Valence and Party Support:
The Measurement of Mood in Issue Competence
Jane Green
University of Manchester
jane.green@manchester.ac.uk
Will Jennings
University of Manchester
will.jennings@manchester.ac.uk
This paper presents a newly compiled aggregate measure of issue competence for
the Republicans and Democrats based on 2,450 survey items on issue competence
over six decades. Using quarterly time series data between 1980 and 2008 we test
three theoretical propositions about the issue valence of U.S. parties: citizens‟
ratings of party competence on valence issues tend to move in common over time,
consistent with the existence of a prevailing mood in public opinion, controlling for
partisan bias; issue valence is driven by presidential performance when the party is
in power, but by other valence indicators when the party is in opposition; and, the
effect of valence exerts a substantive influence upon electoral support. The paper
therefore reveals that existing performance measures of party choice are useful
indicators of competence, but issue valence provides a valuable contribution to
explaining party choice. The implications are significant for the analysis of
electoral choice in U.S. politics and for our understanding of dynamics of public
opinion and party competition.
Paper prepared for the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties Annual Conference
9 - 11 September 2011, the University of Exeter
1
Presidential and party reputations on policy have long been watch-words for electoral
success. Issue-by-issue policy evaluations are an important component of the narrative
of political campaigns, and scholars highlight the effects of these ratings upon party
and candidate strategies (Budge and Farlie 1983; Budge 1987; 2001; Druckman 2004;
Holian 2004; Jacobs and Shapiro 1994; Petrocik 1996; Petrocik et al 2003; Riker
1993; Simon 2002).
Recent scholarship also points to the significance of competence or handling
upon vote choice for electorates in Canada (Fournier et al. 2003) and Europe (Clarke
et al. 2004; 2009; Green-Pedersen 2007). These studies analyse the electoral effects of
voters‟ perceptions of party competence, trust, delivery or handling ratings according
to the idea, first put forward by Stokes (1963; 1992), that on issues which do not
divide the parties – such as economic growth, management of services, reducing
crime – voters should base their vote choice on which candidate or party will be most
likely to deliver, or handle that issue competently.
There has been little research however, which undertakes analysis of similar
predictors in the United States. Previous studies have highlighted the effects of
presidential issue handling upon vote choice (Miller and Wattenberg 1985; Cover
1986) and the association between a party‟s ratings on its owned issues and its vote
share (Petrocik 1996) but U.S, issue voting is more commonly studied via the lens of
Downsian (1957) spatial voting, whereby issue voting is specified as agreement with a
candidate‟s policy position rather than with its competence (e.g. Aldrich et al. 1989;
Carmines and Stimson 1980; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Kedar 2009; Meguid 2008).
Valence is also described as an inherent candidate attribute (Abney et al. forthcoming;
Hayes 2005) and a factor used to explain party positions (Groseclose, 2001;
Schofield, 2003; Adams et al. 2005; Somer-Topcu 2007). Performance voting, on the
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other hand, is defined according to handling of the economy, in line with Fiorina‟s
(1981) retrospective punishment model, inspiring a vast literature on economic voting
(see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Duch and Stevenson 2008, for reviews).
There is a significant gap in our understanding of how public ratings of party
issue competence vary over time, how voters formulate evaluations on competence,
and whether – and how – party competence ratings exert an electoral cost or benefit in
U.S. elections. This paper makes a contribution to the literature on performance and
valence voting by presenting a new aggregate measure of party valence ratings over
six decades, from 1944 to 2008, and by analysing these data, at a quarterly level,
between 1980 and 2008 over 15 U.S. congressional electoral cycles, to reveal the
dynamic properties of party valence, the way these dynamic evaluations are shaped,
and their impacts upon electoral support. The paper estimates alternative valence
models of the generic congressional ballot, to reveal a distinctive contribution of party
valence to the understanding of U.S. electoral choice, and reveals that party valence is
an important factor in the calculus of U.S. electorates.
The implications of our findings are important for scholars of public opinion,
party competition and electoral behavior. With respect to public opinion, our analyses
reveal that public ratings of parties on policy exhibit common variance, such that
party valence can be conceptualised and analysed as aggregate-level mood in public
opinion. While mood in evaluations of handling of valence issues is shaped by voters‟
preferences towards a party, it is also found to precede shifts in macro-partisanship,
and is shaped by exogenous political events, presidential approval and economic
evaluations. With respect to party competition, our findings suggest that scholars may
turn to general evaluations of valence, rather than issue-specific evaluations on issues,
to understand the competition strategies of political parties. Parties develop general
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reputations and track records for performance, management and competence.
Moreover, our new measure of valence makes possible analysis of the effects of
valence on party positions, on party issue emphasis and on the determinants of party
strategies via the drivers of party valence. Finally, the paper reveals that valence can
help explain the aggregate shifts in vote choice in U.S. electoral cycles, both as a
mediating variable for other performance determinants of the vote and as a direct
explanatory variable on party choice.
Performance and Valence Voting
Parties and candidates should prime voters to cast their votes on the basis of their
most advantageous issues, via weighting of these issues in the electoral calculation
(Budge and Farlie 1983; Budge 1987; Budge et al. 2001; Iyengar and Kinder 1987;
Jacobs and Shapiro 1994; Enelow and Hinich 1981; Vavreck 2009). Parties have
different utilities which vary by party and which vary by policy issue (see Petrocik
1996; Petrocik et al. 1996; Simon 2002; Sigelman and Buell 2004; Damore 2005;
Sides 2006; Belangér and Meguid 2008; Bellucci 2006; Green-Pedersen 2007). The
received wisdom implies, therefore, that voters judge parties and candidates on
different issues in different ways, according to whether those issues and utilities are
positive or negative for the party and the voter.
The characteristics of an advantageous issue may relate to spatial proximity
(Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Kedar 2009; Meguid 2008; Vavreck 2009),
or to competence, trust, delivery and commitment (Budge and Farlie 1983; Budge
1987). The latter are particularly salient when valence issues dominate the agenda
(Stokes 1963; Green and Hobolt 2008; Clarke et al. 2004; 2009). Another facet of
competence relates to „ownership‟ (Petrocik 1996; Petrocik et al. 2003), referring to
associations of parties with issues, generated via long-term commitments and
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reputations. Petrocik (1996) found a strong association between ratings on a party‟s
„owned issues‟ and that party‟s electoral support. Therefore, the weighting of issues to
the vote depends on whether spatial, valence or „owned‟ issues dominate the agenda.
These theories overlap with work on the effects of the economy and retrospective
voting (Beck, 1987; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Erikson 1989; Fiorina 1981; Hibbs
1987; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Powell and Whitten 1993). If a candidate has
a positive track record on the economy and the economy is performing well, an
incentive exists to prime the issue in campaigns (Vavreck 2009), as other issues offer
strategic competitive advantages. Further research has analysed the issue of foreign
policy and its effects on presidential approval (Aldrich et al. 1989), the electoral
consequences of presidential handling of war (Krosnick and Brannon 1993), the
effects of crime levels and economic mismanagement and issue handling upon trust in
government (Chanley et al. 2000; Citrin and Green 1986) and presidential issue
handling and the vote (Miller and Wattenberg 1985; Cover 1986).
Despite these literatures, research on the effects of valence issues and party
competence is remarkably sparse. One possible reason for this is the lack of survey
data available to researchers that provides regular and continuous observations. The
National Election Studies offer little by way of continuous ratings of candidates and
parties on performance handling of issues. Since 1956, the NES has asked just 45
questions on issue valence of political parties across 12 different questions, with some
of those items surveyed on just one occasion and no question asked on more than 14
occasions. Another reason is the expectation that questions on competence reveal little
more than partisan preference, rather than informed and varied ratings of parties on
different policy areas. Furthermore, the U.S. system of government means that party
performance or competence must be decoupled from the performance of presidents.
