THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
No. 2008-0723
_________________________________
Green Mountain Realty Corporation
v.
The Fifth Estate Tower, LLC and
Jay Williams, Individually and as Manager
______________________________________
THE THOMAS JEFFERSON CENTER FOR
THE PROTECTION OF FREE EXPRESSION
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS
________________________________________
Daniel St. Hilaire, Esq. (Bar No. 12945)
St. Hilaire & St. Hilaire, PLLC.
194 North Main Street
Concord, NH 03301
Telephone: 603-856-7617
October 30, 2009
Of Counsel:
Robert M. O’Neil
J. Joshua Wheeler
Eisha Jain
The Thomas Jefferson Center for
the Protection of Free Expression
400 Worrell Drive
Charlottesville, Virginia 22911
Telephone: 434-295-4784
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...................................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................1
I.
II.
FIFTH ESTATE TOWER’S STATEMENTS AND POSTCARDS
CONSTITUTE PROTECTED POLITICAL SPEECH. ..........................................2
A.
A speaker’s corporate identity does not diminish First Amendment
considerations. ..................................................................................................4
B.
The presence of a commercial interest does not render the First
Amendment inapplicable.................................................................................5
THE APPLICATION OF THE “ACTUAL MALICE” STANDARD
DEVELOPED IN DEFAMATION CASES IS BOTH LOGICALLY
WARRANTED IN THIS CASE AND ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH U.S.
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT. ..........................................................................8
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................13
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Cases
Pages
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) ...........................................................................................5
Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Products Corp. 463 U.S. 60 (1983)...................................................6
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984) ..................12
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557,
(1980) .........................................................................................................................................6
Compuware v. Moody’s, Inc., 499 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2007) ...............................................9, 10
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).....................................................................................3
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980)..................................4
Deupree v. Iliff, 860 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1988) .........................................................................10
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) ..............................3
Fed. Election Com’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) .............................5
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) ......................................................4
Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) .....................................10
Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) .......................................................................9, 11
Greenbelt Coop. Pub. Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) .....................................................11
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) .......................................................9, 10
Levinsky’s, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122 (1st Cir. 1997) ...................................3
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) ............................................. 2-3
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988) ....................................................................................2, 8
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) .........................................................10, 12
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).....................................................................................9
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).................................................................8, 9
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) ...................................................................................7
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) ................................................9
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) ...................................................................6
Roe v. City of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578 (9th Cir. 1997) .....................................................4
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) ...............................................................................3
Sandy River Nursing Care Center v. Nat’l Council on Compensation Ins., 798 F. Supp. 810
(D. Me. 1992) .............................................................................................................................6
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d. 206 (4th Cir. 2009) ......................................................................10
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)......................................................................................9
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) ................................................................................3
Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) ....5
Other Authorities
U.S. Constitution
Amendment I ....................................................................................................... passim
Consumer Protection Act (CPA), RSA 358-A ................................................................ passim
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Although there are a number of Questions Presented for this Court’s review, this
Brief of Amicus Curiae will only address the following:
1.
Did the Superior Court err when it decided that the constitutions of the United States
and New Hampshire do not protect Fifth Estate’s campaign speech from private-party claims
under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), RSA 358-A, and, therefore, (i) failed to grant
summary judgment, a directed verdict, and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV)
to Fifth Estate on GMR’s CPA claim, and (ii) refused to charge the jury that CPA violations
could only be established by clear and convincing evidence of actual malice and by proof
that the campaign speech caused actual harm?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
Amicus curiae hereby adopts the Statement of the Case and the Statement of Facts
presented in the Brief of Appellants.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There can be little doubt that the expression upon which the Superior Court imposed
liability in this case was political speech entitled to the highest degree of First Amendment
protection. Conveyed in the context of a political campaign preceding a vote on a public
referendum, the speech by Fifth Estate Tower, Inc. (“Fifth Estate Tower”) was intended to
influence the choice voters made in an upcoming election regarding a specific issue. Yet the
rulings of the court below appear not to recognize the protection accorded such political
speech under the First Amendment. Indeed, the jury instructions indicate a view that the
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First Amendment was not implicated in the case at all despite the fact that liability was
premised exclusively on speech. “The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
does not preclude the state from regulating speech or conduct that is at issue in this case.”
