussion of Acquisition Research. It states: "since the
original Department of Defense research guides, PRG-1 and PRG-2, were published in
August 1975, "acquisition" has replaced "procurement" in Government regulations
and directives. Acquisition is a broader term than procurement, and has been difficult
to define precisely. The definition used in this guide is the one found in Defense
Acquisition Circular 76-18, dated 12 March 1979. It states: Acquisition means the
acquiring by contract with appropriated funds of supplies or services (including
construction) by and for the use of the Federal Government through purchase, lease,
or barter, whether the supplies or services are already in existence or must be created,
developed, demonstrated, and evaluated. Acquisition begins at the point when agency
needs are established and includes the description of requirements to satisfy agency
needs, solicitation and selection of sources, award of contracts, contract financing,
contract performance, contract administration, and those technical and management
functions directly related to the process of fulfilling agency needs by contract.
In essence, acquisition pertains to those business management activities which
support the development and introduction of systems or items into the defense
inventory. Contracting pervades the entire process. Logistics is considered a separate
and distinct function and becomes acquisition research only if it is contract or program
related." (79 pages)]
15
1969 to 1980
R.F., 3/1/06
1980, January 9, "Defense's Accounting for its Contracts Has Too Many Errors—
Standardized Accounting Procedures Are Needed," GAO report FGMSD-80-10.
[The report discusses DoD component nonstandard contract accounting procedures
that cause "substantial errors in reporting, recording, and controlling contract financial
data, spending millions of dollars in unnecessary personnel and other costs due to
duplication of accounting functions." (19 pages)]
1980 January 10, "Better Navy Management of Shipbuilding Contracts Could Save
Millions of Dollars," GAO-PSAD-80-18. [GAO points out that changes to any
shipbuilding program can number in the thousands and increase the price of ships by
hundreds of millions of dollars. The Navy makes formal changes by modifying a
shipbuilding contract in writing. Constructive changes result from Navy action or
inaction which causes the shipbuilder to perform additional or different work than
specified in the contract. If the Navy and the shipbuilder agree that a constructive
change occurred because of the Navy, it can become a formal change. If they
disagree, it can form the basis for a shipbuilder's claim. Claims reached $2.7 billion in
1978. Some positive Navy actions may avoid claims or at least provide a defense for
the Government if a claim were filed. However, other Navy actions may avoid claims,
but not necessarily reduce cost to the Government. GAO makes recommendations
that can help keep costs and claims to a minimum. (40 pages)]
1980, February 12, "Financial Status of Major Federal Acquisitions September 30,
1979," GAO/PSAD-80-25. [GAO points out that Federal departments' and agencies'
major acquisitions are presently estimated to cost $607 billion at completion; earlier
estimates were $346 billion. Costs increased $261 billion or 75 percent, and are
shown in this report for 940 civil and military acquisitions currently in development,
test, production, or construction phases. For 224 projects, costs increased by $233
billion. Of this amount, $92 billion, or 39 percent, is attributed to inflation. Other
increases are attributed to changes in (a) quantities ordered; (b) system characteristics
(engineering); (c) delivery dates (schedules); (d) inadequate original cost estimates;
and (e) support needs and spare parts. (35 pages)]
1980, February 14, "F/A-18 Naval Strike Fighter: Its Effectiveness Is Uncertain, GAO
Report PSAD-80-24. [GAO concludes from preliminary tests that the F/A-18 weapon
system is superior in a number of areas to the aircraft it is to replace – the F-4, A-4,
and A-7. However, until the F/A-18's deficiencies, including those in its armament
systems, are resolved, its effectiveness to perform its missions is uncertain. Delays in
testing and in correcting problems may be costly if significant production occurs
before corrections are made, but Navy officials contend that increased costs caused by
a production slowdown could exceed the costs of correcting problems after the aircraft
has been produced. Contractor production difficulties and overly optimistic cost and
schedule estimates are contributing to significant cost growth in the program.
Program funding uncertainties are also having an adverse impact on the ability to
control costs. (28 pages)]
16
1969 to 1980
R.F., 3/1/06
1980, February 29, "The MX Weapon System—A Program with Cost and Schedule
Uncertainties," GAO/PSAD-80-29. [The new MX weapon system has entered fullscale development, yet many uncertainties remain to be resolved. GAO recognizes
that as development of the MX progresses, many of the uncertainties will be resolved.
This does not, however, prevent the need, at the very beginning of full-scale
development, for a complete disclosure of program uncertainties and the potential
impact on cost, schedule, and performance. The report concludes with
recommendations for effective MX management. (35 pages)]
*1980, May 9, "SARs – Defense Department Reports that Should Provide More
Information to the Congress," GAO Report, PSAD-80-37. [The report evaluates
selected acquisition reports (SARs). These reports have become the key recurring
summary reports on the progress of DoD's most costly acquisition programs. SARs
are usually prepared for about 50 major weapon systems and are used by both the
Congress and by top-level DoD managers in making decisions affecting those
systems. (23 pages)]
1980, May 20, "DoD Guide to Preparation and Review of Selected Acquisition Reports
(SARs)," DoD7000.3-G, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
[A comprehensive guide for preparation and analysis of Selected Acquisition Reports.
(92 pages]
1980, May 27, "Can the U.S. Major Weapon Systems Acquisition Process keep Pace with
the Conventional Arms Threat Posed by the USSR? GAO Draft Report PSAD/GP.
[The report reviews the key time consumers in the Major Weapons Systems
Acquisition Process. The scope of the GAO study broadened into a review of
strengths and weaknesses of the DoD acquisition process. (67 Pages)]
*1980, June 12, "Issues Identified in 21 Recently Published Major Weapon System
Reports," GAO report PSAD-80-43. [During January and February 1980, GAO
issued 21 weapon system reports. This report consolidates the summaries and
highlights the issues in those reports. The 21 reports include four Army programs,
seven Navy programs, five Air Force programs, and five Joint programs. (88 pages)]
**1980, Summer, "The Maturing of the DoD Acquisition Process," David D. Acker,
Defense Systems Management Review, Volume 3, Number 3. [The article provides a
comprehensive overview of the development of the defense systems acquisition
process throughout three decades. The author traces the development of the policies,
directives, management procedures, and concepts designed, used, and sometimes
discarded, in the movement toward the efficient acquisition of defense systems.
(70 pages)]
1980, August 18, "Two Contracts for Nuclear Attack Submarine Modified Under
Authority of Public Law 85-804 – Status as of December 22, 1979," Only pages 1
through 6 are retained from the Report PSAD-80-68, U.S. General Accounting Office.
17
1969 to 1980
R.F., 3/1/06
[The report pertains to two contracts the Navy awarded to General Dynamics
Corporation. The purpose of these audits and reviews was to insure that funds
authorized to provide relief under Public Law 85-804 are used only in connection with
the contracts and that the prime contractor did not realize any total combined profit on
the contracts. (6 pages)]
1980, September 3, "CIA Estimates of Soviet Defense Spending." Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S.
House of Representatives (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office).
[95 pages]
1980, September 29, "U.S. Government Procurement Dollars and Actions, by Size and by
Agency for Fiscal Year 1980," Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Office of
Management and Budget, Executive office of the President. [The OFPP tables include
dollar amounts. They also identify what is procured with purchases over $10,000 as
well as the percentage of procurements that are competitive vs. noncompetitive by
agency. (6 pages)]
1980, November, Government Contract Principles, Office of the GAO General Counsel
(Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office). [The document provides a clear
explanation of government contract principles. It contains six chapters: (1) Basic
Principles; (2) Formation of Contracts; (3) Formal Advertising; (4) Negotiation; (5)
Procurement Policies; and (6) Contract Performance. (120 pages)]
*1980, November—February 1981; "Defense Acquisition management Organization,"
Program Manager Journal, pp. S-3 thru S-12, Defense Systems Management
College. [The article provides a selected distillation and schematic analysis of the
similarities and differences of the military services' acquisition processes. The charts
include: (1) Principal Material Organizations—Major Command Level; (2) Selected
Organization Elements—U.S. Army Acquisition Process; (3) Selected Organization
Elements—U.S. Air Force Acquisition Process; (4) Selected Organization Elements—
U.S. Navy Acquisition Process; (5) Selected Organization Elements—U.S. Marine
Corps Acquisition Process; (6) USMC Acquisition Approach; (7) A Comparison of
Key Features, Practices and Focal Points within the Services for Acquisition
Management. (10 pages)]
1980, December, "An Analysis of Weapon System Acquisition Intervals, Past and
Present," G. K. Smith, E. T. Friedmann, A RAND Report prepared for the office of
the Under Secretary of defense for Research and Engineering and the United States
Air Force, RAND Report R-2605-DR&E/AF. [The report examines the evolution of
the acquisition process and explores ways to shorten the acquisition cycle. Topic
headings include: The Selection of Milestones; Requirements Formulation; Concept
Validation; Hardware Development; and Production Phase. (142 pages)]
18
1969 to 1980
R.F., 3/1/06
*1980, December 5, "Defense Facts of Life," Franklin C. Spinney, A staff paper, OSD
(PA&E). [The report contains six chapters concluding that "The bureaucratic
mechanism producing DoD's financial plans establishes conditions for a mismatch
between plans and reality by assuming certainty in future budgets and costs when in
fact the real world is characterized by uncertain budgets and costs. Sections include:
(1) Nature of the Planning Problem; (2) General View of Change in the Post WWII
Era; (3) A Case of Budget Growth: AF TAC AIR; (4) Uncertainty Surrounding
Investment Plans; (5) The Impact of Technological Complexity and Cost Growth on
Perceptions of Capability; and (6) Observations and Conclusions. (132 pages)]
19
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
Section IV
SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON DEFENSE ACQUISITION
arranged by the years covered in DAHP VOLUME IV – 1981 to 1990
1981, February 17, "The MX Weapon System: Issues and Challenges," GAO Report
MASAD-81-1, [The report presents GAO's findings on the major issues concerning
the development and acquisition of the MX weapon system, one year into full-scale
development. Progress has been made, but the Department of Defense still faces
major challenges in achieving cost, schedule, and performance goals. The MX system
can be expanded by adding missiles, shelters, and/or a ballistic missile defense. In the
absence of an arms limitation agreement, however, it is not possible to accurately
forecast the future Soviet threat; thus, the ultimate size and cost of the MX system
cannot be predicted. (43 pages)]
1981, February 27, "Standards for Audit of Governmental Organizations, Programs,
Activities, and Functions – 1981 Revision," Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of
the United States. [The document contains audit standards to be followed by Federal
auditors for audits of Federal organizations, programs, activities, functions, and funds
received by contractors, nonprofit organizations, and other external organizations.
The standards are also recommended for audits of State and local government
organizations, programs, activities, and functions performed by State or local
government auditors or by public accountants. (79 pages)]
1981, March, Contractor Motivation Theory and Applications, Robert F. Williams and
Daniel M. Carr (Fort Lee, Virginia: U.S. Army Procurement Research Office, U.S.
Army Logistics Management Center). [The document discusses contractor motivation
as a complex function of many contract and non-contract factors beyond profit. The
document sets forth the case for Government to consider motivation as well as
capability potential in pre-award planning. Government Contracting personnel should
consider both Government and industry objectives and environments in selecting
incentives for a given contract. The document contains four chapters: (1)
Introduction; (2) Modeling the Contractor Motivation Process; (3) Current and
Potential Use of Contractor Motivation; and (4) Conclusions and Recommendations.
(154 pages)]
*1981, March 16, "A Bigger Defense Stick to Back Up Tough Talk: Reagan is out to
convince Moscow that he really means business—and a boost in military
spending is only the first step," U.S. News & World Report. [The article describes
the objective and content of the Reagan defense build-up. It includes an interview
with Wassily Leontief, Nobel Prize-Winning Economist, describing the economic
havoc that he predicts is likely to result from the Reagan Defense build-up. (4 pages)]
20
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
1981, March 30, "Inside Story of the Trident Debacle," U.S. News & World Report, pp. 2122. [The article cites "Years of delays, runaway costs, shoddy workmanship, incessant
feuds—the supersub mess has few parallels. Now a new Navy Secretary (John
Lehman) is lowering the boom." The article also contains several paragraphs
describing Navy Secretary Lehman, including: "At 38, Lehman is not only the most
youthful Secretary of the Navy in history, but the most controversial man in the
Reagan Pentagon.." (2 pages)]
1981, April, "Note on the Structure of the U.S. Government Decision-Making Process,"
J. Ronald Fox, Harvard Business School Technical Note. [The Note discusses
Governmental Subsystems, Congressional Subcommittees, Government Bureaus, Iron
Triangles, and Issue Networks. (9 pages)]
*1981, May 14, "Acquiring Weapon Systems In A Period of Rising Expenditures:
Implications for Defense Management," GAO Report MASAD-31-26. [The report
concludes that DoD must ensure that its weapon systems will be more effective in
planned missions. The report refers to a series of 24 earlier reports in which GAO has
identified a number of problems in weapon systems development. Adoption of GAO's
recommendations would help to (1) minimize risks and ensure systems effectiveness;
(2) improve disclosure of information to the Congress; (3) ensure that weapon systems
meet mission requirements; (4) evaluate alternatives; and (5) reduce costs. The
planned rapid growth in defense expenditures in the next few years following the
issuance of this report makes it especially important for the Department of Defense to
exercise tight control over the development and acquisition of weapon systems.
Considering the high cost and complexity of modern weaponry. (127 pages)]
1981, May 18, "Counterattack on Defense," Newsweek, pp. 41 & 43. [The article states:
"With little debate and almost no dissent, Congress is going along with President
Reagan's huge increases in defense spending—15 per cent in real dollars for fiscal
1982, tapering off to a still hefty 7 per cent at the end of five years. Democrats in
Congress exhausted by their losing battle against the social-program cuts and gearing
up to fight the Kemp-Roth income-tax reductions, are raising few objections. But
critics outside government—many writing in liberal publications—have raised some
troubling questions about the direction of the Administration's defense policy.
Newsweek Pentagon Correspondent David C. Martin examines three of these
critiques: (1) Richard J. Barnet, of Washington's liberal Institute for Policy Studies,
(2) former Carter speechwriter James Fallows, and (3) MIT economist Lester Thurow.
(2 pages)]
1981, June 8, "Reagan's Arms Buildup," Tom Morganthau with Mary Lord, Newsweek, pp.
28-48. [The article analyzes the Reagan defense buildup under four headings: (1)
Searching for a Strategy; (2) Can U.S. Industry Deliver? (3) Can the Nation Afford it?
and (4) The Men at Defense. The article includes an insert on "What the New Billions
Will Buy." (14 pages)]
21
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
*1981, September 13, "Secretary of Defense Actions to Improve the Acquisition
Process." Prepared under the direction of Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank
Carlucci. [The report describes concerns relating to the defense acquisition process. It
is divided into the following sections: Major Studies of the Process; DoD Management
Philosophy; 32 Initiative to Improve the Acquisition Process; DSARC Prebriefings;
Controlled Decentralization; Cost Growth; Evolutionary Introduction of New
Technology; Economic Production Rates; Multiyear Procurements; Life-Cycle Costs;
Contractor Incentives to Improve Reliability and Support. (43 pages)]
1981, Autumn, "The DoD Acquisition Improvement Program," Colonel G. Dana Brabson,
USAF—Dean, Department of Research and Information, Defense Systems
Management College, Concepts, The Journal of Defense Systems Acquisition
Management, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 54-75. [The article identifies and discusses the 32
actions prescribed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci for DoD to
implement to improve the acquisition process. (22 pages)]
1981, Fall, "Economic Effects of the Defense Budget," Charles L. Schultz—former
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, The Brookings Bulletin, Vol. 18, No.
2, The Brookings Institution. [The article is based on testimony of Charles Schultze
prepared for the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress. The article
discusses the topics: General principles about the effects of defense spending; The
prospective buildup in defense spending; and Implications of the defense spending
buildup. (5 pages)]
1981, September-October, "Breaking the Regulatory Deadlock," J. Ronald Fox, Harvard
Business Review, No. 81506, pp.97-105. [The article describes a new kind of
government-business partnership designed to prevent extreme stands and provide
solutions that satisfy all factions. (9 pages)]
1981, October 21, 27, and November 5, "Acquisition Process in the Defense Department,"
Hearings before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). [Witnesses include Charles A.
Bowsher, Comptroller General; Frank C. Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Gary
Christle, DoD Comptroller's Office; Gordon W. Rule, Director of Procurement
Control and Clearance Division, Department of Navy (Retired); James R. Ambrose,
Under Secretary, Department of the Army; Jacques Gansler; and others discussing the
current state and prospective improvements in management of defense acquisition
programs. (687 pages)]
1981, November 1, "How Many Billions for Defense?" Hedrick Smith, The New York
Times Magazine, p. 25. [Hedrick Smith is the chief Washington correspondent of the
New York Times. The article describes the Reagan defense build-up and discusses
Secretary of Defense Weinberger and the battles he faces. The article begins: "With
his ambitious plans for military spending, Defense Secretary Weinberger has become
the most controversial member of the Reagan Administration." Senator Henry M.
Jackson is quoted as stating "Weinberger's proposals would leave the American land22
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
based deterrent vulnerable to destruction." U.S. Representative Joseph Addabbo is
quoted as stating that "human services" are "being reduced to feed the fatted calf
known as defense spending." The article includes the box comment: "Key
Republicans as well as Democrats say the Reagan-Weinberger military spending plans
are so ambitious that they are unlikely to succeed intact, given the current mood in
Congress—that the real results will depend on the President's willingness to
compromise." (12 pages)]
*1982, Managing Business-Government Relations; Cases and Notes on BusinessGovernment Problems, J. Ronald Fox (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc).
[The book includes a number of technical notes relating to defense acquisition: (1)
Note on the Structure of the U.S. Government Decision-Making Process; (2) The Role
of Congress in the U.S. Government Decision-Making Process. (3) The Role of the
Executive Branch in the U.S. Government Decision-Making Process; (4) Note on
Lobbyists and Interest Groups; and (5) Note on Government Contracting and Methods
of Government Procurement. The book also contains two cases related to contracting
for defense and space projects: (a) The RAWAN Proposal Evaluation Group; and (b)
Thermodyne, Inc and the Pegasus Program.(555 pages)]
1982, February 12, "Weapons Acquisition Policy and Procedures: Curbing Cost
Growth," Report of the Special Panel on Defense Procurement Procedures of the
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office). [Contents: Case Study Approach to the Problem;
Causes of Weapon Systems Cost Growth; Current DoD Acquisition Procedures; Cost
Reporting; Exception Reporting; Weapon Systems Acquisition and the Defense
Budget Process; Contract Management in Major Weapon Systems Programs; Major
Cost Growth Factors; and Competition in the Weapon Systems Acquisition Process.
The report includes case studies on the Black Hawk Helicopter, the Patriot Missile,
and the Air Launched Cruise Missile. (59 pages)]
1982, February 26, "Navy's F/A-18 Expected to Be An Effective Performer But Problems
Still Face the Program," GAO Report MASAD-82-20. [F/A-18 naval strike fighter
development is near completion. Development flight testing, which will end in the
spring of 1982, shows that the F/A-18 will meet most of the design performance goals,
and is expected to effectively perform its fighter and light attack missions. F/A-18
cost increases continue as a major program issue. GAO anticipates additional program
cost growth resulting from underestimated escalation and prime and subcontractor cost
increases. While the Navy projected major cost reductions in several areas, significant
hard savings have not yet been realized. GAO proposes several additional cost
reduction areas which, if accepted could result in substantial savings. (30 pages)]
1982, March 17, "Actions Needed to Reduce Schedule Slippages and Cost Growth on
Contracts for Navy Ship Overhauls," GAO Report, PLRD-82-29. [The report
describes a GAO examination of (1) the effectiveness of the Navy's procedures for
developing contract overhaul work packages and (2) the potential for Navy initiatives
to improve overhaul contracting. The Navy spends about $800 million a year
23
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
contracting for private sector overhauls of auxiliary, amphibious, and less intricate
surface combat ships. The Congress is concerned that the Navy is wasting fiscal
resources by not effectively definitizing overhaul work to be contracted. (52 pages)]
*1982, March 17, "Review of the Impact of Office of Management and Budget Circular
A-109 on Weapon System Acquisition." W. H. Sheley, Jr., Director, Mission
Analysis and Systems Acquisition Division, GAO, letter to the Secretary of Defense.
[This document is useful in gaining an understanding of OMB Circular A-109.
(3 pages)]
1982, Spring, "Can the Defense Industry Respond to the Reagan Initiatives?" Jacques S.
Gansler, International Security, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 102-121. [The article describes
difficulties experienced by the defense industry in dealing with defense acquisition.
Section headings include: Bottlenecks; The Defense Industry's "Lower Tier" Problem;
The Defense Industry's Labor Market; Production Equipment; Special Materials;
Growing Awareness of the Problems; Corrective Actions; and Conclusions.
(10 pages)]
1982, April 19, "Cost Growth and Delivery Delays in Submarine construction at Electric
Boat Are Likely to Continue," GAO Report MASAD-82-29. [The report describes
GAO's evaluation of Electric Boat's ability to build submarines in a timely and costeffective manner. The report also describes other aspects of Electric Boat and its
submarine construction programs. GAO found that although the Navy and Electric
Boat have taken steps to improve their quality assurance programs, more improvement
is needed: cost growth on the SSN-688 and Trident submarine contracts are likely to
continue; some SSN-688 and Trident submarine delivery dates may not be met unless
unfavorable human resources and productivity trends are reversed. (33 pages)]
*1982, April 22, "Status of Major Acquisition As of September 30, 1981: Better
Reporting Essential to Controlling Cost Growth," GAO report MASAD-82-24.
[The first GAO combined defense and civil acquisitions status report (issued in 1976)
showed 585 major Federal acquisitions were estimated to cost $404 billion at
completion – an increase of $148 billion over earlier estimates. Subsequent status
reports have shown that major acquisitions continue to experience substantial cost
growth each year. In 1981 GAO reported that 1,040 major acquisitions were
estimated to cost $776.6 billion at completion – an increase of $325.8 billion –72%-over earlier estimates. This report describes additional cost growth. (118 pages)]
*1982, May 14, "Improving the Effectiveness and Acquisition Management of Selected
Weapon Systems: A Summary of Major Issues and Recommended Actions,"
GAO/MASAD-82-34. [Major issues which could have a direct impact on weapon
system effectiveness are highlighted on 24 selected programs in various stages of the
acquisition process. A summary of GAO's recommendations and observations
addressing these issues is also presented which, if acted upon, would either help to
minimize risk and ensure effectiveness, improve disclosure to the Congress, affirm
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R.F., 3/1/06
requirements, evaluate alternatives, reduce cost, or improve program management.