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Presidential approval offers a readily available performance assessment of the
governing capability in power, alongside economic performance and, where available,
various questions on presidential handling of foreign affairs, the economy, and war.
We contend that citizen‟s competence ratings of political parties make up an
important dynamic of mass opinion, shaped by presidential performance in power, by
events and by other political and economic judgements across the electoral cycle,
representing meaningful shifts in public evaluations of parties on their competence
across the policy agenda.
A Theory of Public Opinion on Valence
Prior to September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush had a positive rating on his
handling of the issue of foreign affairs of 54% (July 2001, Gallup). In a subsequent
poll, in October, that rating had increased to 81% (also Gallup). However, Bush‟s
ratings did not increase on the issue of foreign affairs alone. His ratings also increased
on his handling of social security (41% to 54%), on the economy (54% to 72%), on
the federal budget (46% to 59%), and even on the environment (50% to 54%). This
example serves to illustrate a point: when voters are provided with information about
presidential handling on a salient issue or event, that evaluation, positive or negative,
will extend to ratings across the policy agenda.
Publics lack information about politics and yet still make coherent political
judgements, via the use of heuristics and short-cuts (Popkin 1991; Sniderman et al.
1991; Zaller 1992). Research in social psychology reveals the way citizens form their
opinions about politics via the use of heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman 1982).
Heuristics represent the short-cuts or cues voters use to overcome cognitive burdens
of information processing. Zaller and Feldman (1992, p. 609) note, “…the making of
these judgements requires an aggregation of one‟s feelings across frequently diverse
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concerns”. Heuristics may be particularly useful for evaluating performance.
According to Campbell et al. (1960; also Converse 1964) the vast majority of voters
rely on general judgments of which party will be dependable or capable, and do not
form independent evaluations of candidates on individual policies. Performance on
one issue is like to provide a heuristic to form competence evaluations on others. As
other issues rise in salience, voters are provided with high profile cues to signal the
competence of the government. The economy is another classic example. Economic
shocks may be relatively short-lived, moving issue handling judgments in the shortterm. Other shocks may introduce considerable persistence and long-term memory
into citizens‟ ratings of issue competence and offer voters reliable information about
competence on other issues. The effect of shocks on competence evaluations can
persist indefinitely or otherwise decay over time, with political judgements often
exhibiting at least some long-term persistence (Durr 1993; Box-Steffensmeier and
Smith 1996; 1998; Wlezien 2000; Clarke and Lebo 2003). The implications of these
expectations are that public evaluations on competence should move in common. If a
party, via its president, performs well on a salient policy issue, we would expect
performance judgements to improve on other issues. If a large scale event results in
damage to trust and to performance ratings, damage should extend across the issue
agenda. These expectations are different to the concept of the ownership of issues
(Petrocik 1996; Petrocik et al. 2003), but not in conflict with those ideas. A party‟s
reputation may be higher on some issues and lower on others, but there will still be
common variation in the relative fluctuations across different levels of public ratings
of competence.
Public opinion on valence will be related to movements in partisan preference,
whether endogenous or indicative of running tally evaluations (Fiorina 1981), and to
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other existing indicators of performance; presidential approval and the economy.
Valence will also be shaped by party reputations on issues, and party and candidate
rhetoric and commitment. Public opinion on issue competence can be led through
strategic action of elites, where issue evolution leads to partisan realignment or
change (e.g. Carmines and Stimson 1989). However, variation in public opinion on
valence should be responsive to shocks and changing performance judgements, and
insofar as publics use performance information to make judgements about parties on
competence, these variations in valence should provide additional information about
public evaluations of political elites, with electoral consequences. We suggest that
parties have incentives to perform competently on policy in office, and to nurture and
promote reputations for competence in opposition, because voters evaluate political
parties on competence, and deliver a valence-based verdict at the ballot box.
Valence: Empirical Expectations
In order to operationalise the above theoretical arguments, a number of empirical
expectations can be derived.
The first expectation is that we should observe common variation in issue
competence ratings of U.S. political parties, irrespective of the issue domain in
question. This common movement should be manifested in the loading of issues onto
a single dimension of citizens‟ evaluations on issue competence, indicative of an
underlying factor of public opinion. The time series properties of this latent dimension
can provide substantive interpretation of the nature of persistence in public ratings of
parties on competence. It is argued that the aggregation of individual-level behaviour
can yield long-term persistence in time series if that behaviour is heterogeneous and if
autoregressive processes are present (see Granger 1980; Granger and Joyeaux 1980;
and Box-Steffensmeier and Smith 1996).1 Such an “inertial element” is crucial for the
8
formation of partisan identifications (Fiorina 1981, p. 102) and we would similarly
expect that autoregressive tendencies of individuals‟ ratings of parties on competence,
and their exposure to exogenous political forces, would generate fractional dynamics,
where shocks to parties‟ competence ratings cumulate for extended periods, exhibiting
long-memoried, but not infinite, persistence. In particular, we expect heterogeneity in
the formation of competence evaluations because of individual-level variation in the
strength of partisan attachments, education, political commitment and knowledge (e.g.
Converse 1964; Zaller 1992), all of which would lead shocks for some individuals to
persist for long periods of time, while dissipating for others at a much faster rate. This
inertial element of public evaluations of competence is therefore of substantive
importance. Furthermore, if issue competence variation represents meaningful
information about ratings of parties on competence, variance in issue competence
ratings should not be accounted for by fluctuations in partisanship. If this were the
case, issue competence ratings would simply be endogenous to partisan preference,
and scholars would be correct to be sceptical about these estimates of parties on
issues. The first steps of the empirical analysis in this paper therefore examine the
dynamic properties of issue competence ratings, or valence, and the time series interrelationships between valence and macro-partisanship (see MacKuen et al. 1989).
The second expectation is that valence should be influenced by existing
measures tapping a party‟s performance. Available measures are performance ratings
of a president belonging to a party (presidential approval), mediated by periods when
a party holds the presidency, economic evaluations, events, and party identification,
allowing for party identification to be construed as a dynamic running tally, rather
than social identity (Fiorina 1981; MacKuen et al. 1989; Green et al. 2002). We
expect economic evaluations to influence issue valence judgements, but economic
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evaluations should be influential irrespective of party incumbency. An upturn in the
economy may be as good for the incumbent as it is bad for the opposition, and a
downturn would extend a negative effect on the party in office and a positive effect
for the challenger. 2 Furthermore, we expect significant political or economic events to
have lasting effects upon party valence. Voters recognise policy decisions for which a
party is responsible for, and punish a party accordingly (Duch and Stevenson, 2010).
Major political events should therefore have significant effects on competence,
especially where these denote signals of incompetence, loss of trust, or of strong
political leadership.
The third and final expectation is that valence will have unique explanatory
power in models of generic congressional ballot. If valence is a meaningful construct
of shared underlying dynamics in public evaluations of performance, its behavioural
consequences should be significant. We therefore expect valence to mediate the
effects of presidential approval, of economic evaluations, party identification and
events, but to also account for a unique proportion of variance in vote choice over
consecutive U.S. congressional election cycles.
Data and Measures
Scholars analyzing macro-politics in the US have used measures of party
identification data (see MacKuen et al 1989; Bartels 2000), leader ratings (Erikson
and Wlezien 1994; 1996; Wlezien and Erikson 2004), trust in government (Keele
2007), economic expectations (MacKuen et al. 1992), in addition to other available
measures of macro-economic performance. Using similar approaches, and similar
aggregate-level analysis, we can provide an exploration of valence on policy issues.
