2014 Criminal Law Seminar
Friday, May 2
Case Law Update
12:15 p.m. - 1:15 p.m.
Presented by
Hon. Mary Tabor
Iowa Court of Appeals
Iowa Judicial Branch Building
1111 East Court Avenue
Des Moines, Iowa 50319
Criminal Law Seminar
Case Law Update
April 2013 through March 2014
I.
Constitutional Law
A. Fourth Amendment/Article I Section 8
1.
Investigatory stops
a. No reasonable suspicion from anonymous tip
State v. Kooima, 833 N.W.2d 202 (Iowa 2013)
A four-member majority held an anonymous tip warning of a drunk driver does
not meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment unless it relays to the police (1) a
personal observation of erratic driving,
(2) other facts to establish the driver is intoxicated,
“[W]e stress this court does not
or (3) details not available to the general public as
condone drunk driving.”
–Justice Wiggins
to the suspect’s future actions. This case overruled
State v. Christoffersen, 756 N.W.2d 230 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2008) to the extent that case allowed a “bare assertion of an anonymous tipster
reporting drunk driving” to provide reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle.
A three-member dissent believed the tip provided a sufficient basis for the stop under
State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 2001), which distinguished Florida v. J.L.,
529 U.S. 266 (2000) because (1) the informant
revealed the basis for his knowledge—he was
“[T]his case is functionally similar to
observing a crime in progress, open to public view;
the erratic driving cases, which the
(2) the serious hazard of drunk driving called for a
majority agrees were correctly
decided.”
relaxed threshold of reliability; and (3) a traffic
--Justice Mansfield, dissenting
stop was less intrusive than a pat-down.
The State has filed petition for writ of certiorari in US Supreme Court. Filings were
distributed for conference on January 10, 2014.
Note:
Case pending in US Supreme Court: Naverett v. California (12-9490)
Issue: Does the Fourth Amendment require an officer who received information
regarding drunken or reckless driving to independently corroborate the behavior
before stopping the vehicle?
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b. No probable cause that license plate was obscured
State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288 (Iowa 2013)
Police did not have probable cause to believe motorist was violating Iowa Code
section 321.37(3), which prohibits placing a frame around a license plate that obstructs
the view of the plate. Mistakes of law cannot provide probable cause to justify a traffic
stop. And the court found “no objectively reasonable fact” to support the officer’s
contention that his view of the license plates was obstructed.
c. No reasonable suspicion that temporary plate was invalid
State v. Hollie, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa Ct. App. 2013)
The Court of Appeals held that counsel was ineffective for not filing a timely
motion to suppress evidence discovered during traffic stop. After Hollie was pulled
over, he asked the officer the reason for the stop. The officer replied, “Because you don’t
have a license plate.” Hollie asked, “Because I have temp tags?” The officer responded,
“Yeah. People alter those all the time so we pull them over just to make sure.” Iowa
Code section 321.25 allows a motorist to operate with registration plates for 45 days
after delivery from the dealer if a card with the words “registration applied for” is
attached to the rear of the vehicle. Without reasonable suspicion that Hollie’s card was
in violation of the statute, the stop was unwarranted.
2.
Exigency exception to warrant requirement
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (April 17, 2013)
Five members of the Court ruled “in drunk-driving investigations, the natural
dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case
sufficient to justify conducting a blood test
“In those drunk-driving investigations
without a warrant.” Instead, the Court will
where police officers can reasonably
look at the totality of the circumstances to
obtain a warrant before a blood sample
determine whether the facts of the case merit
can be drawn without significantly
an exception to the warrant requirement,
undermining the efficacy of the search,
the Fourth Amendment mandates that
though “metabolization of alcohol in the
they do so.” –Justice Sotomayor
bloodstream and ensuing loss of evidence are
among the factors” to be considered.
3.
Consent search
Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014)
Consent by one resident of a jointly occupied residence is enough to justify a
warrantless search. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) recognized a narrow
exception, holding “a physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a
police search [of his home] is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow
occupant.” But the objecting occupant must be physically present to refuse admittance.
An occupant who is absent due to a lawful arrest stands in the same position as an
occupant absent for any other reason.
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4.