The 24 programs include 6 Army programs, 7 Navy programs, 7 Air Force programs,
and 4 joint programs. (126 pages)]
1982, Summer, "Weapons Acquisition in the Soviet Union," Stan Woods, Aberdeen
Studies in Defence Economics No. 24, Centre for Defence Studies, Scotland. [Only
the Preface and pages 15-64 are available from a longer report of unknown length. The
pages deal with The Defence Council; The Armed Forces; The Ministry of Defense;
The General Staff; Soviet Defence Industry; The Research and Development
Community; and Soviet Acquisition Procedures in Brief. (RF. Comment. The study is
not comprehensive.) (49 pages)]
1982, Summer, "The New Acquisition Environment: Challenge and Opportunity,"
Lieutenant Colonel John D. Edgar, USAF, appearing in Concepts, The Journal of
Defense Systems Acquisition management, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp.9-15, Defense Systems
Management College. [The article reviews the successes of the DoD Acquisition
Improvement Program during the prior year and challenges the reader to take the
initiative in implementing selected actions of the program. (7 pages)]
1982, Summer, "A Cultural Change: Pre-Planned Product Improvement," Lieutenant
Colonel Garcia E. Morrow, USA and Dr. Jules J. Bellaschi, appearing in Concepts,
The Journal of Defense Systems Acquisition management, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp.16-25,
Defense Systems Management College. [Action 2 of the Carlucci Acquisition
Improvement Program directs that greater emphasis be placed on pre-planned product
improvement (P3I) during system development. The article discusses the P3I concept,
the status of the DoD plan for implementing it, the criteria for application, and
considerations for the program manager. (10 pages)]
1982, Summer, "Increasing Competition in the Acquisition Process," John C.
McKeown—Head of the Flight Controls Section at the Naval Air Systems Command
and former Professor of Acquisition/Program Management at DSMC, appearing in
Concepts, The Journal of Defense Systems Acquisition management, Vol. 5, No. 3,
pp.26-33, Defense Systems Management College. [The article states that current
activity within the Carlucci Acquisition Improvement Program is designed to rekindle
interest in competition. It discusses the benefits of competition that go beyond cost, to
include stimulation of innovation in manufacturing as well as technology and design
and a strengthened industrial base. (8 pages)]
1982, Summer, "Improving the Source Selection Process," Manfred J. Reinhard—
Procurement Analyst in the Office of the Deputy Director, Major Systems Acquisition,
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(Acquisition Policy), appearing in Concepts, The Journal of Defense Systems
Acquisition management, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp.34-43, Defense Systems Management
College. [The article discusses the problems with the source selection process as
identified by the working group chartered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank
Carlucci. The article also describes actions taken to correct the problems and
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R.F., 3/1/06
addresses the changes expected to be incorporated in the revised DoD directive
covering source selection. (10 pages)]
1982, Summer, "Determining the Appropriate Contract Type," Commander Frank T.
Meneely—professor of Contract Management in DSMC's School of Systems
Acquisition Education, appearing in Concepts, The Journal of Defense Systems
Acquisition management, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp.44-49, Defense Systems Management
College. [In any acquisition program, much depends on the selection of the
appropriate contract type. Unfortunately, this is not always an easy choice to make.
In this article the author discusses the selection of contract type in major systems
acquisition, including: Guidelines provided to the contracting officer; Concerns of
industry; and Actions taken by the DoD Acquisition Improvement Task Force that
influence the selection of contract type. (6 pages)]
*1982, Summer, "The Acquisition Process: A Brief Historical Perspective," David D.
Acker—Professor of Management in the Research Directorate at the Defense Systems
Management College, appearing in Concepts, The Journal of Defense Systems
Acquisition management, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp.74-82, Defense Systems Management
College. [At the close of the 1960s, the Laird/Packard team initiated a number of
actions aimed at improving the management of the defense systems acquisition
process and gaining control of costs. This article reviews in some detail the actions
taken by this team, and the refinements to the process in its management during the
decade of the '70s. (9 pages)]
1982, Summer, "Design-to-Cost and the Acquisition Improvement Program," Major
Raymond H. Barley, USAFR—Defense Systems Management College, appearing in
Concepts, The Journal of Defense Systems Acquisition management, Vol. 5, No. 3,
pp.96-111. [The design-to-cost concept has been in use on defense acquisition
programs for a number of years. The author discusses the use of incentives to make
design-to-cost a more viable management tool, providing realistic examples of the use
of the concept as employed on current programs. (16 pages)]
1982, Summer, "Program Stability: An Essential Element in Improved Acquisition,"
Harold J. Schutt—Professor of Acquisition/Program Management in the DSMC
Research Directorate of DSMC and David D. Acker—Professor of Management in the
Research Directorate of DSMC, appearing in Concepts, The Journal of Defense
Systems Acquisition management, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp.148-160, Defense Systems
Management College. [The article suggests that one approach to achieving program
stability is to designate a few programs within each service for stabilization, and to
achieve that stability by forcing cost flexibility on the remaining programs. To
maintain stability, all levels—program management, the services, OSD, and the
Congress—must honor this approach and not cause perturbations in the programs
designated as stable. (13 pages)]
1982, July 28, "DCAA Audits of Contractor Compliance with Cost Accounting
Standards," GAO Letter to the Director, Defense contract Audit Agency
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R.F., 3/1/06
summarizing GAO/PLRD-82-105, GAO Letter B-198520. [The letter highlights the
results of the GAO review of Defense contract Audit Agency (DCAA) audit efforts to
determine contractor compliance with Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). (3 pages)]
1982, November 15, "The Pentagon Trains Its Guns on Weapon Costs," Business Week,
pp. 168-169. [The article describes resistance to the causes of acquisition cost growth
and effort by the Defense Department to maintain better control of increasing
acquisition costs. (2 pages)]
1983, Put Earned Value (C/SCSC) Into Your Management Control System," Quentin W.
Fleming (Newport Beach, CA.: Humphreys & Associates, Inc). [This book is a basic,
practical text on Earned Value. (380 pages)]
1983, January 27, "Assessment of Admiral Rickover's Recommendations to Improve
Defense Procurement," GAO/PLRD-83-37. [The report contains GAO's assessment
of Admiral Rickover's recommendations to improve DoD's procurement. The
recommendations fall into three areas: (1) The utilization of resources; (2) The
conduct of procurement itself; and (3) The resolution of contractual conflicts. The
topics in these three areas include: Requiring DoD Certification on terms and
conditions; Not relying heavily on special financial incentives; Awarding contracts to
other than the low offeror; Not tolerating poorly performing contractors; Limiting the
period for submitting claims to one year; Deterring work stoppage by stopping
payments corporate-wide; and Enforcing fraudulent claims statutes. (93 pages)]
1983, April 14, "Defective Pricing Under the Truth-in-Negotiations Act," Hearing before
the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Part 2 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). [Witnesses include: James P. Viola—Auditor
, GAO; Harvey J. Gordon—Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition; Charles O. Starrett, Jr—Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency; Derek
J. Vander Schaaf—Acting Deputy Inspector General, DoD; Harris J. Andrews, Jr.—
Chairman, Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals; Donald J. Kinlin—Senior
Trial Attorney, U.S. Air Force. (287 pages)]
1983, July 11, "The B-1: When Pentagon, Politicians Joined Hands." U.S. News & World
Report. [The article describes the manner in which jobs and votes—not only national
security—shape major defense decisions and led to the survival of the B-1 bomber
program. (2 pages)]
1983, September 7, "Status of Major Acquisitions As Of September 30, 1982,"
GAO/NSIAD-83-32. [As of September 30, 1982, federal agencies estimated that the
cost of 444 civil and defense major acquisitions was more than $842 billion. This
included cost growth of more than $460 billion over the initial estimates for these
acquisitions. The initial estimate is the estimate contained in the budget justification
on which the Congress bases its original funding of an acquisition. Quantity increase
and inflation were the major reasons for cost growth in DoD acquisitions. Inflation
was the major reason for cost growth in civil acquisitions.
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R.F., 3/1/06
In addition to providing total cost growth information, the report provides
information on the number of individual acquisitions that, when compared to initial
estimates, experienced schedule slippages, quantity variances, and unit cost increases.
(153 pages)]
*1983, September 30, "Weapon systems Overview: A Summary of Recent GAO Reports,
Observations and Recommendations on Major Weapon Systems," GAO/NSIAD83-7. [The report includes summaries of five selected Army weapon systems reports;
five selected Navy weapon systems reports; and four selected Air Force Weapon
System Reports. It also includes summaries of three selected multi-service weapon
system reports:
Army:
AH-64 Helicopter and Hellfire Missile (99 pages)]
Helicopter Improvement Program
Patriot Air Defense
Sergeant York Air Defense
Stinger Missile
Navy:
S-3A Aircraft System
CG-47 Cruiser
Rapid Deployable Surveillance System
TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile
F/A-18 Aircraft System
Air Force:
Over-the-Horizon Backscatter Radar System
U.S. Anti-satellite System
Wide Area Antiarmor Munitions
B-1 Bomber
Joint:
Light Armored Vehicle System
Advanced AMRAAM Missile System
AF & Navy Trainer Aircraft
(99 pages)]
1983, October, "Report on the Acquisition Work Force Through Fiscal Year 1982,"
Federal Acquisition Personnel Information System, Federal Acquisition Institute,
Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), U.S. Office of Management and
Budget. [The report includes statistics on Federal Contracts and Procurement
Specialists; Federal Purchasing Agents; Federal Procurement Clerical Personnel and
Assistants; Federal industrial Specialists; and Federal General Business and Industry
personnel. (68 pages)]
1983, November 3, "Competition in Contracting Act of 1983," Senator Cohen, U.S. Senate
Report 98-297. [The Report discusses the following five topics as they relate to
competition in defense contracting: I. Introduction; II. Amendments of the Committee
on Armed Services—Dual-Sourcing Authority—Grounds for Use of Noncompetitive
28
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R.F., 3/1/06
Procedures—Justification for Use of Noncompetitive Procedures—Application of
Davis-Bacon and Walsh-Healy Acts—Awards in Competitive Procurement without
Discussion—Exceptions from Advertising Procurements—Effective Date—Other
Areas of Committee Interest; III. Estimated Cost of Legislation; IV. Evaluation of
Regulatory Impact; and V. Changes in Existing Law; (The sections of the Act appear
at the end of the report following the five topics described above.) (27 pages)]
1983, November-December, "The Defense Acquisition Improvement Program," Colonel
G. Dana Brabson, USAF (Ret.), Program Manager Journal, pp. 5-13, Defense
Systems Management College. [The article describes the six "consolidated Acquisition
Improvement Program initiatives" promulgated by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Thayer. These initiatives are portrayed as a composite of 12 of the original Carlucci
initiatives introduced in mid-1981. The six consolidated initiatives are: (1) Program
Stability; (2) Multiyear Procurement; (3) Economic Production Rates; (4) Realistic
Budgeting; (5) Improved Support and Readiness; and (6) Encouraging Competition.
(9 pages)]
1983, December 23, "Joint Major System Acquisition By the Military services: An
Elusive Strategy," GAO/NSIAD-84-22. [GAO points out that the military services
have missions requiring the use of similar aircraft, missiles, vehicles, and other high
cost systems. They reason that, at first glance, it appears that there could be
considerable savings by developing and using the same or reasonably common
systems to fit the needs of all. The idea is attractive, but impediments complicate the
acquisition process so that, to date, there have been no real successes in the joint
acquisition of high cost major systems. This report identifies those impediments to
this elusive problem and discusses some suggested solutions. (50 pages)]
1984, The Defense Industry, Jacques S. Gansler (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT
Press). [Chapters of the book include: The Defense Industry and the U.S. Economy;
Underlying Economic Factors; The Market and its Results; Research and
Development; Industrial Mobilization Capability; Subcontractors and Parts Suppliers;
Sectoral Differences; Multinational Considerations; Assessment of Problems and
Future Trends; Criteria and Alternatives for Improvement; The Approaches of Other
Nations; and Proposed Solutions. (346 pages)]
*1984, May 24, "DoD Needs to Provide More Credible Weapon Systems Cost Estimates
to the Congress," GAO/NSIAD-84-70. [The report examines the DoD cost
estimating process on seven selected weapon systems: Army: Apache Helicopter,
Bradley Fighting Vehicle System, and Helfire Missile; Navy: Light Airborne MultiPurpose Systems (LAMPS Mk III Helicopter, and Landing Ship Dock (LSC-41); and
Air Force: T-46A Trainer and B-1B Bomber. GAO found DoD cost estimating
guidance needs improvement and stricter implementation to ensure that cost estimates
are uniform, consistently developed, and well documented. GAO also found that
using more reasonable assumptions and independent cost estimates would result in
more accurate reporting to the Congress. (112 pages)]
29
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R.F., 3/1/06
1984, May 24, "Cost Estimating and Cost Reporting in DoD Weapon Programs,"
Hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). [Witnesses testifying include:
Charles A. Bowsher—Controller General, GAO; John L. Carter—GAO) Evaluator;
John R. Quetsch—Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (Comptroller) OSD; William
W. Crocker—GAO Evaluator; Maj. General. Melvin F. Chubb—Deputy Chief of
Staff, Systems Development. AFASC; Everett Pyatt—Acting Asst. Sec. of the Navy;
Maj. General James F. McCall—Comptroller, DARCOM. (134 pages)]
1984, June 4, "Pentagon Bogs Down in its War on Waste," Robert A. Kittle, U.S. News &
World Report, pp. 73-76. [The article describes inefficiencies and waste in defense
acquisition, what DoD is doing to counteract it, and obstacles to improvements. It
asserts that any notion of running the Defense Department like an efficient business
enterprise turns out to be a mission impossible. (4 pages)]
1984, July, Manufacturing Management Handbook for Program Managers, Department of
Defense (Fort Belvoir, VA.: Defense Systems Management College). [Approximately
200 pages of practical information (9 out of 16 chapters are related mostly to defense
acquisition. (The total Handbook contains 400+ pages)]
1984, July 25, "Financial Analysis of Major Defense Contractors," Robert R. Gigliotti,
RRG Associates, A report prepared for the Chief of Naval Material under contract
N60921-82-C-0038. [The report describes the percent of sales and profits at major
contractors derived from US Government contracts. Data is also included on return on
assets of these contractors. An objective of the report is to isolate, analyze and
contrast financial results on business with the U.S. Government, with the results of
business in the various commercial markets in which each company participates. (The
complete report is not included in these materials. These excerpts include
approximately 150 pages from the report analyzing several major contractors.)]
1984, August, "Report on the Acquisition Work Force – Fiscal Year 1983," Federal
Acquisition Personnel Information System, U.S. General Services Administration,
Office of Acquisition Policy, Federal Acquisition Institute. [The report includes
statistics on Federal Contracts and Procurement Specialists; Federal Purchasing
Agents; Statistics on Federal Procurement Clerical Personnel and Assistants; Federal
industrial Specialists; and Federal General Business and Industry personnel.
(45 pages)]
1984, August 6, "Defense Fraud: Cost is More than Money," Orr Kelly, U.S. News &
World Report, pp 35-36. [The article describes how a Pentagon crackdown aims not
only at saving millions but also protecting the lives of American servicemen. The
article also cites prominent people/companies, describes incidents of defective
products, and discusses difficulties in detecting these problem situations. (2 pages)]
**1984, September, Defense 84 Almanac, Department of Defense (Arlington, VA:
American Forces Information Service). [The document contains 1984 official and
30
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
professional information for commanders and key personnel on matters related to
defense policies, programs, and interests. It is intended to create better understanding
and teamwork within the Department of Defense. The document contains (1) DoD at
a glance: pictorial and tabular displays on organizations and key names and titles in
OSD, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps; (2) Total Force: Composition and
Comparisons; (3) Training loads, Joint Service Schools, War Colleges and
Intermediate Officers Schools, and descriptions of where the military trains; (4)
Money: Analyses of the defense budget, including RDT&E and Procurement, leading
contractors, and spending by state; (5) People: Active Duty, Guard and Reserve,
Civilian Employees and Military Retirees; (6) Weapon Systems and Combat Forces;
(7) Force Locations; (8) International Security Relationships; (9) Conflicts and
Casualties; (10) Defense Presence by State; and (11) Military Installations and
Properties. (51 pages)]
*1984, September-October, "Revamping the Business of National Defense," J. Ronald
Fox, Harvard Business Review, pp. 301-308. [The article points out that every year, it
appears that one or another huge defense program will cost taxpayers millions or even
billions of dollars more than budgeted. Congress and the Defense Department have
made many attempts to improve program management in the past 20 years, but still
the alarming problem of cost overruns lingers on. This article offers practical advice
to help reform defense management: more multiyear funding and planning of major
projects; more competition for program development and systems production; more
rewards for contractors who control costs; and better training and development for the
managers of large defense programs. (8 pages)]
*1984, October 1, "The Air Force Budget Process," AF Pamphlet 172-4, Comptroller of
the Air Force, Headquarters of the U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. [The pamphlet
contains a comprehensive description of the Air Force Budget Process. See also "The
Budget Business," 1961 and "The Air Force Budget," 1970, each listed earlier in this
index. (100 pages)]
1984, October 25, "Analysis of DoD's Fiscal Year 1985 Multiyear Procurement
Candidates," GAO/NSIAD-85-9. [The report describes GAO's analysis of 12
multiyear procurement candidates proposed in DoD's fiscal year 1985 budget request
to determine whether they meet the criteria established by the Congress:
Army:
UH/EH-60 airframe
CH-47D modernization
Five-ton truck (M939)
TOW II missile
Shop Equipment CMV
Bradley turret drive
Bushmaster 25mm gun
Navy:
CH/MH-53E airframe
31
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R.F., 3/1/06
AN/SSQ-36 sonobuoy
Air Force:
F-16 airframe
F-16 simulator
DSCS III
(31 pages)]
1984, December 13, "Career Paths and Professional Development for Acquisition
Managers in the Department of Defense," Hearing before the Task Force on
Selected Defense Procurement Matters of the Committee on Armed services, United
States Senate (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). [Witnesses
include: Rear Adm. Joseph S. Sansone, Jr—U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval
Material (Contracts and Business Management); Major General David W. Stallings,
U.S. Army—Deputy Chief of Staff for Procurement and Production, Army Materiel
Command; Major General Richard E. Steere, U.S. Air Force—DCS/Systems,
Headquarters, Air Force Systems Command; and General Henry A. Miley, Jr., U.S.
Army (Retired)—President, American Defense Preparedness Association.
(133 pages)]
1985, The Arms Race: Economic and Social Consequences, Hugh G. Mosley, Lexington,
MA: Lexington Books. [The book contains 9 chapters: (1) The Cold War Origins of
Military Keynesianism; (2) Military Expenditure: Some Basic Concepts; (3) The
Military Use of Resources; (4) Military Expenditure and Economic Growth; (5)
Military Expenditure and Employment; (6) Military Expenditure and Inflation; (7)
Impact on Balance of Payments and International Competitiveness; (8) The Reagan
Military Buildup and Reaganomics; and (9) The Economic and Social Consequences
of Disarmament. The book also contains an Appendix discussing components of the
U.S. military burden. (203 pages)]
1985, "The Great Engine War," A Harvard Kennedy School of Government case #C16-85629, commissioned by Robert Murray and written by David M. Kennedy for use at the
Kennedy School of Government. [The case describes government directed
competition for contractors to build aircraft engines. (28 pages)]
1985, "Report to the Congress on the Air Force Competition Advocate Program,
Department of the U.S. Air Force. [The report contains five sections: I. Competition
Achieved in Fiscal Year 1985; II. Significant Achievements—Competitive Awards—
Component Breakout—Subcontract Competition; III. Inhibitors to Competition—
engineering Data—Specifications—Congressional Delays; IV. Other Activities—
Training—Competition Studies—Awards; and V. Plan for Improved Competition—
Goal for Fiscal Year 1986—Competition Data Base—NATO Cooperation. (17 pages)]
1985, January 30, "Defense Procurement Process, Part 3" Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Defense Acquisition Policy of the Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). [Witnesses
Roy Anderson, Chairman of the Board and CEO of Lockheed Corporation, and
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1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
Thomas G. Pownall, Chairman and CEO of Martin Marietta Corporation testified on
problems in defense acquisition and suggestions for improving the process.
(38 pages)]
1985, February 20 , "Defense Procurement Process, Part 4" Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Defense Acquisition Policy of the Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). [Witnesses
offering testimony on problems in defense acquisition and suggestions for improving
the process included: Lt. Gen. James Stansberry, U.S. Air Force (Retired), (former
Administrator, Office of Federal Procurement Policy); Hugh Witt, Vice President,
United Technologies Corp. (former Administrator, Office of Federal Procurement
Policy); and Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Professor of Law, George Washington University.
(38 pages)]
1985, March 11, "Improving the Professionalism of the Defense Acquisition Work
Force," Hearing before the Subcommittee on Defense Acquisition Policy of the
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office). [Witnesses: Caleb B. Hurtt—Senior Vice President,
Martin Marietta Corp; General Richard H. Thompson—Commander, Army Materiel
Command; Admiral Steven A. White—Chief of Naval Material; General Lawrence A.
Skantze—Commander Air Force Systems Command. (68 pages)]
1985, March 15, "Navy Pushes Business Skills," Michael Weisskopf, The Washington Post,
pp. 1 and 10. [Article describes how the Navy, under the leadership of Navy Secretary
John Lehman, Jr., planned to reserve 40 percent of its future admiral slots for officers
who have specialized in weapons procurement or management rather than command at
sea. (2 pages)]
1985, March 15, "Navy to Upgrade Procurement Careers As a Way to Combat
Contractor Abuses, Tim Carrington—WSJ Staff Reporter, The Wall Street Journal.
[Describes Navy plans to encourage high-ranking admirals to pursue careers in
weapons procurement. (1 page)]
1985, March 20, "Cost Estimating in Support of Contract Negotiations," Hearing before
the Subcommittee on Defense Acquisition Policy of the Committee on Armed
Services, United States Senate (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office).
[Witnesses: Major General Jere W. Sharp—Director of Contracting and Production,
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army; Rear Adm.
Joseph S. Sansone, Jr, Supply Corps—U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Contracts and
Business Management, Naval Material Command; Major Gen. Bernard L. Weiss—
U.S. Air Force, Director of Contracting and Manufacturing Policy, Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff, Research, Development, and Acquisition, Department of the
Air Force; and Fred Newton—Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency. (87 pages)]
1985, April 10, "DoD Policies on the Use of Progress Payments," Audit Report, Office of
the DoD Inspector General. [The audit was conducted from July 1983 to February
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1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
1984. Audit objectives were (1) to determine whether existing policies on the use of
progress payments protect the Government's interests, (2) to ascertain whether higher
progress payment rates and reimbursement of non-cash contractor expenses result in
premature contract payments, (3) to determine whether the increased progress
payment rates are justified, and (4) to evaluate the necessity and propriety of DoD's
flexible progress payment program. Approximately $56 billion of progress payments
were paid in FY 1983. (44 pages)]
1985, April 18, "Revolving Door, H.R. 272, Defense Production Act Amendments of
1985," Joint Hearing of the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials
Subcommittee and the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed
Services (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). [Witnesses included:
Hon. Barbara Boxer—a Representative from California; Dr. Richard D. DeLauer—
President, Orion Group, Ltd. (and former Under Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering); Donna Martin and Dina Rasor—Project on Military Procurement.