The macro-level consequences of the theory of public opinion and valence
give rise to the concept of a mood in competence evaluations. The work of Tversky
10
and Kahneman (1982) on framing suggests that individuals‟ judgements are often
reducible to a single, dominant consideration. If voters‟ ratings of parties move in
tandem, those ratings will also be indicative of an underlying valence dimension of
public opinion. This can be shown by the degree to which issue competence ratings
are reducible to a single dimension of public opinion, or mood (Stimson 1991; 2002;
2004). In the concept of mood, changes in individual attitudes drive trends in macrolevel opinion – whether or not these shifts in public opinion are heterogeneous or
homogeneous (e.g. Converse 1990, p. 382; Erikson et al. 2002, pp. 5, 428-429;
Stimson 2002, p. 268; Enns and Kellstedt 2008, p. 450). If change occurs at random,
those variations are cancelled out through sampling and measurement over time.
Noise, response instability and individual errors are therefore removed through
aggregation (see Page and Shapiro 1992; Erikson et al. 2002). Furthermore, the effect
of short-term shocks or contamination between issues can accumulate and persist in
macro-level processes, where heterogeneous micro-processes mean that disturbances
can persist in the behaviour of some individuals and decay for others (Granger 1980;
Box-Steffensmeier and Smith 1996; Wlezien 2000). Even if the issue competence
evaluations of a small number of individuals are subject to long-term memory, as
shocks cumulate, this produces macro-level persistence. The concept of mood in
valence therefore represents a combination of change and persistence in the
competence evaluations of parties, expressed at a macro-level of aggregation where
persistence indicates the extent to which people do – and do not – discount the past in
their assessments of the political parties.
Using data collated from a large range of opinion polls, and data available
from election surveys, we gathered 2,512 individual survey items on policy
competence, handling, trust or performance of the Republican and/or Democratic
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Parties, spanning a period of six decades. Sufficient data was gathered for the period
between 1980 and 2010 to enable the reliable estimation of Valence at quarterly
intervals, for use in conjunction with quarterly estimates of other aggregate level
variables (e.g. macro-partisanship, presidential approval, economic evaluations),
outlined below, facilitating its analysis, over 15 congressional elections.
Stimson‟s (1991; Stimson et al. 1995) dyad ratios algorithm is used to extract
a global dimension of competence evaluations. Stimson‟s dyad ratios algorithm offers
a solution to the problem of missing data – in circumstances where 85% of all
possible values are missing and where the distribution of data is irregular (Stimson
2004, p. 10), ideally suited to issue competence data which has not been collated
continuously. The dyad ratios algorithm first calculates valence as an average of the
available observations of positive evaluations of a given party‟s competence in
handling an issue (for example, the percentage of respondents rating a party as best to
run government efficiently or the percentage of respondents rating a party as doing
“quite well” or “very well” in handling the economy), at time period t, through
recursive estimation of dyad ratios (the dyad ratio is estimated for each pair of cases
in which there is an observation of competence evaluation at two points in time),
weighted for the degree of common variance of each evaluation with valence itself.3
In order to ensure our measure is reliable as an indicator of valence, we
estimated four preliminary series; one containing all policy issue items irrespective of
topic; one containing all policy issues but removing economic ratings, in case valence
could be simply a proxy for economic evaluations; one containing issues traditionally
associated with strongly partisan positions in U.S. politics (healthcare and social
security reform, immigration, morality and ethics, and environmental issues), and one
series containing typical valence issues (the economy, foreign affairs, crime, security,
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inflation, governing responsibility and education). Although we recognise that there is
a valence component to spatial issues (and most likely a spatial component to valence
issues), we eliminate positional issues because we suspect they are most prone to
partisan bias, and may be very closely associated in many periods, and because we
seek to estimate a measure of issue valence which is distinct and conceptually valid.
These indices were then subjected to scrutiny.
The analysis employs existing aggregate level performance proxies as
covariates; macro-partisanship, presidential approval, economic conditions and
evaluations, and key events specific to each party. The dependent variable in the first
set of multivariate models is the measure of valence, and in the second set of models
is the two-party share of the generic congressional ballot (vote intention).
The measure of macro-partisanship used in analysis is the series generated by
Stimson and colleagues (Mackuen et al. 1989; Erickson et al. 2002), being equal to
the percent Democratic of party identifiers, with the estimated series compiled from
more than 4,000 opinion polls between 1952 and 2009.
The measure of presidential approval was compiled from the data collection
on presidential performance held at the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research,
consisting of 3,261 polls over the period between 1944 and 2010.
The measure of egocentric economic evaluations (expectations of individuals‟
future economic situation) is compiled from historical data series made available by
the Thompson Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers. Its survey asks
respondents “…Now looking ahead--do you think that a year from now you (and your
family living there) will be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the same
as now?" The survey has been running since 1947. The Michigan Index of Consumer
Sentiment (ICS), used in supplementary analyses, is a composite measure of five
13
different items from the survey (which include current personal finances, expected
personal finances, expected business conditions, national unemployment expectations
and current consumption conditions -- „Generally speaking, do you think now is a
good or bad time for people to buy major household items?‟. The Index of Consumer
Sentiment dates to 1952.
We code political event dummies using variables for the 1980 to 1991 period
taken from Erikson et al. (2002, p. 52), in addition to coding other major events that
occurred between 1992 and 2009. These include the federal government shutdown in
December 1995 and January 1996, the abandonment of the Clinton health care plan in
1994, the terror attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 2001 and the start of
intervention in Afghanistan, Hurricane Katrina, and Lehman‟s filing for bankruptcy in
September 2008.
Finally, our measure of vote intention is the generic congressional ballot, the
survey question asked in a number of forms across a wide range of polling houses
about how respondents intend to vote in their district in the upcoming congressional
elections. The traditional Gallup formulation of the generic ballot question asked
respondents “... If the elections for Congress were being held today, which party‟s
candidate would you vote for in your congressional district -- the Democratic Party‟s
candidate or the Republican Party‟s candidate?”. This question dates back to 1942,
and we have 1,997 generic ballot polls from Wlezien and Erikson (2002; Erikson and
Wlezien 2010), supplemented with data from the Gallup „Brain‟ database and trend
data on generic ballot reported at www.pollingreport.com. The generic congressional
ballot is not without issue as a measure of vote choice, since its emphasis on party
labels erodes the significance of incumbent candidates in local districts, in which
responses tend to adhere to partisan evaluations (e.g. McGhee and Baldassare 2004).
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However we know that the generic ballot becomes an increasingly strong predictor of
election outcomes as the election day nears (Erikson and Wlezien 2002; n.d.) and are
therefore confident that the question taps national support for each party at a given
point in time, while it may not fully capture dynamics in the local districts samples.
We examined the robustness of our findings using two additional covariates;
public policy preferences and congressional approval. Our measure of the public‟s
preference for more liberal or more conservative government is Stimson‟s measure of
public policy mood (Stimson 1991; Stimson et al. 1995). Our congressional approval
series is from Durr et al. (1997), extended by Ramirez (2009) and updated through
2008 with data from Gallup, ABC/WaPo, CBS/NYT and NBC/WSJ polls. In total, the
series is composed of 997 survey items.
Results
The application of the dyad ratios algorithm suggests that there is a strong underlying
latent dimension in evaluations of the issue competence of parties in the U.S. For each
item, the algorithm calculates how much variance is shared with the latent dimension
and the strength of its loading onto this dimension. This loading is interpretable as a
factor score. The latent dimension of valence explains 66.8% of all variance in the
observed public ratings of issue competence of the Democratic Party and 50.84% for
the Republicans.4 These figures are substantively high. Stimson‟s (1991) analysis of
left-right mood in policy preference sin the US found a first dimension accounting for
some 27% of the variance, and 14% of variance for the second. A comparison of the
variance explained across the item selection in the measure (with valence issues, with
position issues and without economic issues) suggests that the index is substantively
distinct if composed of valence or position issues, and uninfluenced by the removal of
economic issues, shown in Table 1.