Parolee searches
State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149 (Iowa 2013)
As a condition of her parole, Kern signed a standard agreement which included
this language: “I will submit my person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal
effects to search at any time, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or
reasonable cause by any parole officer or law enforcement officer.” The district court
found Kern gave “advance consent to search her property without a warrant or without
reasonable cause.”
Five members of the Iowa Supreme Court
decided
no exception existed to the warrant
Under the Supreme Court’s Fourth
requirement under Article I, Section 8 of the Iowa
Amendment jurisprudence, parolees
have little or no reasonable
Constitution to justify the search of her home and
expectation of privacy . . . Yet, we
reversed her conviction for the possession of
have held that the Iowa Constitution
marijuana. The majority reiterated its holding
projects a different view that vests
from State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785 (Iowa
parolees with the expectation of
2013) that a consent-to-search provision in the
privacy enjoyed by persons not
convicted of crimes.
parole agreement did not establish consent to
--Chief Justice Cady
search.
The majority also rejected arguments that the search was justified under several
other warrant exceptions: special needs, exigent circumstances, community caretaking,
or a general balancing of the governmental interests served by the search against the
privacy interest of the parolee.
Two justices (Mansfield and Waterman) would have affirmed the denial of the
motion to suppress on the same basis as the
The majority’s discussion of
dissent in Baldon. The dissent also criticized the
reasonable suspicion is also a puzzler
majority’s analysis of the special-needs and
for me.
reasonable suspicion exceptions, saying the
--Justice Mansfield
decision inserts more uncertainty into state search
and seizure law.
B.
Fifth Amendment
1.
No express invocation of right to silence
Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013)
During a voluntary interview with a police officer regarding a murder, petitioner
answered many questions but declined to answer a specific accusatory question; the
prosecution argued at trial that petitioner’s failure to answer suggested his guilt. The
Court held the self-incrimination clause did not bar the prosecution from using
petitioner’s silence against him. A three-justice plurality reasoned that, as a general
matter, a person who wishes to rely on the privilege against self-incrimination must
expressly invoke it; and neither of the exceptions to that general rule applied here.
Justices (Scalia and Thomas) concurred in the judgment based on their view that Griffin
v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), was wrongly decided and that prosecutors and
judges are entitled to comment on defendants’ exercise of their Fifth Amendment
privilege.
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2.
Rebuttal evidence from court-ordered mental evaluation
Kansas v. Cheever, 134 S. Ct. 596 (2013).
When a defendant presents evidence through a psychological expert who has
examined him, the prosecution is permitted under the Fifth Amendment to challenge
that evidence with evidence from a court-ordered mental evaluation. To deny the
prosecution that right would undermine the adversarial process, because the jury should
hear both sides of any discussion of the defendant’s mental state at the time of the
alleged crime.
3.
Self incrimination at sentencing hearing
State v. Washington, 832 N.W.2d 650 (Iowa 2013)
At the hearing on his plea and sentence, the defendant declined—on advice of
counsel—to answer the district court’s question whether he would test positive if he
provided a urine sample. The district court deferred judgment, but imposed 250 hours
of community service. Five members of the Court concluded the sentencing court
improperly penalized the defendant for invoking his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.
Two dissenting justices found the record did not support retaliatory sentencing,
and would have held the invocation was an “uncertain factor” in the sentence.
C.
Sixth Amendment
1.
Ineffective assistance of counsel
Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014) (per curiam)
Under the standard for effective assistance in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
688 (1984), counsel’s representation must not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness, measured against the practice and expectations of the legal community.
Under that standard, it was unreasonable for a criminal defense attorney in a capital
case to fail to seek additional funds to hire an expert to counter the prosecution’s
evidence on firearms and tool marks. The attorney’s failure was based on the mistaken
belief the available funding was capped at $1,000. The court emphasized it was not
finding counsel ineffective because the expert he hired was not qualified enough,
because the selection of expert witnesses is a “paradigmatic example” of the strategic
choices virtually unchallengeable under Strickland. The inexcusable mistake of law
here was the attorney’s failure to research the resources that state law made available to
him, causing him to employ an expert that counsel considered inadequate.
2.
Waiver of the right to counsel
State v. Neiderbach, 837 N.W.2d 180 (Iowa 2013)
The 20-year-old defendant validly waived his right to an attorney before making
statements concerning shaking his infant in a non-custodial interview with the police.