Jury Charge Tr. at 16.
While the Superior Court was correct in not permitting the jury to decide the degree
of First Amendment protection, it nonetheless failed in its responsibility to ensure sufficient
protection for the speech at issue. Specifically, the court erred in applying the Consumer
Protection Act (“Act”) to the speech at issue, because the Act lacks the constitutional
safeguards necessary for protecting political speech. Alternatively, the court failed to require
a showing of clear and convincing evidence that the appellants acted with actual malice
before liability could be imposed, thereby providing a safeguard sufficient to comport with
the requirements of the First Amendment. Since the Superior Court made no findings in
regard to actual malice, nor even recognized the relevance of the First Amendment to speech
involving an issue of public concern, amicus curiae urges that this Court reverse the
judgment of the Superior Court.
I.
FIFTH ESTATE TOWER’S STATEMENTS AND POSTCARDS
CONSTITUTE PROTECTED POLITICAL SPEECH.
The expression by Fifth Estate Tower upon which the jury based liability directly
addressed a question placed before area voters. As such, it constituted the very essence of
political speech on a matter of public concern. A regulation restricting political speech
“trenches upon an area in which the importance of First Amendment protections is at its
zenith.” Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (citations omitted). See also McIntyre v.
2
Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (stating that anonymously produced
leaflets distributed “in the heat of a controversial referendum vote only strengthens the
protection afforded to [the] expression”) (emphasis added); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957) (affording the highest First Amendment protection to political expression in
order “to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people”); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940)
(holding that “[t]he freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution
embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public
concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment…” and further noting,
“[f]reedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace
all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society
to cope with the exigencies of their period.”)
As the First Circuit has recognized, political speech inherently involves matters of
public concern:
[M]atters of public concern … are those that can be “fairly considered as
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,”
and matters of private concern … are those that address “matters only of
personal interest.” … A court must determine whether a statement comes
within the public concern hemisphere of this formulation by reference to its
“content, form and context.”
Levinsky’s, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 132 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)). The Levinsky’s court continued: “In order to do so, the relevant
community need not be very large and the relevant concern need not be of paramount
importance or national scope. Rather, ‘it is sufficient that the speech concern matters in
3
which even a relatively small segment of the general public might be interested.’” Id.
(quoting Roe v. City of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 585 (9th Cir. 1997)).
A public referendum on the issue of whether a new cell tower may be constructed has
aesthetic, economic, and environmental implications for the Wolfeboro community, and, as
such, was unambiguously a matter of public concern.
A.
A speaker’s corporate identity does not diminish First Amendment
considerations.
The fact that Fifth Estate Tower is a corporation does not diminish the degree of
protection accorded to its political speech. “The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its
capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether
corporation, association, union, or individual.” First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 777 (1978). In Bellotti, the Court considered the constitutionality of a state statute
forbidding certain corporate expenditures in the context of a public referendum. In
determining that this restriction did not comport with the First Amendment, the Court noted
that speech regarding government affairs “is the type of speech indispensable to
decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a
corporation rather than an individual.” Id. See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (extending political speech protection to privately-owned
corporations and government-regulated monopolies).
These decisions reflect the central role of the First Amendment in protecting the free
flow of information in a public debate. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783 (“[T]he First
Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to
4
prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the
public may draw.”) In light of this principle, even a “commercial advertisement is
constitutionally protected not so much because it pertains to the seller’s business as because
it furthers the societal interest in the ‘free flow of commercial information.’” Id. (citing
Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 764
(1976)).
These precedents make apparent the fact that a corporation’s speech in the context of
a public referendum is political, and as such, should receive the fullest protection of the First
Amendment.
B.
The presence of a commercial interest does not render the First
Amendment inapplicable.