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- Table 1 about here If all issue ratings were functions of partisan bias, there would be almost identical
correspondence in the variance explained. Using the valence index, therefore, the
dyad ratios algorithm provides a value of valence for each party in each time point.
The values are presented in Figure 1 using annual data between 1944 and 2010.
- Figure 1 about here The measure reflects the relative strength/cohesiveness of the parties and their
reputations for governing. For most of the time period between 1945 and 1980, the
Democrats held a relative advantage over the Republicans in their competence rating,
suffering occasional dips such as around 1953, 1967 through 1970 (coinciding with
escalation of the Vietnam War), 1979 through 1981 (towards the end of the Carter
presidency and the troubled 1970s, as Reagan and the Republicans started to gain
ascendance), with ratings of the Republicans occasionally peaking for short periods
(during the mid- to late 1950s under President Eisenhower, in the late 1960s under the
pre-Watergate President Nixon). Then, from the 1980s onwards, the index exhibits the
gradual strengthening of Republican valence. The Democrats gain the ascendancy in
competence ratings again around 1996 after the Republican Party had taken control of
the House in the wave election of 1994, and rise sharply under the presidency of
George W. Bush, before falling precipitously back after taking the presidency in the
aftermath of the economic bailout. In the recent time points, then, the series depict the
decline of Republican competence under George W. Bush, and latter a sharp decline
in Democratic competence under the presidency of Barack Obama.
Further to this, valence can be compared alongside the generic congressional
ballot, using quarterly data for the period between 1980 and 2009, presented in Figure
2. The series exhibit strong correspondence over time for both the Republican and
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Democrat series, indicating that issue valence may have the potential to offer an
important explanatory variable in accounting for vote choice.
- Figure 2 about here Using this estimation of valence, we can explore whether common variation
extends across the spectrum of policy domains which would be indicative of transfer
or generalised competence heuristics. Here issue categories are aggregated
thematically, allowing for sufficient sample sizes, and are estimated as „sub-moods‟
using the dyad ratios algorithm. Table 2 presents the correlations of the available issue
sub-moods with valence for each party.
- Table 2 about here The results show that in all cases, issues from across each policy domain (e.g. foreign
affairs, economy) correlate significantly with valence for both political parties. The
associations are strongly significant for the Democrats, and significant but less
strongly so, on average, for the Republicans, which can account for the slightly lower
proportion of variance explained by valence for the Republican Party. These findings
provide support for our theoretical expectation that variation in competence ratings is
common across issues, indicative of a process of common transfer, or heuristics.
Fractional Integration
It is of substantive importance to establish whether shocks persist in competence
evaluations. If shocks to the reputation of parties due to good or bad performance last
indefinitely, public opinion on valence is an integrated process, and if shocks dissipate
quickly, it is stationary. This determines the degree to which parties are forgiven for
past mistakes and mismanagement. This is also important in methodological terms.
The idea of fractional integration (Granger, 1980) is increasingly relevant to the study
of political behaviour (e.g. Box-Steffensmeier and Smith 1996; 1998; Byers et al.
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1997; 2000; Lebo et al. 2000; Clarke and Lebo 2003), prompting some debate (e.g.
Wlezien 2000; Pickup 2010). Fractional integration suggests that time series can be
„long-memoried‟: where some effects of an initial innovation persist for an extended
duration of time, while others are subject to much faster rates of decay. As was noted
earlier, the aggregation of heterogenous processes at the individual level (where
public opinion for some individuals is highly autoregressive, or persistent) can give
rise to fractional integration at the aggregate level (Granger and Joyeaux 1980; BoxSteffensmeier and Smith 1996). The degree of fractional integration of each series can
be estimated with the Robinson (1995) multivariate semiparametric method, which
calculates the value d for the mood index of valence. The idea of fractional integration
(Granger 1980) relaxes the assumption that the order of integration, d, is an integer,
where the value d is a real number between 0 and 1. Table 3 presents these estimates,
and the estimates for the covariates used in subsequent analysis in the paper.
- Table 3 about here The values reported in Table 3 suggest that our measure of valence is a fractionally
integrated process for both parties, with the d being equal to 0.89 for the Democrats
and 0.76 for the Republicans, with the t-statistic indicating this value is significantly
different from zero. This indicates that shocks to valence are long-memoried, meaning
that party reputations are slow to recover from shocks, and that this is more the case
for valence than for similar disturbances to macro-partisanship or public policy mood,
especially for the Democratic Party. The estimated order of fractional integration of
valence for each party is also more persistent than for the version of the index that
consists of position issues, which more closely mirrors the value of d for macropartisanship. These findings are quite intuitive: party identification and liberalconservative attitudes (via public policy mood, and position) are expected to revert
18
quickly to their long-run equilibrium, whereas valence is expected to be rather more
persistent, carrying forward the value of shocks about competence into the future.
Note that generic congressional ballot exhibits far less persistence in its dynamics as
the effects of shocks to vote choice dissipate much more quickly than for macropartisanship, or valence.
The estimation of the order of fractional integration, d, points to the need for
fractional differencing to transform or „pre-whiten‟ the series prior to exploring their
dynamic interrelationships. This modelling decision enables us to avoid threats to
inference from spurious regressions with near- and fractionally integrated data (see De
Boef and Granato 1999; Lebo et al. 2000), as well as avoiding over-differencing of
series, which can lead to introduction of a moving average parameter.
Valence and Macro-partisanship
We next explore the degree to which it is plausible that valence may be serving as a
proxy for partisanship, and the degree to which common variation in competence
evaluations may be attributable to partisan bias. To explore these possibilities, we use
tests for Granger-causation on the fractionally differenced series. The estimation of
Granger-causation between time series (Granger 1969) tests whether past values of a
variable x improve prediction of another variable y relative to prediction of y from
past values of itself alone (see Freeman 1983 for a review of applications in political
science). The Granger approach is useful for determining whether past values of issue
competence improve prediction of current values of macro-partisanship, controlling
for past values of macro-partisanship, and whether prior past of macro-partisanship
improve prediction of current values of Valence, controlling for prior values of
Valence. This relates to the temporal ordering of variables, even if these move
together over time, to determine whether issue competence tends to lead party
19
identification or whether party identification tends to lead issue competence. As such,
the tests for Granger causation enable us to demonstrate weak exogeneity if one
variable contemporaneously occurs before the other. To test for Granger causation, a
vector autoregression framework is used, with the number of lags selected according
to the Akaike information criterion (AIC). The results for the null hypotheses, that
Valence does not lead macro-partisanship, and macro-partisanship does not lead
Valence, are presented in Table 4.
- Table 4 about here –
The tests for Granger causation between Valence and macro-partisanship are
encouraging. Valence leads macro-partisanship in the model for each party, rather
than vice versa, suggesting that in the temporal ordering of variables, Valence
improves prediction of macro-partisanship, but macro-partisanship does not improve
prediction of Valence. This does not suggest that Valence is not influenced by macropartisanship (we expect there to be a theoretical and empirical relationship) but that
the stronger temporal relationship is from Valence to macro-partisanship, controlling
for prior values of the dependent variable, in the aggregate data that is available to us.