Applying a totality of the circumstances test, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to an attorney. His father, Jon Neiderbach, who was an attorney
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himself, acquiesced in the police interview without telling defendant he had the right to
remain silent or wait for another attorney. The Court also found that the defendant’s
statements were made voluntarily. The detective specifically told him, “It’s up to you
whether you speak with us or not. It’s your decision.” The detective also told the
defendant he could have “any attorney in the world except for Jon Neiderbach.”
D.
Eighth Amendment/Cruel and Unusual Sentences
1.
Juvenile homicide offenses
a.
Life without parole
State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 2013)
Jeffrey Ragland was 17 years old in 1986 when he and two friends attacked
another group of boys in a grocery store parking lot in Council Bluffs. Ragland
instigated the fight, but did not swing the tire iron that resulted in the death of Timothy
Sieff. He turned down plea offers, was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced
to life without parole. In State v. Ragland, 812
N.W.2d 654 (Iowa 2012), the Court remanded
Even with the commutation in 2012
for a resentencing hearing after Miller v.
by the Governor, Ragland has been
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) which held that
deprived of the constitutional
mandate that youths be sentenced
mandatory imprisonment without parole for
pursuant to the Miller factors
juveniles violated the 8th Amendment
--Chief Justice Cady
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
Subsequently, Governor Branstad commuted the sentences of Ragland and similarly
situated juveniles serving terms of LWOP for first-degree murder to a mandatory term
of 60 years. In this case, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the district court’s ruling that
the governor’s commutation did not remove the cases from the mandates of Miller.
Finding 60 years was the “functional equivalent” of life without parole, and therefore,
unconstitutional. Ragland is now serving a life term with eligibility for parole after 25
years.
b.
Lengthy term of years with mandatory minimum
State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013)
Two months shy of his 17th birthday, Denem Null broke into apartment and
killed the resident with a handgun. Null received consecutive sentences of 50 years for
second-degree murder and 25 years for firstBecause Miller and our opinion offer
degree robbery with a 70% mandatory
guidance regarding the sentencing
minimum for a total of 52.5 years without the
proceeding, the district court on
possibility of parole. Five justices ruled that
remand should reopen the record to
while technically not a life sentence, the length
allow the parties to make additional
of Null’s prison term triggered the protections
evidentiary presentation.
--Justice Appel
set forth in Miller. The majority remanded the
case for an individualized sentencing hearing on
parole eligibility. The majority directed the district court to recognize (1) children are
constitutionally different from adults as far as their lack of maturity, underdeveloped
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sense of responsibility, vulnerability to peer pressure and less fixed nature of their
character; (2) children are more capable of change; and (3) a lengthy prison sentence is
appropriate only in rare cases.
The dissenters did not believe Null’s sentence violated Miller and concluded the
district court appropriately exercised its discretion to impose the consecutive sentences.
The dissent opined that despite providing “pages of material,” the majority’s reasoning
was “cursory.”
2.
Juvenile non-homicide offenses
a.
Life without parole
State v. Hoeck, 843 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 2014)
In 1994 Anthony Hoeck was sentenced to life without parole for first-degree
kidnapping and to 95 years on his other counts. In 2011 he filed a motion to correct an
illegal sentence under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 18 (2010), which categorically
prohibited life without parole sentences for juveniles who committed non-homicide
offenses. In Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697, 702 (Iowa 2010), the Iowa Supreme
Court reacted to Graham and determined it was appropriate to sever an invalid portion
of a sentence without disturbing the whole sentence. The district court granted Hoeck’s
motion and, without having Hoeck present for a hearing, corrected his sentence to life
with immediate parole eligibility. The Supreme Court “conditionally affirmed” the
resentencing decision, finding it complied with the federal constitution, but giving the
defendant ninety days from procedendo to argue the illegality of his sentence under the
Iowa Constitution.
Three dissenting justices (Mansfield, Waterman and Zager) objected to the
conditional nature of the affirmance.
b.