(177 pages)]
**1985, May 14-18, "As Arms Buildup Eases, U.S. Tries to Take Stock (A collection of
five NYT articles on defense, following the Arms Buildup," New York Times. The
five articles are entitled: (1) Billions for Defense—The Spending Debate (describing
military spending amounts and trends, 1947-1985—Out of the Post-Vietnam
Trough—The Reagan Spending Spurt—Gauging Improvements—Public Outlook on
Outlays—Concern About Cutbacks; (2) Pentagon Buying: Need for Businesslike
Business—Pentagon Buying: Effort To Be Like a Business—Pressure From
Congress—Seeking Competition—Incentives at Boeing; (3) The Pride of the Military
Has Become Its People—Pentagon Taking Pride in Quality of Personnel; (4) Political
Aims of Lawmakers Bring Military Budget Rises—Military Budget Problems are
Increased by the Pet Projects of Lawmakers; (5) Critics See Key Flaws in Arms Cost
Controls—Arms System is Called Fundamentally Flawed. (25 pages)]
1985, July 18, "Remarks Presented by Rear Admiral Stuart F. Platt, SC, USN,
Competition Advocate General of the Navy to the Meeting of Federal Agency
Competition Advocates, The meeting was sponsored by the Office of Management
and Budget. [Admiral Platt's remarks address three points: (1) Strategic Planning for
Increased Procurement Competition in the Navy; (2) Results of the Navy's Efforts to
Increase Competition; (3) Key Elements of a Successful Competition Program.
(29 pages)]
1985, August, "How to Do Business with the Navy," Navy briefing. [Contents: Contracting
Statistics; Contracting Environment; Competitive Awards; Navy Acquisition
Organizations; Top Ten Navy Contractors; and How To. (43 pages)]
1985, August 22, "Unarmed Patrol: Pentagon's Auditors Prove a Poor Defense Against
Cost Overruns," Robert S. Greenberger—Staff Reporter, The Wall Street Journal.
[The article describes how DoD auditors often are outflanked by contractors or even
by others in the Department. It also describes harassment of a whistle blower.
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(2 pages)]
**1985, September, Defense 85 Almanac, Department of Defense (Arlington, VA:
American Forces Information Service). [This is a DoD publication designed to
provide 1985 official and professional information for commanders and key personnel
on matters related to defense policies, programs, and interests, and to create better
understanding and teamwork within the Department of Defense. The document
contains (1) DoD at a glance: pictorial and tabular displays on organizations, names
and titles of OSD, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps key personnel; (2) Total
Force: Composition and Comparisons; (3) Money: Analyses of the defense budget,
including RDT&E and Procurement, leading contractors, and spending by state; (4)
People: Active Duty, Guard and Reserve, Civilian Employees, and Military Retirees;
(5) Training loads, Joint Service Schools, War Colleges and Intermediate Officers
Schools, and descriptions of where the military trains; (6) Weapon Systems and
Combat Forces; (7) Force Locations; (8) International Security Relationships; (9)
Conflicts and Casualties; (10) Defense Presence by State; and (11) Military
Installations and Properties. (51 pages)]
**1985, September, "Department of Defense Fact Book 1985," Directorate for Defense
Information, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. [The data
in the book are current as of September 1985. The Fact Book contains twelve
sections: I. Historical Background from September 17, 1947; II. List of Current
Department of Defense Officials by Title; III. Biographical Sketches of Former and
Present Secretaries—Sec. of Defense, Dep. Sec. of Defense, Sec. of Army, Sec. of
Navy, Sec. of Air Force; IV. Biographical Sketches of Former and Present Under
Secretaries—Under Secretary for Policy—Under Secretary for Research and
Engineering; V. Former and present Assistant Secretaries of Defense; VI. General
Counsels; VII. Inspectors General; VIII. Directors, Operational Test and Evaluation;
IX. Chairmen, Military Liaison Committee to the Department of Energy; X. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff—Past and Present—Chief of Staff, Army—Chief of Naval
Operations—Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force—Commandant of the Marine Corps—
Director, Joint Staff, JCS; XI. Current Commanders of the Unified and Specified
Commands and their Component Commanders; and XII. List of Department of
Defense Agencies and Agency Officials. (56 pages)]
1985, September 9, "After a Big Gun Comes a Dud . . . (DIVAD)," U.S. News & World
Report, p.11. [A synopsis of the DIVAD (Division Air Defense) weapon system
acquisition program. "DIVAD cost the taxpayers 1.8 billion dollars, yet was destined
to be the anti-aircraft gun that couldn't perform. (1 page)]
*1985, October 16, "Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System," Chapter 7 of
"Defense Organization: The Need for Change," Staff Report to the Committee on
Armed Services, United States Senate. [The report contains the following sections:
(1) Introduction; (2) Historical Development of the PPB System; (3) Key Trends in the
PPB System; (4) Current PPBS Procedures; (5) Problem Areas and Causes; (6)
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R.F., 3/1/06
Descriptions of Solutions to Problem Areas; (7) Evaluation of Alternative Solutions;
and (8) Conclusions and Recommendations. (45 pages)]
**1985, October 16, "Defense Organization: The Need for Change," Staff Report to the
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office). [This document is known as "The Locher Report" after
James R. Locher III, congressional staff member and director of the study. Chapters
deal with the following topics: (1) Civilian Control of the Military; (2) Office of the
Secretary of Defense; (3) Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (4) Unified and
Specified Commands; (5) Military Departments; (6) Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System; (7) The Acquisition Process; (8) Congressional Review and
Oversight; and (9) Overview Analysis. Pages 529-568 are particularly useful from the
perspective of acquisition history and acquisition issues. (645 pages)]
1985, October 21, "Drums along the Potomac," Time, [The article states that the military
establishment is besieged by some of its staunchest supporters. Goldwater and Nunn
attack buy-now, pay-later pitches for an Air Force fighter, the Navy's tilt-rotor aircraft,
and the Army's LHX helicopter. Les Aspin asks: What have we got for a trillion
dollars? (4 pages)]
1985, November, "Soviet Strategic Defense Programs," National Defense, pp. i-xxiv. [The
document describes Soviet strategic defense programs and the U.S. response to these
programs. (24 pages)]
*1985, November 25, "Key Recommendations of the Grace Commission," prepared by
Warren L. Nelson, Professional Staff Member of the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Armed Services. [The report describes the key recommendations of the
Grace Commission and includes estimated cost savings from implementing the
recommendations. The report includes a cover letter by Patricia Schroeder, Chair of
the Grace Commission Panel, and Robert W. Davis, Ranking Minority Member of the
Grace Commission Panel. (100 pages)]
1985, December 6, "Pentagon Official Urges Setting Up Purchasing Corps," Robert S.
Greenberger, Staff Reporter, The Wall Street Journal. [The article is a brief account
of James Wade, the Pentagon's top acquisition official, suggesting the creation of a
professional defense purchasing "corps" as one of several possible ways to streamline
procurement. The article summarizes a 42-page study conducted by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense criticizing the military's buying practices. (1 page)]
1985, December 31. "Effective Competition During Weapon System Acquisition." A
report prepared for the National Contract Management Association by Louis A. Kratz
and Jacques S. Gansler of the Analytic Sciences Corporation, Arlington, VA. [The
includes five sections: (1) Background—The Objectives of Competition during
Acquisition; (2) Competition during Development; (3) Competition during
Production; (4) Breakout: Establishing Competitive Sources; and (5) Summary.
36
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
(66 pages)]
*1986, Aerospace Facts and Figures, compiled by Economic Data Service, Aerospace
Research Center (Washington, DC: Aerospace Industries Association of America,
Inc). [A comprehensive collection of data and analyses relating to U.S. Aerospace and
Defense activities. (188 pages)]
1986, The Defense Game, Richard A. Stubbing with Richard A. Mendel (New York: Harper
& Row). [The book is an insider's critical exploration of the realities of America's
Defense Establishment. The book is interesting, but is based largely on anecdotes.
(445 pages)]
*1986, A History of the Defense Systems Management College, David D. Acker
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). [A thorough history of the
Defense Systems Management College including text and photos, organized by
periods governed by each of the first nine commandants. (434 pages)]
1986, January 28, "Department of Defense Test Procedures," Hearing before the Research
and Development Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of
Representatives (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). [Test
Procedure testimony includes that of Anthony Battista—HASC; Hon Charles E.
Bennett—Representative from Florida; Col. James G. Burton, USAF Military Staff
Assistant for Defense Test and Evaluation, OSD, Joint Live-Fire Program; General
James Hollingsworth, USA (Ret.); General Max Thurman—Vice Chief of Staff, U.S.
Army; and Hon. Melvin Price—Representative from Florida. (108 pages)]
*1986, January 30, "Characterizing the Acquisition Process," Leonard Sullivan, CSIS,
Washington, DC. [A clearly-written report of an Acquisition Study conducted by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies. It includes sections on The acquisition
domain: (1) Requirements Process; (2) Planning Process; (3) Management Process; (4)
Acquisition Leadership in DoD; (5) Congressional interference in the Acquisition
Process; and (6) Opportunities to improve the DoD Acquisition Process. (75 pages)]
1986, January-February, "Reflections of a Department of Defense Program Manager,"
Wilbur D. Jones, Jr., Program Manager Journal, Defense Systems Management
College. [This is an interesting article, based on interviews with several program
managers. (8 pages)]
*1986, January-February, "Reshuffling at the Top," Calvin Brown, professor of
engineering management in the Research Directorate at the Defense Systems
Management College, Program Manager Journal, DSMC, pp. 46,47,53. [The article
describes the appointment of William H. Taft IV, deputy secretary of defense to the
dual roles of defense acquisition executive (DAE) and procurement executive (PE). In
an internal Pentagon memorandum, Mr. Taft divested James P. Wade, Jr., assistant
37
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
secretary of defense for acquisition and logistics (ASD(A&L) of those roles, which
were assigned July 25, 1985. The article suggests a rationale for elevating the defense
acquisition executive/procurement executive positions from the assistant-secretary
level to the deputy-secretary level. (3 pages)]
1986, February, "Improving the Military Acquisition Process; Lessons from Rand
Research, Michael Rich and Edmund Dews, A Project Air Force report #F-3373AF/RC, prepared for the United States Air Force by RAND Corporation. [The report
contains five chapters: I. Introduction: The Challenges of Force Modernization; II.
Trends in Outcomes of Past Weapon System Acquisitions Cost, Schedule, and
Performance—Acquisition Intervals; III. Trends Affecting Future Weapon System
Acquisitions—Escalating Enemy Threats—Resource Constraints and Uncertainties—
Longer Retention of Weapon Systems in Operational Service—Increased Difficulties
of Producing at Affordable Cost IV. A Strategy for Strengthening the Acquisition
Process—Improve the Process of Formulating Requirements for Needed Operational
Capabilities—Make Early Development More Austere—Separate Critical Subsystem
Development from Platform Development and Use "Maturational Development"—
Encourage the Use of Austere Prototyping—Improve the Transition from Full-Scale
Development to Production Through "Phased Acquisition"—Focus More Attention on
Upgrading Fielded Weapon Systems; and V. Conclusions—The Need to Beware of
False Solutions—The Need for an Integrated Approach. (52 pages)]
1986, February 3, "Defense: How Much Is Enough?" Newsweek. [The article describes
Reagan's buildup as an unfinished revolution. The question now is what the nation
obtained for its money and charting the military balance: How U.S. Forces Measure up
to Soviet forces. (6½ pages)]
1986, February 26, "Weapons Acquisition: Processes of Selected Foreign Governments,"
GAO/NSIAD-86-51FS. [The report describes weapon system acquisition processes in
France, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Israel, and the Soviet Union. (97 pages)]
1986, March 10, "Defense About Defense," Time, [The article states that President Reagan's
call for a greater buildup is met by one for a fix-up. (1.5 pages)]
1986, March 10, "Soft on the Pentagon," Wall Street Journal, lead editorial. [The editorial
is critical of the Packard Commission recommendation to reorganize the Pentagon to
create more overseers at the top. (1 page)]
1986, March-April, "Containing Weapon Program Costs in a Sole-Source Environment,"
Ernest J. Kish—Planning officer, HARM Program Office, Program Manager Journal,
pp.9-11, Defense Systems Management College. [The article describes techniques
employed on the HARM program to reduce costs. (3 pages)]
1986, March-April, "Streamlining Initiatives; They've Been Around for a Long Time,"
The Honorable Donald A. Hicks, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering, Program Manager Journal, pp.24-26, Defense Systems Management
38
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
College. [Undersecretary Hicks asks the question about acquisition reform: "Is the
Department of Defense really serious this time?" "There is nothing really new . . . so
why is it always difficult, in the real world, to put good ideas into practice." He
cautions that "we must avoid the temptation to try to solve our problems with
simplistic solutions, many of which only unnecessarily increase our complexities.
(3 pages)]
1986, March-April, "Reviewing Your Contract," Alan W. Beck—Planning Director for the
Enhanced Program Managers Course at DSMC, Program Manager Journal, pp.40-42,
Defense Systems Management College. [The author presents suggestions to aid in
understanding the complexities of government contracts. (3 pages)]
1986, Spring, "Acquiring Major Weapons: A Better Way," Michael Rich and Edmund
Dews, with C.L. Batten, Jr, "Improving the Military Acquisition Process: Lessons
from Rand Research," RAND Report R-3373-AF/RC, February 1986, summarized in
Rand Research Review, Volume X, Number one. [5 pages]
1986, April 3, "Technical Risk Assessment: The Status of Current DoD Efforts,"
GAO/PEMD-86-5. [The report contains a GAO evaluation of the policies and
procedures for technical risk assessment in the Department of Defense.
Recommendations are included in the report. (127 pages)]
1986, April 14, "Statement of Rear Admiral Stuart Platt, Competition Advocate General
of the Navy, before the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management." [The statement describes how the Navy has improved procurement
competition performance from 1982 through 1986, complete with examples.
(20 pages)]
1986, May 2, "Contract Pricing: Obligations Exceed Definitized Prices On Unpriced
Contracts," GAO/NSIAD-86-128. [The report describes a GAO review of DoD's use
of unpriced contracts at five contractor locations: General Electric Corporation;
McDonnell Douglas Corporation; FMC Corporation; Texas Instruments; and
Westinghouse Electric Corporation. (6 pages)]
1986, May 6, "Pentagon Dodge: Suspended Contractors often Continue to Get More
Defense Business," Eileen White—Staff Reporter, The Wall Street Journal, pp. 1, 22,
23. [Despite the Pentagon's controls on non-compliant contractors, loopholes are
exploited that enable suspended contractors to obtain additional contract business,
including subcontracting. The article describes how this occurs. (3 pages)]
**1986, May 12, "DoD Acquisition: Strengthening Capabilities of Key personnel in
Systems Acquisition," GAO/NSIAD-86-45. [The report discusses the capabilities of
key individuals in the acquisition workforce—program managers and contracting
officers – involved in the early program phases of defense acquisition. It addresses
(1) roles, (2) tools to carry out the roles, (3) external influences, and (4) career
preparation. The report also includes a section on the weapon system concept.
39
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
(158 pages)]
*1986, June, "A Quest for Excellence, Final Report by the President's Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense management" (Washington, DC: Department of
Defense). [The Packard Commission Report contains: A Foreword by David Packard;
Summary; Introduction; Ch. 1: National Security Planning and Budgeting; Ch. 2:
Military Organization and Command; Ch. 3: Acquisition Organization and
Procedures; and Ch. 4: Government-Industry Accountability. (115 pages)]
*1986, June, "A Quest for Excellence, Appendix to the Final Report by the President's
Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management," (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense). [Appendix to The Packard Commission Report includes: (1)
Recommendations of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management; (2) National Security Decision Directive 219 (1986); (3) President's
Special Message to Congress (April 24, 1986); (4) Recommended Process for
National Security Planning and Defense Budgeting; (5) A Comparison of Cost Growth
in Defense and Non-Defense Programs; (6) An Illustrative Organization of the
Acquisition Staff of the Secretary of Defense; (7) The Department of Defense and
Rights in Technical Data; (8) An Alternative (Navy) Personnel Management System;
(9) Survey of Department of Defense Work Force (1986); (10) U.S. National Survey:
Public Attitudes on Defense Management (1986); (11) Defense Industry Initiatives on
Business Ethics and Conduct; (12) Ethics Resource Center Final Report and
Recommendations; (13) Report on Survey of Defense Contractors' internal Audit
Processes; and (14) Study of Government Audit and Other Oversight Activities.
(378 pages)]
1986, June 16, "Pistol Procurement: Allegations on Army Selection of Beretta 9-mm. as
DoD standard Sidearm," GAO/NSIAD-86-122. [The report describes a GAO
investigation of the award of an Army contract for 9-millimeter pistols to the Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., a subsidiary of the Italian firm, Beretta. The 5-year contract for 315,930
pistols has an estimated value of about $75 million. As requested by the chairman of
the Government Operations Committee, GAO investigated allegations that (a) the
procurement was "wired" for Beretta and that U.S. firms had no chance for the award
from the outset; (b) the Army conducted "covert" testing to insure the outcome; (c) a
competitor's bid was given to Beretta; and (d) the award was influenced by an
international agreement secretly made between the U.S. and Italian governments.
GAO also examined the potential economic impact the award will have on U.S.
industry. (59 Pages)]
1986, Summer. "Buying Weapons: Bleak Prospects for Real Reform," by Thomas L.
McNaugher of the Brookings Institution. The Brookings Review, Volume 4, Number
3, pp. 11-16. [The article describes the persistent challenge of reforming defense
acquisition. Section headings in the article include: AMRAAM and the Basic Pattern;
The Problem of Design; The Problem of Planning; The Problem of Control; Politics
and the Acquisition Process. (6 pages)]
40
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
1986, June 26, "The Spend-Up," James Fallows, The Atlantic, July 1986 issue. [The article
concludes that the U.S. military arsenal has become more expensive but not larger
during the Reagan "buildup." The article discusses problems associated with cost
estimating and cost control of acquisition programs, and contractor profits.
(4 pages)]
1986, June 30, "Legislative Oversight: DoD Appearances at Congressional Hearings
During 1985," GAO/NSIAD-86-147FS. [On February 5, 1986, the U.S. House
Committee on Armed Services requested a GAO review and analysis of the number of
DoD congressional requests for testimony, briefings, written inquiries, telephone
inquiries, and other information. GAO reported the results. This report is a follow-up
to the earlier report and analyzes DoD's 1985 hearings data to obtain further insight
into the extent of congressional committee and subcommittee hearings activity
involving DoD witnesses. DoD officials appeared at 412 hearings before 100 House,
Senate, and Joint committees, subcommittees, panels, and task forces. (64 pages)]
1986, July 7, "Mr. Packard Reports," Wall Street Journal lead editorial. [The editorial
discusses The Packard Report: The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management. The editorial points out that Packard cites problems stemming from
Congress and from counterproductive incentives in the acquisition process. (1 page)]
1986, July 16, "Budget Reprogramming: Department of Defense Process for
Reprogramming Funds," GAO/NSIAD-86-164BR. [The report describes the
reprogramming process for the DoD budget (Reprogramming is the use of funds for
purposes other than those originally contemplated at the time of appropriation.) The
report concludes that reprogramming is a cumbersome process within both DoD and
the Congress because of the many levels of review and the wide variety of
congressional committee review procedures. Some DoD officials and congressional
staff said that the degree of difficulty serves to ensure that those reprogramming
requests that are submitted are the highest priority items for DoD. (30 pages)]
1986, July 22, "Aircraft Procurement: Air Force Air Defense Fighter Competition,"
GAO/NSIAD-86-170BR. [The report discusses the Air Force's planned competition
acquisition of 270 fighter aircraft for the strategic air defense forces, The aircraft are
the F-20 produced by Northrop Corporation and the F-16(SC) produced by General
Dynamics Corporation. (8 pages)]
*1986, July 23, "Acquisition: DoD's Defense Acquisition Improvement Program: A
Status Report," GAO/NSIAD-86-148. [The report reviews DoD's implementation of
the 32 Carlucci initiatives on defense acquisition improvements instituted in 1981. the
initiatives were to address longstanding problems with major weapon systems
acquisition, including significant cost overruns and schedule slippages. In 1983, DoD
focused high-level management attention on the initiatives involving (1) program
stability, (2) multiyear procurement, (3) economic production rates, (4) realistic
41
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
budgeting, (5) readiness and support, and (6) competition. In 1984, DoD added an
additional initiative involving ways to enhance the defense industrial base. (43 pages)]
*1986, July 31, "DoD Revolving Door: Relationships Between Work at DoD and Post
DoD Employment," GAO/NSIAD-86-180BR. [The report is based on a
questionnaire completed by a sample of former DoD personnel in the acquisition
workforce. The information is projectable to a population of about 5,100 mid- or
high-level DoD personnel (GS-13 and above and military O-4 and above) who left
DoD during fiscal years 1983 and 1984 and subsequently continued working in the
defense area, as evidenced by the fact that they held an industrial security clearance.
GAO found in an earlier report (GAO/NSIAD-86-71, Mar. 1986) that many former
Defense personnel were not reporting defense-related employment. GAO
recommended improvements to the reporting system. (34 pages)]
1986, August 26, "Contract Pricing: Material Prices Overstated on T-56 Engine
Contracts," GAO/NSIAD-86-156. [The report describes a GAO review at General
Motors Corporation's Allison Gas Turbine Division in Indianapolis, Indiana, where
GAO examined six T-56 aircraft engine contracts to determine if the contract prices
were fair and reasonable. (7 pages)]
**1986, September/October, Defense 86 Almanac, Department of Defense (Arlington, VA:
American Forces Information Service). [The Almanac is a DoD publication designed
to provide 1985 official and professional information for commanders and key
personnel on matters related to defense policies, programs, and interests, and to create
better understanding and teamwork within the Department of Defense. The document
contains sections: (1) DoD at a glance: pictorial and tabular displays on organizations
and key acquisition names and titles in OSD, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps;
(2) Total Force: Composition and Comparisons; (3) Money: Analyses of the defense
budget, including RDT&E and Procurement, leading contractors, and spending by
state; (4) People: Active Duty, Guard and Reserve, Civilian Employees, and Military
Retirees; (5) Training loads, Joint Service Schools, War Colleges and Intermediate
Officers Schools, and descriptions of where the military trains; (6) Weapon Systems
and Combat Forces; (7) Force Locations; (8) International Security Relationships; (9)
Conflicts and Casualties; (10) Defense Presence by State; and (11) Military
Installations and Properties. (51 pages)]
1986, October 15, "Strengthening U.S. Competitiveness: A Possible Role for the DoD,"
Jacques S. Gansler. [The article proposes that a government-operated industrial
strategy for the defense industrial base is much needed. Gansler asserts that the
government is "so involved already with industry that there is no way for it to
disengage.". The article argues that the U.S. already has an industrial strategy, but it is
incoherent and ineffective. Gansler states that "We must strive to make the policy
politically neutral. Obviously, this will be difficult; in fact some politics will almost
certainly creep in, and thus introduce some inefficiencies." "[I]n the aircraft industry
there were clearly too many firms present; while in the tank industry there were too
42
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
few; and in the electronics industry there was a lack of integration between the
commercial and the military industries." The author outlines five focal points for the
U.S. defense strategy: (1) An R&D investment strategy; (2) Creation of incentives for
productivity gains; (3) Far greater integration of civil and military production; (4)
Implementation of the defense industrial strategy on the large resource
commitments—through major weapon system and budget decisions; and (5) Making
defense industrial strategy part of U.S. national security strategy. (20 pages)]
1986, November 7, "Defense Organization: Advantages and Disadvantages of a
Centralized Civilian Acquisition Agency," GAO/NSIAD-87-36. [The report
contains a GAO review of all available reports and analyses of the organizational
structure for the acquisition workforce, reporting on the advantages and disadvantages
of establishing a Centralized Civilian Acquisition Agency to be placed either inside or
outside the Department of Defense; (23 pages)]
1986, December 23, "Government Contracting: Assessment of the Study of Defense
Contractor Profitability," GAO/NSIAD-87-50. [The report addresses the
completeness, accuracy, and adequacy of DoD's Defense Financial and Investment
Review (DFAIR)—i.e., a review of DoD's profit policy and the results it achieves.