Furthermore, using tests for Granger causation, we can scrutinise our selection
of issues. We removed position issues from the measure of valence because we
anticipated greater partisan bias, or endogeneity, for issues on which the parties – and
their voters – are strongly aligned. We would expect therefore macro-partisanship to
lead position issues but to have less statistical prediction upon valence issues. Support
for this expectation is provided in Table 5, which reports the tests for Granger
causation between macro-partisanship and the index comprised of position issues.
- Table 5 about here -
20
The results reveal Granger causation from macro-partisanship to the position issues
index for Democrats, as well as Granger causation from positional issues to macropartisanship for Republican partisanship.
One further means of assessing the effects of partisanship on valence is within
a multivariate framework. This also allows us to test theoretical expectations about
valence, namely that valence should be explained by presidential performance,
especially for the party of the incumbent, by economic evaluations, by macropartisanship and also by salient political and/or economic events. We then, finally,
estimate the effects of valence on generic ballot controlling for the determinants of
valence, to establish whether valence simply mediates existing performance indicators
or provides additional explanatory power.
A performance model of valence
To explore the dynamic interrelationships between variables, we use a multivariate
ARFIMA framework (e.g. Box-Steffensmier and Smith 1998; Box-Steffensmier et al.
2009), where the model of valence for each party takes the form:
dVALENCEt = α0 + β1∆dMACRO-PARTISANSHIPt + β2∆dPERSONAL ECONOMIC
EXPECTATIONSt + β3∆dPERSONAL ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS t*PRESIDENTt +
β4∆dPRESIDENTIAL APPROVALt + β5∆dPRESIDENTIAL APPROVALt*PRESIDENTt +
β6PRESIDENTt + φ7EVENTSt + μt
This is where valence is modelled via a „performance model‟ comprising party
identification, economic evaluations, presidential approval and events, and where we
expect presidential approval to operate when the party has a president in office. The
model also includes an intercept (α0) and the disturbance (μt), where μt = ρμt + θεt-1 +
εt in which the noise structure is modelled as a function of an autoregressive term (ρ)
and the moving average (θ) of the error term (~ i.i.d. N(0, ζ2)).5
21
The data are transformed („pre-whitened‟) by fractional differencing each
series to make it stationary using the d‟s estimated with Robinson‟s (1995)
semiparametric method reported in Table 3. We then explored whether an
ARFIMA(p, d, q) framework was an appropriate specification to control for the
presence of autocorrelation or moving averages in the data, testing for up to three
autoregressive and three moving average parameters. We find that an ARFIMA(2, d,
0) specification best accounts for valence for the Democratic Party and that a (0, d, 0)
model for the Republican Party. The results for the ARFIMA (p, d, q) model of
valence are reported in Table 6.
- Table 6 about here The results indicate that the effect of macro-partisanship (the percent Democratic of
party identifiers) on valence is significant in the expected direction for each of the
parties. These effects are not insubstantial in size: a one point increase in partisan
affiliation is associated with a 0.7 point increase in valence for the Republican Party
and a 0.4 point increase for the Democratic Party. These findings suggest that the link
between valence and partisanship is of a greater order for the Republicans.
In terms of the link between presidential approval and party valence, through
which presidential rates might be transferred onto evaluations of party performance,
there is a negative and significant effect for the Democratic Party. This is perhaps not
surprising given that for twenty years of the twenty-nine period there was a
Republican President, leading positive approvals of Republican presidents to erode
competence evaluations of the Democratic Party. This is confirmed upon inspection
of the interaction of presidential approval with party control of the presidency for the
Democrats, with the effect becoming positive and significant. The results do not
22
indicate, however, a link between presidential approval for Republican valence,
whether in general or for incumbents in particular.
Turning to the effect of economic evaluations, the model for the Republican
Party suggests that the effect of egocentric economic evaluations is positive and
significant, but also that the effect of economic evaluations on valence is reduced
when the party holds the presidency, or greater when the party is out of power, with
the effect of the interaction being negative and significant. The interaction of
economic evaluations with party control is similarly negative and significant for the
Democratic Party. This is an interesting finding, and suggests that whereas valence is
moved by presidential approval for the Democrats when a party has a president in
office, voters turn to other performance indicators, in this case economic evaluations,
to inform their evaluations of valence in opposition. Economic evaluations affect
mood (Durr 1993), macro-partisanship (Mackuen et al. 1989; Erikson et al. 2002),
presidential approval (Mackuen et al. 1992), congressional approval (Durr etal. 1997),
and trust in government (Chanley et al. 2000), and so this mechanism may reflect the
transmission of a range of influences towards the challenger party.
We find that there is evidence that the effects of major political events can
have significant and lasting consequences for valence (tested in the model using a step
intervention). Specifically, the model indicates that the federal government shutdown
of 1996 had a positive and near significant effect on Democratic valence, while the
bailout passed in 2008 was linked to a negative and significant effect on party
valence. For the Republicans, the Persian Gulf War of 1991 was associated with a
drop in party valence, while the effect of the events of September 11 and the start of
combat operations in Afghanistan were associated with a positive and near-significant
effect for Republican valence. Thus, there is evidence that events can have direct and
23
immediate effects on party valence. However, key to understanding the nature of
valence is whether valence is simply the product of events and other performance
indicators, as a mediating variable in the vote choice, or whether it adds explanation
to the electoral preferences of voters. This is the subject of the final analysis.
A valence model of generic ballot
Following from the specification of the performance model of valence, our model of
vote choice for each party takes the form:
dVOTEt = α0 + β1∆dMACRO-PARTISANSHIPt + β2∆dPERSONAL ECONOMIC
EXPECTATIONSt + β3∆dPERSONAL ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS t*PRESIDENTt +
β4∆dPRESIDENTIAL APPROVALt + β5∆dPRESIDENTIAL APPROVALt*PRESIDENTt +
β6dVALENCEt + β7dVALENCEt*PRESIDENTt + β8PRESIDENTt + φ9EVENTS + εt
The model includes an intercept (α0 ) and stochastic error term (ε t), (~N(0, ζ2). Once
again, the data are pre-whitened by fractional differencing by d and we explored
whether an ARIMA(p, d, q) framework was an appropriate specification, testing for
up to three autoregressive and three moving average parameters. Since we did not find
evidence of presence of these parameters, we conduct ordinary least squares
regression of the transformed series. The results for the OLS regression model of vote
are reported in Table 7. In each party model (A and B) we report the performance
baseline model from Table 6 in Model 1, and then introduce valence in Model 2 and
interact this with party control of the presidency in Model 3, before introducing a
selection of event dummies (Model 4).
- Table 7 about here The results indicate first of all that the effect of macro-partisanship (the percent
Democratic of party identifiers) is significant in the expected direction in both of the
base models, being negative and significant for the Republican Party and positive and
24
significant for the Democratic Party. When valence is introduced to the model,
however, the effect of macro-partisanship ceases to be significant at the 95 confidence
level for the Republicans. Interestingly, the effect of partisan identification on vote
remains significant in each of the Democratic models. This is consistent with our
findings in the model of valence in Table 6, where the effect of partisanship on
valence was stronger for the Republican Party, suggesting that some effects of
partisan identification are subsumed in the measure of valence for the Republicans.
However, if valence is acting as a mediating variable for partisanship in the
Republican model, it is exerting an additive effect in the Democrat model, whereby
both valence and macro-partisanship are significant in models 2, 3 and 4. The increase
in model fit between models 1 and 2 (from 0.29 to 0.31 in the Republican model, and
from 0.39 to 0.41 in the Democrat model) suggests that valence is providing
additional explanatory power, and not simply functioning as a substitute for macropartisanship.