Mandatory minimum/consecutive terms
State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 2013)
Seventeen-year-old Desirae Pearson committed armed robberies at two different
homes on Thanksgiving night. She received two consecutive terms of 25 years—which
amounted to a total mandatory minimum term of 25 years without the possibility of
parole. A majority of the court held that her sentence “effective deprived [her]” of “any
chance of leading a normal adult life.” The Court vacated the sentence and remanded
for application of the Miller standards.
E.
Due process clause – Iowa Constitution
1.
Facial challenge to Iowa Code section 622.10(4)
State v. Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 2013)
The defendant sought to obtain the mental health records of girlfriend, who he
fatally shot twice in the head after she made an obscene gesture to him. The trial court
refused his request. On appeal, the defendant claimed his counsel was ineffective for
not challenging a new statute—Iowa Code section 622.10(4)(Supp. 2011)—as a violation
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of the due process clause of the Iowa Constitution. That statute superseded the protocol
for obtaining the mental health records of a witness or victim set out in State v. Cashen,
789 N.W.2d 400 (Iowa 2010). The Court held section 622.10(4) was constitutional on
its face, rejecting challenges to (1) the threshold requirement that defendant show a
reasonable probability the records would likely contain exculpatory evidence, (2) the incamera review process, and (3) the requirement the defendant show the information
sought would not be available from any other source.
2.
Remand for in-camera review
State v. Neiderbach, 837 N.W.2d 180 (Iowa 2013)
The defendant filed a motion to compel production of the mental health records
of his girlfriend, who was a co-defendant and witness against him in the child
endangerment trial involving their infant son. The Court upheld the constitutionality of
section 622.10(4), for the same reasons noted in Thompson. But the Court decided the
trial court should have conducted an in-camera review of the co-defendant’s mental
health records under the exception to the statutory confidentiality privilege. The
defendant demonstrated in good faith a reasonable probability that those records would
contain exculpatory evidence. The co-defendant’s credibility was a central issue in the
case. She behaved strangely in jail, by stating she should be in “a psych ward,” baring
her breasts, and falsely saying her son was dead while asking, without emotion, about
burial costs.
II.
Evidentiary Issues
A.
Hearsay
State v. Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 2013)
The defendant claims the district court erroneously excluded evidence supporting
his defense related to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) when it declined to admit
letters he mailed home while serving in the military which described his war experience.
The Court held the letters were inadmissible hearsay. Because the defendant did not
show the letters were written while he was perceiving an event or immediately
thereafter, he failed to lay a proper foundation for their admission as present sense
impressions under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803.
B.
Video exhibit/ Expert testimony from medical journal
State v. Neiderbach, 837 N.W.2d 180 (Iowa 2013)
The defendant sought to exclude a five-minute video showing his son eighteen
months after he sustained life-altering injuries. The video showed the child having his
tracheostomy tube cleaned and suffering several seizures. The defendant argued it was
irrelevant under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.401 and more prejudicial than probative under
Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403. The Court disagreed, finding it was relevant to the childvictim’s serious injury and depicted the ongoing care he needed. The Court concluded
the video’s impact on the jury resulted from the nature of the child’s condition, which
was fairly depicted.
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The defendant also challenged expert testimony discussing a medical journal case
study of brain injuries in which caregivers confessed to shaking infants. The Court
concluded the district court erred in overruling the hearsay objection to this evidence
because the expert did not testify that the facts in the study were “of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts” in her field, as required under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.703. Nor
did the State claim the expert’s testimony regarding the study was admissible under the
learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(18). But the
court found no reversible error because the hearsay testimony was brief and there was
ample evidence, properly admitted, from which the jury could conclude impact was not
required to inflict brain injuries.
III.
Criminal Procedure
A.
Trial information
1.
Amendment at close of evidence
State v. Brothern, 832 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 2013)
The defendant was convicted of domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury
enhanced, and domestic abuse assault by use or display of a weapon. At the close of
evidence, the district court granted the State’s motion to amend to add habitual offender
enhancements. The defendant entered guilty pleas to enhancements then filed motions
for a new trial and in arrest of judgment prior to sentencing. The Court held that
amending the information during trial to add an enhancement can prejudice the
“substantial rights of the defendant”—if the defendant had no prior notice of the State’s
plan to amend and would have pled guilty had he or she known of that plan before trial.
2.