(121 pages)]
1987, The Political Economy of National Defense, William J. Weida and Frank L. Gertcher
(Boulder Colorado: Westview Press). [The book contains 12 chapters: (1) The Dual
Nature of Defense; (2) The Politics of National Defense Spending; (3) The Economics
of Production, Distribution, and Defense; (4) Making and Controlling the Defense
Budget; (5) Regional Defense Spending; (6) Preparing for War: The Defense
Industrial Base; (7) Efficient Production of Weapon Systems; (8) The Growth of Cost:
Efficiency Issues; (9) The Growth of Cost: Other Factors; (10) International
Determinants of Defense Costs; (11) Star Wars: The Political Economy of Strategic
Defense; and (12) Conclusion: Finding Better Solutions. (230 pages)]
1987, The Air Force and the Great Engine War, Robert W. Drewes (Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press). [Chapter headings in the book include: Getting
off the Ground; Engine Development Programs; Problems with the Engine; The Battle
Lines; The Biggest Battle of All; and Overall Assessment. Robert W. Drewes, wrote
this book when he was an Air Force Colonel attending the industrial College of the
Armed Forces as a National Defense University Senior Fellow. Drewes later became
a Major General in the Air Force and Commander of the Defense Contract
Management Command. (178 pages)]
*1987, January, "DoD Organization Chart and Key Personnel Locator," Directorate for
Organizational and Management Planning, Office of the Secretary of Defense. [A
large one-page organization chart approximately 30"x30" with hundreds of DoD
names and office designations. (1 page)]
43
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
1987, March, "U.S. Defense Acquisition: A Process in Trouble, --The CSIS Defense
Acquisition Study" A report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. [The report contains three
sections: I. Overview, including perspectives from the Department of Defense, the
Congress, and from the Defense Industries; II. Key Problem Areas, including the
requirements and planning process; laws, rules, and regulations; program variability;
and personnel in Government-related acquisition; and III. Guidelines for Action and
recommendations, including the Packard Commission recommendations. (171 pages)]
1987, March 10, "Missile Procurement: AMRAAM Cost Growth and Schedule Delays,"
GAO/NSIAD-87-78. [The report discusses the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air
Missile (AMRAAM) research, development, and production program from a historical
viewpoint and focuses on the missile's requirements determination, contracting
strategy, testing, and program management. It also describes why schedule delays and
cost overruns occurred. (32 pages)]
1987, March-April, "Weapon Systems Acquisition in the Soviet Union," Timothy D.
Desmond, Program Manager Journal, pp. 15-23, Defense Systems Management
College, [The article contains a description of the weapon systems acquisition process
in the Soviet Union. It focuses on Soviet organizations associated with the acquisition
process, along with organization charts. It also describes the design approaches
adopted by the Soviet Union for its weapon systems. (9 pages)]
1987, April 1, "AMC Project Management List," Office of Project Management,
Headquarters, US Army Materiel Command (AMC), Alexandria, VA. [The paper
contains a listing of AMC projects/programs, the names of program/project/product
managers and deputy managers along with their location, and telephone number.
(36 pages)]
*1987, April 2, "DoD Acquisition Programs: Status of Selected Systems," GAO/NSIAD87-128. [The report describes GAO's review of 20 selected major defense acquisition
programs that have reached or are scheduled to reach either full-scale development
(milestone II) or full-rate production (milestone IIIB) by fiscal year 1988 or 1989:
Army:
Light Helicopter Family
Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle
Forward Area Air Defense System
Line-of-Sight Forward Heavy Weapon
Non-Line-of-Sight Weapon
Command, Control and Intelligence System
All-Source Analysis System
Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
Navy:
TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile
Carrier Inner Zone Anti-Submarine Warfare Helicopter
Trident II (D-5) System
44
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
FY 1989 Submarine Combat System
Air Force:
Titan IV Rocket (CELV)
Common Strategic Rotary Launcher
Short Range Attack Missile II
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile
Mark XV Identification Friend or Foe System
Microwave Landing System
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (User Equipment)
World Wide Military Command & Control System's Info System
(105 pages)]
1987, April 14, "Aircraft Procurement: Status and Cost of Air Force Fighter
Procurement," GAO/NSIAD-87-121. [The report contains information on the Air
Force's plans and efforts to modernize and expand its tactical fighter force from 36 to
40 wings and on the cost and affordability of these plans. (19 pages)]
1987, May 4, "Navy Contracting: Fiscal Year 1986 Contract Award for Construction of
SSN 688 Submarines," GAO/NSIAD-87-120. [The report pertains to the award of a
fiscal year 1986 contract to Electric Boat, a division of General Dynamics
Corporation. A fixed-price incentive contract was awarded for the construction of
four SSN 688 Class nuclear attack submarines. GAO examines this procurement to
ascertain (1) whether the proposed prices were realistic, (2) what the cost and national
security consequences would be if they were not, (3) what assurances, if any, exist that
the Navy will obtain its four 688 submarines within the contract price, and (4) how the
actual costs of performing the contract will be monitored. (17 pages)]
*1987, May 4, "Defense Strategy: Competition among Contractors for Large Weapons
Systems, James E. Hyman, Forest L. Reinhardt, Pieter C. T. Ter Kuile, Harvard
Business School Report funded by the Pew Foundation. [The report contains section
on The Contracting System; Measures of Success in Defense Contracting; Defense
Business Strategies; Relationships Between Strategies and Outcomes; and Limitations
of the Industry Analysis Approach. (116 pages)]
1987, July-August, "Defense Profit Policy," Emanuel Kintisch, Office of the Secretary of
the Army, National Defense. [The article discusses the DoD "Profit 76" Study; the
DoD "DFAIR" Study; the Profit Information System; and Contractors' Role in Profit
Negotiations. (4 pages)]
1987, July-August, "Streamlining the Acquisition Process, DoD's Aggressive Agenda,"
Robert B. Costello, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics),
Department of Defense, Defense/87, pp. 16-23. [Robert Costello describes five
objectives to streamline the acquisition process: (1) revitalizing the industrial base; (2)
reducing the cost of quality; (3) improving relations between government and
industry; (4) improving the procurement and logistics workforce; and (5) regulatory
reform. (8 pages)]
45
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
1987, August 31, "Procurement: Assessment of DoD's Multiyear Contract Candidates,"
GAO/NSIAD-87-202BR. [The report describes GAO's analysis of nine multiyear
contract candidates in DoD's fiscal years 1988-1989 budget request to determine
whether they satisfied the legislative criteria for multiyear contract approval. The nine
candidates include: (1) AN/ALQ-136 (V)2 Radar Jammer; (2) CH-47D Helicopter
Modernization program; (3) High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle; (4) TOW2 Missile; (5) Harpoon Missile; (6) Hawk Missile; (7) Defense Meteorological
Satellite Program; (8) F-16 Aircraft; (9) Imaging Infrared Maverick Missile. GAO
points out that the law requires that the government benefit from a multiyear contract
by saving money and improving contractors' productivity. GAO found that two of the
nine candidates proposed for multiyear procurement, the F-16 aircraft and the CH-47D
helicopter, generally met the criteria for multiyear procurement. With respect to the
other seven candidates, GAO identified areas of increased risk that must be weighed
against the potential savings to determine whether multiyear procurement authority
should be granted. (34 pages)]
1987, September 2, "Government Contracting: Selected Review of Defense Contractor
Profitability," GAO/NSIAD-87-195BR. [The report is a follow up on selected
aspects of GAO report entitled :Government Contracting: Assessment of the Study of
Defense contractor Profitability (GAO/NSIAD-87-50, Dec. 23, 1986), in which GAO
reported on the results of the Defense Financial and Investment Review and showed
that defense contractor profitability was higher than comparable durable goods
manufacturers from 1970 to 1983. GAO also reported that defense contractors were
"35 percent more profitable than commercial manufacturers during 1970-1979 and
120 percent more profitable during 1980-1983." This conclusion differed from that in
the Defense Financial and Investment Review which basically stated that defense
contractors' profitability was very similar to that of comparable durable goods
manufacturers for the years 1970 through 1979; but during 1981 to 1983 defense
profits were higher overall. The primary difference centers on methodology used in
computing return on assets (ROA). Our report also discussed the potential impact of
the Department of Defense's (DoD's) interim profit policy and the likelihood of it
causing overall negotiated defense profits to be reduced. GAO recommends that the
Congress consider establishing a profitability reporting program.
In this report, GAO (1) provides data on the profitability of specific product
categories within the defense industry compared with the overall profitability of
durable goods manufacturers; (2) assesses whether DoD's interim profit policy could,
under the certain conditions, accomplish its intended objective of reducing overall
negotiated profit objectives by 1 percent and examine whether this will be enough to
achieve DoD's goal; and (3) assess whether GAO's proposal for a Profitability
Reporting Program is consistent in concept with title IV of S.940 introduced in the
99th Congress. (7 pages)]
1987, October 7, "Strategic bombers: Estimated Costs to Deploy the B-1B, GAO/NSIAD88-12. [The report contains an estimate of what it will eventually cost to deploy the
baseline B-1B weapon system. The Air Force has still not identified all tasks needed
46
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R.F., 3/1/06
to complete development, procurement, and deployment of the baseline B-1B system,
nor has it estimated the costs of all the tasks it has identified. GAO presents its best
estimate of the eventual program costs to deploy the B-1B fleet including costs
identified for potential enhancements to the baseline program. (16 pages)]
1987, October 16, "Navy Contracting: Cost Overruns and Claims Potential on Navy
Shipbuilding Contracts," GAO/NSIAD-88-15. [The report contains a GAO review
of selected shipbuilding contracts awarded over the past few years. GAO sought to
determine (1) whether these contracts can be executed within the funding
appropriated, (2) the status of current and future claims against the government, (3) the
actions that the Navy is taking to address current and anticipated claims, and (4)
whether current staffing levels at Navy Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and
Repair (SUPSHIP) activities are providing effective oversight of the contracts.
(15 pages)]
1987, November 3, "Incentive Contracts: Examination of Fixed-Price Incentive
Contracts," GAO/NSIAD-88-36BR. [GAO examined a number of fixed-price
incentive (FPI) contracts to determine how the final price of each compared with the
contract's established target and ceiling price. GAO determined the percentage of
contracts in their sample which (1) achieved the target price exactly, (2) overran and
underran the target price, and (3) attained the ceiling price. (20 pages)]
1987, Winter, The GAO Review, pp. 17-38 (Washington, DC: The U.S. General Accounting
Office). [This issue of the Review includes six articles relating to defense acquisition
by senior analysts and directors in GAO. The articles are: "Toward a Stronger
National Security: Major Issues;" "Defense Procurement Oversight: Greater Demands
on GAO;" "GAO's Defense Budget Work: Saving Billions of Dollars;" "Weapon
System Acquisition in the Soviet Union;" "The Uncertain Link to the Strategic Triad;"
and "Auditing Highly Classified Air Force Programs." (22 pages)]
*1987, Winter, "Management of America's National Defense," David Packard, Article
appearing in American Enterprise. [The article provides an overview of the report by
the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard
Commission) issued in June 1986. (1 page)]
*1988, "The Defense Acquisition Process: An Overview," J. Ronald Fox, Adapted from
The Defense Management Challenge, Chapter 1, Boston: Harvard Business School
Press. [Section headings in the paper include: the U.S. Defense Establishment; Major
weapon systems; Defense Acquisition versus Commercial Business Operations;
Participants in the Acquisition Process; Selecting a Contractor; Controlling Schedules
and Costs; Funding Instability; The Basis for Profits; Socioeconomic Programs,
Government Controls, and Red Tape; Limited production Rates; and Limitations of
Government Program Managers. (11 pages)]
47
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R.F., 3/1/06
*1988, "Defense Systems Acquisition: Twelve Mini-Case Studies," Harvard Business
School case N9-388-101. [These twelve mini-cases explore the assignments,
qualifications, and tenure of program managers, along with the external influences on
their acquisition programs. The mini-cases are based on twelve GAO reports:
GAO/NSIAD-86-45A-1, -4, -5, -6, -7, -8, -11, -12, -13, -14, -15, and -17. They
include: (1) the Army's LHX helicopter; (2) the Army's Sense and Destroy Armor
Projectile (SADARM); (3) the Navy CZ Inner Zone Helicopter (LAMPS MK III); (4)
the Navy Undergraduate Jet Flight Training System (VTXTS); (5) the Joint Services
Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft managed by the Navy; (6) the Navy Anti-Submarine
Standoff Weapon; (7) the Air Force Advanced Air-to-Surface Missile (SRAM); (8) the
Air Force Advanced Tactical Fighter; (9) the Air Force Advanced Tactical Fighter
Engine; (10) the Air Force Advanced Warning System (AWS); (11) the Joint Military
Strategic and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) managed by the Air Force; and (12) the Air
Force Space-Based Space Surveillance System. (32 pages)]
*1988, "Four Defense Development and Production Programs: Army (1), Navy (2), Air
Force (1)," Harvard Business School case N9-388-102. [Like HBS case N9-399-101,
these four mini-cases explore the assignment, qualifications, and tenure of program
managers in the acquisition workforce, along with the external influences on four
programs. The mini-cases are based on four GAO reports: GAO/NSIAD-86-45A-2, 9, -10, and -16. They include: (1) the Army Tactical Missile System; (2) the Navy
DDG-51 Guided Missile Destroyer; (3) the Navy Minesweeper Hunter Program; and
(4) the Air Force Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. (22 pages)]
1988, "Industrial Policy and Competition in the U.S. Navy, with Epilogue," Harvard
Kennedy School of Government case C15-88-807.0, prepared by National Security
Analyst Harvey Simon and supervised by Kennedy School of Government Case
Program Director Howard Husock for use by the Kennedy School. [The case includes
sections on the Navy's Aegis program; the Todd Shipyard; and Navy competition in
contracting. (15 pages)]
1988, "Managing Viper," Kennedy School of Government case C16-88-850.0. [The case
deals with managing the Viper assault/anti-tank acquisition weapon system.
(24 pages)]
1988, "Trident Contracting (A), (B), (C), and Epilogue," A Harvard Kennedy School of
Government case series prepared by Mary Schumacher under the direction of
Professor R. Fox for use by the Kennedy School of Government. [Each of the three
cases focuses on one of the following topics: A. Drafting the Request for Proposals
C15-88-837.0; B. Evaluating the Bids C16-88-838,0; C. Negotiating the Contract
C15-88-839,0; and Epilogue 15-88-839.1. (43 pages)]
1988, "Managing For Competitiveness: The Improved Microwave Landing System
Avionics," Harvard Kennedy School of Government case C16-88-842.0, prepared by
48
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
Schuyler Houser under the direction of Professor R. Fox for use by the Kennedy
School of Government. [16 pages]
1988, "Mast Bumping in Huey and Cobra Helicopters," Harvard Kennedy School of
Government case study C15-88-800.0, prepared by Vlad Jenkins under the direction of
Professor Michael O'Hare,. [The case study discusses the design problems with the
Huey and Cobra helicopters. (5 pages)]
**1988, The Defense Management Challenge, J. Ronald Fox with James L. Field (Boston,
Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press). [Chapters include: The Defense
Acquisition Process; Congress and the Wweapons Acquisition Process; The Pentagon
(the size and organization of the Department of Defense acquisition activities);
Program Management; Careers in Acquisition Management; Civil Servants in the
Defense Acquisition Work Force; Government Representatives at Contractor Plants;
and Conclusions. (348 pages)]
1988, February 18, Report of the Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci to the Congress
on the Amended FY 1988 / FY 1989 Biennial Budget (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office). [The report has four sections: Part I. Defense Policy
(U.S. National Values and Security Interests; Threats, Military Balances, and Net
Assessments; U.S. Defense Policy and Strategy; Collective Security; Reducing and
Controlling Arms; and Competitive Strategies); Part II. Defense Resources (The
Defense Budget; Defense Management; Manpower; and The Defense Industrial Base
and Defense Installations); Part III. Defense Programs (Land Forces; Naval Forces;
Tactical Air Forces; Force Projection; Special Operations Forces; Nuclear Forces; and
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence); and Part IV. Items of Special
Importance (Strategic Defense Initiative; Military Space Operations; Research and
Development; Military Health Care; and Anti-Drug Programs). (325 pages)]
*1988, April 8, "Federal Productivity: DoD Functions With Savings Potential from
Private Sector Cost Comparisons," GAO/GGD-88-63FS. [The report responds to a
request from Congress to provide information on specific government functions that
would have the greatest potential for savings from implementation of Office of
Management and Budget Circular A-76. OMB Circular A-76, "Performance of
Commercial Activities," is the Executive branch policy that requires federal agencies
to generally procure commercial products and services from private sector sources
when a comparison of costs shows that the private sector can provide the same quality
job at less cost than a government operation. GAO found that DoD records showed
that 1,661 A-76 cost comparisons had been conducted from Fiscal year 1979 through
the first quarter of fiscal year 1987 (December 1986), which was the most current data
at the time of the GAO review. The cost comparisons covered 25 major types of
commercial functions and indicated that estimated annual savings of $613 million
were achieved through contracting with the private sector and more efficient in-house
operations. (20 pages)]
49
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R.F., 3/1/06
1988, May 10, "Procurement: Multiyear Contracting and Its Impact on Investment
Decisions," GAO/NSIAD-99-125. [The report describes GAO's review of DoD's
multiyear contracting method of acquiring weapon systems to determine its effect on
the defense industrial base. More specifically, GAO reviewed the effect of multiyear
contracting on (1) encouraging prime contractors and subcontractors to invest in
manufacturing equipment and (2) the competitive environment at the subcontractor
level. (47 pages)]
*1988, May 24, "Competition: Information on Federally Funded Research and
Development Centers," GAO/NSIAD-88-116FS. [The report provides factual data
supplementing GAO's recent report on the national defense role of federally funded
research and development centers (FFRDCs) – GAO/NSIAD-88-22. The earlier GAO
report addressed concerns about the nature and amount of work being performed by
these organizations. This report compiles official statements of mission, purpose, and
general scope of effort of the 12 FFRDCs discussed in the earlier GAO report. The
report also provides information on how the Department of Defense and the
Department of Energy oversee the operations of FFRDCs and how the military
services place work at the FFRDCs they sponsor. (42 pages)]
1988, June 30, "DoD Acquisition Programs: Status of Selected Systems, GAO/NSIAD-88160. [The report contains a GAO review of 23 defense acquisition programs with
current information on each program's requirements, schedule, performance, cost, and
funding support: 10 Army programs; 6 Navy programs; and 7 Air Force programs.
(167 pages)]
1988, July 11, "Oversight Hearings on the Defense Acquisition Process; Opening
Statement by Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). [The Opening Statement
describes the objectives of the congressional hearings and articulates Senator Nunn's
concerns about the defense acquisition process. (5 pages)]
1988, July 11, "Statement of Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United
States before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate," GAO/TNSIAD-88-38. [The Comptroller General refers to the acquisition problems/scandals
encountered by DoD during the 1980s, describes the likely effects of these
problems/scandals and suggests ways to prevent or minimize future problems.
(10 pages)]
*1988, July 11, 12, 27, and August 4, "Defense Acquisition Process," Hearings before the
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office). [Witnesses discussing defense acquisition problems and
suggested improvements include: Charles A. Bowsher—Comptroller, GAO; Frank C.
Carlucci—Secretary of Defense; David Packard—former Deputy Secretary of
Defense; R. James Woolsey—former Under Secretary of the Navy; J. Ronald Fox—
Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School; Lawrence J. Korb—
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1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
The Brookings Institution; Richard A. Stubbing; Professor of Public Policy Analysis,
Duke University. (251 pages)]
1988, July 11, "Trying to Find the Key to Reform amid Contract Scandal Blues," Insight
Journal, pp. 20-21. [As a growing scandal (defense procurement) gets media
attention, many in defense worry that structural flaws in military procurement will get
overlooked. There is wide disagreement on how to solve the problems, and many
experts fear changes that might undermine competent and honest purchasing – the vast
majority of deals. (2 pages)]
1988, July 12, "Statement by Honorable Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense before
the Senate Armed Services Committee, on Defense Acquisition Systems.
[Secretary Carlucci discusses the DoD Acquisition system and proposes five
guideposts for reforming the acquisition process: (1) Reform Should Target Causes,
Not Symptoms; (2) Reform Should Build On Our Progress To Date; (3) Reform
Should Simplify, Not Complicate Defense Procurement; (4) Reform Should
Strengthen America's Defense Industrial Base; and (5) Reform Must Keep Users
Involved in Acquisition. (11 pages)]
1988, July 26, "Testimony of Honorable Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense, before
the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives," [The
statement deals with the topic of Procurement Fraud. (11 pages)]
*1988, July 27, "Testimony of David Packard, Chairman of the Board of The HewlettPackard Company before the Senate Armed Services Committee," Washington,
D.C. [David Packard expresses his personal views on actions needed to improve
defense acquisition. (14 pages)]
1988, July 27, "Statement of R. James Woolsey, Shea & Gardner, Member, Packard
Commission, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Forces," Washington,
D.C. [James Woolsey, a member of the Packard Commission, supplements the
testimony of David Packard discussing the Packard Commission Report. (9 pages)]
*1988, July 31, "Private Industry's Lesson for the Pentagon," J. Ronald Fox, Los Angeles
Times, pp. 34-35, July 31, 1988, p.3, and Harvard Business School Bulletin,
December 1988. [The article describes private industry practices that could be usefully
adopted in defense acquisition. (2 pages)]
1988, August, "A Formal Description of The Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisition
Process; Decision-Making and Direction at the OSD Level," Institute for Defense
Analysis (IDA), Draft Working Paper #2, Defense Acquisition Study. [Sections of the
Working Paper include: Process Description; Documentation of DoD Responses to
Reform Recommendations; Critique (Functions of the Under Secretary of Defense—
Acquisition; and Strategic Planning as a Line Function. Appendix A contains a
51
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
description of Acquisition Program Milestones and Appendix B contains a description
of the DoD Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). (29 pages)]
*1988, August 4, "J. Ronald Fox Testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee." [Testimony includes sections on: Overview of defense acquisition; The
relationship between government and industry; Differing perceptions of Defense
Acquisition; Re-examining the program manager concept; The need for acquisition
careers; The revolving door; Incentives; The need for extended follow-up action; and
Prospective. (24 pages)]
1988, August 22, DoD Directives 5160.55 and 5000.52 with a personal cover note from
Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci. [The two directives expand the mission of the
Defense Systems Management College to oversee acquisition education and training,
consolidating all acquisition education and training under the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition. (DoDD 5150.55 has 7 pages and DoDD 5000.52 has
10 pages)]
*1988, September 13, "Major Acquisitions: Summary of Recurring Problems and
Systemic Issues: 1960-1987," GAO/NSIAD-88-135BR. [The report explores
questions of whether (1) the problems in acquiring defense weapons systems today are
different from those in the past, and (2) if the problems are similar, whether the
problems are more serious, less serious, or almost the same. To address these
questions, GAO reviewed prior reports on problems with weapon systems since 1960,
five major weapons acquisition studies: "The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report in
1970;" "the Commission on Government Procurement in 1972;" "DoD's Assessment of
its Weapon Systems (Carlucci Initiatives) in 1981;" "the President's Private Sector
Survey on Cost Control in 1983;" and "the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management (Packard Commission") in 1986. The GAO also reviewed the
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) on weapon systems being acquired by DoD.