The effect of valence on vote is positive and significant for both the
Republicans and Democrats. Furthermore, the size of the coefficient is substantial,
with a one point increase in valence leading to a 0.5 percent increase for the
Republicans and a 0.3 per cent increase for the Democrats in their two-party share of
the vote in our final model (Model 4). When the interaction of valence with party
control of the presidency is introduced, however, the effect of the interaction is found
to be negative and significant for the Republican Party in our final model (*and
approaching significance in Model 3), indicating that the effect of party valence on
party vote is lower when the party holds the presidency. This is reminiscent of the
earlier finding that the effects of economic evaluations were greater for the challenger
party where presidential approval is stronger for the incumbent. Here, in the
25
Republican vote model, it again appears that voters turn to valence judgements in
their performance assessment on the vote for the party in opposition where they can
no longer turn to presidential approval to translate a performance assessment on their
vote choice. The absence of effects for the Democratic Party might be attributed to the
relatively shorter duration of Democratic presidential control, 1993-2000 and 2009.
The pattern for the effect of economic evaluations in the base model is similar
to that for valence, with the effect being positive and significant for both the
Republican and Democratic vote share with the interaction being negative and
significant, indicating that the effect of economic evaluations on party vote is lower
when the party holds the presidency. Once valence and its interaction with
presidential control are introduced into the model (Model 3), however, the interaction
of economic evaluations with presidential control ceases to have a negative and
significant effect on vote.
With the exception of the effect of the 1990 federal government shutdown on
Democratic vote, events are not significant in our model of vote, suggesting their
effects are transmitted through other measures, such as valence. In both cases, the
introduction of event variables increases the coefficient for valence, supporting the
interpretation that events have persistent effects on voters‟ evaluations of parties on
valence, and in turn this has a significant effect at the ballot box.
We checked our results for robustness, introducing variables (congressional
approval and public policy mood) and by alternating personal economic expectations
with national economic expectations and consumer sentiment. In all cases the
substantive conclusions remained identical, and the statistical power of valence on
generic ballot was greater. Therefore the results presented in Table 7 represent the
most conservative estimate of valence across potential model specification.
26
Conclusions
The study of U.S. public opinion and of vote choice has focused, until now, on the
effects of issue voting according to spatial models, and the effects of performance
according to the dynamic effects of the economy, of presidential approval, political
events and partisanship. This paper argues that voters observe party competence on
policy issues, and use information about performance to form their ratings of parties
on issues. Rather than issue ratings representing static party characteristics, this paper
revealed that the rise and fall of evaluations of parties on issues represents a mood in
public opinion. Aggregate level valence can be measured over time for each party, it
is moved by economic evaluations, presidential approval, by partisan identification
and by events, but it is more than a mediating factor for these existing predictors of
the vote. Our analyses showed that valence moves party electoral support over U.S.
election cycles, and can therefore provide an issue-based performance measure to
estimate congressional vote.
The implications of the paper are threefold. Firstly, the implication of mood in
public ratings of party competence on issues represents a different way of thinking
about party issue strengths and weaknesses. If a political party is always rated
positively on its owned issues, and negatively on an alternate party‟s owned issues
(Petrocik 1996; Petrocik et al. 2003), there should be little variation in issue
competence ratings, and little shared variation across issue domains. We do not have
sufficient data to disaggregate our analysis by individual issue, but our analyses
suggest that when a party is more highly rated on one issue, it will be more highly
rated on others. When it suffers a lost of trust or performance, its ratings will be lower
across the issue agenda. This does not mean that a party still cannot „own‟ certain
issues (those ratings will be higher in level) but it means a party‟s strategic advantages
27
will be driven by its overall competence rating; many issues will be positive, or many
issues will be negative. This finding may help inform studies of party issue emphasis
in campaigns (Norporth and Buchanan 1992; Simon 2002; Sigelman and Buell 2004;
Sides 2006), and offers a new mechanism and data source with which to test these
party-oriented theories. As Franklin and Jackson (1983: 969-70) observe, “contrary to
the view that party fortunes are largely dependent upon slow demographic changes or
dramatic crises, the continual actions, decisions, and performance of party leaders
affect partisan strength and provide the basis for competitive party strategies”.
Secondly, the analysis of mood in valence offers a measure of public opinion
and a theoretical contribution about the transfer of competence information issue to
issue. Our analysis is confined to the aggregate level, and represents the macro-level
implications of a micro-level process whereby voters transfer useful competence or
performance information to their evaluations on issues, and transfer information from
one issue to another, even accounting for partisan bias. In an ideal world we would
extend our analysis to consider the micro-foundations of mood through disaggregating
these processes of issue transfer (e.g. Enns and Kellestedt 2008). To the best of our
knowledge, ours is the first study to examine the implications of performance failures
via events, and of heuristics of economic evaluations and presidents upon generalised
evaluations of competence, and on the evaluations of parties on issues. The insights
can help explain how existing indicators of performance exert persistence into public
ratings of parties on policy. Further research is made possible on the effects of valence
on long-term cycles of government and the consequences of performance „events‟.
Thirdly, our analyses suggest that valence acts as a mediating variable for the
effects of the economy, presidential approval, partisanship and events, but not only as
a mediating variable. Accounting for public evaluations of party competence on issues
28
can enhance our explanation of the U.S. generic congressional ballot significantly.
This is an empirically important finding, and also a normatively important point.
Insofar as parties, and presidents, provide responsible government, these findings
suggest that parties face real electoral incentives to manage and enhance their
perceptions for competence. Perhaps this is why so many party scholars have focused
on issue handling, performance and competence for so long (Budge and Farlie 1983;
Budge 1987; 2001; Petrocik 1996; Petrocik et al 2003; Riker 1993), and why scholars
of electoral behaviour might introduce valence into future analysis of vote choice.
Valence offers many other new theoretical and empirical opportunities. Our
measure of valence might be incorporated into analyses of party positions, of public
policy agendas, of the salience of issues and the public mood. If voters‟ evaluations of
political parties represent a mood in public opinion, then the consequences of this
construct for understanding political behavior are promising.
“… The idea goes by different names - the national mood, the climate in
the country, changes in public opinion, or broad social movements. But
common to all of these labels is the notion that a rather large number of
people out in the country are thinking along certain common lines, that
this national mood changes from one time to another in discernible
ways” (Kingdon 1984: 153).
29
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FIGURE 1. Valence in Historical Perspective, 1945 - 2010
Democratic Party
50
45
40
35
30
25
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
1990
2000
2010
Republican Party
50
45
40
35
30
25
1950
1960
1970
1980
34
FIGURE 2. Valence and the Generic Ballot, 1980 - 2008
A. DEMOCRATIC PARTY
70
60
50
40
30
20
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
Competence (Valence)
2000
2004
2008
Generic Ballot
B. REPUBLICAN PARTY
70
60
50
40
30
20
1980
1984
1988
1992
Competence (Valence)
1996
2000
2004
2008
Generic Ballot
35
TABLE 1. Valence Percent of Variance Explained
Pct.