Multiplicitous charging of lesser included offenses
State v. Neiderbach, 837 N.W.2d 180 (Iowa 2013)
The trial information violated Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.6(1) by
charging lesser included offenses (here five counts of child endangerment) along with
the greater offense of multiple acts of child endangerment in violation of Iowa Code
section 726.6A. The Court held the district court erred in not dismissing counts two
through six of the trial information as lesser included offenses. Only the major offense
under section 726.6A should have been charged. But finding the primary risk of
prejudice arising from a multiplicitous indictment was multiple sentences for a single
offense, the Court found no prejudice because the district court merged the lesser
offenses into count one and sentenced him only on the greater offense.
B.
Juvenile court jurisdiction
State v. Duncan, 841 N.W.2d 604 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013)
Jason Duncan faced 41 counts of sexual abuse in the second degree for acts he
alleged committed when he was between the ages of 12 and 15. Duncan is now in his
twenties. The district court determined he was ineligible for waiver to juvenile court.
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The Iowa Court of Appeals held Duncan could not be tried in criminal court for
offenses allegedly committed when he was younger than fourteen. The Court also
concluded Duncan was eligible for waiver to the juvenile court on the remaining
counts of the trial information. The district court was directed to exercise its
discretion under section 803.5(5) to transfer jurisdiction of those counts if “the court
determines that there is probable cause to believe that [Duncan] committed an
offense while still a juvenile, and waiver to the criminal court would be inappropriate
under the criteria set forth in section 232.45(6), paragraph ‘c’, and section 232.45,
subsection 8, if [Duncan] were still a child.”
C.
Inconsistent verdicts
State v. Merrett, 842 N.W.2d 266 (Iowa 2014)
A jury found the defendant guilty of intimidation with a dangerous weapon with
intent based on his involvement in a shooting. At the same time, the jury answered “no”
to a special interrogatory that asked whether the defendant had possessed a firearm. If
the jury had answered “yes” to the interrogatory, the defendant would have been subject
to a five-year minimum sentence under Iowa Code section 902.7 (2011). The district
court viewed the verdicts as inconsistent and proposed that the matter be resubmitted
to the jury. However, the defendant and State requested the court to accept the verdicts
as rendered rather than run the risk of the jury changing its answer to the special
interrogatory upon further inquiry. The defendant then appealed, claiming the district
court erred in accepting inconsistent verdicts.
The Court found the general verdict and the special interrogatory were not
inconsistent. A jury that had reasonable doubt as to whether Merrett personally
discharged the firearm could have found him guilty of Count V on the theory that, at a
minimum; he had aided and abetted his passenger in discharging the firearm. At the
same time, the jury would have answered the special interrogatory in the negative,
reasoning that the aiding-and-abetting theory of liability only applied to the overall
crime, not to the enhancement.
D.
Plea hearings
State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46 (Iowa 2013)
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b) requires the district court to derive a
factual basis for a guilty plea on the record at a plea hearing. But Finney was not
entitled to relief because he was not claiming his plea was involuntary under the due
process clause. He was claiming the plea bargain was invalid because of a lack of
accuracy on the factual basis issue. For this sort of claim, the appellate court may
examine the entire record before the district court to decide if a factual basis exists.
Here, the minutes of testimony supported the factual basis for defendant’s plea to
attempted murder.
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E.
Unit of prosecution
1.
Willful injury—guilty pleas
State v. Velez, 829 N.W.2d 572 (Iowa 2013)
The State charged Valentin Valez with robbery in the first degree and willful
injury causing serious injury in connection with a single incident involving a single
victim. Velez entered pleas of guilty to two counts of willful injury causing serious
injury. The minutes of evidence stated that Velez struck the victim twenty to forty times
with a metal pole over a five to ten minute period. The victim sustained multiple
injuries, including a broken right forearm, a broken left forearm, broken bones in his
hand, and an injury to his leg. The question on appeal was whether there was a
sufficient factual basis for guilty pleas to two separate willful injury charges under Iowa
Code section 708.4. The Court explained that the unit of prosecution for a particular
crime depended on the wording of the statute and focused on the section 708.4
reference to “an act.” The Court ultimately determined Velez committed at least two
separate acts using either the “completed-acts test” or the” break-in-the-action test”
promulgated by courts in other jurisdictions. The minutes included witness
descriptions of a break in time between a series of blows and the victim’s multiple
injuries supported multiple completed acts.