(23 pages)]
*1988, September 29, "J. Ronald Fox Statement before the House Armed Services
Committee." [This is similar to the Fox statement of August 4, 1988 to the Senate
Armed Services Committee describing persistent acquisition problems and needed
improvements. Topics include: The relationship between government and industry;
Defense Contractors; Differing perceptions of defense acquisition; Re-examining the
program manager concept; Incentives for Industry and Government; and Conclusions.
(14 pages)]
*1988, October, "Comprehensive Organization charts for Army, Navy, Air Force
Acquisition Organizations," Directory Issue, National Defense, Volume LXXIII,
No. 441. [This issue of National Defense contains charts naming government
acquisition organizations and government personnel assigned to the organizations.
The Directory Issue also contains the names of defense contractor firms. (150 pages)]
52
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
1988, November, "Defense Acquisition: Observations Two Years after the Packard
Commission," Volume I: Main Report. Prepared by the Institute for Defense
Analyses for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. [The
report describes progress and problems in implementing the Packard Commission
recommendations. (140 pages)]
*1988, November, "The Real Scandal in Military Contracts," David Packard, Across the
Board, pp. 17-23. [The article contains descriptions of persistent underlying problems
in defense acquisition. (7 pages)]
**1988, November 1, Defense Acquisition: Major U.S. Commission Reports (1949-1988)
Volume I, prepared for the use of the Defense Policy Panel and Acquisition Policy
Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). [The reports described in this
document include: First Hoover Commission (1949); Second Hoover Commission
(1955); Fitzhugh Commission (1970); Commission on Government Procurement
(1972); Grace Commission (1983); and Packard Commission (1986). (993 pages)]
*1988, November 4, "Defense Management: Status of Recommendations by the Blue
Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission),"
GAO/NSIAD-89-19FS. [GAO reports the status of actions taken to implement the
recommendations made by the Packard Commission. The Commission divided its
recommendations into four sections and GAO maintains the same structure in the
appendixes II through V included in this report. The Commission describes the DoD
acquisition work force as "undertrained, underpaid, and inexperienced." (The report
provides an excellent overview of the Packard Commission Report.) (72 pages)]
1988, November 30, "Weapons Cost: Analysis of Major Weapon Systems Cost and
Quantity changes," GAO/NSIAD-89-32FS. [The report contains GAO updates on
the status of acquisition programs within the Department of Defense as of December
31, 1987. In preparing the report, GAO used data as presented in the SARs and did
not perform additional work to verify the accuracy of the data. For the three services,
the combined total program cost estimate (in current dollars) for all of the systems was
$751.6 billion. This represented an increase of approximately $216.8 billion over the
base year estimates for these programs. While GAO acknowledges that SARs provide
a valuable tool for the Congress' use in performing its oversight role, GAO expressed
reservations about the quality of the data contained in the SARs. Appendix V contains
a brief summary of some of the problems that have been identified in the past.
(145 pages)]
1989, Out of the Cold, Robert S. McNamara (New York: Simon and Schuster). [The book
contains seven chapters: I. The Origins of the Cold War: The Immediate Postwar
Years; II. The Evolution of East-West Relations, 1955-1985; III. The Costs of the
Conflict; IV. Gorbachev's Changes in Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policy; V.
53
1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
Western Responses to the Shift in the Soviet Position; VI. Potential Criticisms of a
Program; and VII. An Approach to the Twenty-first Century. (221 pages)]
1989, New Weapons Old Politics: America's Military Procurement Muddle, Thomas L.
McNaugher (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution). [Chapters include: The
Unhappy Accommodation; The Era of Construction; The Era of Reform;
Mismanaging Modernization; Perverse Priorities; The Accidental Industrial Policy;
Toward meaningful Reform. (251 pages)]
*1989, January, "Obstacles to Improving the Defense Acquisition Process," Professor J.
Ronald Fox, Harvard Business School Working Paper. A version of this article also
appeared in the publication: American Defense Annual 1989-1990, pp.145-159, Joseph
Kruzel, Editor, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989. [Topics in the article include:
The Acquisition Management Task; The Business-Government Relationship;
Differing Perceptions of Defense Acquisition; Acquisition Careers; Incentives for
Industry and Government; and Conclusions. Appendices include: Qualifications of
Acquisition Managers; Program Manager Responsibilities; Career Paths for Combat
Arms Officers and Acquisition managers; Topics Needing More Attention in the
Training of Acquisition Managers; Near-Term Steps to Address Acquisition
Management Problems. (94 pages)]
*1989, February, "The Source Selection Process: Selecting Contractors for Large
Defense Programs," James L. Field, Harvard Business School Working Paper. [The
paper describes the DoD process of selecting contractor sources for government
programs. Topics include: (1) Source Selection Objectives and Working Groups; (2)
The Pre-Solicitation Process; (3) The Post-Solicitation Process; (4) Source Selection
Protests; (5) Criticism of the Source Selection Process; (6) Outside Influences on the
Source Selection Process; and (7) Recommendations and Conclusions. (116 pages)]
1989, February 3, "Strategic Bombers: B-1B Cost and Performance Remain Uncertain,"
GAO/NSIAD-89-55. [The report points out that the Air Force has made progress in
correcting deficiencies in the B-1B program, such as flight controls and terrainfollowing radar. However, the expected progress in resolving defense avionics
problems has not materialized. It is now known that the defensive avionics cannot
meet specifications without a major redesign. To date the Air Force has incurred costs
of about $31 billion for 100 B-1B aircraft, including both baseline and non-baseline
costs. Potential enhancements and modifications could cost another $9 billion.
(56 pages)]
1989, March 6, "How You Ended Up Paying $7,662 for a Coffeepot," Dave Griffiths,
Business Week. [The Business Week Washington Correspondent provides a review of
the book, "The Pentagonists: An Insider's View of Waste, Mismanagement, and Fraud
in Defense Spending by A. Ernest Fitzgerald, Houghton Mifflin, Publisher.
(1½ pages)]
54
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R.F., 3/1/06
1989, April, Holding the Edge: Maintaining the Defense Technology Base, Office of
Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office). [Chapters include: (1) Introduction; (2) Options for Congress; (3) Summary;
(4) Planning and Funding DoD Technology Base Programs; (5) The Management of
Defense Department Laboratories; (6) Exploiting Other Management Approaches; (7)
Implications for the Defense Technology Base: Options for Congress; (8) Lab to
Field: Why so Long? and (9) Civilian Technology and Military Security.
(187 pages)]
1989, May 17, "Government Contracting: Effect of Changes in Procurement and Tax
Policy on the Defense Industry," GAO/NSIAD-89-121. [The report contains the
GAO analysis of the MAC Group (industry-sponsored) study entitled "The Impact on
Defense Industrial Capability of Changes in Procurement and Tax Policy—19841987." Specifically, GAO (1) analyzes the reliability of the "raw data," (2) identifies
the study's methodology and assumptions, and (3) evaluates the relevance of its
findings and recommendation with respect to congressional proposals for defense
industry reporting of profits. (62 pages)]
*1989, May 31, "Dealing with Persistent Management Problems," Testimony of Army
Assistant Secretary R. Fox before the Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate.
[Unanticipated problems arise in large defense acquisition programs because the
programs are necessarily defined incrementally rather than at one time. The
incremental definition causes initial cost estimates to contain substantial amounts of
uncertainty. Other problems arise from the necessity of government program
managers maintaining a critical balance between the adversarial and the partnership
roles with the contractors employed on the acquisition program. (11 pages)]
*1989, July, "Defense Management Report to the President," Secretary of Defense Dick
Cheney, Office of the Secretary of Defense. [The report is devoted largely to defense
acquisition, to plans for accomplishing full implementation of the Packard
Commission recommendations, and to realizing substantial improvements in defense
management overall. (32 pages)]
1989, July, "Program Documentation and Reporting Requirements: Reducing the
Burden on Program Managers," Linda S. Brandt and John E. Keller, A research
memorandum of the Center for Naval Analysis. [The study found that documentation
and reporting requirements impose a significant workload burden on defense
acquisition program managers. In NAVAIR, for example, nearly 20 percent of the
available, in-house man-years and 30 percent of senior management's time are devoted
to the paperwork burden. (19 pages)]
*1989, August 16, "A Review of Defense Acquisition in France and Great Britain," This
is a report of the Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office). [The report topics include: Organization of the Acquisition System; the
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1981 to 1990
R.F., 3/1/06
Acquisition Process; Professionalism in Acquisition; Relationship of the Government
Buying Organizations to industry; and Legislative Oversight. (60 pages)]
1989, September 5, "Procurement: Assessment of DoD's Multiyear Contract
Candidates," GAO/NSIAD-89-224BR. [The report describes GAO's analysis of
eight multiyear contract candidates in DoD's fiscal years 1990-1991 biennial budget to
determine whether they satisfied the legislative criteria for multiyear contract
approval. The eight candidates included: (1) Imaging Infrared Maverick Missile; (2)
KC-135R Re-engine Program; (3) Combined Effects Munition; (4) M1 Tank; (5)
Bradley Fighting Vehicle; (6) Palletized Load System; (7) F/A-18 Aircraft; and (8) E2C Aircraft. GAO found that seven systems did not clearly meet one or more of the
legislative criteria. This did not mean that these systems were inappropriate
candidates. Instead, it indicated an area of increased risk that must be weighed against
the potential savings to determine whether multiyear procurement approval should be
granted. Four of the systems' savings projections were unrealistic because of
questionable assumptions. GAO found limited support for the savings projected for
the Combined Effects Munition and questionable estimating techniques for the KC135R, Palletized Load System, and M1 Tank. (36 pages)]
1989, Fall, "Acquisition Reform: Three Guiding Principles," Paul Math, The GAO
Journal, Number 7, pp. 4-8. [The author discusses the three principles: (1) Improving
the System will take First-Rate People, (2) Attention to Affordability, and (3) Better
Management and Financial Controls. (5 pages)]
*1989, Fall, "Training the Wise Buyer," J. Ronald Fox, The GAO Journal, Number 7,
pp.9-15. [The article describes the need to improve skills of the acquisition workforce
as a prerequisite to improving outcomes of the acquisition process. Section headings
include: The Business-Government Relationship; How Perceptions Differ on Defense
Acquisition; the Liaison Manager; The Active Manager; Acquisition Careers;
Incentives for Industry and Government; and The Value of Incentives. (7 pages)]
1989, October 1, The U.S. Defense Industry: Key Issues for the 1990s, Ronald W.
Stahlschmidt, Ernst & Young National Director, Aerospace and Defense Industry
Services; (St. Louis, Missouri: Ernst & Young). [Report topics include: External
Factors Impacting the Defense business: Global Competition; Competition for
Funding; Product and Process Technology Trends; and Skill and Education
Requirement Trends. (79 pages)]
*1989, November 1, "Acquisition Reform: DoD's Efforts to Streamline Its Acquisition
System and Reduce Personnel," GAO/NSIAD-90-21. [The report reviews DoD's
efforts to implement recommendations made by the President's Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission) for streamlining defense
acquisition organizations and reducing the size of the acquisition workforce. GAO
found that each military services created a three-tiered acquisition reporting chain for
major programs that consisted of a Service Acquisition Executive, program Executive
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R.F., 3/1/06
Officers, and Program Managers. However, these chains do not have the full
management authority and responsibility envisioned by the Commission. Reductions
in acquisition personnel have been minor. The Secretary of defense completed a
management review and found many of the same problems as the Packard
Commission. DoD concluded that it must redouble its efforts to fully implement the
Packard Commission's reforms. (48 pages)]
1989, December 14, "Defense Acquisition Programs: Status of Selected Systems,"
GAO/NSIAD-90-30. [The report reviews the requirements, schedule, performance,
cost, and funding support for 13 defense acquisition programs: 4 Army programs; 4
Navy programs; and 5 Air Force programs. (115 pages)]
1990, Defense Acquisition Management, George Sammet, Jr. and David E. Green (Boca
Raton: Florida Atlantic University Press). [The book attempts to "bring together all
aspects of military acquisition management and do it in such a manner that this book is
for everyone. We (the authors) hope it will be understandable to the taxpayer, to the
student, to the contractor, to the military, and, yes, to the project manager and those
who aspire to be one." A sampling of the 21 chapter headings includes: The Defense
Industry; The Industrial Base; Defense Marketing; The Program Manager; Program
Controls; Manufacturing Management; Procurement; Subcontracting; Supportability;
Contract Administration; and Innovations in Defense Acquisition. (498 pages)]
1990, Glasnost, Perestroika, and U.S. Defense Spending, William W. Kaufmann
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution). [The book contains five chapters
entitled: (1) The Issue of Reduced Defense Spending; (2) The Five-Year Defense
Program, 1990-1994; (3) START and CFE Agreements and Their Implications, 19951997; (4) Defense after START and CFE Agreements, 1997-2000; and (5) Summary
of Proposed Reductions. (85 pages)]
*1990, March 15, "OMB Circular A-76: DoD's Reported Savings Figures are
Incomplete and Inaccurate," GAO/GGD-90-58. [The report evaluates, in part,
federal agency implementation of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Circular A-76, "Performance of Commercial Activities." A principal purpose of
OMB's A-76 program is to achieve economy in government operations. GAO focuses
on the savings attributed by DoD to it’s A-76 efforts. As part of its evaluation, GAO
assessed (1) the accuracy of A-76 savings data reported to OMB and (2) the
availability of A-76 administrative cost information. (32 pages)]
1990, April 24, "R. Fox Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee,
Investigations Subcommittee." [The testimony describes: The Defense Acquisition
Management Task; The Relationship Between Government and Industry; and
Acquisition Careers; and improvements needed in Defense Acquisition Management.
(8 pages)]
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*1990, May 8, The Quality and Professionalism of the Acquisition Workforce, Report of
the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of
Representatives (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). [The
Acquisition Workforce—civilian & military; The Contracting Workforce—Army,
Navy, Air Force, Defense Logistics Agency; The Program Manager and Deputy
Program Manager; Professionalism of the Acquisition Workforce. (776 pages)]
1990, June, "Dual-Source Procurement in the Tomahawk Program" John L. Birkler and
Joseph P. Large, Rand Report R-3867-DR&E, Santa Monica CA: Rand Corporation.
[The report describes dual-source competition on the Tomahawk Program and
discusses the possibility of resultant savings in excess of $500 million. Only the
Summary, Introduction and Overview of the report are retained. (21 pages)]
1990 September 6, "Defense Acquisition: Fleet Ballistic Missile Program Offers Lessons
for Successful programs," GAO/NSIAD-90-160. [The report discusses program
management features of the Navy's Fleet Ballistic Missile program that have been
major contributors to the program's success. GAO also reports that successful
programs in the other services tend to share similar features. (47 pages)]
*1990, November 29, "A-12 Administrative Inquiry" (The Beach Report) Report to the
Secretary of the Navy prepared by Chester Paul Beach, Jr. on failures in conducting
the A-12 RDT&E acquisition program. [This comprehensive, candid report discusses
the failure of the Navy and its contractor to report accurate cost information on the
Navy A-12 stealth aircraft development program. (35 pages)]
1990, November 29, "DoD Inspector General's letter to Congressman Andy Ireland,
relating to the Navy A-12 Acquisition Program," Inspector General, Department of
Defense, Arlington, Virginia 22202. [The report expresses the views of the DoD
Inspector General on the Navy and contractor failure to report cost and schedule
information on the Navy A-12 Program. (5 pages)]
1990, December, "Issues Associated with Second-Source Procurement Decisions," J.L.
Birkler, E. Dews, J.P. Large, Rand Report R-3996-RC, Santa Monica, CA: Rand
Corporation. [The report discusses the costs and benefits of second-source
procurement. Only a summary of the report is retained. (7 pages)]
*1990, December 4, "Acquisition Reform: Defense Management Report Savings
Initiatives," GAO/NSIAD-91-11. [In July 1989, the President approved and the
Secretary of Defense issued the Defense management Report (DMR) which outlined
actions needed to improve DoD management. In January 1990, DoD issued a status
report on DMR implementation that contained specific management improvement
initiatives intended to (1) save an estimated $39 billion in program costs and (2)
eliminate an estimated 42,900 civilian and military positions over fiscal years 19911995. In this report, GAO presents its evaluation of DoD's implementation of several
of the DMR savings initiatives. GAO's objectives were to (a) determine the status of
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R.F., 3/1/06
those initiatives, (b) evaluate the savings estimated to result from implementing some
major (high dollar) initiatives, and (c) determine whether the services have reduced the
number of acquisition personnel since the Packard Commission's 1986
recommendation. (18 pages)]
*1990, December 5, "Defense Management: Efforts to Streamline Acquisition
Management Structure," GAO/NSIAD-91-15. [The report describes the military
services' efforts to streamline their acquisition management structures as called for in
the Secretary of Defense's July 1989 Defense Management Report (DMR). (16 pages)]
1990, December 13, "After Criticism over Overruns on Plane, Pentagon Official Resigns;
Eric Schmitt, New York Times. [The article describes John Betti and his problems with
the A-12 Aircraft Acquisition Program. (1 page)]
1990, December 24, "It was Mr. Fixit vs. The Pentagon – and the Pentagon Won,"
Business Week Washington Outlook. [A brief report on John Betti and the
cancellation of the Navy A-12 stealth aircraft acquisition. (1 page)]
59
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R.F., 3/1/06
Section V
SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON DEFENSE ACQUISITION
arranged by the years covered in DAHP VOLUME V – 1991 to 2005
*1991, Affording Defense, Jacques S. Gansler (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press).
[Dr. Gansler offers sensible proposals for the reform and revitalization of the U.S.
national security system. Chapters include: (1) The Dilemma; (2) Potential Conflicts;
(3) Selecting Weapons; (4) Defense Spending and the Economy; (5) Budgeting and
Congress; (6) Buying Military Equipment; (7) Research and Development; (8) The
Industrial Base; (9) Personnel; (10) Other Countries' Approaches; and (11) Changes
Needed. (417 pages)]
*1991, January, "Creating A Professional Acquisition Work Force," Congressman
Nicholas Mavroules, National Contract Management Journal, January 1991, pp. 1523. [Congressman Mavroules, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigations,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives describes the
congressional study concluding that professional skills and attributes are essential for
the people performing acquisition functions. Mavroules concludes that a
comprehensive program is needed to ensure required improvement in the quality and
professionalism of those individuals working in acquisition positions throughout DoD.
The FY-91 Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act addresses this goal by
establishing the framework for a career program for all DoD personnel who wish to
pursue careers in the defense acquisition field. (9 pages)]
1991, January, "Best Practices: Keys to a Streamlined Acquisition Process (Volume I),"
A Report to the Defense Science Board's Acquisition Streamlining Task Force, by the
Logistics Management Institute, McLean, Virginia. [The report identifies "best
practices" for system development and acquisition. Best practices are tools or
techniques that demonstrably reduce product development time, cost, or improve
quality. The report contains eleven chapters: (1) Introduction; (2) Findings and
Conclusions; (3) Disciplined Planning and Management; (4) Integrated
Product/Process Development; (5) Enterprise Integration and Automation; (6) Process
Management and Improvement; (7) Technology Management; (8) Close CustomerSupplier Relationship; (9) Human Development; (10) Best-Practice Application in
Industry; and (11) Best-Practice Application in DoD and the Services. (115 pages)]
1991, January, "Acquisition Streamlining: Barriers to implementation of Prior
Recommendations, Volume I" Report RE001R1, Logistics Management Institute,
Report 1A to the Defense Science Board's Acquisition Streamlining Task Force.
[Volume I concludes that the problem with prior attempts to streamline defense
acquisition has been failure to fully implement the many recommendations made over
the years. The report identifies three major types of barriers to implementing prior
recommendations: cultural barriers arising from individuals' reluctance to accept
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change; systemic barriers caused by shortcomings in the structure of the acquisition
process; and procedural barriers, which have to do with how recommendations and
implementation plans are defined. What is needed is an effort that has top-level
leadership, is focused, is articulated clearly and unambiguously, and is maintained
steadily until successful. (135 pages)]
1991, January, "Acquisition Streamlining: Barriers to implementation of Prior
Recommendations, Volume II" Report RE001R1, Myron G. Myers, John A. Ciucci,
Gerald T. Kelley, Donna J.S. Peterson, Logistics Management Institute. 1A Report to
the Defense Science Board's Acquisition Streamlining Task Force. [Volume II
contains the final briefing presentation of the LMI study given to the Acquisition
Streamlining Task Force and the questionnaire used to survey program offices on the
effectiveness of prior recommendations. (150 pages)]
1991, February 1, "Aircraft Development: Reasons for Recent Cost Growth in the
Advanced Tactical Fighter Program," GAO/NSIAD-91-138. [In April 1990, the
Secretary of Defense announced that a review of the Air Force's Advanced Tactical
Fighter (ATF) program found that the ATF was needed to replace the F-15 for the air
superiority mission, but its production could be delayed because of changed world
conditions and the possibility of a longer F-15 service life. Air Force officials
subsequently told the Senate Armed Services Committee staff that the production
delay and other program changes increased the total estimated program cost of the F15 program in escalated dollars from $79.5 billion to $102 billion. In January 1991,
Senator William S. Cohen asked the GAO to identify the key factors in the ATF's cost
estimate that contributed to the increase. This report responds to that request, based
on data provided by the Air Force. (10 pages)]
1991, May 9, "Strategic Bombers: Updated Status of the B-1B Recovery Program,"
GAO/NSIAD-91-189, U.S. General Accounting Office. [The report discusses the
recovery program initiated in 1988 to correct B-1B deficiencies with respect to the
defense avionics system causing it to not have the capability to defend against enemy
threats to the extent required. In this report, GAO discusses the status of the Recovery
Program in terms of (1) the CORE program, (2) the addition of a radar warning
receiver, and (3) an improved antenna for jamming some radars. Under the CORE
program, changes have been made to the defensive avionics system in an attempt to
improve its performance, (6 pages)]
*1991, August 8, "Acquisition Reform: Implementing Defense Management Review
Initiatives," GAO/NSIAD-91-269. [The report reviews DoD's efforts to establish a
new management structure for the acquisition workforce and make other changes in its
system for acquiring major weapon systems. The President's Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission) recommended in 1986
that DoD establish clear accountability over the acquisition of major weapon systems
and provide unambiguous lines of authority for the individuals responsible for
managing the programs. The intent of the Commission's recommendations was to
nourish a new acquisition culture within DoD so that decisions on purchasing major
61
1991 to 2005
R.F., 3/1/06
weapon systems were based on realistic costs and capabilities. In this report, GAO
examined DoD's progress in implementing the Packard Commission's
recommendations and determined whether the intended cultural changes have
occurred. GAO also reviewed several related DoD initiatives addressing the
relationship between the federal government and the defense industry. (13 pages)]
1991, August 30, "Defense Contracting: Terminating Major Weapons contracts for the
Government's Convenience," GAO/NSIAD-91-255. [The report is based on a GAO
study that (1) identified whether changes had occurred in DoD's termination clauses
and the types of allowable costs over the last 10 years, (2) compared termination
procedures among the DoD agencies, (3) determined whether private industry had
comparable termination procedures, (4) ascertained whether changes to DoD's
termination procedures were being considered, (5) determined whether DoD had
criteria for identifying the most appropriate weapon systems as candidates for
termination, and (6) addressed DoD's systems to forecast major weapon system
termination costs. (14 pages)]
1991, September 17, "Tactical Missile Acquisitions: Understated Technical Risks
Leading to Cost and Schedule Overruns," GAO/NSIAD-91-280. [The report
describes GAO's examination of missile acquisition programs to (1) determine
whether they were meeting their cost and schedule goals, (2) determine why some
programs fail to meet these goals, and (3) recommend ways to help the acquisition
program meet its goals. To achieve these objectives, GAO selected two different
groups of missiles. The first group (12 systems) identified whether current missile
systems with five years of production experience had overrun cost or schedule goals.