Explained
Number
of Items
Number
of Series
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Democratic Party
61.1
2476
263
40.20
4.62
Republican Party
48.03
2478
263
34.31
3.66
Democratic Party
66.88
1918
187
38.32
4.88
Republican Party
50.84
1920
187
36.04
3.86
Democratic Party
52.30
558
76
44.93
3.88
Republican Party
58.31
558
76
29.86
3.24
Democratic Party
58.37
1884
204
40.21
4.54
Republican Party
45.70
1886
204
34.23
3.73
Valence (All)
Valence (Valence)
Valence (Positional)
Valence (No Economic Issues)
N=126, Start=1980Q1, End =2011Q2
36
TABLE 2. Correlations of Valence and Sub-Moods
Valence
Democratic
Party
Republican
Party
N
Economy
0.90***
0.86***
120
Foreign
0.88***
0.61***
120
Security
0.79***
0.33***
112
Education
0.76***
0.29**
120
General
0.95***
0.92***
120
Other
0.52***
0.09
120
†<0.1 *p≤0.05, **p≤0.01, ***p≤0.001
Start =1980Q1, End = 2009Q4
37
TABLE 3. Estimates of Fractional Differencing Parameter d
Robinson‟s d
d
Std Err
t-ratio
d=0
Valence: Democratic Party
0.85
0.08
10.86***
Valence: Republican Party
0.76
0.07
8.46***
Macro-Partisanship
0.74
0.08
9.74***
Public Policy Mood
0.71
0.10
7.46***
Presidential Approval
0.76
0.09
8.44***
Congressional Approval
0.75
0.08
9.74***
Democratic Party
0.56
0.07
7.69***
Republican Party
0.56
0.07
7.69***
Consumer Sentiment (ICS)
0.93
0.08
11.23***
Personal Economic Expectations (ICS)
0.54
0.09
6.07***
National Economic Expectations (ICS)
0.70
0.08
8.38***
Position: Democratic Party
0.78
0.11
7.20***
Position: Republican Party
0.68
0.09
7.64***
Generic Ballot
Economic Evaluations
†<0.01 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
N = 120, Start = 1980Q1, End = 2009Q4
38
TABLE 4. Granger Causation Tests between Valence and Macro-partisanship
Republicans
Democrats
χ2 test statistic
7.362*
3.181†
p-value
0.025
0.075
χ2 test statistic
3.367
0.825
p-value
0.186
0.36
AIC
6.348
6.321
Durbin-Watson d-statistic
1.97
2.19
Lag, selected according to AIC criteria
2
1
N
106
107
Valence Granger-causes macro-partisanship
Macro-partisanship Granger-causes Valence
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 (variables are pre-whitened through fractional differencing)
Start = 1983Q1, End = 2009Q4. Observations for the period 1980Q1 to 1982Q4 are lost due to
fractional differencing of the variables.
39
TABLE 5. Granger Causation Tests between Position Issues and Macro-partisanship
Republican
Party
Democratic
Party
χ2 test statistic
7.078*
0.791
p-value
0.029
0.374
χ2 test statistic
0.798
3.1178†
p-value
0.671
0.077
AIC
6.256
6.360
Durbin-Watson d-statistic
1.995
2.141
2
1
106
107
Position Issues Granger-causes macro-partisanship
Macro-partisanship Granger-causes Position Issues
Lag, selected according to AIC criteria
N
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 (variables are pre-whitened through fractional differencing)
Start = 1983Q1, End = 2009Q4
40
TABLE 6. An ARFIMA (p,d,q) model of valence
∆dValencet
Democratic
Party
Republican
Party
∆dMacro-Partisanshipt
0.438**
(0.165)
-0.713***
(0.169)
∆dPersonal Economic Expectationst
0.043
(0.029)
0.084*
(0.037)
∆dPersonal Economic Expectationst*Presidentt
-0.109**
(0.035)
-0.067*
(0.028)
∆dPresidential Approvalt
-0.145***
(0.024)
-0.061
(0.046)
∆dPresidential Approvalt*Presidentt
0.279***
(0.076)
0.203
(0.057)
Presidentt
-0.620*
(0.266)
-0.794
(0.604)
Event 1990 Q4 Budget & Congressional Fight
0.297
(0.405)
-
-
-1.360*
(0.614)
0.439†
(0.274)
-
Event 2001 Q4 September 11 / Afghanistan
-
1.277†
(0.739)
Event 2003 Q1 Iraq War
-
-0.664
(0.756)
Event 2005 Q4 Hurricane Katrina
-
-0.445
(0.690)
-1.919**
(0.620)
-
-0.478
(0.430)
1.825*
(0.826)
Sigma
1.225***
(0.088)
1.343***
(0.116)
AR(1)
-0.354***
(0.085)
-
AR(2)
-0.264**
(0.091)
-
2.013
1.755
Log Likelihood
-175.242
-185.074
ARIMA (p,d,q)
(2,d,0)
(0,d,0)
Event 1991 Q1 Gulf War
Event 1996 Q1 Federal Government shutdown
Event 2008 Q4 Bailout
Constant
Durbin–Watson d-statistic
Standard Error of Estimate (SEE)
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 † p ≤ 0.1.
N = 108; Start = 1983Q1, End = 2009Q4
41
TABLE 7. A model of the vote (generic ballot, two-party share)
A. REPUBLICAN PARTY
∆dGeneric Ballott
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
-0.490*
(0.196)
-0.307
(0.211)
-0.260
(0.212)
-0.325
(0.208)
∆dPersonal Economic Expectationst
0.176***
(0.035)
0.146***
(0.038)
0.110*
(0.045)
-0.009
(0.052)
∆dPersonal Economic Expectationst*Republican Presidentt
-0.104***
(0.031)
-0.085**
(0.032)
-0.027
(0.052)
0.041
(0.052)
∆dPresidential Approvalt
-0.095†
(0.057)
-0.079
(0.056)
-0.066
(0.057)
-0.035
(0.055)
∆dPresidential Approvalt*Republican Presidentt
0.215**
(0.067)
0.162*
(0.071)
0.160*
(0.070)
0.138*
(0.068)
Presidentt
0.402
(0.369)
0.383
(0.363)
0.545
(0.378)
0.618
(0.546)
∆dValencet
-
0.244*
(0.115)
0.418*
(0.167)
0.515**
(0.163)
∆dValencet*Republican Presidentt
-
-
-0.216
(0.150)
-0.434**
(0.155)
Event 1991 Q1 Gulf War
-
-
-
-0.912
(0.584)
Event 2001 Q4 September 11 / Afghanistan
-
-
-
-0.360
(0.879)
Event 2003 Q1 Iraq War
-
-
-
-0.866
(0.883)
Event 2005 Q4 Hurricane Katrina
-
-
-
-0.195
(0.651)
1.406***
(0.413)
1.374***
(0.406)
1.433***
(0.406)
3.350***
(0.826)
Durbin–Watson d-statistic
1.833
1.921
1.933
2.137
R-squared
0.289
0.312
0.320
0.398
Root MSE
1.707
1.678
1.669
1.570
Breusch-Godfrey (1)
0.618
0.068
0.034
0.886
∆dMacro-Partisanshipt
Constant
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 † p ≤ 0.1.
N = 108; Start = 1983Q1, End = 2009Q4
42
DEMOCRATIC PARTY
∆dGeneric Ballott
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
∆dMacro-Partisanshipt
0.758***
(0.202)
0.671***
(0.203)
0.694***
(0.205)
0.629**
(0.198)
∆dPersonal Economic Expectationst
0.127***
(0.030)
0.122***
(0.030)
0.114***
(0.031)
0.048
(0.036)
∆dPersonal Economic Expectationst*Democratic Presidentt
-0.079*
(0.039)
-0.057
(0.040)
-0.034
(0.048)
-0.014
(0.046)
∆dPresidential Approvalt
-0.090**
(0.033)
-0.053
(0.037)
-0.045
(0.038)
-0.042
(0.038)
0.168†
(0.085)
0.109
(0.088)
0.140
(0.095)
0.146
(0.091)
-1.214***
(0.360)
-1.078***
(0.360)
-1.010**
(0.368)
-0.254
(0.421)
∆dValencet
-
0.240*
(0.113)
0.255*
(0.114)
0.328*
(0.117)
∆dValencet*Democratic Presidentt
-
-
-0.114
(0.126)
-0.191
(0.127)
Event 1990 Q4 Budget & Congressional Fight
-
-
-
-1.480**
(0.553)
Event 1996 Q1 Federal Government shutdown
-
-
-
-0.141
(0.428)
Event 2008 Q4 Bailout
-
-
-
0.173
(0.833)
1.647***
(0.330)
1.622***
(0.324)
1.650***
(0.326)
3.091***
(0.533)
Durbin–Watson d-statistic
2.091
2.040
2.019
2.052
R-squared
0.388
0.408
0.407
0.453
Root MSE
1.641
1.613
1.615
1.551
Breusch-Godfrey (1)
0.262
0.059
0.017
0.091
∆dPresidential Approvalt*Democratic Presidentt
Democratic Presidentt
Constant
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 † p ≤ 0.1.