2.
Intimidation with a dangerous weapon—verdicts
State v. Ross, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2014) (2014 WL 1128309)
A jury convicted Aki Malik Ross of voluntary manslaughter under Iowa Code
section 707.4 and five (of seven marshaled) counts of intimidation with a dangerous
weapon with intent under Iowa Code 708.6. The question on appeal was whether
substantial evidence supported the verdicts on the five separate counts of intimidation.
Expanding on the unit of prosecution
discussion in Velez, the Court adopted a six-factor
Determining the unit of
prosecution is another way of saying,
test to determine if conduct constitutes one
what act did the general assembly
continuous act or a series of separate and distinct
criminalize?
acts, the factors are (1) the time interval occurring
--Justice Wiggins
between the successive actions of the defendant;
(2) the location of the actions; (3) the identity of the victims; (4) the existence of an
intervening act; (5) the similarity of the defendant’s actions; and (6) the defendant’s
intent at the time of his actions.
Applying that test to the facts, the Court upheld two of the five charges of
intimidation. The Court also explained the element of “reasonable apprehension of
serious injury” did not require proof that identified, individual victims at the scene
experienced fear, rather the crime involved discharging a firearm into an assembly of
people which would objectively cause apprehension.
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3.
Intimidation with a dangerous weapon—guilty pleas
State v. Gines, ___ N.W.2d ___ (2014) (2014 WL 1128316)
Tommy Gines entered pleas of guilty to three counts of intimidation with a
dangerous weapon and one count of felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced
to consecutive terms totaling thirty-five years. On appeal he contested the factual basis
for the separate intimidation counts. The Court reiterated the factors from Ross, and
found the defendant’s admission to firing three shots did not establish three separate
and distinct acts. The case was remanded to see if it was possible for the State to
establish a factual basis for the multiple counts.
4.
Robbery—verdicts
State v. Copenhaver, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2014) (2014 WL 1128320)
Randy Copenhaver entered a bank and approached two separate tellers,
demanding each teller give him money from their cash drawers. The State charged him
with two separate robberies and the jury convicted him on both counts. On appeal, the
Court used the same reasoning articulated in Ross, and decided the unit of prosecution
for robbery under Iowa Code section 711.1 requires the defendant to have the intent to
commit a theft, coupled with any of the following—commits an assault upon another,
threatens another with or purposely puts another in fear of immediate serious injury, or
threatens to commit immediately any forcible felony. The Court decided the record
supported the commission of two acts of robbery. “Each teller had possession of a bank
drawer. Thus, each teller had possession of the property of the bank. When Copenhaver
approached each teller, he intended to take possession or control of the bank's property
in the possession of each teller.”
IV.
Specific Offenses
A.
Drug offenses: conspiracy and possession
State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149 (Iowa 2013)
Parolee Kern lived in the home of her boyfriend, Sean Grant. Grant had an
extensive marijuana growing operation in the home. The court found a rational jury
could have concluded the two occupants of the home had a tacit agreement to promote
the conspiracy to manufacture a controlled
substance. Kern “literally lived with the
Conspiracy and possession are
manufacturing process” and provided Grant with
independent concepts.
cover for his illegal enterprise.
--Chief Justice Cady
On the other hand, the court decided the
State did not prove Kern had dominion and control over the drugs. “[T]here was no
evidence that Kern was more than an agreeable bystander to a vast operation she
permitted to take place.”
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B.
Escape
State v. Miller, 841 N.W.2d 583 (Iowa 2014).
Overruling State v. Beeson, 569 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 1997), the Court now holds the
crime of absence of custody under Iowa Code section 719.4(3) qualifies as a lesser
included offense of escape under section 719.4(1).
C.
Sexual exploitation by a school employee
State v. Romer, 832 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 2013)
For purposes of Iowa Code section 709.15(3), criminalizing sexual exploitation by
a school employee, the Court found a contemporaneous teacher student relationship is
not required. The Court also held that orchestrating and photographing sexual conduct
between minors constituted sexual conduct as defined by section 709.15(3). Moreover,
because the events at issue fell within a common scheme or pattern, the charges were
appropriate to be joined.