To analyze why such changes occurred, GAO selected a smaller group of eight
missiles at different milestone decision points. (21 pages)]
1991, September 27, "1992 Navy Budget: Potential Reduction in Aircraft Procurement
Program," GAO/NSIAD-91-324BR. [The report contains a GAO review of the
Navy's amended fiscal year 1992 Aircraft Procurement budget request and prior
appropriations to determine the status of the aircraft acquisition programs. GAO
focused its review on the A-12 Avenger, the F-14 Tomcat, the F/A-18 Hornet, the V22 Osprey, and the A-6 Intruder programs. The GAO objective was to identify
potential reductions to the fiscal year 1992 budget request and potential rescissions of
prior year appropriations. (9 pages)]
1991, November 26, "Right-Sizing Defense Acquisition: The Defense Research,
Development, and Acquisition Agency, Senator William V. Roth, Jr., United States
Senate. [Senator Roth describes his legislation to correct cost and schedule problems
in defense acquisition. The legislation is "The Defense Department Acquisition
Reorganization Act of 1991." A synopsis of the Act is attached to Senator Roth's
remarks. (6 pages)]
1992, "Career Opportunities in the Defense Acquisition Workforce," DoD pamphlet
#ADS-92-01-BR. [At the beginning of the pamphlet, Under Secretary of Defense Don
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1991 to 2005
R.F., 3/1/06
Yockey, states: "This pamphlet has been prepared for members of the DoD acquisition
workforce and for others interested in the many opportunities that a career in
acquisition can offer. It explains the most important provisions of our implementation
of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) and addresses
areas of interest and concern to you, our valued employee." (22 pages)]
*1992, "DAWIA Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act Briefing Slides,"
Office of the Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RDA), Department of
the Navy. [Briefing slides describing DAWIA; Acquisition Workforce Policies; What
is meant by Professionalization of the Acquisition Workforce; the Navy RD&A
Organization; the DACM Organization; the Acquisition Position Identification
Process; Career Fields and Functional Areas; Military and Civilian Positions in the
Navy Acquisition Workforce; Experience/Education/Training; Acquisition
Professional Requirements; and What's in it for the Acquisition Workforce? (29
pages)]
1992, Overhead Allocation and Incentives for Cost Minimization in Defense
Procurement, A RAND report sponsored by and prepared for the Assistant Secretary
(Program Analysis and Evaluation) by William P. Rogerson. [The report includes the
observation that "A firm may respond to (contract) incentive(s) by engaging in pure
waste, i.e., by simply employing excess direct labor on contracts that it would like to
shift overhead onto. However, a firm may also respond by distorting its input
substitution decisions. It would substitute toward (away from) direct labor on
contracts that it would like to shift overhead onto (away from). Two major types of
input substitutes exist—capital and material. The level of automation clearly affects
the capital/labor mix. A firm can essentially substitute away from material and toward
labor by reducing its level of subcontracting and bringing more business in-house."
This report predicts that production of products whose prices are fairly responsive to
accounting cost will exhibit too little automation and too much in-house production.
The reverse will be true for products whose prices are fairly unresponsive to
accounting cost. (107 pages)]
1992, Fundamentals of Project Performance Measurement, Robert R. Kemps (San Diego,
CA: San Diego Publishing Company). [The document is an excellent introduction to
project performance measurement. The book contains 16 chapters: (1) Introduction;
(2) Understanding the Project; (3) Organizing for the Project; (4) Scheduling; (5)
Budgeting; (6) Establishing the Baseline; (7) Detailed Planning; (8) Measuring
Performance with Earned Value; (9) Accounting; (10) Data Collection; (11)
Estimating Cost at Completion; (12) Change Control; (13) Baseline Maintenance; (14)
External Reporting; (15) Graphic Presentation Data; and (16) C/SCSC. (119 pages)]
1992, January 14, "Defense Contracting: Key Data Not Routinely Used in Progress
Payment Reviews," GAO/NSIAD-92-01. [GAO examined contractor progress
payment requests to identify any excessive progress payments made by the Navy.
Progress payments are a method of interim contract financing on fixed-price contracts
in which the government and the contractor share the financial burden of contract
63
1991 to 2005
R.F., 3/1/06
performance. GAO discovered that the administrative contracting officers
administering various contracts had not been routinely using the most timely
indications to identify cost overruns, and thus were not in the best position to prevent
overpayments. (21 pages)]
1992, January 31, "Defense Management: Implementation of the Defense Acquisition
Workforce Improvement Act," GAO/NSIAD-93-129. [The report was prepared in
compliance with the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 1990,
requiring the Secretary of Defense to establish an acquisition work force with specific
experience, education, and training qualifications. The act requires that GAO
determine whether DoD has effectively implemented the act and made any
recommendations appropriate to meet the act's objectives. This report evaluates DoD's
implementation efforts through December 31, 1991. DoD will face a number of
difficulties as it implements the act. First, service officials state that the process of
identifying acquisition positions and evaluating the individual qualifications of each
member of the work force is time-consuming and may delay implementation of key
act provisions. Second, the funding necessary to implement the act could be
significant. Third, the requirement to significantly increase the number of civilians in
critical positions is controversial with the services and may encounter some resistance.
The report contains further comments and recommendations pertaining to the
acquisition work force. (10 pages)]
*1992, May "The Defense Systems Acquisition Management Process," A chart prepared
and distributed by the Defense Systems Management College, Director of Corporate
Planning. [The chart contains a description of (1) Acquisition policy; (2) Principles of
Program management; (3) Managerial Development; (4) Contractor Finance, (5)
Cost/Schedule Management; (6) Government Funds Management; (7) Contract
Management; (8) Systems Engineering; (9) Software Management; (10) Test and
Evaluation; (11) Manufacturing Management; and (12) Logistics Support, as they
occur at each phase of the acquisition process from Pre-Milestone 0, through Phase 0,
I, II, III, and IV. (1 page, 23" x 34")
1992, May 21, "Contract Pricing: Status of Defective Pricing," GAO/NSIAD-92-184FS.
[The report is one in a series GAO issued in response to requests by the U.S. Senate to
evaluate the adequacy of controls for preventing fraud, waste, and mismanagement in
DoD subcontract pricing. The GAO analyzed the Defense Contract Audit Agency
(DCAA) data base of defective pricing audits to assess whether prime contractors and
subcontractors complied with a key safeguard intended to ensure fair and reasonable
prices on noncompetitive procurements—the Truth in Negotiations Act. This report
includes information through fiscal year 1991. The GAO report describes (1) the
dollar amount of the potential defective pricing DCAA identified in prime contract
and subcontract audits, (2) the risk of defective pricing in smaller contracts, (3) the
frequency with which defective pricing occurred in prime contract and subcontract
audits, and (4) the extent that defective pricing is concentrated among a small number
of contractors. (15 pages)]
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1992, May 27, "Comanche Helicopter: Program Needs Reassessment Due to Increased
Unit Cost and other factors," GAO/NSIAD-92-204. [The report reviews the
development of the Army's Light Helicopter, known as the RAH-66 Comanche
helicopter. The report includes recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense and the
Army. (40 pages)]
1992, August, "Final Report of the Task Force on Defense Spending, the Economy, and
the Nation's Security," U.S. Senator Tim Wirth, Norman Augustine, U.S.
Representative Tom Campbell, and U.S. Representative Nicholas Mavroules, authored
the report, co-sponsored by The Defense Budget Project and The Henry L. Stimson
Center. Washington, DC. [Chapters in the report include: Introduction; Federal Policy
for Defense Related Adjustment; Reshaping the Defense Industrial Base; Promoting
Technological Progress; and Summary. (21 pages)]
1992, August 31, "Navy Contracting: Cost Growth Continues on Ship Construction
Contracts," GAO/NSIAD-92-218. [For the past several years, GAO has monitored
cost growth on Navy ship construction contracts and has testified and issued several
reports on the subject. This report updates the status of the cost growth, describes
trends in that growth, and discusses recent actions to finance additional costs and the
implications of future cost growth. The potential total cost for completing
construction of the 165 ships under the Navy's 54 ship construction contracts that were
open at the end of fiscal year 1991 was about $6.4 billion (24 percent) higher than the
contracts initial target costs of about $27.1 billion. The Navy's share of that increase
was about $4 billion; the shipyards are liable for the remainder. (32 pages)]
*1992, October, "Directory of Military Acquisition Agencies and Programs of the
Department of Defense, 1992" National Defense Journal. [The Directory contains a
listing of the acquisition organizations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. It also contains a listing of major
acquisition programs in the military services. (47 pages)]
*1992, November 20, "Contract Pricing: Unallowable Costs Charged to Defense
Contracts," GAO/NSIAD-93-79. [The report discusses GAO's review of the
overhead cost submissions of six defense contractors where the Defense contract
Audit Agency (DCAA) does not have a resident audit office. At all six contractors
GAO reviewed, contractors did not identify and exclude all unallowable costs, as
required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation. For example, in addition to almost $1
million in costs questioned by DCAA at these six contractors, GAO identified about
$2 million more in overhead costs that are either expressly unallowable or
questionable.(15 pages)]
**1992, December, "Weapons Acquisition: A Rare Opportunity for Lasting Change,"
GAO/NSIAD-93-15. [The report is excellent. It reflects on the major acquisition
issues addressed in GAO work performed during the past 15 years. Upon taking note
of the similarity of the issues during those years, the report explores the cultural side
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1991 to 2005
R.F., 3/1/06
of acquisition problems to suggest ways to ameliorate such problems in the future.
These suggestions are outlined in chapter 5. The report is not presented as the singular
correct view of the issues discussed; nor does it attempt to cover all acquisition
problems. However, it does contend that making fundamental improvements in the
acquisition workforce and in acquisition programs will require attacking the cultural
dimension of the "problem." (84 pages)]
1992, December 4, "B-2 Bomber: Status of Compliance with the 1992 and 1993 Defense
Authorization Act," GAO/NSIAD-93-46. [During the past two years, Congress has
passed legislation that restricts the B-2 program's use of appropriations until the
Secretary of Defense certifies progress has been made in demonstrating specific B-2
performance characteristics. This report provides the status of these demonstrations.
Specifically, the report discusses actions taken by DoD as required by section 131 (c)
and (e) of the Defense Authorization Act of 1992 and 1993. The report also discusses
the status of the continuing "long lead" production effort on the 16th through the 20th
aircraft, the last five B-2s that DoD intends to procure but which have only been
conditionally authorized by Congress. (18 pages)]
1993, Military Project Management Handbook, Editors: David I. Cleland, James M.
Gallagher, Ronald S. Whitehead (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc). [The book contains
44 chapters in five parts: Part 1. Functional Management; Part 2. The Environment of
Military Project Management; Part 3. The Human Element of Military Project
Management; Part 4. Military Project Management Framework; and Part 5. Strategic
Outcomes. Only eight chapter have been retained: Ch. 4. Test and Evaluation; Ch. 6.
Project Contract Administration; Ch. 11. Military Program Management: A Personal
Perspective; Ch. 12. Program Management in the United States Army; Ch. 13.
Program Management in the U.S. Navy; Ch. 14. Program Management in the U.S. Air
Force; Ch. 16. The Joint Project Office for Unmanned Ground Vehicles; and Ch. 43.
Project Advocacy. (Each chapter is numbered separately. 400+ pages in total.)]
1993, An Examination of the Air Force's Pre-Milestone One Planning/Decision Process,
Committee on Pre-Milestone One Planning/Decision process (Washington, DC:
National Academy Press). [The Committee included Edward Hirsch—DSMC,
Chairman; Michael J. Dugan--U.S. Air Force (Ret.); Robert E. Fischell—Johns
Hopkins University; Robert A. Fuhrman—Lockheed Corporation (Ret.); Wesley L.
Harris—NASA; Dale D. Myers—Dale Myers & Associates; Donald S. Pihl—U.S.
Army (Ret.); William H. Rowden—U.S. Navy (Ret.); and Lawrence A Skantze—U.S.
Air Force (Ret.). (73 pages)]
1993, Cases in Procurement Management, John F. Magnotti, Jr. professor of Procurement
Management, The American University (Shady Side, MD: Shady Side Publications).
[The book contains 20 cases including 11 from the Harvard Business School. The
cases deal with the topics: Contract Administration; Cost and Price Analysis; Major
Systems Acquisition, and Service Contracting. The book also contains three technical
notes related to defense procurement: (1) Volume-Cost-Profit Analysis; (2)
Accounting and Cost Principles; and (3) Learning Curve Theory. (208 pages)]
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**1993, Defense Dollars and Sense; A Common Cause Guide to the Defense Budget
Process, Mark Rovner (Washington, DC: Common Cause). [An interesting, clearly
written guide to the defense budget process including the names and offices of key
participants. Chapters include: I. The Defense Budget—A Brief Overview; II. The
Defense Budget Process; III. Problems with the Defense Budget Process—The
Executive Branch; IV. Problems with the Defense Budget Process—The Congress;
and V. Towards an Agenda for Reform. (90 pages)]
*1993, March 30, "Acquisition management: Waivers to Acquisition Workforce
Training, Education, and Experience Requirements," GAO/NSIAD-93-128. [On
November 5, 1990, Congress enacted the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Improvement Act. The intent of the Act was to professionalize DoD's acquisition
work force. It established education, training, and experience requirements that took
effect over a three-year period, beginning in October 1991. The Act permits DoD
officials to waive specific qualification requirements pertaining to program managers
and other acquisition personnel. It also required that, through 1998, GAO annually
report on DoD's compliance with the Act's waiver provisions. This is GAO's second
required report. The first report, "Acquisition management: Implementation of the
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act," was published January 31, 1992.
(11 pages)]
1993, April, Adjusting to the Drawdown: The Transition in the Defense Industry, Richard
A. Bitzinger (Washington, DC: Defense Budget Project). [The report addresses two
questions confronting policymakers searching for appropriate federal – as well as state
and local – programs to manage this transition: (a) What is the nature of the various
firms, rather than the market, experiencing these impacts; and (b) Which strategies and
options are available to and being taken by firms to deal with the structural change in
the defense market? The Report contains seven chapters: I. Introduction and
Summary; II. The Defense Drawdown and its Impact on the Defense Market; III. The
State of the Defense Industrial Base; IV. Defense Adjustment Strategies and Firm
Strengths and Vulnerabilities; V. Defense Industry Adjustment and Workforce Impact;
VI. Defense Industry Transition and Federal Policy; and VII. Conclusion. (41 pages)]
1993, April 26, "Acquisition management: Implementation of the Defense Acquisition
Workforce Improvement Act," GAO/NSIAD-93-129. [The report was prepared in
compliance with the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 1990,
requiring the Secretary of Defense to establish an acquisition work force with specific
experience, education, and training qualifications. The act requires that GAO
determine whether DoD has effectively implemented the act and make any
recommendations appropriate to meet the act's objectives. This report evaluates DoD's
implementation efforts through January 1993. DoD has identified and designated over
127,000 acquisition work force positions. However, the process of determining the
specific qualifications of each member of the work force is proving time-consuming.
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The report contains further comments and recommendations pertaining to the
acquisition work force. See also report for January 31, 1992. (40 pages)]
1993, May 28, International Aerospace & Defense Research Study, Ronald W.
Stahlschmidt, Ernst & Young National Director, Aerospace and Defense Industry
Services (St. Louis, Missouri: Ernst & Young). [The study explores the challenges of
the aerospace and defense industry undergoing significant transitions, resizing itself to
reflect the changed marketplace. The study compiles the views of senior aerospace
and defense management in Japan, North America, and Western Europe on the
substantive issues they face. A questionnaire sought industry's opinions in six critical
areas; (1) Changes Resulting from the Upheaval in Aerospace and Defense; (2) Peace:
Is it Temporary or Lasting? (3) Technology: Effects of Changes in Defense Spending;
(4) Globalization of Arms Sales; (5) Restructuring the Industry; and (6) Tactical
Management Issues. Perspectives of the study include: Defense Spending; The Role
of Space; Technology Base; Peace and Maintaining the Proper Military Balance; The
Impact on Research and Development; Defense Conversion and Commercial
Products; Competitive Issues; and Social Issues. (82 pages)]
1993, July, "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Acquisition
Reform," Robert J. Hermann, Task Force Chairman, Office of the Secretary of
Defense. [The report concludes that the most important and urgent imperative for
defense acquisition reform is the need to integrate major parts of the defense industrial
base with the commercial industrial base. The report includes an Executive Summary
and seven chapters: (1) Introduction – The Context for Reform in the '90s; (2) The
problems We are Trying to Solve; (3) Major Offending Processes in the Current
System – Barriers to Commercial Practice; (4) The Efficiency Issue – Where the Costs
Are; a. Inefficiencies in the "Program Definition" Area; b. Inefficiencies in Program
Execution; c. Inefficiencies in the Defense Industrial Base; and d. Conclusions on
Cost.); (5) "Requirements"/Program Definition Process – Another Barrier; (6)
Elements of a Solution – Removing the Barriers; (7) How to Begin. (33 pages)]
1993, July 1, "Contract Pricing: Issues Related to DCAA Staff Levels," GAO/NSIAD-93225. [With the downsizing of the defense budget—in particular, the procurement
component—DCAA's staffing has been significantly reduced from its peak of 7,030work years in fiscal year 1990 to 5,650-work years in fiscal year 1993. For fiscal year
1994, the President's budget proposed a 70-work year increase in DCAA staffing to
5,720. This report comments on the possible effects of the recent reductions in the
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) staffing levels on DCAA's ability to protect
against fraud, waste, and mismanagement. (7 pages)]
1993, October 15, "Contracting Officer Price Analyses," DoD Inspector General Report
No. 94-004. [The Audit Report provides the Inspector General's determination as to
whether DoD contracting officer price analysis techniques used in evaluating
contractor proposal prices were appropriately utilized, adequately detailed, and
properly documented in the contracting records. The Inspector General also evaluated
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the adequacy and effectiveness of internal controls over the use and documentation of
price analysis techniques. (55 pages)]
**1993, November "Acquisition Reform: As Yogi Berra Would Explain, "It Is Déjà Vu
All Over Again" Jed L. Babbin, National Defense, p.3. ["If you look back at the
work of the Section 800 Panel, the Packard and Grace Commissions, Frank Carlucci's
Initiatives of 1981, and even back to the Hoover Commission, we find the same
problems and solutions stated over and over again. In each new administration, the
same group is asked to look at the procurement process and recommend reforms.
Every time a new commission studies the problem and recommends solutions, the
bureaucracy procrastinates—very little is actually changed. There is nothing in the
National performance Review that indicates the result will be any different." The
article concludes that what is not needed is a revolution in government procurement:
"What is needed is a means of picking up where the Grace Commission, the Packard
Commission, and National Performance Review all leave off. We need a mechanism
for ensuring that these good ideas actually are brought to fruition. Someone jokingly
suggested that what we need is an implementation commission, not another study
commission. In fact, that is precisely what is most needed in the procurement process.
One way to do this could be for President Clinton to establish a presidential
commission with a clear legal mandate and the authority to carry out the reforms
recommended by the Hoover, Grace, and Packard Commissions, and to make other
changes which will make the process more efficient and less costly to both
government and industry. . . ."
"In the absence of an implementation commission, the system will continue to
chug along. A few years from now we will be reading yet another report on reform
issued by yet another group of intelligent, well meaning people. It, like all the others,
will end up decorating someone's bookshelf." (1 page)]
1993, November 9, "Acquisition of the Longbow Apache System, DoD Inspector General
Audit Report No. 94-015. [The audit's overall objective was to evaluate the
acquisition management of the Longbow Apache System regarding program
management elements critical to a system in the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Phase. The audit also included a review of the quantitative requirements
for missiles and an evaluation of internal controls. (17 pages)]
*1993, December, The Globalization of Arms Production: Defense Markets in Transition,
Richard A. Bitzinger (Washington, DC: Defense Budget Project). [While national
defense industrial base contracts and arms exports decline, one activity of the arms
industry is actually expanding: the "globalization" or internationalization of the
development, production, and marketing of weapon systems. The globalization of the
arms industry entails a major shift away from traditional, single-country patterns of
weapons production toward a more transnational development and manufacture of
arms. The report contains an Executive Summary and six chapters: (1) Introduction;
(2) Globalization of Arms Production: General Trends and Findings; (3) Transatlantic
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vs. Intra-European Arms Collaboration; (4) East Asia; (5) The Third World; and (6)
Conclusions. (52 pages)]
**1994, Critical Issues in the Defense Acquisition Culture, J. Ronald Fox, Edward Hirsch,
and George Krikorian (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Systems Management College).
[The report is divided into five parts: I. Introduction; II. Roles and Responsibilities of
Government Program Management; III. Government Oversight of Contractors; IV.
Qualifications and Training. The report describes cultural factors that serve as barriers
to acquisition reform. (81 pages)]
1994, January, The Globalization of the Defense Industry: Roles and Responsibilities of the
Federal Government, Erik D. Kiefel and Richard A Bitzinger (Washington, DC:
Defense Budget Project). [The report examines how the US government addresses the
growing trend toward increased globalization or internationalization of the
development, production and marketing of military systems. The report shows that
international cooperation in arms production has accelerated dramatically, both
quantitatively and qualitatively, since the mid-1980s. According to the analysis of
data presented in the report, the globalization of arms production poses major
challenges to long-term U.S. security policies and military posture. The report
concludes that there is no integrated US policy to address the phenomenon; moreover,
the government lacks detailed information on industry-led collaboration efforts.