Although the record does not indicate why the Superior Court chose not to
incorporate First Amendment protections into its instructions to the jury, the court’s silence
creates the perception that its reasoning was influenced by Fifth Estate Tower’s commercial
interest in the outcome of the referendum. The ambiguity of the court’s action suggests an
analysis directly at odds with U.S. Supreme Court precedent stating that First Amendment
considerations remain fully in force, regardless of the speaker’s commercial motivations or
other economic intent.
In Fed. Election Com’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., the Supreme Court cautioned
that “an intent-based test would chill core political speech by opening the door to a trial …
on the theory that the speaker actually intended to affect an election.” 551 U.S. 449, 468
(2007); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335 (1988) (“any restriction on speech, the
5
application of which turns on the content of the speech, is a content-based restriction
regardless of the motivation that lies behind it.”) (Brennan, J., concurring); Bolger v. Youngs
Drugs Products Corp. 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983) (stating that an economic motivation would be
“clearly insufficient” to transform non-commercial statements into commercial statements);
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557,
580 (1980) (“Nor should the economic motivation of a speaker qualify his constitutional
protection…”).
Lower federal courts have also recognized the principle that First Amendment
protection for political speech is not diluted by potential economic gain. E.g. Sandy River
Nursing Care Center v. Nat’l Council on Compensation Ins., 798 F. Supp. 810, 815 (D. Me.
1992) (noting that “[i]t is … enshrined in the Free Speech and Petition Clauses of the First
Amendment … that concerted efforts to influence legislation ought to be permitted,
regardless of motive,” and concluding, “It is neither unusual nor illegal for people to seek
action on laws in the hope that they may bring about an advantage to themselves and a
disadvantage to their competitors.”).
Fifth Estate Tower’s speech – seeking only a particular political outcome in a public
referendum – could at most be considered a hybrid form of speech, one in which political and
commercial motivations are intertwined. In Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind, the Supreme Court
stated that speech is fully protected where “the component parts of a single speech are
inextricably intertwined” because “speech [does not retain] its commercial character when it
is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech.” 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988).
6
In Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (per curium), a lawsuit arose after Nike
engaged in a campaign to deny allegations of poor employment practices overseas. Nike’s
campaign prompted a California resident to sue Nike for deceptive business practices. The
Supreme Court’s per curiam majority dismissed the case solely on jurisdictional grounds.
Justice Breyer dissented, however, and engaged with the substance of the First Amendment
question. The majority’s lack of any First Amendment commentary lends force to the
substance of Justice Breyer’s analysis, which is informative in this instance. Justice Breyer
asserted that Nike’s speech could not be considered commercial because it “does not propose
the presentation or sale of a product or any other commercial transaction . . . [and] concerns a
matter that is of significant public interest and active controversy, and it describes factual
matters related to that subject in detail.” Nike, 539 U.S. at 677 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer further characterized the language used by Nike as “not purely commercial in
nature . . . [and] involving a mixture of commercial and noncommercial (public-issueoriented) elements.” Id. at 676 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As in the Nike case, the fact that
Fifth Estate Tower’s speech did not propose a commercial transaction, but related to a matter
of significant public interest forecloses any classification as commercial speech.
Given that the speech at issue here has only tangential commercial relevance and
relates to an important matter of public concern, the Superior Court erred in not assuring
sufficient protection for the speech in the jury instructions. More broadly, the Consumer
Protection Act cannot be applied to political speech of this variety because the Act does not
contain the necessary constitutional safeguards required for political speech.
7
II.
THE APPLICATION OF THE “ACTUAL MALICE” STANDARD
DEVELOPED IN DEFAMATION CASES IS BOTH LOGICALLY
WARRANTED IN THIS CASE AND ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH U.S.
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT.
Government restrictions on political speech must overcome a burden that “is well-
nigh insurmountable.” Meyer, 486 U.S. at 425. Even in legal disputes between private
individuals or entities, it is well-established that a high standard must be met if the action is
based on speech directed against a public official or figure, or concerns a matter of public
concern. If this Court chooses to apply the Consumer Protection Act to the case at hand, then
it should only do so only by including constitutional safeguards similar to those that have
developed in other areas. The defamation context provides a useful analogy, the application
of which is both logically warranted and entirely consistent with U.S. Supreme Court
precedent.