D.
Voluntary Manslaughter
State v. Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 2013)
A jury convicted Christopher Thompson of second-degree murder. On appeal, he
argued that he was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction on voluntary
manslaughter because the record included evidence of serious provocation by the
victim, who was his girlfriend. The Court decided evidence of the victim slapping the
defendant and “flipping him off” was not sufficient to excite such passion in a
reasonable person.
V.
Sentencing
A.
Credit for time served
State v. Calvin, 839 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 2013)
The Court decided defendants are entitled to credit for time spent at the Iowa
Residential Treatment Center, as well as credit for time spent in jail as a result of any
drug court program violations.
B.
Restitution
1.
Civil set-offs
State v. Driscoll, 839 N.W.2d 188 (Iowa 2013).
The defendant was the driver in a single-vehicle accident resulting in the deaths
of two people. He was charged with two counts of homicide by vehicle. While the
criminal case was pending, he entered civil agreements with the estates agreeing to pay
$130,000 and $165,000 in exchange for a release from all claims resulting from the
accident. He entered guilty pleas to the criminal charges and was ordered to pay
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$150,000 in restitution to each of the victim’s estates. On appeal, the Court held that
payments by defendant to the estates of victims could be set off against restitution.
2.
State as “victim”
State v. Hagen, 840 N.W.2d 140 (Iowa 2013)
When a defendant engages in fraud by failing to file tax returns with intent to
evade tax, as required for imposition of a civil fraud tax penalty as part of a restitution
order; the state is a “victim,” for purposes of restitution under Iowa Code section
910.1(5). The status of the state as a party to the prosecution of defendant did not
prevent the state from being a “victim” for purposes of restitution. Civil tax penalties
sought by the state for inclusion in the restitution order constitute “pecuniary damages”
suffered by the state as a result of the conduct for which defendant was convicted. Thus,
the restitution order was required to include prejudgment interest and postjudgment
interest at the statutory rate of interest on unpaid taxes.
3.
Fees
State v. Robinson, 841 N.W.2d 615 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013)
A $10 domestic violence fee authorized by Iowa Code section 910.2(1), must be
supported by the record, as to what organization is being paid, if that organization is
known to be a “local anticrime organization,” and if that organization provided
assistance in the particular case.
C.
Sex Offender Registry
State v. Iowa Dist. Ct. ex rel. Story County, 843 N.W.2d 76 (Iowa 2014)
In 2002, 18-year-old David Buchwald was convicted of a sex offense in adult
court, and upon his release from prison in 2004 was required to register as a sex
offender for ten years—under the then existing registration statute. In 2009, the
legislature passed a sweeping amendment to the registration requirements, including
the new ability to petition for modification. See Iowa Code § 692A.128. In 2011,
Buchwald petitioned for modification of his requirement to register. The Court
interpreted the word “adjudication” in the statutory amendment, and decided it referred
to both adult and juvenile offenders. Accordingly, the court found Buchwald was
eligible for modification of his registration requirement.
VI.
Post-Conviction Issues
A.
Parole
State v. Anderson, 836 N.W.2d 669 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013).
A defendant serving a ten-year “special sentence” under supervision “as if on
parole” under Iowa Code section 903B.2 is not required to be released on parole during
that sentence.
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B.
Sexually violent predator commitment
In re Detention of Geltz, 840 N.W.2d 273 (Iowa 2013).
Applying the current statutory language the Iowa Code section 229A specifically
does not state that a juvenile adjudication can substitute for a predicated conviction as
required to commit someone as a sexually violent predator (SVP). Because other Code
sections do include such language the court determined a juvenile adjudication does not
constitute a conviction under section 229A.2(11).
C.
Wrongful imprisonment
State v. Desimone, 839 N.W.2d 660 (Iowa 2013)
Desimone was cleared of a sexual abuse conviction and brought a wrongful
imprisonment claim. The Court held Desimone was eligible to bring a wrongful
imprisonment claim when he was acquitted on retrial following an order vacating his
conviction. The court also found the district court erred in not considering the prior
criminal case testimony even though the State did not show the witnesses were no
longer available. Finally the court found there was substantial evidence to support the
district court's finding of innocence on the existing record.