N = 108; Start = 1983Q1, End = 2009Q4
43
Table A1. Questions on Competence
Questions
Valence/
Positional
Valence
Obs
%
48
1.91
CRIME
Crime, law and order
ECONOMY
Valence
418
16.64
EDUCATION
Economy; savings and loans; country prosperous; making America competitive globally; economic conditions; economic growth;
encouraging new business start-ups, trade, small businesses,
Education; education system.
Valence
97
3.86
EMPLOYMENT
Unemployment; economy and jobs; creating jobs, strikes and labor relations
Valence
51
2.03
FOREIGN
Valence
325
12.94
Valence
438
17.44
GOVERNING
Foreign affairs; keeping America out of war; peace; dealing with Russia; China; Eastern Europe; wise about foreign affairs; world affairs;
making America more respected in the world; foreign trade; increasing respect for U.S.; problems in Middle East; war in Iraq, war in
Afghanistan; war in Persian Gulf; Vietnam; situation in Iraq; making wise decisions in Iraq
Running the government efficiently; reforming Washington government; domestic affairs; well organized; manage federal government;
understanding the needs of people like you; standing up to lobbyists/special interests; right decisions for the country; dealing with main
problems over next years; major problems; running the state;
Ethics; corruption in government; Washington; dealing with special interests
Valence
60
2.39
GREEN
Environment; pollution and environment; protecting the environment; global warming
Positional
62
2.47
HEALTH CARE
Healthcare; medicare reform; healthcare system
Positional
184
7.32
IMMIGRATION
Immigration; illegal immigration
Positional
76
3.03
INFLATION
Inflation; cost of living; gas and oil prices; keeping wages high
Valence
37
1.47
MORALITY
Drugs; abortion; improving morality; personal responsibility; moral values/ standards; protecting traditional values; guns; same sex
marriage; stem cell research.
Racial problems; race relations; equal rights.
Positional
116
4.62
Positional
9
0.36
Terrorism, homeland security, national defense; terrorism, military threats, protecting the country; terrorism; military and defense issues;
protecting the country
Social security; retirement benefits; seniors prescriptions; poverty and homelessness; problem of homelessness; welfare reform.
Valence
174
6.93
Positional
111
4.42
Valence
113
4.50
TAX
Reducing federal spending; balancing the budget; reducing the deficit; government spending; federal spending and deficit; cutting
government expenses.
Holding taxes down; dealing with taxes; taxes
Valence
137
5.45
OTHER
Energy situation; farming; domestic issues; the middle class.
Valence
56
2.23
GENERAL
RIGHTS
SECURITY
SOCIAL SECURITY
SPENDING
Total
2,512
100.00
44
Sample questions:
Q. Which political party, the (Democrats) or the (Republicans), do you trust to do a better job handling ... the U.S. campaign against terrorism?
Q. Who do you trust to do a better job of handling the economy: the Democrats or the Republicans?
Q. Please tell me if you think the Democratic Party or the Republican Party could do a better job in each of the following areas. Which party could do a better
job of making wise decisions about what to do in Iraq?
Q. Please tell me if you think the Democratic Party or the Republican Party could do a better job in each of the following areas. Which party could do a better
job of reforming the U.S. health care system?
Q. When it comes to … Ensuring a strong national defense ... which party do you think would do a better job--the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, or
both about the same? If you think that neither would do a good job, please just say so.
Q. When it comes to … Dealing with the economy ... which party do you think would do a better job--the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, or both
about the same? If you think that neither would do a good job, please just say so.
Q. Please tell me whether you think each of the following applies, or does not apply to the Democratic Party today. Is able to manage the federal government
effectively
Q. Please tell me whether you think each of the following applies, or does not apply to the Democratic Party today. Has a clear plan for solving the country's
problems
45
Table A2. Number of competence poll questions per year
Year
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1951
1952
1953
1954
1956
1957
1958
1959
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1977
1978
1979
Total
1
4
5
1
3
9
30
13
17
9
3
8
14
1
3
5
23
12
12
9
22
7
9
8
22
14
20
5
15
12
8
16
2
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Total
9
5
24
9
20
14
13
18
21
20
53
69
85
52
148
40
59
42
97
78
13
40
114
53
59
63
226
139
155
146
184
59
Grand 2,512
Total
46
Table A3. Number of competence poll questions per polling house
Polling House
Freq.
Percent
355
14.13
AP-GfK
66
2.63
AP/Ipsos
43
1.71
CBS/NYT
110
4.38
CNN/ORC
35
1.39
CNN/USA Today/Gallup
10
0.40
733
29.18
Ipsos/McClatchy
26
1.04
LA Times
60
2.39
5
0.20
495
19.71
42
1.67
Pew Research
270
10.75
Rasmussen
210
8.36
Reuters/Ipsos
39
1.55
USA Today/Gallup
13
0.52
2,512
100.00
ABC/WPo
Gallup
LAT/Bloomberg
NBC/WSJ
NES
Total
47
Endnotes
1
Box-Steffensmeier and Smith (1996) show that if a population consists of individuals whose current
partisan affiliation (xit) can be modelled as a function of their past values (xit-1) and other systematic,
exogenous factors such as presidential performance (zt), represented in the form xit = αixit-1 + δzt +
εit, fractional integration can arise due to conditions where 0 ≤ αi < 1 (autoregressive processes in
heterogeneous behaviour) or where 0 ≤ α < 1 and δ ≠ 0 (autoregressive processes in homogenous
behaviour with partisan affiliation is also influenced by current political forces).
2
Note that these expectations are with respect to economic evaluations. Some objective economic
indictors may be more closely associated with incumbent competence, than for the challenger party.
3
Expressed in the form:
n
Vt 
t
 u
i 1
2
i

j 1
xij
xib
 Mb
n
where I = 1, n is all available issues on which the public rates a particular party positively on their
competence; where j = 1, t is all available dyadic comparisons for competence evaluations on an issue
2
i; b is the base period for the recursive metric; Mb is the value of the metric for period b; and ui is an
estimated weight for the common variance of competence evaluations, xi , and Valence mood (which is
the squared correlation for each issue with the latent dimension, providing an estimate of indicator
validity). The index is then smoothed with an exponential algorithm, yt  αxt  ( 1  α)xt-1 , to
dampen the volatility of random errors from sampling fluctuations. This calculates Valence (yt) as a
weighted moving average of past (xt-1) and future values (xt) of the raw series.
4
For the purposes of this analysis, we do not extract a second dimension of mood in valence because
we do not have an a priori theoretical expectation of what the substantive meaning of that dimension
might be (if, indeed, common variation of items does in fact load onto a second dimension).
5
The ARFIMA framework models the noise disturbance according to the general form: yt = Χt β + ρ1
(yt-1 - Χt-1β) + ρ2 (yt-2 - Χt-2β) + … + ρp (yt-p - Χt-pβ) + θ1εt-1 + θ2εt-2 + … + θqεt-q + εt
where ρp is the p-order autocorrelation parameter, θq is the q-order moving average parameter, εt ~
i.i.d. N(0, ζ2) meaning that εt is a white-noise disturbance.
48