(40 pages)]
**1994, February, Analysis of the Fiscal Year 1995 Defense Budget Request, with
Historical Defense Budget Tables dating back to 1946, Steven Kosiak (Washington,
DC: Defense Budget Project). [The report contains ten tables entitled: (1) National
Defense and Defense Department Budget Authority and Outlays, FY 83 through FY
99; (2) Real growth in National Defense and Department of Defense Budget Authority
and Outlays, FY 80 through FY 99; (3) National Defense Budget Authority in Current
and Constant Dollars, FY 46 through FY 99; (4) National Defense Outlays in Current
and Constant Dollars, FY 46 through FY 99; (5) Military Personnel Strength, FY 90
through FY 99; (6) National Defense Budget Authority by Title, FY 80 through FY
95; (7) Real Defense Funding Growth by Title, FY 80 through FY 94; (8) Department
of Defense Procurement Budget, FY 93 through FY 95; (9) Department of Defense
Research and Development Budget, FY 93 through FY 95; (10) National Defense, and
the Federal Budget and Gross Domestic Product, FY 80 through FY 99. The report
also contains two graphs: (i) Defense Budget Authority, FY 46 through FY 99; and (ii)
National Defense Spending: Share of GDP, FY 60 through FY 99. (23 pages)]
*1994, February, "Dr. Perry Urges Radical Surgery for Acquisition; Robert H. Williams,
National Defense, pp. 11-12. [Dr. Perry concludes that Defense Industrial and
technology bases must be merged with the larger commercial structure. Dr. Perry will
spearhead departmental efforts to effect major acquisition reform this year. In a
speech to graduates of the Defense Systems Management College, Dr. Perry pointed
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to a defense industrial base three to four years from now that will be one-third the size
of what it was in the mid-1980s. (2 pages)]
1994, February 9, "Statement of Dr. William J. Perry Secretary of Defense to the
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives." [Dr. Perry points
out that Acquisition reform is imperative because under the current system: (1) DoD is
often unable to acquire state-of-the-art technology; (2) DoD is often unable to buy
from commercial companies—even when their costs are cheaper or the commercial
product is the only one DoD can obtain to meet its needs; (3) DoD's costs of doing
business are too great. Dr. Perry then described the solution: Increasing the Simplified
Acquisition Threshold; A Commercial Purchasing Environment; Pilot Programs; and
Internal DoD Initiatives. (1/3 of page 11 is obscured) (18 pages)]
1994, February 16, "DoD Acquisition: Fiscal Year 1993 Waivers to Acquisition
Workforce Requirements," GAO/NSIAD-94-92. [The Defense Acquisition
Workforce Improvement Act of November 5, 1990 was enacted to professionalize
DoD's acquisition workforce. The act imposes education, training, and experience
requirements, which take effect over a 3-year period, beginning in October 1991. The
act permits DoD officials to waive specific qualification requirements pertaining to
program managers and other acquisition personnel. It also requires that, through 1998,
GAO annually report on DoD's compliance with the act's waiver provisions. This is
the third GAO report required by the act. (The two earlier GAO compliance reports
are GAO/NSIAD-92-97, January 31, 1992 and GAO/NSIAD-93-128, March 30,
1993.) During fiscal year 1993, the military services granted a total of 30 waivers for
26 individuals—3 fewer than fiscal year 1992. Most of the waivers were for program
managers. No waivers were granted for contracting officers. There were some
significant differences between the fiscal year 1992 and 1993 waivers. Compared to
fiscal year 1992, the documentation provided to support the waivers contained less
information regarding the unusual circumstances that existed or the individual
qualifications that obviated the need for meeting the standards. (15 pages)]
1994, June 27, "Hanging for Life; Defense Workers in Battered Connecticut are
Struggling to Survive" and "Europe's Defense Contractors Get Hit." U.S. News &
World Report, pp. 45-51. [Connecticut has lost some 50,000 defense jobs; 20,000
more positions could be cut. Two million square feet of space is unused at Pratt's JetEngine Plant in East Hartford, Connecticut. The end of the cold war leads to financial
losses in Europe as well as in the U.S, legions of layoffs, and a troubled future.
Europe's defense industry could lose an additional 150,000 to 200,000 jobs by 1997.
(7 pages)]
*1994, July 29, "Future Years Defense Program: Optimistic Estimates Lead to Billions
in Overprogramming," GAO/NSIAD-94-210. [The report is responsive to
congressional concern that the fiscal year 1995 Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP) submitted by DoD is overprogrammed, or contains more programs than the
President's current funding projections will support. GAO (1) examined major
funding assumptions underlying DoD's FYDP and (2) determined whether the FYDP
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complies with statutory requirements. The GAO review of 1995-1999 FYDP revealed
a substantial amount of risk that has resulted in overprogramming. Thus
overprogramming could be in excess of $150 billion. (19 pages)]
*1994, November 21, "Weapons Acquisition: Low-Rate initial Production Used to Buy
Weapon Systems Prematurely," GAO/NSIAD-95-18. [The report addresses DoD's
policies and practices on the use of low-rate initial production in relation to
operational test and evaluation. It also examines the impact of the current legislative
requirements in each area. It makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and
presents matters for congressional consideration, both of which are intended to
minimize the risk of prematurely committing to production and later encountering
costly technical problems. (44 pages)]
1995, Bomber R&D Since 1945; the Role of Experience, Mark A. Lorell with Alison
Saunders and Hugh P. Levaux (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Corp). [This report
assesses the major trends in the history of jet bomber design and development in the
United States since World War II to evaluate the role of prior bomber and related
research and development (R&D) experience among prime contractors. Chapters
include: (1) Introduction; (2) The 1940s and 1950s: Ever Faster and Higher; (3) The
1960s and 1970s: The Strategic Bomber Under Attack; (4) The 1970s through the
1990s: The Stealth Revolution; (5) Concluding Observations. (77 pages)]
1995, Defense conversion: Transforming the Arsenal of Democracy, Jacques S. Gansler
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press). [Gansler argues that the government
must make its acquisitions process more flexible, specifically by lowering barriers to
integration, for the defense industry to survive and thrive. These actions must include,
among other things, rethinking the production specifications for new equipment and
changing bids for contracts from a cost basis to a price basis. Chapters include: (1)
The Challenge; (2) The Cold War Defense Industry; (3) Growing Foreign
Involvement; (4) Initial Post-Cold War Developments; (5) Prior Lessons of Industrial
Conversion; (6) The Best Structure for the Twenty-First Century; (7) A Few DefenseUnique Plants; (8) Current Barriers to Integration; (9) A Three-Part Transformation
Strategy; (10) Technological Leadership; (11) The Critical Work Force; and (12)
Achieving Civil/Military Integration. (277 pages)]
1995, January 12, "Unreasonable Pressures on Defense Program Managers," J. Ronald
Fox, Edward Hirsch, and George Krikorian, Inside the Pentagon, January 12, 1995,
and Program Manager Magazine, July-August 1995. [The article presents an
overview of the DSMC Research Report: "Critical Issues in the Defense Acquisition
Culture," 1994, recommending major changes in acquisition organization and
incentives to reduce cost growth and schedule slippages in defense acquisition..
(6 pages)]
1995, January 31, "Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DoD Assumptions,"
GAO/NSIAD-95-56. [The report contains a GAO analysis of DoD assumptions about
the key aspects of the DoD two-conflict strategy to determine whether they reasonably
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support DoD's conclusions that the projected force, with capability enhancements, can
execute the strategy. (69 pages)]
1995, May 3, "Overhead Costs: Defense Industry Initiatives to Control Overhead
Rates," GAO/NSIAD-95-115. [The report contains a GAO analysis of business unit
overhead costs of General Dynamics, General Motors, Lockheed, Martin Marietta,
McDonnell Douglas, and United Technologies. (17 pages)]
1995, May 24, "Directions for Defense," Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions
of the Armed Forces, John P. White, chairman, Department of Defense. [The report
includes the following sections: (1) A Commission on Roles and Missions; (2)
Effective Unified Military Operations; (3) Efficient and Responsive Support (Increase
Reliance on Market Solutions: Outsource Commercial Activities); (4) Improved
Management and Direction; (5) Conclusion: The Future. (136 pages)]
1995, Summer. "Acquisition Reform: It's Not as Easy as It Seems," Mark Cancian, in
Acquisition Review Quarterly, pp. 189-212, [The report contains pragmatic
observations. Section headings include: (1) Why is Defense Different? (2) How Does
This Affect Reform? (3) What is Our Experience with Reform? and (4) What are the
Prospects for Reform? (24 pages)]
1995, August 4, "B-2 Bomber: Status of Cost, Development and Production,"
GAO/NSIAD-95-164. [The report discusses (1) the Air Force's progress in acquiring
20 operational B-2 aircraft within cost limitations set by the Congress and (2) the
extent of the progress achieved in flight testing, production, and modification efforts.
The 1994 Defense Authorization Act limits B-2 program acquisition costs to $28,968
million, expressed in fiscal year 1981 constant dollars. A recent Air Force cost
estimate indicates the final cost for 20 operational aircraft will be about $28,820
million in fiscal 1981 constant dollars, or 99.5 percent of the legislated amount.
Expressed in then-year dollars, the current estimated cost of the B-2 program totals
$44,389 million; 91 percent of this amount has been appropriated through fiscal year
1995. (30 pages)]
1995, September 15, "Future Years Defense Program: 1996 Is Considerably Different
From the 1995 Program," GAO/NSIAD-95-213. [The report highlights major
funding shifts in the FYDP from FY95 to FY96. In GAO's review of the 1995 FYDP,
the first FYDP to reflect the implementation of the Bottom-up Review strategy, GAO
concluded that DoD's major planning assumptions relied too heavily on optimistic cost
estimates and potential savings. As a result, it had not gone far enough to meet
economic realities, thus leaving its new plan with more programs than proposed
budgets would support. This included approximately $20 billion in overprogramming,
which DoD identified in the 1995 FYDP as undistributed future adjustments. The
1995 FYDP, which totaled $1,240 billion, represented DoD's 5-year program plan
through fiscal year 1999. The 1996 FYDP, which totals $1,544 billion, covers the 6year period from fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2001. The 1996 plan overlaps
the 1995 plan for the years 1996-99. (24 pages)]
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1995, September 15, "1996 Defense Budget: Potential Reductions, Rescissions, and
Restrictions in RDT&E and Procurement," GAO/NSIAD-95-218BR. [The report
examines DoD's fiscal year 1996 budget request and prior years' appropriations for
selected research, development, test, and evaluation and procurement programs.
GAO's objectives were to identify potential reductions in the fiscal year 1996 budget
request and potential rescissions to prior years' appropriations. GAO identified
opportunities to reduce the funding levels for fiscal year 1996 by about $956.4 million
and rescind about $265.2 million from prior years' appropriations. GAO also
identified about $934.2 million the Congress can restrict from obligation until
specified criteria are met to minimize risks in acquisition programs. (105 pages)]
*1995, October 6, "DoD Procurement: Millions in Contract Payment Errors Not
Detected and Resolved Promptly," GAO/NSIAD-96-8. [The report describes a
GAO survey of a group of large and small defense contractors, identifying the amount
of outstanding DoD overpayments and underpayments found in contractors' records.
(28 pages)]
1997, August, "Final Report of the Process Action Team (PAT) on Acquisition
Education and Training Structures and Process," Eric M. Levi, PAT chairman,
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology). [The report
describes a comprehensive review of DoD's acquisition education and training
structure and processes. The report offers a number of recommendations for
improving the quality and cost effective delivery of the acquisition education and
training process in DoD. The recommendations embrace fundamental changes in the
organization, management, and procedures for educating the acquisition work force.
They build upon the foundation established by the Defense Acquisition University
consortium. The report also incorporates a transition plan which includes a timephased decision and implementation schedule culminating in a reengineered education
and training enterprise becoming operational in early Fiscal Year 2000. Though the
transition stretches over a period of two plus years, the Process Action Team believes
that the decisions taken early-on will provide the momentum to achieve the goal of
major improvements in the education and training of the entire acquisition work force.
It remains unclear whether the report recommendations will be implemented
effectively. (62 pages)]
1997, September, Program Manager's Tool Kit (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Systems
management College). [A useful reference document containing a graphic outline of
management tools/techniques useful in defense acquisition. (87 pages)]
*1997, October, "The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of U.S. Fighter R&D," Mark Lorell,
Hugh Levaux, with Alison Sanders, Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation Report
MR-939-AF. [Chapters include: (1) Introduction; (2) The 1920s to the 50s: The Long
Road Toward U.S. Leadership in Fighter R&D; (3) The Supersonic Revolution; (4)
The 1960s and 70s: Acquisition Reform, Doctrinal Ferment; (5) Revival of the Air
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Superiority Fighter; (6) The 1970s-90s: The Stealth Revolution; and (7) Concluding
Observations. Comprehensive, practical. (180 pages)]
1998, "Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisitions Requires Changes
in DoD's Environment," GAO/NSIAD-98-56. [The report assesses whether
commercial product development practices offer ways to improve the process used at
DoD for transitioning weapons from development to production. Specifically, this
report (1) compares DoD's practices for preparing a weapon system for production
with best commercial practices, (2) determines how differences in commercial and
DoD environments for developing new products affect practices, and (3) discusses
environmental changes that are key to the success of DoD initiatives for improving the
transition of weapons from development to production. (81 pages)]
1998, March 19, "Report of the Defense Science Board Acquisition Workforce Sub-Panel
of the Defense Acquisition Reform Task Force on Defense Reform," Dr. Craig L.
Fields, Sub-Panel Chairman, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Technology. [The objective of the Sub-Panel study was to produce a defense
acquisition process yielding better, cheaper, and faster acquisition, defined from the
warfighter's perspective. The acquisition process must be better so that the warfighter
has the high-quality, leading edge systems needed to maintain technological
superiority; and cheaper so that the acquisition process is carried out efficiently,
enabling the Department to make the best use of its limited resources so that DoD can
draw upon its capabilities. The report also calls for (1) Establishing an all-Service
development Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I)
capability; (2) Increasing the use of price-based forms of contracting; (3) Giving
Program Executive Officers (PEOs) and Program Managers (PMs) full responsibility
for life cycle support of their systems, to include funding responsibility; and (4)
Redesigning the nature of the acquisition workforce to result in a much smaller group
of acquisition professionals who will be performing different jobs than they do today.
The members of the new acquisition workforce must become more skilled as
managers rather than as doers, more focused on systems engineering and less on
component development, and more capable of making business judgments rather than
being guided by rule-based thinking. (RF comment: The report is likely to produce
few, if any, significant changes leading to a better trained and skilled government
workforce more knowledgeable of the mixed motives that exist in buyer-seller
relationships between government and industry. It is unclear how this report will lead
to its stated objective of a "better, cheaper, faster" acquisition system. More likely, it
will do just the opposite. It appears to view the government-industry relationship as
one in which the participants join hands and sing Kum Ba Yah rather than conducting
informed arms-length negotiations.) (160 pages)]
1998, March-April, "Why DoD Contractors File Protests," Steve Roemerman—President
and Manager, Business Development, Raytheon TI Systems, Inc. PM Program
Manager Journal, pp.28-30, Defense Systems Management College. [The article
explores some of the reasons why DoD contractors file protests. The article is divided
into five sections: (1) Why are protests filed? (2) Environmental Influences; (3) What
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about those who never file protests? (4) Government actions to allay protests; and (5)
A few caveats. (3 pages)]
1998, July 21, "Future Years Defense Program: Substantial Risks Remain in Dod's 19992003 Plan," GAO/NSIAD-98-204. [The report points out that despite DoD's
reductions in military and civilian personnel, force structure, and facilities over several
years, the Department has been unable to shift funds from infrastructure to
modernization. This is the fifth consecutive year since 1995 that DoD's proposed
program was inverse to its goals of reducing its infrastructure costs and increasing
funds for weapons modernization. Although DoD's 1999 program made adjustments
to the 1998 program to decrease the risk that funds would migrate from procurement
to unplanned operating expenses, GAO continues to see risks that DoD's program may
not be executable as planned. For example, the military services' plans to reduce
military and civilian personnel are incomplete or based on optimistic assumptions.
(46 pages)]
1998, August 12, "Defense Spending: Trends and Geographical Distribution of Prime
Contract Awards and Compensation," GAO/NSIAD-98-195. [DoD spends more
than $200 billion annually for contracts and compensation across the country. These
dollars, entering each state's economy, are generally associated with employment and
other economic benefits. In this report, GAO reviewed (1) the overall trends and
geographical distribution of defense spending between 1988 and 1997 and (2) defense
spending in conjunction with each state's population and income tax contributions.
GAO found that the award of DoD prime contracts in the United States declined from
$164 billion to $107 billion from 1988 to 1997. There were large declines in
equipment and research prime contracts, while service prime contracts became a more
significant portion of total prime contracts. Meanwhile, DoD compensation decreased
from $111 billion to $97 billion. Data were adjusted for inflation and shown in
constant 1997 dollars. Four states—California, Virginia, Texas, and Florida—
accounted for $81 billion, or about 40 percent of DoD prime contract awards and DoD
compensation in 1997. Over the period 1988 to 1997, changes in the prime contract
awards have occurred throughout the 50 states; California has experienced the largest
decrease. States with the largest decreases had major reductions in prime contracts for
equipment. In some states, gains in prime contracts for services lessened the impact of
significant decreases in equipment prime contracts. (27 pages)]
1998, September 24, "Dividing Defense Dollars" (in 1997), The Washington Post, p. A23.
[The article reports that the Defense Department spends more than $200 billion
annually for defense contracts and work compensation across the country. This
amount accounts for 14 percent of federal expenditures in 1997. The article points out
how DoD spending is divided by state and by per capita spending. (1 page)]
1998, September-October, "Gansler Endorses Single Process Initiative Throughout DoDIndustry," LeAntha Sumpter—Senior Acquisition Reform Specialist, Office of the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform) interviewing Dr. Jacques S.
Gansler Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology), PM Program
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Manager Journal, pp. 2-7, Defense Systems Management College Press. [The article
discusses the Single Process Initiative – an initiative that facilitates the elimination of
the distinction between traditional defense and commercial suppliers. It is the
mechanism by which DoD expedites the transition of existing government contracts to
common best practices. Questions Dr. Gansler answers include: "What is the
overarching goal of SPI and what are the expected benefits?" "Do you realistically
expect to receive the SPI ROM (Rough Order Magnitude) savings that industry has
projected over the past few years? If so, when and in what form?" "Do you expect
that the benefits of Acquisition Reform will ever be observed at the PM Level? If so,
how?" "How does a program justify spending its limited resources working "longterm perspective" SPI proposals or contract changes that do not benefit their instant
contracts or programs?" "Are there any plans to "incentivize" industry to participate
further in the program?" "Do you think the Department of Defense Inspector General
or General Accounting Office should examine the SPI to see if the Report of
Investigation is worth what DoD is putting into the program. (6 pages)]
1998, December, "Pentagon Institutes New Grading Scale for Contract Performance,"
National Defense Magazine, p.8. [The Defense Department is implementing a new
method to evaluate contractor performance. The new guidelines will replace current
regulations, which most contractors say are costly and time consuming. The Pentagon
asked industry leaders in the 1960s to design criteria by which performance could be
quantified during and after a contract. They produced a checklist of 35 items, the
cost/schedule control systems criteria (CSCSC). (1 page)]
*1999, Arming the Eagle: A History of U.S. Weapons Acquisition Since 1775, Wilbur D.
Jones, Jr. (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Systems Management College Press). [The book
traces the history of U.S. weapons acquisition chronologically in sixteen chapters from
1775 through 1998. (531 pages)]
1999, June 1, "Best Practices applicable to DoD Developmental Test and Evaluation," A
study performed by the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) for the
Directorate of Test, Systems Engineering and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of
Defense. [The focus of the study is on best practices in developmental test and
evaluation (DT&E). DT&E can be defined as test and evaluation conducted
throughout the acquisition process to assist in the engineering design and development
process and to verify the attainment of technical performance specifications and
supportability objectives. The study seeks to answer the question: "What are the best
practices in test and evaluation that are currently employed by successful enterprises
to support the maturation of product design, measure the performance of the
production-ready version, and verify product acceptability for the end-user
application? While the study team "found no silver bullets," it did identify some
twenty practices used by commercial enterprises that are relevant to ODTSE&E
(Office of the Director for Test, Systems Engineering and Evaluation within OSD)
business practices. These practices are grouped in the report under the categories
"Policy," "Planning," "Test Conduct," and "Test Analysis." (56 pages)]
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1999, July 30, "Best Practices: Better management of Technology Development Can
Improve Weapon System Outcomes," GAO/NSIAD-99-162. [The report assesses
how best practices offer improvements to the way DoD incorporates new technology
into weapon system programs. It also assesses the factors that can make it difficult to
mature technologies before they are included on weapon system programs and what
can be done about them. GAO concludes from the experience of DoD and
commercial technology development cases that demonstrating a high level of maturity
before new technologies are incorporated into product development programs places
those programs in a better position to succeed. The report cites two additional
principal findings: (1) Controllable conditions affect how well a technology's inclusion
on a product can be managed; and (2) Impediments to adopting best practices for
technology inclusion in DoD are surmountable. (73 pages)]
*1999, July/August, "Listing of the DoD Acquisition Organizations and Contractors.
National Defense Magazine, Volume LXXXIII, Number 549, pp. 73-159, Arlington,
VA: National Defense Industrial Association. [The document contains a listing of
defense contractor firms by product categories, along with the names, address, and
phone numbers of key personnel in each firm. The listing also includes a description
of DoD acquisition organizations in the Army, Navy, Air Force and OSD along with
the names, addresses and phone numbers of key acquisition personnel, major
acquisition programs, and the names and phone numbers of program directors.