At least since New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964), it has been
clear that “what a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is
likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel.” To guard against the possibility of public
officials employing defamation suits to circumvent First Amendment protections, the Court
imposed a requirement that a defendant must be shown to have acted with “actual malice” –
with knowledge or with reckless disregard of a statement’s falsity – before the underlying
claim is actionable. See id. As the Supreme Court later explained: “This standard
administers an extremely powerful antidote to the inducement to media self-censorship of the
common-law rule of strict liability for libel and slander. And it exacts a correspondingly high
price from the victims of defamatory falsehood. Plainly many deserving plaintiffs, including
8
some intentionally subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount the barrier of the New York
Times test.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). The heightened standard is
necessary to ensure robust protection of speech in the context of defamation lawsuits: “[W]e
have been especially anxious to assure to the freedoms of speech and press that ‘breathing
space’ essential to their fruitful exercise.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342 (citing NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). See also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,
772 (1986) (citing Button, 371 U.S. at 433). Even recognizing that “falsehoods have little
value in and of themselves, they are ‘nevertheless inevitable in free debate,’ … and a rule
that would impose strict liability on a publisher for false factual assertions would have an
undoubted ‘chilling’ effect on speech relating to public figures that does have constitutional
value.” Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at
339).
Although the actual malice standard originally applied only to defamation suits
involving public figures, the Supreme Court recognized its potentially broader application to
such analogous torts as false-light privacy, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
The failure of the court below to invoke a protective standard similar to the actual
malice standard is not only inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s approach to speech that
touches on matters of public concern, but is also inconsistent with the approach of other
federal circuit courts. In Compuware v. Moody’s, Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2007), the
Sixth Circuit determined that the actual malice standard should mitigate a breach of contract
claim brought against a rating agency by a company subjected to an unwelcome financial
9
report. That court determined that the contract between the two companies was so
“intimately tied to speech, expression and publication” that allowing an untempered
judgment for a contractual breach would effectively sanction a “backdoor attempt to recover
damages for the harm allegedly caused by [the rating agency’s] protected expression of its
opinion of the [rated company’s] financial condition.” Id. at 531.
The actual malice standard has served to bar that “backdoor” or at least to make such
an alternative route substantially more difficult – and has thus inhibited unfettered damage
claims arising from the dissemination of material “intimately tied to speech, expression and
publication.” Compuware, 499 F.3d. at 531. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit a decade ago
recognized the appropriateness of analogous reasoning in claims for fraud, breach of duty of
loyalty, and trespass brought by a corporation. Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194
F.3d 505, 511, 522 (4th Cir. 1999).
More recently, the Fourth Circuit held that constitutional limits exist on the type of
speech to which state tort liability may attach, regardless of a plaintiff’s status as private or
public figure. See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d. 206, 218 (4th Cir. 2009). See also Milkovich
v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990); Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50; Deupree v. Iliff, 860
F.2d 300, 304-05 (8th Cir. 1988). In Snyder, the Fourth Circuit reversed a lower court’s
finding of liability for three tort actions brought by the father of a soldier killed in Iraq
against members of a so-called church which protested near the funeral claiming, inter alia,
that the soldier’s death was God’s punishment for America’s tolerance of homosexuality in
the military. Despite finding that neither the father nor his deceased son were public figures,
10
the Fourth Circuit determined that the First Amendment was implicated because the
protestors’ messages were matters of public concern. See Synder, 580 F.3d at 218.
The Superior Court should have required a higher standard to overcome First
Amendment protection, because the Fifth Estate Tower’s speech addressed a matter of public
concern, and because the plaintiff is public figure for the purposes of this litigation. The U.S.
Supreme Court has instructed that public figures are “those who, by reason of the notoriety of
their achievements or the vigor and success with which they seek the public’s attention.”