D.
Federal Habeas Corpus
Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10 (2013)
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that, when a state prisoner
asks a federal court to set aside a sentence due to ineffective assistance of counsel, the
AEDPA requires the Court of Appeals to apply a “doubly-deferential” standard in which
both the state court and the defense attorney are given the benefit of the doubt. Because
the state court’s factual determination is assumed to be correct, the state prisoner has
the burden to disprove that determination with clear and convincing evidence. In this
case, the Court held that there was no convincing evidence that the new counsel’s advice
did not stem from the defendant’s continued protestations of innocence. In the absence
of such evidence, the new counsel’s advice was reasonable and the defendant could not
prove that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013)
By a 5-4 vote, the Court held that a claim of actual innocence, if proved, can
excuse a habeas petitioner’s failure to meet AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations for
filing a federal habeas petition. A prisoner can meet this “actual-innocence gateway”
only by showing “that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would
have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” The Court further held that a
habeas in presenting new evidence bears on the determination whether the petitioner
has made the petitioner does not have to prove diligence to invoke the exception, though
“[u]nexplained delay requisite showing [of innocence].”
Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088 (2013)
Under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d), a federal habeas court must deferentially review a
claim that the state court “adjudicated on the merits.” The Court held by an 8-1 vote
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that “when the state court addresses some of the claims raised by a defendant but not a
claim that is later raised in a federal habeas proceeding,” the “federal habeas court must
presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits—but that presumption can
in limited circumstances be rebutted.” An example of when the presumption might be
rebutted is where the state court rejects a state claim but does not separately address a
federal claim and the federal standard is more protective than the state standard. The
Court found that the presumption was not rebutted in this case, where the California
Court of Appeal rejected a claim by relying on a state court decision that discussed
federal decisions that addressed the federal constitutional issue at length.
VII.
Federal criminal statutes
Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121 (2013)
By a 6-3 vote, the Court held that an error is “plain” for purposes of review under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) even where the plainness of the error becomes
evident only during appellate review, after the lower court made the error. The Court
had previously applied that rule in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997), in
situations when “the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at
the time of appeal.” The Court here extended that approach to when the law was
unsettled at the time the lower court committed the error, but became clear during
appellate review. In this case the district court increased petitioner’s sentence based on
factors that are plainly impermissible under Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382
(2011), which was issued while petitioner’s case was on appeal. Under today’s decision,
that error was "plain" for purposes of Rule 52(b) review.
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013)
The federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) increases the length of sentence
for felons who have three or more prior convictions for a “violent felony,” 18 U.S .C.
§ 924(e), which is defined to include “burglary.” Courts apply a “categorical approach”
to determine whether a past conviction qualifies as burglary under ACCA by comparing
the elements of the prior conviction “with the elements of the generic crime-i.e., the
offense as commonly understood.” When a prior conviction is for violating a divisible
statute (a statute that sets out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative),
courts employ a “modified categorical approach” in which they may look at a limited set
of documents (such as the indictment and jury instructions) to determine whether the
defendant was convicted of a generic burglary offense. By an 8-1 vote, the Court held
“that sentencing courts may not apply the modified categorical approach when [as here]
the crime of which the defendant was convicted has a single, indivisible set of elements.”
Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720 (2013)
The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, makes it a crime to, among other things, affect
commerce by engaging in “extortion,” which is defined as “the obtaining of property
from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful” conduct. The Court held that
“attempting to compel a person,” through blackmail, “to recommend that his employer
approve an investment” does not constitute “the obtaining of property from another”
and therefore is not extortion under the Act.
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Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881(2014)
Where use of the drug distributed by the defendant is not an independently
sufficient cause of the victim’s death or serious bodily injury, a defendant cannot be
liable for penalty enhancement under § 841(b)(1)(C) unless such use is a but-for cause of
the death or injury.
United States v. Castleman, No.12-1371, 572 U.S.__ (2014)
The defendant’s state law conviction of intentionally or knowingly causing bodily
injury” to the mother of his child qualified as a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence” under the federal statute forbidding the possession of firearms (18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(9)). The Court held the “physical force” requirement in section 922(g)(9) was
satisfied by a common-law battery conviction, namely offensive touching.
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