(87 pages)]
1999, August 15, "Dogfight Over a Must-Win Contract," Leslie Wayne, The New York
Times, Section 3, pp. 1, 10, 11. [The article describes the competition between Boeing
Corporation and Lockheed Martin Corporation to win a contract to develop and
produce the Air Force/Navy Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft System—a contract that
could be the largest military contract ever. "Nearly 5,000 of these planes are expected
to be made, to replace nearly all the fighter planes flying today." (3 pages)]
**1999, August 16, "Best Practices: DoD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon
System Programs Implement Best Practices," GAO/NSIAD-99-206. [The report
assesses the extent to which DoD's training helps weapon system program offices
apply best practices and whether such training can be of more help. GAO concludes
that DoD's standard training did not make a major contribution to the leading program
offices' ability to implement best practices. In evaluating their key sources of
knowledge, none of the key officials from programs at the forefront of implementing
best practices ranked standard DoD training first, with many ranking it last. DoD
training either did not reach the right people when it was needed or did not reach them
at all. When training on best practices was received, it did not contain the depth or
practical insights program office people needed to implement the practices. It was
primarily through their own efforts—learning on the job, finding external training, or
developing their own training program—that they attained the knowledge needed to
apply best practices. The report contrasts DoD practices in training program offices
with the practices followed by leading commercial firms. (69 pages)]
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1999, September, A Comparison of the Defense Acquisition Systems of France, Great
Britain, Germany and the United States," Tony Kausal (editor), Gertrud Humily,
Trevor Taylor, and Peter Roller (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Systems Management
College Press). [The report is organized in five parts: (1) France; (2) Germany; (3)
United Kingdom; (4) The United States; and (5) A Comparison of the four Acquisition
Systems. The first four parts each contain information and discussion that generally
includes the following topics (with names that vary depending on the country
discussed): History and Traditions; The Government; The Defense Organization; The
Procurement/Acquisition System; The Acquisition Workforce; The Defense
Industry/Industrial Base; and Future Trends. The Appendices include a description of
the armed forces of each of the four nations and a list of acquisition and related
Organizations. (298 pages)]
1999, Fall, "Paving the Way for Price-Based Acquisition," Edward L. Will—Boeing
Director of Contracts and Pricing for Acquisition Streamlining, Acquisition Review,
pp.369-381, Defense Acquisition University. [The article is an advocacy piece for
price-based contracting: shifting away from cost-based contracts to fixed-price type
contracts. The shift is advocated to provide the government with less information on
contractor cost and pricing data and fewer opportunities for cost analysis of what DoD
is purchasing. The theory is that presenting the government with less cost information
will reduce the cost of defense acquisition. That connection is apparently yet to be
demonstrated. The author criticizes cost-based contracting as imposing "unique
accounting systems, extensive auditing, growing cycle times, and a loss of focus on
best value" –although these costs are difficult to attribute to the contracting
mechanism. Price-based contracting certainly makes sense when DoD is purchasing
commercials products, but its use on non-commercial purchases is more problematic.
In the Conclusion section of the article the author acknowledges that "the specifics of
DoD's new price-based acquisition policies have not been published (as this article
went to press). Nonetheless, the author concludes in the same paragraph (without
evidence) that "The savings in cycle time and cost (from using price-based
contracting) can be significant. (13 pages)]
1999, November 12, "Ground Zero: Military Must Change For 21st Century—The
Question is How; U.S. Chooses: Terminator, Peacekeeping Globocop, or
Combination of Roles," by Thomas E. Ricks, Staff Reporter, The Wall Street
Journal. [The article discusses the kind of war the U.S. will fight in the future and the
manner in which the U.S. is and is not preparing for such a conflict. The article
compares the U.S. 1998 defense budget with the 1998 defense budgets of Russia,
France, Japan, China, U.K. Germany, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Taiwan, India, South
Korea, and Israel. It also compares U.S. defense spending per capita and potential
troop strength in millions with comparable statistics for the same list of countries.
(4 pages)]
*2000, April 26, "Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better
Weapon System Decision," GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137. [Congressional testimony of
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the Comptroller General discusses issues the Department of Defense faces in its
acquisition of weapon systems and the application of best practices to help address
those issues. After having performed hundreds of reviews of major weapon systems
over the past 20 years, GAO has seen many of the same problems recur—cost
increases, schedule delays, and performance problems. This testimony focuses on
how best commercial practices help shape improvements in the way DoD operates and
makes decisions through the weapons acquisition process. The Comptroller General
discusses why weapon system acquisition problems persist and how a process based
on best practices can lead to better weapon system outcomes. These issues have
significant implications for decisions made on individual programs and for DoD's
larger modernization goals.
The Comptroller General points out that pressures of competing for the funds
to launch and sustain a weapon system program create incentives for starting programs
too early, over-promising performance capabilities; and understating expected costs,
schedules, and risks associated with developing and producing the weapon. Headings
throughout the testimony include: "Persistent Problems are Reinforced by the Current
Process;" "How a Knowledge-Based Process Can Lead to Better Weapons
Acquisitions;" "Technology and Requirements Must Match Before a Program Can Be
Launched;" "Product Development Should Deliver a Mature Design and Key
Processes;" "Successful Product Development Allows a True Production Focus;" and
"Implications of a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Process for the Future." (16 pages)]
2001, The $5 Billion Misunderstanding; The Collapse of the Navy's A-12 Stealth Bomber
Program (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press). [The book presents a candid
examination of the A-12 development program. Chapters include: (1) A Point of
Reference; (2) The Conception of Stealth; (3) A-12 Gestation and the Decline of the
Scientific Method; (4) Born in Felonious conduct; (5) Risk Reduction—The
Demonstration and Validation Phase; (6) The Fraudulent Competition for Full-Scale
Development; (7) The Full-Scale Development Phase; (8) The Major Aircraft Review;
(9) From "Well Handled" to the Beach Report; (10) From the Beach Report to
Contract Termination; (11) Cancellation Afterplay; and (12) What, If Anything, Can
Be Learned. (483 pages)]
2001, March 8, "Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to
Better Weapon System Outcomes," GAO-01-288. [The report includes sections
entitled: "Timely matching of Requirements and Resources is Critical to Product
Development Outcomes;" "Several Factors Enable Customer Wants and Developer
Resources to be Matched Before Program Launch;" and "Characteristics of DoD's
Acquisition Process Make It Hard to Match Expectations and Resources Before
Program Launch." (11 pages)]
2001, April 10, "DoD Teaming Practices Not Achieving Potential Results," GAO-01-510.
[The report examines how best practices can help DoD maximize the benefits of
integrated product teams (IPTs) in its development of weapon systems. It describes
the rise of IPTs in product development and examines the factors that are critical to
making integrated product teams effective, including the environment in which such
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teams operate. GAO makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on how to
better support the use of integrated product teams on weapon system programs.
(55 pages)]
2000, July, A Comparison of the Defense Acquisition Systems of Australia, Japan, South
Korea, Singapore and the United States, B.A. "Tony" Kausal, Editor, and Professor
Stefan Markowski (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Systems Management College Press).
[The report is organized into separate sections for each country listed in the title.
Within each section, the report discusses (1) The history and governmental process;
(2) Requirements, planning, and budgeting; (3) The defense acquisition system; (4)
Program management; (5) The procurement process, (6) International cooperation and
arms sales; and (7) The defense industrial base. The report concludes with a
comparative analysis section of acquisition systems at the named countries.
(346 pages)]
2001, July, Redesigning Acquisition Processes: A New Methodology based on the Flow of
Knowledge and Information, Ned Kock—Temple University and Frederic Murphy—
Temple University (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Acquisition University Press). A
research project report funded by the DAU External Acquisition Research Program
(EARP). [The report describes a methodology for redesigning acquisition processes
based on knowledge and information-flow analysis. The methodology, called
InfoDesign, focuses on the knowledge embedded in a business process, the
information processing resources involved in execution of the process, and the
information flowing through the process. The validation of the methodology was
conducted as an action research study in which one acquisition process involving the
U.S. Government and one key supplier was analyzed and redesigned. (RF Comment:
The article challenges the Taylor scientific management method assumption that
activity-flow representations should provide the basis for business process redesign
and that Taylor's assumption is "clearly inconsistent with the fact that, currently
"information" is what flows the most in business processes, even in manufacturing
organizations." While information flow is important in business process redesign,
information flow should supplement activity-flow, rather than replacing it. (78 pages)]
2001, November, The Falcon and the Mirage: Managing for Combat Effectiveness,
B.A. "Tony" Kausal—Air Force Chair, Executive Institute (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense
Acquisition University Press). [The document compares the acquisition of the French
Mirage aircraft with that of the U.S. F-16 aircraft. It begins with a description of the
French National Milieu discussing the Political-Military Environment, the Ministry of
Defense Acquisition Program Management, Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System, the Procurement/Contracting System, the Acquisition workforce, and
Armament Sales, --followed by a similar description of the same topics in the U.S.
National Milieu. The document also discusses Industry-Government Relationships
followed by a comprehensive examination of the French Mirage 2000 Program and
the United States F-16 Program. (148 pages)]
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*2002, March-April, "Where Are All the Civilian 'PMs in Waiting'?" Arthur SantoDonato—Acting Project Manager—Effects and Fires Command and Control Systems,
Ft. Monmouth, PM Program Manager Journal, pp. 68-75, Defense Acquisition
University. [Topics in the article include: Compensation Inequities; No Control Over
Next Job; No Longer in Charge; High Risk; Lack of Substantive Bonuses to Reward
Risktaking. The author concludes: "Once the professional acquisition workforce
perceives that there is a real career ladder that places significant value on
Program/Product manager, Deputy Program/Project Manager, and Product Manager
jobs, there will, I believe, be a surge in exceptional candidates for these jobs. The
article also includes a number of suggestions to improve the number of civilian 'PMs
in Waiting.' (8 pages)]
2002, June 4, "Statement by Franklin C. Spinney, OSD Staff Analyst, Department of
Defense, before The Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of
Representatives. [The statement contains thirteen section headings: (1) The PPBS, (2)
the FYDP Database and the Link between Output and Input; (3) The Breakdown
between the Present and the Past; (4) The Breakdown in the Link between the Present
and the Future: The Plans/Reality Mismatch, the Defense Power Games, and the
Boom and Bust Cycle of Decay; (5) Interim Summary; (6) Teach the Pentagon to
Think Before It Spends; (7) Strategic Planning as a Complex Adaptive Process –
Theory; (8) Phase I: A Crash Program to Clean the Books; (9) Phase II – The
Construction of Component Planning Options; (10) How Much Spending is Enough?
– Accounting for the External Threat; (11) How Much is Enough? – Accounting for
Internal Constraints; (12) How Much is Enough?—Hypothetical Budget Scenarios;
and (13) Phase III – The Construction of Strategic Planning Options. (31 pages)]
2002, July-August, "Best Value Formula," David P. Quinn—a former Senior Computer
Scientist for the National Security Agency, PM Program Manager Journal, pp. 40-43,
Defense Acquisition University. [The article describes the "Best Value" approach to
source selection and advocates the "best value" formula as a method for reflecting the
government's true best interest. The formula is meant to help quantify where the
government obtains the best technical and management implementation for its money.
Sections of the article include: (1) Eyes on the prize; (2) Evaluating proposals; (3)
Cost as a factor; (4) Examples of impact of price on contract award; (5) Finding the
real best value; (6) Whither goes the past performance factor; (7) Punishment or
reward; (8) Validating the best value formula; and (9) Final justification. (4 pages)]
2002, August, A comprehensive list of defense industry firms, addresses, phone numbers,
and officers, National Defense Journal, Volume LXXXVII, No. 585. [120 pages]
2003, January, "A-12 termination Sets Harmful Precedent for Defense Programs,"
J. Ronald Fox, National Defense Journal. [The article describes the reasons why the
manner in which the A-12 development program was terminated establishes harmful
precedents for future defense acquisition programs. (4 pages)]
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2004, Cost Growth in Major Weapon Procurement Programs, David L. McNicol,
Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA). [The publication provides a
detailed analysis of the causes of growth in the procurement costs of major acquisition
programs from the costs estimated when the programs entered into the Engineering
and Manufacturing Development Phase. Seven chapters include: (1) Is There a Case
for "Doing Something" about Cost Growth? (2) Introduction to the Data; (3)
Mechanisms of Cost Growth; (4) Decisions; (5) Mistakes Related to Unrealistic
Milestone II Estimates; (6) Mistakes Unrelated to Milestone II Estimates; and (7)
Conclusions and Recommendations. Five Appendices include: A. Memoranda on Use
of Parametric Cost Estimates and Creation of the OSD Cost Analysis Improvement
Group; B. Consequences of Mistakes Cost Growth; C. Deflation and Quantity
Normalization; D. Variable Specifications, Data Sources, and Estimates Regression
Equations; and E. Mistakes Component of Growth in Development Cost. (119 pages)]
*2004, August, "Defense Department Acquisition 2004 Directory," National Defense
Journal, Arlington, VA.: National Defense Industrial Association. [The Directory
contains names and phone numbers of key individuals and offices associated with
defense acquisition in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, and Air
Force, along with the names, addresses, and phone numbers of companies and senior
officials at approximately 1,000 defense contractor organizations. (126 pages)]
*2005, August, "Defense Department Acquisition 2005 Directory," National Defense
Journal, Arlington, VA: National Defense Industrial Association. [The Directory
contains names and phone numbers of key individuals and offices associated with
defense acquisition in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, and Air
Force, along with the names, addresses, and phone numbers of companies and senior
officials at approximately 1,000 defense contractor organizations. (142 pages)]
*2005, October, "Defense Acquisition Reform: A Case of Déjà Vu," Lawrence P. Farrell,
Jr., President, National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), National Defense
Journal, October 2005. [The article cites the close similarity between acquisition
improvements being proposed by DOD's Defense Acquisition Performance
Assessment Project (DAPA) in 2005 and improvement proposed repeatedly in years
past. "Industry officials who testified at DAPA noted the problem of diffused
acquisition authority, which often leaves program managers without the proper tools
and authority to do their jobs. This also makes it difficult to hold anyone accountable
when problems arise." The article also states that "A recent Government
Accountability Office study of 26 major acquisition programs suggests that the top
five programs have nearly doubled in cost during the past four years—in fact,
skyrocketing from $281 billion to $521 billion. The trend is not abating—estimates of
cost growth and development time of these same five programs grew 14.3 percent and
5.5 percent, respectively, in the past year alone, according to GAO." (1 page)]
*2005, November 30, "Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program
Managers Needed to Improve Outcomes," GAO Report GAO-06-110, U. S.
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General - Accountability Office. [The report examines the role of DoD program
managers and concludes that DoD is not supporting its program managers Effectively.
The report compares DoD with commercial program management. DoD leadership
rarely separates long-term wants from needs based on credible, future threats. As a
result, DoD starts many more programs than it can afford—creating a competition for
funds that pressures program managers to produce optimistic cost estimates and to
over-promise capabilities. Moreover, GAO work has shown that DoD allows
programs to begin without establishing a formal business case. And once they begin,
requirements and funding change over time. In fact, program managers personally
consider requirements and funding instability—which occur throughout the
program—to be their biggest obstacles to success. Program managers also believe that
they are not sufficiently empowered to execute their programs, and that because much
remains outside of their span of control, they cannot be held accountable. The report
contains five chapters: (1) Introduction and Background; (2) Senior Leader Support
and Disciplined Knowledge-Based Processes Are Critical Enablers for Program
Managers; (3) DoD Is Not Supporting Its Program Managers Effectively; (4) Basic
Incentives Drive Differences in How Program Managers Are Supported and Held
Accountable; and (5) Conclusions and Recommendations. (71 pages)]
*2006, January, Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project (DAPA) for the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, USAF (Ret)—
Panel Chairman. [The DAPA project reports that "A number of studies of the defense
acquisition process have been conducted since the genre was born with the Hoover
study in 1949. There is remarkable agreement as to the problems which need to be
addressed. The difficulty resides in having the will to do anything about those
problems. Norman R. Augustine, a former Under Secretary of the Army and former
CEO of Martin Marietta Corporation points out in a Forward to the NAPA report that
Gil Fitzhugh's study in 1966 observed that a fundamental problem is that everyone is
responsible for everything and no one is responsible for anything. Dick DeLauer's
study in the 1970s concluded that the problem was "turbulence" – perpetually
changing budgets, schedules, requirements and people. Dave Packard's somewhat
more recent study pointed to the shortage of experienced managers as the root cause of
many problems.
Norman Augustine also observes that "Experience suggests that promising
areas to look for progress include seeking experienced, capable managers; supporting
basic research; starting fewer and finishing more projects; reducing turbulence;
assigning clear responsibilities; providing financial reserves; incrementally budgeting
to milestones; accepting prudent risks; controlling cost; disciplining requirements;
utilizing appropriate contractual and competitive instruments; emphasizing reliability;
creating fast-tracks; and, as always, insisting on ethical comportment. . . . The present
review, as was the case with its predecessors, will ultimately be judged not by how
well it identified the problems, or even how well it points to the solutions. It will be
judged by what it (the DAPA Project) actually makes happen. (139 pages)]
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C-17 DOCUMENTS (including GAO reports)
arranged by the years covered in DAHP VOLUME V - 1987-2005
C-17 1987, March 20, "Military Airlift; Air Force Analysis Supports Acquisition of C-17
Aircraft," GAO/NSIAD-87-97. [The report contains a GAO evaluation of the Air
Force's analysis leading to its decision to develop and produce the C-17 aircraft, rather
than buy additional C-5 aircraft, to reach its long-range airlift goal. (61 pages)]
C-17 1989, August 18, "Military Airlift: C-17 Faces Schedule, Cost, and Performance
Challenges," GAO/NSIAD-89-195. [This report provides information on the Air
Force's progress in developing and acquiring the C-17 airlift aircraft. GAO found that
the C-17 program faces significant schedule, cost, and performance challenges. GAO
concluded that it is unlikely that the aircraft's planned first flight date of August 1990
will be met. (36 pages)]
C-17 1991, March, "Military Airlift: Cost and Complexity of the C-17 Aircraft Research
and Development Program," GAO/NSIAD-91-5. [The report responds to a request
from the Chairman, Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense, Senate
Armed Services Committee, to identify the cost elements of the C-17 research and
development program and to provide information on the complexity of C-17 systems
and structures. (24 pages)]
C-17 1991, November 14, "Status of the C-17 Program and Related Issues Affecting the
McDonnell Douglas Corporation," Statement of Nancy R. Kingsbury, Director, Air
Force Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, GAO/T-NSIAD92-4. ["Because of Major schedule delays and increases in the overall cost of the
program, Douglas Aircraft is facing a cost overrun on the development contract. That
overrun is estimated to range from $450 million—the company's estimate—to $1.4
billion—an estimate developed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition." [17 pages]
C-17 1992, April 20, "Military Airlift: Status of C-17 Aircraft Development Program,"
GAO/NSIAD-92-205BR. [The report provides information on the status of the
development, production, and testing of the C-17 military transport aircraft that GAO
presented to the staff of the Senate Committee on Armed Services on March 23, 1992.
(14 pages)]
C-17 1992, April 30, "GAO says C-17 (is) Behind Schedules," Business Section, Daily
News. [The first seven C-17s are estimated to be a cumulative 21 months behind on
their production schedules. (1 page)]
C-17 1992, May 13, "Lawmakers Call For Deep Cuts in C-17 Program," Andy Pasztor,
The Wall Street Journal. [The article describes a proposed 30% cut in C-17 funding to
$1.9 billion for next year. (1 page)]
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C-17 1993, March 10, "Military Airlift: Status of the C-17 Development Program,"
GAO/T-NSIAD-93-6. [The report contains the statement of Frank C. Conahan,
Assistant Comptroller General to the Subcommittees on Military Acquisition and on
Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives. It discusses the status of the C-17 program and includes information
on cost and schedule issues, contract and funds management issues, the status of
testing, and a series of technical issues. (16 pages)]
C-17 1993, March 18, "Military Airlift: Status of the C-17 Development Program,"
GAO/T-NSIAD-93-8. [The report contains the statement of Louis J. Rodrigues, GAO
Director, Systems Development and Production Issues, National Security and
International Affairs Division. C-17 cost trends continue to deteriorate and the
contract delivery schedules continue to slip. The Air Force and the contractor have
consistently been unduly optimistic in their cost and schedule estimates and currently
have obligated over $1 billion on undefinitized contracts for future aircraft without
having a legally enforceable delivery schedule. The Air Force has recently revised the
delivery schedules for the lot III production contract in a series of modifications which
GAO believes raise questions about the impact of contractor finances on Air Force
actions; the ability of the Air Force to compel contractor performance; and the
adequacy of legal, contractual and financial protection for the government. (15 pages)]
C-17 1993, October 21, "The C-17 Cargo Plane Production Problems," James P.
Wootten, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research
Service, the Library of Congress, A CRS Issue Brief. [The production of the C-17
aircraft has been hampered by a series of delays, including the diversion of funds to
alternative programs, late delivery of parts, tooling and components, and contract
disputes between McDonnell Douglas, the prime contractor, and several of its major
subcontractors. (14 pages)]
C-17 1993, November 18, "Response to Air Force Review Regarding the Inspector
General, Department of Defense, Administrative Inquiry on the C-17 Program,"
Derek J. Vander Schaaf—Deputy Inspector General, DoD Inspector General,
Memorandum for Secretary of the Air Force. [14 pages]
C-17 1993, December, "C-17 Review," A report of the Defense Science Board Task Force
on C-17 Review, Washington, DC, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition & Technology. [The study was conducted to assess the current status of
the C-17, the contractor's capability to successfully complete C-17 development and
transition into production, and to identify the changes that would be necessary to
ensure success and reduce risk. In developing its findings and recommendations, the
Task Force established seven integrated product teams to assess the current program
as well as investigate all other pertinent issues. (67 pages)]
C-17 1994, February 10, "Military Airlift: The C-17 Program Status and Proposed
Settlement," GAO/T-NSIAD-94-115. [The report contains testimony by Frank C.
Conahan, Assistant Comptroller General. It discusses the current status of the C-17
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program. It also updates information on C-17 cost, schedule, and performance issues
and on GAO observations on DoD's proposed settlement agreement with McDonnell
Douglas Corporation, the prime contractor on the C-17 aircraft. (42 pages)]
C-17 1994, April 15, "Military Airlift: C-17 Settlement Is Not a Good Deal,"
GAO/NSIAD-94-141. [The report describes the current status (April 1994) of the C17 program, with emphasis on DoD's proposed settlement agreement with McDonnell
Douglas, the prime contractor on the C-17 program. It also discusses DoD's efforts to
identify alternatives to the C-17 program. (15 pages)]
C-17 1994, July 20, "DoD Inspector General Letter to Honorable Charles E. Grassley,
United States Senate," Derek J. Vander Schaaf, DoD Deputy Inspector General.
[The letter discusses the DoD C-17 settlement with McDonnell Douglas Corporation.
The letter was written to Senator Grassley in response to his request for specific
references to Derek Vander Schaaf's testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, when Mr. Vander Schaaf referred to congressional direction to the Air
Force to break out production of the C-17 wing from the prime contractor. [The letter
contains several attachments relating to the congressional testimony. (24 pages)]
C-17 1995, January 26, "C-17 Aircraft: Cost and Performance Issues," GAO/NSIAD-9526. [The report assesses the C-17's original justification and the effect of technical
problems and cost increases on the aircraft's ability to achieve original program
requirements. The report also discusses some of the assumptions underlying the
conclusions in the recent C-17 cost and operational effectiveness analysis.
The Air Force originally planned to acquire 210 C-17 aircraft. However, in April
1990, as part of DoD's Major Aircraft Review, the Secretary of Defense reduced the
program to 120 aircraft—a sufficient number to maintain an airlift capacity of 52
million ton-miles per day, which was judged to be sufficient in the post-Cold War Era.
Through fiscal year 1995, Congress has appropriated almost $18 billion for the C-17
program. Due to cost, schedule, and performance concerns, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense recently reduced the program to 40 aircraft, pending a Defense Acquisition
Board (DAB) review currently scheduled to occur in November 1995. The Air Force,
however, is still planning for a 120-aircraft program. (50 pages)]
C-17 1995, September 7, "Air Force May Buy as Many as 120 of McDonnell Douglas's
C-17 Aircraft," The Wall Street Journal. [1 page]
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