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342. The public attention need not be broad and all encompassing, for
“commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved
[and] … they invite attention and comment.” Id. at 345. In one instance, the Court found that
a public figure was one who “was deeply involved in the future development of the city …
seeking … favors to permit the construction of housing units of a type not contemplated in
the original city plan.” Greenbelt Coop. Pub. Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 8 (1970). The
Court noted that these qualities placed a person “within even the most restrictive definition of
a ‘public figure.’” Id. at 9. Similarly, the plaintiff/appellee deliberately assumed public
figure status by initiating and playing a central role in a public referendum. Because the
plaintiff/appellee in this case is a public figure for the purposes of this litigation and the issue
in this case is a matter of public concern, invoking the actual malice standard is not only
logical, but also strongly endorsed by federal precedent.
Further, the application of an actual malice standard forecloses the imposition of
liability based on the postcards under the Consumer Protection Act, because they contained
11
only statements of opinion. In order to establish actual malice, it must be proven both that
the postcards contained false information and that Fifth Estate Tower knew or surmised that
they were false. The standard for such proof is high: “The burden of proving ‘actual malice’
requires the plaintiff to demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
realized that his statement was false or that he subjectively entertained serious doubt as to the
truth of his statement.” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S.
485, 511 (1984). Yet, the Superior Court dismissed the claim of defamation based on the
postcards precisely because they contained only statements of opinion. See Order on Motion
for Summary Judgment p. 5 (Appellant’s Appendix p. 414). As such, the Superior Court
should have similarly dismissed the Consumer Protection Act claim based on the postcards
because “a statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain
a provably false factual connotation… receive[s] full constitutional protection.” Milkovich,
497 U.S. at 20.
12
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amicus curiae the Thomas Jefferson Center for the
Protection of Free Expression urges this Honorable Court to reverse the decision of the
Superior Court.
Respectfully submitted,
THE THOMAS JEFFERSON CENTER FOR
THE PROTECTION OF FREE EXPRESSION
By Counsel,
St. Hilaire & St. Hilaire, PLLC.
By:__________________________________________
Daniel St. Hilaire, Esq. (Bar No. 12945)
194 North Main Street
Concord, NH 03301
Telephone: (603) 856-7617
Dated: October 30, 2009
Of Counsel:
Robert M. O’Neil
J. Joshua Wheeler
Eisha Jain
The Thomas Jefferson Center for
the Protection of Free Expression
400 Worrell Drive
Charlottesville, Virginia 22911
Telephone: 434-295-4784
13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned counsel certifies that, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 30, an
original and seven copies of the foregoing were filed with the court. Undersigned counsel
further certifies that, in compliance with Supreme Court Rule 26, a copy of the foregoing has,
this day, been sent to the following counsel by first class U.S. mail:
Christopher T. Hilson
Robert M. Derosier
Donahue, Tucker & Ciandella, PLLC
225 Water Street
Exeter, NH 03833
William Philpot, Jr.
Haughey, Philpot & Laurent, P.A.
816 North Main Street
Laconia, NH 03246-2656
Thomas P. Simon
Thomas E. McCormick
McCormick, Fitzpatrick, Kasper & Burchard, P.C.
40 George Street
Burlington, VT 05401
William L. Chapman
Orr & Reno, P.A.
One Eagle Square
Post Office Box 3550
Concord, NH 03302-0550
Michael Delaney, Attorney General
New Hampshire Department of Justice
Civil Law Bureau
33 Capitol Street
Concord, NH 03301
Roy McCandless
D’Amante, Couser, Steiner, Pellerin, P.A.
9 Triangle Park Drive
Concord, NH 03302
Barbara Keshen
New Hampshire Civil Liberties Union
18 Low Avenue
Concord, NH 03301
Matthew R. Johnson
Joshua M. Wyatt
111 Amherst Street
Manchester, NH 03101
_____________________________________
Daniel St. Hilaire, Esq. (Bar No. 12945)
14